



County of Fairfax, Virginia

MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 31, 2024

TO: Fairfax County Board of Supervisors

Bryan Hill
County Executive

Tom Arnold
Deputy County Executive for Safety and Security

FROM: Richard G. Schott
Independent Police Auditor

SUBJECT: Disposition of Independent Police Auditor Review for:

IPA-18-21R
IPA-19-13R
IPA-19-15R
IPA-19-21R
IPA-20-11R
IPA-20-12R
IPA-21-05R

As set forth in the Office of the Independent Police Auditor's Procedural Memorandum 04, dated September 11, 2023, the following Fairfax County Police Department ("FCPD") investigations have been reviewed and will not be the subject of a detailed Office of the Independent Police Auditor ("OIPA") Incident Report.¹ Rather, this Summary Memo documents my reviews of the investigations into complaints made about uses of force that resulted in "non-serious"² injuries in seven separate incidents between 2018 – 2021.³

¹ [OIPA Procedural Memorandum 04: Case Intake and Public Reports](#)

² When each of the seven incidents occurred, FCPD General Order ("G.O.") 540 defined "serious injury" as "[a]n injury which creates a substantial risk of death, disfigurement, prolonged hospitalization, impairment of the functions of any bodily organ or limb, or any injury that medical personnel deem to be potentially life-threatening." When the department revised G.O. 540, effective April 12, 2022, it added the following statement to the preceding definition: "Any other injury to a person not meeting this definition is to be deemed a non-serious injury." FCPD G.O. 540 III. 26.

³ Six incidents in this memo were reviewed under FCPD G.O. 540, effective March 31, 2017, while IPA-21-05R was reviewed under G.O. 540, effective March 1, 2021.

IPA-18-21R

At approximately 10:30 p.m. on December 13, 2018, FCPD officers from the McLean District Station responded to a domestic disturbance at an apartment complex located on Dorr Avenue. While the officer investigating the disturbance stood outside of the apartment where the disturbance was reported, an individual (identified by her initials, “L.R.”) tried to enter the apartment, which belonged to L.R.’s mother. When the officer did not allow her to enter—because of the ongoing investigation—L.R. swiped at his arm and attempted to push him out of her way. The officer used his body to prevent L.R. from entering the apartment. To prevent her from further interfering with the investigating officer, Police Officer First Class #1 (“PFC#1”) began to interact with her. PFC#1 immediately smelled alcohol on L.R.’s breath, and he noted that she was unsteady on her feet. She immediately became belligerent with PFC#1. PFC#1 asked L.R.’s mother (who was involved in the original domestic dispute and who had, in fact, requested that L.R. come to the apartment⁴) to calm L.R. down. When those efforts were unsuccessful, PFC#1 advised L.R. that she was under arrest for being drunk in public.⁵

L.R. immediately began to resist by swinging her arms to avoid being handcuffed, thrashing her body, and not responding to verbal commands. PFC#1 performed a “leg sweep” to take L.R. to the ground in a controlled manner so he could get her handcuffed. With the help of Police Officer #1 (“OFFC#1”), PFC#1 got L.R. cuffed, stood her up, and escorted her to his patrol car. When L.R. refused to allow the officers to search her,⁶ PFC#1 pushed her body against his car to keep her immobile while he conducted the search. After the search, PFC#1 and OFFC#1 placed L.R. in the police car, secured her, and PFC#1 transported her to the Fairfax County Adult Detention Center (“ADC”).

A full medical screening was not completed upon her arrival at the ADC because she was not cooperative with Fairfax County Sheriff’s Office (“FCSO”) personnel there. The FCSO personnel did note, however, that L.R. had no injuries and was not in any obvious pain. Additionally, the ADC intake records documented that L.R. was placed in a particular unit at the ADC because she was “too intoxicated and irrational.”

L.R. made no complaint of excessive force—or of being injured—at the time of her arrest, during her transport to the ADC, or upon her arrival at the ADC. On December 16, 2018, she submitted an online complaint to the FCPD alleging that PFC#1 and OFFC#1 used excessive force and that she was injured as a result of that force. Specifically, she alleged that PFC#1 slammed her head on the side of the police car and that he tried to slam her into the ground during her arrest. She also alleged that her wrists were injured by the

⁴ L.R. was attending a “Casino Night” event at the apartment complex.

⁵ Fairfax County Code § 5-1-1 provides that “[i]f any person is drunk in public he is guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor.

⁶ Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), recognizing that a warrantless search of an arrestee is allowed pursuant to that person’s lawful, custodial arrest.

handcuffs; and, in a later complaint, alleged that a pre-existing injury to one of her breasts was aggravated during the arrest.

The allegations of excessive force used by PFC#1 and OFFC#1 were investigated by FCPD's Internal Affairs Bureau ("IAB"). The IAB investigator interviewed L.R., PFC#1, OFFC#1, the officer who investigated the initial domestic disturbance call on the night of this incident, and residents of the apartment complex who saw—or at least heard—what transpired during L.R.'s arrest; reviewed available in-car video ("ICV") footage of the incident and subsequent transport of L.R. to the ADC; reviewed documents prepared upon L.R.'s arrival at the ADC; and attempted to obtain medical records related to injuries sustained by or treatment provided to L.R. following her arrest.⁷

The FCPD investigation concluded that PFC#1's and OFFC#1's minimal use of force complied with the department's policy on the use of force, specifically that the force was objectively reasonable as required by FCPD General Order ("G.O.") 540.

