Modi’s Politics Hinder Neighborhood Ties

When Narendra Modi became India’s prime minister 10 years ago, those invited to his swearing-in included leaders of every South Asian country. This reflected his “Neighborhood First” foreign policy, which was intended to foster cordial relations and economic synergy with India’s smaller neighbors. The approach soon floundered due to border disputes and bilateral disagreements, India’s tardy execution of development projects, and rising Chinese influence in the region.

However, Bangladesh was seen as one of its shining successes. Bangladeshi then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who held power for 15 consecutive years before resigning under pressure this month, worked closely with Modi; their friendly relationship seemed to be a win-win situation. But in Bangladesh, Hasina transformed into an authoritarian ruler despite her democratic beginnings. Popular anger against her brewed; the final trigger came with student protests against an order for government job quotas. The demonstrations soon turned on Hasina herself, leading to nationwide unrest. She fled the country on Aug. 5 and is currently residing in India.

Despite her unpopularity, Hasina’s resignation came as a shock to the Indian political and security establishment. India fully backed Hasina during her tenure, often ignoring the concerns of other stakeholders and the people of Bangladesh. Under Modi, New Delhi has taken this approach with most of its smaller neighbors, with sometimes unfortunate consequences.

It is clear India’s policy failures in its neighborhood are not solely due to external events. They are also manifestations of India’s current domestic politics. From the securitization of diplomacy to Modi’s strongman image, New Delhi has undermined its liberal credentials among the people of South Asia. Preferential treatment for Modi’s favored corporate interests by governments such as Hasina’s—an international extension of Indian cronyism—has further raised suspicion about New Delhi’s intentions.

The adherence of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to Hindu nationalist ideology has played a major role in harming India’s regional interests, especially in Bangladesh. The 2019 Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) that fast-tracked Indian citizenship for persecuted minority groups in neighboring countries while excluding Muslims fueled criticism from the Bangladeshi public. The BJP regime’s ill treatment of Muslims within India has fueled criticism of Modi abroad; his 2021 visit to Bangladesh was met with violent riots.

Hasina’s resignation provided the opportunity for a moment of introspection for the Indian government, but it seems unable to engage in policy correction. India’s tarnished image in Bangladesh is not the Modi government’s first major failure in South Asia, and it won’t be the last. Its pursuit of a de facto Hindu Rashtra (“Hindu state”) is not only damaging to India but will also have disastrous results in South Asia.

India’s ties to Hasina run deep. After her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman—Bangladesh’s founding leader—was assassinated in a 1975 military coup, Hasina and her sister took refuge in India. She returned to Bangladesh to fight for democracy, first serving as prime minister from 1996 to 2001 before returning to office in 2009. Her rule took an authoritarian turn after 2014 as she went after political opponents, journalists, and activists.

Hasina’s party, the secular Awami League, targeted radical Islamist groups; unlike her opponents, she did not did not allow anti-India militant groups to establish bases in Bangladesh. India backed Hasina to the exclusion of everyone else, with officials arguing that if she lost power, Bangladesh would become a “breeding ground for Islamist groups posing a threat to India’s national security.” This year, after Hasina won a fourth term in a criticized election, India lobbied U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration to stop applying pressure to Bangladesh over democratic backsliding.

Hasina presided over soaring economic growth and controlled all state institutions, including the military; as a result, India assumed that she would continue to rule despite protests. But in a striking Indian intelligence and diplomatic failure, New Delhi was stunned when the army asked Hasina to leave the country this month. No Western government has offered her asylum, leaving her holed up in New Delhi. Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval greeted Hasina when she landed.

India’s over-securitized approach to neighborhood diplomacy—reflected in its unconditional support of Hasina—goes against the grain of historical, cultural, ethnic, geographic, and economic ties that India has throughout South Asia. New Delhi has missed opportunities to gain the confidence of its neighbors, in effect breeding insecurity in these countries. It has become out of touch with larger public sentiment in the region, burning bridges with the political opposition, including in conditions of democratic backsliding.

In Myanmar, India has shunned pro-democracy protesters in Myanmar in favor of the military junta that seized power in a coup in 2021. In Afghanistan, it has established friendly ties with the Taliban rulers, neglecting longstanding relationships with nationalist Afghans. In Bangladesh, the security-centric approach has manifested in policing along the countries’ border; complaints about the heavy-handed behavior of India’s Border Security Force abound.

