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Approved by:

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1. Purpose and Overarching Guidelines

1.1. Purpose of PSPS. The purpose of proactive de-energization is to promote public safety by decreasing the risk of utility infrastructure as a source of wildfire ignitions. Generally, proactive de-energization will be referred to as Public Safety Power Shutoff ("PSPS"), which is consistent with the terminology used by the major California investor-owned utilities. As a measure of last resort, PSPS activation is consistent with the statutory obligation to protect public safety pursuant to Public Utilities Codes ("PUCs") § 451 and 399.2(a).

1.2. Purpose of PSPS Plan. This document provides the policies and procedures of Bear Valley Electric Service, Inc. ("BVES" or "Bear Valley") with regard to PSPS and addresses the following operational issues:

- PSPS advance planning and preparations prior to the fire season.
- Procedures leading up to, during, and following extreme fire threat weather events in which PSPS may be invoked. These include BVES's operational fire prevention actions and procedures.
- Public outreach, coordination with local and government officials, advisory boards, public safety partners, representatives of people/communities with access and functional needs ("AFN"), tribal representatives (if applicable), senior citizen groups, business owners, and public health and healthcare providers including those with medical needs. This includes a Community Resource Center ("CRC") and communications regarding PSPS.
- Establish guidelines for PSPS exercises.

1.3. Measure of Last Resort. BVES must only deploy PSPS as a *measure of last resort* and must justify why PSPS was deployed over other possible measures or actions. This plan provides the course of action to be followed prior to enacting a PSPS, demonstrating that enacting a PSPS is the measure of last resort.

Customer Engagement. BVES will work to engage its customers and other impacted stakeholders to promote understanding of the purpose of PSPS actions, BVES's process for initiating it, how to safely manage a PSPS event, and the impacts if deployed.

1.4. PSPS Coordination. Deploying PSPS requires a coordinated effort across multiple state and local jurisdictions and agencies. Coordination in preparation for PSPS is a shared responsibility between BVES, public safety partners, and local governments; however, BVES is ultimately responsible and accountable for the safe deployment of PSPS. BVES must work with the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services to integrate its warning programs with the agencies and jurisdictions within California that have a role in ensuring that the public is notified before, during, and after emergencies. Throughout this document, the collective phrase "Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations" includes applicable local government and agencies, utilities, key

non-government and commercial entities, and also includes critical facilities and critical infrastructure. Further discussion is provided in Section 5.

1.5. PSPS Is an Emergency. Consequences of PSPS should be treated in a similar manner as other emergencies that may result in loss of power, such as earthquakes or floods.

1.6. Reporting and Continuous Improvement. BVES must report on lessons learned from each PSPS event, including instances when PSPS protocols are initiated, but de-energization does not occur, to continually improve PSPS practices.

BVES must work together with the other utilities to share information and advice to create effective and safe PSPS programs at each utility and ensure utilities are sharing current and accurate information with public safety partners.

2. Chain of Responsibility

2.1. President holds overall responsibility for the PSPS Plan and ensuring it is properly implemented, resourced, trained upon, executed, and updated as appropriate. Furthermore, the President shall ensure proper communications and coordination with local government, agencies, and customers.

2.2. Utility Manager is responsible for executing the following actions under BVES PSPS Plan:

- Direct emergency operations under this Plan and the EDRP;
- Ensure monitoring of fire potential index (FPI), weather forecasts, and actual weather conditions are properly conducted by appropriate staff;
- Direct (the operational activities related to system line-up and PSPS as warranted;
- Ensure Field Operations staff provide timely and accurate information to the Customer Service Supervisor and other staff performing customer and public information functions;
- Work closely and coordinate with counterparts at local government and agencies leading up to a PSPS event, during PSPS, and during restoration procedures;
- Activate the Wildfire Response Team (WRT) for PSPS procedures
- Determine the appropriate staff composition of the WRT when activated;
- Train or assign training to BVES staff with roles required by this Plan;
- Ensure resources are available to properly execute this plan and identify any gaps in resources to the President as well as proposed remedies;
- Ensure all regulations are followed and required reports are timely submitted to the applicable regulatory bodies, including the Commission and Energy Safety;
- Evaluate whether changes to this plan are warranted and implement any necessary changes.

2.3. Field Operations Supervisor is responsible for executing or directing operations in the field, including:

- Monitor (or direct monitoring) weather advisories, consultant forecasts, and the FPI forecast at least daily;
- Direct and manage operational system line-ups based on conditions as described in this plan;
- Direct and coordinate PSPS procedures in this plan;
- Direct the activities of the WRT;
- Control all switch and system lineup operations;
- Provide (or ensure) timely and accurate information to the Customer Service Supervisor and/or other staff performing customer and public information functions;
- Inform the Utility Manager of any system issues;
- Collect relevant data and maintain documentation including, but not limited to, inspections, operational system lineup, and PSPS activities; and
- Submit to the Utility Manager recommended changes to this plan as warranted.

2.4. Utility Engineer & Wildfire Mitigation Supervisor are responsible for fire prevention planning and engineering design of the electric distribution, sub-transmission and substations, includeing:

- Ensure system design and construction is in compliance with applicable government rules and regulations to mitigate fire;
- Develop distribution, sub-transmission, and substation designs to reduce fire risk;
- Research, evaluate, and source materials fire resistant materials and equipment;
- Develop device protective settings and select fuses to enhance fire prevention while taking into account reliability and the served load;
- Support Field Operations and the WRT as directed by the Utility Manager in the execution of system operations per this plan; and
- Submit recommended changes to this plan to the Utility Manager as warranted.

2.5. Wildfire Mitigation & Reliability Engineer, under the supervision of the Utility Engineer & Wildfire Mitigation Supervisor, will monitor Bear Valley's Wildfire Analyst Enterprise (WFA-E) fire risk (Fire Behavior Index and other applicable consequence models) and the FPI model. The Wildfire Mitigation & Reliability Engineer will send the forecasts (WFA-E fire risk) and FPI to designated Field Operations and Management staff (President, Energy Resource Manager, Utility Manager, Field Operations Supervisor, Utility Engineer & Wildfire Mitigation Supervisor, Electrical Distribution System Engineer, Customer Programs Specialist, Substation Technician), and other staff as designated by the Utility Manager. In the absence of the Wildfire Mitigation & Reliability Engineer or the GIS Specialist as designated by the Utility Engineer & Wildfire Mitigation Supervisor.

2.6. Customer Program Specialist, under the supervision of the Customer Service Supervisor and the Energy Resource Manager, is responsible for the BVES Communications Plan, including:

- Notify (or direct to notify) local government, agency, and customer notifications under this plan;
- Establish and maintain customer communications methods and systems equipment to support proactive de-energization notifications per this plan;
- Train staff assigned to issue customer and public information via media notification statements and customer communications methods;
- Developing (or causing to be developed) the contact list of local government and agencies per this plan;
- Direct a customer education strategy to inform customers about BVES's fire mitigation programs, including PSPS; and
- Submit to the Utility Manager recommended changes to this plan as warranted.

3. Considerations for Plan Activation

3.1. Considerations for PSPS Plan Activation. The BVES service area is susceptible to several conditions in which BVES may activate its PSPS Plan. These are:

- Extreme fire threat weather and fuel conditions in BVES's service area that warrant BVES to implement PSPS on BVES-owned and operated power lines in some or all areas of its service area.
- Extreme fire threat weather and conditions outside of the BVES's service area, in which Southern California Edison (SCE) directs a PSPS on SCE-owned/operated power lines leading to a partial or complete loss of the three SCE supply lines into the BVES service area. This threat is higher than the likelihood that BVES initiates its own PSPS due to the greater presence of extreme fire threat weather and fuel conditions across SCE's territory than in the BVES service area. In such a case, BVES would seek to supply power to its customers using all available power resources.
- In the circumstance that a PSPS is warranted in some or all areas of the BVES service area and SCE has implemented PSPS actions that result in a partial or complete loss of supplies to the BVES service area.

