Efficient Threshold FHE for Privacy-Preserving Applications

Siddhartha Chowdhury¹, Sayani Sinha¹, Animesh Singh¹, Shubham Mishra², Chandan Chaudhary¹, Sikhar Patranabis³, Pratyay Mukherjee⁴, Ayantika Chatterjee¹, and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay¹

> ¹IIT Kharagpur ²UC Berkeley ³IBM Research, India ⁴SupraOracles Research

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Abstract

Threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption (ThFHE) enables arbitrary computation over encrypted data while keeping the decryption key distributed across multiple parties at all times. ThFHE is a key enabler for threshold cryptography and, more generally, secure distributed computing. Existing ThFHE schemes relying on standard hardness assumptions, inherently require highly inefficient parameters and are unsuitable for practical deployment. In this paper, we take a novel approach towards making ThFHE practically usable by (i) proposing an efficient ThFHE scheme with a new analysis resulting in significantly improved parameters; (ii) and providing the first practical ThFHE implementation benchmark based on Torus FHE.

- We propose the *first practical* ThFHE scheme with a *polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio* that supports practically efficient parameters while retaining provable security based on standard quantum-safe assumptions. We achieve this via Rényi divergence-based security analysis of our proposed threshold decryption mechanism.
- We present a prototype software implementation of our proposed ThFHE scheme that builds upon the existing Torus-FHE library and supports (distributed) decryption on highly resource-constrained ARM-based handheld devices. Along the way, we implement several extensions to the Torus FHE library, including a Torus-based linear integer secret sharing subroutine to support ThFHE key sharing and distributed decryption for any threshold access structure.

We illustrate the efficacy of our proposal via an end-to-end use case involving encrypted computations over a real medical database and distributed decryptions of the computed result on resource-constrained ARM-based handheld devices.

Contents

1	Intr	roduction	3
	1.1	Our Contribution	4
2	\mathbf{Rel}	ated Works	5
	2.1	Threshold FHE	5
	2.2	Additional Related Works	7
3	\mathbf{Pre}	liminaries and Background	9
	3.1	Notations and Mathematical Background	10
	3.2	Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)	11
	3.3	Threshold FHE	12
	3.4	Linear Integer Secret Sharing Scheme (LISSS)	15
4	Our	Proposal: Torus-FHE with Threshold Decryption	16
	4.1	Decryption in Torus-FHE	16
	4.2	Achieving (T, T) -Distributed Decryption	17
	4.3	Security of Proposed (T, T) -Threshold FHE	18
	4.4	Generalized (t, T) -Threshold Decryption Protocol	21
		4.4.1 Extending Benaloh-Leichter LISSS	21
		4.4.2 Proposed (t, T) -Threshold Decryption	23
		4.4.3 Correctness and Security of the Proposed Scheme	24
5	Soft	tware Implementation and Experimental Evaluation	28
	5.1	Implementation Details	29
	5.2	Experimental Evaluation	30
6	Cas	e-Study: Computing over Encrypted Medical Data	34
	6.1	Encrypted KNN Computation	34
	6.2	Experimental Results	35
7	Cor	nclusion and Future Work	36
Α	Sec	urity Proof of (t, T) -threshold FHE for Any $t' \le (t - 1)$ Corruptions	44
в	Obs	serving the Pattern of Secret Shares	46
С	ΑI	Discussion on extended Benaloh-Leichter LISSS	49

1 Introduction

Outsourced Computation. The recent advent of cloud computing technologies [Hay08, WVLY⁺10] enables individuals and organizations to outsource heavy computations to potentially untrusted third-party servers. However, this poses new challenges for the security and privacy of the data, particularly when the data contains sensitive information such as individual medical records, etc. For compliance, regulation, and other essential privacy requirements, the data must be kept secure at rest, in transit, and during computation.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). While traditional encryption procedures are useful for securing data at rest and in transit, they often fail to achieve any security during computation. FHE [Gen09, BGV14, BGG⁺18] resolves this problem by enabling computation on encrypted data. This motivates a significant body of research work [SS10, CNT12, DM15a, CGGI20, CGBH⁺18, SFK⁺21] to focus on building practically efficient fully homomorphic encryption systems.

Threshold Cryptography. While FHE resolves the crucial problem of computation on encrypted data, one must store the decryption key securely to get any real benefit out of it. Typical enterprise key management solutions involve using secure hardware solutions such as HSMs, SGXs, etc. While they provide reasonable security in practice, they often suffer from a lack of programmability, cumbersome setup procedures, scalability, high cost, sidechannel attacks etc [KHF⁺19,LSG⁺18]. An alternative approach, that uses threshold cryptography [Sha79,DF90,DDFY94] is offered by enterprises like Hashicorp Vault¹. In that approach, the key is shared among multiple servers (say T) to avoid a "single point of failure" and a threshold number of them (say t) can collaborate to recompute the decryption key. However, this defies the purpose as a single compromise at the decryption server, during a key reconstruction, would reveal the key entirely. An ideal solution must have the decryption key distributed at all time. This is achieved by a ThFHE (Threshold-FHE) scheme [AJL⁺12, MW16, BGG⁺18, CCK23], where the decryption is performed jointly by any threshold number of parties without reconstructing the key at any one place. In particular, parties compute partial decryption with their shares of the key and send them over to the decryptor, who, once obtains t such partial decryptions in total (may include its own partial decryption), combines them to get the message.

Practical ThFHE. While there are several ThFHE schemes in the literature [AJL⁺12,MW16, BGG⁺18, MS⁺11, JRS17, CCK23], they are far from being practical. This is in contrast to the literature in FHE, in that many practical proposals and prototypes exist². Perhaps the most crucial bottleneck of the existing schemes comes from the security requirement imposed by the threshold decryption procedure, which might involve up to t - 1 corrupted servers (we only consider passive/semi-malicious corruption here). In slightly more detail, the modulus-to-noise ratio used in the existing threshold schemes must be set *super-polynomial* (in the security parameter) compared to the non-threshold FHE schemes that require only a polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio. The use of super-polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio stems from a technique called *smudging* (alternatively *noise flooding*), which is used to achieve security when the parties are corrupt during the distributed decryption. In this work, we propose an efficient ThFHE scheme, which uses polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio – we achieve this by adapting a

¹https://www.vaultproject.io/

²https://homenc.github.io/HElib/,

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/microsoft-seal/, https://palisade-crypto.org/

https://tfhe.github.io/tfhe/,

Rényi divergence-based technique for distinguishing problems with public sampleability property as discussed in [BLRL⁺18, TT15]. This dramatically improves the system's efficiency, as shown by our prototype software implementation.

1.1 Our Contribution

In this work we significantly improve the state-of-art for practical ThFHE scheme by both *new theoretical analysis* and *first prototype implementations*. Finally, we complement this by providing a use case for a real-world, end-to-end system that securely computes outsourced medical data, and distributed decryption of the computed result is performed by distributing the key among different lightweight devices that medical personnel hold while avoiding the single-point of failure, thus enabling enhanced privacy.

Practical Threshold FHE Scheme with Polynomial Modulus-to-Noise Ratio. Our construction is based on the prior constructions [AJL⁺12, MW16, CM15]. In particular, we plug-in the threshold decryption technique from Asharov et al. [AJL⁺12] into the FHE scheme by Gentry, Sahai and Water [GSW13] (GSW) – as a result, we get a single-key ThFHE version of the scheme by Mukherjee and Wichs [MW16] with two crucial differences: (i) the smudging noise is sampled from a Gaussian distribution; (ii) a polynomial modulus is used. In our analysis, which is inspired by the works such as [BLRL⁺18, TT15, ASY22], we use Rényi divergence instead of statistical distance, which essentially made those changes possible and achieves indistinguishability-based notion of security [JRS17]. As a result, we obtain the practically efficient ThFHE scheme with polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio. Remarkably, polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio not only improves the efficiency significantly but also makes the scheme potentially more secure – this is because such a ratio for the underlying Learning with Errors problem [Reg09] implies reduction to the corresponding worst-case lattice problem with polynomial approximation factor, which is believed to be significantly harder than the same problem with super-polynomial approximation factor, which is obtained if a super-polynomial ratio is used. For more details, we refer to, for example, [BV14].

First Software Prototype for Threshold FHE. We provide the first prototype implementation of a ThFHE system with a benchmark in software. We expand further below.

- In our software implementation, we provide an extension of the existing library for Torus-FHE¹. We also provide the first software implementation of a linear integer secret sharing scheme extended from [DT06] to support Torus Ring-LWE secret key sharing, which may be of independent interest. Our extended Torus-FHE library supports arbitrary t-out-of-T threshold decryption while maintaining a polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio.
- To emulate our intended use-case of decryption in handheld devices, we develop a portable implementation of the threshold decryption routines. We provide the results from its experimentation on a Raspberry Pi 3b board that uses a 64 bit ARM CPU.

A Practical Use-case. Finally, as a use-case, we provide a detailed description of an endto-end secure computation system over outsourced encrypted medical data. The goal is to have encrypted medical data stored in the cloud, such that any heavy computation may be performed on that encrypted data. At the same time, the decryption key must be stored in an easily accessible but secure way. In particular, a medical personnel who owns many lightweight

¹https://tfhe.github.io/tfhe/

devices should be able to access the result of the computation by using t devices, but if any t-1 device are compromised, then the decryption key must not be revealed, even if the compromised device participates in several decryption sessions. For example, in a (5,8)-threshold decryption system, any five devices should be able to perform the distributed decryption, and the decryption key should remain secure as long as the number of compromised parties is less than five. Furthermore, the system should be such that the encryption or the computation on the encrypted data should be oblivious to the values of t or T. In particular, one may think about changing those values later. Our system satisfies all of these aspects.

2 Related Works

2.1 Threshold FHE

The concept of ThFHE, introduced by Asharov et al. [AJL⁺12], has been majorly studied in two related but slightly different contexts: (i) to build low-round multiparty computation protocols [AJL⁺12, MW16, GLS15, BJMS20]; (ii) and as a key enabler for threshold cryptography [BGG⁺18, JRS17, CCK23]. At a technical level these two categories of schemes follow slightly different definitions because of different application requirements. The MPCmotivated works (category (i) above) consider mainly (T, T)-threshold settings (Badrinarayan et al. [BJMS20] is an exception), whereas the later works are focused towards achieving (t,T) $(t \leq T)$ setting (which is standard in the threshold cryptography literature). Furthermore, the former works (necessarily, due to requirement of MPC) considered distributed key-generation for single-key schemes,¹ unless, of course, a specialized public-key infrastructure was assumed. The only distributed step considered by the threshold-inspired works (category-(ii) above) was distributed decryption, in that every party has a common ciphertext and their own share of secret decryption key; and then each party broadcasts a partially decrypted ciphertext generated locally, which are then combined together to obtain the decrypted value – this is similar to threshold public-key encryption [BBH06, Fra90, DF90, SG02]. The distributed decryption step is modular and essentially agnostic of how the ciphertext is generated. In particular, such decryption protocol can be plugged-in to schemes with appropriate distributed key-generation protocol or can be used in a multi-key scheme a la [MW16,BJMS20] (or even with a symmetrickey scheme).² Therefore, distributed decryption step appears in both categories of the above work. Our focus here is more aligned with the threshold cryptography literature, and hence we follow the second approach. One common aspect of all of the above distributed decryption constructions is the use of the so-called noise smudging technique to achieve a simulationbased security guarantee when up to (t-1) parties are (semi-maliciously) corrupt. The main idea is to sample noise from a Gaussian distribution and then use it to "smudge" (alternatively "flood") the "sensitive LWE noise" in the partially decrypted ciphertext. The analysis (based on simple statistical distance measurements) crucially relies on the smudging noise being super-polynomially larger than the LWE noise; then to ensure correctness one must use a superpolynomial modulus-to-noise ratio – this results in impractical parameters. In this paper, we instead use a novel Rényi divergence-based analysis inspired by [BLRL+18, TT15] – this allows

 $^{^{1}}$ The multi-key schemes are the exceptions. For e.g., Mukherjee and Wichs [MW16] naturally dispensed with the key-generation step, which was the key-step to achieve round-optimal MPC in the common random string model.

²In a (T,T) setting the distributed key-generation is trivial [AJL⁺12]. In the (t,T) setting, a non-trivial protocol (using a generic MPC protocol a la [BJMS20] or more efficient protocols [GHL22]) is required. This is not the focus of our work.

us to use a polynomially large smudging noise and subsequently a polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio, thereby putting ThFHE in the practical regime.

Comparison with a Few Concurrent and Independent Works. We compare our work ¹ with a few concurrent and independent works [BS23b,DWF22,MS23,DDEK⁺23] that also aim to design ThFHE schemes with polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio with some of them relying on Renýi divergence-based arguments. In particular, we highlight the key technical differences between our approach and the approaches used in these works, and the resulting differences in terms of security, practical efficiency, and reliance on assumptions (such as random oracles or non-standard hardness assumptions).

Comparison with [BS23b]. Boudgoust and Scholl [BS23b] proposed a poly-modulus threshold FHE scheme that achieves full-fledged IND-CPA security with partial decryption query simulatability. They follow a two-step proof strategy: (a) argue one-way CPA security based on Rényi divergence (which, unlike our approach, does not require a public sampleability argument), and (b) use an additional transformation to achieve full-fledged security, which either uses a random oracle (RO) or Goldreich-Levin (GL) hard-core predicates [GL89]. As mentioned in [BS23b], the RO-based construction incurs significant limitations in terms of homomorphic computation capabilities (in particular, since the RO itself does not have an efficient circuit description), while the hardcore predicate-based construction incurs additional overheads, particularly due to larger ciphertext size. On the other hand, we prove the indistinguishabilitybased security of ThFHE using a Rényi divergence-based public sampleability argument in the standard model, thereby avoiding random oracles and preserving the fully homomorphic computation capabilities of the underlying scheme without any additional overheads.

Comparison with [DWF22]. Dai et al. [DWF22] proposed a ThFHE scheme while relying on Rényi divergence-based arguments. The work proposes two approaches – the first based on leakage-resilient Dual-GSW [BHP17], and the other based on RO. The first approach relies on a security argument that seems to hold only for a single (or at most a constant number of) partial decryption query (queries), and it is unclear how the analysis would extend to polynomially many partial decryption queries (and what the corresponding effect on the scheme's noise parameters would be). On the other hand, our security model allows polynomially many partial decryption queries and we prove the security of our proposed ThFHE scheme in this model, while also formalizing the effect of the number of queries on the noise parameters for our scheme. We believe that for real-world applications, it is reasonable to assume that the adversary is allowed to see polynomially many decryption queries, and any restriction thereof is perhaps undesirable. Finally, our approach avoids the use of RO (and any restrictions to the homomorphic computation capabilities resulting from such an approach).

Comparison with $[DDEK^+23]$. In a recent work, Dahl et al. $[DDEK^+23]$ targeted to construct a practical ThFHE scheme with polynomial modulus. However they have an incomparable security model with respect to ours. $[DDEK^+23]$ supports at most $t < \frac{T}{3}$ malicious corruptions, whereas we allow any t < T semi-honest corruptions. From the perspective of performance, our implementation outperforms $[DDEK^+23]$ significantly in terms of threshold decryption while maintaining the same homomorphic evaluation performance. Given a ciphertext with modulus "q" and dimension "n", $[DDEK^+23]$ uses a two-step approach for every threshold decryption, which requires more than 300 milliseconds overall: (a) The first step (switch-andsquash) requires around 300 milliseconds (Table-2 of $[DDEK^+23]$), (b) The second step is the actual threshold decryption. Even ignoring the additional computation/communication

¹Full version of this work is available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1625

required by an additional offline step in [DDEK⁺23] for larger values of $\binom{T}{t}$, the reported execution time in Section 5 of [DDEK⁺23] is around 2 milliseconds. Our threshold decryption has an execution time of 0.05 milliseconds (Figure 9), ignoring network latency. Including latency (assuming 5 Mbps network), our end-to-end threshold decryption time is around 6 milliseconds (Figure 8), which is significantly smaller than [DDEK⁺23].

In contrast, our approach results in a decryption protocol which is always just one round. Apart from that, to achieve stronger multiparty security guarantees such as robustness, resilience against malicious adversaries etc., [DDEK⁺23] restricts to the cases of either honest supermajority $(t < \frac{T}{3})$ or honest majority $(t < \frac{T}{2})$; whereas, our protocol achieves security in semi-honest settings for arbitrary threshold t.

Comparison with [MS23]. In another very recent work, Micciancio et al. [MS23] proposed a threshold FHE that requires only polynomial modulus even when the adversary is allowed to perform arbitrarily any polynomial number of partial decryption queries. This is in contrast to our proposed threshold FHE where we achieve a polynomial modulus with a priori bounded number of queries. However, the difference is that our construction does not require any additional hardness assumption for thresholdization of the existing FHE scheme whereas their threshold construction relies on a new variant of the RLWE problem called "Known-Covariance RLWE" whose hardness is yet to be well-understood. In this context, we believe both of these works are of independent interest: one achieves a polynomial modulus with standard assumptions but a priori bounded number of queries. Both these insights can potentially lead to future schemes with practical parameters based on standard cryptographic assumptions while allowing polynomially many queries.

