Yeon-Koo Che
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Yeon-Koo Che | |
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Academic career | |
Field | Microeconomic theory |
Institution | Columbia University |
Alma mater | Stanford University Seoul National University |
Doctoral advisor | Paul Milgrom |
Information at IDEAS / RePEc |
Yeon-Koo Che is an economist. He is the Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory at Columbia University, a position he held since 2009. Prior to joining Columbia in 2005, he was a professor at University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Education
He earned his BA in economics from Seoul National University in 1984, his MA from University of Toronto in 1986. He received his Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1991, with Paul Milgrom serving his main advisor.[1]
Academic Career
Yeon-Koo Che’s research concerns microeconomic theory, with special focus on markets, auctions, contracts and matching, dynamic information acquisition. His research has been supported by National Science Foundation grants and National Research Founation grants from Korea. He is Fellow of Econometric Society (elected 2009)[2] and Fellow of Economic Theory (elected 2014) for the Society of Advancement of Economic Theory.[3] He is a member of Council of Game Theory Society (elected 2017).[4] He has served as editor of Journal of Industrial Economics, associate editor of Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, and Games and Economic Behavior. He was the inaugural recipient in 2008 of the R. K. Cho Economics Prize[5], and the recipient of 2009 KAEA-MK Prize [6]. He has given numerous Keynote addresses, including the Jacob Marschak Lecture at Australasian Meeting of Econometric Society (2016)[7], Asian Meeting of Econometric Society (2018), and Latin American Meeting of Econometric Society (2018).
Research
He made significant contributions to the theory of market design, particularly in the areas of auction theory, contract theory and matching theory. His early work contributes to the theory of mechanism and auction design: scoring-rule auctions, auctions with budget constraints, collusion-proof mechanism design, research contest, the incomplete contract paradigm for organization theory, and the matching theory in the context of college admission and school choice. His recent research agenda includes data-driven digital economy and dynamic information acquisition by economic agents. His current research projects explore the implications of data-driven economic decision making and resource allocation for welfare and distributional consequences.
Auction theory and mechanism design
Many public-works contracts are awarded via auctions where bidders compete in multiple dimensions of performances. He developed a theory of scoring-rule auctions to model such situations. In a scoring-rule auction, bidders propose multi-attribute bids say quality and price , and the auctioneer (procurer) uses a scoring function to evaluate the bid, and awards a contract to the bidder whose proposal score is the highest. His paper[8] shows that the optimal outcome can be implemented using a scoring function that downplays quality relative to price to intensify price competition. His second-score format anticipates the practice of adjusting payments based on advertiser’s click-through rates commonly used in the Internet ad auctions.
He wrote a series of papers with Ian Gale on the role of budget constraints in auctions and auctions design. They show that bidders differing in budgets act fundamentally differently from bidders differing in their valuations of goods, leading to important implications for efficiency and revenue. The well-known revenue equivalence theorem fails for instance.[9]
Contract theory
Many key institutions such as property rights, authority, decision rights, and communication channels are difficult to explain in light of the Coase theorem: parties can simply bargain to agree on an efficient action and enforce that agreement through a contract. To explain those institutions, one thus need to explain why such a contractual approach is not possible or too costly to work. The incomplete contracts paradigm pioneered by Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart, and John H. Moore argues that contracts are often incomplete and unable to provide adequate incentives for crucial relationship-specific investments needed for transactions, thus rationalizing organizational intervention such as ownership rights and authority, etc. His paper with Don Hausch [10] provides a rigorous foundation (see Segal 1999[11] and Hart and Moore 1999[12] for alternative foundation) for this paradigm, identifying investment externalities ("cooperativeness") and renegotiability of contracts in the face of mutually beneficial ex post gains as two conditions rationalizing organizational interventions.
Matching theory
His research studied the matching markets particularly in the context of assignment of students to public schools, particularly focusing on the stability and fairness of the assignment outcome as well as the incentives of market participants. His works show a large market size helps to achieve a stable outcome[13] and to resolve tradeoffs between efficiency on one side of the market (e.g., students) and the fairness.[14] His pioneering work on college admission shows how the strategic behavior by colleges in a decentralized admission system can produce an inefficient and unfair outcome.