4. **BVES Fire Prevention Procedures**

4.1. Fire Prevention.

4.1.1. Bear Valley's Wildfire Mitigation Plan provides descriptions of system hardening projects, operations and maintenance programs, and other initiatives being pursued by BVES to mitigate wildfire. This PSPS Plan is an extension of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan's fire prevention efforts.

4.1.2. As system improvements are made and environmental conditions change, the plan will evolve to meet these changes. In creating the plan, BVES has incorporated the input and interests of our stakeholders to ensure that the needs of the community are effectively met while mitigating the risk of wildfire. Community outreach and communications are a key component of this plan, as well as maintaining partnerships with the Big Bear Valley Mountain Mutual Aid Association, City of Big Bear Lake, San Bernardino County, Big Bear Fire Department, Big Bear Lake Sheriff's Department, other local agencies, local utilities, local radio stations, news media, and the public.

4.1.3. PSPS is an operational safety measure of last resort to prevent wildfires. It is logical that the PSPS Plan includes Bear Valley's operational fire prevention plan measures so that the progression of operational steps to be taken by BVES staff is properly sequenced and understood by all stakeholders.

4.1.4. Regulatory Background

Ordering Paragraph 5 of D.12-01-032 required BVES to prepare a Fire Prevention Plan to identify the occurrence of 3-second wind gusts that exceed the structural and mechanical design standards for overhead power-line facilities.

D.14-05-020 modified D.12-01-032 by eliminating the requirement to identify 3-second wind gusts in real time, provided a utility will still address the situation when all three of the following conditions occur simultaneously:

(i) 3-second wind gusts exceed the structural or mechanical design standards for the affected overhead power-line facilities,

- (ii) these 3-second gusts occur during a period of high fire danger, and
- (iii) the affected facilities are located in a high fire-threat area.

D.14-05-020 also required utilities to identify the specific parts of their service territories where all three conditions listed in Ordering Paragraph I (a) occur simultaneously, based on a minimum probability of 3% over a 50-year period that 3-second wind gusts that exceed the design standards for the affected facilities will occur during a Red Flag Warning in a high fire-threat area. Ordering Paragraph 2 of D.17-12-024 requires each electric investor-owned utility have a fire prevention plan for facilities in the High Fire-Threat District containing the information specified in General Order ("GO") 166, Standard 1, Part E, to the extent applicable to the electric utility's service area and to file a report containing the fire prevention plan annually beginning October 31, 2018.

4.1.5. This plan lists and describes the operational fire prevention measures BVES intends to implement to mitigate the threat of power-line fires generally and in the situation where all three of the conditions listed in GO-166, Standard 1, Part E occur simultaneously. BVES has identified areas potentially susceptible to these conditions. These areas are heavily forested, abundant in available fuel, and could threaten the system when high winds occur. When these conditions exist, BVES has pre-identified areas that are targeted for PSPS in Appendix B.

4.2. Seasonal Considerations. Understanding BVES' system demand, service area environmental factors, and wildfire risk drivers allows BVES to operate the system in a manner that is optimized for public safety including wildfire mitigation, reliability, and increased quality of service delivered.

The non-winter months (April through October) bring the following characteristics to BVES's service area:

- Lower load demand due to reduced or minimal tourism and no ski resort snowmaking, therefore BVES' load is generally lowest in April, May, September, and October; the load increases somewhat in the summer months of June, July, and August;
- Higher ambient temperatures with low humidity that rarely require air conditioning; and
- Higher wildfire risk due to low moisture content in the service area and increased presence of fuel (dry vegetation).

Therefore, during the winter months, as described above, the BVES distribution system is optimized for safety and reliability. Following the winter season, the system's operational focus is more defensive and optimized almost entirely for fire prevention.

4.3. Daily-to-Real-time Considerations. The daily and even hourly changes in environmental and system conditions can change the risk of wildfire significantly. Therefore, the factors affecting Daily-to-Real-time considerations must be understood and evaluated by the Operations Team to develop the appropriate risk mitigation package on a daily or even more frequently when adverse factors develop or are expected to develop. Some of the factors that the Operations Team needs to consider are:

- Forecasted and actual weather: Sustained wind speed, wind gust strength, dryness (humidity), precipitation, etc.
- **Fuel inventory:** Buildup of ground cover vegetation, timber on the ground, thickness of forest, etc.
- Dryness of fuel: Dryness of dead vegetation, timber on the ground, etc.
- **System design limitations:** Installed bare conductor configuration, conventional expulsion fuses installed in the system, switches with limited protective and remote control capabilities, etc.
- **T&D equipment failure or degradation:** Protective switch failure, loss of remote connectivity with protective devices, etc.
- **Missed or delayed inspection:** Detailed inspection or patrol per GO-95 missed or delayed, GO-174 inspection missed or delayed, other inspection deemed critical missed or delayed, etc.
- **Delayed correction of fire hazard inspection discrepancies:** Correction of "must be fixed before fire season" discrepancies, GO-95 discrepancies not corrected within required periodicity, etc.

- **Operational deviations from normal lineup:** Abnormal system lineup due to planned maintenance, system upgrades, equipment degradation, etc.
- **Degradation in situational awareness:** Failure or loss of connectivity with installed weather stations, loss of FPI model, loss of WFA-E application, loss of NFDRS (e.g., during Federal Government shutdown), loss of remote circuit monitoring, loss of HD Alert Camera coverage, etc.
- **Resource degradation:** Insufficient line crews and/or other key operation staff, loss of utility vehicles, etc.

Daily-to-Real-time considerations always override seasonal considerations.

4.4. Pre-Planned Operational Posture. The operational actions to be taken for forecasted and actual weather, fuel inventory, dryness of fuel, and system design limitation consideration factors are easily pre-determined. Whereas the response to the rest of the Daily-to-Real-time consideration factors must be individually evaluated to determine their impact on the overall plan. For example, if certain weather stations suffer a failure, the Utility Manager may require the Wildfire Response Team be deployed sooner in a high wind situation.

4.4.1. **Seasonal Operational Posture**: The following operational actions are to be taken during fire season and are incorporated into BVES's PSPS planning. Generally, BVES considers April to November but specific dates will be recommended by the Field Operations Supervisor and approved by the President based upon current conditions and forecasted weather outlook.

- The Radford Line is de-energized. The line will be ready for re-energization should the load demand require it, for planned maintenance or system upgrades, or for other operational reasons approved by the Utility Manager. The Utility Manager will inform the President of any changes in the status of the Radford Line. Note: Once the Radford Line Replacement Project is completed and fully operational, the Radford Line will not be de-energized as part of the seasonal operational posture.
- Certain Auto-Reclosers (ARs) and Switches are placed in "Manual" (e.g., they will not shut and test upon detecting a fault). The Field Operations Supervisor develops a list of the devices to be placed in "Manual" and forwards the list to the Utility Manager and President.
- All Fuse TripSavers shall be placed in "Manual" (i.e., they will not shut and test upon detecting a fault).
- Due to reduced load in non-winter period, the Utility Engineer & Wildfire Mitigation Supervisor developed specific settings for Auto-Recloser and other protective devices in the field to enhance fire prevention. The list of affected devices will be provided to the Utility Manager and the Field Operations Supervisor. Additionally, the Field Operations Supervisor will be provided the settings that the Field Operations staff will be required to set on each device. Engineering staff will not change device settings without the Field Operations Supervisor's authorization.

 When an Auto-Recloser, Switch, or Fuse TripSaver placed in "Manual" due to the above policy trips open, the affected portions of the de-energized circuit or feeder will be patrolled prior to re-energizing them. If the cause is identified and the FPI is "Green," the Field Operations Supervisor may authorize the Line Crew to test the device once. If the device trips open again, the circuit or feeder must be thoroughly patrolled to determine the fault and ensure there is no risk of causing fire.

