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The '''mass line''' is a political, organizational, and leadership methodology developed by [[Mao Zedong]] and the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) during the [[Chinese Communist Revolution]]. Who used the term first is disputed, with some crediting [[Li Lisan]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Newman |first1=Edward |last2=Zhang |first2=Chi |date=2021-05-04 |title=The Mass Line approach to countering violent extremism in China: the road from propaganda to hearts and minds |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2020.1825379 |journal=Asian Security |language=en |volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=4 |doi=10.1080/14799855.2020.1825379 |issn=1479-9855}}</ref> and others [[Zhou Enlai]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Schram |first=Stuart |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/thought-of-mao-tsetung/2DA4C693E131E41A72AE2CB3E8B90B94 |title=The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung |date=1989 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-31062-8 |series=Contemporary China Institute Publications |location=Cambridge |doi=10.1017/cbo9780511521454}}</ref> In mass line methodology, leadership formulates policy based on theory, implements it based on the people's real world conditions, revises the theory and policy based on actual practice, and uses that revised theory as the guide to future practice. This process is summarized as leadership "from the masses, to the masses", repeated indefinitely.<ref name=":2">{{Citation |last=Cheek |first=Timothy |title=Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Methods of Leadership |date=2002 |work=Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions |pages=120–121 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_11 |access-date=2024-05-27 |place=New York |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US |doi=10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_11 |isbn=978-1-349-63485-9}}</ref> |
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The '''mass line''' is the political, organizational and leadership method developed by [[Mao Zedong]] and the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) during the [[Chinese Communist Revolution]]. The essential element of the mass line is consulting the masses, interpreting their suggestions within the framework of [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxism-Leninism]], and then enforcing the resulting policies.<ref>{{cite web|title=Short Definitions of the 'Mass Line' and a 'Mass Perspective'|url=http://massline.info/sum1p.htm|website=massline.info|access-date=15 June 2014}}</ref> |
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Mao developed |
Mao developed the mass line into a organizing methodology that encompasses philosophy, strategy, tactics, leadership, and [[organizational theory]], which has been applied by many [[Communism#Marxist communism|communists]] subsequent to the Chinese Communist Revolution: from [[Che Guevara]] in [[Latin America]], to [[Ho Chi Minh]] in [[Vietnam]].<ref name=":7" /> Many CCP leaders have attributed their attainment of power to the faithful pursuit of effective "mass line" tactics, and a "correct" mass line is supposed to be the essential prerequisite for the full consolidation of power.<ref name="steiner">{{Cite journal |last=Steiner |first=H. Arthur |date=June 1951 |title=Current "Mass Line" Tactics in Communist China |url= |journal=[[American Political Science Review]] |language=en |volume=45 |issue=2 |pages=422–436 |doi=10.2307/1951469 |issn=0003-0554 |jstor=1951469|s2cid=145666761 }}</ref> |
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==Theory== |
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==History and 20th century origins== |
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In its original conception, the mass line referred to both an ideological goal as well as a working method based on "pooling the wisdom of the masses" ({{lang-zh|t=集中群眾智慧|s=集中群众智慧|p=jízhōng qúnzhòng zhìhuì}}) from which CCP leadership could formulate policy after further deliberation, adjustments, implementation and experimentation, which would in turn continue to receive feedback from the masses.<ref name="Lin2019">{{cite book |last1=Lin |first1=Chun |
In its original conception, the mass line referred to both an ideological goal as well as a working method based on "pooling the wisdom of the masses" ({{lang-zh|t=集中群眾智慧|s=集中群众智慧|p=jízhōng qúnzhòng zhìhuì}}) from which CCP leadership could formulate policy after further deliberation, adjustments, implementation and experimentation, which would in turn continue to receive feedback from the masses.<ref name="Lin2019">{{cite book |last1=Lin |first1=Chun |title=Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi |date=2019 |publisher=[[ANU Press]] |isbn=9781788734769 |editor1-last=Sorace |editor1-first=Christian |location=Canberra |page=122 |chapter=Mass Line |jstor=j.ctvk3gng9.23 |oclc=1107512484 |editor2-last=Franceschini |editor2-first=Ivan |editor3-last=Loubere |editor3-first=Nicholas |jstor-access=free}}</ref> The methodology is as follows: |
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# An initial policy is formulated based on historical analysis and theory.<ref name=":0" /> |
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In Maoist politics, the mass line is summarized in the phrase, "To the masses- from the masses - to the masses."<ref name=":0" /> The process is said to include investigating the conditions of people, learning about and participating in their struggles, gathering ideas from them, and creating a plan of action based on these ideas and concerns of the people, and also based on an analysis of the objective conditions and in light of the revolutionary goal. |
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# As it is implemented, the policy and underlying theory are revised consistent with real world conditions.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Karl |first=Rebecca E. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/503828045 |title=Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world : a concise history |date=2010 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-4780-4 |location=Durham [NC] |pages=58–59 |oclc=503828045}}</ref> |
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# This revised theory then becomes the guide to future correct action.<ref name=":0" /> |
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Thus, the mass line is a method in which theory is refined by practice, with leadership flowing "to the masses - from the masses - to the masses".<ref name=":0" /> |
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After recognizing that large numbers of cadres properly trained in mass line tactics were critically needed for the CCP's building of a "complete [[Socialist mode of production|socialist]] order", the Party intensified its [[Cadre system of the Chinese Communist Party|cadre training program]] in 1950–1951 to ensure that all cadres and other workers would be "carefully indoctrinated in basic [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]] mass line theory and practice".<ref name=steiner/> |
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In doing this, a line of feedback is formed between leaders and masses, representing the aggregate interests of ordinary people on their behalf, in a [[Maoism|Maoist]] [[Party line (politics)|political line]], ostensibly derived "from the peasants".<ref name="mao1961" /> It is governments role to listen to the scattered ideas of the masses, turn them into systemic ones, and return them back to the people as a guide for action.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chun |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63178961 |title=The transformation of Chinese socialism |date=2006 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-3785-0 |location=Durham [N.C.] |pages=142, 144, 147 |oclc=63178961}}</ref> This is a process by which leadership refines the views of the people, "pooling the wisdom of the masses", while constantly adjusting and testing decisions in an "endless spiral" of improvement.<ref name=":1" /> |
