17 results
409 Raising research awareness through StudyFinder
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- Megan C Hoffman, Rachel Whitwam, Michelle Hoedeman, Brenda Prich, Joshua Fehrmann, Byron P Vaughn
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- Journal of Clinical and Translational Science / Volume 7 / Issue s1 / April 2023
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- 24 April 2023, p. 122
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OBJECTIVES/GOALS: To increase public awareness and access to research opportunities at the University of Minnesota (UMN) utilizing StudyFinder, a public-facing website that features actively enrolling UMN research studies and directly connects website visitors with study teams. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: Promote the University of Minnesota CTSI’s StudyFinder website to the public via social media ad campaigns and community outreach. Upon completion of the latest StudyFinder enhancement project in 2021, CTSI focused 2022 efforts on marketing and promotion of the site. CTSI created three StudyFinder social media ad campaigns in January, June, and October. CTSI also planned outreach events during the week of Clinical Trials Day, the Minnesota State Fair (1.8M attendees over 12 days), and the UMN’s Urban Research and Outreach-Engagement Center Community Day. RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: Website traffic data from Google Analytics indicated a 72.76% increase in StudyFinder sessions from 2021 (Jan 1, 2021 to Nov 1, 2021) to 2022 (Jan 1, 2022 to Nov 1, 2022), with 16,262 sessions to 28,094 sessions, respectively. Direct emails from potential participants to study teams increased 89% in that same timeframe, from 3,082 emails to 5,819 emails. Targeted marketing campaigns and attending community events can improve the visibility of an institution’s research and connections of potential research participants to research teams. DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE: Recruitment remains a main challenge in clinical and translational research. StudyFinder is an important patient-facing tool to connect individuals to specific studies. Future directions include expanding marketing efforts, events, and public feedback.
Contributors
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- By Mitchell Aboulafia, Frederick Adams, Marilyn McCord Adams, Robert M. Adams, Laird Addis, James W. Allard, David Allison, William P. Alston, Karl Ameriks, C. Anthony Anderson, David Leech Anderson, Lanier Anderson, Roger Ariew, David Armstrong, Denis G. Arnold, E. J. Ashworth, Margaret Atherton, Robin Attfield, Bruce Aune, Edward Wilson Averill, Jody Azzouni, Kent Bach, Andrew Bailey, Lynne Rudder Baker, Thomas R. Baldwin, Jon Barwise, George Bealer, William Bechtel, Lawrence C. Becker, Mark A. Bedau, Ernst Behler, José A. Benardete, Ermanno Bencivenga, Jan Berg, Michael Bergmann, Robert L. Bernasconi, Sven Bernecker, Bernard Berofsky, Rod Bertolet, Charles J. Beyer, Christian Beyer, Joseph Bien, Joseph Bien, Peg Birmingham, Ivan Boh, James Bohman, Daniel Bonevac, Laurence BonJour, William J. Bouwsma, Raymond D. Bradley, Myles Brand, Richard B. Brandt, Michael E. Bratman, Stephen E. Braude, Daniel Breazeale, Angela Breitenbach, Jason Bridges, David O. Brink, Gordon G. Brittan, Justin Broackes, Dan W. Brock, Aaron Bronfman, Jeffrey E. Brower, Bartosz Brozek, Anthony Brueckner, Jeffrey Bub, Lara Buchak, Otavio Bueno, Ann E. Bumpus, Robert W. Burch, John Burgess, Arthur W. Burks, Panayot Butchvarov, Robert E. Butts, Marina Bykova, Patrick Byrne, David Carr, Noël Carroll, Edward S. Casey, Victor