4.4.2. **Daily-to-Real-time Operational Posture**: The pre-planned operational postures provided in this section take into account the System Design Limitations factor.

BVES' forecasting framework for fire prevention measures relies on use of a Fire Potential Index (FPI) model produced by Technosylva specifically customized for the BVES service area. The FPI model quantifies the fire activity potential over the territory based on different parameters including fuels, terrain, and weather. Table 4-1: Fire Potential Index provides the following categories of FPI:

FPI categories	FPI value	FPI percentile
Very Low	< 5	<60
Low	5-10	60-80
Moderate	10-13.5	80-85
High	13.5-23	85-95
Very High	23-37.5	95-99
Extreme	> 37.5	>99

FPI will be used to assist the BVES Team in making operational decisions regarding the sub-transmission and distribution system. As shown in the table

above as FPI increases, the risk of wildfire increases. Therefore, the BVES Team will initiate operational and customer procedures to mitigate wildfire. The FPI is updated at least daily by the Wildfire Mitigation & Reliability Engineer.

As an additional aid and backup to the FPI, the contracted meteorologist integrates the National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS) with the detailed local forecast specific to BVES's service area and develops a risk rating as indicated below in Table 4-2: Fuel Dryness and High-Risk Days and Table 4-3: Fire Potential.

Fuel Dryness & High Risk Days	Rating	Description	
Green	Moist	Little to no risk of fires.	
Yellow	Dry	Low risk of large fires in the absence of a "High Risk" event.	
Brown	Very Dry	Low/moderate risk of large fires in the absence of a "High Risk" event.	
Orange	High-Risk Day	At least a 20% chance of a "Large Fire" due to a combination of either "Dry" or "Very Dry" fuel dryness and a critical burn environment (e.g., Santa Ana winds).	
Red	High-Risk Day	At least a 20% chance of a "Large Fire" due to a combination of either "Dry" or "Very Dry" fuel dryness and an ignition trigger (lightening).	

Table 4-2: Fuel Dryness and High-Risk Days

Table 4-3: Fire Potential



The Field Operations Supervisor will monitor the FPI as reported by the Wildfire Mitigation & Reliability Engineering and indications from installed weather stations, which are equipped with alarms based on actual wind speed, and then direct the proper operational pre-planned response. As indicated in Table 4-4 below, "Brown", "Red", and "Orange" are considered elevated fire threat conditions that require the BVES system to be configured for fire prevention over reliability concerns.

Table 4-4: Operational Direction Based on Fire Potential Index For OverheadFacilities

FPI Category	Very Low and Low	Moderate	High	Very High/Extreme
Auto-Reclosers and Protective Switches with Reclosing Capability	Automatic ¹	Manual (Non- Automatic)	Manual (Non- Automatic)	Manual (Non- Automatic)
Patrol following circuit or feeder outage	No ^{2,3}	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fuse TripSavers	Automatic ¹	Automatic ¹	Manual (Non- Automatic)	Manual (Non- Automatic)
Designate which circuits are under: (1) Consideration (2) In Scope	No	No	Yes	Yes
Deploy Wildfire Risk Team(s) to circuits "In Scope".	No	No	Yes ⁴	Yes
Cease using any spark-producing tools and equipment for circuits under consideration or in scope.	No	No	Yes	Yes
Cease vegetation management work for circuits under consideration or in scope.	No	No	Yes⁵	Yes
Cease "high risk" energized line work for circuits under consideration or in scope. ⁶	No	No	Yes	Yes
Forward to Field Operations updated list of medical baseline customers and impacts access and functional needs population.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Review Local Government, Agencies, First Responders, Critical Infrastructure, and Stakeholder notification lists and procedures.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Review customer notification procedures.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Activate EOC.	No	No	Yes ⁷	Yes
Initiate Local Government, Agencies, First Responders, Critical Infrastructure, and Stakeholder notification in accordance with BVES PSPS Procedures.	No	No	Yes ⁸	Yes ⁸
Initiate customer notification in accordance with BVES PSPS Procedures.	No	No	Yes ⁸	Yes ⁸
Prepare Bear Valley Power Plant for sustained operations.	No	No	Yes	Yes
Conduct switching operations to minimize impact of potential PSPS activity	No	No	Yes	Yes
Activate first responder, local government and agency, customer and community, and stakeholders PSPS communications plan.	No	No	Yes ⁹	Yes ⁹
Activate Community Resource Centers.	No	No	Yes ¹⁰	Yes
Invoke Public Safety Power Shutoff.	No	No	Yes ¹¹	Yes ¹¹

¹During the non-winter months, certain devices as developed by the Field Operations Supervisor and approved by the Utility Manager will remain in Manual (Non-Automatic) for the entire period regardless of the wildfire risk.

² During the non-winter months, when an Auto-Recloser, Switch, or Fuse TripSaver that was placed in "Manual" due to the above policy trips open, the affected portions of the de-energized circuit or feeder will be patrolled prior to re-energizing them. If the cause is likely known and the fire risk is "Green" or "Yellow," the Field Operations Supervisor may authorize the Line Crew to test the device once. If the device trips open again, the circuit or feeder must be thoroughly patrolled to determine the fault and ensure there is no risk to causing fire.

³No patrol is required. Re-test allowed following check of fault indicators, SCADA, other system indicators, and reports from the field. If the re-test fails, a patrol is mandatory.

⁴Based on actual conditions in the area, the Field Operations Supervisor may rescind the requirement to deploy Wildfire Risk Teams.

⁵The Wildfire Mitigation & Reliability Engineer may allow certain vegetation management activities to continue with additional controls to mitigate ignitions in place.

⁶The Field Operations Supervisor will review and designate which work is considered "high risk." Examples of "high risk" work include line work that can result in ignitions such as line work in high vegetation density areas where the line could make contact with vegetation or work that could cause line slap.

⁷If forecasted sustained wind or 3-second wind gusts expected to exceed 55 or actual sustained wind or 3-second wind gusts exceed 45 mph and expected to increase. The Utility Manager reduced the scope of the EOC to match actual conditions in the field.

⁸Executive Management will approve initiating notifications.

⁹Executive Management will approve activating first responder, local government and agency, customer and community, and stakeholders PSPS communications plan.

¹⁰Based on actual conditions in the area, the Energy Resource Manager may rescind the requirement to activate the Community Resource Center.

¹¹If actual sustained wind or 3-second wind gusts exceed 55 mph. The President may initiate PSPS if in his judgement the actual conditions in the field pose a significant safety risk to the public.

When sub-transmission and distribution facilities are in areas where the FPI is designated as "High" or higher, the circuit is designated as being under "consideration." When facilities are designated as being under "consideration," the Management and the Operations Team will evaluate the facilities for their condition (material condition, level of grid hardening, level of protective equipment and automation, etc.), status (energized, loading, etc.), scheduled work and maintenance, status of situational awareness monitoring equipment, actual weather, other weather forecasts, staff resources, etc. The Customer Service Team will review notification procedures for the affects area(s).

When sub-transmission and distribution facilities are in areas where the FPI is designated as "Very High" or higher, the circuit is designated as being under "in scope". When facilities are designated as being "in scope," all of the actions required for circuits "under consideration" will be taken. Additionally, the BVES Team will start making preparations for possible PSPS implementation on affected circuits.

Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Activation Consideration. BVES determined that specific actions per Table 4-4 above should be taken when wind gusts of 3 seconds or more exceed 55 mph and a period of high fire threat danger exists. These conditions are often referred to as "extreme fire threat weather and conditions."