Comparison with $[STH^+23]$. In this paper $[STH^+23]$, Sugizaki et al. proposed a Threshold FHE with distributed key generation and distributed decryption on Torus-FHE library [CGGI20]. While they primarily focus on distributed key generation, the smudging noise parameter required in distributed decryption remains unaltered (super-polynomial). On the contrary, our main focus is to develop a threshold FHE with threshold decryption requiring only polynomial smudging noise parameter. Apart from that, our proposed threshold decryption has significantly better performance. For example, Table-3 of $[STH^+23]$ reports an execution time of 20 milliseconds for a 3-out-of-8 threshold scenario, whereas our proposed threshold decryption takes around 0.05 milliseconds. Also, $[STH^+23]$ reports a communication time of 350 milliseconds of communication time, assuming just 5 Mbps network.

Table 1 provides a summary of comparison of our work with other concurrent and independent works for several parameters. In the next subsection, we mention some additional related works with different goals and/or security models compared to ours.

2.2 Additional Related Works

More Threshold Cryptosystem. In [BD10], Bendlin and Damgård proposed a generic technique to construct a threshold cryptosystem from the Regev cryptosystem, however, requiring a super-polynomially large modulus-to-noise ratio. Agrawal et al. [ASY22] uses a Rényi divergence-based technique for tightening their security and does achieve polynomial-modulus but in the context of lattice-based threshold signature. Gur et al. [GKS23] build threshold lattice-based signatures from a threshold homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme while sup-

Scheme	Dis- tributed key gener- ation	Dis- tributed de- cryp- tion	Smudg- ing Noise	Threat model	Arbi- trary cor- rup- tion	Allowed queries	Assumption
Boudgoust and Scholl [BS23b]	No	Yes	Polyno- mial	Semi- honest	Yes	Adaptive and poly- nomial	$\begin{array}{c} \text{RLWE} + \text{RO} \\ \text{model} \end{array}$
Dahl et al. [DDEK ⁺ 23]	No	Yes	Polyno- mial	Mali- cious	No	Adaptive and poly- nomial	RLWE + MPC (pre- processing)
Dai et al. [DWF22]	No	Yes	Polyno- mial	Semi- malicious	Yes	Adaptive and constant	Leakage- resilient dual- GSW/RO model
Micciancio et al. [MS23]	No	Yes	Polyno- mial	Semi- honest	Yes	Adaptive and poly- nomial	Known- Covariance RLWE
Sugizaki et al. [STH ⁺ 23]	Yes	Yes	Super- Polynomial	Semi- honest	Yes	Adaptive and poly- nomial	Super- polynomial RLWE
Ours	No	Yes	Polyno- mial	Semi- honest	Yes	Selective and poly- nomial	RLWE

Table 1: Comparison with concurrent works

porting active security in distributed key-generation and threshold decryption, but their HE scheme is linearly homomorphic and their smudging parameter is chosen based on statistical argument which requires a super-polynomially large modulus. In contrast to the above-mentioned works, our proposed scheme requires only a polynomially large modulus while thresholdizing the **Torus-**FHE scheme which is fully homomorphic.

Efficient FHE Bootstrapping. In a recent work, Lee et al. $[LMK^+23]$ proposed improved bootstrapping methods for FHEW/Torus FHE [DM15b, CGGI20] and their threshold versions. They do not focus on achieving ThFHE with polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio, which is the main focus of our work. Our techniques are agnostic of the bootstrapping procedure used during homomorphic evaluations (and can be potentially combined with the bootstrapping techniques of $[LMK^+23]$ to achieve more efficient ThFHE schemes; we leave this as an interesting open question).

Approximate and Circuit-Private FHE. Other recent works [LMSS22, KS23] focus on achieving stronger security notions (namely IND-CPA^D security) and circuit-privacy for approximate FHE schemes (e.g., CKKS [CKKS17]) using differential privacy tools. Again, their goals and security models are orthogonal to ours, as we focus on designing efficient threshold decryption mechanisms for *exact* FHE schemes (such as Torus FHE) under a different (and incomparable) security definition as compared to IND-CPA^D. Consequently, the security analysis and lower bounds on parameter choices described in [LMSS22, KS23] are seemingly inapplicable to our scheme and differ conceptually from our Rényi divergence-based security analysis of ThFHE.

Multi-Key FHE. In a multi-key FHE scheme, the parties encrypt their input with individual keys (generated locally) and then broadcast them; subsequently, an extended ciphertext is constructed using all the encryptions from the involved parties, and any arbitrary homomorphic operation can be performed on the extended ciphertext [LATV12, CM15, MW16, BP16, PS16, CZW17, CO17, CCS19, AJJM20, Par21]. We do not focus on multi-key FHE in this work; however, as mentioned earlier, our distributed/threshold decryption approach and the corresponding security analyses can be adapted to the multi-key setting. We leave this as an interesting direction of future research.

Multiparty HE. Mouchet et al. [MTBH21] recently considered a new notion of multiparty homomorphic encryption scheme (MPHE), which is very similar to the Asharov's et al. [AJL⁺12]'s threshold FHE notion, that has both distributed key-generation plus distributed decryption, albeit for a (T, T) access structure. They also included an implementation benchmark [MBTPH20]. A subsequent construction secure against malicious adversary has been proposed [CMS⁺23] recently. However, a major shortcoming of their definition is the absence of a simulation-based definition for their partial decryption protocol – so it does not capture a realistic threat model where adversary can corrupt parties while participating in the decryption procedure. Therefore, they did not need to use any noise smudging. Therefore, their implementation can not be counted as a predecessor of ours. Another work by Ananth et al. [AJJM20] defines another primitive, which they also call multiparty homomorphic encryption – this is a slightly weaker variant of multi-key FHE, in that the decryption computation complexity grows with the circuit being evaluated. Padron and Vargas [PV21] define an even weaker primitive (where the evaluator holds part of the secret key) and calls it multiparty homomorphic encryption. Our notion of ThFHE and the corresponding security definition differ significantly from all of the above mentioned notions.

Software Frameworks. Recent works have accelerated FHE (non-threshold) implementations via GPU based parallelizations. Based on [CGGI20], a Python library **NuFHE**¹ has been developed. In [CDS15], the **Cingulata** (formerly, Armadillo) C++ toolchain and run-time environment were introduced for running programs over FHE ciphertexts, which now supports Torus FHE. **Lattigo**² [MBTPH20] on the other hand is a Go based module that builds secure protocols based on Multiparty-Homomorphic-Encryption and Ring-Learning-With-Errors-based Homomorphic Encryption Primitives. Some recent extensions proposed in [MBH23, MTBH21] do support threshold decryption; however, all of these implementations fundamentally require a superpolynomial modulus-to-noise ratio. Additionally, they only support *leveled* homomorphic versions (i.e., without bootstrapping) of the BGV [BGV14], BFV [Bra12, FV12] and CKKS [CKKS17] FHE schemes. Our ThFHE implementation builds upon and extends the Torus FHE library in a natural way (including the bootstrapping procedure), and is cross-compatible with all of these computation frameworks.

3 Preliminaries and Background

In this section, we introduce the notations and some preliminary background on cryptographic primitives used in this paper.

¹https://nufhe.readthedocs.io/en/latest/

²https://github.com/tuneinsight/lattigo

3.1 Notations and Mathematical Background

Notations. We use \mathbb{T} to denote the **Torus** (i.e., the set of all real numbers modulo 1). We write $x \leftarrow \chi$ to represent that an element x is sampled uniformly at random from a set/distribution \mathcal{X} . For $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $a, b \ge 0$, we denote by [a] and [a, b] the set of integers lying between 1 and a (both inclusive), and the set of integers lying between a and b (both inclusive). We refer to $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ as the security parameter, and denote by $\operatorname{poly}(\lambda)$ and $\operatorname{negl}(\lambda)$ any generic (unspecified) polynomial function and negligible function in λ , respectively.¹

LWE Assumption and its Variants. Here, we recall the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption and some of its variants, including the Ring LWE (RLWE) and the Binary RLWE assumption.

<u>LWE Assumption</u>. Let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ be a security parameter, and let $q, n, m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$. For each $i \in [m]$, let

$$a_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n, \quad b_i = a_i \cdot s + e_i, \quad u_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q,$$

where $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is a uniformly sampled secret vector, $e_i \leftarrow \psi$ where ψ is a Gaussian noise distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q , and $a_i \cdot s$ denotes the vector dot-product between the vectors a_i and s. The LWE hardness assumption states that, for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary \mathcal{A} , the following holds:

$$|\mathsf{Pr}[\mathcal{A}(\{\boldsymbol{a}_i, b_i\}_{i \in [m]}) = 0] - \mathsf{Pr}[\mathcal{A}(\{\boldsymbol{a}_i, u_i\}_{i \in [m]}) = 0]| < \operatorname{negl}(\lambda).$$

<u>RLWE Assumption</u>. Let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ be a security parameter, and let $q, N, m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$. For each $i \in [m]$, let

$$A_i(X) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N+1), \quad B_i(X) = A_i(X) \cdot S(x) + E_i(X),$$
$$U_i(X) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N+1),$$

where $S(X) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N+1)$ is a uniformly sampled secret polynomial, $E_i(X) \leftarrow \psi[X]/(X^N+1)$ where ψ is a Gaussian noise distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q , and $A_i(X) \cdot S(X)$ denotes the polynomial multiplication modulo (X^N+1) between $A_i(X)$ and S(X). The Ring LWE (RLWE) hardness assumption states that, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(\{A_i(X), B_i(X)\}_{i \in [m]} \right) = 0 \right] - \\ \Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(\{A_i(X), U_i(X)\}_{i \in [m]} \right) = 0 \right] \right| < \operatorname{negl}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

Binary RLWE. The Binary RLWE (BRLWE) hardness assumption is a variant of the RLWE hardness assumption described above where, the secret key polynomial S(X) is sampled from $\mathbb{B}[X]/(X^N+1)$ as opposed to $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^N+1)$, where $\mathbb{B} = \{0, 1\}$. Note that although an equivalence between the LWE with binary secrets assumption and the standard LWE assumption is known [Mic18], a similar result for BRLWE and RLWE is not known to the best of our knowledge. However, the BRLWE hardness assumption is widely believed to hold [BBPS19, BD20].

Threshold Access Structure. For any $T, t \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $t \leq T$, a (t, T)-threshold access structure over any set $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$ is defined as a collection of qualified subsets of the form $\mathbb{A}_{t,T} = \{\overline{\mathcal{P}} \subseteq \mathcal{P} : |\overline{\mathcal{P}}| \geq t\}$, which (informally) states that any subset with t or more parties is a qualified subset. If $\mathbb{A}_{t,T}$ is a *minimal* (t,T)-threshold access structure, then it only consists

¹Note that a function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ is said to be negligible in λ if for every positive polynomial $p, f(\lambda) < 1/p(\lambda)$ when λ is sufficiently large.

of subsets of size exactly t; in other words, we have $|\mathbb{A}_{t,T}| = \binom{T}{t}$. Observe that this access structure can be represented efficiently [BGG⁺18]. In particular, there exists a polynomial-size circuit that takes as input T-length vectors and outputs a bit, such that for every valid subset $S \in \mathbb{A}_{t,T}$, on input the T-sized binary vector $V = \{V_i\}_{i \in [T]}$ with $V_i = 1$ if and only if $P_i \in S$, the circuit outputs 1 (see [BGG⁺18] for details).

Rényi Divergence. Let Supp(P) and Supp(Q) denote the supports of distributions P and Q respectively, such that $Supp(P) \subseteq Supp(Q)$. For $a \in (1, +\infty)$, the Rényi divergence of order a is

$$R_a(P||Q) = \left(\sum_{x \in Supp(P)} \frac{P(x)^a}{Q(x)^{a-1}}\right)^{\frac{1}{a-1}}$$

This definition extends naturally to continuous distributions (see [BLRL+18] for details).

3.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a form of encryption that permits computations directly over encrypted data without decrypting it first. The result of this computation is also encrypted. Below, we recall the definition of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [Gen09, GHS12] for any message space \mathcal{M} .

Definition 1 (Fully Homomorphic Encryption). A fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme is a tuple of four algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) with respect to a class of Boolean functions $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_\ell\}_{\ell \in \mathbb{N}}$ (represented as Boolean circuits with ℓ -bit inputs) such that the tuple (Gen, Enc, Dec) is an IND-CPA-secure public-key encryption (PKE) scheme as defined below, and the evaluation algorithm Eval satisfies the homomorphism and compactness properties as defined below:

IND-CPA security: For any $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen(1^{\lambda})$, for any messages $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$, and for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary \mathcal{A} , letting $ct_0 \leftarrow Enc(pk, m_0)$ and $ct_1 \leftarrow Enc(pk, m_1)$,

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk},\mathsf{m}_0,\mathsf{m}_1,\mathsf{ct}_0)=1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk},\mathsf{m}_0,\mathsf{m}_1,\mathsf{ct}_1)] = 1| \le \operatorname{negl}(\lambda).$$

Correctnesss: The homomorphism of the FHE scheme ensures correctness. For any (Boolean) function $f : \{0,1\}^{\ell} \to \{0,1\} \in \mathcal{F}$ and any sequence of ℓ messages $\mathsf{m}_1, \ldots, \mathsf{m}_{\ell}$, letting $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^{\lambda})$, and $\mathsf{ct}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{m}_i)$ for each $i \in [\ell]$, we have the following:

 $\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{pk},f,\mathsf{ct}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{ct}_\ell)) \neq f(\mathsf{m}_1,\ldots,\mathsf{m}_\ell)] \leq \operatorname{negl}(\lambda).$

Compactness: There exists a polynomial $p(\lambda)$ such that, for any (Boolean) function $f : \{0,1\}^{\ell} \to \{0,1\} \in \mathcal{F}$ and any sequence of ℓ messages m_1, \ldots, m_{ℓ} , letting $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^{\lambda})$, and $\mathsf{ct}_i \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{m}_i)$ for each $i \in [\ell]$, we have

$$|\mathsf{ct}^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{pk}, f, \mathsf{ct}_1, \dots, \mathsf{ct}_\ell))| \le p(\lambda),$$

where $p(\lambda)$ is independent of size of f and the number ℓ of inputs.

In the definition mentioned above, we assumed that the evaluation key is included as part of the public key.

3.3 Threshold FHE

In this section, we define Threshold FHE (or ThFHE in short), which is aligned with ThFHE definition of [BGG⁺18].

Definition 2 (Threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption (ThFHE)). Let S be a class of efficient access structures on a set of parties $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$. A ThFHE scheme for S over a message space \mathcal{M} is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms

ThFHE = (ThFHE.Gen, ThFHE.Enc, ThFHE.Eval, ThFHE.PartialDec, ThFHE.Combine),

defined as follows:

- ThFHE.Gen(1^λ, 1^d, A): On input the security parameter λ, a depth bound d, and an access structure A ∈ S, the setup algorithm outputs an encryption (public) key pk, a decryption (secret) key sk, and a set of secret key shares sk₁,..., sk_T.
- ThFHE.Enc(pk, μ): On input pk and a plaintext μ, the encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext ct.
- ThFHE.Eval(pk, C, ct₁,..., ct_ℓ): On input a public key pk, a Boolean circuit C of depth¹ at most d, and a set of ciphertexts ct₁,..., ct_ℓ, the evaluation algorithm outputs a ciphertext ct^{*}.
- ThFHE.PartialDec(sk_i, ct): On input a secret key share sk_i and a ciphertext ct, the partial decryption algorithm outputs a partial decryption p_i.
- ThFHE.Combine($\{p_i\}_{i \in S}$): On input a set of partial decryptions $\{p_i\}_{i \in S}$ for some subset $S \subseteq \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$, the combination algorithm either outputs a plaintext μ or the symbol \perp .

Trusted vs. Transparent setup. The key generation step of threshold FHE can be achieved in two different ways. One approach uses a "top-down" technique [BGG⁺18, JRS17] in which a trusted key dealer generates a public key-secret key pair, and then secret-shares the secret decryption key among the parties. Another approach alleviates the need for a trusted key dealer by allowing the parties to generate their secret key-public key pairs. Then, it uses a "bottom-up" technique [AJL⁺12, STH⁺23, KJY⁺20] to generate the common public key and evaluation key. In our work, we follow the top-down approach to generate the keys. However, we can support the bottom-up approach of distributed key generation in our threshold FHE scheme using the method proposed by Sugizaki et al. [STH⁺23] at an additional cost of key generation and homomorphic computation time, thus affecting the efficiency significantly.

Correctness and Compactness. Correctness and compactness of a ThFHE scheme are very similar in flavor to those for traditional FHE (Section 3.2). In case of correctness, while FHE requires that any honestly generated ciphertext should be decrypted to the correct plaintext, ThFHE requires that given an honestly generated ciphertext from homomorphic evaluation of some circuit on some encrypted inputs, recombining its partial decryptions by a threshold number of parties should result in correct circuit output. See [BGG⁺18] for formal definitions.