Caston, Victor Caston, Albert Casullo, Robert L. Causey, Alan K. L. Chan, Ruth Chang, Deen K. Chatterjee, Andrew Chignell, Roderick M. Chisholm, Kelly J. Clark, E. J. Coffman, Robin Collins, Brian P. Copenhaver, John Corcoran, John Cottingham, Roger Crisp, Frederick J. Crosson, Antonio S. Cua, Phillip D. Cummins, Martin Curd, Adam Cureton, Andrew Cutrofello, Stephen Darwall, Paul Sheldon Davies, Wayne A. Davis, Timothy Joseph Day, Claudio de Almeida, Mario De Caro, Mario De Caro, John Deigh, C. F. Delaney, Daniel C. Dennett, Michael R. DePaul, Michael Detlefsen, Daniel Trent Devereux, Philip E. Devine, John M. Dillon, Martin C. Dillon, Robert DiSalle, Mary Domski, Alan Donagan, Paul Draper, Fred Dretske, Mircea Dumitru, Wilhelm Dupré, Gerald Dworkin, John Earman, Ellery Eells, Catherine Z. Elgin, Berent Enç, Ronald P. Endicott, Edward Erwin, John Etchemendy, C. Stephen Evans, Susan L. Feagin, Solomon Feferman, Richard Feldman, Arthur Fine, Maurice A. Finocchiaro, William FitzPatrick, Richard E. Flathman, Gvozden Flego, Richard Foley, Graeme Forbes, Rainer Forst, Malcolm R. Forster, Daniel Fouke, Patrick Francken, Samuel Freeman, Elizabeth Fricker, Miranda Fricker, Michael Friedman, Michael Fuerstein, Richard A. Fumerton, Alan Gabbey, Pieranna Garavaso, Daniel Garber, Jorge L. A. Garcia, Robert K. Garcia, Don Garrett, Philip Gasper, Gerald Gaus, Berys Gaut, Bernard Gert, Roger F. Gibson, Cody Gilmore, Carl Ginet, Alan H. Goldman, Alvin I. Goldman, Alfonso Gömez-Lobo, Lenn E. Goodman, Robert M. Gordon, Stefan Gosepath, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Daniel W. Graham, George A. Graham, Peter J. Graham, Richard E. Grandy, I. Grattan-Guinness, John Greco, Philip T. Grier, Nicholas Griffin, Nicholas Griffin, David A. Griffiths, Paul J. Griffiths, Stephen R. Grimm, Charles L. Griswold, Charles B. Guignon, Pete A. Y. Gunter, Dimitri Gutas, Gary Gutting, Paul Guyer, Kwame Gyekye, Oscar A. Haac, Raul Hakli, Raul Hakli, Michael Hallett, Edward C. Halper, Jean Hampton, R. James Hankinson, K. R. Hanley, Russell Hardin, Robert M. Harnish, William Harper, David Harrah, Kevin Hart, Ali Hasan, William Hasker, John Haugeland, Roger Hausheer, William Heald, Peter Heath, Richard Heck, John F. Heil, Vincent F. Hendricks, Stephen Hetherington, Francis Heylighen, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Risto Hilpinen, Harold T. Hodes, Joshua Hoffman, Alan Holland, Robert L. Holmes, Richard Holton, Brad W. Hooker, Terence E. Horgan, Tamara Horowitz, Paul Horwich, Vittorio Hösle, Paul Hoβfeld, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder, Anne Hudson, Deal W. Hudson, Carl A. Huffman, David L. Hull, Patricia Huntington, Thomas Hurka, Paul Hurley, Rosalind Hursthouse, Guillermo Hurtado, Ronald E. Hustwit, Sarah Hutton, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Harry A. Ide, David Ingram, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Alfred L. Ivry, Frank Jackson, Dale Jacquette, Joseph Jedwab, Richard Jeffrey, David Alan Johnson, Edward Johnson, Mark D. Jordan, Richard Joyce, Hwa Yol Jung, Robert Hillary Kane, Tomis Kapitan, Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, James A. Keller, Ralph Kennedy, Sergei Khoruzhii, Jaegwon Kim, Yersu Kim, Nathan L. King, Patricia Kitcher, Peter D. Klein, E. D. Klemke, Virginia Klenk, George L. Kline, Christian Klotz, Simo Knuuttila, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Konstantin Kolenda, Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Isaac Kramnick, Richard Kraut, Fred Kroon, Manfred Kuehn, Steven T. Kuhn, Henry E. Kyburg, John Lachs, Jennifer Lackey, Stephen E. Lahey, Andrea Lavazza, Thomas