4.4.3. Despite having a proactive and aggressive vegetation management program, vegetation may still contact power lines; for example, in high winds, branches outside the vegetation clearance zone may break and be blown onto bare conductors, and/or trees outside the clearance zone may fall into bare conductors. The specific strength of trees and branches is unknown; therefore, in high winds, it is impossible to predict how every tree and branch in the service territory would be impacted. This condition plays a key role in how BVES has selected its tripwire 3-second wind gust speed for PSPS and designated certain locations as "at risk" locations for proactive de-energization during extreme fire weather conditions.

4.4.4. Changes in vegetation density, circuit improvements such as covering bare wire, or other environmental factors may drive BVES to re-evaluate the designated "at risk" line sections in its system and, therefore, specific line sections may be added, removed or modified to the "at risk" list as appropriate in the future.

4.4.5. Because BVES is not able to determine the strength or health of vegetation surrounding bare conductors outside of the required vegetation clearance zones, as well as other structures that may come loose and impact BVES distribution facilities. Therefore, BVES may determine a need to proactively de-energize facilities during

high fire threat and high wind conditions. This would be done in close consultation and coordination with local government and agencies.

4.4.6. In determining whether to invoke PSPS, BVES staff considers factors driving "extreme fire weather" and dangerous threat conditions including, but not limited to, the following:

- Design, strength, and other characteristics of distribution overhead facilities.
- Vegetation density.
- FPI.
- High winds.
- Low humidity.
- National Weather Service advisories.
- Local weather forecasts and advisories.
- BVES meteorologist's forecast.
- Observed conditions.
- Information from BVES-installed weather stations.
- Real-time information from trained personnel positioned in high-risk areas.
- Input from state and local authorities and Emergency Management Personnel.
- Fire threat to electric infrastructure.
- Public Safety Risk.

"Extreme fire weather conditions" are deemed to be forecasted or exist when the FPI is High, Very High, or Extreme, high winds (45 mph or greater) are forecasted or measured, and the BVES meteorologist forecasts high fire threat conditions.

If "extreme fire weather conditions" are forecasted or exist, BVES Staff will implement BVES Public Safety Power Shutoff Procedures at the direction of the President.

4.5.5 BVES has identified seven sections of "at risk" areas based on the type of distribution facilities (overhead bare conductions, high voltage, etc.), tree and vegetation density, available dry fuel, and other factors. These "at risk" areas are identified on the map in Appendix A. These areas may be selectively de-energized by "opening" the ARs designated in Table 4-5, Switches to De-energize "At Risk" Areas, below.

Circuit (AR To Be Opened)	Number of Customers	Number of AFN
Radford 34kV	0*	0
North Shore 4kV (Open AR) 805)	1075	19
Erwin 4 kV (Open AR 1128)	262	8
Boulder 4kV (Open AR 105)	1211	16
Lagonita 4kV (Open AR 145)	1001	9

Table 4-5: Switches to De-energize "At Risk" Areas

Club View 4kV (Open AR 424)	772	7
Goldmine 4kV (Open AR 405)	1035	15

*Load is shifted to Shay 34kV line.

BVES expects that if a PSPS is necessary, it should be limited to one or more of these "high-risk" areas. However, the Operations Team must monitor the entire service area and invoke PSPS as a measure of last resort on any BVES circuit when conditions warrant such action.

4.5. Restoration from PSPS. When wind speeds in the affected area where PSPS was invoked calm below 50 mph for a minimum period of 20 minutes, crews may assess if the fire weather conditions have subsided to "safe levels" to begin the restoration of de-energized circuits. However, the crews may extend the calm period beyond 20 minutes, if they determine further gusts of greater than 50 mph are likely based on their direct observation of local conditions or forecasts indicate a high probability of winds picking up to greater than 50 mph. Crews should communicate with the Field Operations Supervisor prior to assessing the situation as "safe levels" so that an evaluation of actual conditions in the field may be merged with the latest forecasted information. Restoration activities include:

- Validating that the extreme fire weather conditions have subsided to safe levels.
- Conducting field inspections and patrols of facilities that were de-energized.
- Repair of any identified immediate hazards (Level 1 inspection conditions)
- Re-energization of inspected circuits.

5. BVES PSPS Procedures

5.1. Emergency Disaster and Response Plan. Section 4 of the BVES Emergency Response and Disaster Plan (EDRP) explains the BVES system sources of power and actions to be taken when there is partial or complete loss of sources of power. Appendix B to the EDRP provides a graphic showing the sources of power available to the BVES system including the SCE supply lines and their capacity. This PSPS Plan provides supplemental guidance in the case of an SCE PSPS event leading to a complete or partial loss of all SCE lines in order to avoid a "black start" of the Bear Valley Power Plant (BVPP). Once PSPS is implemented, outages shall be managed using the guidance of the BVES EDRP and the supplemental guidance of this procedure.

5.2. PSPS Phases. In *Table 5-1, PSPS Phases for PSPS Procedures*, BVES provides a time-line summary of actions to be taken for PSPS on BVES-owned bare wire overhead power lines affecting some or all of the BVES service area or a SCE-directed PSPS affecting the BVES service area.

It should be noted that weather changes can be sudden and the target timelines may end up being shorter than indicated in Table 5-1. PSPS actions are driven by forecasts and actual conditions in the field. The specific phases are:

- 1. Preparatory Phase: Conducted annually well before extreme fire threat conditions are expected; or when lessons learned or other conditions warrant updating plans, training, or outreach. This involves the developing of communication and notification plans jointly with stakeholders such as CalOES, county and local governments, independent living centers, and representatives of people/communities with AFN. Review and revise plans for establishing CRC(s). BVES currently holds PSPS exercises to further develop their staff to be readily available to properly activate a PSPS event. For further detail regarding BVES Functional Exercise: Bear Valley Wildfire Threat Situation Manual in Appendix F.
- 2. Warning Phase: Approximately 4-7 days prior to forecasted extreme fire threat weather and conditions, the warning phase involves assessing whether activating a PSPS may be warranted. If a PSPS is possible or likely, BVES notifies local government, agencies, partner organizations, and customers. This phase includes various levels of notification at the 4-7 days ahead, 4 days ahead, 2-3 days ahead, 1-2 days ahead, and 1-4 hours ahead (PSPS imminent) points in the preparatory process.
- **3. Implementation Phase:** De-energization actions are taken for "at-risk" areas due to observed extreme fire threat weather and conditions or imminent or active SCE-directed PSPS of SCE supply lines to BVES service area.
- **4. Restoration Phase:** This phase enables the safe restoration of power to deenergized circuits following verification that actual extreme fire threat weather and conditions have subsided and/or restoring SCE supply lines when they are reenergized. All de-energized lines must be patrol-inspected for vegetation and equipment hazards and all Level 1 conditions must be remediated before restoring power.
- **5. Reporting and Lessons Learned Phase:** Documenting and reporting to Safety Enforcement Division required information on the PSPS event and capturing lessons learned to ensure future PSPS events benefit from an understanding of what worked and what did not work in previous PSPS events.

5.3. PSPS Exercises. BVES conducts at least one tabletop and one functional simulation exercise annually. These exercises involve participating stakeholders from the Big Bear community and are coordinated with CPUC Cal Fire, Cal OES, communication providers, AFN representatives, and other public safety partners. Additionally, BVES will coordinate with these stakeholders to develop and plan the exercises. The exercises seek to prepare BVES and its community partners for a PSPS event, and enhance their performance, communication protocols, notification practices, and restoration procedures, and test the functionality of the plan to the extent practicable.

BVES will keep detailed records of these plans and submit reports of these exercises to the CPUC as required. BVES will review the exercises to identify strengths and weaknesses of BVES actions and seek to incorporate lessons learned into this Plan and other associated documentation, as appropriate.

Phase Preparatory	Timeframe Pre-fire season. • • Conducted annually	Internal Staff Actions Planning and Training	External Communications and Notifications
Preparatory		Planning and Training	
	 well before extreme fire threat conditions are expected; or When lessons learned or other conditions warrant updating plans, training, and/or outreach. 	 Managers review and update plans and procedures. Managers ensure staff are trained on PSPS procedures as applicable. Reach out to media and community-based organizations to ensure consistent awareness of and availability to third parties of all messaging and map data, including application programming interfaces that are used for deenergization events. Customer Service Department will ensure all equipment and supplies for the CRC are functional and readily available. Coordinate with stakeholders including CPUC, CalFire, CalOES, communications providers, representatives of people/communities with access and functional needs, and other public safety partners to plan de-energization simulation exercises throughout the utility service territories in the areas with the highest historical and forecasted risk for de-energization in advance of fire season. 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations: Provide copy of plan and solicit comments. Incorporate comments as deemed appropriate. Conduct meetings to discuss procedures. Update primary and secondary contacts for PSPS communications. Advisory Board: May consist of public safety partners, communications and water service providers, local and tribal government officials, business groups, non-profits, representatives of people/communities with access and functional needs and vulnerable communities, and academic organizations. Customer Outreach and Education: Post PSPS information and list of PSPS POCs on BVES's website and social media. Include PSPS information in periodic customer newsletter. Conduct public workshops. Provide PSPS notifications via email, telephone calls, Interactive Voice Response (IVR) proactive calling system, and two-way text messaging.
Warning	4-7 Days Ahead When forecasts indicate extreme fire threat weather and conditions may occur	 Operations & Planning: Evaluate system for possible impact area(s) and ensure resources ready to support PSPS. Contact SCE Staff and closely follow status of SCE supply lines (Doble, Cushenberry, and Bear Valley/Radford). Review operational and maintenance status of subtransmission system. Review operational and maintenance status of Bear Valley Power Plant (BVPP). Review operational and maintenance status of Radford Line. Consider conducting patrol of Radford Line. Review FPI, WFA-E, National Weather Service (NWS) forecasts, National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS) 7-day forecast, and weather and threat assessments from contracted meteorology consultant. Notify meteorology consultant to provide more frequent forecasts. Alert customer service to possibility of PSPS. 	None

Table 5-1: PSPS Phases for PSPS Procedures

		 Review and edit as applicable templates for PSPS events and the anticipated impacts on BVES Customers. Staff drafts notices to Public Affairs consultant for review, significant changes to templates are made. Create warning notifications to customers via email, telephone calls, IVR proactive calling system, and two- way text messaging. 	
Warning	4 Days Ahead If continuing and consistent forecasts of extreme fire threat weather and conditions	 Operations & Planning: Closely monitor fire weather alerts from various sources with the goal of refining the forecast (FPI, WFA-E, NWS, NFDRS, and meteorology consultant weather and threat assessments). Continue contacts with SCE Staff and closely follow status of SCE supply lines. If any SCE lines are under "PSPS Consideration," take actions per Table 4-2, BVES Action for SCE Lines Under PSPS Consideration. Ensure sub-transmission system is in most reliable condition. Defer or secure from planned maintenance. Ensure BVPP ready to operate. Defer or secure from planned maintenance. Alert Energy Resource Department of possible extended BVPP operations. Consider energizing Radford Line, if deemed necessary for reliability. Closely coordinate with SCE Staff regarding the PSPS status of SCE supply lines. Ensure BVES-installed weather stations fully operational. Ensure BVES staff incident responders on alert. Customer Service: Finalize "4 Day Alert" email regarding continuing and consistent forecasted extreme fire threat weather and conditions, which may lead to possible BVES directed PSPS and/or SCE directed PSPS.	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations: Email "4 Day Alert" to local government, agencies, and partner organizations' primary and secondary points of contact. Alert the emergency management community, first responders, and local government first.

Warning	2-3 Days Ahead Extreme fire threat weather and conditions forecasted with increasing confidence	 Operations & Planning: Continue to closely monitor fire weather alerts. Prepare staff rotation plans to support continuous field crew operations, BVPP operations, dispatch, and customer service. Evaluate need for additional resources from mutual aid agreements (CUEA and MMAA) and contracted services. Alert additional resources points of contact. Set up processes to frequently monitor BVES-installed weather stations. Review pre-approved field Switching Orders against current system line-up and make changes as applicable with Field Operations Supervisor's approval. Keep Customer Service informed of latest forecast to ensure accurate communications with stakeholders. Closely coordinate with SCE Staff regarding SCE supply lines to the BVES service area and take actions per Table 4-2, BVES Action for SCE Lines Under PSPS Watch, as applicable. Customer Service: Finalize "2-3-Day Notice" regarding forecasted extreme fire threat weather and conditions, about possible BVES directed PSPS and/or SCE directed PSPS. Provide anticipated impacts on BVES Customers and direction of event. Obtain President's approval to release. Issue a press release to local media (newspaper and radio) and post notification on website. Create warning notifications to customers via email, telephone calls, (IVR) proactive calling system, and two- 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations: Email "2-3 Day Notice" to local government, agencies, and partner organizations' primary and secondary points of contact. Coordinate with the emergency management community, first responders, and local government first. Encourage widest dissemination of this information. Customer Outreach: Post "2-3 Day Notice" on BVES website and social media. Issue "2-3 Day Notice" on BVES website and social media. Send out "2-3 Day Notice" via IVR. Send out "2-3 Day Notice" via Text Send out "2-3 day Notice" via Email
		•	
Warning	1-2 Days Ahead Extreme fire threat weather and conditions forecasted with high degree of confidence	 Operations & Planning: Continue to closely monitor fire weather alerts and observed conditions from various sources with the goal of refining the forecast. If needed, request additional resources from mutual aid agreements (CUEA and MMAA) and contracted services). Keep Customer Service informed of latest forecast to ensure accurate communications with stakeholders. Set up CRC and conduct a mock SOE scenario to include testing of all equipment and needed supplies. 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations: Email "1-2 Day Notice" to local government, agencies, and partner organizations' primary and secondary points of contact. Coordinate with the emergency management community, first responders, and local government first. Encourage widest dissemination of this information. Customer Outreach: Post "1-2 Day Notice" on BVES website and social media. Issue "1-2 Day Notice" press release for local media.

		 Purchase non-perishable food items to provide to our customers including bottled water. Continue to closely coordinate with SCE Staff regarding 	 Send out "1-2 Day Notice" via IVR. Send out "1-2 Day Notice" via Text Activate "1-2 day Notice" via Email
		 Continue to closely coordinate with SCE Staff regarding SCE supply lines to the BVES service area and take actions per Table 4-2, BVES Action for SCE Lines Under PSPS Watch, as applicable. When directed by the Utility Manager: Staff incident responders called in. Incident dispatch established. Field Crews dispatched to monitor various actual field conditions for extreme fire weather and other dangerous conditions throughout the service area and "at risk" areas. Implement BVES EDRP including staffing the EOC as applicable. 	
		 Customer Service: Finalize "1-2 Day Notice" regarding imminent extreme fire threat weather and conditions, which may result in BVES directed PSPS and/or SCE directed PSPS. Provide anticipated impacts on BVES Customers and duration of event. Obtain President's approval to release. Identify medical baseline and AFN customers that may lose power as result of PSPS. Issue a press release to local media (newspaper and radio) and post notification on website. Issue warning notifications to customers via email, telephone calls, (IVR) proactive calling system, and two-way text messaging 	
Warning	1-4 Hours Ahead When De-Energization Imminent. Extreme fire threat weather and conditions validated by field resources	 Operations & Planning: Closely coordinate with SCE regarding SCE-directed PSPS affecting SCE supply lines into BVES service area and take applicable actions per Table 4-3, BVES Action for SCE Lines De-energized Due to PSPS. Frequently monitor BVES-installed weather stations. Patrol throughout service area especially "at risk" areas to monitor various actual field conditions for extreme fire weather and other dangerous conditions. Monitor local wind gusts in "at-risk" areas. 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations: Email "De-energization Imminent Notice" to local government, agencies, and partner organizations. Coordinate with the emergency management community, first responders, and local government in managing outages due to PSPS. Provide list of customers that may be without power and listed as medical baseline customers to Sheriff Department and Fire Department.
		Customer Service:	Customer Outreach:

