Read an Excerpt

Pacific Victory

Tarawa to Okinawa 1943â"1945

The History Press

Tarawa

The Turning of the Tide

With men and materials flowing at an ever-increasing rate from an invigorated US war machine, the Allies were at last in a position to go on the offensive. Midway had removed the threat to the Hawaiian Islands, and MacArthur's victories in New Guinea and the Solomons ensured the security of Australia and the vital supply lines from America. The Navy's depleted carrier force was being rapidly reinforced with the new 'Essex' class carrier, capable of operating over eighty aircraft, and US shipbuilders were turning out battleships, cruisers and other vessels at an astonishing rate. As MacArthur continued his thrust westward towards his ultimate goal, a victorious return to the Philippines, Adm Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, pressed for an advance through the islands and atolls of the central Pacific; 'island hopping' through the Gilberts, Marshall Islands and Carolines towards the Japanese mainland, occupying those islands that were of strategic importance and isolating those that were of no military value or were geographically unsuitable for amphibious operations.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Adm King and Gen George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, persuaded the Combined Chiefs to agree to a series of operations against the Gilbert Islands and the Japanese-mandated Marshalls and Carolines; this was confirmed in May at the Trident Conference in Washington. Originally it was intended that the Marshall Islands would be the starting point for the campaign, but the threat of a massive retaliation from the Japanese naval base at Truk persuaded Nimitz and Spruance to go for the less risky option of the Gilberts.

In August 1942, a Marine Raider battalion had attacked the island of Makin in the northern Gilberts, and, though the raid had achieved little, the propaganda value had been immense and had raised the USA's flagging morale. But the Japanese saw the raid as a precursor to an all-out assault on the Gilberts and immediately set about reinforcing Tarawa, the largest atoll in the islands.

Lying some 2,500 miles south-west of Hawaii and 1,300 miles south-east of Truk, Tarawa was the most southerly point in Japan's outer defence ring and was in a key position along the vital lifeline from the United States to the south Pacific. The Gilbert Islands had been under British jurisdiction before the war, and US forces had access to up-to-date information about the islands, something that was not available to them for the Marshalls. At a meeting in Hawaii in September 1943, 'Operation Galvanic' – the invasion of Tarawa, Makin and the tiny island of Apamama – was formulated, and the 'island hopping' campaign was up and running.

'Operation Galvanic'

'The question of landing in the face of an enemy is the most complicated and difficult of the war.'

(Gen Sir Ian Hamilton (Gallipoli Diary))

Mounting an amphibious assault against a heavily defended island is fraught with huge problems under the best of conditions. At this stage of the war nobody knew if such a dangerous and complex undertaking could succeed, and at what cost. US forces had only limited experience of amphibious warfare, unlike the Japanese, who at that time were probably the world's leading exponents; but a start had to be made somewhere and Tarawa was to be the testing ground.

The Marines for the operation, the 5th Marine Amphibian Corps (VMAC), were under the overall command of Lt-Gen Holland M. Smith, a volatile officer whose initials 'H.M.' were adapted to 'Howlin' Mad' by his men, a name that stuck for the rest of his career. The assault on Betio (pronounced 'Bay-sho'), the largest island of Tarawa Atoll and the site of the only airfield in the Gilberts, was allocated to the 2nd Marine Division under its commander, Maj-Gen Julian C. Smith, while the occupation of the more northerly Makin went to the Army's 27th Division under yet another Smith, Maj-Gen Ralph C. Smith. Getting the Marines and soldiers to the Gilberts was the responsibility of the commander of Task Force 24, Rear-Adm Richmond Kelly Turner – 'Terrible Turner' to one and all. The most experienced American in the art of amphibious warfare, he had overseen and organised the landing on Guadalcanal in 1942 and was later to oversee the assaults on the Marshalls, Marianas, Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

The defence of the Gilberts came under the joint jurisdiction of the CIC South-East Asia, Vice-Adm Kusaka, and the CIC 2nd Fleet, Vice-Adm Kondo; but once 'Operation Galvanic' got under way the islands were virtually written off. In September 1943, Rear-Adm Keiji Shibasaki was appointed as commander on Betio, and an impressive programme was put in hand to make the island one of the most heavily defended outposts of the Japanese perimeter.

The first obstacle that the Marines would encounter was a natural one, a shelflike reef that extended between 800yd and 1,200yd offshore, to which the Japanese added further hazards in the shape of log barricades, barbed wire, and pyramid-shaped concrete tetrahedrons. At the shoreline a barricade of logs, 3ft to 5ft high, was constructed around most of the island's perimeter, behind which were machine-gun and rifle emplacements. Anti-tank ditches were dug at various strategic positions on the south shore and to the east and west of the airfield. At various points around the island were coastal-defence guns ranging in calibre from 205mm to 80mm; dual-purpose anti-aircraft guns between 127mm and 70mm and over thirty other artillery pieces from 75mm pack howitzers, 37mm light field guns, heavy 13mm machine-guns and an assortment of mortars. In the centre of the island the airfield, with its 4,000ft runway dominated the landscape, and the Admiral's command post, a reinforced concrete structure measuring 60ft 2 40ft 2 25ft high, stood a short distance inland from the short Burns-Philp pier. The 111th Construction Unit under Lt Murakami had performed a brilliant job in turning Betio into what was probably, yard for yard, the most heavily defended position in the world at that time – indeed Adm Shibasaki boasted, 'the Americans could not take Tarawa with a million men in a hundred years'.

Planning

The US force was divided into two groups. The northern group (Task Force 52), with the Army's 165th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of the 27th Division, had the task of securing Makin. Vice-Adm Richmond Kelly Turner, accompanied by Holland Smith, was in command. In his mind was the possibility of a major Japanese retaliation from Truk. If this happened, he wanted the most powerful naval force and the top commanders available in the north.

The southern group (Task Force 53), was under Rear-Adm Harry Hill. 'Handsome Harry', as he was known, would support the Marines of the 2nd Division in their assault on Betio. Maj-Gen Julian Smith had taken command of the 2nd Division in May 1943 while they were recuperating in New Zealand after fighting alongside the 1st Division on Guadalcanal. They were in poor condition; there were over 13,000 confirmed cases of malaria alone, and a large number of replacements were being shipped out from America. The division consisted of three infantry regiments – the 2nd, 6th and 8th Marines – together with a regiment of artillery (the 10th), a tank battalion and an amphibious tractor battalion. The Engineers, the Pioneers and the Naval Construction Battalion ('Seabees') were grouped with the 18th Marines. The elements of the United States Navy accompanying the VMAC could only be described as awesome (the rate at which the shipyards of America replenished the Navy after Pearl Harbor is one of the unsung epics of the war). Harry Hill's Task Force 53 consisted of 3 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers, 13 attack transports and, to supply air cover, 3 aircraft carriers.

The Gilberts had been under British control since 1915, and the Marines were able to draw on the experience of a number of expatriates, whom they labelled the 'Foreign Legion'. The maps and charts of the area dated from the turn of the century, and intelligence was based more on aerial photographs, along with surveys made of the islands by the submarine USS Nautilus. A vital factor in the invasion was going to be the depth of water around Betio on D-Day, which was set for 20 November. The 'Foreign Legion' offered various opinions about the tides, but one dissonant voice, that of Frank Holland, was adamant that the water would be too low on that day. Holland had spent fifteen years in the islands and had made a hobby of studying the tides; he was appalled at the Marine's choice of D-Day and declared that there would be a 'dodging tide' – an extra-low tide – on 20 November.

There were to be two ways of transporting the Marines from the troopships to the shore. The first three waves of 1,500 men were to go in amphibious tractors (Amtracs), so the depth of water was theoretically irrelevant; but the remainder would come ashore in Higgins Boats (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, or LCVP), shallow-draught 36ft-long boats with wide ramps which drew only 3–4ft of water when loaded. If Frank Holland's predictions were correct, the Higgins Boats would ground on the reef and the Marines would have no option but to wait for returning Amtracs or wade to the shore.

A careful study of aerial photographs had convinced Col David M. Shoup, the Divisional Planning Officer, that the Marines should attack from the lagoon side of the island. Three landing beaches had been designated: 'Red 1', a deep cove stretching from the north-west tip of the island for around 500yd – here the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Marines (3–2), under Maj John Schoettel, would land; 'Red 2', from the edge of the cove to the long pier, was assigned to the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Marines (2–2), under Lt-Col Herbert R. Amey; and 'Red 3', from the edge of the pier to a point in line with the end of the main runway was allocated to the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Marines (2–8), under Maj Henry P. 'Jim' Crowe. The western end of the island was designated 'Green Beach' and the southern shores as 'Black 1' and 'Black 2', but no landings were planned here for D-Day. Most of the Marines had no idea of what they were going to be up against; the constitution of Japanese forces was pretty much a mystery to all but the senior ranks, and rumours had it that they would be fighting their opposite number – 'Imperial Marines'. No such unit existed, but they were not far from the truth.

The Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces

The Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF), the 'Rikusentai', could trace their origins back to the earliest days of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Initially developed as small infantry units attached to naval ships, they gradually developed into larger units of highly trained amphibious infantry. In the early years of the war, SNLF units were used as shock troops for the invasion of Wake Island, where 450 troops overwhelmed the small Marine garrison, and in 1941 a force of 5,000 landed on Guam. They were also the first reinforced units to land on Guadalcanal, and they offered fierce resistance to the 1st Marine Division's landings on Tulagi and Gavutu.

By 1942, there were some 50,000 Rikusentai based at various locations throughout the Pacific, and their experience of amphibious warfare gave them an expertise that no other country possessed. A typical unit was commanded by a navy captain and had three rifle companies supplemented by anti-aircraft, coastal-defence, field-artillery and anti-boat units. At Tarawa, the USMC would face the 3rd Special Base Force (formerly known as the 6th Yokosata Special Naval Landing Force), the 7th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force, the 111th Pioneers and the 4th Construction Unit – over 4,850 troops in total. The SNLF were elite troops specially trained in the use of a wide variety of weapons and all imbued with the spirit of 'bushido' – death before dishonour. They were to distinguish themselves at Tarawa; after 76 hours of savage fighting, 4,690 lay dead and only 17 wounded Japanese surrendered. A mere 146 prisoners were listed at the end of the battle – almost all conscripted Korean labourers.

'In Landing Operations Retreat is Impossible' Lt Gen George S. Patton Jr)

The battle had a deceptively quiet start. The huge invasion fleet of transports, battleships and carriers lay off the coast of Betio in the pre-dawn darkness of 20 November, but it was so quiet that some doubted whether there were any Japanese on the island. 'Try as I might, I never got over the feeling that the Japs had pulled out of Tarawa – not until the first bullet whizzed by my ear,' said war correspondent Robert Sherrod. By 3.00 a.m., the transports had assembled in their formations and the Marines began disembarking into the Amtracs and Higgins Boats, a difficult task for a 'Leatherneck' burdened with up to 100lb of equipment, some with extra items such as radios, mortars, ammunition and stripped-down machine-guns. Many eyes on many ships were watching Betio, and at 4.40 a.m. all heads turned as a single red star shell rocketed from the centre of the island – any doubts about a Japanese presence were gone.

Shortly after 5.00 a.m., Harry Hill's flagship, the USS Maryland, launched her Kingfisher spotter plane, and the Japanese, seeing the flash from the catapult, opened up with one of their 8in guns at Temakin Point. The shells overshot the battleship and, in response, the US ships opened up with their 16in and 8in guns, which began pounding the enemy positions. The salvos from the Maryland's massive guns made the old ship shudder; dust spurted from every crevice, crumbling insulation showered down, lights went out, and the massive vibrations caused the radios to malfunction. This loss of communications was to prove a serious problem throughout the battle and later resulted in the practice of adapting transport ships, bristling with antennae, as the communications centres for future invasion fleets.

