Thereafter the State Department continued to advise courts on a case-by-case basis whether immunity should be granted; if in a particular case no advice was forthcoming, then the courts independently determined whether immunity was appropriate. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th Cir. 1986). By enacting the FSIA in 1976, the Congress substantially codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
To the extent courts have considered the retroactivity of the FSIA, the consensus appears to be that it would encompass events dating back at least as far as the date of this letter. See Carl Marks Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986); Slade v. United States of Mexico, 617 F.Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1985). We need not reach the broad conclusion of the district court that the FSIA may be generally applied to events predating the 1952 Tate Letter.
The Court's review of such a discretionary standard would not be complete without determining whether the foreign policy overtones that this case has assumed present the "extraordinary circumstances" that justify setting aside the judgment. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Alabama, 1984), affirmed, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986), rehearing denied, 801 F.2d 404 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1371, 94 L.Ed.2d 687 (1987), presented a situation similar to the one here. In Jackson, a district court, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), vacated a default judgment against the People's Republic of China ("PRC") for debts an earlier Chinese government incurred in 1911.
This reflects the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity that underlies the FSIA. See Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917, 107 S.Ct. 1371, 94 L.Ed.2d 687 (1987); H.R.Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations § 1.2, at 3-8 (1988). The focus of § 1605(a)(2) is the activity of the sovereign.
On the other hand, we will not ignore the strong policy stated in the statute, as part of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, of encouraging foreign states and their instrumentalities to appear before United States courts and allowing the merits of cases involving foreign sovereigns to be considered completely and carefully. See Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1989) (affirming district court's grant of Rule 60(b) relief); Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543, 1551-52 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (remanding for consideration of Rule 60(b) relief); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming Rule 60(b) relief under subsection (6)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917, 107 S.Ct. 1371, 94 L.Ed.2d 687 (1987). Thus, rather than following the course suggested by either party, we hold that the policy expressed in the statute and the broad divergence of cultural, governmental, and political practices between the United States and Romania are factors which should have been considered by the district court in the exercise of its discretion.
Before 1952 foreign sovereigns were entitled to assert absolute immunity from suit in United States courts (see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983)). Then the 1952 issuance of the Tate Letter by the State Department restricted that immunity to suits involving the public acts of a foreign sovereign, while eliminating such immunity for commercial acts (see, e.g., Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th Cir. 1986)). Nearly a quarter century later (in 1976) Congress entered the picture with the Act, which both (1) codified and clarified that restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and (2) also granted subject matter jurisdiction to United States courts over suits falling within certain exceptions to sovereign immunity.
Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the Soviet Union's willful default is tempered by its genuine but unfounded belief that it enjoys such sovereign immunity that it can merely crumple and discard our legal process, and that this inherent quality of sovereignty cannot be impaired unilaterally by the United States' adoption of the FSIA. See Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1371, 94 L.Ed.2d 687 (1987). We also believe that the Soviet Union has tendered meritorious defenses.
For these reasons, the U.S. Government on many occasions has submitted an amicus brief urging vacatur of a default judgment against a foreign sovereign. See, e.g ., id. ; FG Hemisphere , 447 F.3d at 838 ; Gregorian v. Izvestia , 871 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1989) ; Jackson v. People's Republic of China , 794 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1986). In this case, however, we think it significant that the Government has not taken a position on Sudan's motion to vacate.
See 317 F. 3d 954. Accord, Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 332 F. 3d 679 (CADC 2003); Carl Marks Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F. 2d 26 (CA2 1988) (per curiam); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F. 2d 1490 (CA11 1986). The conclusion to which the sui generis rule leads the Court shows the rule lacks a principled basis: "[W]e think it more appropriate, absent contraindications, to defer to the most recent [decision by the political branches on the foreign sovereign immunity question] — namely, the FSIA."
We review a district court's denial of a, Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. See Turner v. Sec'y of the AirForce, 944 F.2d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 1991); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11th Cir. 1986). IV. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES