Moral particularism: Difference between revisions
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{{short description|The view that there are no moral principles and that moral judgement can be found only as one decides particular cases, either real or imagined}} |
{{short description|The view that there are no moral principles and that moral judgement can be found only as one decides particular cases, either real or imagined}} |
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{{no footnotes|date=February 2013}} |
{{no footnotes|date=February 2013}} |
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'''Moral particularism''' is a theory in [[meta-ethics]] that there are no [[moral principle]]s and that moral judgement is determined by relevant factors in a particular context.<ref>{{cite news|title=Moral Particularism|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/morlpat/|work=Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy| |
'''Moral particularism''' is a theory in [[meta-ethics]] that there are no [[moral principle]]s and that moral judgement is determined by relevant factors in a particular context.<ref>{{cite news|title=Moral Particularism|url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/morlpat/|work=Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy|access-date=17 October 2019}}</ref> This stands in stark contrast to other prominent moral theories, such as [[deontology]], [[consequentialism]] and [[virtue ethics]]. |
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==History== |
==History== |
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==Views== |
==Views== |
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[[Jonathan Dancy]] argued that cases, whether they're imagined or otherwise, contain certain elements from which we can infer certain moral ideas.<ref>{{cite news|title=Moral Particularism and the Role of Imaginary Cases|url=https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/468|work=European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy| |
[[Jonathan Dancy]] argued that cases, whether they're imagined or otherwise, contain certain elements from which we can infer certain moral ideas.<ref>{{cite news|title=Moral Particularism and the Role of Imaginary Cases|url=https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/468|work=European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy|access-date=17 October 2019}}</ref> |
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=== Criticisms === |
=== Criticisms === |
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A criticism of moral particularism is that it is inherently irrational. The criticism is that to be rational in relation to moral thought, you have to consistently apply that rationality to moral issues: but moral particularism does not do this.<ref>{{cite news|title=Moral Particularism|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism/|work=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| |
A criticism of moral particularism is that it is inherently irrational. The criticism is that to be rational in relation to moral thought, you have to consistently apply that rationality to moral issues: but moral particularism does not do this.<ref>{{cite news|title=Moral Particularism|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism/|work=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=17 October 2019}}</ref> |
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==Further reading== |
==Further reading== |
Revision as of 16:54, 22 December 2020
This article includes a list of references, related reading, or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. (February 2013) |
Moral particularism is a theory in meta-ethics that there are no moral principles and that moral judgement is determined by relevant factors in a particular context.[1] This stands in stark contrast to other prominent moral theories, such as deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics.
History
The term "particularism" was coined to designate this position by R. M. Hare, in 1963 (Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon, p. 18).
Views
Jonathan Dancy argued that cases, whether they're imagined or otherwise, contain certain elements from which we can infer certain moral ideas.[2]
Criticisms
A criticism of moral particularism is that it is inherently irrational. The criticism is that to be rational in relation to moral thought, you have to consistently apply that rationality to moral issues: but moral particularism does not do this.[3]
Further reading
- Hooker B, Little MO (eds.) (2001). Moral particularism. OUP.
- Dancy, Jonathan (2004). Ethics without principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
References
- ^ "Moral Particularism". Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy. Retrieved 17 October 2019.
- ^ "Moral Particularism and the Role of Imaginary Cases". European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy. Retrieved 17 October 2019.
- ^ "Moral Particularism". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 17 October 2019.
External links
- Dancy, Jonathan (2005). "Moral particularism", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Tsu, Peter Shiu-Hwa. "Moral Particularism", in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.