event. • Closely coordinate with SCE regarding SCE-directed PSPS Organizations: A PSPS event is initiated. • Closely coordinate with SCE regarding SCE-directed PSPS • Email "De-energization Notice" to local government, agencies, and partner organizations. Image: Closely coordinate with SCE regarding SCE-directed PSPS • Email "De-energization Notice" to local government, agencies, and partner organizations.		 Finalize "De-energization Imminent Notice" regarding imminent PSPS de-energization(s) directed by BVES or SCE Include areas to be de-energized, number of customers without power, and best estimated time to restore (ETR). Obtain President's approval to release. Identify medical baseline customers that may lose power. Identify AFN customers that may lose power as result of PSPS Issue a press release to local media and post notification on website. Issue warning notifications to customers via email, telephone calls, (IVR) proactive calling system, and two-way text messaging. 	 Post "De-energization Imminent Notice" on BVES website and social media. Issue "De-energization Imminent Notice" press releases for local media. Send "De-energization Imminent Notice" via IVR. Send "De-energization Imminent Notice Day Notice" via Text Send "De-energization Imminent Notice" via Email
 Monitor local wind gusts. De-energize circuits in "at risk" areas as wind gusts reach threshold for de-energization as designated by Field Operations Supervisor. Field Crews may de-energize additional power lines they evaluate as posing a public safety hazard or as directed by Field Operations Supervisor. Prepare GO-166 major outage and ESRB-8 notifications as applicable. Notify President Safety Enforcement Division (SED), Cf within twelve hours of the power being shut off per ES de-energization Notice" regarding extreme fire threat conditions and actual PSPS de-energization(s) directed by BVES and/or SCE. Must include:	Implementation	 affecting SCE supply lines into BVES service area and take applicable actions per Table 4-3, BVES Action for SCE Lines De-energized Due to PSPS. Frequently monitor BVES-installed weather stations. Patrol throughout service area especially "at risk" areas to monitor field conditions for extreme fire weather and dangerous conditions. Monitor local wind gusts. De-energize circuits in "at risk" areas as wind gusts reach threshold for de-energize additional power lines they evaluate as posing a public safety hazard or as directed by Field Operations Supervisor. Prepare GO-166 major outage and ESRB-8 notifications as applicable. Customer Service: Finalize "De-energization Notice" regarding extreme fire threat conditions and actual PSPS de-energization(s) directed by BVES and/or SCE. Must include: areas de-energized, number of customers without power, and best estimated time to restore (ETR). 	 Email "De-energization Notice" to local government, agencies, and partner organizations. Coordinate with the emergency management community, first responders, and local government in managing outages due to PSPS. Send "De-energization Updates" on the PSPS. Provide list of customers without power and listed as medical baseline and AFN customers to Sheriff Department and Fire Department. Encourage widest dissemination of this information. Notify California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and Warning Center at the Office of Emergency Services San Bernardino within one hour of shutting off the power if the outage meets the major outage criteria of GO-166. Notify President Safety Enforcement Division (SED), CPUC within twelve hours of the power being shut off per ESRB-8. Customer Outreach: Post "De-energization Notice" and "De-energization Updates" (when warranted) on BVES website and social media. Issue "De-energization Notice" and "De-energization Updates" (when warranted) press releases for local media.

		 power or ETR(s) change significantly. Obtain President's approval to release. Identify lists of medical baseline customers without power. Issue a press release to local media (newspaper and radio) and post notification on website. Issue warning notifications to customers via email, telephone calls, (IVR) proactive calling system, and twoway text messaging. 	 Activate "De-energization Notice" and "De-energization Updates" (when warranted) via Email Communicate with emergency services regarding AFN and medical baseline customers.
Restoration	Re-energization Extreme fire conditions subside to safe levels as validated by field conditions	 Operations & Planning: Validate extreme fire weather conditions have subsided to safe levels as designated by the Field Operations Supervisor and report these conditions to Dispatch. Conduct and patrols of de-energized facilities. Restore power to affected circuits following satisfactory completion of field inspections and patrols. Conduct switching operations as directed by Field Operations Supervisor to restore systems normal as SCE restores supply lines, as applicable. Customer Service: Finalize "Intent to Restore" notice to include ETRs and obtain President's approval to release. Finalize "Restoration Complete" notice to be issued when power is fully restored and obtain President's approval to release. Breakdown of CRC including removal/storage of all equipment and supplies. 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations: Send "Intent to Restore" notice to local government, agencies, and partner organizations. Encourage widest dissemination of this information. Coordinate with the emergency management community, first responders, and local government in managing restorations. Send "Restoration Complete" notice to local government, agencies, and partner organizations once power is fully restored or an update if restoration is delayed. Customer Outreach: Post "Intent to Restore" notice on BVES website and social media. Issue "Intent to Restore" notice via IVR. Send "Intent to Restore" notice via IVR. Send "Intent to Restore" notice via Text Send "Intent to Restore" notice on BVES website and social media. Issue "Intent to Restore" notice via Text Send "Intent to Restore" notice via IVR. Send "Intent to Restore" notice via Text Send "Intent to Restore" notice on BVES website and social media once power is fully restored or an update if restoration is delayed. Issue "Restoration Complete" notice on a Update if restoration is delayed. Send "Restoration Complete" notice via IVR once power is fully restored or an update if restoration is delayed. Send "Restoration Complete" notice via Text once power is fully restored or an update if restoration is delayed. Send "Restoration Complete" notice via Text once power is fully restored or an update if restoration is delayed. Send "Restoration Complete" notice via Text once power is fully restored or an update if restoration is delayed. Send "Restoration Complete" notice via Text once power
Reporting and Lessons Learned	Post Event	 Operations & Planning: Conduct lessons learned with applicable staff. Utility Manager will include Customer Service and solicit input 	 CPUC Safety Enforcement Division: File a report (written) to President of SED no later than 10 business days after the Shutoff event ends per ESRB-8.

from Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations. • Update plan and procedures per the lessons learned, if	
 Prepare PSPS Post Event Report required by ESRB-8 and 	
forward to President and Manager of Regulatory Affairs for approval.	

5.4. SCE-Directed PSPS Procedures. Close coordination with SCE is essential to mitigating the impact of any SCE directed PSPS event that would result in a complete or partial loss of SCE supply lines. The following preparatory coordination steps are established:

- Each year, before fire season, BVES Management Team engages SCE Management on coordination for potential and actual PSPS events.
- BVES Management Team updates contact information with the SCE Key Account Manager for the BVES account, upon any change.
- BVES Field Operations staff updates contact information with the SCE Lugo and Colton Control Stations which have direct operational control over the SCE supply lines to BVES.

When PSPS events are forecasted, the SCE Key Account Manager will coordinate with BVES Management and the SCE Lugo and Colton Control Stations will coordinate directly with the designated BVES Field Operations Team until the event is complete or canceled.

Table 5-2, BVES Action for SCE Lines Under PSPS Consideration, provides procedures to implement to best prepare the BVES system for a complete or partial loss of SCE supply lines.

Table 5-2: BVES Action for SCE Lines Under PSPS Consideration		
Condition	BVES Action	
SCE places Doble or Cushenberry Line under PSPS Consideration.	 Notify key internal staff and brief Field Operations staff on condition for situational awareness. Operations & Planning Manager evaluates energizing Radford Line for improved reliability. 	
SCE places Bear Valley Line under PSPS Consideration.	 Notify key internal staff and brief Field Operations staff on conditions for situational awareness. If Radford is energized, shift loads to Shay Line. 	
SCE places Doble and Cushenberry Lines under PSPS Consideration.	 Notify key internal staff and brief Field Operations staff on condition for situational awareness. Energize the Radford Line. Prepare for potentially losing all SCE supply lines from Lucerne. Prepare for sustained BVPP operations and rolling blackouts. Evaluate distribution circuit loads. 	
SCE places Doble or Cushenberry, and Bear Valley Lines under PSPS Consideration	 Notify key internal staff and brief Field Operations staff on condition for situational awareness. Prepare for potentially losing all SCE supply lines from Lucerne. Prepare for sustained BVPP operations and rolling blackouts. Evaluate distribution circuit loads. 	
SCE places Doble, Cushenberry, and Bear Valley Lines under PSPS Consideration	 Notify key internal staff and brief Field Operations staff on condition for situational awareness. Prepare for potentially losing all SCE supply lines into BVES service area. Prepare for sustained BVPP operations and rolling blackouts. Evaluate distribution circuit loads. 	

Table 5-3, BVES Action for SCE Lines De-energized Due to PSPS, provides procedures to use in the event of a partial or complete loss of SCE supply lines. These procedures are based on procedures in the BVES EDRP and take into account that BVES will closely coordinate with SCE Staff as follows:

- SCE should provide warnings of impending PSPS on the SCE lines about 2 days prior to the event.
- SCE should provide updates to the status of the lines under PSPS consideration.
- SCE should notify BVES at least 4 hours prior to de-energizing any SCE supply lines to BVES service area.

These timely notifications will allow BVES to take preparatory action to shed load to within the expected capacity of its remaining sources of power and allow BVES to avoid a "blackstart" on the BVPP. Therefore, the procedures of Table 5-3 should be followed during PSPS event. However, if there is a sudden complete or partial loss of SCE supply lines, the procedures in Section 4 of the BVES EDRP are more appropriate and should be followed as directed by the Utility Manager.

Table 5-3: BVES Action for SCE Lines De-energized Due to PSPS			
Condition	BVES Action		
SCE De-energizes Doble or Cushenberry Line for PSPS.	 Notify key staff and brief Field Operations staff on condition for situational awareness. Energize Radford Line if needed to meet load demand and reliability. Start up the BVPP as needed to meet load demand. No reduction in load necessary, since the Doble and Cushenberry are capable of carrying the other's load. Implement BVES EDRPn for a partial loss of SCE supply lines. 		
SCE De-energizes Bear Valley Line for PSPS.	 Notify key staff and brief Field Operations staff on condition for situational awareness. If Radford is energized, shift loads to Shay Line prior to de- energizing for PSPS. This should be done about 4 hours prior to the SCE de-energizing the line. If needed, start up the BVPP to meet load demand. If needed, instruct interruptible customers (Bear Mountain Resorts) to reduce load as needed to meet load demand. Implement BVES EDRP for a partial loss of SCE supply lines. 		
SCE De-energizes Doble or Cushenberry <u>and</u> Bear Valley Lines for PSPS.	 Notify key staff and brief Field Operations staff on condition for situational awareness. Since the Doble and Cushenberry are capable of carrying the other's load, follow the procedure for "SCE De-energizes Bear Valley Line for PSPS" above. Prepare for potentially losing all SCE supply lines into BVES service area. Prepare for sustained BVPP operations and rolling blackouts. Evaluate distribution circuit loads. Implement BVES EDRP for a partial loss of SCE supply lines. 		
SCE De-energizes Doble <u>and</u> Cushenberry Lines for PSPS.	 Notify key staff and brief Field Operations staff on condition for situational awareness. Energize the Radford Line. Four hours prior to SCE de-energizing the lines, per the Field Operations Supervisor's direction, shift as much of the load to the BVPP and Radford Line as follows: Open the Shay and Baldwin ARs. "Express" the Radford Line to Meadow Substation without overloading the Radford Line per Field Operations' switching order. Start BVPP, place enginators online, and increase load to within the combined capacity of the BVPP and Radford Line. Implement BVES EDRP for sustained loss of SCE supplies from Lucerne including "rolling blackout" procedures. Prepare for sustained BVPP operations and rolling blackouts. Frequently monitor distribution circuit loads. 		

Table 5-3: BVES Action for SCE Lines De-energized Due to PSPS			
Condition	BVES Action		
SCE de-energizes Doble, Cushenberry, <u>and</u> Bear Valley Lines for PSPS.	 Notify key staff and brief Field Operations staff on condition for situational awareness. If the Radford Line is energized, shift loads to the Shay Line. Four hours prior to SCE de-energizing the lines, per the Field Operations Supervisor's direction, perform the following: Start up all BVPP enginators. Reduce system load to within the capacity of the BVPP by isolating distribution circuits as directed by the Field Operations Supervisor. Once system load is matched with the BVPP capacity, open the Shay and Baldwin ARs. Implement BVES EDRP for sustained loss of all SCE supply lines including "rolling blackout" procedures. 		

Table 5-3: BVES Action for SCE Lines De-energized Due to PSPS

6. **PSPS Public Outreach and Communications**

6.1. Importance of Public Outreach. Due to the significant impact a PSPS event may have on the community and customers, early and accurate communications must be conducted throughout the PSPS event in coordination with local government, agencies, partner organizations (including emergency management community and first responders, CalOES, local governments, independent living centers, and representatives of people/communities with AFN), and customers. Effective communications are key to allowing stakeholders to take preparatory actions to mitigate the impact of a PSPS event. It is also understood the importance of hosting community workshops to allow for community members to understand the process leading to a PSPS event. BVES hosts exercises and workshops with the community to better prepare customers for a PSPS event. BVES also conducts public safety briefings with the CPUC related to de-energization events, including exercises.

BVES retains ultimate responsibility for notification and communication throughout a PSPS event.

6.2. EDRP Communications Procedures. During the period leading up to the PSPS event, during a PSPS event, and during the restoration period from a PSPS event, the Emergency Response Communications Plan of the EDRP shall be implemented as applicable in conjunction with this plan.

To accomplish this, BVES shall:

- Develop and use a common nomenclature that integrates with existing state and local emergency response communication messaging and outreach and is aligned with the California Alert and Warning Guidelines.
- Develop multimodal notification and communication protocols and systems to reach customers no matter where the customer is located and deliver messaging in a clear and understandable manner.
- Communicate to customers in different languages and in a way that addresses different access and functional needs using multiple modes/channels of communication.
- Establish a Community Resource Center and work with local organizations to promote community safety (see Appendix C Community Resource Center Protocol).

6.3. PSPS Planned Communications. Table 6-1, BVES PSPS Communications Template Listing, is to be prepared by the Customer Program Specialist and preapproved by the President ahead of an expected PSPS event such to allow BVES staff to quickly initiate effective communications with stakeholders during a PSPS event. The templates are designed to provide a standard "fill in the blank" notice that may be amended depending on the specific situation as applicable. Templates shall initially be reviewed and edited as applicable by BVES's public relations contractor. Additionally, the templates shall be reviewed annually and/or when lessons learned indicate changes to the templates are appropriate.

Table 6-1: BVES PSPS Co	ommunications Template I	Listing	
Template	Content	Media	Recipients
4-Day Alert	Provides notice of continuing and consistent forecasted extreme fire threat weather and conditions, which may lead to possible BVES-directed or SCE- directed PSPS. Also, provides anticipated impacts on BVES customers and direction of event.	• Email	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations (Includes emergency management community and first responders, CALOES, county and local governments, independent living centers, and representatives of people/communities with access and function needs), and customers (including medical baseline and behind-the-meter).
2-3 Day Notice	Provides notice of forecasted extreme fire threat weather and conditions, which may lead to BVES-directed or SCE-directed PSPS. Provides anticipated impacts on BVES customers and duration of event.	 Email BVES Website Social Media Press Release IVR Message Text Message 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations (Includes emergency management community and first responders, CALOES, county and local governments, independent living centers, and representatives of people/communities with access and function needs) and customers (including medical baseline and behind-the-meter).
1-2 Day Notice	Provides notice regarding imminent extreme fire threat weather and conditions, which may result in BVES-directed or SCE-directed PSPS. Also, provides anticipated impacts on BVES Customers and duration of event.	 Email BVES Website Social Media Press Release IVR Message Text Message 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations (Includes emergency management community and first responders, CALOES, county and local governments, independent living centers, and representatives of people/communities with access and function needs) and customers (including medical baseline and behind-the-meter).

