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RT (medij)

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RT
LastnikANO "TV-Novosti"[1]
DržavaRusija
JezikNovice:
angleščina, francoščina, nemščina, arabščina, spanščina
Dokumentarni filmi:
angleščina, ruščina
Spletna platforma:
portugalščina (Brazilija), srbščina.
SedežUlica borovaja, zgradba 3/1, Moskva
Nekdanja imenaRussia Today (2005–2009)
Spletna stranwww.rt.com Uredite to na Wikipodatkih
RT
LastnikANO "TV-Novosti"[1]
DržavaRusija
JezikNovice:
angleščina, francoščina, nemščina, arabščina, spanščina
Dokumentarni filmi:
angleščina, ruščina
Spletna platforma:
portugalščina (Brazilija), srbščina.
SedežUlica borovaja, zgradba 3/1, Moskva
Nekdanja imenaRussia Today (2005–2009)
Spletna stranwww.rt.com Uredite to na Wikipodatkih

RT (do 2009 znan kot Russia Today)[2] je ruski državni[9] mednarodni medij, ki ga financira ruska vlada.[10][11] RT upravlja plačljive in brezplačne TV kanale ter spletno stran v ruskem, angleškem, španskem, francoskem, nemškem, arabskem, portugalskem in srbskem jeziku.

RT je[a] en izmed najpomembnejših virov ruske propagande, dezinformacij in teorij zarot za mednarodna občinstva.[28][37][44][51] Med rusko-gruzijsko vojno leta 2008 je glavna urednica RT izjavila, da bije informacijsko vojno s celotnim zahodnim svetom.[52] Med pandemijo covida-19 je RT tujim občinstvom širil proticepilsko retoriko in dezinfomacije, kar je bilo v nasprotju z rusko vladno retoriko za domača občinstva.[53] Poročanje RT najpogosteje skuša ustvariti negativno sliko zahodnega sveta (in Rusijo kot podcenjeno nasprotnico tem slabostim),[54] bralcu ustvariti vtis, da resnice ni mogoče odkriti oz. da so vse »resnice« enakovredne[55][56] ter vzbuditi nezaupanje do zahodnih medijev.[56]

Po ruski okupaciji Krima leta 2014 in začetku rusko-ukrajinske vojne je bil RT blokiran v Ukrajini,[57] iz istega razloga leta 2020 v Latviji in Litvi,[58][59] od leta 2022 pa v celotni EU, Združenem kraljestvu in Kanadi zaradi širjenja dezinformacij o ruski invaziji na Ukrajino.[60][61][62] Kanali medija so leta 2022 bili prav tako odstranjeni s strani različnih družbenih omrežij in ponudnikov spletnih vsebin.[63][64][65] Wikipedija je konsenz o neprimernosti uporabe RT kot vira sprejela leta 2020.[66] Kljub blokadam se propagandana vsebina medija še vedno širi posredno prek tretjih oseb.[67]


Ob ustanovitvi RT leta 2005 je ANO TV-Novosti vložil 30 $ milijonov začetnih stroškov[68] in 30 $ milijonov v proračun za prvo leto delovanja. Do leta 2012 je letni proračun narasel na 300 $ milijonov.[69][70] Putin je 30. oktobra 2012 prepovedal zmanjšanje financiranja RT.[71] Do danes se je letni proračun gibal okoli 300 milijonov ameriških dolarjev, kar RT postavlja na prvo mesto med ruskimi mediji po financiranju.[72][73][74] Marca 2022 je kanale RT prenašalo 22 satelitev in 230 operaterjev, kar omogoča doseg približno 700 milijonov gospodinjstev v več kot 100 državah.[75] Poleg glavnih televizijskih kanalov v angleščini RT International, RT UK in RT America, RT oddaja tudi v arabščini Rusiya Al-Yaum, španščini Actualidad RT in dokumentarni kanal RTDoc.[76]


Opombe

  1. ↑ Kot takega so ga opredelili različni nekdanji (in trenutni) uslužbenci, akademiki, preverjevalci dejstev in novinarji

Sklici

  1. ↑ 1,0 1,1 »Contact info«. RT International (v angleščini). Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 20. januarja 2017. Pridobljeno 14. aprila 2017.