Around 5.40 a.m. the bombardment ceased: Harry Hill had learned that a strong current was carrying the transports southward. They were not only straying into the warships' field of fire; they were drifting within range of the enemy guns. The repositioning of the transports and their landing craft not only delayed the operation; it gave Adm Shibasaki time to move men and equipment from the southern shore to the lagoon side of Betio, where it was now obvious that the landings were going to be made. An air strike from the carriers Essex, Bunker Hill and Independence had been arranged, but the planes were conspicuous by their absence. Hill could not contact the carriers because of his radio problems, and he was just about to resume his bombardment when they finally arrived. The 'Dauntless' and 'Avenger' bombers, and 'Hellcat' fighters, plastered the island for seven minutes (the plans had called for much longer), and Harry Hill then mounted his main bombardment of the island. For an hour and twenty minutes three battleships and four cruisers raked the island from end to end; great gouts or sand and coral erupted into the air, palm trees were ripped from the ground, ammunition dumps exploded and a great pall of smoke from a fuel dump added to the shroud of dust that hung over Betio.

Spectacular as it was, the greatest pre-invasion bombardment of the war thus far failed in its main objective of destroying the enemy defences. Many shells were fired from close offshore and, with a low trajectory, simply bounced off the island and into the sea beyond; others missed the island altogether. Nor did it eliminate the garrison; the Japanese simply retired to their well-prepared bunkers and dugouts and sat out the storm.

It was a long haul for the landing craft. After leaving the transports they had a 3½-mile slog to the line of departure just inside the lagoon, and another 6,500yd to the beaches. By the time they landed, some of the Marines would have been afloat for nearly six hours. Lt-Cdr Robert MacPherson, the observer in the Kingfisher spotter plane, had a dramatic view of the bombardment but was becoming concerned about the slow progress of the landing craft, which were also being tracked on the radar of the minesweeper Pursuit. As reports filtered through to Harry Hill, he realised that he had no choice but to delay H-Hour, the time at which the landing craft were to hit the beaches, by an hour until 9.00 a.m.

Braving anti-aircraft fire, MacPherson's plane dived in low to have a look at the reef. What he saw filled him with horror: instead of the 4 or 5ft of water that had been expected, the sea was so low in places that long stretches of coral were drying in the sun. He knew that the Amtracs would grind over the reef, but the fourth, fifth and sixth waves of Higgins Boats were inevitably going to run aground hundreds of yards out. Frank Holland's predictions were going to haunt a lot of people before the end of the day.

Horror at the Reef

As the Amtracs and Higgins Boats left the point of departure, a lone boat surged ahead of them. Lt William Hawkins and his Scout Sniper Platoon were heading for the end of the long pier; their task was to clear from it any Japanese troops who could fire on the waves of landing craft that would shortly be passing on either side. Landing at the Y-shaped seaplane dock at the seaward end, Hawkins and his men silenced a machine-gun and then proceeded to shoot, grenade and flame-throw their way down the quarter-mile-long pier, clearing snipers from small barges moored alongside it and silencing another machine-gun nest on a platform under the trestles.

The lines of landing craft were now on their final approach. As Ralph Butler of 3–2 recalled, 'After what seemed like hours of milling about we were in proper alignment and proceeding shoreward. We were in high spirits. There was even a sense of adventure. I don't recall how far from shore we were when all hell let loose: explosions, detonations, bodies slumping and bloody, and as we crunched to a halt somebody yelling, "Get the hell out of here fast."'

As the rows of Amtracs entered the cove on 'Red Beach 1', heavy machine-guns and artillery opened up from ahead and from both sides. Within minutes, Amtracs were burning as their unarmoured fuel tanks exploded; others spun as their drivers fell dead or wounded; and some just disappeared in a ball of flame as they were blown apart by artillery at almost point-blank range. The pattern of landings planned for 'Red 1' had disintegrated as the drivers took the line of least resistance and headed as far away from the enemy fire as possible.

---

Excerpted from Pacific Victory by Derrick Wright. Copyright © 2013 Derrick Wright,. Excerpted by permission of The History Press.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

---