H. Leahey, Joo Heung Lee, Keith Lehrer, Dorothy Leland, Noah M. Lemos, Ernest LePore, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Isaac Levi, Andrew Levine, Alan E. Lewis, Daniel E. Little, Shu-hsien Liu, Shu-hsien Liu, Alan K. L. Chan, Brian Loar, Lawrence B. Lombard, John Longeway, Dominic McIver Lopes, Michael J. Loux, E. J. Lowe, Steven Luper, Eugene C. Luschei, William G. Lycan, David Lyons, David Macarthur, Danielle Macbeth, Scott MacDonald, Jacob L. Mackey, Louis H. Mackey, Penelope Mackie, Edward H. Madden, Penelope Maddy, G. B. Madison, Bernd Magnus, Pekka Mäkelä, Rudolf A. Makkreel, David Manley, William E. Mann (W.E.M.), Vladimir Marchenkov, Peter Markie, Jean-Pierre Marquis, Ausonio Marras, Mike W. Martin, A. P. Martinich, William L. McBride, David McCabe, Storrs McCall, Hugh J. McCann, Robert N. McCauley, John J. McDermott, Sarah McGrath, Ralph McInerny, Daniel J. McKaughan, Thomas McKay, Michael McKinsey, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ernan McMullin, Anthonie Meijers, Jack W. Meiland, William Jason Melanson, Alfred R. Mele, Joseph R. Mendola, Christopher Menzel, Michael J. Meyer, Christian B. Miller, David W. Miller, Peter Millican, Robert N. Minor, Phillip Mitsis, James A. Montmarquet, Michael S. Moore, Tim Moore, Benjamin Morison, Donald R. Morrison, Stephen J. Morse, Paul K. Moser, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, Ian Mueller, James Bernard Murphy, Mark C. Murphy, Steven Nadler, Jan Narveson, Alan Nelson, Jerome Neu, Samuel Newlands, Kai Nielsen, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Carlos G. Noreña, Calvin G. Normore, David Fate Norton, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Donald Nute, David S. Oderberg, Steve Odin, Michael O’Rourke, Willard G. Oxtoby, Heinz Paetzold, George S. Pappas, Anthony J. Parel, Lydia Patton, R. P. Peerenboom, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Adriaan T. Peperzak, Derk Pereboom, Jaroslav Peregrin, Glen Pettigrove, Philip Pettit, Edmund L. Pincoffs, Andrew Pinsent, Robert B. Pippin, Alvin Plantinga, Louis P. Pojman, Richard H. Popkin, John F. Post, Carl J. Posy, William J. Prior, Richard Purtill, Michael Quante, Philip L. Quinn, Philip L. Quinn, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Diana Raffman, Gerard Raulet, Stephen L. Read, Andrews Reath, Andrew Reisner, Nicholas Rescher, Henry S. Richardson, Robert C. Richardson, Thomas Ricketts, Wayne D. Riggs, Mark Roberts, Robert C. Roberts, Luke Robinson, Alexander Rosenberg, Gary Rosenkranz, Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, Adina L. Roskies, William L. Rowe, T. M. Rudavsky, Michael Ruse, Bruce Russell, Lilly-Marlene Russow, Dan Ryder, R. M. Sainsbury, Joseph Salerno, Nathan Salmon, Wesley C. Salmon, Constantine Sandis, David H. Sanford, Marco Santambrogio, David Sapire, Ruth A. Saunders, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Charles Sayward, James P. Scanlan, Richard Schacht, Tamar Schapiro, Frederick F. Schmitt, Jerome B. Schneewind, Calvin O. Schrag, Alan D. Schrift, George F. Schumm, Jean-Loup Seban, David N. Sedley, Kenneth Seeskin, Krister Segerberg, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Dennis M. Senchuk, James F. Sennett, William Lad Sessions, Stewart Shapiro, Tommie Shelby, Donald W. Sherburne, Christopher Shields, Roger A. Shiner, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert K. Shope, Kwong-loi Shun, Wilfried Sieg, A. John Simmons, Robert L. Simon, Marcus G. Singer, Georgette Sinkler, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Matti T. Sintonen, Lawrence Sklar, Brian Skyrms, Robert C. Sleigh, Michael Anthony Slote, Hans