  2. ↑ Pisnia, Natalka (15. november 2017). »Why has RT registered as a foreign agent with the US?«. BBC News (v angleščini). Washington. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 2. marca 2022. Pridobljeno 2. marca 2022.
  3. ↑ 3,0 3,1 Haigh, Maria; Haigh, Thomas; Kozak, Nadine I. (26. oktober 2018). »Stopping Fake News«. Journalism Studies. Routledge. 19 (14): 2062–2087. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2017.1316681. ISSN 1461-670X. S2CID 152142122. Pridobljeno 1. marca 2022 – prek Taylor & Francis.
  4. ↑ 4,0 4,1 Golovchenko, Yevgeniy; Hartmann, Mareike; Adler-Nissen, Rebecca (1. september 2018). »State, media and civil society in the information warfare over Ukraine: citizen curators of digital disinformation« (PDF). International Affairs. Oxford University Press. 94 (5): 975–994. doi:10.1093/ia/iiy148. ISSN 0020-5850. Arhivirano (PDF) iz spletišča dne 16. junija 2024. Pridobljeno 20. marca 2021. Particularly in the wake of the crisis in Ukraine that erupted in 2013–2014, the Kremlin has been accused of orchestrating disinformation campaigns against the Ukrainian government and western countries by using online trolls and state-controlled online outlets such as RT (formerly known as Russia Today), Sputnik and Life News.
  5. ↑ 5,0 5,1 Hellman, Maria; Wagnsson, Charlotte (3. april 2017). »How can European states respond to Russian information warfare? An analytical framework« (PDF). European Security. Taylor & Francis. 26 (2): 153–170. doi:10.1080/09662839.2017.1294162. S2CID 157635419. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča (PDF) dne 23. aprila 2021. Pridobljeno 23. septembra 2022 – prek Charles University.
  6. ↑ 6,0 6,1 Al-Rawi, Ahmed (12. februar 2021). »How did Russian and Iranian trolls' disinformation toward Canadian issues diverge and converge?«. Digital War (v angleščini). Palgrave Macmillan. 2 (1–3): 21–34. doi:10.1057/s42984-020-00029-4. ISSN 2662-1983. S2CID 258704949. {{navedi časopis}}: Preveri vrednost |s2cid= (pomoč)
  7. ↑ Denton, Allison (16. april 2019). »Fake News: The Legality of the Russian 2016 Facebook Influence Campaign« (PDF). Boston University International Law Journal. Boston University School of Law. 37: 209. Arhivirano (PDF) iz spletišča dne 26. februarja 2022. Pridobljeno 26. februarja 2022. Additionally, the U.S. is not the only country that has been targeted by Russian influence campaigns. Russia has been accused of conducting another influence campaign prior to the 2017 French election between Marine Le Pen (Russia's pick) and Emmanuel Macron. Before the election, Kremlin-controlled news sources Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik reported that Macron was secretly gay, and that he was backed by a "very rich gay lobby."
  8. ↑ 8,0 8,1 Nassetta, Jack; Gross, Kimberly (30. oktober 2020). »State media warning labels can counteract the effects of foreign misinformation«. Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review. Harvard University: Harvard Kennedy School. doi:10.37016/mr-2020-45. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 1. marca 2021. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021. However, when it comes to disinformation from state-controlled media sources platforms' options are more limited. Most often channels like Russia's RT and Iran's PressTV do not technically violate a platform's terms of service and so cannot be removed. However, they still play a vital role in the disinformation ecosystem. Not only do they put out disinformation through their websites and social media channels, they are key nodes in coordinated campaigns, as well. For instance, the content originally posted on RT will be reposted down a chain of websites until it appears to be an organic article on an American outlet (Nimmo, 2017).
  9. ↑ [3]:{{{1}}}[4][5]:4[6]:2[7][8](Implications)
  10. ↑ Fisher, Max (13. junij 2013). »In case you weren't clear on Russia Today's relationship to Moscow, Putin clears it up«. The Washington Post. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 12. junija 2018. Pridobljeno 31. julija 2016.