Modi’s strongman politics have also shaped India’s regional diplomacy. While Modi maintains a silence on China’s ingress on the disputed India-China border, India’s smaller neighbors bear the brunt of his image building. India launched a cross-border raid in Myanmar in 2015 against transit camps of Indian insurgents, the same year it unleashed a trade blockade on Nepal when the latter declared itself a secular republic. Last year, Modi’s supporters launched a campaign for Indian tourists to boycott the Maldives, after a diplomatic row when some Maldivian ministers allegedly criticized Modi.

In Bangladesh, the tough approach of India’s border police added to public grievances about New Delhi’s actions on water sharing, transit facilities, and other trade-related issues that were supposedly unfair to Dhaka. In a young country with fragile nationalism, the public seemed to transfer its rage against India for violating Bangladesh’s sovereignty to Hasina.

Political opponents in India have regularly criticized Modi for his support of crony firms, especially those owned by the billionaire Gautam Adani. These ties have attracted attention in India’s neighborhood, too. Last year, Adani posted a picture with Hasina after announcing that an Adani Group power plant would supply 100 percent of its electricity to Bangladesh. It drew criticism in Bangladesh for being too expensive, too late, and too risky while lining Adani’s pockets. Experts alleged that Hasina need Modi’s associated political favor to “secure political legitimacy.”

Populism, authoritarianism, and cronyism contributed to India’s troubles in Bangladesh, but the Modi government’s pursuit of Hindu nationalist ideology has been even more damaging.

The 2019 CAA ultimately serves the goal of creating a de facto Hindu state; among the persecuted communities that it fast-tracked for Indian citizenship were Hindus in Bangladesh. (Hasina’s media advisor Iqbal Sobhan Chowdhury expressed distaste at being compared to Pakistan and Afghanistan, countries rife with terrorist activity.) This fed an anti-India narrative that gained ground in Bangladesh, as did other rhetoric about Bangladeshis from top BJP leaders. Indian Home Affairs Minister Amit Shah, Modi’s de facto no. 2, has called Bangladeshi immigrants termites, illegal infiltrators, and a threat to national security.

Before the CAA, the Indian judiciary ordered a draconian survey to document legal citizens and identify Bangladeshi immigrants in the border state of Assam—seen by critics as a way of targeting undocumented Indian Muslims. Shah vowed to implement this National Register of Citizens (NRC) nationwide, but that has not yet materialized. Although New Delhi characterized the register as a domestic issue, Bangladesh found itself at the center of India’s “illegal foreign nationals” problem. Many analysts feared the CAA and NRC could push millions of Indian Muslims into Bangladesh.

Meanwhile, Hasina’s government continued to reinforce the perception that she was taking orders from New Delhi. When a BJP spokesperson made remarks insulting the prophet Muhammad in 2022, it earned the ire of many Muslim-majority countries; Hasina’s government declared the matter an “internal issue.” The grievances began adding up in Bangladesh, and the BJP government’s escalating discrimination toward Indian Muslims has not helped. On the campaign trail this year, Modi indulged in anti-Muslim dog-whistling. Last year, he inaugurated a new parliament building that features a mural of Akhand Bharat (“Unbroken India”)—including all of India’s smaller neighbors within its borders.

In his national address on India’s Independence Day on Aug. 15, Modi spoke about India’s 1.4 billion citizens worrying about the safety of Hindus in Bangladesh. It was a thinly veiled way of framing India as only a Hindu homeland—not the multiethnic, multireligious, and multilingual country it has been for hundreds of years. It is no surprise that the BJP government refuses to censure its right-wing supporters and media that spread disinformation about killings of Hindus in Bangladesh amid the recent unrest—even after retaliatory attacks in India on the Muslim community.

Modi’s government now seems to have little capacity for self-reflection. Instead of blaming Pakistan, China, or Islamists for the events that led to Hasina’s resignation in Bangladesh, India should acknowledge that its neighboring countries’ citizens can win back their agency and exercise it against authoritarian regimes. Although India is hailed as a rising power in distant lands, it is still seen as a relatively weak power by those in its neighborhood. Geography dictates that its smaller neighbors must work with India, but it is now up to New Delhi to negotiate fresh terms of engagement.