Sluga, Barry Smith, Michael Smith, Robin Smith, Robert Sokolowski, Robert C. Solomon, Marta Soniewicka, Philip Soper, Ernest Sosa, Nicholas Southwood, Paul Vincent Spade, T. L. S. Sprigge, Eric O. Springsted, George J. Stack, Rebecca Stangl, Jason Stanley, Florian Steinberger, Sören Stenlund, Christopher Stephens, James P. Sterba, Josef Stern, Matthias Steup, M. A. Stewart, Leopold Stubenberg, Edith Dudley Sulla, Frederick Suppe, Jere Paul Surber, David George Sussman, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Zeno G. Swijtink, Richard Swinburne, Charles C. Taliaferro, Robert B. Talisse, John Tasioulas, Paul Teller, Larry S. Temkin, Mark Textor, H. S. Thayer, Peter Thielke, Alan Thomas, Amie L. Thomasson, Katherine Thomson-Jones, Joshua C. Thurow, Vzalerie Tiberius, Terrence N. Tice, Paul Tidman, Mark C. Timmons, William Tolhurst, James E. Tomberlin, Rosemarie Tong, Lawrence Torcello, Kelly Trogdon, J. D. Trout, Robert E. Tully, Raimo Tuomela, John Turri, Martin M. Tweedale, Thomas Uebel, Jennifer Uleman, James Van Cleve, Harry van der Linden, Peter van Inwagen, Bryan W. Van Norden, René van Woudenberg, Donald Phillip Verene, Samantha Vice, Thomas Vinci, Donald Wayne Viney, Barbara Von Eckardt, Peter B. M. Vranas, Steven J. Wagner, William J. Wainwright, Paul E. Walker, Robert E. Wall, Craig Walton, Douglas Walton, Eric Watkins, Richard A. Watson, Michael V. Wedin, Rudolph H. Weingartner, Paul Weirich, Paul J. Weithman, Carl Wellman, Howard Wettstein, Samuel C. Wheeler, Stephen A. White, Jennifer Whiting, Edward R. Wierenga, Michael Williams, Fred Wilson, W. Kent Wilson, Kenneth P. Winkler, John F. Wippel, Jan Woleński, Allan B. Wolter, Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Rega Wood, W. Jay Wood, Paul Woodruff, Alison Wylie, Gideon Yaffe, Takashi Yagisawa, Yutaka Yamamoto, Keith E. Yandell, Xiaomei Yang, Dean Zimmerman, Günter Zoller, Catherine Zuckert, Michael Zuckert, Jack A. Zupko (J.A.Z.)
- Edited by Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
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- The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
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- 05 August 2015
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- 27 April 2015, pp ix-xxx
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Chapter 9 - Neo-Aristotelianism and substance
- Edited by Tuomas E. Tahko, University of Helsinki
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- Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics
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- 05 December 2011
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- 08 December 2011, pp 140-155
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Summary
Neo-Aristotelianism in metaphysics is an extension of and/or in imitation of Aristotle's metaphysics. This chapter begins with a brief account of what Aristotle had to say about substance. It summarizes the features of Aristotle's metaphysics of substance that provide the basis for saying that a later philosopher defends a 'neo-Aristotelian' theory of substance. Chisholm also places the category of substance within a more general theory of categories, in much the same way that Aristotle did. Like both Aristotle and Chisholm, Jonathan Lowe's latest system of categories is intended to postulate what kinds of entities there are, and not just to represent what kinds of entities are epistemically possible. Aristotelian theories of substance both from those who would eliminate substances or reduce them to instances of some other ontological category or categories, and from metaphysical antirealists.
