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Korean name in lead per MOS:KO; also strange taht his name means "research", and strange how he romanized his name
 
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{{Short description|Korean American economist}}
{{AFC submission|t||ts=20200628235123|u=Dongwoohahm|ns=118|demo=}}<!-- Important, do not remove this line before article has been created. -->
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{{Infobox economist|image=|institution=[[Columbia University]]|field=[[Microeconomic theory]]|repec_id=pch91|alma_mater=[[Stanford University]]<br>[[University of Toronto]]<br>[[Seoul National University]]|doctoral_advisor=[[Paul Milgrom]]|name=Yeon-Koo Che|repec_prefix=e}}


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{{Infobox economist|image=|institution=[[Columbia University]]|field=[[Microeconomic theory]]|repec_id=pch91|alma_mater=[[Stanford University]]
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[[University of Toronto]]
[[Seoul National University]]|doctoral_advisor=[[Paul Milgrom]]|name=Yeon-Koo Che|repec_prefix=e}}

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'''Yeon-Koo Che''' is an [[economist]]. He is the [[Kelvin Lancaster|Kelvin J. Lancaster]] Professor of [[Economic theory|Economic Theory]] at [[Columbia University]], a position he held since 2009. Prior to joining Columbia in 2005, he was a professor at [[University of Wisconsin–Madison|University of Wisconsin-Madison]].


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'''Yeon-Koo Che''' ({{Korean|hangul=최연구}}) is a Korean American [[economist]]. He is the [[Kelvin Lancaster|Kelvin J. Lancaster]] Professor of [[Economic theory|Economic Theory]] at [[Columbia University]], a position he held since 2009. Prior to joining Columbia in 2005, he was a professor at [[University of Wisconsin–Madison|University of Wisconsin-Madison]].


== Education ==
== Education ==
He earned his BA in economics from [[Seoul National University]] in 1984, his MA from [[University of Toronto]] in 1986. He received his Ph.D. from [[Stanford University]] in 1991, with [[Paul Milgrom]] serving his main advisor.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Che|first=Yeon-Koo|date=|title=Curriculum Vitae|url=https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e56e1139e190014f1116cac/t/5e5c8fa89c441026dcb1b1b3/1583124392904/cv20.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-06-28|website=Yeon-Koo Che}}</ref>
Che earned his BA in economics from [[Seoul National University]] in 1984, his MA from [[University of Toronto]] in 1986. He received his Ph.D. from [[Stanford University]] in 1991, with [[Paul Milgrom]] serving his main advisor.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Che|first=Yeon-Koo|date=|title=Curriculum Vitae|url=https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e56e1139e190014f1116cac/t/5e5c8fa89c441026dcb1b1b3/1583124392904/cv20.pdf|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-06-28|website=Yeon-Koo Che}}</ref>