  11. ↑ Nimmo, Ben (8. januar 2018). »Question That: RT's Military Mission«. Atlantic Council-Digital Forensic Research Lab. medium.com. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 20. septembra 2020. Pridobljeno 13. marca 2018.
  12. ↑ Langdon, Kate C.; Tismaneanu, Vladimir (9. julij 2019). »Russian Foreign Policy: Freedom for Whom, to Do What?«. Putin's Totalitarian Democracy: Ideology, Myth, and Violence in the Twenty-First Century (v angleščini). Springer International. str. 189–224. ISBN 978-3-030-20579-9. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 31. januarja 2024. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021 – prek Google Books. Soviet-born British journalist Peter Pomerantsev documented the typical newsroom antics in one of Russia's largest propaganda outlets, RT News (formerly known as Russia Today). When his acquaintance composed a piece that referenced the Soviet Union's occupation of Estonia in 1945, the writer was chewed out by his boss, who maintained the belief that Russians saved Estonia. Any other descriptions of the events of 1945 were unacceptable assaults on Russia's integrity, apparently, so the boss demanded that he amend his text.
  13. ↑ Reire, Gunda (2015). »Euro-Atlantic values and Russia's propaganda in the Euro-Atlantic space« (PDF). Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. 13 (4). Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča (PDF) dne 4. novembra 2021. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021 – prek Center for International Studies. Nowadays, Russia attacks the Western value of rationality and uses the argument of "the second opinion" or plurality of opinions. The phrase "the second opinion" has even become the slogan of RT. For instance, this propaganda channel used the public opinion's contention as to the nature of the Iraq war, to sell itself as an impartial, objective media outlet in the USA. Overall, Russian propaganda involves a clash of political systems, which is more dangerous than the old-school Soviet propaganda.
  14. ↑ Benkler, Yochai; Faris, Rob; Roberts, Hal (Oktober 2018). »Epistemic Crisis«. Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation and Radicalization in American Politics. Oxford University Press. str. 358. doi:10.1093/oso/9780190923624.001.0001. ISBN 978-0-19-092362-4. OCLC 1045162158. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 26. januarja 2021. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021. The emphasis on disorientation appears in the literature on modern Russian propaganda, both in inward-focused applications and in its international propaganda outlets, Sputnik and RT (formerly, Russia Today). Here, the purpose is not to convince the audience of any particular truth but instead to make it impossible for people in the society subject to the propagandist's intervention to tell truth from non-truth.
  15. ↑ Karlsen, Geir Hågen (5. avgust 2016). »Tools of Russian Influence: Information and Propaganda«. V Matláry, Janne Haaland; Heier, Tormod (ur.). Ukraine and Beyond (v angleščini). Palgrave Macmillan. str. 199. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-32530-9_9. ISBN 978-3-319-32530-9. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 7. aprila 2023. Pridobljeno 28. februarja 2022 – prek Google Books. The propaganda apparatus proper consists of four means: media, social media, political communication and diplomacy, and covert active measures, all tied together in a coordinated manner. The main international media channel is the RT broadcaster and website, formerly known as Russia Today. It is complemented by Sputnik radio and website, news and video agencies, and the Russia Beyond the Headlines news supplement, making up a news conglomerate operating in almost 40 languages.
  16. ↑ Ižak, Štefan (Januar 2019). »(Ab)using the topic of migration by pro-Kremlin propaganda: Case study of Slovakia« (PDF). Journal of Comparative Politics (v angleščini). University of Economics in Bratislava / University of Ljubljana / Alma Mater Europaea. 12 (1): 58. ISSN 1338-1385. Arhivirano (PDF) iz spletišča dne 1. marca 2022. Pridobljeno 28. februarja 2022. Almost all important media in Russia are state controlled and used to feed Russian audience with Kremlin propaganda. For international propaganda Kremlin uses agencies like RT and Sputnik. Both are available in many language variations and in many countries (Hansen 2017). Aim of this propaganda is to exploit weak spots and controversial topics (in our case migration to the EU) and use them to harm integrity of the West (Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014).