Table 6-1: BVES PSPS Communications Template Listing			
Template	Content	Media	Recipients
De-energization Imminent Notice	Provides notice that BVES- directed or SCE-directed PSPS is imminent (within 1-4 hours) based on extreme fire threat weather and conditions. Also, provides anticipated impacts on BVES customers and duration of event.	 Email BVES Website Social Media Press Release IVR Message Text Message 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations (Includes emergency management community and first responders, CALOES, county and local governments, independent living centers, and representatives of people/communities with access and function needs) and customers (including medical baseline and behind-the-meter).
De-energization Notice	Provides notice of extreme fire threat weather and conditions and PSPS de-energization(s) and includes areas de-energized, number of customers without power, and best estimated time to restore (ETR).	 Email BVES Website Social Media Press Release IVR Message Text Message 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations (Includes emergency management community and first responders, CALOES, county and local governments, independent living centers, and representatives of people/communities with access and function needs) and customers (including medical baseline and behind-the-meter).
De-energization Updates	During de-energization event, provides notice of changes such as when the number of customers without power or ETR changes significantly.	 Email BVES Website Social Media Press Release IVR Message Text Message 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations (Includes emergency management community and first responders, CALOES, county and local governments, independent living centers, and representatives of people/communities with access and function needs) and customers (including medical baseline and behind-the-meter).

Table 6-1: BVES PSPS Communications Template Listing			
Template	Content	Media	Recipients
Intent to Restore	Provides notice that extreme fire threat weather and conditions have subsided, BVES crews are performing post-PSPS restoration inspections, and ETR.	 Email BVES Website Social Media Press Release IVR Message Text Message 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations (Includes emergency management community and first responders, CALOES, county and local governments, independent living centers, and representatives of people/communities with access and function needs) and customers (including medical baseline and behind-the-meter).
Restoration Complete	Provides notice that power is fully restored.	 Email BVES Website Social Media Press Release IVR Message Text Message 	 Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations (Includes emergency management community and first responders, CALOES, county and local governments, independent living centers, and representatives of people/communities with access and function needs) and customers (including medical baseline and behind-the-meter).

6.4. Critical Facilities and Infrastructure. The terms 'critical facilities' and 'critical infrastructure' refer to facilities and infrastructure essential to public safety and that require additional consideration for resiliency during PSPS events. The following provides guidance on what constitutes critical facilities and infrastructure:

6.4.1. Emergency Services Sector

- Police Stations
- Fire Stations
- Emergency Operations Centers
- 6.4.2. Government Facilities Sector
 - Schools
 - Jails and prisons
- 6.4.3. Healthcare and Public Health Sector
 - Public Health Departments
 - Medical facilities, including hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing homes, blood banks, health care facilities, dialysis centers and hospice facilities

6.4.4. Energy Sector: Public and private utility facilities vital to maintaining or restoring normal service, including, but not limited to, interconnected publicly-owned utilities.

6.4.5. Water and Wastewater Systems Sector: Facilities associated with the provision of drinking water or processing of wastewater including facilities used to pump, divert, transport, store, treat, and deliver water or wastewater.

6.4.6. Communications Sector: Communication carrier infrastructure including selective routers, central offices, head ends, cellular switches, remote terminals, and cellular sites.

6.4.7. Chemical Sector: Facilities associated with the provision of manufacturing, maintaining, or distributing hazardous materials and chemicals.


6.5. Key Partners. The following provides the list of pertinent Local Government, Agencies, and Partner Organizations to BVES PSPS notifications. This list overlaps with the list of what is considered critical facilities and infrastructure:


- Local officials (City of Big Bear Lake and San Bernardino County)
- State officials (normally CPUC Energy Division and Safety Enforcement Division)
- San Bernardino County Office of Emergency Services (County OES)
- Big Bear Fire Department
- California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE)
- U.S. Forest Service
- San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department Big Bear Lake Patrol Station
- California Highway Patrol (CHP) Arrowhead Area
- California Department of Transportation (Caltrans)
- Big Bear Area Regional Wastewater Agency (BBARWA)
- Big Bear City Community Services District (CSD)
- Big Bear Lake Water Department (DWP)
- Big Bear Municipal Water District (MWD)
- Southwest Gas Corporation
- Bear Valley Community Hospital
- Bear Valley Unified School District
- Big Bear Chamber of Commerce
- Big Bear Airport District
- Big Bear Mountain Resorts
- Spectrum Communications
- Cell tower providers

Critical Facilities and Infrastructure Plan. For further detail regarding BVES' Critical Facilities and Infrastructure Plan processes and procedures.


- 7 **Compliance.** This document includes requirements invoked by:
- Safety and Enforcement Division Resolution, Electric Safety and Reliability Branch Resolution ESRB-8 8 of July 12, 2018: Resolution Extending De-Energization Reasonableness, Notification, Mitigation and Reporting Requirements in Decision 12-04-024 to All Electric Investor-Owned Utilities (IOU).
- California Public Utilities Commission Decision 19-05-036 of May 30, 2019: Guidance Decision on 2019 Wildfire Mitigation Plans Submitted Pursuant to Senate Bill 901.
- California Public Utilities Commission Decision 19-05-040 of May 30, 2019: Decision on 2019 Wildfire Mitigation Plans of Liberty Utilities/CalPeco Electric; Bear Valley Electric Service, a Division of Golden State Water Company; and Pacific Power, a Division of PacifiCorp Pursuant to Senate Bill 901.
- California Public Utilities Commission Decision 19-05-042 of May 30, 2019: Decision Adopting De-Energization (Public Safety Power Shutoff) Guidelines (Phase 1 Guidelines).
- California Public Utilities Commission Decision 20-03-004 of March 12, 2020: Decision on Community Awareness and Public Outreach Before, During, and After a Wildfire, and Explaining Next Steps for Other Phase 2 Issues.
- California Public Utilities Commission Decision D20-05-051 of May 28, 2020: Decision Adopting Phase 2 Updated and Additional Guidelines for De-Energization of Electric Facilities to Mitigate Wildfire Risk.
- California Public Utilities Commission Decision D21-06-024 of June 24, 2021: Decision Adopting Phase 3 Revised and Additional Guidelines and Rules for Public Safety Power Shutoffs (Proactive De-Energizations) of Electric Facilities to Mitigate Wildfire Risk caused by Utility Infrastructure

Appendix A: BVES "High Risk Areas" for PSPS Consideration





Appendix B: BVES Supply Lines, Sources of Power and Sub-Transmission System



APPENDIX C: COMMON ACRONYMS

Acronym	Definition
AAR	After Action Report
COA	Course of Action
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
EEG	Exercise Evaluation Guide
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FE	Functional Exercise
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FPI	Fire Potential Index
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HQ	Headquarters
ICS	Incident Command System
IP	Improvement Plan
ISR	Initial Situation Report
N/A	Not Available
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NRF	National Response Framework
NWS	National Weather Service
OPORD	Operations Order
Ops	Operations
POC	Point of Contact
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
SitMan	Situation Manual
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOG	Standard/Standing Operating Guidelines
TBD	To Be Determined
WFA-E	Wildfire Analyst Enterprise