== Academic Career ==
== Academic career ==
Yeon-Koo Che’s research concerns [[microeconomic theory]], with special focus on markets, auctions, contracts and matching, dynamic information acquisition. His research has been supported by [[National Science Foundation]] grants and National Research Founation grants from Korea. He is Fellow of [[Econometric Society]] (elected 2009)<ref>{{Cite web|title=Fellows of the Econometric Society 1950 to 2019 {{!}} The Econometric Society|url=https://www.econometricsociety.org/society/organization-and-governance/fellows|access-date=2020-06-28|website=www.econometricsociety.org}}</ref> and Fellow of Economic Theory (elected 2014) for the Society of Advancement of Economic Theory.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Economic Theory Fellows|url=https://saet.uiowa.edu/economic-theory-fellows/|access-date=2020-06-28|website=SAET|language=en-US}}</ref> He is a member of Council of [[Game Theory Society]] (elected 2017).<ref>{{Cite web|date=2017-09-28|title=the Council of the Game Theory Society -|url=http://gametheorysociety.org/council-of-the-game-theory-society/|access-date=2020-06-28|language=en-US}}</ref> He has served as editor of ''Journal of Industrial Economics'', associate editor of ''[[Econometrica]], [[Journal of Economic Theory]],'' and ''[[Games and Economic Behavior]]''. He was the inaugural recipient in 2008 of the [[R. K. Cho Economics Prize]]<ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=2008-04-24|title=제1회 조락교경제학상 최연구 교수|url=https://www.hankyung.com/news/article/2008042487221|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-06-28|website=[[Korea Economic Daily]]|language=ko}}</ref>, and the recipient of 2009 KAEA-MK Prize <ref>{{Cite web|date=2020-05-30|title=Maekyung-KAEA Economist|url=https://kaea.org/maekyung-kaea|access-date=2020-06-28|website=KAEA|language=en-US}}</ref>. He has given numerous Keynote addresses, including the [[Jacob Marschak]] Lecture at Australasian Meeting of Econometric Society (2016)<ref>{{Cite web|title=Jacob Marschak Lecture {{!}} The Econometric Society|url=https://www.econometricsociety.org/jacob-marschak-lecture|access-date=2020-06-28|website=www.econometricsociety.org}}</ref>, Asian Meeting of Econometric Society (2018), and Latin American Meeting of Econometric Society (2018).
Che’s research concerns [[microeconomic theory]], with special focus on markets, auctions, contracts and matching, dynamic information acquisition. His research has been supported by [[National Science Foundation]] grants and National Research Foundation grants from Korea. He is Fellow of [[Econometric Society]] (elected 2009)<ref>{{Cite web|title=Fellows of the Econometric Society 1950 to 2019 {{!}} The Econometric Society|url=https://www.econometricsociety.org/society/organization-and-governance/fellows|access-date=2020-06-28|website=www.econometricsociety.org}}</ref> and Fellow of Economic Theory (elected 2014) for the Society of Advancement of Economic Theory.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Economic Theory Fellows|url=https://saet.uiowa.edu/economic-theory-fellows/|access-date=2020-06-28|website=SAET|language=en-US}}</ref> He is a member of Council of [[Game Theory Society]] (elected 2017).<ref>{{Cite web|date=2017-09-28|title=the Council of the Game Theory Society -|url=http://gametheorysociety.org/council-of-the-game-theory-society/|access-date=2020-06-28|language=en-US}}</ref> He has served as editor of ''Journal of Industrial Economics'', associate editor of ''[[Econometrica]], [[Journal of Economic Theory]],'' and ''[[Games and Economic Behavior]]''. He was the inaugural recipient in 2008 of the [[R. K. Cho Economics Prize]],<ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=2008-04-24|title=제1회 조락교경제학상 최연구 교수|url=https://www.hankyung.com/news/article/2008042487221|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-06-28|website=[[Korea Economic Daily]]|language=ko}}</ref> and the recipient of 2009 KAEA-MK Prize.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2020-05-30|title=Maekyung-KAEA Economist|url=https://kaea.org/maekyung-kaea|access-date=2020-06-28|website=KAEA|language=en-US}}</ref> He has given numerous Keynote addresses, including the [[Jacob Marschak]] Lecture at Australasian Meeting of Econometric Society (2016),<ref>{{Cite web|title=Jacob Marschak Lecture {{!}} The Econometric Society|url=https://www.econometricsociety.org/jacob-marschak-lecture|access-date=2020-06-28|website=www.econometricsociety.org}}</ref> Asian Meeting of Econometric Society (2018), and Latin American Meeting of Econometric Society (2018).


== Research ==
== Research ==
He made significant contributions to the theory of [[market design]], particularly in the areas of [[auction theory]], [[contract theory]] and [[Matching theory (economics)|matching theory]]. His early work contributes to the theory of mechanism and auction design: scoring-rule auctions, auctions with budget constraints, collusion-proof mechanism design, research contest, the incomplete contract paradigm for organization theory, and the matching theory in the context of college admission and school choice. His recent research agenda includes data-driven digital economy and dynamic information acquisition by economic agents. His current research projects explore the implications of data-driven economic decision making and resource allocation for welfare and distributional consequences.
Che has made significant contributions to the theory of [[market design]], particularly in the areas of [[auction theory]], [[contract theory]] and [[Matching theory (economics)|matching theory]]. His early work contributes to the theory of mechanism and auction design: scoring-rule auctions, auctions with budget constraints, collusion-proof mechanism design, research contest, the incomplete contract paradigm for organization theory, and the matching theory in the context of college admission and school choice. His recent research agenda includes data-driven digital economy and dynamic information acquisition by economic agents. His current research projects explore the implications of data-driven economic decision making and resource allocation for welfare and distributional consequences.