  17. ↑ Oates, Sarah; Steiner, Sean (17. december 2018). »Projecting Power: Understanding Russian Strategic Narrative«. Russia's Public Foreign Policy Narratives (PDF). Russian Analytical Digest. 229. Zv. 17. University of Bremen: Research Centre for East European Studies. str. 2–5. doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000311091. Arhivirano (PDF) iz spletišča dne 1. oktobra 2020. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021 – prek ETH Zurich. The analysis of Russian strategic narrative allows us to understand more clearly the logic in Russian propaganda found on English-language outlets such as RT and more effectively deter Russian information aggression.
  18. ↑ Napaka pri navajanju: Neveljavna oznaka <ref>; sklici, poimenovani Orttung, ne vsebujejo besedila (glej stran pomoči).
  19. ↑ Ajir, Media; Vailliant, Bethany (Fall 2018). »Russian Information Warfare: Implications for Deterrence Theory«. Strategic Studies Quarterly. 12 (3): 70–89. ISSN 1936-1815. JSTOR 26481910. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 9. februarja 2021. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021. The real-world repercussions of these objectives are identified through several forms of attack. The first is through disseminating official Russian state propaganda abroad via foreign language news channels as well as Western media. Most notable is the creation of the very successful government-financed international TV news channel, Russia Today (RT).
  20. ↑ Bicknell, Bob (11. december 2005). »Russian News, English Accent«. CBS News (v ameriški angleščini). Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 30. maja 2019. Pridobljeno 11. marca 2021.
  21. ↑ Napaka pri navajanju: Neveljavna oznaka <ref>; sklici, poimenovani Ioffe, ne vsebujejo besedila (glej stran pomoči).
  22. ↑ Napaka pri navajanju: Neveljavna oznaka <ref>; sklici, poimenovani SpiegelBidder, ne vsebujejo besedila (glej stran pomoči).
  23. ↑ Napaka pri navajanju: Neveljavna oznaka <ref>; sklici, poimenovani Guardian_Harding_RT, ne vsebujejo besedila (glej stran pomoči).
  24. ↑ Kramer, Andrew E (22. avgust 2010). »Russian Cable Station Plays to U.S.«. The New York Times. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 1. marca 2019. Pridobljeno 23. februarja 2017.
  25. ↑ »Ukraine hits back at Russian TV onslaught«. BBC. 2014. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 29. maja 2014. Pridobljeno 20. junija 2018.
  26. ↑ 26,0 26,1 MacFarquhar, Neil (28. avgust 2016). »A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories«. The New York Times. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 18. junija 2018. Pridobljeno 29. avgusta 2016.
  27. ↑ 27,0 27,1 Oremus, Will (16. marec 2017). »Irony Dies Again as Russia Today Launches Fake-News Debunker«. Slate (v angleščini). Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 17. decembra 2021. Pridobljeno 17. decembra 2021.
  28. ↑ [12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27]
  29. ↑ Golovchenko, Yevgeniy (11. december 2020). »Measuring the scope of pro-Kremlin disinformation on Twitter«. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications (v angleščini). 7 (1): 1–11. doi:10.1057/s41599-020-00659-9. ISSN 2662-9992. The impact of Russian state-controlled news outlets—which are frequent sources of pro-Kremlin disinformation—is concentrated in one, highly popular news outlet, RT. [...] When it comes to overt reach, the Russian government openly funds English-speaking outlets, such as Sputnik News and RT. These outlets serve as a frequent source of pro-Kremlin disinformation both according to scholars, fact-checkers and Western authorities (BBC, 2019; Elliot, 2019; Thornton, 2015).
  30. ↑ Walker, Christopher (2016). »The Hijacking of "Soft Power"« (PDF). Journal of Democracy. Johns Hopkins University Press. 27 (1): 49–63. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0007. S2CID 31802016. Arhivirano (PDF) iz spletišča dne 31. januarja 2024. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021 – prek National Endowment for Democracy. State or state-friendly media in Russia – Life News, NTV, Channel One Russia, and Russia 24—disseminate not just the Kremlin's narratives but also outright fakery to domestic audiences and those in the Russian-speaking space. These outlets spread the same stories via social media as well. RT, meanwhile, pushes this manipulated content out to international audiences.
