Stated another way, John Deere Financial asserts that § 1325(a)(5)'s options are mutually exclusive and that the plan must provide for the same treatment for all of the collateral securing its loan contracts which contain cross-collateralization clauses. See Williams v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc. (In re Williams), 168 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 1999). Conversely, the Debtors contend that § 1325(a)(5) should be interpreted to create nonexclusive alternatives for treatment of a claim secured by multiple pieces of collateral.

Commercial Corp. v. Rash , 520 U.S. 953, 956–57, 117 S.Ct. 1879, 138 L.Ed.2d 148 (1997). The Fifth Circuit previously analyzed how a debtor may employ § 1325(a)(5)'s options in In re Williams , 168 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 1999), which involved a single loan secured by multiple pieces of collateral. Id. at 846.

We held that the debtor's plan could not be approved because "[t]he plain language of [ § 1325(a)(5) ] does not give the debtor the right to adopt a combination of the options offered in (B) and (C)." 168 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 1999).Id. at 846-47.

We also agree that a list of three options, separated by "or," creates a type of exclusivity in that it does not permit the selection of a fourth non-enumerated option. See, e.g., Williams v. Tower Loan of Miss., Inc. (In re Williams), 168 F.3d 845, 847-48 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that where Congress has provided three permissible treatments of secured claims under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) the parties may not construct a fourth extra-statutory option). None of these observations, however, inform our analysis here.

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5). Gant argues these two options are mutually exclusive, citing In re Williams, 168 F.3d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Although 11 U.S.C. § 102(5) states that '"or" is not exclusive,' it does not follow that Congress intended the word 'or' to create a fourth alternative."). Gant contends the requirement in the Plan that O'Brien surrender the Property to Wells Fargo extinguished its lien. Williams does not hold a requirement to surrender property to a lienholder extinguishes the rights of the lienholder to enforce the lien.

Other courts interpreting Section 1325(a)(5) have held that despite Section 102(5), the options for treatment of secured claims are mutually exclusive. See Williams v. Tower Loan of Miss., 168 F.3d 845; In re Walton, No. 98-00985-5 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 18, 1999); In re Covington, 176 B.R. 152 (Bankr.

The court grounded its holding on dicta in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, in which the Supreme Court observed that:168 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 1999) ; see alsoFirst Brandon Nat'l Bank v. Kerwin (In re Kerwin),996 F.2d 552 (2nd Cir. 1993) (holding that § 1225(a)(5) prevented the Chapter 12 Debtor from disposing of her farm through both surrender and distribution; however, the court found that the Debtor could accomplish the same end by simply distributing only some of the farm property); Evolve Fed. Credit Union v. Barragan-Flores (In re Barragan-Flores),585 B.R. 397 (W.D. Tex. 2018) (applying Williams to two cross-collateralized car loans and holding that the debtor could not surrender just one car); In re Elkins, Case No. 04-67961, 2005 WL 4030041, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2900 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2005) ; In re Covington,176 B.R. 152 (Bankr.

Third, the Debtors urge the Court to adopt the reasoning of the court in In re McCommons, 288 B.R. 594 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002), which held that the provisions of § 1325(a)(5) are not mutually exclusive and ruled that where multiple items of collateral secure a creditor's claim, a debtor may elect to surrender some items while retaining others. The Bank, on the other hand, asserts that the holding in Williams v. Tower Loan, Inc. (In re Williams), 168 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 1999) is controlling. In Williams, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend, by using the word "or" between sub-parts (B) and (C) of § 1325(a)(5), to create a hybrid alternative for the treatment of secured claims in Chapter 13 plans.

To the contrary, because the practice has been generally accepted without question in this District, the analysis has proved a useful exercise. In Williams v. Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc. (In re Williams), 168 F.3d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected a debtor's proposed partial surrender of collateral and partial cram down. The debtor had given the creditor a security interest in various unrelated items of personal property, including books, jewelry, and electronic equipment.

Because the Bankruptcy Code provides, as a rule of construction, that "`or' is not exclusive," 11 U.S.C.A. § 102(5) (West 2004 Supp. 2006), the courts concluded that the plain language of § 1325(a)(5), with its use of "or" between the cram down and surrender options, permits a debtor to pursue one or the other or both. Both courts acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in In re Williams, 168 F.3d 845, 847 (5th Cir.1999) ("Although 11 U.S.C. § 102(5) states that `"or" is not exclusive,' it does not follow that Congress intended the word `or' to create a fourth alternative [under § 1325(a)(5)]."). As noted above, we do not reach this question in this case.