==== Auction theory and mechanism design ====
=== Auction theory and mechanism design ===
Many public-works contracts are awarded via auctions where bidders compete in multiple dimensions of performances. He developed a theory of scoring-rule auctions to model such situations. In a scoring-rule auction, bidders propose multi-attribute bids say quality <math>q</math> and price <math>p</math>, and the auctioneer (procurer) uses a scoring function <math>s(q,p)</math> to evaluate the bid, and awards a contract to the bidder whose proposal score is the highest. His paper<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Che|first=Yeon-Koo|date=1993|title=Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions|url=https://econpapers.repec.org/article/rjerandje/v_3a24_3ay_3a1993_3ai_3awinter_3ap_3a668-680.htm|journal=RAND Journal of Economics|volume=24|issue=4|pages=668–680|issn=0741-6261}}</ref> shows that the optimal outcome can be implemented using a scoring function that downplays quality relative to price to intensify price competition. His second-score format anticipates the practice of adjusting payments based on advertiser’s click-through rates commonly used in the Internet ad auctions.
Many public-works contracts are awarded via auctions where bidders compete in multiple dimensions of performances. He developed a theory of scoring-rule auctions to model such situations. In a scoring-rule auction, bidders propose multi-attribute bids say quality <math>q</math> and price <math>p</math>, and the auctioneer (procurer) uses a scoring function <math>s(q,p)</math> to evaluate the bid, and awards a contract to the bidder whose proposal score is the highest. His paper<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Che|first=Yeon-Koo|date=1993|title=Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions|url=https://econpapers.repec.org/article/rjerandje/v_3a24_3ay_3a1993_3ai_3awinter_3ap_3a668-680.htm|journal=RAND Journal of Economics|volume=24|issue=4|pages=668–680|doi=10.2307/2555752|jstor=2555752|issn=0741-6261}}</ref> shows that the optimal outcome can be implemented using a scoring function that downplays quality relative to price to intensify price competition. His second-score format anticipates the practice of adjusting payments based on advertiser’s click-through rates commonly used in the Internet ad auctions.


He wrote a series of papers with Ian Gale on the role of budget constraints in auctions and auctions design. They show that bidders differing in budgets act fundamentally differently from bidders differing in their valuations of goods, leading to important implications for efficiency and revenue. The well-known revenue equivalence theorem fails for instance.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Che|first=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian|date=1998|title=Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/2567001|journal=The Review of Economic Studies|volume=65|issue=1|pages=1–21|issn=0034-6527}}</ref>
He wrote a series of papers with Ian Gale on the role of budget constraints in auctions and auctions design. They show that bidders differing in budgets act fundamentally differently from bidders differing in their valuations of goods, leading to important implications for efficiency and revenue. The well-known revenue equivalence theorem fails for instance.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian|date=1998|title=Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders|journal=The Review of Economic Studies|volume=65|issue=1|pages=1–21|doi=10.1111/1467-937X.00033|jstor=2567001|issn=0034-6527}}</ref>


==== Contract theory ====
=== Contract theory ===
Many key institutions such as property rights, authority, decision rights, and communication channels are difficult to explain in light of [[The Coase Theorem|the Coase theorem]]: parties can simply bargain to agree on an efficient action and enforce that agreement through a contract. To explain those institutions, one thus need to explain why such a contractual approach is not possible or too costly to work. The [[incomplete contracts]] paradigm pioneered by [[Sanford J. Grossman]], [[Oliver Hart (economist)|Oliver D. Hart]], and [[John Hardman Moore|John H. Moore]] argues that contracts are often incomplete and unable to provide adequate incentives for crucial relationship-specific investments needed for transactions, thus rationalizing organizational intervention such as ownership rights and authority, etc. His paper with Hausch <ref>{{Cite journal|last=Che|first=Yeon-Koo|last2=Hausch|first2=Donald B.|date=1999|title=Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/116982|journal=The American Economic Review|volume=89|issue=1|pages=125–147|issn=0002-8282}}</ref> provides a rigorous foundation (see Segal 1999<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Segal|first=Ilya|date=1999-01-01|title=Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts|url=https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/66/1/57/1666392|journal=The Review of Economic Studies|language=en|volume=66|issue=1|pages=57–82|doi=10.1111/1467-937X.00078|issn=0034-6527}}</ref> and Hart and Moore 1999<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hart|first=Oliver|last2=Moore|first2=John|date=1999-01-01|title=Foundations of Incomplete Contracts|url=https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/66/1/115/1666367|journal=The Review of Economic Studies|language=en|volume=66|issue=1|pages=115–138|doi=10.1111/1467-937X.00080|issn=0034-6527}}</ref> for alternative foundation) for this paradigm, identifying investment externalities ("cooperativeness") and renegotiability of contracts in the face of mutually beneficial ex post gains as two conditions rationalizing organizational interventions.
Many key institutions such as property rights, authority, decision rights, and communication channels are difficult to explain in light of [[The Coase Theorem|the Coase theorem]]: parties can simply bargain to agree on an efficient action and enforce that agreement through a contract. To explain those institutions, one thus need to explain why such a contractual approach is not possible or too costly to work. The [[incomplete contracts]] paradigm pioneered by [[Sanford J. Grossman]], [[Oliver Hart (economist)|Oliver D. Hart]], and [[John Hardman Moore|John H. Moore]] argues that contracts are often incomplete and unable to provide adequate incentives for crucial relationship-specific investments needed for transactions, thus rationalizing organizational intervention such as ownership rights and authority, etc. His paper with Don Hausch <ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Hausch|first2=Donald B.|date=1999|title=Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting|journal=The American Economic Review|volume=89|issue=1|pages=125–147|doi=10.1257/aer.89.1.125|jstor=116982|issn=0002-8282}}</ref> provides a rigorous foundation (see Segal 1999<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Segal|first=Ilya|date=1999-01-01|title=Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts|url=https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/66/1/57/1666392|journal=The Review of Economic Studies|language=en|volume=66|issue=1|pages=57–82|doi=10.1111/1467-937X.00078|issn=0034-6527}}</ref> and Hart and Moore 1999<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hart|first1=Oliver|last2=Moore|first2=John|s2cid=54504498|date=1999-01-01|title=Foundations of Incomplete Contracts|url=https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/66/1/115/1666367|journal=The Review of Economic Studies|language=en|volume=66|issue=1|pages=115–138|doi=10.1111/1467-937X.00080|issn=0034-6527}}</ref> for alternative foundation) for this paradigm, identifying investment externalities ("cooperativeness") and renegotiability of contracts in the face of mutually beneficial ex post gains as two conditions rationalizing organizational interventions.