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Training in mass line tactics ranges in scope from propaganda to public administration, according to UCLA professor Arthur Steiner. Its principal focus, however, is in the "delicate area" of the CCP's dealings with the masses of Chinese people who have not yet bought into the communist program.<ref name="steiner" /> In the early 1950s, the problem was sufficiently serious and urgent that CCP leadership temporarily deferred several important social reforms pending the completion of the cadre training program.<ref name="steiner" /> |
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Pragmatic considerations evident in mass line include its ability to reconcile central leadership with mass consultation. It alleviates "two problematic tendencies" that occur with centralization: losing touch with popular sentiment and creating political apathy among citizens.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book |last=Lieberthal |first=Kenneth |title=Governing China: from revolution through reform |date=2004 |publisher=W. W. Norton |isbn=978-0-393-92492-3 |edition=2nd |location=New York |pages=64–65}}</ref> Some have gone as far as to speculate that Mao's success resulted from his understanding of how government can employ mass line to its strength.<ref name="steiner" /> |
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Steiner writes that Mao rose to pre-eminence in the CCP because he understood the requirements for effecting the strongest possible organization of the Chinese masses in unstable political circumstances.<ref name="steiner" /> Since the days of his early activity among the peasantry of Hunan Province, Mao preached that the Party must rely on the masses for its strength, that it must serve their needs, "draw inspiration" from them, and orient its political ideology and organizational tactics to their responsiveness.<ref name="steiner" /> |
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Mass line is also part of a long spanning Marxist-Leninist "epistemology (''zhishi lun'') or methodology (''fangfa lun'')".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hammond |first=Edward |date=January 1978 |title=Marxism and the Mass Line |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009770047800400101 |journal=Modern China |volume=4 |issue=1 |pages=6 |doi=10.1177/009770047800400101 |issn=0097-7004}}</ref> Mao acknowledged inspiration in the [[October Revolution]] and subsequent formation of [[Vladimir Lenin|Vladimir Lenin's]] [[Vanguard Party]].<ref>{{Citation |last=TSE-TUNG |first=MAO |title=Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China |date=1977 |work=Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung |pages=332–349 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-022984-3.50060-8 |access-date=2024-05-28 |publisher=Elsevier |doi=10.1016/b978-0-08-022984-3.50060-8 |isbn=978-0-08-022984-3}}</ref> Mass line also exhibits elements of ancient Chinese beliefs, which emphasized the importance of wise rulers reading signs of popular discontent in order to avoid social calamity.<ref name=":1" /> Some argue that Mao's conception of the mass line reflected his faith in the people as well as a theory of "history from below."<ref name=":1" /> |
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Mao criticized [[Joseph Stalin]] for a lack of faith in the peasantry and the masses of people, being mechanical in his understanding of the development of socialism, and not actively engaging the masses in the struggle for socialism. Regarding Stalin, Mao wrote in 1961: {{"'}}Politics in command' and the 'mass line' are not stressed. There is no discussion of 'walking on two legs', and individual material interest is onesidedly emphasized. Material incentives are proclaimed and individualism is far too prominent."<ref name=mao1961>{{cite book |author=Mao Tsetung |url=http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/CSE58.html |title=A Critique of Soviet Economics |others=Translated by Moss Roberts, annotated by Richard Levy, with an introduction by James Peck |publisher=Monthly Review Press |location=New York and London |year=1977 |orig-year=1961}}</ref> The Mass Line is a method of leadership that seeks ostensibly to "learn from the peasants."<ref name=mao1961 /> |
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The principle of the mass line is reflected in the Party slogan "[[Serve the People|serve the people]]".<ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |url= |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |date=2022 |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |location=New Haven |doi=10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k |jstor=j.ctv3006z6k |oclc=1348572572 |author-link=Christopher Marquis |s2cid=253067190}}</ref>{{Rp|page=43}} |
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Some critics of Maoism consider the mass line to be a form of [[populism]], a criticism that Lenin had leveled against the reformists in the [[Russian Social Democratic Labour Party]] in ''[[What Is To Be Done?]]''.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.massline.info/mlms/mlch07.htm |title=The Initiative, Creativity and Ideas of the Masses |first=Scott |last=Harrison |work=The Mass Line and the American Revolutionary Movement}}</ref>{{sps|date=May 2020}} |
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== |
== History == |
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=== Mao Zedong === |
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| ⚫ | In his own words, Xi has described the campaign in terms of "purification" of the |
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Throughout Mao Zedong's early revolutionary activity among the peasantry of the Hunan Province, he preached that the CCP must rely on the masses for its strength, serve their needs, "draw inspiration" from them, and orient its political ideology and organizational tactics to their responsiveness.<ref name="steiner" /> This is formally articulated in the 1927 ''[[Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan]]'', which Mao wrote while working in [[Changsha]]. Among other observations, the ''Hunan Report'' highlighted the challenges to and successes of local communist mobilization.<ref name=":4" /> |
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In 1948, Mao would claim that the discussion of mass line had been ongoing for "the past dozen years".<ref name=":5" /> This situates its conception in the 1930s at the beginning of the [[Yan'an Rectification Movement]] (1935-1947). Mao's published works reflect this: in a speech given at the [[Yan'an Forum|Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art]] in 1942, mass line was articulated as an unofficial doctrine of communism. In one section, Mao argues that cultural workers have a role to play in the revolutionary army just as peasants do, emphasizing that artists and their like must serve the people by becoming one with the masses.<ref>{{Citation |last=Cheek |first=Timothy |title=Talks at the Yan'an Conference on Literature and Art 1942 |date=2002 |work=Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions |pages=112–117 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_4 |access-date=2024-05-27 |place=New York |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US |doi=10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_4 |isbn=978-1-349-63485-9}}</ref> |
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| ⚫ | As part of this campaign, Xi Jinping has declared that "All Party organs and members should be frugal and make determined efforts to oppose [[Conspicuous consumption|ostentation]] and reject hedonism",<ref>{{cite web |