The many streams of the Magellanic Stream
- Snežana Stanimirović, Samantha Hoffman, Carl Heiles, Kevin A. Douglas, Mary Putman, Joshua E. G. Peek
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- Proceedings of the International Astronomical Union / Volume 4 / Issue S256 / July 2008
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- 01 July 2008, pp. 129-134
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- July 2008
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As a part of the ongoing H i survey by the consortium for Galactic studies with the Arecibo L-band Feed Array (GALFA-HI), we have recently imaged the tip of the MS and found several long filamentary structures. This demonstrates that the northern portion of the MS, which has been interacting with the Galactic halo for a long time, is more extended than previously thought and in the form of highly organized H i structures. The observed filaments, and especially the kinematic dichotomy of H i clouds observed for the first time, agree with predictions by the Connors, Kawata & Gibson (2006) tidal model. However, specific time-stamps in the history of the Magellanic System are required to explain these phenomena. The 20-degree long filaments are accompanied by a large population of small H i clouds. We investigate the observed properties of these clouds and explore various instabilities that affect a warm tail of gas trailing through the Galactic halo. Interestingly, if the observed H i structure is mainly due to thermal instability, then the tip of the MS is at a distance of ~70 kpc.
1 - Substance and other categories
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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- 25 November 1994, pp 5-28
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Summary
First philosophy, according to the traditional schedule, is analytic ontology, examining the traits necessary to whatever is, in this or any possible world. Its cardinal problem is that of substance and attribute.
D. C. Williams Principles of Empirical Realism 74 (1966)[Categories are] … the different kinds of notions corresponding to the definite forms of existence… an enumeration of all things capable of being named, the most extensive classes into which things could be distributed.
“Category” Oxford English Dictionary (1971)STATEMENT AND DEFENSE OF OUR PROJECT
Metaphysics has often been revisionary, and less often descriptive. Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure.
P. F. Strawson Individuals 9 (1959)One of the main projects in this book is to conduct a conceptual investigation of the notion of an individual substance as ordinarily understood, paradigm instances of which seem to be particular material objects and persons. In one of its ordinary senses, the term ‘thing’ means individual substance. For example, the term ‘thing’ is being used in this sense in the following sentences:
‘Wisdom is not a thing, it is a quality of a thing’.
‘Surfaces and holes are not things, they are limits and absences of them, respectively’.
‘A chameleon's turning color is not a thing, it is a change in one’.
![](https://assets.cambridge.org/97805214/61016/cover/9780521461016.gif)
Substance among Other Categories
- Joshua Hoffman, Gary S. Rosenkrantz
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- 18 September 2009
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- 25 November 1994
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This book revives a neglected but important topic in philosophy: the nature of substance. The belief that there are individual substances, for example, material objects and persons, is at the core of our common-sense view of the world yet many metaphysicians deny the very coherence of the concept of substance. The authors develop an account of what an individual substance is in terms of independence from other beings. In the process many other important ontological categories are explored: property, event, space, time. The authors show why alternative theories of substance fail, and go on to defend the intelligibility (though not the existence) of interacting spiritual and material substances.
3 - Collectionist theories of substance
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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- 18 September 2009
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- 25 November 1994, pp 58-88
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Summary
Bundle: A collection of things bound or otherwise fastened together; a bunch; a package, parcel.
“Bundle” Oxford English Dictionary (1971)The former recited particulars, howsoever improperly… bundled up together.
F. Greville The Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney 235 (1628)WHAT IS A COLLECTIONIST THEORY OF SUBSTANCE?
The idea of a substance is nothing but a collection of simple ideas that are united by the imagination and have a particular name assigned them by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or to others, that collection.
D. Hume A Treatise of Human Nature I. iv. 6 (1739–1740)A distinction needs to be drawn between two sorts of collectionist theories about substance. The eliminative collectionist theory holds that there are no substances. Instead, there are collections of entities of another sort, which collections are not to be identified with substances. This view usually maintains that what are taken to be substances are really collections of nonsubstances. A proponent of this view seems to be the Hume of the Treatise. Hume is the sort of eliminationist who thinks that there is no intelligible concept of substance, but it is possible to be an eliminationist and also hold that the concept of substance is a coherent one.
A second kind of collectionist theory identifies substances with collections of nonsubstances. Such a theory attempts to provide a philosophical analysis of the concept of an individual substance as ordinarily understood in terms of a collection of this kind.