==== Matching theory ====
=== Matching theory ===
His research studied the matching markets particularly in the context of assignment of students to public schools, particularly focusing on the stability and fairness of the assignment outcome as well as the incentives of market participants. His works show a large market size helps to achieve a stable outcome<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Che|first=Yeon-Koo|last2=Kim|first2=Jinwoo|last3=Kojima|first3=Fuhito|date=2019|title=Stable Matching in Large Economies|url=https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13547|journal=Econometrica|language=en|volume=87|issue=1|pages=65–110|doi=10.3982/ecta13547|issn=0012-9682}}</ref> and to resolve tradeoffs between efficiency on one side of the market (e.g., students) and the fairness.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Che|first=Yeon-Koo|last2=Tercieux|first2=Olivier|date=2019-10-01|title=Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/701791|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=127|issue=5|pages=2301–2342|doi=10.1086/701791|issn=0022-3808}}</ref>
His research studied the matching markets particularly in the context of assignment of students to public schools, particularly focusing on the stability and fairness of the assignment outcome as well as the incentives of market participants. His works show a large market size helps to achieve a stable outcome<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Kim|first2=Jinwoo|last3=Kojima|first3=Fuhito|date=2019|title=Stable Matching in Large Economies|journal=Econometrica|language=en|volume=87|issue=1|pages=65–110|doi=10.3982/ecta13547|s2cid=53622988 |issn=0012-9682}}</ref> and to resolve tradeoffs between efficiency on one side of the market (e.g., students) and the fairness.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Tercieux|first2=Olivier|date=2019-10-01|title=Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=127|issue=5|pages=2301–2342|doi=10.1086/701791|s2cid=158508994|issn=0022-3808|url=http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2013.pdf}}</ref> His pioneering work on college admissions shows how colleges' strategic behavior in the decentralized admission system can lead to an inefficient and unfair outcome.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Koh|first2=Youngwoo|date=2016-10-01|title=Decentralized College Admissions|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=124|issue=5|pages=1295–1338|doi=10.1086/688082|s2cid=217918131|issn=0022-3808}}</ref>