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Becoming one with the masses was also asserted as a strategy by which leaders and local organizers could form a common language, [[Maoism]], allowing them to unite and "analyze China's problems and propose solutions"<ref name=":3" />:<blockquote>“''Revolutionary statesmen, the political specialists who know the science or art of revolutionary politics, are simply the leaders of millions upon millions of statesmen—the masses. Their task is to collect the opinions of these mass statesmen, sift and refine them, and return them to the masses who then take them and put them into practice''”.<ref>{{Citation |title=Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art |date=1965-01-01 |work=Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung |pages=87 |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780080229829500102 |access-date=2024-05-27 |publisher=Pergamon |doi=10.1016/B978-0-08-022982-9.50010-2 |isbn=978-0-08-022982-9}}</ref></blockquote>On June 1st 1943, Mao formally articulated this message, the essence of mass line, in a report to the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]]. In the report, titled ''Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Methods of Leadership,'' Mao argued that correct governance comes "from the masses," and is delivered back "to the masses". This required strict adherence to two principles: combining the "general with the particular" and "leadership with the masses".<ref name=":2" /> In asserting this, Mao answered challenges proposed in the Hunan Report by summarizing lessons learned in the Yan'an Rectification Movement.<ref name=":7">{{Citation |last=Cheek |first=Timothy |title=Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Methods of Leadership June 1, 1943 |date=2002 |work=Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions |pages=117–123 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_5 |access-date=2024-05-27 |place=New York |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US |doi=10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_5 |isbn=978-1-349-63485-9}}</ref> The report was passed by the [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party]] in 1943.{{cn|date=June 2024}} |
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In 1945, [[Liu Shaoqi]] delivered a report to the [[7th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]],emphasizing the necessity of selfless leadership, accountable to the masses. Thus, certain mass points had to be instilled in the minds of party members. One of such was the paramount importance of external audit of leadership by the masses.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=MacFarquhar |first=Roderick |date=1973 |title=Problems of Liberalization and the Succession at the Eighth Party Congress |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/652160 |journal=The China Quarterly |issue=56 |pages=637–640 |jstor=652160 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref> |
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By the end of the Yan'an Era in 1947, the CPP had developed a series of operational principles reflecting mass line, known informally as the "Yan'an Complex". Decentralization, close ties with local populations, and a focus on simple living were balanced against expertise among officials and ideological programs to assure party loyalty among cadres. These would be enshrined in the founding of the [[China|People's republic of China]] in 1949.{{cn|date=June 2024}} |
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After recognizing that large numbers of cadres properly trained in mass line tactics were necessary to build a "complete [[Socialist mode of production|socialist]] order", the CCP intensified its [[Cadre system of the Chinese Communist Party|cadre training program]] in 1950–1951 to ensure that all cadres and other workers would be "carefully indoctrinated in basic [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]] mass line theory and practice".<ref name="steiner" /> The problem was deemed so serious, that CCP leadership temporarily deferred several important social reforms pending the completion of the cadre training program.<ref name="steiner" /> In 1958, regulation required Military Officers to work one month each year in the ranks as common soldiers.<ref name=":3" /> Bureaucrats were under similar pressures to learn from peasants, leading many to adopt the practice of personally inspecting locales. Liu Shaoqi, for example, frequented [[Tianjin]], the municipality where his wife was born.<ref name=":3" /> Across many programs implemented throughout the 1950s, the focus was the "delicate area" of leadership relations with the unconverted masses: those who had not yet bought into the communist program.<ref name="steiner" /> |
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In 1956, the [[8th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]] was held. In contrast with Liu Shaoqi's emphasis on the "audit by the masses" in his 7th Congress Report, the 8th Congress emphasized leadership's role as the director of the mass line. This was articulated by [[Deng Xiaoping]] in his report:<blockquote>"''Whether the Party can remain correct in leadership will be determined by whether the Party can systematically sum up after analysis and coordination the experiences and views of the masses and turn them into the Party's views, and then taking the resulting ideas back to the masses, explaining and popularizing them until the masses embrace the ideas as their own...''"<ref>{{Cite journal |last=MacFarquhar |first=Roderick |date=December 1973 |title=Problems of Liberalization and the Succession at the Eighth Party Congress Roderick MacFarquhar |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000019524 |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=56 |pages=639 |doi=10.1017/s0305741000019524 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref></blockquote>The next period would see a grappling with the role of leadership in mass line. In the 1957 essay ''[[On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People|On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People]]'', Mao outlines a new application of mass line feedback between leadership and masses. Arguing that bureaucracy has eroded mass line's efficacy, Mao proposes that intellectuals among the masses engage in a critique of government<ref>{{Citation |last=Cheek |first=Timothy |title=On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People June 1957 |date=2002 |work=Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions |pages=127–159 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_8 |access-date=2024-05-27 |place=New York |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US |doi=10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_8 |isbn=978-1-349-63485-9}}</ref> in what would come to be known as the [[Hundred Flowers Campaign]]. These critiques were promptly shut down when they became critical of government. An [[Anti-Rightist Campaign]] followed from 1957 to 1959. |
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While mass line was emphasized in the late 1950 and into the 1960s,<ref name=":9" /> its practice became less clear. This has lead some to argue that post 1960s China was "a situation of unprecedented mass activity without the mass line".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Young |first=Graham |date=1980 |title=On the Mass Line |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/189074 |journal=Modern China |volume=6 |issue=2 |pages=237 |doi=10.1177/009770048000600204 |jstor=189074 |issn=0097-7004}}</ref> |