My opinion is that the FCPD investigation into L.R.'s allegations was complete, thorough, impartial, objective, and accurate. I agree that, based on the results of that investigation, the minimal force used on L.R. was objectively reasonable and, therefore, complied with departmental policy.

IPA-19-13R

At approximately 11:55 p.m. on June 17, 2019, an individual (identified by her initials "V.H.") was pulled over by an FCPD Police Officer First Class ("PFC#1") because she was driving her vehicle without its lights on. Unbeknownst to PFC#1, V.H. had been stopped only minutes earlier by another FCPD officer ("OFFC#1") for an unilluminated license plate. OFFC#1 failed to determine that V.H.'s driver's license was suspended, and he allowed her to drive away after giving her a verbal warning. She failed to put her lights on after leaving that brief stop.

When PFC#1 saw V.H.'s vehicle without its lights on, he pulled behind her and activated his police lights and siren. V.H. immediately turned her lights on, made an illegal U-turn, and pulled into a nearby parking lot. As PFC#1 approached the car, V.H. opened her door, but PFC#1 immediately advised her to stay in the car. He identified himself and told her she was driving without her lights on and, furthermore, had made an illegal U-turn in front of him. She denied doing either, and said she was simply being harassed.⁸ When PFC#1 asked for V.H.'s driver's license, she said, "No, you can arrest me." PFC#1 told V.H. to get out of her car so he could arrest her, but she stated that she was going to call her husband first. Rather than allowing her to make a call, PFC#1 reached inside the car, grabbed V.H.'s left wrist and, despite

⁷ L.R. refused to provide her necessary consent for the medical records to be obtained.

⁸ Although PFC#1 was initially unaware of OFFC#1's traffic stop of V.H. minutes earlier, OFFC#1 arrived on the scene before PFC#1 approached V.H.'s car. OFFC#1 told PFC#1 that he had just pulled V.H. over for the inoperable license plate lights.

resistance from V.H., pulled her from the vehicle and directed her to the ground. With the help of OFFC#1, PFC#1 handcuffed V.H.

After being handcuffed, V.H. stated that PFC#1 had broken her arm, that she could not feel her arm, and that her arm was “jacked up.” She was lifted from the ground and put in PFC#1’s police car to be transported to the ADC. While in route to the ADC, V.H. again complained of arm pain. PFC#1 asked if she wanted to be evaluated by medical personnel, but she did not answer his question. PFC#1 did not seek rescue personnel or take her to a hospital. He did, however, notify his lieutenant (“LT#1”) of her complaints. LT#1 did not respond to the ADC nor did he summon medical personnel to evaluate V.H.

When PFC#1 and V.H. arrived at the ADC, PFC#1 told deputies that V.H. was complaining of arm pain. A nurse spoke to V.H. and the nurse provided V.H. with over-the-counter pain medication.

On June 18, 2019, V.H.’s husband submitted a complaint alleging that PFC#1 had broken his wife’s arm when he arrested her the night before, and that the initial traffic stop was undertaken because V.H. was wearing a religious veil at the time of the stop. During the ensuing administrative investigation into the allegations, neither V.H. nor her husband agreed to an interview. Consequently, no medical records were obtained, and it was not confirmed whether V.H. actually sustained an injury to her arm.

PFC#1 had the requisite legal justification for initiating the traffic stop of V.H. When she refused to produce her driver’s license (which PFC#1 later determined to be suspended) and told PFC#1 to arrest her, he had the legal authority to do so. When she resisted arrest by refusing to get out of her car and stated that she was going to make a phone call, PFC#1 had the legal authority to use a reasonable amount of force to accomplish the arrest.⁹ The limited force used to effect V.H.’s arrest was objectively reasonable.¹⁰

While the force was deemed to be both lawful and allowed by FCPD policy—which closely parallels the Graham standard¹¹—separate violations of policy were identified during the FCPD investigation into the incident. Specifically, PFC#1 was faulted for not immediately requesting medical assistance for V.H. after she complained of being injured; and, LT#1 was faulted for not securing medical treatment for V.H. and for not responding to investigate, despite being advised by PFC#1 that V.H. had complained of being hurt.

According to FCPD G.O. 540.0 II., “[a]ccess to medical treatment shall be provided to any individual who complains of injury, has obvious injuries, or who requests medical attention.” This was not done by either PFC#1 or LT#1 for V.H. Furthermore, G.O. 540.7 I. A. provides

⁹ In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-397 (1989), the United States Supreme Court recognized that “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”

¹⁰ *Id.* In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court made clear that the force used to accomplish an arrest or investigatory stop needs to be “objectively reasonable” to be Constitutional.