== Selected Publication ==
== Selected publications ==


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*{{Cite journal|last=Che|first=Yeon-Koo|date=1993|title=Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions|journal=The RAND Journal of Economics|volume=24|issue=4|pages=668–680|doi=10.2307/2555752|issn=0741-6261|jstor=2555752}}
* {{Cite journal|last=Abdulkadiroğlu|first=Atila|last2=Che|first2=Yeon-Koo|last3=Pathak|first3=Parag|last4=Roth|first4=Alvin|last5=Tercieux|first5=Olivier|date=2019|title=Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20190307|journal=American Economic Review: Insights|volume=|pages=|access-date=2020-06-28|via=}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Mierendorff|first2=Konrad|date=2019|title=Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention|url=https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20171000|journal=American Economic Review|volume=109|issue=8|pages=2993–3029|doi=10.1257/aer.20171000|issn=0002-8282|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian L.|date=1998|title=Caps on Political Lobbying|journal=The American Economic Review|volume=88|issue=3|pages=643–651|issn=0002-8282|jstor=116854}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Tercieux|first2=Olivier|date=2019|title=Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/701791|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=127|issue=5|pages=2301–2342|doi=10.1086/701791|issn=0022-3808|eissn=1537-534X|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian|date=1998|title=Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders|journal=Review of Economic Studies|volume=65|issue=1|pages=1–21|doi=10.1111/1467-937X.00033|issn=0034-6527|eissn=1467-937X}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Kim|first2=Jinwoo|last3=Kojima|first3=Fuhito|date=2019|title=Stable Matching in Large Economies|url=https://www.econometricsociety.org/doi/10.3982/ECTA13547|journal=Econometrica|volume=87|issue=1|pages=65–110|doi=10.3982/ECTA13547|issn=0012-9682|accessdate=2020-06-28|via=}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Hausch|first2=Donald B.|date=1999|title=Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting|journal=American Economic Review|volume=89|issue=1|pages=125–147|doi=10.1257/aer.89.1.125|issn=0002-8282}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Hörner|first2=Johannes|date=2018|title=Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning*|url=https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/133/2/871/4768293|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|volume=133|issue=2|pages=871–925|doi=10.1093/qje/qjx044|issn=0033-5533|eissn=1531-4650|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Yoo|first2=Seung-Weon|date=2001|title=Optimal Incentives for Teams|journal=American Economic Review|volume=91|issue=3|pages=525–541|doi=10.1257/aer.91.3.525|issn=0002-8282}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Condorelli|first2=Daniele|last3=Kim|first3=Jinwoo|date=2018|title=Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions|url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0022053118305842|journal=Journal of Economic Theory|volume=178|pages=398–435|doi=10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.005|issn=00220531|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian|date=2003|title=Optimal Design of Research Contests|journal=American Economic Review|volume=93|issue=3|pages=646–671|doi=10.1257/000282803322157025|issn=0002-8282}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Tercieux|first2=Olivier|date=2018|title=Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/TE2793|journal=Theoretical Economics|volume=13|issue=1|pages=239–271|doi=10.3982/TE2793|issn=1555-7561|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Severinov|first2=Sergei|date=2017|title=Disclosure and Legal Advice|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20140272|journal=American Economic Journal: Microeconomics|volume=9|issue=2|pages=188–225|doi=10.1257/mic.20140272|issn=1945-7669|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Choi|first2=Syngjoo|last3=Kim|first3=Jinwoo|date=2017|title=An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions|url=http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825616301233|journal=Games and Economic Behavior|volume=102|pages=20–43|doi=10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.008|issn=0899-8256|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Koh|first2=Youngwoo|date=2016|title=Decentralized College Admissions|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/688082|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=124|issue=5|pages=1295–1338|doi=10.1086/688082|issn=0022-3808|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Kim|first2=Jinwoo|last3=Kojima|first3=Fuhito|date=2015|title=Efficient assignment with interdependent values|url=http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053115000514|journal=Journal of Economic Theory|volume=158|pages=54–86|doi=10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.008|issn=0022-0531|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Abdulkadiroğlu|first1=Atila|last2=Che|first2=Yeon-Koo|last3=Yasuda|first3=Yosuke|date=2015|title=Expanding "Choice" in School Choice|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20120027|journal=American Economic Journal: Microeconomics|volume=7|issue=1|pages=1–42|doi=10.1257/mic.20120027|issn=1945-7669|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Sethi|first2=Rajiv|date=2014|title=Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.6.4.1|journal=American Economic Journal: Microeconomics|volume=6|issue=4|pages=1–34|doi=10.1257/mic.6.4.1|issn=1945-7669|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Kim|first2=Jinwoo|last3=Mierendorff|first3=Konrad|date=2013|title=Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA11405|journal=Econometrica|volume=81|issue=6|pages=2487–2520|doi=10.3982/ECTA11405|issn=1468-0262|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Budish|first1=Eric|last2=Che|first2=Yeon-Koo|last3=Kojima|first3=Fuhito|last4=Milgrom|first4=Paul|date=2013|title=Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.103.2.585|journal=American Economic Review|volume=103|issue=2|pages=585–623|doi=10.1257/aer.103.2.585|issn=0002-8282|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Dessein|first2=Wouter|last3=Kartik|first3=Navin|date=2013|title=Pandering to Persuade|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.103.1.47|journal=American Economic Review|volume=103|issue=1|pages=47–79|doi=10.1257/aer.103.1.47|issn=0002-8282|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Y.-K.