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* In 1961, Mao criticized [[Joseph Stalin]] for a lack of faith in the peasantry and the masses of people, being mechanical in his understanding of the development of socialism, and not actively engaging the masses in the struggle for socialism.<ref name="mao1961">{{Cite book |last=Mao |first=Zedong |title=A Critique of Soviet Economics |title-link=A Critique of Soviet Economics |date=1977 |publisher=[[Monthly Review Press]] |isbn=978-0-85345-412-0 |language=en |author-link=Mao Zedong}}</ref> This critique closely followed the Anti-Rightist Campaign, in which Mao had sought to weed out those with contrary views to government. |
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* In 1966 the ''Sixteen Articles'', repeatedly eulogized mass action, while simultaneously providing strict instructions for party leaders and citizenry alike. |
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* In the 1966 [[Cultural Revolution]] that followed, local mass activity was widespread in organizations such as the [[Red Guards]], but was steered, in part, by the ideological leadership of Mao. This was evident in adherence to the philosophies of the [[The Little Red Book|''Little Red Book'']]. |
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* Other [[List of campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party|Chinese political campaigns]] during the 1960s exhibited high mass mobilization, steered by leadership. |
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By Mao's death on September 9th, 1976, his own role had been elevated to the point that he had become the defining factor in the mass line.<ref name=":6">{{Cite book |last=Lieberthal |first=Kenneth |title=Governing China: from revolution through reform |date=2004 |publisher=W. W. Norton |isbn=978-0-393-92492-3 |edition=2nd |location=New York |pages=125–127}}</ref> |
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In 1977, the new preeminent political leader of China, Deng Xiaoping, would move the country into decades of reform. While partially honouring the legacy of Mao in his 1981 ''[[Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China]]'', Deng's leadership placed a lesser emphasis on Maoist egalitarianism and collectivism fundamental to mass line.<ref name=":6" /> |
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=== Xi Jinping === |
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One of the distinctive features of the [[Xi Jinping Core Administration|national leadership]] of [[Communist Party of China|Chinese Communist Party]] [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of China|general secretary]] [[Xi Jinping]] has been the revival of the mass line in CCP theory and praxis.<ref name="english.peopledaily.com.cn">{{cite web |date=10 December 2013 |title=Xi demands implementation of 'mass line' campaign |url=http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90785/8479207.html |work=[[People's Daily]]}}</ref><ref name="thediplomat.com">{{cite web|date=9 September 2013 |title="China's "Mass Line" Campaign" |url=https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/chinas-mass-line-campaign-2/ |work=[[The Diplomat]]}}</ref> Xi's ideological contributions, described as [[Xi Jinping Thought]], seek to reinvigorate the mass line.<ref name=":Tsang&Cheung">{{Cite book |last1=Tsang |first1=Steve |author-link=Steve Chang |title=The Political Thought of Xi Jinping |last2=Cheung |first2=Olivia |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197689363}}</ref>{{Rp|page=10}} In 2013, Xi initiated the first of his Party's Education Programs on Selected Themes, which addressed the mass line.<ref name=":Hou">{{Cite book |last=Hou |first=Xiaojia |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |chapter=China's Shift to Personalistic Rule: Xi Jinping's Centralization of Political Power |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref>{{Rp|page=95}} This program sought to address four types of harmful behaviors by party cadres and to require cadres to conduct self-examination and self-criticism in front of their subordinates and to solicit criticism from their subordinates.<ref name=":Hou2">{{Cite book |last=Hou |first=Xiaojia |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |chapter=China's Shift to Personalistic Rule: Xi Jinping's Centralization of Political Power |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref>{{Rp|page=95}} |
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| ⚫ | As of 2014, this revival is still ongoing, and is "not a short-term movement" according to the ''[[People's Daily]]''.<ref>{{cite web |title=CPC's "mass line" campaign not a short-term movement |url=http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206976/8325279.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130826050448/http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206976/8325279.html |archive-date=26 August 2013 |access-date=9 August 2022 |website=[[People's Daily]] Online }}</ref> A new official website{{Of what|date=November 2022}} has been launched, focusing on the mass line.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dickson |first1=Bruce J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0L2SDAAAQBAJ&q=http://qzlx.people.com.cn&pg=PT162 |title=The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival |date=2016 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=9780190228576 |page=150 |language=en |access-date=23 June 2018}}</ref> |
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| ⚫ | In his own words, Xi has described the campaign in terms of "purification" of the CCP, often involving the elimination of "[[hedonism]] and extravagance",<ref>{{cite web |title=People's Daily editorial stresses stronger ties with masses |url=http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206974/8305468.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130818212607/http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206974/8305468.html |archive-date=18 August 2013 |access-date=14 January 2022 |website=[[People's Daily]] Online }}</ref> although the purification implied is sometimes extended metaphorically to issues such as "reducing air pollution".<ref name="english.peopledaily.com.cn"/> |
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| ⚫ | As part of this campaign, Xi Jinping has declared that "All Party organs and members should be frugal and make determined efforts to oppose [[Conspicuous consumption|ostentation]] and reject hedonism",<ref name=":5">{{cite web |title=Xinhua Insight: Secretive government receptions defy China's central authority |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-01/23/c_132123374_2.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130128181710/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-01/23/c_132123374_2.htm |archive-date=28 January 2013 |access-date=14 January 2022 |website=[[Xinhua]]}}</ref> although the interpretation of what this means seems to have varied from one province to the next somewhat. [[Hebei province]] reportedly reduced public spending on official receptions by 24%, cancelled the order of 17,000 new cars, and punished 2,750 government officials.<ref name="english.peopledaily.com.cn"/> ''[[The Economist]]'' reported two specific examples of punishments under the new mass line: the suspended [[Capital punishment in China|death sentence]] for corruption given to Liu Zhijun and charging the 17-year-old-son of a high-ranking military officer for an alleged connection to a gang rape.<ref>{{Cite news |date=13 July 2013 |title=Masses of meetings |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |url=https://www.economist.com/china/2013/07/13/masses-of-meetings |access-date=2022-11-12 |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> Perhaps 20,000 party officials were punished within the first year of the revival campaign.<ref>{{cite web |last=Tiezzi |first=Shannon |date=December 27, 2013 |title=The Mass Line Campaign in the 21st Century |url=https://thediplomat.com/2013/12/the-mass-line-campaign-in-the-21st-century/ |access-date=26 May 2020 |work=[[The Diplomat]] |quote=Xinhua says that almost 20,000 Party officials have been punished this year ...}}</ref> |