IND-Security. We adopt a selective version of the definition of IND-secure ThFHE from [JRS17]. Consider a ThFHE scheme over a message space \mathcal{M} for a threshold access structure $\mathbb{A}_{t,T}$ for a

 $^{^{1}}$ As we deal with FHE with bootstrapping in Torus-FHE, any circuit with arbitrary depth can be evaluated.

set of T parties $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$. Let λ be the security parameter and d be the depth bound for the ThFHE scheme. We define below a game $\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{ThFHE},\mathcal{A},\mathbb{A}_{t,T}}(1^{\lambda}, 1^d)$ between a PPT challenger \mathcal{C} and a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} .

 $\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{ThFHE},\mathcal{A},\mathbb{A}_{t,T}}(1^{\lambda},1^{d})$:

- 1. The challenger C runs ThFHE.Gen $(1^{\lambda}, 1^{d}, \mathbb{A}_{t,T})$ to obtain pk, sk, sk₁,..., sk_T, such that sk_i is the secret share corresponding to P_i , and provides the public key pk to the adversary A.
- 2. The adversary \mathcal{A} outputs a set $\mathcal{S} \subset \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$ such that $\mathcal{S} \notin \mathbb{A}_{t,T}$, and receives the set of secret key shares $\{sk_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}$ from \mathcal{C} .
- 3. The adversary \mathcal{A} outputs two set of messages $\mathbf{m}_0 = (m_1^0, \dots, m_\ell^0)$, $\mathbf{m}_1 = (m_1^1, \dots, m_\ell^1) \in \mathcal{M}$, along with a set of Q (= poly(λ)) circuits { $C_i : \mathcal{M}^\ell \to \mathcal{M}$ }_{$i \in [Q]$} of its choice (where each circuit C_i has depth at most d), such that $\forall i \in [Q]$, we have

$$C_i(m_1^0, \dots, m_\ell^0) = C_i(m_1^1, \dots, m_\ell^1).$$

- 4. The challenger C randomly samples a bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and provides \mathcal{A} with $\mathbf{ct}^* = \{\mathbf{ct}_i^*\}_{i \in [\ell]} = \{\mathsf{ThFHE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, m_i^b)\}_{i \in [\ell]}$.
- 5. In response to each query circuit C_i , where $i \in [Q]$, \mathcal{A} receives $(\hat{ct}_i, \{p_{i,j}\})$ for each $P_j \notin \mathcal{S}$, where

 $\hat{ct}_i = \text{ThFHE.Eval}(pk, C_i, ct^*), \quad p_{i,j} = \text{ThFHE.PartialDec}(sk_j, \hat{ct}_i).$

- 6. The adversary \mathcal{A} eventually outputs a bit $b' \in \{0, 1\}$.
- 7. If b' = b, output 1, otherwise output 0.

We say that a threshold FHE scheme ThFHE is IND-secure if, for any security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for any depth $d = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, for any threshold access structure $\mathbb{A}_{t,T}$, and for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , letting $\gamma_{\beta} = \Pr[\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{ThFHE},\mathcal{A},\mathbb{A}_{t,T}}(1^{\lambda}, 1^{d}) = \beta]$, for $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$ (where the probability is over the random coins used by ThFHE.Gen, ThFHE.Enc, ThFHE.Eval and the adversary \mathcal{A}), we have $|\gamma_{0} - \gamma_{1}| \leq \operatorname{negl}(\lambda)$.

A Detailed Discussion on Security Notions of ThFHE. The IND-security definition of ThFHE from [JRS17] effectively combines in sequence the definitions of simulation and semantic security for ThFHE from prior works [MW16, BGG⁺18, CCK23]. Informally, a ThFHE scheme is said to provide semantic security if a PPT adversary cannot efficiently distinguish between encryptions of arbitrarily chosen plaintext messages \mathbf{m}_0 and \mathbf{m}_1 [BGG⁺18, CCK23]. Additionally, a ThFHE scheme is said to provide simulation security if there exists an efficient algorithm to simulate partial decryptions of honest parties on ciphertexts that are produced by evaluating one or more circuits on (honestly generated) ciphertexts, without any knowledge of secret shares of honest parties [MW16, BGG⁺18, CCK23]. The IND-security definition of [JRS17] can be viewed as an indistinguishability-based security notion where we essentially require these two notions of security to hold simultaneously against a PPT adversary that is given the secret key shares of a set of corrupt parties belonging to an invalid access structure set S.

As noted in [JRS17], IND-security is a natural notion of security for ThFHE, and is implied by the simulation security definitions in prior works [MW16, BGG⁺18]. As is the case for many

other cryptographic primitives (e.g., functional encryption [BSW11]), indistinguishability-based security suffices for real-world applications (e.g., it suffices for the application presented subsequently as part of our case study in Section 6). We adopt a selective version of this definition from [JRS17] for our work and prove the security of our proposed ThFHE scheme under this definition.

Our notion of IND-security. The main difference between our notion of IND-security presented in the game $\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{ThFHE},\mathcal{A},\mathbb{A}_{t,T}}(1^{\lambda},1^{d})$ above and the security notion in [JRS17] is that we do not allow the adversary to adaptively decide the circuits for its partial decryption queries after seeing the challenge ciphertext. This restriction ensures that the adversary cannot "embed" the challenge ciphertext into the queried circuits, and is used in our proof of security (see Section 4.3 for a discussion). Notably, this IND-security definition allows us to port existing technical machinery for Rényi divergence-based analysis of other lattice-based cryptosystems [BLRL+18] to the context of threshold FHE (unfortunately, the original simulation security definition from prior works [MW16, BGG⁺18, CCK23] is not amenable to such techniques). Rényi divergence has previously been applied to achieve better parameter choices, particularly in case of search problems, for e.g., [ASY22, BLRL⁺18, BGM⁺16]. Applying Rényi divergence in the context of distinguishing problems is not straightforward. However, in this work, we can use techniques from [BLRL⁺18] to argue that for any ThFHE scheme, as long as the adversary's views of the real and simulated partial decryptions in our security game are publicly sampleable and have a bounded Rényi divergence, it cannot distinguish between encryptions of \mathbf{m}_0 and \mathbf{m}_1 with non-negligible probability without breaking the original semantic security guarantees of underlying FHE scheme. Looking ahead, for our proposed ThFHE scheme, we can achieve the desired bounds on the Rényi divergence while only using a polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio, which is the technical crux of our contribution. On the contrary, it is seemingly hard to achieve the original notion of simulation security proposed in [MW16, BGG⁺18, CCK23] without a superpolynomial modulus-to-noise ratio while relying on well-studied assumptions. However, [DDEK⁺23] achieves simulation security by maintaining a polynomial modulus while only supporting a priori number of bounded queries, on the other hand [MS23] achieves polynomial modulus by relying on non-standard variants of the ring LWE assumption ("Known-Covariance RLWE") that are yet to be well-understood.

Relation with IND-CPA^D Security of Approximate FHE. A (seemingly) related notion of IND-CPA^D security emerged in order to make approximate homomorphic encryption schemes secure against a specific key-recovery attack [LM21], which exploits the fact that a decryption oracle access to the adversary for the honestly generated ciphertexts helps it to retrieve the ciphertext noise in this scenario. However, the notion of $IND-CPA^D$ security reduces to IND-CPA security for the exact homomorphic schemes [LM21]. And as we deal with exact fully homomorphic encryption schemes (albeit in the threshold setting), we do not provide exactly that decryption oracle access (for honestly generated ciphertexts) to the adversary. Instead, we allow the adversary to query for honest parties' partial decryptions on honestly generated ciphertexts with proper constraints as described in the game $\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{ThFHE},\mathcal{A},\mathbb{A}_{\tau,T}}(1^{\lambda},1^{d})$. Therefore, though both definitions are augmented from standard IND-CPA security, there are crucial differences in the settings that seemingly make them orthogonal. For IND-CPA D , the entire secret key is in one place and the decryption oracle performs the entire decryption and then returns an erroneous plaintext, whereas, in the IND-secure security definition, a partial decryption oracle just returns a (possibly noisy) partial ciphertext computed using a share of the key. One may notice that a special case of IND-secure security, where there is only one party (essentially a centralized FHE) coincides with the standard IND-CPA, as we are in the exact setting. However, as long as the secret key is shared between more than one party, IND-secure

security appears to become orthogonal to IND-CPA^D , despite high-level similarities in terms of allowing decryption.¹

Discussion on active security. Our proposed threshold FHE scheme is secure against semi-honest adversaries which can corrupt the decryption servers. However, to enhance security against malicious adversaries, it is imperative to verify partial decryption performed by each decryption server using a quantum-safe Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) protocol [CDG⁺17, BLNS20, GCZ16] based verifiable distributed decryption techniques [LNP22, LNPS21, ABGS23], integrated with efficient commitment schemes [ACL⁺22, BS23a]. Presently available quantum-safe NIZKs suffer from practical inefficiencies. Therefore, their utilization within our threshold FHE scheme may significantly degrade the performance of the threshold decryption protocol.

3.4 Linear Integer Secret Sharing Scheme (LISSS)

In this work, we base our constructions and software implementation of Threshold FHE on a special class of secret sharing schemes called Linear Integer Secret Sharing Scheme (LISSS) defined below.

Definition 3 (LISSS). Let $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$ be a set of parties, and let \mathbb{S} be a class of efficient access structures on \mathcal{P} . A secret sharing scheme SS with secret space $\mathcal{K} = \mathbb{Z}_p$ for some prime p is called a linear integer secret sharing scheme (LISSS) if there exist the following algorithms:

- SS.Share $(k \in \mathcal{K}, \mathbb{A})$: There exists a matrix $\mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{d \times e}$ with dimensions determined by the access structure $\mathbb{A} \in \mathbb{S}$ called the distribution matrix, and each party P_i is associated with a partition $T_i \subseteq [d]$. To create the shares on a secret $k \in \mathcal{K}$, the sharing algorithm uniformly samples $\rho_2, \ldots, \rho_e \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, defines a vector $\mathbf{s} = (s_1, \ldots, s_d)^{\mathbf{T}} = \mathbf{M} \cdot (k, \rho_2, \ldots, \rho_e)^{\mathbf{T}}$, and outputs to each party P_i the corresponding set of shares $\mathsf{shares}_i = \{s_j\}_{j \in T_i}$.
- SS.Combine({share_i}_{P_i∈ P}): For any qualified subset of parties P ∈ A, there exists a set of efficiently computable "recovery coefficients" {c_j}_{j∈∪P_i∈ PT_i}, such that

$$\sum_{j \in \bigcup_{P_i \in \overline{\mathcal{P}}} T_i} c_j \cdot \mathbf{M}[j] = (1, 0, \dots, 0),$$

where $\mathbf{M}[j]$ denotes the *j*-th row of the matrix \mathbf{M} described earlier. Then, the final secret k can be re-computed using these recovery coefficients as

$$k = \sum_{j \in \cup_{P_i \in \overline{\mathcal{P}}} T_i} c_j \cdot s_j.$$

Definition 4 ($\{-1, 0, 1\}$ -LISSS). Let $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$ be a set of parties, and let \mathbb{S} be a class of efficient access structures on \mathcal{P} . Any LISSS scheme SS = (SS.Share, SS.Combine) as defined above is a $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ -LISSS if it is guaranteed that for any set of "recovery coefficients" $\{c_j\}$ generated by SS.Combine (on input the set of shares corresponding to a qualified subset of parties $\overline{\mathcal{P}} \in \mathbb{A}$ for an access structure $\mathbb{A} \in \mathbb{S}$), we must have $c_j \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$.

In this paper, we use a special instance of $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ -LISSS, called the Benaloh-Leichter LISSS [DT06]. We expand more on Benaloh-Leichter LISSS in Section 4.4.1.

¹Though we do not provide formal proof of orthogonality, one can observe that, as long as the secret key is shared, it is not clear how a reduction can work.

4 Our Proposal: Torus-FHE with Threshold Decryption

In this section, we present our novel construction of practical threshold FHE. We introduce two protocols - threshold secret sharing of the decryption key and threshold decryption, to realize our final ThFHE. Along the way, we describe our two main theoretical contributions an extension of the standard LISSS due to Benaloh and Leichter [DT06] to support the secret key structure which consists of binary polynomials, and the usage of Rényi Divergence based analysis to achieve only a small polynomial blowup in the noise level for our proposed ThFHE built upon Torus-FHE scheme. We first describe the generic decryption algorithm of any Ring-LWE based FHE scheme and then build its thresholdized construction. Our security proofs rely on the hardness of the LWE problem in the ring setting with binary secrets.

Remark. We remark here that our threshold decryption technique can, in fact, be generalized to any lattice-based encryption scheme where the decryption procedure involves computing a linear function of the secret key (in particular, Regev-style decryption based on computing an inner-product of the ciphertext vector and the secret key vector). However, since our concrete goal is to realize a threshold version of the **Torus**-FHE scheme from [CGGI20], we keep our theoretical discussion aligned with the **Torus**-FHE scheme (and the **Torus**-FHE library) for ease of exposition.

4.1 Decryption in Torus-FHE

For ease of exposition, we start with describing the generic decryption algorithm of a Ring-LWE based Torus-FHE scheme over a message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{T}[X]/(X^N + 1)$. We assume TRLWE to be an instantiation of such a scheme, represented by a tuple of PPT algorithms as follows,

$$\mathsf{TRLWE} = (\mathsf{TRLWE}.\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{TRLWE}.\mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{TRLWE}.\mathsf{Eval}, \mathsf{TRLWE}.\mathsf{Dec}).$$

The scheme has two fixed parameters N and k to denote size of polynomials and number of polynomials respectively. The secret key (say, **SK**) in TRLWE has the following structure with $SK_{i,j} \in \{0,1\} \ \forall 1 \leq i \leq k, \forall 1 \leq j \leq N$,

$$\mathbf{SK} = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N} SK_{1,j} x^{j-1}, \dots, \sum_{j=1}^{N} SK_{k,j} x^{j-1}\right).$$

The ciphertext in TRLWE can be written as CT = (A, B), where $B = \sum_{i=1}^{k} A[i] \cdot \mathbf{SK}[i] + \mathbf{m} + e$. Here $\mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{M}$ is the underlying plaintext and A can be represented as the following with each $A_{i,j} \in \mathbb{T}$,

$$A = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N} A_{1,j} x^{j-1}, \dots, \sum_{j=1}^{N} A_{k,j} x^{j-1}\right).$$

Also, $A[i] \cdot \mathbf{SK}[i]$ is the polynomial multiplication between i^{th} polynomial of A and i^{th} polynomial of \mathbf{SK} modulo $(x^N + 1)$. In order to avoid notational complexity, we will henceforth use $A \cdot \mathbf{SK}$ to denote $\sum_{i=1}^{k} A[i] \cdot \mathbf{SK}[i]$ in the paper. And, $e = \sum_{j=1}^{N} e_j x^{j-1}$ is RLWE noise polynomial with each $e_j \leftarrow \mathcal{G}$ (a Gaussian distribution).

We focus on distributed decryption of a Ring-LWE ciphertext and rely on a public key adaptation [Rot11] of underlying FHE scheme to perform the encryption and evaluation operations. Hence we do not discuss those algorithms (TRLWE.Enc, TRLWE.Eval) here. We discuss the original decryption algorithm TRLWE.Dec first, then modify it later in order to support threshold decryption.

TRLWE.Dec(SK, CT): Given the secret key SK and a ciphertext CT = (A, B), the decryption algorithm proceeds as follows:

- TRLWE.Decode₀(SK, CT): On input ciphertext CT and secret key SK, this step of the decryption calculates $\Phi = B A \cdot SK$, which is equal to m + e. Here, m is the plaintext polynomial and e is the ring-LWE noise polynomial.
- TRLWE.Decode₁(Φ): This final step rounds up each of the N coefficients of Φ to return the "exact" coefficients of the plaintext polynomial m.

The security of TRLWE follows from the hardness of the Binary Ring Learning with Errors (BRLWE) problem (see Section 3.1 for the formal definition). Note that although a reduction from binary LWE to LWE exists [Mic18], a reduction for its ring-variant is not yet known; nonetheless, binary RLWE is widely [BBPS19, BD20] believed to be computationally hard.

Our main contribution is a proposal for thresholdizing the decryption of the aforementioned TRLWE scheme. We discuss the specific case of (T, T)-threshold decryption and its security analysis based on Rényi Divergence in subsequent sections. We provide the generalized (t, T)-threshold decryption along with its security analysis in Section 4.4.

4.2 Achieving (T, T)-Distributed Decryption

Let us assume $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$ is the set of T parties and they are willing to perform TRLWE.Dec on a Torus Ring-LWE ciphertext CT = (A, B) in a distributed way. We are in the *dealer-based model*, i.e., we assume that a trusted dealer uses some secret sharing algorithm to distribute the Torus Ring-LWE secret **SK** to each P_i as SH_i , such that $\mathbf{SK} = \sum_{i=1}^T SH_i$. In this context, each $P_i \in \mathcal{P}$ individually performs the following steps:

- TRLWE.PartialDec(SH_i , CT): On input of the secret share SH_i and the ciphertext CT = (A, B), this algorithm generates partially decrypted ciphertext $part_decrypt_i = A \cdot SH_i + e_{sm}^i$. Here, e_{sm}^i is the smudging noise polynomial added by P_i , where each coefficient of e_{sm}^i is sampled from the Gaussian smudging noise distribution \mathcal{G}_{sm} (we expand on the smudging noise subsequently in Section 4.3). The partial decryption $part_decrypt_i$ is then broadcast to the rest of the (T-1) parties.
- TRLWE.Combine({ $part_decrypt_i$ }_{i\in[T]}, CT): This algorithm takes all the partially decrypted ciphertexts { $part_decrypt_i$ }_{i\in[T]} and the ciphertext CT = (A, B) as input, and calculates $\Phi = B \sum_{i=1}^{T} part_decrypt_i$. Note that Φ is essentially $\left(\mathsf{m} + e \sum_{i=1}^{T} e_{sm}^i\right)$.
- TRLWE.Decode₁(Φ): On input of the phase Φ, its N coefficients are rounded up to retrieve N coefficients of the plaintext m.