  31. ↑ Fletcher, Richard; Cornia, Alessio; Graves, Lucas; Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis (1. januar 2018). »Measuring the reach of "fake news" and online disinformation in Europe« (PDF). Australasian Policing. 10 (2). Arhivirano (PDF) iz spletišča dne 25. februarja 2022. Pridobljeno 25. februarja 2022 – prek Mediterraneo Cronaca. For comparative purposes, we also included two prominent Russian news sites which have featured in European policy discussions around disinformation, namely Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik. These Russian state-backed organisations are clearly different from sites that engage in for-profit fabrication of false news, but both independent fact-checkers and the EU's European External Action Service East Stratcom Task Force have identified multiple instances where these sites have published disinformation.
  32. ↑ Borges, Priscila Monteiro; Gambarato, Renira Rampazzo (29. januar 2019). »The Role of Beliefs and Behavior on Facebook: A Semiotic Approach to Algorithms, Fake News, and Transmedia Journalism«. International Journal of Communication (v angleščini). USC Annenberg Press. 13: 603–618. ISSN 1932-8036. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 12. marca 2024. Pridobljeno 26. februarja 2022. Notorious examples of fake news masquerading as news can be found in reports broadcast on the U.S. cable news channel Fox News (Schram & Fording, 2018) and the Russian international television network RT (Russia Today; Dowling, 2017). Thus, there are also a number of fake news reports published by traditional media outlets (White, 2017), generating a consequent increase in distrust for traditional journalism (Siddique, 2018).
  33. ↑ LoGiurato, Brett (30. april 2014). »Russia's Propaganda Channel Just Got A Journalism Lesson From The US State Department«. Business Insider. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 4. julija 2019. Pridobljeno 11. marca 2021.
  34. ↑ Crowley, Michael (1. maj 2014). »Tit-for-Tat: Putin's Maddening Propaganda Trick«. Time. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 19. novembra 2018. Pridobljeno 11. marca 2021.
  35. ↑ Napaka pri navajanju: Neveljavna oznaka <ref>; sklici, poimenovani sarafirth, ne vsebujejo besedila (glej stran pomoči).
  36. ↑ Napaka pri navajanju: Neveljavna oznaka <ref>; sklici, poimenovani Reliable Sources, ne vsebujejo besedila (glej stran pomoči).
  37. ↑ [3][4][5][6][8][26][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36]
  38. ↑ Napaka pri navajanju: Neveljavna oznaka <ref>; sklici, poimenovani economist-wobbly, ne vsebujejo besedila (glej stran pomoči).
  39. ↑ Yablokov, Ilya (november 2015). »Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool: The Case of Russia Today (RT)« (PDF). Politics. SAGE. 35 (3–4): 301–315. doi:10.1111/1467-9256.12097. S2CID 142728966. Arhivirano (PDF) iz spletišča dne 12. aprila 2021. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021 – prek University of Montenegro. Among the conspiratorial ideas that feature in RT's broadcasts, two types are of particular interest: the first includes genuinely American conspiracy theories; and the second includes ideas of conspiracy in relations between the US and Russia. The analysis of these two types of conspiracy theories offers an opportunity to explore how they are employed to undermine US domestic and foreign policies.{{navedi časopis}}: Vzdrževanje CS1: samodejni prevod datuma (povezava)
  40. ↑ Elswah, Mona; Howard, Philip N (1. oktober 2020). »"Anything that Causes Chaos": The Organizational Behavior of Russia Today (RT)«. Journal of Communication. Oxford University Press. 70 (5): 623–645. doi:10.1093/joc/jqaa027. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 16. marca 2024. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021. Across our interviews, our respondents agreed that the goals of the channel since 2008 have been and still are as follows. First, to push the idea that Western countries have as many problems as Russia. Second, to encourage conspiracy theories about media institutions in the West in order to discredit and delegitimize them. This is clearly adherent to the channel's "Questions More" slogan. Third, to create controversy and to make people criticize the channel, because it suggests that the channel is important, an approach that would particularly help RT managers get more funding from the government.