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| ⚫ | Academic Alexander Korolev argues that: "If implemented not as a [[Propaganda in China|propaganda]] tool but as a mechanism of interest articulation and aggregation, the mass line has the potential to offer China alternative routes of [[democratization]]."<ref name="Korolev">{{cite journal |last=A. |first=Korolev |date=14 July 2017 |title=De-ideologized Mass Line, Regime Responsiveness, and State-Society Relations |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/664741 |journal=[[China Review]] |volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=7–36}}</ref> |
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==Connection with propaganda== |
==Connection with propaganda== |
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| Line 47: | Line 79: | ||
The directive called for the establishment of networks of "propaganda officers"—one in every party cell—and "reporting officers" at higher levels. Propaganda activity was to be conducted among the masses under strict control and in "fixed activity programs".<ref name=steiner/> Among other duties, propaganda officers were to maintain "constant public contact" so they could "assist the Party in the choice of propaganda matter and methods appropriate for different periods of time".<ref name=steiner/> |
The directive called for the establishment of networks of "propaganda officers"—one in every party cell—and "reporting officers" at higher levels. Propaganda activity was to be conducted among the masses under strict control and in "fixed activity programs".<ref name=steiner/> Among other duties, propaganda officers were to maintain "constant public contact" so they could "assist the Party in the choice of propaganda matter and methods appropriate for different periods of time".<ref name=steiner/> |
||
Earlier directives connected the need to boost consciousness of the mass line with criticisms and [[Self-criticism (Marxism–Leninism)|self-criticisms]] in the press. |
Earlier directives connected the need to boost consciousness of the mass line with criticisms and [[Self-criticism (Marxism–Leninism)|self-criticisms]] in the press. CCP members were supposed to "be trained to appreciate that criticism and self-criticism in newspapers and periodicals are necessary methods for strengthening the relations between the Party and the popular masses".<ref name=steiner/> |
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==Mass organizations== |
==Mass organizations== |
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{{See also|People's organization}} |
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During the Maoist era the state supported a range of mass organizations, coordinated by the CCP through |
During the Maoist era the state supported a range of mass organizations, coordinated by the CCP through its [[United Front (China)|united front]] system. The most significant of the mass organizations encompassed large numbers of people from major social groups, including workers through trade unions, students, youth, and women. Their purpose was to "penetrate society, to bring vast sections of the population further into the party's net," [[Frederick Teiwes]] writes.<ref name="teiwes">{{cite book |last=Teiwes |first=Frederick C. |url=https://archive.org/details/modernchinesesta00davi |title=The Modern Chinese State |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |year=2000 |editor-last=Shambaugh |editor-first=David |location=Cambridge |pages=[https://archive.org/details/modernchinesesta00davi/page/n128 105]–160 |chapter=The Chinese State During the Maoist Era |doi=10.1017/CBO9780511528194 |isbn=9780521776035 |url-access=limited}}</ref> The effort was skewed, however, and coverage was far more extensive in urban areas, with peasant associations existing only sporadically. |
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==Influence outside the Chinese Communist Party== |
==Influence outside the Chinese Communist Party== |
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{{Globalize|date=November 2022}} |
{{Globalize|date=November 2022}} |
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The largest self-proclaimed Maoist party in the US, the [[Revolutionary Communist Party, USA|Revolutionary Communist Party]], which proclaims itself adopted the concept of "mass line" during the 1970s.<ref>{{ |
The largest self-proclaimed Maoist party in the US, the [[Revolutionary Communist Party, USA|Revolutionary Communist Party]], which proclaims itself adopted the concept of "mass line" during the 1970s.<ref name=":4">{{Cite book |last=Elbaum |first=Max |url= |title=Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and Che |title-link=Revolution in the Air |date=2018-04-10 |publisher=[[Verso Books]] |isbn=978-1-78663-458-0 |language=en |oclc=1031091411 |author-link=Max Elbaum}}</ref> |
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==See also== |
==See also== |
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==References== |
==References== |
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{{Reflist}} |
{{Reflist}}{{Maoism}} |
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==External links== |
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*[http://www.morningsun.org/living/redbook/book11.html Selected Quotations of Chairman Mao Zedong Chapter XI. Mass Line] |
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*[http://marx2mao.com/Mao/HP27.html Mao Zedong, Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan] |
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*[http://lesmaterialistes.com/english/communist-party-peru-mass-line Communist Party of Peru: The Mass Line] |
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*[https://web.archive.org/web/20080229002007/http://www.frso.org/about/docs/frsomassline.htm Some Points on Mass Line] |
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*[http://www.massline.info/rcp/ml_rcp.htm Three Part Pamphlet on Mass Line] |
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*[http://www.massline.info/India/ht_ProletarianMassLine.htm The Proletarian Mass Line by Harsh Thakor] |
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*[http://www.massline.info/Philippines/masswork.htm Communist Party of the Philippines: Mass Work] |
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{{Maoism}} |
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Revision as of 02:14, 22 August 2024
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The mass line is a political, organizational, and leadership methodology developed by Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Chinese Communist Revolution. Who used the term first is disputed, with some crediting Li Lisan[1] and others Zhou Enlai.[2] In mass line methodology, leadership formulates policy based on theory, implements it based on the people's real world conditions, revises the theory and policy based on actual practice, and uses that revised theory as the guide to future practice. This process is summarized as leadership "from the masses, to the masses", repeated indefinitely.[3]
Mao developed the mass line into a organizing methodology that encompasses philosophy, strategy, tactics, leadership, and organizational theory, which has been applied by many communists subsequent to the Chinese Communist Revolution: from Che Guevara in Latin America, to Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam.[4] Many CCP leaders have attributed their attainment of power to the faithful pursuit of effective "mass line" tactics, and a "correct" mass line is supposed to be the essential prerequisite for the full consolidation of power.[5]
Theory