Theorem 1 (Correctness). Let $q = 2^{\lambda_1}$ be the TRLWE modulus (or equivalently, suppose that the Torus-FHE scheme supports a maximum precision of λ_1 bits) and let $p = 2^{\lambda_2}$ be the size of the space of message-polynomial coefficients (or equivalently, suppose that the Torus-FHE scheme supports message-polynomial coefficients with a precision of λ_2 bits) such that $p \leq q$. Also assume $\Delta = q/p = 2^{\lambda_1 - \lambda_2}$. Then, decryption correctness of the proposed (T, T)-threshold TRLWE is the same as of the original (non-threshold) TRLWE as described in Section 4.1, if $\|e_{sm}\|_{\infty} < \Delta/(2(T+1))$. Here, $\|\cdot\|_{\infty}$ denotes the infinity norm of a polynomial.

Proof. This theorem provides an *upper bound* on the smudging noise that each party can add, and here, we allow the maximum possible smudging noise that does not affect the correctness of the distributed decryption protocol. At a high level, to ensure the correctness of (T, T)-distributed decryption, we need the *total* noise in the combined ciphertext (i.e., the output of TRLWE.Combine) to be upper bounded by $\Delta/2$. For correctness of (T, T)-distributed decryption to hold, we must have $||e||_{\infty} + T \cdot ||e_{sm}||_{\infty} < \Delta/2$. Since $||e_{sm}||_{\infty} > ||e||_{\infty}$ (i.e., smudging noise must be large enough to hide the ciphertext noise), we choose $||e_{sm}||_{\infty} < \Delta/(2(T+1))$.

This (T, T) distributed decryption is very specific, in the sense that the participation of each party is mandatory to perform a distributed decryption. Later, we generalize this to (t, T) threshold decryption for any 0 < t < T in Section 4.4.

4.3 Security of Proposed (T, T)-Threshold FHE

We now elaborate on our main theoretical contribution, namely, achieving a polynomial modulusto-noise ratio (i.e. a polynomial ratio between the modulus q and the Ring LWE noise e) for our proposed threshold version of Torus-FHE (abbreviated as TRLWE henceforth) via: (a) a novel usage of Gaussian smudging noise during partial decryption (as described earlier in Section 4.2 and Section 4.4), and (b) application of Rényi Divergence for distinguishing problems with public sampleability property to prove the security of our proposed Threshold FHE scheme TRLWE (under our proposed security definition in Section 3.3).

Let us first formally state our argument on the security of (T, T)-threshold version of TRLWE.

Theorem 2 (Security). Let σ and α be the standard deviations of \mathcal{G}_{sm} and \mathcal{G} respectively and Q be the number of selective partial decryption queries. The proposed (T,T)-threshold TRLWE is IND-secure (ref. Section 3.3) if the underlying non-threshold TRLWE is IND-CPA secure and $\sigma \geq c \cdot \alpha \cdot \sqrt{Q \cdot N}$ for some constant c.

Proof. We will prove this theorem in a stepwise manner in this section and then show that, it provides a lower bound on the value of the smudging noise parameter. \Box

Our Approach: Rényi Divergence-based Analysis of Smudging Noise. In this paper, due to our novel approach of using Gaussian smudging noise and then using a Rényi Divergence based analysis akin to that of [BLRL⁺18, TT15] as opposed to the statistical distance-based analysis used in prior works [MW16, BGG⁺18, CCK23], it suffices to sample the smudging noise from a Gaussian distribution with standard deviation only polynomially larger than the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution pertaining to the RLWE noise. As a result, from a theoretical point of view, we obtain a practical ThFHE scheme with polynomial modulus to noise ratio. From an implementation point of view, it leads to a practically efficient prototype implementation in software (ref. Section 5). We expand on our approach below.

Analyzing (T, T)-Distributed Decryption. For the ease of exposition, we now describe the Rényi Divergence-based analysis of our proposed distributed decryption protocol for TRLWE for the special case of (T, T)-distributed decryption (described originally in Section 4.2).

The Adversarial Model. Recall from Section 4.2 that for the case of (T, T)-distributed decryption, the Torus Ring-LWE secret **SK** is linearly secret-shared across $\{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$ as $\mathbf{SK} = \sum_{i=1}^{T} SH_i$, where party P_i holds the secret key share SH_i . Now consider a scenario where, as per our security definition in Section 3.3, an adversary \mathcal{A} corrupts all but one party (say party P_1 without loss of generality), and gains access to the secret key shares of all of the corrupted parties (i.e., SH_2, \ldots, SH_T). Keeping analogy to our security definition, assume that \mathcal{A} chooses two set of plaintexts $\mathbf{M}_0 = \{M_i^0\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ and $\mathbf{M}_1 = \{M_i^1\}_{i \in [\ell]}$, along with Q-many partial decryption queries. Each query consists of a new circuit C of bounded depth with a constraint that $C(\{M_i^0\}_{i \in [\ell]}) = C(\{M_i^1\}_{i \in [\ell]})$. \mathcal{A} then receives a challenge set of honest encryptions $\mathbf{CT}^* = \{\mathbf{CT}_i^*\}$, which is component-wise encryption of either \mathbf{M}_0 or \mathbf{M}_1 .

For each query circuit C, the challenger computes a resultant ciphertext $\widehat{CT} = (A, B)$ by homomorphically evaluating C on the set \mathbb{CT}^* . The adversary \mathcal{A} is then allowed to see the partial decryption of $\widehat{\mathbb{CT}}$ by the honest party P_1 , computed (in the "real" security game) as $part_decrypt_1 = A \cdot SH_1 + e_{sm}$, where e_{sm} is the smudging noise polynomial added by party P_1 (each coefficient is sampled from a Gaussian distribution \mathcal{G}_{sm} with standard deviation σ).

"Simulating" an Honest Partial Decryption. We now construct a simulator S that "simulates" a partial decryption of \widehat{CT} on behalf of the honest party P_1 without the knowledge of the partial decryption key SH_1 , but simply from the knowledge of the underlying plaintext m and the knowledge of the corrupted partial decryption keys $\{SH_j\}_{j \in [2,T]}$. Before delving into the description of the simulator S, we briefly motivate the construction of such a simulator S. Observe that S has no additional information beyond what \mathcal{A} already knows. So, \mathcal{A} is not able to distinguish \mathbf{CT}_0 from \mathbf{CT}_1 , i.e., the component-wise encryption of two set of plaintexts \mathbf{M}_0 and \mathbf{M}_1 of its choice, due to the hardness of Binary Ring-LWE assumption, on which the original Torus-FHE scheme relies.

We now construct the simulator S as follows. Given the ciphertext $\widehat{CT} = (A, B)$, its underlying plaintext message \mathfrak{m} , and the corrupted partial decryption keys $\{SH_j\}_{j\in[2,T]}$, the simulator S outputs a "simulated" partial decryption

$$part_decrypt_1^{\mathsf{Sim}} = B - \mathsf{m} - \sum_{i=2}^T A \cdot SH_i + e_{sm},$$

where e_{sm} is a smudging noise polynomial (again, each coefficient of this polynomial is sampled from a Gaussian distribution \mathcal{G}_{sm} with standard deviation σ). Now, observe that, letting $\gamma = B - \mathbf{m} - \sum_{i=2}^{T} A \cdot SH_i$, we have

$$part_decrypt_1 = \gamma - e + e_{sm}, \quad part_decrypt_1^{\mathsf{Sim}} = \gamma + e_{sm},$$

where e is the RLWE noise polynomial embedded in \widehat{CT} .

Rényi Divergence-based Analysis. Let η be the set of fixed parameters instantiating the security game described in Section 3.3 as follows,

$$\eta = (\mathbf{PK}, \mathbf{SK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{i \in [T]}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \{C_i\}_{i \in [Q]}).$$

Let a distribution

$$D_b^{\eta}(r) = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{i \in [2,T]}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_b, \{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^b\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_i^b\}_{i \in [Q]})$$

represent the view of the adversary, when the challenger \mathcal{C} samples bit b in Step 4 of the game. The set of noise values $r = \{r_i\}_{i \in [Q]}$ is used in the computation of honest party P_1 's partial decryption $p_i = \gamma + r_i$ and each r_i is sampled either from distribution of $(e_{sm} - e)$ or from distribution of e_{sm} , depending on whether \mathcal{C} provides real or simulated partial decryptions to \mathcal{A} . Let δ and δ' denote the advantages with which \mathcal{A} distinguishes $D_0^{\eta}(r)$ from $D_1^{\eta}(r)$ in the presence of real or simulated partial decryptions respectively. Assuming that the aforementioned distinguishing problems are "publicly sampleable" [BLRL⁺18], the relation below follows from known results in [BLRL⁺18]: $\delta' \geq \frac{\delta}{4R_a(\Psi||\Psi')} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{2}\right)^{\frac{a}{a-1}}$, where Ψ and Ψ' denote the distribution of $(e_{sm} - e)$ and the distribution of e_{sm} respectively and $R_a(\Psi||\Psi')$ is the Rényi divergence of order a between the distributions Ψ and Ψ' .

Arguing Public Sampleability. In order to invoke the aforementioned relation, we first need to argue that the aforementioned distinguishing problems satisfy the notion of public sampleability as defined in [BLRL⁺18]. Given a bit $b' \in \{0,1\}$ and a sample x from $D_b^{\eta}(r)$, we can publicly sample a fresh element x' of $D_{b'}^{\eta}(r)$ by (i) replacing \mathbf{CT}_b of x with $\mathbf{CT}_{b'} = \{\mathsf{TRLWE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathbf{PK}, M_j^{b'})\}_{j \in [\ell]}$, (ii) replacing $\{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^b\}_{i \in [Q]}$ with $\{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^{b'}\}_{i \in [Q]} = \{\mathsf{TRLWE}.\mathsf{Eval}(\mathbf{PK}, C_i, \mathbf{M}_{b'})\}_{i \in [Q]}$ and, (iii) replacing the last component $\{p_b^b\}_{i \in [Q]}$ with $\{p_b^{b'}\}_{i \in [Q]}$ such that $p_i^{b'} = \gamma^{b'} + r_i$. Here, computation of $\gamma^{b'}$ requires the knowledge of $\widehat{CT}_i^{b'}$ and computation of r_i requires the knowledge of $\widehat{CT}_i^{b'}$ and p_i^b. Hence $D_b^{\eta}(r)$ is indeed publicly sampleable.

Remark. The above argument relies on the fact that the partial decryption queries are made selectively and not adaptively; since the adversary cannot embed any information about the challenge ciphertext \mathbf{CT}_b in the circuits corresponding to the partial decryption queries, the distribution of these circuits is statistically independent of b, which allows directly using the randomness term $r = \{r_i\}_{i \in [O]}$ to publicly re-sample the partial decryption outputs in $D^{\eta}_{b'}(r)$.

Completing the Proof. We can now invoke known results from [TT15] and the *multiplicative* property of Rényi Divergence to argue that for any $a \in (1, \infty)$, we have,

$$R_a(\Psi||\Psi') \le \exp\left(\frac{a \cdot \pi \cdot N \cdot ||e||_{\infty}^2}{\sigma^2}\right),$$

where $||e||_{\infty}$ denotes the infinity norm of the degree (N-1)-RLWE noise polynomial e. Assuming that $||e||_{\infty} \leq c\alpha$, where c is some constant and α is the standard deviation of Gaussian RLWE noise distribution \mathcal{G} , we have, $R_a(\Psi||\Psi') \leq \exp\left(\frac{a\cdot\pi\cdot N\cdot c^2\cdot \alpha^2}{\sigma^2}\right)$.

Finally, for the scenario where the adversary \mathcal{A} sees a maximum of $Q = poly(\lambda)$ such partial decryption samples, we invoke the multiplicative properties of Rényi Divergence to state the following:

$$R_a(\Psi||\Psi') \le \exp\left(\frac{a \cdot \pi \cdot Q \cdot N \cdot c^2 \cdot \alpha^2}{\sigma^2}\right).$$

Parameter Choices (Lower Bounds). At this point, we are ready to propose the asymptotic parameter choices for our ThFHE scheme TRLWE supporting (T, T)-threshold decryption. Assume that the adversary \mathcal{A} sees at most $Q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ partial decryption samples, let σ and α be the standard deviation parameters for the Gaussian distributions pertaining to the smudging noise and RLWE noise, respectively, and let c be a constant such that $|e| \leq c\alpha$ (e being the RLWE noise polynomial). It suffices for us to choose σ such that

$$\sigma \ge c \cdot \alpha \cdot \sqrt{Q \cdot N},$$

since this yields $R_a(\Psi || \Psi') \leq \exp(a \cdot \pi)$, and hence

$$\delta' \geq \frac{\delta}{4} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{2}\right)^{\frac{a}{a-1}} \cdot \exp(-a \cdot \pi).$$

Taking any value of a > 1 yields the desired condition on δ and δ' , i.e., non-negligible δ would result in non-negligible δ' . Note that it suffices for σ to be only polynomially larger than α . Hence, our scheme is secure whenever $\sigma \geq c \cdot \alpha \cdot \sqrt{Q \cdot N}$.

Achieving polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio. Combining the lower bounds on the smudging noise imposed by Theorem 2 with the upper bounds imposed by Theorem 1, we thus avoid the super-polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio (ratio between modulus q and any co-efficient of RLWE noise polynomial e) incurred by all prior works on ThFHE, thereby yielding a practical ThFHE scheme with polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio.

The above Rényi Divergence-based analysis immediately generalizes to (t, T)-threshold decryption for any $t \leq T$. The detailed security analysis for the general case appears in the subsequent section.

4.4 Generalized (t, T)-Threshold Decryption Protocol

In this section, we describe the generalized (t, T)-threshold decryption algorithm for our proposed threshold Torus-FHE. Here, we propose an extended version of Benaloh-Leichter LISSS to share the secret key across the various parties (as opposed to a simple additive sharing in the (T, T)-case in Section 4.2). Consequently, we modify the TRLWE.PartialDec and TRLWE.Combine algorithms to enable correct and efficient decryption by any t'-sized subset of the T parties for $t' \geq t$.

4.4.1 Extending Benaloh-Leichter LISSS

For the purpose of (t, T)-threshold secret sharing, we resort to using Benaloh-Leichter LISSS [DT06], as it supports an efficient final combination of partial decryptions, in contrast to multiplying partial decryptions with large Lagrange coefficients while using Shamir's secret sharing [Sha79], that leads to noise-blowup in the ciphertext and incorrect decryption. The original scheme [DT06] shares a scalar secret, but we propose an extended Benaloh-Leichter LISSS to support (t, T)-threshold secret sharing of the TRLWE secret which is composed of k number of N-sized binary polynomials (see Section 4.1). Let **SK** be the **Torus**-RLWE secret key, which is to be shared among T parties belonging to the set $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$ according to a (t, T)-threshold access structure. We first describe some pre-processing steps.

Formation of Distribution Matrix M. Formation of distribution matrix M depends upon the monotone Boolean formula (MBF¹) of a (t, T)-threshold access structure. Since an MBF is a combination of AND and OR of Boolean variables, we can construct distribution matrix of any MBF by taking care of the following three cases:

A Boolean variable. The identity matrix of dimension $k(I_k)$, represents the distribution matrix of each Boolean variable x_i .

 $^{^1\}mathrm{By}$ MBF, we refer to Boolean formulae having a single output and consisting of only AND and OR combination of variables.

Algorithm 1 *t*-out-of-*T* Secret Sharing

```
1: function SHARESECRET(t, T, M, \rho, d, k)
         shares \gets M \cdot \rho
 2:
         row \leftarrow 1
 3:
 4:
         while row < d do
 5:
             gid \leftarrow \lceil row/kt \rceil
 6:
             pt \leftarrow \text{FINDPARTIES}(gid, t, T)
 7:
             for i = 1 to t do
                 rowcount \leftarrow row + (i-1)k
 8:
 9:
                  curr\_share \leftarrow TRLWEKEY()
                  for j = 0 to k - 1 do
10:
                      curr\_share[j] \gets shares[rowcount+j]
11:
                  cur\_share.party\_id \leftarrow pt[i-1]
12:
13:
                  cur\_share.group\_id \leftarrow gid
             row \leftarrow row + kt
14:
```

 \triangleright New TRLWE Key

AND-ing of two MBFs. Let us suppose, matrix M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} are the distribution matrices for MBFs f_a and f_b respectively and have dimension $d_a \times e_a$ and $d_b \times e_b$ respectively. Then we form $M_{f_a \wedge f_b}$ to represent $f_a \wedge f_b$ as follows:

c_a^k	c_a^k	C_a	0
0	c_b^k	0	C_b

Here, c_a^k and c_b^k denote first k columns and C_a and C_b denote the rest of the columns of M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} respectively. Resulting $M_{f_a \wedge f_b}$ has dimension $(d_a + d_b) \times (e_a + e_b)$.