|last2=Gale|first2=I.|last3=Kim|first3=J.|date=2013|title=Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents|url=https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/restud/rds025|journal=The Review of Economic Studies|volume=80|issue=1|pages=73–107|doi=10.1093/restud/rds025|issn=0034-6527|eissn=1467-937X|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Abdulkadiroğlu|first1=Atila|last2=Che|first2=Yeon-Koo|last3=Yasuda|first3=Yosuke|date=2011|title=Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.1.399|journal=American Economic Review|volume=101|issue=1|pages=399–410|doi=10.1257/aer.101.1.399|issn=0002-8282|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Kim|first2=Jinwoo|date=2010|title=Bidding with Securities: Comment|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.100.4.1929|journal=American Economic Review|volume=100|issue=4|pages=1929–1935|doi=10.1257/aer.100.4.1929|issn=0002-8282|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Kojima|first2=Fuhito|date=2010|title=Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA8354|journal=Econometrica|volume=78|issue=5|pages=1625–1672|doi=10.3982/ECTA8354|issn=1468-0262|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon‐Koo|last2=Kartik|first2=Navin|date=2009|title=Opinions as Incentives|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/648432|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=117|issue=5|pages=815–860|doi=10.1086/648432|issn=0022-3808|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Terrence|first2=Hendershott|date=2009|title=The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games|url=https://econpapers.repec.org/article/bpjevoice/v_3a6_3ay_3a2009_3ai_3a9_3an_3a5.htm|journal=The Economists' Voice|volume=6|issue=9|pages=1–4|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Kim|first2=Jinwoo|date=2009|title=Optimal collusion-proof auctions|url=http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053108001270|journal=Journal of Economic Theory|volume=144|issue=2|pages=565–603|doi=10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004|issn=0022-0531|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Kim|first2=Jinwoo|date=2006|title=Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00694.x|journal=Econometrica|volume=74|issue=4|pages=1063–1107|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00694.x|issn=1468-0262|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Sákovics|first2=József|date=2004|title=A Dynamic Theory of Holdup|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00526.x|journal=Econometrica|volume=72|issue=4|pages=1063–1103|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00526.x|issn=1468-0262|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Hausch|first2=Donald B.|date=1999|title=Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.89.1.125|journal=American Economic Review|volume=89|issue=1|pages=125–147|doi=10.1257/aer.89.1.125|issn=0002-8282|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian|date=2003|title=Optimal Design of Research Contests|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282803322157025|journal=American Economic Review|volume=93|issue=3|pages=646–671|doi=10.1257/000282803322157025|issn=0002-8282|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian L.|date=1998|title=Caps on Political Lobbying|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/116854|journal=The American Economic Review|volume=88|issue=3|pages=643–651|issn=0002-8282|jstor=116854|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian L.|date=2006|title=Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply|url=https://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a96_3ay_3a2006_3ai_3a4_3ap_3a1355-1360.htm|journal=American Economic Review|volume=96|issue=4|pages=1355–1360|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Yoo|first2=Seung-Weon|date=2001|title=Optimal Incentives for Teams|url=https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.91.3.525|journal=American Economic Review|volume=91|issue=3|pages=525–541|doi=10.1257/aer.91.3.525|issn=0002-8282|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian|date=2006|title=Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types|url=https://ideas.repec.org/a/the/publsh/157.html|journal=Theoretical Economics|volume=1|issue=1|pages=95–118|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian|date=1998|title=Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders|url=https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-lookup/doi/10.1111/1467-937X.00033|journal=Review of Economic Studies|volume=65|issue=1|pages=1–21|doi=10.1111/1467-937X.00033|issn=0034-6527|eissn=1467-937X|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Gale|first2=Ian|date=2000|title=The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer|url=http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002205319992639X|journal=Journal of Economic Theory|volume=92|issue=2|pages=198–233|doi=10.1006/jeth.1999.2639|issn=0022-0531|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite conference|last1=Andreoni|first1=James|last2=Che|first2=Yeon-Koo|last3=Kim|first3=Jinwoo|date=2005|title=Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment|url=https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/clalevrem/666156000000000474.htm|publisher=UCLA Department of Economics|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Spier|first2=Kathryn E.|date=2008|title=Strategic judgment proofing|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00044.x|journal=The RAND Journal of Economics|volume=39|issue=4|pages=926–948|doi=10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00044.x|issn=1756-2171|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Che|first1=Yeon-Koo|last2=Lewis|first2=Tracy R.|date=2007|title=The role of lockups in takeover contests|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00105.x|journal=The RAND Journal of Economics|volume=38|issue=3|pages=648–669|doi=10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00105.x|issn=1756-2171|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
* {{Cite journal|last1=Burguet|first1=Roberto|last2=Che|first2=Yeon-Koo|date=2004|title=Competitive Procurement with Corruption|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1593729|journal=The RAND Journal of Economics|volume=35|issue=1|pages=50–68|doi=10.2307/1593729|issn=0741-6261|jstor=1593729|accessdate=2020-06-28}}
⚫
* {{Cite journal|last=Che|first=Yeon-Koo|date=1993|title=Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2555752|journal=The RAND Journal of Economics|volume=24|issue=4|pages=668–680|doi=10.2307/2555752|issn=0741-6261|jstor=2555752|accessdate=2020-06-28}}