5 - Souls and bodies
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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- 18 September 2009
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- 25 November 1994, pp 144-181
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The Egyptians were the first to advance the idea that the soul is immortal and that when the body dies it enters into another animal which is then being born; when it has gone round all the creatures of the land, the sea, and the air, it enters into the body of a man which is then being born; and this cycle takes it three thousand years. Some of the Greeks – some earlier, some later – put forward this idea as though it were their own: I know their names but I do not transcribe them.
Herodotus Histories II. 193That, however, which is neither itself a body, nor a force within a body, is not existent according to man's first notions, and is above all excluded from the range of imagination.
Maimonides The Guide for the Perplexed I. xlviTHE NATURE OF A SOUL
The ideas we have belonging, and peculiar to Spirit, are Thinking, and Will.
John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II. xxiii (1695)The spirit-monad – the monad that has consciousness of itself.
E. Caird A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant Introd. V. 79 (1877)In previous chapters, we have explored the intuitive notion of an individual substance, culminating in our analyses of this notion in Chapter 4.
Index
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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- 18 September 2009
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- 25 November 1994, pp 194-198
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2 - Historically prominent accounts of substance
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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- 18 September 2009
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- 25 November 1994, pp 29-57
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Summary
All modern philosophy hinges round the difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate, substance and quality, particular and universal.
A. N. Whitehead Process and Reality 64 ([1929] 1969)Indeed, what has been sought after of old, and now, and always, and is always puzzled over, namely, What is being? is this: What is substance?
Aristotle Metaphysics Z 1028bTWO ARISTOTELEAN THEORIES
The first substance is the individual which can neither exist in another nor be predicated of another.
W. Turner History of Philosophy 133 (1903)… that which receives modifications and is not itself a mode …
“Substance” Oxford English Dictionary (1971)As we have indicated, the concept of substance has played a prominent role in the history of philosophy. Any attempt to provide an analysis of substance should be informed by an awareness of the efforts of the great philosophers of the past to characterize the ordinary concept of substance, and of the strengths and weaknesses of those efforts. As will become evident, our own analysis of the ordinary concept of substance is rooted firmly in one of the traditional approaches to understanding this concept. In this chapter, we will survey and critically assess several historically important attempts to analyze the ordinary concept of individual substance.
The first historically important attempt to analyze the ordinary concept is due to Aristotle, and states that a substance is that which can persist through change.
Introduction
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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Summary
This essay is an exploration of the ontological landscape of ordinary discourse and thought. Most philosophers would concede that there is an ordinary, commonsense, or “folk” conceptual scheme, and that this scheme has certain ontological presuppositions. Foremost among these is the idea that there are enduring things, or individual substances, continuants such as people, rocks, flowers, and houses. Other kinds of entities which common sense appears to recognize are events, places, times, properties, and collections, as well as surfaces, edges, shadows, and holes. Any ontologist must begin as a point of reference with a consideration of this folk or commonsense ontology, even if in the end he revises it in some way. At least since the time of Aristotle, philosophers have tried to organize and relate entities of the kinds which belong to the commonsense ontology, kinds which Aristotle called categories.
One of our primary aims is to analyze the ordinary or commonsense concept of an individual substance, and the other is to characterize the possible extension of this concept. These analytical enterprises do not involve any commitment to the existence of an individual substance so conceived. Our analysis of substance will be carried out in terms of a broad theory of ontological categories which covers both commonsense categories of the sort just referred to and categories of a more theoretical sort, which are scientific, mathematical, or philosophical in origin.
Appendix 2 - Continuous space and time and their parts: A defense of an Aristotelean account
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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- 18 September 2009
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- 25 November 1994, pp 188-193
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Summary
It is absurd that a magnitude should be constituted from non-magnitudes.
Aristotle On Generation and Corruption 1.2Mathematical continuity, at least in the versions of Dedekind, Cantor, and their successors, is clearly not instantiated in experience. This raises the question of the relation of mathematical continuity to experience.