OR-ing of two MBFs. Assuming matrices M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} of dimension $d_a \times e_a$ and $d_b \times e_b$ respectively to be the distribution matrices for Boolean formula f_a and f_b respectively, we form $M_{f_a \vee f_b}$ of dimension $(d_a + d_b) \times (e_a + e_b - k)$ to represent $f_a \vee f_b$ as following:

c_a^k	C_a	0	
c_b^k	0	C_b	

Again, c_a^k and c_b^k denote first k columns and C_a and C_b denote the rest of the columns of M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} respectively.

It can be easily verified that, the distribution matrix M for (t, T)-threshold secret sharing has dimension $d \times e$, where $d = \binom{T}{t}kt$ and $e = \binom{T}{t}kt - \binom{T}{t}-1k$.

Formation of Share Matrix ρ . Though ρ is a vector in the original scheme [DT06], in our extended version, ρ is a matrix with dimension $e \times N$. Its first k rows are populated from the coefficients of k binary polynomials in **SK**. The rest of the rows of the matrix are filled uniformly randomly from $\{0, 1\}$.

Sharing. The number of t-sized subsets of \mathcal{P} is $\binom{T}{t}$. We enumerate over all these subsets and tag each of them with the corresponding enumerating serial number and call it the group_id. During the sharing process (Algorithm 1), total $d = \binom{T}{t}kt$ rows of shares matrix consists of $\binom{T}{t}t$ number of key shares, each having k consecutive rows. Each key share is tagged with the following two attributes:

- party_id: refers to which party the key share belongs to.
- group_id: refers to the *t*-sized group for the key share.




Figure 1: Maximum size of secret shares held by a party

Once the sharing process is complete, each party P_i gets $\binom{T-1}{t-1}$ number of key shares to store, for each possible *t*-sized group, that P_i can belong to. Note that the findParties(gid, t, T) procedure in Algorithm 1, returns a list of party ids present in gid^{th} *t*-sized group (subset) of \mathcal{P} .

Reconstruction. Any *t*-sized group of parties should be able to reconstruct **SK**, with the help of the key shares, they have. Given a *t*-sized group $\mathcal{P}' = \{P'_1, P'_2, \ldots, P'_t\} \subset \mathcal{P}$, each of the *t* parties will have one key share with group_id corresponding to \mathcal{P}' . Let us denote these *t* key shares as $\{SH_1, SH_2, \ldots, SH_t\}$. We observe (Appendix B) that exactly one share among them will have non-binary coefficients in its *k* polynomials. We call the party, having non-binary key share, the group_leader of the *t*-sized group. In any *t*-sized group, the group_leader has the minimum value of party_id.

Now, without loss of generality, let us assume P'_1 is the group_leader of \mathcal{P}' and its non-binary key share is SH_1 . Then the secret S can be reconstructed as: $\mathbf{SK} = SH_1 - \sum_{i=2}^{t} SH_i$. Hence, recovery coefficient c_1 is 1 for the group_leader and c_i is -1 for each of other (t-1) parties. We exploit this reconstruction property in final combination stage of (t, T)-threshold decryption technique.

Size of Secret Shares. After applying (t, T)-threshold secret sharing on SK, each party gets $\binom{T-1}{t-1}$ key shares to store. For any t-sized group, the group_leader's share size (in number of bits) is upper bounded by $\lceil \log_2 t \rceil \cdot N \cdot k$, and each of the other (t-1) parties has share of size exactly $N \cdot k$ bits. This can be proved by close observation of the secret shares (See Appendix B). Thus, for (t, T)-threshold secret sharing, a party needs a maximum storage of $\binom{T-1}{t-1} \cdot \lceil \log_2 t \rceil \cdot N \cdot k \rceil$ bits. Figure 1 depicts the maximum storage a party requires to keep all its secret shares.

We refer interested readers to Appendix C for a detailed security analysis of the extended Benaloh-Leichter LISSS.

4.4.2 Proposed (t,T)-Threshold Decryption

Let $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \ldots, P_T\}$ be a set of T parties and $\mathcal{P}' = \{P_{id_1}, \ldots, P_{id_t}\} \subset \mathcal{P}$ be a *t*-sized subset of \mathcal{P} with group_id j, authorized to threshold-decrypt a ciphertext $\mathsf{CT} = (A, B)$. Also, without loss of generality, let us assume $id_1 < \cdots < id_t$, so that P_{id_1} is the group_leader of \mathcal{P}' .

We begin by assuming that all of the T parties in \mathcal{P} have already received their key shares after the successful execution of the (t, T)-threshold secret sharing scheme on **SK**. Hence, each $P_{id_i} \in \mathcal{P}'$ has exactly one key share corresponding to group_id j. We denote these t key shares as $\{SH_{id_1,j}, \ldots, SH_{id_t,j}\}$. Recall from Section 4.4.1 that,

$$\mathbf{SK} = SH_{id_1,j} - \sum_{i=2}^{t} SH_{id_i,j}.$$

The threshold decryption of CT consists of the following steps, performed by each $P_{id_i} \in \mathcal{P}'$ individually:

• TRLWE.PartialDec $(SH_{id_i,j}, CT)$: On input TRLWE ciphertext CT and a key share $SH_{id_i,j}$, P_{id_i} calculates the following:

$$part_decrypt_{id_i} = A \cdot SH_{id_i,j} + e_{sm}^{id_i}$$

where $e_{sm}^{id_i}$ is a smudging noise polynomial and each coefficient of $e_{sm}^{id_i}$ is sampled from a Gaussian smudging noise distribution \mathcal{G}_{sm} . Then, P_{id_i} broadcast $part_decrypt_{id_i}$ to rest of the (t-1) parties.

• TRLWE.Combine($\{part_decrypt_{id_i}\}_{i \in [t]}, CT$): On input all t partial decryptions, each party calculates the phase

$$\phi = B - (part_decrypt_{id_1} - \sum_{i=2}^{t} part_decrypt_{id_i}),$$

where ϕ equals $\mathbf{m} + e - e_{sm}^{id_1} + \sum_{i=2}^{t} e_{sm}^{id_i}$.

TRLWE.Decode₁(φ): Each of the N coefficients of φ is rounded up to extract the coefficients of the message m.

4.4.3 Correctness and Security of the Proposed Scheme

We formalize the correctness and security of the proposed (t, T)-threshold FHE through Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 below.

Theorem 3 (Correctness). Decryption correctness of the proposed (t,T)-threshold TRLWE is same as of the original (non-threshold) TRLWE as described in Section 4.1 if $||e_{sm}||_{\infty} < \Delta/(2(t+1))$.

Proof. We prove the above theorem and discuss the upper bounds for different noise parameters to ensure the correctness of our proposed (t, T)-threshold decryption procedure.

Some Notations. Let us assume $q = 2^{\lambda_1}$ to be the modulus in TRLWE and $|\mathcal{M}| = p = 2^{\lambda_2}$ to be the size of the space of coefficients of message-polynomial such that $p \leq q$. Now, let $\Delta = \frac{q}{p} = 2^{\lambda_1 - \lambda_2}$ denote the distance between two consecutive values of a message coefficient in \mathcal{M} . Note that we assume $\Delta = 1$ throughout the paper, as in Torus-FHE library $\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = 32$ have been considered.

TRLWE noise. When applying TRLWE.Decode₀ on a TRLWE ciphertext CT = (A, B), we effectively compute $\Phi = B - A \cdot SK$, which essentially equals $\Delta \cdot \mathbf{m} + e$. Now, Δ being a constant we can rewrite Φ as $\sum_{i=0}^{N-1} (\Delta \cdot \mathbf{m}_i + e_i) x^i$. Next, we round up and approximate each coefficient

of Φ during TRLWE.Decode₁ as $\Delta \cdot \mathbf{m}_i + e_i \xrightarrow{round} \Delta \cdot \mathbf{m}_i \xrightarrow{approximate} \mathbf{m}_i$. For correctness, we need $|e_i| < \Delta/2$.

Smudging noise. The parties eventually combine their partial decryptions to compute an unmasking component $part_decrypt_f$. Without loss of generality, for party P_1 , $part_decrypt_f$ is computed as:

$$\left(A \cdot SH_1 - \sum_{j=2}^t A \cdot SH_j + e_{sm}^1 - \sum_{j=2}^t e_{sm}^j\right).$$

The final message recovery step proceeds as:

$$B - part_decrypt_f = \Delta \cdot \mathbf{m} + e - \left(e_{sm}^1 - \sum_{l=2}^t e_{sm}^l\right)$$

Here, $e = e_0 + e_1 x + \dots + e_{N-1} x^{N-1}$ is the RLWE noise polynomial and $e_{sm}^i = e_{sm,0}^i + e_{sm,1}^i x + \dots + e_{sm,N-1}^i x^{N-1}$ is the smudging noise polynomial added by party P_i . Hence, for correct decryption, the following condition should hold for each $z \in [0, N-1]$:

$$|e_z - e_{sm,z}^1 + \sum_{l=2}^t e_{sm,z}^l)| < \frac{\Delta}{2}.$$

Let $||e||_{\infty}$ and $||e_{sm}||_{\infty}$ denote the infinity norms of the RLWE noise polynomial e and the smudging noise polynomial e_{sm} , respectively. Then, we must have:

$$\|e\|_{\infty} + t \cdot \|e_{sm}\|_{\infty} < \Delta/2.$$

Since $||e_{sm}||_{\infty} > ||e||_{\infty}$ (by the lower bound argument presented above), it suffices to choose $||e_{sm}||_{\infty} < \Delta/(2(t+1))$.

Theorem 4 (Security). Let σ and α be the standard deviations of \mathcal{G}_{sm} and \mathcal{G} respectively and Q be the number of selective partial decryption queries. Proposed (t, T)-threshold TRLWE is IND-secure (ref. Section 3.3), if the underlying non-threshold TRLWE is IND-CPA secure and $\sigma \geq c \cdot \alpha \cdot \sqrt{Q \cdot (T-t+1) \cdot N}$ for some constant c.

Proof. Let us recall the notion of security in the form of a game between adversary \mathcal{A} and challenger \mathcal{C} from Section 3.3 for our proposed threshold FHE scheme TRLWE. We prove the above theorem in a step-by-step manner in the following.

A Close Look at Partial Decryptions. First, we take a close look at the partial decryption component returned by the challenger C in the partial decryption query phase (Step 5) of the security game. We allow the corrupted subset S in the security game to be of maximal size, i.e., |S| = (t - 1). Let us assume \widehat{CT}_i to be the i^{th} evaluated ciphertext during partial decryption query phase (Step 5), i.e., \widehat{CT}_i is obtained by homomorphically evaluating C_i on the set of inputs $\mathbf{CT}^* = {\mathsf{CT}_j^*}_{j \in [\ell]}$ for some $i \in [Q]$. Here, $\mathbf{CT}^* = {\mathsf{CT}_j^*}_{j \in [\ell]}$ is the challenge set returned to the adversary in Step 4 of the security game. A partial decryption of $\widehat{CT}_i = (\hat{A}_i, \hat{B}_i)$ by some honest party $P_j \notin S$ corresponds to a *t*-sized group $P_j \bigcup S$ with group_id *g* and we denote it with $p_{i,j}$. Challenger C computes $p_{i,j}$ as follows,

$$p_{i,j} = A_i \cdot SH_{j,g} + e_{sm},$$

where $SH_{j,g}$ is P_j 's secret share corresponding to group_id g and e_{sm} is a smudging noise polynomial with each coefficient sampled from \mathcal{G}_{sm} . However using the linear reconstruction property of Benaloh-Leichter $\{0, 1\}$ -LISSS (Section 4.4.1), we can alternatively express $p_{i,j}$ as following,

$$p_{i,j} = \hat{B}_i - m_i - e - \sum_{P_k \in \mathcal{S}} \hat{A}_i \cdot SH_{k,g} + e_{sm},$$

where e is the RLWE noise polynomial of ciphertext $\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i$ with each of its coefficients sampled from \mathcal{G} , and m_i is the expected output of the circuit C_i in plaintext, i.e., $C_i(m_1^0, \ldots, m_\ell^0) = C_i(m_1^1, \ldots, m_\ell^1) = m_i$. Letting $\gamma_i = \hat{B}_i - m_i - \sum_{P_k \in \mathcal{S}} \hat{A}_i \cdot SH_{k,g}$, we get

$$p_{i,j} = \gamma_i + r_{i,j},$$

such that $r_{i,j}$ is sampled from distribution of $(e_{sm} - e)$.

We can publicly simulate the partial decryption by some honest party $P_j \notin S$ as follows,

$$p_{i,j}' = \gamma_i + r_{i,j}',$$

where $r'_{i,j}$ is sampled from distribution of e_{sm} .

Defining Some Distributions. Recall the security game between the challenger C and the adversary A in Section 3.3 with respect to our proposed scheme TRLWE. Let η is the set of some fixed parameters in a particular instance of the game as follows,

$$\eta = (\mathbf{PK}, \mathbf{SK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{i \in [T]}, \mathcal{S}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \{C_i\}_{i \in [Q]}).$$

Let $r = \{r_{i,j}\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin S}$ be a set of noise parameters. We define the distribution $D_b^{\eta}(r)$ parameterized by η as follows,

$$D_b^{\eta}(r) = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_b, \{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^b\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_{i,j}^b\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin \mathcal{S}}).$$

Here each component is analogous to the components described in $\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{ThFHE},\mathcal{A},\mathbb{A}_{t,T}}(1^{\lambda}, 1^{d})$ of Section 3.3. Component \mathbf{CT}_{b} of $D_{b}^{\eta}(r)$ denotes the scenario when the challenge set \mathbf{CT}^{\star} in the game is component-wise encryption of \mathbf{M}_{b} , i.e., $\mathsf{CT}_{j}^{\star} = \mathsf{TRLWE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathbf{PK}, M_{j}^{b})$ for each $j \in [\ell]$.

Public Sampleability of $D_b^{\eta}(r)$. We argue the public sampleability [BLRL⁺18] of $D_b^{\eta}(r)$ by providing a public sampling algorithm PS in Algorithm 5. Given any sample

$$x = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_b, \{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^b\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_{i,j}^b\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin S}),$$

from $D_b^{\eta}(r)$ with unknown bit b and a bit b', it generates fresh sample

$$x' = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_{b'}, \{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^{b'}\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_{i,j}^{b'}\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin \mathcal{S}})$$

of $D_{b'}^{\eta}(r)$ efficiently.

Note that the algorithm requires the knowledge of **PK**, the output of the circuit evaluations in plaintext (i.e., $\{m_i\}_{i \in [Q]}$, which is independent of bit *b* due to the constraint on the choice of adversarially chosen post-challenge partial decryption query circuits), and the secret shares of the corrupted parties in S. All this information is publicly available. Besides, the values of noise samples $\{r_{i,j}\}_{i \in [Q], P_i \notin S}$ can be retrieved from the knowledge of evaluated ciphertexts

Algorithm 2 Public Sampling Algorithm PS Input:

 $x = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_b, \{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^b\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_{i,j}^b\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin \mathcal{S}}),$ $b' \in \{0, 1\}.$

Output: $x' \in D_{h'}^{\eta}(r)$.

- 1: Compute a new challenge set $\mathbf{CT}_{b'}$, which is component-wise fresh encryption of $\mathbf{M}_{b'}$.
- 2: For each $i \in [Q]$, generate an evaluated ciphertext $\widehat{\operatorname{CT}}_{i}^{b'} = (\hat{A}_{i}^{b'}, \hat{B}_{i}^{b'}) = \operatorname{TRLWE.Eval}(\operatorname{PK}, C_{i}, \operatorname{CT}_{b'}).$ 3: For each $i \in [Q]$, first compute $\gamma_{i}^{b} = \hat{B}_{i}^{b} m_{i} \sum_{P_{k} \in \mathcal{S}} (\hat{A}_{i}^{b} \cdot SH_{k,g})$ and next retrieve the noise value $r_{i,j} = p_{i,j}^{b} \gamma_{i}^{b}$ for each honest party $P_{j} \notin \mathcal{S}$. Here g is group_id of $P_{j} \cup \mathcal{S}$.
- 4: For each $i \in [Q]$, compute $\gamma_i^{b'} = \hat{B}_i^{b'} m_i \sum_{P_k \in S} (\hat{A}_i^{b'} \cdot SH_{k,g})$ and then for each honest party $P_j \notin S$, compute partial decryption $p_{i,j}^{b'} = \gamma_i^{b'} + r_{i,j}$.
- 5: Return a fresh sample x' as,

$$x' = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_{b'}, \{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^o\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_{i,j}^{b'}\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin \mathcal{S}}).$$

 $\{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^b\}$ and partial decryptions $\{p_{i,j}^b\}$ in x, and then further be used during computation of partial decryptions $\{p_{i,i}^{b'}\}$ in x'. Hence we can indeed publicly generate a valid sample x' of $D_{h'}^{\eta}(r)$ efficiently. Hence we conclude that the distribution $D_{h}^{\eta}(r)$ is publicly sampleable.