In its original conception, the mass line referred to both an ideological goal as well as a working method based on "pooling the wisdom of the masses" (simplified Chinese: 集中群众智慧; traditional Chinese: 集中群眾智慧; pinyin: jízhōng qúnzhòng zhìhuì) from which CCP leadership could formulate policy after further deliberation, adjustments, implementation and experimentation, which would in turn continue to receive feedback from the masses.[6] The methodology is as follows:
- An initial policy is formulated based on historical analysis and theory.[7]
- As it is implemented, the policy and underlying theory are revised consistent with real world conditions.[7]
- This revised theory then becomes the guide to future correct action.[7]
Thus, the mass line is a method in which theory is refined by practice, with leadership flowing "to the masses - from the masses - to the masses".[7]
In doing this, a line of feedback is formed between leaders and masses, representing the aggregate interests of ordinary people on their behalf, in a Maoist political line, ostensibly derived "from the peasants".[8] It is governments role to listen to the scattered ideas of the masses, turn them into systemic ones, and return them back to the people as a guide for action.[9] This is a process by which leadership refines the views of the people, "pooling the wisdom of the masses", while constantly adjusting and testing decisions in an "endless spiral" of improvement.[9]
Pragmatic considerations evident in mass line include its ability to reconcile central leadership with mass consultation. It alleviates "two problematic tendencies" that occur with centralization: losing touch with popular sentiment and creating political apathy among citizens.[10] Some have gone as far as to speculate that Mao's success resulted from his understanding of how government can employ mass line to its strength.[5]
Mass line is also part of a long spanning Marxist-Leninist "epistemology (zhishi lun) or methodology (fangfa lun)".[11] Mao acknowledged inspiration in the October Revolution and subsequent formation of Vladimir Lenin's Vanguard Party.[12] Mass line also exhibits elements of ancient Chinese beliefs, which emphasized the importance of wise rulers reading signs of popular discontent in order to avoid social calamity.[9] Some argue that Mao's conception of the mass line reflected his faith in the people as well as a theory of "history from below."[9]
The principle of the mass line is reflected in the Party slogan "serve the people".[13]: 43
History
Mao Zedong
Throughout Mao Zedong's early revolutionary activity among the peasantry of the Hunan Province, he preached that the CCP must rely on the masses for its strength, serve their needs, "draw inspiration" from them, and orient its political ideology and organizational tactics to their responsiveness.[5] This is formally articulated in the 1927 Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, which Mao wrote while working in Changsha. Among other observations, the Hunan Report highlighted the challenges to and successes of local communist mobilization.[14]
In 1948, Mao would claim that the discussion of mass line had been ongoing for "the past dozen years".[15] This situates its conception in the 1930s at the beginning of the Yan'an Rectification Movement (1935-1947). Mao's published works reflect this: in a speech given at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art in 1942, mass line was articulated as an unofficial doctrine of communism. In one section, Mao argues that cultural workers have a role to play in the revolutionary army just as peasants do, emphasizing that artists and their like must serve the people by becoming one with the masses.[16]
Becoming one with the masses was also asserted as a strategy by which leaders and local organizers could form a common language, Maoism, allowing them to unite and "analyze China's problems and propose solutions"[10]:
“Revolutionary statesmen, the political specialists who know the science or art of revolutionary politics, are simply the leaders of millions upon millions of statesmen—the masses. Their task is to collect the opinions of these mass statesmen, sift and refine them, and return them to the masses who then take them and put them into practice”.[17]
On June 1st 1943, Mao formally articulated this message, the essence of mass line, in a report to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In the report, titled Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Methods of Leadership, Mao argued that correct governance comes "from the masses," and is delivered back "to the masses". This required strict adherence to two principles: combining the "general with the particular" and "leadership with the masses".[3] In asserting this, Mao answered challenges proposed in the Hunan Report by summarizing lessons learned in the Yan'an Rectification Movement.[4] The report was passed by the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party in 1943.[citation needed]
In 1945, Liu Shaoqi delivered a report to the 7th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party,emphasizing the necessity of selfless leadership, accountable to the masses. Thus, certain mass points had to be instilled in the minds of party members. One of such was the paramount importance of external audit of leadership by the masses.[18]
By the end of the Yan'an Era in 1947, the CPP had developed a series of operational principles reflecting mass line, known informally as the "Yan'an Complex". Decentralization, close ties with local populations, and a focus on simple living were balanced against expertise among officials and ideological programs to assure party loyalty among cadres. These would be enshrined in the founding of the People's republic of China in 1949.[citation needed]
After recognizing that large numbers of cadres properly trained in mass line tactics were necessary to build a "complete socialist order", the CCP intensified its cadre training program in 1950–1951 to ensure that all cadres and other workers would be "carefully indoctrinated in basic Marxist-Leninist mass line theory and practice".[5] The problem was deemed so serious, that CCP leadership temporarily deferred several important social reforms pending the completion of the cadre training program.[5] In 1958, regulation required Military Officers to work one month each year in the ranks as common soldiers.[10] Bureaucrats were under similar pressures to learn from peasants, leading many to adopt the practice of personally inspecting locales. Liu Shaoqi, for example, frequented Tianjin, the municipality where his wife was born.[10] Across many programs implemented throughout the 1950s, the focus was the "delicate area" of leadership relations with the unconverted masses: those who had not yet bought into the communist program.[5]
In 1956, the 8th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held. In contrast with Liu Shaoqi's emphasis on the "audit by the masses" in his 7th Congress Report, the 8th Congress emphasized leadership's role as the director of the mass line. This was articulated by Deng Xiaoping in his report:
"Whether the Party can remain correct in leadership will be determined by whether the Party can systematically sum up after analysis and coordination the experiences and views of the masses and turn them into the Party's views, and then taking the resulting ideas back to the masses, explaining and popularizing them until the masses embrace the ideas as their own..."[19]
The next period would see a grappling with the role of leadership in mass line. In the 1957 essay On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People, Mao outlines a new application of mass line feedback between leadership and masses. Arguing that bureaucracy has eroded mass line's efficacy, Mao proposes that intellectuals among the masses engage in a critique of government[20] in what would come to be known as the Hundred Flowers Campaign. These critiques were promptly shut down when they became critical of government. An Anti-Rightist Campaign followed from 1957 to 1959.