== References ==
== References ==
{{reflist}}
<references />

⚫
== External Links ==


⚫
== External links ==
* [https://www.yeonkooche.com/ Yeon-Koo Che's webpage]
* [https://www.yeonkooche.com/ Yeon-Koo Che's webpage]
* [https://econ.columbia.edu/ Department of Economics, Columbia University]
* [https://econ.columbia.edu/ Department of Economics, Columbia University]
* [https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=V5B7RHcAAAAJ Yeon-Koo Che] publications indexed by [[Google Scholar]]
* [https://scholar.google.com/citations?hl=en&user=V5B7RHcAAAAJ Yeon-Koo Che] publications indexed by [[Google Scholar]]

{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Che, Yeon-Koo}}
[[Category:Year of birth missing (living people)]]
[[Category:Living people]]
[[Category:20th-century American economists]]
[[Category:21st-century American economists]]
[[Category:Seoul National University alumni]]
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[[Category:University of Toronto alumni]]
[[Category:Stanford University alumni]]
[[Category:University of Wisconsin–Madison faculty]]
[[Category:Columbia University faculty]]
[[Category:Fellows of the Econometric Society]]

Latest revision as of 08:12, 24 February 2024

Yeon-Koo Che
Academic career
FieldMicroeconomic theory
InstitutionColumbia University
Alma materStanford University
University of Toronto
Seoul National University
Doctoral
advisor		Paul Milgrom
Information at IDEAS / RePEc

Yeon-Koo Che (Korean: 최연구) is a Korean American economist. He is the Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory at Columbia University, a position he held since 2009. Prior to joining Columbia in 2005, he was a professor at University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Education

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Che earned his BA in economics from Seoul National University in 1984, his MA from University of Toronto in 1986. He received his Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1991, with Paul Milgrom serving his main advisor.[1]

Academic career

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Che’s research concerns microeconomic theory, with special focus on markets, auctions, contracts and matching, dynamic information acquisition. His research has been supported by National Science Foundation grants and National Research Foundation grants from Korea. He is Fellow of Econometric Society (elected 2009)[2] and Fellow of Economic Theory (elected 2014) for the Society of Advancement of Economic Theory.[3] He is a member of Council of Game Theory Society (elected 2017).[4] He has served as editor of Journal of Industrial Economics, associate editor of Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, and Games and Economic Behavior. He was the inaugural recipient in 2008 of the R. K. Cho Economics Prize,[5] and the recipient of 2009 KAEA-MK Prize.[6] He has given numerous Keynote addresses, including the Jacob Marschak Lecture at Australasian Meeting of Econometric Society (2016),[7] Asian Meeting of Econometric Society (2018), and Latin American Meeting of Econometric Society (2018).

Research

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Che has made significant contributions to the theory of market design, particularly in the areas of auction theory, contract theory and matching theory. His early work contributes to the theory of mechanism and auction design: scoring-rule auctions, auctions with budget constraints, collusion-proof mechanism design, research contest, the incomplete contract paradigm for organization theory, and the matching theory in the context of college admission and school choice. His recent research agenda includes data-driven digital economy and dynamic information acquisition by economic agents. His current research projects explore the implications of data-driven economic decision making and resource allocation for welfare and distributional consequences.

Auction theory and mechanism design

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Many public-works contracts are awarded via auctions where bidders compete in multiple dimensions of performances. He developed a theory of scoring-rule auctions to model such situations. In a scoring-rule auction, bidders propose multi-attribute bids say quality and price , and the auctioneer (procurer) uses a scoring function to evaluate the bid, and awards a contract to the bidder whose proposal score is the highest. His paper[8] shows that the optimal outcome can be implemented using a scoring function that downplays quality relative to price to intensify price competition. His second-score format anticipates the practice of adjusting payments based on advertiser’s click-through rates commonly used in the Internet ad auctions.