Proof Outline. Notice that $D_h^{\eta}(r)$ captures the view of the adversary in the security game when the challenger C samples the bit b in Step 4 and $r = \{r_{i,i}\}$ is the set of noise values sampled from the distribution of $e_{sm} - e$ and used in computing partial decryptions $\{p_{i,j}\}$ for all $i \in [Q]$ and $P_j \notin S$. However in simulated world, we can simulate partial decryptions $p'_{i,j} = \gamma_i + r'_{i,j}$, by just sampling each $r'_{i,j}$ from the distribution of e_{sm} . Let us denote a problem P as distinguishing a sample of $D_0^{\eta}(r)$ from a sample of $D_1^{\eta}(r)$ and the problem P' as distinguishing a sample of $D_0^{\eta}(r')$ from a sample of $D_1^{\eta}(r')$. Using a novel Rényi divergence based analysis, we show that non-negligible distinguishing advantage of problem P leads to non-negligible distinguishing advantage of problem P'. But due to hardness of binary ring-LWE problem, no PPT adversary can distinguish \mathbf{CT}_0 from \mathbf{CT}_1 in the simulated world, as it gains no effective information about the actual secret shares of honest parties by seeing the simulated partial decryptions. Thus distinguishing advantage of problem P' is already known to be negligible due to binary ring-LWE assumption. Now by contradiction we conclude that the distinguishing advantage in P is negligible, making our TRLWE a secure ThFHE scheme.

Rényi Divergence based Analysis. Recall from Theorem 4.2 of [BLRL⁺18], due to public sampleability property of $D_b^{\eta}(r)$, if there exists a τ -time distinguisher \mathcal{D} for problem P with distinguishing probability δ , then there must exists a distinguisher \mathcal{D}' for Problem P' with distinguishing probability δ' with run-time τ' , such that,

$$\begin{split} \delta' &\geq \frac{\delta}{4R_a(\Psi||\Psi')} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{2}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}},\\ \tau' &\leq \frac{64}{\delta^2} \log(\frac{8R_a(\Psi||\Psi')}{\delta^{a/(a-1)+1}})(\tau_S + \tau) \end{split}$$

Here, τ_S is the run-time of public sampling algorithm for $D_b^{\eta}(r)$. Also Ψ is the distribution of $(e_{sm}-e)$ and Ψ' is the distribution of e_{sm} . Now, with the results from Lemma 5 in [TT15]

and multiplicative property of Rényi Divergence we argue that for any $a \in (1, \infty)$:

$$R_a(\Psi||\Psi') \le \exp\left(\frac{a \cdot \pi \cdot N \cdot ||e||_{\infty}^2}{\sigma^2}\right),$$

where $||e||_{\infty}$ denotes the infinity norm of the (N-1)-degree RLWE noise polynomial e. Assuming that $||e||_{\infty} \leq c\alpha$, where c is some constant and α is the standard deviation of RLWE noise distribution \mathcal{G} , we have

$$R_a(\Psi||\Psi') \le \exp\left(\frac{a \cdot \pi \cdot N \cdot c^2 \cdot \alpha^2}{\sigma^2}\right).$$

Finally, considering the scenario that the adversary \mathcal{A} does $Q = poly(\lambda)$ number of queries, and thus is able to see a total of $Q \cdot (T - t + 1)$ number of partial decryptions corresponding to (T-t+1) number of honest parties, we invoke the multiplicative properties of Rényi Divergence from [TT15] to state the following:

$$R_a(\Psi||\Psi') \le \exp\left(\frac{a \cdot \pi \cdot Q \cdot (T-t+1) \cdot N \cdot c^2 \cdot \alpha^2}{\sigma^2}\right).$$

Observe that it suffices for us to choose σ such that

$$\sigma \ge c \cdot \alpha \cdot \sqrt{Q \cdot (T - t + 1) \cdot N},$$

since this yields $R_a(\Psi || \Psi') \leq \exp(a \cdot \pi)$, and hence:

$$\delta' \ge \frac{\delta}{4} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{2}\right)^{\frac{a}{a-1}} \cdot \exp(-a \cdot \pi) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{\delta}{2}\right)^{\frac{2a-1}{a-1}} \cdot \exp(-a \cdot \pi).$$

and for the run-time we have,

$$\tau' \le \frac{64}{\delta^2} \log(\frac{8 \cdot \exp(a \cdot \pi)}{\delta^{a/(a-1)+1}})(\tau_S + \tau).$$

Hence the condition $\sigma \geq c \cdot \alpha \cdot \sqrt{Q \cdot (T - t + 1) \cdot N}$ (i.e., smudging noise is only polynomially larger than RLWE noise) implies that, for any a > 1, non-negligible δ would result in non-negligible δ' . This completes the proof of security for our proposed TRLWE scheme supporting (t, T)-threshold decryption.

Appendix A discusses the simulation of partial decryptions in the proof of security when less than (t-1) parties are corrupted.

5 Software Implementation and Experimental Evaluation

We now describe a prototype implementation of our (t, T)-threshold decryption scheme over Torus-FHE on two extreme varieties of computing platforms - a high-end x86-based server, and a low-end resource-constrained ARM-based platform¹. Although Torus-FHE library implements

 $^{^1{\}rm Our}$ implementation code and additional (low-level) implementation details are available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/ThFHE_artifacts-2FD3

Parameter	Value
k (Number of polynomials in Torus-RLWE ciphertext)	1
n (Torus-LWE dimension)	1024
N (Degree of Torus-RLWE polynomial is $(N-1)$)	1024
α (Standard deviation of Torus-RLWE noise)	2^{-25}
Q (Number of partial decryption queries)	2^{20}
σ (Standard deviation of smudging noise)	2^{-7}

Table 2: Parameters used in experimental setting

a symmetric-key version of the underlying FHE scheme, we use the idea of [Rot11] to implement its public-key version and extend it to support threshold decryption in order to get the desired implementation of ThFHE, namely TRLWE. We stress that this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first practical implementation of any ThFHE scheme with the capability of executing the threshold decryption algorithm practically on resource-constrained platforms.

In our setting, the threshold secret sharing is performed by a trusted cloud server with sufficient computational resources. Subsequently, homomorphic evaluations happen on encrypted data stored on the cloud server. The key focus of our implementation is on realizing the proposed threshold decryption algorithm on resource-constrained handheld devices; hence our experiments and evaluation focus purely on the performance of our threshold decryption implementation.

For the sake of completeness, we implement our threshold decryption algorithm on two kinds of platforms, lying at two extreme ends of the spectrum of computational capabilities: (a) a high-end workstation with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2690 v4 CPU (2.60GHz clock-frequency), 28 physical cores, and 128GB RAM, and (b) a low-end Raspberry Pi 3b board with a Quad Core 1.2GHz Broadcom BCM2837 64bit CPU and 1 GB RAM running Raspberry Pi OS Lite (Linux kernel version: 5.10.63-v7+).

5.1 Implementation Details

We implement the natural public-key analogue of the Torus-FHE library while leaving implementation of the homomorphic evaluation unchanged. This makes our implementation crosscompatible with other libraries (e.g., NuFHE) that build directly upon Torus-FHE. Since our core contribution lies in thresholdizing the decryption process, which only requires the secret key, we keep our discussion limited to generating and sharing the secret key.

We extend the **Torus-**FHE library to support threshold secret sharing and threshold decryption. We use the **Torus-**RLWE secret key generation routine to generate the secret key with a set of parameters chosen by relying on our proposed Rényi divergence-based security argument. In particular, this analysis enables a polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio, which crucially allows our implementation to be practically deployable on a resource-constrained platform.

Once the key has been generated, we build the distribution matrix M and share matrix ρ (see Section 4.4.1). The distribution matrix generation, when implemented directly in software, results in a recursive implementation, which potentially results in high memory access overheads, and is unsuitable for resource-constrained platforms. However, we can avoid these excess func-




Figure 2: Minimum and maximum values of σ , the standard deviation of smudging noise distribution.




Figure 3: Minimum values of σ with different values of Q for a fixed value of (t,T) = (4,7)

tion call overheads and generate them iteratively in one go by exploiting a regular pattern, as discussed in Appendix B.

For the partial and threshold decryption functions, we have two implementations. The first implementation targets a high-end processor and directly leverages **Torus-**FHE APIs for fast polynomial multiplication using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), as is required in the partial decryption phase. The other is a portable implementation suited for low-end resource-constrained handheld devices. In particular, the latter replaces the FFT polynomial multiplication, which depends on x86 AVX instructions for efficiency, with a naïve school-book multiplication. This is done to keep the implementation as architecture-agnostic and lightweight as possible. In the porting process, we have removed multiple dynamic memory allocation steps to achieve better memory efficiency. Also, our observation that each of the participating parties except one receives a binary key share through (t, T)-threshold secret sharing significantly contributes to reduce the cycle counts in polynomial multiplication in both implementations.

5.2 Experimental Evaluation

In this section, we validate our proposed threshold decryption technique by an implementation over Torus-FHE library and the steps involved are summarized in Algorithm 3. The output of BootstrappedOR in step 4 here is a Torus-LWE ciphertext and we convert it to a Torus-RLWE ciphertext in step 5, to support packing of multiple plaintext bits together.

In accordance with our intended use-case, we experimentally evaluate steps 1 through 6 of

Algorithm 3 Software implementation of cryptosystem with (t, T)-threshold decryption

Input: $inp_1 \in \mathbb{N}, inp_2 \in \mathbb{N}, t \in \mathbb{N}, T \in \mathbb{N}, \mathcal{P} \subset [1, T] \text{ s.t } |\mathcal{P}| = t$

Output: $outp \leftarrow inp_1 \lor inp_2$

- 1: $(LweSK, LwePK) \leftarrow$ LweKeyGen
- 2: $cipher_1 \leftarrow ENCRYPT(LwePK, inp_1), cipher_2 \leftarrow ENCRYPT(LwePK, inp_2)$
- 3: $eval_res \leftarrow BOOTSTRAPPEDOR(cipher_1, cipher_2, LwePK)$
- 4: $(rcipher, RLweSK) \leftarrow CONVERTLWETORLWE(eval_res, LweSK)$
- 5: SHARESECRET $(RLweSK, t, T) \triangleright$ Now all parties get their key shares. Each party $i \in \mathcal{P}$ calculates *outp* on its own.
- 6: $outp \leftarrow \text{ThresholdDecrypt}(rcipher, \mathcal{P}, t, T, i)$
- 7: return *outp*




Figure 4: Secret Sharing and Threshold Decryption time in high-End server.

Algorithm 3 on a high-end server, and step 7 on both the high-end server and a low-end resource-constrained handheld device. In particular, in our experiments we measure the time taken by steps 6 and 7. Note that step 7 includes both partial decryption and final combination.

Concrete parameters choices. Table 2 lists the concrete parameters used in our experiments. The choices for n, N and α are directly adopted from the Torus-FHE library. For smooth conversion in step 5 of Algorithm 3, we fix k = 1. Figure 2 plots the minimum and maximum values of the smudging noise parameter σ for different values of (t, T) used in our experimental evaluations (the bounds are derived as per Theorems 4 and 3 when the allowed number of partial decryption queries Q is set to 2^{20} , the constant $c = 2^1$, and the parameter $\Delta = \frac{1}{2}$ for correctness of the Torus-FHE scheme). In particular, for all the (t, T) values used in our experimental evaluation, the choice of smudging noise $\sigma = 2^{-7}$ (Table 2) satisfies the lower and upper bounds in Figure 2. Moreover, Figure 3 depicts how the minimum value of the smudging parameter (σ) varies with the allowed number of partial decryption queries (Q) according to Theorem 4 for a fixed value of (t, T) = (4, 7) and constant c = 2. The y-axis plots $\log_2 \sigma$ instead of σ .

Figures 4 and 5 show the secret key sharing time, the partial decryption time, the final decryption time, and the plain decryption time on a high-end workstation in terms of milliseconds and clock cycles respectively, while Figures 6 and 7 show the partial and final decryption times in milliseconds and clock cycle counts respectively on the low-end Raspberry Pi 3b platform. All four graphs have logarithmic y-axis.

¹We choose c = 2 since the absolute value of the TRLWE noise sampled from \mathcal{G} with standard deviation α is upper bounded by 2α with probability 95.44%.




Figure 5: Secret Sharing and Threshold Decryption clock cycles in high-End server




Figure 6: Threshold Decryption time in handheld device




Figure 7: Threshold Decryption clock cycles in handheld device

The partial decryption time in all the figures follow a constant trend as in our use case, it is done parallelly in individual devices and the vector or polynomial sizes do not change with the number of parties. We emphasize that, as a direct consequence of the efficient parameter choices for threshold FHE enabled by our Rényi Divergence-based analysis, the threshold decryption timing is practical even on a highly resource-constrained ARM-based platform.

Finally, Figure 9 and Figure 10 with logarithmic y-axis show that our proposed threshold decryption incurs only minimal time overhead over the plain (baseline) decryption algorithm




Figure 8: Final Decryption time in high-end server and low-end handheld device with Additional Communication Delay considering 5 MBps bandwidth between decryption servers




Figure 9: Time comparison between Plain Decryption and Threshold Decryption for high-end server




Figure 10: Time comparison between Plain Decryption and Threshold Decryption for handheld device

specified in the original Torus-FHE library, for both the high-end workstation and the resourceconstrained device. Since each participating party executes the partial decryption phase in parallel, threshold decryption time includes the time required for *single* partial decryption and final re-combination of all partial descriptions. Threshold decryption time is dominated by the partial decryption time, which is independent of (t, T); hence, both the graphs in Figure 9 and Figure 10 grow minimally with increasing (t, T) values.

Figure 8 depicts the final combination time on both high-end server and resource-constrained handheld device considering latency due to communication of the partial decryptions through a

Algorithm 4 KNN over encrypted medical data

```
Input: test_data = ENCRYPT(k, test_patient),
    train_data = \{ ENCRYPT(k, patient_1), \dots, ENCRYPT(k, patient_n) \},\
    bk = bootstrapping key, K = KNN parameter.
Output: decisional_bit = ENCRYPT(k, predicted_bit)
 1: Initialize a Torus-LWE ciphertext array distant of size n
 2: for i = 1 to n do
       distant[i] \leftarrow MANHATTAN(test_data, train_data[i], bk)
 3:
 4: sorted\_train\_data \leftarrow BUBBLESORT(distant, train\_data, bk)
 5: Initialize a counter ciphertext count = ENCRYPT(k, zero) to count the decision of K-
    Nearest Neighbours
 6: for i = 1 to K do
       count \leftarrow count + DECISION(sorted\_train\_data[i]))
 7:
 8: Initialize a Torus-LWE variable threshold = ENCRYPT(k, |K/2|)
 9: decisional\_bit \leftarrow DIFFERENCE(threshold, count, bk)
10: return decisional_bit
```

network with reduced bandwidth of 5 MBps. In particular, the time required for communicating all (t-1) partial descriptions parallelly to the combiner is added with the time required to compute the final decryption as shown in Figure 8 with logarithmic *y*-axis for varying (t,T) values. Since the communication cost is independent of (t,T) values and is quite higher than the final decryption time on high-end server, the plot for the high-end server grows minimally with increasing (t,T) values.

6 Case-Study: Computing over Encrypted Medical Data

In this section, we use our proposed ThFHE scheme over the Torus to realize an end-to-end usecase of outsourced computations over encrypted medical datasets, where the final outcome is computed in a distributed manner by multiple entities (e.g. doctors, research laboratories, or other medical practitioners). Concretely, we illustrate the efficacy of our proposal via experiments evaluating encrypted computations over a real medical database, as well as distributed decryptions of the computed result on resource-constrained handheld devices, where both the encryption and distributed decryption operations are performed using our proposed ThFHE scheme. We perform an encrypted K-Nearest Neighbours (KNN) classification [SCK14] that outputs an encrypted prediction bit indicating the possibility of cardiovascular disease. The classification is done based on a patient's encrypted medical records and pre-computed encrypted training data.

6.1 Encrypted KNN Computation

The encrypted KNN algorithm (Algorithm 4) takes as input: (a) an encrypted set of test data, which is to be predicted, (b) an encrypted set of training data to train the KNN algorithm, (c) the bootstrapping key bk, which is a part of public key and (d) KNN parameter K to output an encrypted single prediction bit. Following the approach outlined in [RC19], we sub-divide the encrypted KNN computation algorithm into three parts as described below.

K	Neighbour size	Prediction time without OpenMP (in minutes)	Prediction time with OpenMP (in minutes)	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{Prediction}\\ \textbf{time with}\\ \textbf{OpenMP}\\ \textbf{(cycle count}\\ \textbf{in} \ 10^{12} \textbf{)} \end{array}$
	10	154.88	15.96	2.49
	20	369.90	29.71	4.64
5	30	558.36	49.96	7.79
	40	850.70	60.11	9.38
	50	1062.86	72.90	11.37
	10	194.81	18.50	2.89
	20	431.41	33.66	5.25
7	30	726.13	50.08	7.81
	40	975.01	63.83	9.96
	50	1282.08	79.78	12.45
	10	235.30	24.23	3.78
	20	527.98	46.66	7.28
9	30	844.36	60.55	9.45
	40	1146.26	80.81	12.61
	50	1498.43	99.31	15.49

Table 3: Encrypted KNN execution time

Encrypted Manhattan Distance Computation. First, the encrypted Manhattan distances between the testing data and all the training data are homomorphically computed and stored in the *distant* variable. The Manhattan distance is preferred over other distances to avoid the "curse of dimensionality" problem in machine learning [AHK01]. To compute the difference between two ciphertexts (ThFHE_{DIFF} between Encrypt($k, Plain_1$) and Encrypt($k, Plain_2$)), we use the 2's complement form representation.