  41. ↑ Byford, Jovan (2011). »Introduction«. Conspiracy Theories: A Critical Introduction (v angleščini). Palgrave Macmillan UK. str. 9–10. doi:10.1057/9780230349216. ISBN 978-1-349-32350-0. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 9. oktobra 2021. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021 – prek Google Books. The channel has provided the likes of Alex Jones, Webster Tarpley, David Ray Griffin and Jim Marrs with the opportunity to promote, to an international audience, their ideas about the New World Order, 9/11, the Bilderberg group or the climate change conspiracy, all while being treated with absolute deference by the channel's journalists. Embedded video clips of appearances on Russia Today have become a regular feature on the websites of American conspiracy theorists, where they are brandished as a sign of credibility and mainstream recognition.
  42. ↑ Dukalskis, Alexander (2021). Making the World Safe for Dictatorship (v angleščini). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-752014-7. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 31. januarja 2024. Pridobljeno 13. maja 2021.
  43. ↑ Gray, Rosie (13. marec 2014). »How The Truth Is Made At Russia Today«. BuzzFeed News (v angleščini). Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 22. februarja 2018. Pridobljeno 11. marca 2021.
  44. ↑ [38][27][39][40][41][42][43]
  45. ↑ William Turvill (15. november 2012). »Ofcom rules against Russia Today over Syria conflict report«. Press Gazette. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 30. maja 2019. Pridobljeno 23. januarja 2016.
  46. ↑ Napaka pri navajanju: Neveljavna oznaka <ref>; sklici, poimenovani BBC-21Sept, ne vsebujejo besedila (glej stran pomoči).
  47. ↑ Napaka pri navajanju: Neveljavna oznaka <ref>; sklici, poimenovani GuardianOfcom, ne vsebujejo besedila (glej stran pomoči).
  48. ↑ Alevtina Kuzmenkova (18. oktober 2016). »British Bank Closes Russian Broadcaster RT Accounts«. Transitions Online. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 20. oktobra 2016. OFCOM, the British broadcast regulator, has repeatedly singled out RT for its lack of impartiality
  49. ↑ Waterson, Jim (16. julij 2018). »Alex Salmond's RT show breached Ofcom broadcasting rules«. The Guardian (v angleščini). Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 16. novembra 2020. Pridobljeno 21. marca 2021.
  50. ↑ Pomerantsev, Peter (4. januar 2015). »Inside Putin's Information War«. Politico. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 5. januarja 2015. Pridobljeno 11. marca 2021.
  51. ↑ [45][46][47][48][49][50]
  52. ↑ EUvsDisinfo (15. januar 2018). »Chief Editor: RT is Like "a Defence Ministry"«. EUvsDisinfo (v ameriški angleščini). Pridobljeno 8. septembra 2024.
  53. ↑ »The two faces of RT's coronavirus propaganda When it comes to Russia Today and the pandemic, coverage at home and abroad is worlds apart«. Meduza (v angleščini). Pridobljeno 8. septembra 2024.
  54. ↑ Dukalskis, Alexander (2021). Making the World Safe for Dictatorship (v angleščini). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-752014-7.
  55. ↑ Engelhart, Katie (24. maj 2015). »Meet the Colonel in Charge of Countering Russian Propaganda in Lithuania«. VICE (v ameriški angleščini). Pridobljeno 8. septembra 2024.
  56. ↑ 56,0 56,1 Pomerantsev, Peter (9. april 2015). »Inside the Kremlin's hall of mirrors«. The Guardian (v britanski angleščini). ISSN 0261-3077. Pridobljeno 8. septembra 2024.
  57. ↑ Zinets, Natalia; Prentice, Alessandra (19. avgust 2014). Balmforth, Richard (ur.). »Ukraine bans Russian TV channels for airing war 'propaganda'«. Reuters. Robin Pomeroy (ed.). Pridobljeno 12. decembra 2020.
  58. ↑ Anstrate, Vita (30. junij 2020). »Kremlin propaganda channel "RT" banned in Latvia«. Public Broadcasting of Latvia. Pridobljeno 30. junija 2020.