He wrote a series of papers with Ian Gale on the role of budget constraints in auctions and auctions design. They show that bidders differing in budgets act fundamentally differently from bidders differing in their valuations of goods, leading to important implications for efficiency and revenue. The well-known revenue equivalence theorem fails for instance.[9]

Contract theory

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Many key institutions such as property rights, authority, decision rights, and communication channels are difficult to explain in light of the Coase theorem: parties can simply bargain to agree on an efficient action and enforce that agreement through a contract. To explain those institutions, one thus need to explain why such a contractual approach is not possible or too costly to work. The incomplete contracts paradigm pioneered by Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart, and John H. Moore argues that contracts are often incomplete and unable to provide adequate incentives for crucial relationship-specific investments needed for transactions, thus rationalizing organizational intervention such as ownership rights and authority, etc. His paper with Don Hausch [10] provides a rigorous foundation (see Segal 1999[11] and Hart and Moore 1999[12] for alternative foundation) for this paradigm, identifying investment externalities ("cooperativeness") and renegotiability of contracts in the face of mutually beneficial ex post gains as two conditions rationalizing organizational interventions.

Matching theory

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His research studied the matching markets particularly in the context of assignment of students to public schools, particularly focusing on the stability and fairness of the assignment outcome as well as the incentives of market participants. His works show a large market size helps to achieve a stable outcome[13] and to resolve tradeoffs between efficiency on one side of the market (e.g., students) and the fairness.[14] His pioneering work on college admissions shows how colleges' strategic behavior in the decentralized admission system can lead to an inefficient and unfair outcome.[15]

Selected publications

[edit]
  • Che, Yeon-Koo (1993). "Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions". The RAND Journal of Economics. 24 (4): 668–680. doi:10.2307/2555752. ISSN 0741-6261. JSTOR 2555752.
  • Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian L. (1998). "Caps on Political Lobbying". The American Economic Review. 88 (3): 643–651. ISSN 0002-8282. JSTOR 116854.
  • Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian (1998). "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders". Review of Economic Studies. 65 (1): 1–21. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00033. eISSN 1467-937X. ISSN 0034-6527.
  • Che, Yeon-Koo; Hausch, Donald B. (1999). "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting". American Economic Review. 89 (1): 125–147. doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.125. ISSN 0002-8282.
  • Che, Yeon-Koo; Yoo, Seung-Weon (2001). "Optimal Incentives for Teams". American Economic Review. 91 (3): 525–541. doi:10.1257/aer.91.3.525. ISSN 0002-8282.
  • Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian (2003). "Optimal Design of Research Contests". American Economic Review. 93 (3): 646–671. doi:10.1257/000282803322157025. ISSN 0002-8282.

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Che, Yeon-Koo. "Curriculum Vitae" (PDF). Yeon-Koo Che. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
  2. ^ "Fellows of the Econometric Society 1950 to 2019 | The Econometric Society". www.econometricsociety.org. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
  3. ^ "Economic Theory Fellows". SAET. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
  4. ^ "the Council of the Game Theory Society -". 2017-09-28. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
  5. ^ "제1회 조락교경제학상 최연구 교수". Korea Economic Daily (in Korean). 2008-04-24. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
  6. ^ "Maekyung-KAEA Economist". KAEA. 2020-05-30. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
  7. ^ "Jacob Marschak Lecture | The Econometric Society". www.econometricsociety.org. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
  8. ^ Che, Yeon-Koo (1993). "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions". RAND Journal of Economics. 24 (4): 668–680. doi:10.2307/2555752. ISSN 0741-6261. JSTOR 2555752.
  9. ^ Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian (1998). "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders". The Review of Economic Studies. 65 (1): 1–21. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00033. ISSN 0034-6527. JSTOR 2567001.
  10. ^ Che, Yeon-Koo; Hausch, Donald B. (1999). "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting". The American Economic Review. 89 (1): 125–147. doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.125. ISSN 0002-8282. JSTOR 116982.
  11. ^ Segal, Ilya (1999-01-01). "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts". The Review of Economic Studies. 66 (1): 57–82. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00078. ISSN 0034-6527.
  12. ^ Hart, Oliver; Moore, John (1999-01-01). "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts". The Review of Economic Studies. 66 (1): 115–138. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00080. ISSN 0034-6527. S2CID 54504498.
  13. ^ Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo; Kojima, Fuhito (2019). "Stable Matching in Large Economies". Econometrica. 87 (1): 65–110. doi:10.3982/ecta13547. ISSN 0012-9682. S2CID 53622988.
  14. ^ Che, Yeon-Koo; Tercieux, Olivier (2019-10-01). "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets" (PDF). Journal of Political Economy. 127 (5): 2301–2342. doi:10.1086/701791. ISSN 0022-3808. S2CID 158508994.
  15. ^ Che, Yeon-Koo; Koh, Youngwoo (2016-10-01). "Decentralized College Admissions". Journal of Political Economy. 124 (5): 1295–1338. doi:10.1086/688082. ISSN 0022-3808. S2CID 217918131.
[edit]
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