Sorting over Encrypted Data. In this step, the neighbors are sorted in ascending order based on the calculated distances. The encrypted-bubble-sort implementation directly uses encrypted-comparison and sorting techniques from prior-works [RC19, CSS20, CS20, CDSS15]. Our encrypted bubble sort implementation takes the bootstrapping key, the patient's encrypted data and their corresponding encrypted Manhattan distances, and outputs the sorted patient data based on these encrypted distances.

Prediction over Encrypted Data. The encrypted decision bits of KNN computation are added to get Encrypt(k, count) (line 7, Algorithm 4), which is then compared homomorphically with the threshold value ($\text{Encrypt}(k, \lfloor K/2 \rfloor)$) to arrive at the (encrypted) decision. The final plaintext decision is recovered via threshold decryption.

6.2 Experimental Results

We consider a cardiovascular disease-related dataset¹ that comprises of 70000 data instances and 12 features like age_days , height, weight, ap_lo (Diastolic Blood Pressure), ap_hi (Systolic Blood Pressure), gender, cholesterol, glucose, smoke, alcohol, active, id, and cardio. Out of 12 features, cardio is the target feature which needs to be predicted based on the rest 11 features.

¹https://www.kaggle.com/sulianova/cardiovascular-disease-dataset

An accuracy of 70% has been achieved with 60 (training=40, testing =20) data-rows and that can be improved further by performing more hyperparameter tuning and by incorporating more data-rows into account. Out of 70000 data instances, we randomly select 60 data instances and divide them into different training-to-testing ratios. Table 3 shows the execution time of KNN algorithm in two variants, with (using OpenMP) and without any parallel processing techniques. The OpenMP version has a big advantage of parallelizing multiple loops to facilitate smaller execution time, as shown in Table 3 for K = 5, 7, 9. Note that the number of OpenMP threads used during each execution is equal to the neighbour size listed in Table 3. The execution platform is equipped with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2690 v4 with 2.60GHz clock. The system has 132GB of RAM and 56 available physical cores.

7 Conclusion and Future Work

We presented the design, analysis and practical implementation for a novel threshold FHE scheme from the hardness of Binary Ring-LWE with polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio. We showed, for the first time, that threshold FHE can actually be deployed in a fast, scalable and reasonably resource-efficient manner for real-world applications via benchmarking experiments on two extreme varieties of computing platforms - a high-end x86-based server and a low-end resource-constrained ARM-based platform. We showcased an end-to-end implementation of our proposed system and used it for fast, scalable yet secure k-nearest-neighbor computations over encrypted medical data outsourced to a cloud service provider.

Our work gives rise to many interesting directions of future research. In particular, we leave it as an open question to extend our Rényi divergence-based security analysis techniques to the setting of multi-key FHE with threshold decryption, for which all known realizations still require super-polynomial modulus-to-noise ratio. Such an extension would enable efficient realizations of richer applications such as round-optimal multi-party computation.

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Algorithm 5 Public Sampling Algorithm PS Input:

 $x = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_b, \{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^b\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_{i,j}^b\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin \mathcal{S} \bigcup \mathcal{S}'},$ $\{\hat{p}_{i}^{b}\}_{i \in [O], P_{i} \in S'}, b' \in \{0, 1\}.$

Output: $x' \in D_{k'}^{\eta}(r)$.

- 1: Compute a new challenge set $\mathbf{CT}_{b'}$, which is component-wise fresh encryption of $\mathbf{M}_{b'}$.

- 2: For each $i \in [Q]$, generate an evaluated ciphertext $\widehat{\mathbf{CT}}_{i}^{b'} = (\widehat{A}_{i}^{b'}, \widehat{B}_{i}^{b'}) = \mathsf{TRLWE.Eval}(\mathbf{PK}, C_{i}, \mathbf{CT}_{b'}).$ 3: Let us denote the shares of pseudo-corrupt set \mathcal{S}' with $\{\mathbf{SK}_{i}\}_{P_{i} \in \mathcal{S}'}.$ 4: For each $i \in [Q]$, for each honest party $P_{j} \notin \mathcal{S} \bigcup \mathcal{S}'$, first compute $\gamma_{i}^{b} = \widehat{B}_{i}^{b} m_{i} \sum_{P_{k} \in \mathcal{S} \bigcup \mathcal{S}'} (\widehat{A}_{i}^{b} \cdot SH_{k,g})$ and next retrieve the noise value $r_{i,j} = p_{i,j}^b - \gamma_i^b$. Here g is group_id of $P_j \bigcup S \bigcup S'$.
- 5: For each $i \in [Q]$, compute $\gamma_i^{b'} = \hat{B}_i^{b'} m_i \sum_{P_k \in S \bigcup S'} (\hat{A}_i^{b'} \cdot SH_{k,g})$ and then for each honest party $P_j \notin S \bigcup S'$, compute partial decryption $p_{i,j}^{b'} = \gamma_i^{b'} + r_{i,j}$.
- 6: For each $i \in [Q]$, for each pseudo-corrupt party $P_j \in S'$, compute $\gamma_i^b = \hat{A}_i^b \cdot SH_{j,g}$ for a specific t-sized group with group_id g. Compute $\gamma_i^{b'} = \hat{A}_i^{b'} \cdot SH_{j,g}$ for the same group. Now compute partial decryption $\hat{p}_{i,j}^{b'} = \hat{p}_{i,j}^b - \gamma_i^b + \gamma_i^{b'}.$
- 7: Return a fresh sample x' as,

$$x' = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_{b'}, \{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^{b'}\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_{i,j}^{b'}\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin \mathcal{S} \bigcup \mathcal{S}'},$$

 $\{\hat{p}_{i,j}^{b'}\}_{i\in[Q],P_{i}\in\mathcal{S}'}).$

Security Proof of (t, T)-threshold FHE for Any $t' \leq (t - T)$ Α 1) Corruptions

In this section, we prove that our proposed (t, T)-threshold decryption of Section 4.4 is secure for any corruptions up to (t-1) while considering the security notion of Section 3.3. Let us assume that the adversary has corrupted some $t' \leq (t-1)$ number of parties, i.e., $|\mathcal{S}| = t'$, where \mathcal{S} is the corrupted subset. Then, at the beginning of the game, we choose an arbitrary set \mathcal{S}' of honest parties, such that $|\mathcal{S}'| = (t - 1 - t')$. We call this set pseudo-corrupt to allow a maximal pseudo-corruption of (t-1) parties. Apart from the shares of the corrupted parties in \mathcal{S} , the simulator uses the shares of the parties in \mathcal{S}' for simulating the partial decryption of any honest party $P_j \notin S \bigcup S'$.

A Close Look at Partial Decryptions. First, we take a close look at the partial decryption component returned by the challenger \mathcal{C} in the partial decryption query phase (Step 5) of the security game. Let us assume $\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i$ to be the i^{th} evaluated ciphertext during partial decryption query phase (Step 5), i.e., $\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i$ is obtained by homomorphically evaluating C_i on the set of inputs $\mathbf{CT}^* = \{\mathbf{CT}_j^*\}_{j \in [\ell]}$ for some $i \in [Q]$. Here, $\mathbf{CT}^* = \{\mathbf{CT}_j^*\}_{j \in [\ell]}$ is the challenge set returned to the adversary in Step 4 of the security game. For each such honestly evaluated ciphertext CT_i , the following set of partial descriptions is returned to the adversary:

- (i) For each honest party $P_j \notin S \bigcup S'$, return a single partial decryption $p_{i,j} = A_i \cdot SH_{j,g} +$ e_{sm} , where g is the group_id of the t-sized subset $P_j \bigcup S \bigcup S'$, $SH_{j,g}$ is P_j 's secret share corresponding to group_id g and e_{sm} is a smudging noise polynomial with each coefficient sampled from \mathcal{G}_{sm} .
- (ii) For each pseudo-corrupt party $P_j \in \mathcal{S}'$, which is honest in the view of the adversary,

return a single partial description corresponding to one of the $\binom{T-1-t'}{t-1-t'}$ t-sized group that consists of S and P_j itself. Let g be the group_id of this t-sized group. Then, $\hat{p}_{i,j} = \hat{A}_i \cdot SH_{j,g} + e_{sm}$ is returned.

As mentioned earlier, the actual partial decryption of an honest party $P_j \notin S \bigcup S'$ can be expressed as $\gamma_i + r_{i,j}$, where $\gamma_i = \hat{B}_i - m_i - \sum_{P_k \in S \bigcup S'} \hat{A}_i \cdot SH_{k,g}$ and $r_{i,j}$ is sampled from the distribution of $(e_{sm} - e)$.

Simulation of honest partial decryptions. As described in the previous section, the partial decryption of an honest party $P_j \notin S \bigcup S'$, is computed using the shares of the parties in pseudo-corrupt set S' and corrupt set S as follows,

$$p_{i,j} = \gamma_i + r'_{i,j},$$

where $\gamma_i = \hat{B}_i - m_i - \sum_{P_k \in S \bigcup S'} \hat{A}_i \cdot SH_{k,g}$ and $r'_{i,j}$ is sampled from the distribution of e_{sm} . Note that, since we consider the parties in S' to be pseudo-corrupt, partial decryption of a party $P_j \in S'$ does not need any simulation, hence real partial decryption of the form $\hat{A}_i \cdot SH_{j,g} + e_{sm}$ is returned corresponding to one of the *t*-sized group that P_j and parties in S belong to.

Defining Some Distributions. Recall the security game between the challenger C and the adversary A in Section 3.3 with respect to our proposed scheme TRLWE. Let η is the set of some fixed parameters in a particular instance of the game as follows,

$$\eta = (\mathbf{PK}, \mathbf{SK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{i \in [T]}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{S}', \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \{C_i\}_{i \in [Q]}).$$

Let $r = \{r_{i,j}\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin S \bigcup S'}$ be a set of noise parameters. We define the distribution $D_b^{\eta}(r)$ parameterized by η as follows,

$$D_b^{\eta}(r) = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_b, \{\widehat{\mathbf{CT}}_i^o\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_{i,j}^b\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin \mathcal{S}} \cup \mathcal{S}', \{\hat{p}_{i,j}^b\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \in \mathcal{S}'}).$$

Here each component is analogous to the components described in $\mathsf{G}_{\mathsf{ThFHE},\mathcal{A},\mathbb{A}_{t,T}}(1^{\lambda}, 1^{d})$ of Section 3.3. Component \mathbf{CT}_{b} of $D_{b}^{\eta}(r)$ denotes the scenario when the challenge set \mathbf{CT}^{\star} in the game is component-wise encryption of \mathbf{M}_{b} , i.e., $\mathsf{CT}_{j}^{\star} = \mathsf{TRLWE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathbf{PK}, M_{j}^{b})$ for each $j \in [\ell]$.

Public Sampleability of $D_b^{\eta}(r)$. We argue the public sampleability [BLRL⁺18] of $D_b^{\eta}(r)$ by providing a public sampling algorithm PS in Algorithm 5. Given any sample

$$x = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_b, \{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^b\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_{i,j}^b\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin \mathcal{S} \bigcup \mathcal{S}'}, \{\hat{p}_{i,j}^b\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \in \mathcal{S}'}),$$

from $D_b^{\eta}(r)$ with unknown bit b and a bit b', it generates fresh sample

$$x' = (\mathbf{PK}, \{\mathbf{SK}_i\}_{P_i \in \mathcal{S}}, \mathbf{M}_0, \mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{CT}_{b'}, \{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^{b'}\}_{i \in [Q]}, \{p_{i,j}^{b'}\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin \mathcal{S} \cup \mathcal{S}'}, \{\hat{p}_{i,j}^{b'}\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \in \mathcal{S}'}),$$

of $D_{b'}^{\eta}(r)$ efficiently.

Note that the algorithm requires the knowledge of **PK**, the output of the circuit evaluations in plaintext (i.e., $\{m_i\}_{i \in [Q]}$, which is independent of bit b due to the constraint on the choice of adversarially chosen post-challenge partial decryption query circuits), and the secret shares of the corrupted parties in S. All this information is publicly available. Besides, the values of noise samples $\{r_{i,j}\}_{i \in [Q], P_j \notin S}$ can be retrieved from the knowledge of evaluated ciphertexts $\{\widehat{\mathsf{CT}}_i^b\}$ and partial decryptions $\{p_{i,j}^b\}$ in x, and then further be used during computation of partial decryptions $\{p_{i,j}^b\}$ in x'. Hence we can indeed publicly generate a valid sample x' of $D_{b'}^{\eta}(r)$ efficiently. Hence we conclude that the distribution $D_b^{\eta}(r)$ is publicly sampleable.

Proof Outline. Provided that the view of the adversary is publicly sampleable with less than (t-1) corruptions, the rest of the proof proceeds essentially in a similar manner.

B Observing the Pattern of Secret Shares

We state our observation on the pattern of the secret shares, generated by the (t, T)-threshold secret sharing using Benaloh-Leichter LISSS (Section 4.4.1), in the form of a theorem and provide the corresponding proof here.

Theorem 5. $\mathcal{P}' = \{P_{id_1}, P_{id_2}, \ldots, P_{id_t}\} \subset \mathcal{P} = \{P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_T\}$ is a t-sized group with group_id value of gid, where $id_1 < id_2 < \cdots < id_t$. $\forall 1 \leq i \leq t$, P_{id_i} has a key share SH_i , tagged with group_id value of gid. Then all key shares except SH_1 , have only binary coefficients in their k polynomials, while SH_1 will have coefficient value upper-bounded by t in its k polynomials.

In order to prove Theorem 5, we will first state two lemmas related to the structure of the distribution matrix M for (t, T) threshold secret sharing of a TRLWE secret key S. We consider the number of polynomials in S is k and I_k denotes the identity matrix of dimension k. The first lemma is about the pattern of the distribution matrix for Boolean formula of the form $x_1 \wedge x_2 \wedge \cdots \wedge x_t$ for any t.

Lemma 1. We consider **0** to be a notation of zero matrix of dimension $k \times k$. Then, distribution matrix M_f for Boolean formula $f = x_1 \wedge x_2 \wedge \cdots \wedge x_t$ follows the following structure.

ſ	I_k	I_k	I_k		I_k	I_k	
	0	0	0		0	I_k	
	0	0		0	I_k	0	
	÷			 0 0 0			
	0	0	I_k	0		0	
	0	I_k	0	0		0	$kt \times kt$

Proof of Lemma 1. We prove the lemma by induction on the value of t. For t = 1, $f = x_1$ and $M_f = I_k$. Hence, the stated matrix structure is satisfied by default. For t = 2, $f = x_1 \wedge x_2$. We follow the ANDing procedure (see Section 4.4.1) of $M_{x_1} = I_k$ and $M_{x_2} = I_k$ and get $M_{x_1 \wedge x_2} = \begin{bmatrix} I_k & I_k \\ \mathbf{0} & I_k \end{bmatrix}$, which clearly satisfies the claimed structure. Let us assume that the claimed structure of the distribution matrix holds for t = i, i.e., for $f = x_1 \wedge x_2 \wedge \cdots \wedge x_i$, M_f is as shown below. Also, x_{i+1} being a Boolean variable, $M_{x_{i+1}} = I_k$. ANDing M_f and $M_{x_{i+1}}$ produces $M_{f_1} = M_{f \wedge x_{i+1}}$ as shown below. M_f has a dimension of $ki \times ki$ and M_{f_1} has a dimension of $k(i+1) \times k(i+1)$.

$$M_{f} = \begin{bmatrix} I_{k} & I_{k} & I_{k} & \dots & I_{k} & I_{k} \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & I_{k} \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & I_{k} & \mathbf{0} \\ \vdots & & & & \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & I_{k} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{0} & I_{k} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix}$$
$$M_{f_{1}} = \begin{bmatrix} I_{k} & I_{k} & I_{k} & I_{k} & \dots & I_{k} & I_{k} \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & I_{k} \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & I_{k} \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & I_{k} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ \vdots & & & & \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & I_{k} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{0} & I_{k} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix}$$

Clearly, the structure is maintained for t = i + 1. Hence, by induction, the lemma is true for any $t \ge 1$.

And the second lemma is about the pattern of distribution matrix for Boolean formula consisting of disjunction of l number of such t-sized conjunctive terms, i.e., $(x_{1,1} \wedge x_{1,2} \wedge \cdots \wedge x_{1,t}) \vee \cdots \vee (x_{l,1} \wedge x_{l,2} \wedge \cdots \wedge x_{l,t})$.