While mass line was emphasized in the late 1950 and into the 1960s,[13] its practice became less clear. This has lead some to argue that post 1960s China was "a situation of unprecedented mass activity without the mass line".[21]
- In 1961, Mao criticized Joseph Stalin for a lack of faith in the peasantry and the masses of people, being mechanical in his understanding of the development of socialism, and not actively engaging the masses in the struggle for socialism.[8] This critique closely followed the Anti-Rightist Campaign, in which Mao had sought to weed out those with contrary views to government.
- In 1966 the Sixteen Articles, repeatedly eulogized mass action, while simultaneously providing strict instructions for party leaders and citizenry alike.
- In the 1966 Cultural Revolution that followed, local mass activity was widespread in organizations such as the Red Guards, but was steered, in part, by the ideological leadership of Mao. This was evident in adherence to the philosophies of the Little Red Book.
- Other Chinese political campaigns during the 1960s exhibited high mass mobilization, steered by leadership.
By Mao's death on September 9th, 1976, his own role had been elevated to the point that he had become the defining factor in the mass line.[22]
In 1977, the new preeminent political leader of China, Deng Xiaoping, would move the country into decades of reform. While partially honouring the legacy of Mao in his 1981 Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, Deng's leadership placed a lesser emphasis on Maoist egalitarianism and collectivism fundamental to mass line.[22]
Xi Jinping
One of the distinctive features of the national leadership of Chinese Communist Party general secretary Xi Jinping has been the revival of the mass line in CCP theory and praxis.[23][24] Xi's ideological contributions, described as Xi Jinping Thought, seek to reinvigorate the mass line.[25]: 10 In 2013, Xi initiated the first of his Party's Education Programs on Selected Themes, which addressed the mass line.[26]: 95 This program sought to address four types of harmful behaviors by party cadres and to require cadres to conduct self-examination and self-criticism in front of their subordinates and to solicit criticism from their subordinates.[27]: 95
As of 2014, this revival is still ongoing, and is "not a short-term movement" according to the People's Daily.[28] A new official website[of what?] has been launched, focusing on the mass line.[29]
In his own words, Xi has described the campaign in terms of "purification" of the CCP, often involving the elimination of "hedonism and extravagance",[30] although the purification implied is sometimes extended metaphorically to issues such as "reducing air pollution".[23]
As part of this campaign, Xi Jinping has declared that "All Party organs and members should be frugal and make determined efforts to oppose ostentation and reject hedonism",[15] although the interpretation of what this means seems to have varied from one province to the next somewhat. Hebei province reportedly reduced public spending on official receptions by 24%, cancelled the order of 17,000 new cars, and punished 2,750 government officials.[23] The Economist reported two specific examples of punishments under the new mass line: the suspended death sentence for corruption given to Liu Zhijun and charging the 17-year-old-son of a high-ranking military officer for an alleged connection to a gang rape.[31] Perhaps 20,000 party officials were punished within the first year of the revival campaign.[32]
Academic Alexander Korolev argues that: "If implemented not as a propaganda tool but as a mechanism of interest articulation and aggregation, the mass line has the potential to offer China alternative routes of democratization."[33]
Connection with propaganda
According to Steiner, the mass line is closely related to the CCP's propaganda apparatus.[5] Despite the vast output from the CCP's propaganda apparatus, in January 1951 the Central Committee published a directive condemning as a "principal weakness of the Party's propaganda" a failure to effectively give "systematic guidance and control of various levels of party organizations".[5]
The directive said that "One of the inborn duties of a Communist lies in the incessant effort to carry out propaganda among the people so as to educate them, to wage relentless war against all reactionary and mistaken conceptions and principles, and to promote as well as raise the political consciousness of the masses."[5]
The directive called for the establishment of networks of "propaganda officers"—one in every party cell—and "reporting officers" at higher levels. Propaganda activity was to be conducted among the masses under strict control and in "fixed activity programs".[5] Among other duties, propaganda officers were to maintain "constant public contact" so they could "assist the Party in the choice of propaganda matter and methods appropriate for different periods of time".[5]
Earlier directives connected the need to boost consciousness of the mass line with criticisms and self-criticisms in the press. CCP members were supposed to "be trained to appreciate that criticism and self-criticism in newspapers and periodicals are necessary methods for strengthening the relations between the Party and the popular masses".[5]
Mass organizations
During the Maoist era the state supported a range of mass organizations, coordinated by the CCP through its united front system. The most significant of the mass organizations encompassed large numbers of people from major social groups, including workers through trade unions, students, youth, and women. Their purpose was to "penetrate society, to bring vast sections of the population further into the party's net," Frederick Teiwes writes.[34] The effort was skewed, however, and coverage was far more extensive in urban areas, with peasant associations existing only sporadically.
Influence outside the Chinese Communist Party
 | The examples and perspective in this article may not represent a worldwide view of the subject. (November 2022) |
The largest self-proclaimed Maoist party in the US, the Revolutionary Communist Party, which proclaims itself adopted the concept of "mass line" during the 1970s.[14]
See also
- Propaganda in the People's Republic of China
- Thought reform in the People's Republic of China
- General line of the party (Soviet Union)
References
- ^ Newman, Edward; Zhang, Chi (2021-05-04). "The Mass Line approach to countering violent extremism in China: the road from propaganda to hearts and minds". Asian Security. 17 (2): 4. doi:10.1080/14799855.2020.1825379. ISSN 1479-9855.
