In Fortin, supra at 786-787, we noted that a church structure could be either hierarchical or congregational, or that it could be a mix of both, citing Antioch Temple, supra at 860-862. See Primate Bishops' Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia v. Russian Orthodox Church of The Holy Resurrection, Inc., 418 Mass. 1001 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995). In Antioch Temple, supra, we described the distinction between the two structures, observing that a congregational church "is strictly independent" and, so far as church government is concerned, "owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority;" in a hierarchical church structure, in contrast, a local church is but "an integral and subordinate member of a larger, general church organization."

Decisions of the courts established by the U.N. Security Council, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg established in the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War-Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, U.N.T.S. 280 (hereinafter "London Charter"), and the several Nuremberg tribunals are recognized as an authoritative source of customary international law. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 244 n. 18 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Yousef 327 F.3d 56, 105 nn. 39-40 (2d Cir. 2003); cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 610 n. 40, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 165 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006); Prinez v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121, 115 S.Ct. 923, 130 L.Ed.2d 803 (1995). See generally Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 551, 559 (2006).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. On de novo review, we affirm the judgment of the district court, see Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (foreign government's entitlement to sovereign immunity is question of law subject to de novo review), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121, 115 S.Ct. 923, 130 L.Ed.2d 803 (1995), as set forth below. II.

In her dissenting opinion in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judge Wald agreed with the majority that application of the FSIA to pre-1952 conduct is not impermissibly retroactive, but set forth a narrower rationale for that conclusion. See 26 F.3d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting on other grounds), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121, 115 S.Ct. 923, 130 L.Ed.2d 803 (1995). The "presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic."

See. e.g.,Carl Marks & Co., Inc. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir.1988) (declining to apply the FSIA retroactively in action against the Soviet Union to recover on debt instruments); Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1497-98 (11th Cir.1986) (declining to apply the FSIA retroactively in action against China for default on bonds); Slade v. United States of Mexico, 617 F.Supp. 351, 356-58 (D.D.C.1985) (declining to apply the FSIA retroactively in action against Mexico for default on bonds), aff'd mem., 790 F.2d 163 (D.C.Cir.1986). But seePrincz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1170 (D.C.Cir.1994) (noting that "the implication is strong that all questions of foreign sovereign immunity, including those that involve an act of a foreign government taken before [the FSIA became law in 1976], are to be decided under the FSIA"), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995). Before 1952, foreign sovereigns enjoyed virtually absolute immunity from suit in United States courts.

This is a question of law that the court reviews de novo. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995). It is well established that "Indian tribes are `distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights' in matters of local self-government."

properly raised and preserved. People v. Stanaway, 446 Mich. 643, 694 (1994), cert den sub nom People v. Caruso, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995); Mich Ed Ass'n v. Secretary of State, 280 Mich. App. 477, 488 (2008). An issue is properly raised and preserved if it is addressed by the trial court.

Courts have been "reluctant to stray beyond these examples" when considering claims of implicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany , 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D. C. Cir. 1994), cert denied , 513 U.S. 1121, 115 S.Ct. 923, 130 L.Ed.2d 803 (1995). Courts have found an implicit waiver under § 1605(a)(1) in "cases involving contracts in which a foreign state has agreed to arbitrate disputes without specifying jurisdiction in a particular country or forum" but "most courts have refused to find an implicit waiver of immunity to suit in American courts from a contract clause providing for arbitration in a country other than the United States."Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , 761 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1985) ; see alsoCreighton , 181 F.3d at 123 (examining district court cases finding an implied waiver based on the foreign sovereign's agreement to arbitrate in the territory of a state that had signed the New York Convention, and distinguishing between those in which the foreign sovereign was a signatory to the Convention and those in which the foreign sovereign was not a signatory to the Convention).

Nor could the plaintiffs in Coleman rely upon the FSIA exception in Section 1605(a)(5) since the "plaintiffs [did] not plead facts indicating that the entire tort occurred in the United States. . . ." 888 F. Supp. at 1403. See also Princz v. Federal Republic of German, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995) (noting that "courts applying the FSIA have uniformly rejected the argument that a personal injury suffered overseas produces a direct effect in the United States when the injured person later returns home.")

See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 725-26 (1985) (IAD applies only to detainers lodged on untried criminal charges.); see also U.S. v. Coffman, 905 F.2d 330, 332 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Hernandez v. U.S., 527 F.Supp. 83, 84 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (By its terms the IAD "applies only to detainers based upon untried indictments, informations or complaints".); State v. Burkett, 179 Ariz. 109, 111-12, 876 P.2d 1144 (Ariz.App. Div. 1, 1993), review denied (1994), cert. denied, Arizona v. Burkett, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995) (collecting cases); Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1369-70 (Colo. 1993);State of New Mexico v. Sparks, 104 N.M. 62, 65, 716 P.2d 253 (N.M.App. 1986) (Because sentencing, like probation revocation, does not fall within the plain meaning of an "untried indictment, information or complaint," the provisions of the IAD do not apply to a sentencing detainer.) (citing Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 726 (1985)).