Lemma 2. Let us assume that $f' = (x_{1,1} \land x_{1,2} \land \cdots \land x_{1,t}) \lor \cdots \lor (x_{l,1} \land x_{l,2} \land \cdots \land x_{l,t})$ is a Boolean formula, where $\forall 1 \leq i \leq l, 1 \leq j \leq t, x_{i,j}$ is a binary variable and each of the $(x_{i,1} \land x_{i,2} \land \cdots \land x_{i,t})$ terms is represented by distribution matrix M_f , as stated in Lemma 1. We denote the first k columns of M_f by F of dimension $kt \times k$ and the rest of the columns of M_f by R of dimension $kt \times k(t-1)$. **0** denotes zero matrix of dimension $kt \times k(t-1)$. The distribution matrix $M_{f'}$ has the following structure:

$$\begin{bmatrix} F & R & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & R & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ \vdots & & & & & \\ F & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & R & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & R \end{bmatrix}_{lkt \times (lkt - (l-1)k)}$$

Proof of Lemma 2. We prove the lemma by induction on the value of l. For l = 1, $f' = f = (x_{1,1} \land x_{1,2} \land \cdots \land x_{1,t})$ and $M_{f'} = M_f = \begin{bmatrix} F & R \end{bmatrix}$, which satisfies the claimed structure by default.

For, l = 2, $f' = (x_{1,1} \land x_{1,2} \land \dots \land x_{1,t}) \lor (x_{2,1} \land x_{2,2} \land \dots \land x_{2,t})$. We perform ORing on $M_{x_{1,1} \land x_{1,2} \land \dots \land x_{1,t}} = M_f$ and $M_{x_{2,1} \land x_{2,2} \land \dots \land x_{2,t}} = M_f$ (see Section 4.4.1) and get

$$M_{f'} = \begin{bmatrix} F & R & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & R \end{bmatrix}_{2kt \times (2kt-k)}$$

This structure follows the lemma.

Let us assume that the structure is maintained $\forall l \leq j$. So, with $f' = (x_{1,1} \land x_{1,2} \land \cdots \land x_{1,t}) \lor$

 $\cdots \lor (x_{j,1} \land x_{j,2} \land \cdots \land x_{j,t})$ and $f'' = (x_{j+1,1} \land x_{j+1,2} \land \cdots \land x_{j+1,t})$, $M_{f'}$ has a dimension of $jkt \times jkt - (j-1)k$ and $M_{f''}$ has a dimension of $kt \times kt$. $M_{f'}$ follows the structure as shown below. $M_{f''} = \begin{bmatrix} F & R \end{bmatrix}$. Now, ORing $M_{f'}$ and $M_{f''}$ produces $M_{f_2} = M_{f' \lor f''}$ with dimension $(j+1)kt \times ((j+1)kt - jk)$ as shown below.

$$M_{f'} = \begin{bmatrix} F & R & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & R & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ \vdots & & & & & \\ F & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & R & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & R \end{bmatrix}$$
$$M_{f_2} = \begin{bmatrix} F & R & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & R & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & R & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & R & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & R & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & R \end{bmatrix}$$

So, the lemma is true for l = (j + 1). Hence, by induction, the lemma is true for any $l \ge 1$.

Now we use Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 to provide here the proof of Theorem 5.

Proof of Theorem 5. Let us recall from Section 4.4.1 that the monotone Boolean formula for (t,T)-threshold secret sharing can be written as $f = (x_{1,1} \land x_{1,2} \land \cdots \land x_{1,t}) \lor \cdots \lor (x_{l,1} \land x_{l,2} \land \cdots \land x_{l,t})$, where $l = \binom{T}{t}$. If **0** denotes zero matrix of dimension $kt \times (kt-k)$, from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we know that structure of the corresponding distribution matrix M with dimension $\binom{T}{t}kt \times \binom{T}{t}kt - \binom{T}{t}-1k$ is as follows:

$$M = \begin{bmatrix} F & R & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & R & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ \vdots & & & & & \\ F & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & R & \mathbf{0} \\ F & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & R \end{bmatrix}$$
$$F = \begin{bmatrix} I_k \\ \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{0} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix} \quad R = \begin{bmatrix} I_k & I_k & I_k & \dots & I_k \\ \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} & I_k \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{0} & I_k & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \\ I_k & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \dots & \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix}$$

A detailed look into the above matrix M reveals that F has a structure of dimension $kt \times k$ and R has a structure with dimension $kt \times (kt - k)$ as shown in the above matrix structure. In F and R, **0** denotes a zero matrix of dimension $k \times k$. It is obvious from the structure of M that each of its $\binom{T}{t}$ horizontal sections contain exactly one F and one R along with $\binom{T}{t} - 1$ zero matrices $\mathbf{0}_{kt \times (kt-k)}$. Now, the structure of F shows that each of its first k rows contains one '1' entry. No other row below has any '1' in it and the structure of R reveals that each of its first k rows contains exactly (t-1) number of '1' in it. Each of the other rows below contains

exactly one '1' in it. Hence, each of the first k rows of any one horizontal section (out of total $\binom{T}{t}$ sections) of M has exactly t number of '1' in it. Each of the rest of the rows below in that section contains exactly one '1' in it.

Let us recall that, each section of M corresponds to one section of shares (shares = $M \cdot \rho$) from Section 4.4.1 in the paper, i.e, the key shares of any t-sized subset of collaborating parties. ρ is a binary matrix. During matrix multiplication, the dot product between one row of M and one column of ρ produces an entry in shares. The dot product between two binary vectors is always upper bound by the number of '1' in any of the two vectors. As, each of the first k rows of any section of M contains exactly t number of '1', the entries of the first k rows of any section in shares are always upper bounded by t. First k rows of any section of shares form one key-share. Clearly, that key share will have non-binary entries in it. Similarly, each of the other (kt - k) rows below in any section of shares are upper-bounded by 1. In other words, those entries can be either 0 or 1. Hence, the rest of the (t - 1) key shares of any t-sized subset of parties, have only binary entries in it.

Hence we conclude that, in our proposed (t,T) threshold LISSS for a *t*-sized subset of parties $PT' = \{P_{id_1}, P_{id_2}, \ldots, P_{id_t}\}$, where $id_1 < id_2 < \cdots < id_t$, all the parties except P_{id_1} will have binary key shares.

C A Discussion on extended Benaloh-Leichter LISSS

We recall from [DT06] that an LISSS needs to be correct and private. Informally, an LISSS is correct if a qualified/valid subset of parties are able to reconstruct the secret by taking an integer linear combination of their shares while the coefficients of linear combination depend upon the qualified set. Whereas, an LISSS is said to be private if given an unqualified/invalid subset of parties, the secret is completely undetermined in an information theoretic sense. We also recall that $\mathcal{M} = (M, \psi, \epsilon)$ is said to be an integer span program (ISP) if M is an integer matrix of dimension $d \times e$, $\psi : [d] \rightarrow [T]$ is a surjective mapping to label each row of M to an integer, and $\epsilon = (1, 0, \dots, 0)^{\top}$ is the *e*-dimensional "target vector". And the following two properties of an ISP are useful to build a correct and private LISSS from it.

- If A is a qualified subset, and M_A denotes the union of all rows of M corresponding to the party-ids in A, then there exists a d-dimensional vector λ such that $M_A^{\top}\lambda = \epsilon$. Informally the rows of M owned by a qualified set must include the target vector in their span.
- If A is a invalid set, then there exists a sweeping vector κ of dimension e such that $M_A \kappa = 0$, a d-dimensional vector of all zeros.

In this section, we show that our proposed method of generating distribution matrix for a given monotone Boolean formula (MBF) f (representing an access structure) in the extended Benaloh-Leichter LISSS (ref. 4.4.1) to support t-out-of-T sharing of a secret of dimension $k \times N$, essentially satisfies all the required properties such that $\mathcal{M} = (M, \psi, \epsilon)$ continues to be a valid integer span program (ISP).

Before going into details, we would like to emphasize the difference between original Benaloh-Leichter LISSS that aims to secret-share a scalar or a vector and the proposed extended Benaloh-Leichter LISSS (ref. 4.4.1) to support secret-sharing of a matrix of dimension $k \times N$ in Table 4

Parameter	Original scheme	Extended scheme
$\frac{\epsilon \text{ (Target}}{\text{vector/matrix}}$	e-dimensional vector with first element 1	$e \times N$ dimensional matrix with all 1's in the first k rows
ψ (The surjective mapping)	$\psi: [d] \to [T]$ (Each row of M corresponds to a secret share)	$\psi: \left[\frac{d}{k}\right] \to [T] \text{ (A bunch of } k \\ \text{consecutive rows corresponds to a} \\ \text{secret share)}$
$M_{x_i} \text{ (Distribution} \\ \text{matrix for MBF} \\ f = x_i \text{)}$	A 1×1 matrix with 1 as its only element	An identity matrix I_k of dimension $k \times k$
$\begin{array}{c} M_{f_a \wedge f_b} \\ \text{(Distribution} \\ \text{matrix for MBF} \\ f_a \wedge f_b \text{ given } M_{f_a} \\ \text{ and } M_{f_b}) \end{array}$	A matrix with dimension $(d_a + d_b) \times (e_a + e_b - 1)$, where first column is vertical concatenation of first columns of M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} , next $(e_a - 1)$ columns are columns of M_{f_a} vertically appended with appropriate number of zeros, last $(e_b - 1)$ columns are appropriate number of zeros vertically appended with columns of M_{f_b}	A matrix with dimension $(d_a + d_b) \times (e_a + e_b - k)$, first k columns are vertical concatenation of first k columns of M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} , and rest of the columns are formed in the same manner as of the original scheme.
$\begin{array}{c} M_{f_a \lor f_b} \\ \text{(Distribution} \\ \text{matrix for MBF} \\ f_a \lor f_b \text{ given } M_{f_a} \\ \text{ and } M_{f_b}) \end{array}$	A matrix with dimension $(d_a + d_b) \times (e_a + e_b)$, where first column is the first column of M_{f_a} concatenated with appropriate number of zeros, second column is the vertical concatenation of first column of M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} , next $(e_a - 1)$ columns are columns of M_{f_a} vertically appended with appropriate number of zeros, last $(e_b - 1)$ columns are appropriate number of zeros vertically appended with columns of M_{f_b}	A matrix with dimension $(d_a + d_b) \times (e_a + e_b)$, where first k columns are the first column of M_{f_a} vertically concatenated with appropriate number of zeros, second k columns are the vertical concatenation of first k columns of M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} , and rest of the columns are formed in the same manner as of the original scheme.

Table 4: Original Benaloh-Leichter LISSS vs. Extended Benaloh-Leichter LISSS

to reflect upon the natural extension in terms of the dimensions of several parameters. For ease of exposition, we keep the notations (e.g., ψ , ϵ , κ etc.) in this section aligned with [DT06].

Note that the correctness of the extended LISSS is obvious from its construction in Section 4.4.1. Now to show that our proposed extended Benaloh-Leichter LISSS is secure, it suffices to prove that the underlying ISP is a valid one with the two above-mentioned properties. After taking into account the changes in dimension as depicted in Table 4, we provide the following lemmas.

Lemma 3. If A is a qualified set with respect to a given access structure \mathbb{A} (corresponding to an MBF f), and M is the distribution matrix for f with a dimension of $d \times e$, there exists a $d \times N$ -dimensional matrix λ_A , such that $M_A^\top \lambda_A = \epsilon$.

Proof. The proof is based on induction on the MBF f, that represents the access structure \mathbb{A} and is analogous to the proof of the original scheme as shown in the proof of Lemma 4 of [DT06].

As the base case, let us assume the MBF $f = x_i$, consisting of a single Boolean variable. The corresponding distribution matrix is $M = I_k$. Clearly the target vector is a matrix of dimension $k \times N$ with all 1's in it. Hence, we can form λ to be a matrix of dimension $k \times N$ such that $M^{\top} \lambda = \epsilon$.

Let us now consider the MBF $f = f_a \vee f_b$. M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} are the distribution matrices for f_a and f_b respectively. So, by induction, there must exist λ_a such that $M_{f_a}^{\top}\lambda_a = \epsilon$, such that ϵ has dimension $e_a \times N$ and λ_a has dimension $d_a \times N$. Now we define λ to be λ_a vertically appended with appropriate number of zeros such that λ has dimension $(d_a + d_b) \times N$, and $M_{f_a \vee f_b}^{\top}\lambda = \epsilon$ such that ϵ is now of dimension $(e_a + e_b - k) \times N$.

Next we consider the MBF $f = f_a \wedge f_b$. M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} are the distribution matrices for f_a and f_b respectively. So, by induction, there must exist λ_a such that $M_{f_a}^{\top}\lambda_a = \epsilon$, such that ϵ has dimension $e_a \times N$ and λ_a has dimension $d_a \times N$. Similarly there also exists λ_b such that $M_{f_b}^{\top}\lambda_b = \epsilon$, such that ϵ has dimension $e_b \times N$ and λ_b has dimension $d_b \times N$. Now we define λ to be vertical concatenation of λ_a and $-\lambda_b$ such that dimension of λ is $(d_a + d_b) \times N$, and $M_{f_a \wedge f_b}^{\top} = \epsilon$ is satisfied for ϵ of dimension $(e_a + e_b) \times N$.

Thus we conclude that by induction, it is always possible to find a λ corresponding to the distribution matrix M of a MBF f such that $M^{\top}\lambda = \epsilon$.

Lemma 4. If A is a forbidden set with respect to a given access structure A (corresponding to an MBF f), and M is the distribution matrix for f with a dimension of $d \times e$, there exists a sweeping vector κ of dimension e, with its first k entries fixed to 1, such that $M_A \kappa = \mathbf{0}$.

Proof. The proof by induction follows analogously as provided in the proof of Lemma 5 of [DT06]. As elaborated in [DT06], the base case is formula of the form $f = f_a \wedge f_b$ such that both f_a and f_b consist of purely all \vee operators. M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} are distribution matrices for f_a and f_b respectively. The Boolean variables in f representing the parties in A cannot be on both sides of the \wedge operator, since that would make A qualify trivially as a valid set. This further implies that the parties cannot own rows in both the upper and lower part of the matrix $M_{f_a \wedge f_b}$. If the parties in A own rows in the top part of $M_{f_a \wedge f_b}$, the sweeping vector becomes $\kappa = (1, \dots, 1, 0, \dots, 0)^{\top}$, such that there are k leading 1's followed by $(e_a + e_b - k)$ number of zeros. On the other hand, if the parties in A own rows in the bottom part of $M_{f_a \wedge f_b}$, then the sweeping vector becomes $\kappa = (1, \dots, 1, -1, \dots, -1, 0, \dots, 0)^{\top}$, with 1's in first k positions, -1's in next k positions and 0's in the rest of the positions.

Given a formula $f = f_a \lor f_b$, with their corresponding distribution matrices M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} , by induction we know the existence of $\kappa_a = (1, \dots, 1, \kappa_{a,k+1}, \dots, \kappa_{a,e_a})^{\top}$ and $\kappa_b = (1, \dots, 1, \kappa_{b,k+1}, \dots, \kappa_{b,e_b})^{\top}$ such that $M_{f_a}\kappa = \mathbf{0}$ for invalid sets according to f_a and $M_{f_b}\kappa = \mathbf{0}$ for invalid sets according to f_b . Then sweeping vector for $M_{f_a}\lor_{f_b}$ becomes $\kappa = (1, \dots, 1, \kappa_{a,k+1}, \dots, \kappa_{a,e_a}, \kappa_{b,k+1}, \dots, \kappa_{b,e_b})^{\top}$.

Given a formula $f = f_a \vee f_b$, with their corresponding distribution matrices M_{f_a} and M_{f_b} , by induction we know the existence of $\kappa_a = (1, \dots, 1, \kappa_{a,k+1}, \dots, \kappa_{a,e_a})^{\top}$ and $\kappa_b = (1, \dots, 1, \kappa_{b,k+1}, \dots, \kappa_{b,e_b})^{\top}$ such that $M_{f_a}\kappa = \mathbf{0}$ for invalid sets according to f_a and $M_{f_b}\kappa = \mathbf{0}$ for invalid sets according to f_b . If the given set A qualifies to reconstruct secret from f_a , but not from f_b , then there exists κ_b such that $(M_{f_b})_A\kappa_b = \mathbf{0}$; and the sweeping vector for $M_{f_a\wedge f_b}$ becomes $\kappa = (1, \dots, 1, -1, \dots, -1, 0, \dots, 0, -\kappa_{b,k+1}, \dots, -\kappa_{b,e_b})^{\top}$ such that first k entries are 1, next k entries are -1, next $(e_a - 1)$ entries are 0, and last $(e_b - 1)$ entries are from κ_b . If A does not qualify as a valid set with respect to f_a , then there exists κ_a such that $(M_{f_a})_A\kappa_a = \mathbf{0}$. Now the sweeping vector for $M_{f_a\wedge f_b}$ becomes $\kappa = (1, \dots, 1, 0, \dots, 0, \kappa_{a,k+1}, \dots, \kappa_{a,e_a}, 0, \dots, 0)^{\top}$. In both the cases κ has a dimension of $(e_a + e_b)$.

From the above two lemmas we conclude that the ISP corresponding to the extended Benaloh-Leichter LISSS for sharing a secret matrix of dimension $k \times N$ is a valid one, thus leading to the correctness and privacy of the LISSS.