Stephan Korner “Continuity” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967)We have maintained that point-positions and instants are not parts of space and time, respectively. Rather, we have taken the neo-Aristotelean view that such entities are dependent on places and times of higher dimensionality. Thus, we said that a point-position can be a limit of a line, or the place of a corner of a material object, or a place where two spheres touch, and so forth, but a point-position cannot exist apart from a place of higher than zero-dimensionality. Thus, our view has been an antifoundationalist one when it comes to space and time, one aspect of this antifoundationalism being that space and time are not composed of unextended parts.
However, many philosophers, taking their lead from certain mathematicians and, we believe, from the logicist tradition, hold that extended spaces and temporal intervals have a nondenumerable number of zero-dimensional parts. M. J. White has aptly described the contrast between the two views in question:
The tendency of contemporary mathematics, of course, has been to… [treat] continuous magnitudes as constituted of indivisible elements (e.g., sets of points) that are in a certain intuitive sense ‘discrete’. […]
Contents
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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- 18 September 2009
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- 25 November 1994, pp vii-viii
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Acknowledgments
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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- 18 September 2009
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- 25 November 1994, pp ix-x
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4 - The independence criterion of substance
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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- 18 September 2009
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- 25 November 1994, pp 89-143
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Summary
A Being of itself and independent from any other.
Bp. Pearson Exposition of the Creed I. 31 ([1659] 1682)A substance is a being which can subsist by itself, without dependence upon any other created being.
I. Watts Logick: Or the Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry After Truth I. ii. § 2 (1725)PROBLEMS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE CRITERION
The chain of dependence which runs throughout creation.
J. Tyndall The Glaciers of the Alps I. xxvii. 199 (1860)The substance is not enough, unless it be clothed with its circumstances.
Gracian's (B.) Courtiers Oracle, or the Art of Prudence ii (1685 trans.)According to a traditional view, an individual substance is that which could exist all by itself or which in some sense is “independent”. In this chapter, we construct a new version of an analysis of the ordinary notion of substance in terms of independence, and argue for its adequacy.
Our project is to construct an adequate philosophical analysis of this ordinary notion of thinghood. In setting forth our analysis we shall rely on our earlier arguments that a thing in this ordinary sense, that is, an individual substance, is not reducible to or identifiable with an entity of another kind or ontological category, for example, a set or collection of either properties, ideas, sense-data, or events. (This does not rule out the possibility that substances can be eliminated in favor of entities of another kind or ontological category.)
Appendix 1 - The concrete–abstract distinction
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Substance among Other Categories
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- 18 September 2009
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- 25 November 1994, pp 182-187
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Summary
A concrete name is a name which stands for a thing; an abstract name is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing.
J. S. Mill A System of Logic I. ii. § 4 (1846)Realists and antirealists presuppose an intuitive distinction between abstracta and concreta in their debates about the problem of universals. Examples of abstracta are squareness (a property), betweenness (a relation), there being horses (a proposition), the null set, and the number 7. Examples of concreta are a stone (a material substance), God (a disembodied spiritual substance), Hurricane Andrew (an event), instants and seconds (times), points and expanses of space (places), the particular wisdom of Socrates (a trope), the sum of Earth and Mars (a collection), the Earth's surface (a limit), and shadows and holes (privations). It is desirable that a philosophical analysis of the concrete–abstract distinction allow for the possibility of entities of any intelligible sorts, given some plausible view about the nature, existence conditions, and interrelationships of entities of those sorts. This desideratum seems to require allowing for the possibility of entities of the aforementioned kinds. Six attempts have been made to analyze the concrete–abstract distinction.
Unlike abstracta, concreta are spatially located or spatially related to something.
Unlike abstracta, concreta are capable of moving or undergoing intrinsic change.
Concreta have contingent existence, whereas abstracta have necessary existence.
Unlike concreta, abstracta are exemplifiable.
Unlike concreta, abstracta are (intellectually) graspable.
Unlike abstracta, concreta can be causes or effects.
Frontmatter
- Joshua Hoffman, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, Gary S. Rosenkrantz, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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- Book:
- Substance among Other Categories
- Published online:
- 18 September 2009
- Print publication:
- 25 November 1994, pp i-vi
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