Selected Publication
- Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila; Che, Yeon-Koo; Pathak, Parag; Roth, Alvin; Tercieux, Olivier (2019). "Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching". American Economic Review: Insights. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Mierendorff, Konrad (2019). "Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention". American Economic Review. 109 (8): 2993–3029. doi:10.1257/aer.20171000. ISSN 0002-8282. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Tercieux, Olivier (2019). "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets". Journal of Political Economy. 127 (5): 2301–2342. doi:10.1086/701791. eISSN 1537-534X. ISSN 0022-3808. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo; Kojima, Fuhito (2019). "Stable Matching in Large Economies". Econometrica. 87 (1): 65–110. doi:10.3982/ECTA13547. ISSN 0012-9682. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Hörner, Johannes (2018). "Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning*". The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 133 (2): 871–925. doi:10.1093/qje/qjx044. eISSN 1531-4650. ISSN 0033-5533. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Condorelli, Daniele; Kim, Jinwoo (2018). "Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions". Journal of Economic Theory. 178: 398–435. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.005. ISSN 0022-0531. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Tercieux, Olivier (2018). "Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets". Theoretical Economics. 13 (1): 239–271. doi:10.3982/TE2793. ISSN 1555-7561. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Severinov, Sergei (2017). "Disclosure and Legal Advice". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 9 (2): 188–225. doi:10.1257/mic.20140272. ISSN 1945-7669. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Choi, Syngjoo; Kim, Jinwoo (2017). "An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions". Games and Economic Behavior. 102: 20–43. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.008. ISSN 0899-8256. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Koh, Youngwoo (2016). "Decentralized College Admissions". Journal of Political Economy. 124 (5): 1295–1338. doi:10.1086/688082. ISSN 0022-3808. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo; Kojima, Fuhito (2015). "Efficient assignment with interdependent values". Journal of Economic Theory. 158: 54–86. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.008. ISSN 0022-0531. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila; Che, Yeon-Koo; Yasuda, Yosuke (2015). "Expanding "Choice" in School Choice". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 7 (1): 1–42. doi:10.1257/mic.20120027. ISSN 1945-7669. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Sethi, Rajiv (2014). "Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 6 (4): 1–34. doi:10.1257/mic.6.4.1. ISSN 1945-7669. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo; Mierendorff, Konrad (2013). "Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach". Econometrica. 81 (6): 2487–2520. doi:10.3982/ECTA11405. ISSN 1468-0262. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Budish, Eric; Che, Yeon-Koo; Kojima, Fuhito; Milgrom, Paul (2013). "Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications". American Economic Review. 103 (2): 585–623. doi:10.1257/aer.103.2.585. ISSN 0002-8282. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Dessein, Wouter; Kartik, Navin (2013). "Pandering to Persuade". American Economic Review. 103 (1): 47–79. doi:10.1257/aer.103.1.47. ISSN 0002-8282. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Y.-K.; Gale, I.; Kim, J. (2013). "Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents". The Review of Economic Studies. 80 (1): 73–107. doi:10.1093/restud/rds025. eISSN 1467-937X. ISSN 0034-6527. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila; Che, Yeon-Koo; Yasuda, Yosuke (2011). "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered". American Economic Review. 101 (1): 399–410. doi:10.1257/aer.101.1.399. ISSN 0002-8282. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo (2010). "Bidding with Securities: Comment". American Economic Review. 100 (4): 1929–1935. doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1929. ISSN 0002-8282. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Kojima, Fuhito (2010). "Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms". Econometrica. 78 (5): 1625–1672. doi:10.3982/ECTA8354. ISSN 1468-0262. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon‐Koo; Kartik, Navin (2009). "Opinions as Incentives". Journal of Political Economy. 117 (5): 815–860. doi:10.1086/648432. ISSN 0022-3808. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Terrence, Hendershott (2009). "The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games". The Economists' Voice. 6 (9): 1–4. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo (2009). "Optimal collusion-proof auctions". Journal of Economic Theory. 144 (2): 565–603. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004. ISSN 0022-0531. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo (2006). "Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation". Econometrica. 74 (4): 1063–1107. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00694.x. ISSN 1468-0262. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Sákovics, József (2004). "A Dynamic Theory of Holdup". Econometrica. 72 (4): 1063–1103. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00526.x. ISSN 1468-0262. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Hausch, Donald B. (1999). "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting". American Economic Review. 89 (1): 125–147. doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.125. ISSN 0002-8282. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian (2003). "Optimal Design of Research Contests". American Economic Review. 93 (3): 646–671. doi:10.1257/000282803322157025. ISSN 0002-8282. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian L. (1998). "Caps on Political Lobbying". The American Economic Review. 88 (3): 643–651. ISSN 0002-8282. JSTOR 116854. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian L. (2006). "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply". American Economic Review. 96 (4): 1355–1360. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Yoo, Seung-Weon (2001). "Optimal Incentives for Teams". American Economic Review. 91 (3): 525–541. doi:10.1257/aer.91.3.525. ISSN 0002-8282. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian (2006). "Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types". Theoretical Economics. 1 (1): 95–118. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian (1998). "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders". Review of Economic Studies. 65 (1): 1–21. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00033. eISSN 1467-937X. ISSN 0034-6527. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian (2000). "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer". Journal of Economic Theory. 92 (2): 198–233. doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2639. ISSN 0022-0531. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Andreoni, James; Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo (2005). Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment. UCLA Department of Economics. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Spier, Kathryn E. (2008). "Strategic judgment proofing". The RAND Journal of Economics. 39 (4): 926–948. doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00044.x. ISSN 1756-2171. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo; Lewis, Tracy R. (2007). "The role of lockups in takeover contests". The RAND Journal of Economics. 38 (3): 648–669. doi:10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00105.x. ISSN 1756-2171. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Burguet, Roberto; Che, Yeon-Koo (2004). "Competitive Procurement with Corruption". The RAND Journal of Economics. 35 (1): 50–68. doi:10.2307/1593729. ISSN 0741-6261. JSTOR 1593729. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- Che, Yeon-Koo (1993). "Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions". The RAND Journal of Economics. 24 (4): 668–680. doi:10.2307/2555752. ISSN 0741-6261. JSTOR 2555752. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
References
- ^ Che, Yeon-Koo. "Curriculum Vitae" (PDF). Yeon-Koo Che. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "Fellows of the Econometric Society 1950 to 2019 | The Econometric Society". www.econometricsociety.org. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- ^ "Economic Theory Fellows". SAET. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- ^ "the Council of the Game Theory Society -". 2017-09-28. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- ^ "제1회 조락교경제학상 최연구 교수". Korea Economic Daily (in Korean). 2008-04-24. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
{{cite web}}
: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ^ "Maekyung-KAEA Economist". KAEA. 2020-05-30. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- ^ "Jacob Marschak Lecture | The Econometric Society". www.econometricsociety.org. Retrieved 2020-06-28.
- ^ Che, Yeon-Koo (1993). "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions". RAND Journal of Economics. 24 (4): 668–680. ISSN 0741-6261.
- ^ Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian (1998). "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders". The Review of Economic Studies. 65 (1): 1–21. ISSN 0034-6527.
- ^ Che, Yeon-Koo; Hausch, Donald B. (1999). "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting". The American Economic Review. 89 (1): 125–147. ISSN 0002-8282.
- ^ Segal, Ilya (1999-01-01). "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts". The Review of Economic Studies. 66 (1): 57–82. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00078. ISSN 0034-6527.
- ^ Hart, Oliver; Moore, John (1999-01-01). "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts". The Review of Economic Studies. 66 (1): 115–138. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00080. ISSN 0034-6527.
- ^ Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo; Kojima, Fuhito (2019). "Stable Matching in Large Economies". Econometrica. 87 (1): 65–110. doi:10.3982/ecta13547. ISSN 0012-9682.
- ^ Che, Yeon-Koo; Tercieux, Olivier (2019-10-01). "Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets". Journal of Political Economy. 127 (5): 2301–2342. doi:10.1086/701791. ISSN 0022-3808.
External Links
- Yeon-Koo Che's webpage
- Department of Economics, Columbia University
- Yeon-Koo Che publications indexed by Google Scholar