- ^ Schram, Stuart (1989). The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung. Contemporary China Institute Publications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511521454. ISBN 978-0-521-31062-8.
- ^ a b Cheek, Timothy (2002), "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Methods of Leadership", Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, pp. 120–121, doi:10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_11, ISBN 978-1-349-63485-9, retrieved 2024-05-27
- ^ a b Cheek, Timothy (2002), "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Methods of Leadership June 1, 1943", Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, pp. 117–123, doi:10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_5, ISBN 978-1-349-63485-9, retrieved 2024-05-27
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Steiner, H. Arthur (June 1951). "Current "Mass Line" Tactics in Communist China". American Political Science Review. 45 (2): 422–436. doi:10.2307/1951469. ISSN 0003-0554. JSTOR 1951469. S2CID 145666761.
- ^ Lin, Chun (2019). "Mass Line". In Sorace, Christian; Franceschini, Ivan; Loubere, Nicholas (eds.). Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi. Canberra: ANU Press. p. 122. ISBN 9781788734769. JSTOR j.ctvk3gng9.23. OCLC 1107512484.
- ^ a b c d Karl, Rebecca E. (2010). Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world : a concise history. Durham [NC]: Duke University Press. pp. 58–59. ISBN 978-0-8223-4780-4. OCLC 503828045.
- ^ a b Mao, Zedong (1977). A Critique of Soviet Economics. Monthly Review Press. ISBN 978-0-85345-412-0.
- ^ a b c d Lin, Chun (2006). The transformation of Chinese socialism. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press. pp. 142, 144, 147. ISBN 978-0-8223-3785-0. OCLC 63178961.
- ^ a b c d Lieberthal, Kenneth (2004). Governing China: from revolution through reform (2nd ed.). New York: W. W. Norton. pp. 64–65. ISBN 978-0-393-92492-3.
- ^ Hammond, Edward (January 1978). "Marxism and the Mass Line". Modern China. 4 (1): 6. doi:10.1177/009770047800400101. ISSN 0097-7004.
- ^ TSE-TUNG, MAO (1977), "Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Elsevier, pp. 332–349, doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-022984-3.50060-8, ISBN 978-0-08-022984-3, retrieved 2024-05-28
- ^ a b Marquis, Christopher; Qiao, Kunyuan (2022). Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise. New Haven: Yale University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k. ISBN 978-0-300-26883-6. JSTOR j.ctv3006z6k. OCLC 1348572572. S2CID 253067190.
- ^ a b Elbaum, Max (2018-04-10). Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and Che. Verso Books. ISBN 978-1-78663-458-0. OCLC 1031091411.
- ^ a b "Xinhua Insight: Secretive government receptions defy China's central authority". Xinhua. Archived from the original on 28 January 2013. Retrieved 14 January 2022.
- ^ Cheek, Timothy (2002), "Talks at the Yan'an Conference on Literature and Art 1942", Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, pp. 112–117, doi:10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_4, ISBN 978-1-349-63485-9, retrieved 2024-05-27
- ^ "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art", Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Pergamon, p. 87, 1965-01-01, doi:10.1016/B978-0-08-022982-9.50010-2, ISBN 978-0-08-022982-9, retrieved 2024-05-27
- ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick (1973). "Problems of Liberalization and the Succession at the Eighth Party Congress". The China Quarterly (56): 637–640. ISSN 0305-7410. JSTOR 652160.
- ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick (December 1973). "Problems of Liberalization and the Succession at the Eighth Party Congress Roderick MacFarquhar". The China Quarterly. 56: 639. doi:10.1017/s0305741000019524. ISSN 0305-7410.
- ^ Cheek, Timothy (2002), "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People June 1957", Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, pp. 127–159, doi:10.1007/978-1-137-08687-7_8, ISBN 978-1-349-63485-9, retrieved 2024-05-27
- ^ Young, Graham (1980). "On the Mass Line". Modern China. 6 (2): 237. doi:10.1177/009770048000600204. ISSN 0097-7004. JSTOR 189074.
- ^ a b Lieberthal, Kenneth (2004). Governing China: from revolution through reform (2nd ed.). New York: W. W. Norton. pp. 125–127. ISBN 978-0-393-92492-3.
- ^ a b c "Xi demands implementation of 'mass line' campaign". People's Daily. 10 December 2013.
- ^ ""China's "Mass Line" Campaign"". The Diplomat. 9 September 2013.
- ^ Tsang, Steve; Cheung, Olivia (2024). The Political Thought of Xi Jinping. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780197689363.
- ^ Hou, Xiaojia (2024). "China's Shift to Personalistic Rule: Xi Jinping's Centralization of Political Power". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.). China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment. Leiden University Press. ISBN 9789087284411.
- ^ Hou, Xiaojia (2024). "China's Shift to Personalistic Rule: Xi Jinping's Centralization of Political Power". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.). China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment. Leiden University Press. ISBN 9789087284411.
- ^ "CPC's "mass line" campaign not a short-term movement". People's Daily Online. Archived from the original on 26 August 2013. Retrieved 9 August 2022.
- ^ Dickson, Bruce J. (2016). The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival. Oxford University Press. p. 150. ISBN 9780190228576. Retrieved 23 June 2018.
- ^ "People's Daily editorial stresses stronger ties with masses". People's Daily Online. Archived from the original on 18 August 2013. Retrieved 14 January 2022.
- ^ "Masses of meetings". The Economist. 13 July 2013. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 2022-11-12.
- ^ Tiezzi, Shannon (December 27, 2013). "The Mass Line Campaign in the 21st Century". The Diplomat. Retrieved 26 May 2020.
Xinhua says that almost 20,000 Party officials have been punished this year ...
- ^ A., Korolev (14 July 2017). "De-ideologized Mass Line, Regime Responsiveness, and State-Society Relations". China Review. 17 (2): 7–36.
- ^ Teiwes, Frederick C. (2000). "The Chinese State During the Maoist Era". In Shambaugh, David (ed.). The Modern Chinese State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 105–160. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511528194. ISBN 9780521776035.