  59. ↑ »Radijo ir televizijos komisija uždraudė Lietuvoje retransliuoti RT programas«. lrt.lt (v litovščini). 8. julij 2020. Pridobljeno 8. julija 2020.
  60. ↑ Zimonjic, Peter (16. marec 2022). »CRTC bans Russian state-controlled TV channels RT, RT France from Canadian airwaves«. CBC News. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 1. julija 2022. Pridobljeno 5. maja 2022.
  61. ↑ Chmielewski, Dawn (1. marec 2022). »Roku is removing RT from the Roku Channel Store in Europe – source«. Reuters (v angleščini). Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 2. marca 2022. Pridobljeno 1. marca 2022.
  62. ↑ »Russian-backed RT channel to lose Sky TV slot in UK within 24 hours«. The Guardian (v angleščini). 1. marec 2022. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 17. septembra 2022. Pridobljeno 1. marca 2022.
  63. ↑ Emerson, Sarah. »Apple Halted Product Sales In Russia And Disabled Apple Maps Features In Ukraine«. BuzzFeed News (v angleščini). Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 1. marca 2022. Pridobljeno 1. marca 2022.
  64. ↑ Newman, Jared (1. marec 2022). »Here's which tech companies have—and haven't—banned Russia's state-sponsored RT media app«. Fast Company (v ameriški angleščini). Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 1. marca 2022. Pridobljeno 1. marca 2022.
  65. ↑ »Microsoft to remove RT apps, ban Russian state-owned media ads«. Reuters (v angleščini). Reuters. 28. februar 2022. Arhivirano iz spletišča dne 1. marca 2022. Pridobljeno 1. marca 2022.
  66. ↑ Harrison, Stephen (1. marec 2022). »How the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Is Playing Out on English, Ukrainian, and Russian Wikipedia«. Slate (v ameriški angleščini). ISSN 1091-2339. Pridobljeno 8. septembra 2024.
  67. ↑ Bond, Shannon (6. junij 2024). »This is what Russian propaganda looks like in 2024«. NPR. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 15. junija 2024. Pridobljeno 15. junija 2024.
  68. ↑ Beth Knobel "Russian News, English Accent: New Kremlin Show Spins Russia Westward" Arhivirano 24 September 2015 na Wayback Machine., CBS News, 12 December 2005
  69. ↑ Marcin Maczka, The Propaganda Machine Arhivirano 7 October 2014 na Wayback Machine., New Eastern Europe website, 9 July 2012, originally published in New Eastern Europe: New Europe, Old Problems No. 3 (IV), 2012.
  70. ↑ Lenizadt estimates the 2012 Russian Federal Budget at 11 billion rubles to RT's parent company ANO TV-Novosti.
  71. ↑ »Putin forbids funding cuts to state-run media outlets – Gazeta. Ru – English news blog«. Gazeta.Ru. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 2. novembra 2012.
  72. ↑ »Russia Cuts State Spending on RT News Network«. The Moscow Times. 11. oktober 2015. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 18. decembra 2020. Pridobljeno 30. januarja 2016.
  73. ↑ »Госфинансирование RT и МИА «Россия сегодня» будет увеличено на 1,4 и 1,7 млрд рублей в 2022 году« [State funding of RT and MIA Rossiya Segodnya will be increased by 1.4 and 1.7 billion rubles in 2022]. RTVI (v ruščini). 22. december 2021. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 4. februarja 2022. Pridobljeno 4. februarja 2022.
  74. ↑ »RT остался лидером по объемам госфинансирования среди СМИ. В 2022 году канал получит почти 29 миллиардов рублей« [RT remained the leader in terms of state funding among the media. In 2022, the channel will receive almost 29 billion rubles]. Meduza (v ruščini). 23. december 2021. Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 4. februarja 2022. Pridobljeno 4. februarja 2022.
  75. ↑ »Distribution«. RT International (v angleščini). Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 7. junija 2023. Pridobljeno 13. marca 2022.
  76. ↑ »About RT (formerly corporate profile)«. RT International (v angleščini). Arhivirano iz prvotnega spletišča dne 24. februarja 2019. Pridobljeno 14. aprila 2017.
Pridobljeno iz »https://sl.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=RT_(medij)&oldid=6294756«