¹¹ *Supra*, notes 9 and 10.

that [a] supervisor shall respond to the scene of any force incident where an individual has an injury, complains of an injury, is transported to a medical facility for medical treatment, or is otherwise provided with access to medical treatment.” Despite being made aware of V.H.’s complaint the night of the incident and her arrest, LT#1 did not respond to investigate. I believe these FCPD conclusions are correct, and that the administrative investigation of this matter was complete, thorough, impartial, objective, and accurate.

IPA-19-15R

On June 13, 2019, three FCPD police officers (one Master Police Officer and two Police Officers First Class) responded to a call reporting two intoxicated juvenile females at a location on Burke Center Parkway. When the officers arrived, they found a highly intoxicated juvenile (“Complainant”) who was disoriented and unsteady on her feet. Before the officers approached Complainant, they saw her strike her own face with a water bottle, bang her head against the window and pillar of a business, and punch a wooden pillar with a closed fist. Because of her self-destructive behavior, the officers approached and used empty-hand control tactics to gain control of Complainant and get her handcuffed.

When officers brought her to the front of a police car, Complainant tried to kick the officers. When the officers held her down on the hood of the police car, she began to yell that the officers raped her and had targeted her because of her ethnicity. The officers then tried to get Complainant into the back seat of the police car, but when she refused, they allowed her to sit on the ground outside of the car. She then deliberately banged her own head against the ground.

Complainant’s mother was called and when she arrived, she noticed that her daughter had a chipped tooth. Rescue personnel arrived to evaluate Complainant. After they evaluated Complainant, she was released to the custody of her mother.

An administrative investigation was initiated by the FCPD based on the allegations Complainant made during the incident, as well as the chipped tooth. During the administrative investigation, Complainant recanted her allegations of rape and ethnic bias, admitting that she made the allegations out of spite for being taken into custody by the officers. Also, on July 15, 2019, the Complainant withdrew any complaint regarding the chipped tooth because she admitted to having no recollection of the events that led to it. Exactly when the tooth got chipped and the cause of it were not determined, even after a review of police in-car video footage which had captured much of Complainant’s self-destructive behavior on June 13, 2019.

IPA-19-21R

On October 9, 2019, FCPD officers from the Mason District Station were dispatched to the AT&T store in the Bailey’s Crossroads section of Fairfax County for a larceny at the store. A description of the suspect and his clothing was provided to officers. While enroute to the store, Police Officer #1 (“OFFC#1”) saw an individual—matching the physical and clothing description provided—

walking near (and away from) the store. OFFC#1 decided to investigate¹² to determine if the individual (identified by his initials, “I.K.”) was involved in the larceny. OFFC#1 approached I.K., informed him of the reason for the stop, and asked him for identification. I.K. declined to produce any identification. At this point, Police Officer First Class #1 (“PFC#1”) arrived and confirmed with I.K. that he understood why the officers were talking to him. They again asked for identification. I.K. declined to identify himself and turned and began to walk away. OFFC#1 and PFC#1 grabbed I.K.’s arms, and when he tried to pull away, the officers took I.K. to the ground and handcuffed him. He then offered his photo I.D.

An employee at the AT&T store sent a picture of the larceny suspect to OFFC#1 and PFC#1. They determined that I.K. had not been involved in the larceny at the store. They immediately released him, asked if he was injured, and if he wanted to be seen by rescue personnel. I.K. advised he was not injured and did not want to be evaluated. PFC#1 provided a business card and contact information to I.K.

On October 11, 2019, I.K. went to INOVA Hospital because of back pain caused by his encounter with OFFC#1 and PFC#1. He sent a letter to the FCPD’s IAB dated October 21, 2019, complaining about being detained and the force used on him. The FCPD investigation into I.K.’s complaint concluded that the brief investigative detention of I.K. and his being “forced to cuff” were legal and complied with departmental policy. In Graham v. Connor,¹³ the United States Supreme Court recognized that “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” I agree that the officers in this incident had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain I.K., and that the force used to effect the investigative detention was objectively reasonable.

While the officers should have explained (though not legally required) to I.K. that he was being detained, it is important to note that the officers asked I.K. to identify himself during the detention, but did not threaten to arrest—or actually arrest—I.K. for declining. Virginia does not have a so-called “stop and identify” statute, which allows for the arrest of someone if they refuse to identify themselves when a law enforcement officer has the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain them.¹⁴

IPA-20-11R

On February 25, 2020, an FCPD sergeant (“SGT#1”) was at the Walmart on Kingstowne Boulevard in the Alexandria section of Fairfax County. He was discussing a matter that had occurred earlier with a store loss prevention officer. At the same time, another loss prevention officer was trying to get an individual (identified by his initials “F.N.”) to leave the store, but F.N. refused. SGT#1 responded to assist, but F.N. still refused to leave. Police Officer First Class #1 (“PFC#1”) and Police Officer First Class #2 (“PFC#2”) also arrived at the store to assist.

¹² Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) allows officers to detain individuals when they have reasonable suspicion that those individuals are engaged in, or were recently engaged in, criminal activity.

¹³ *Supra*, note 9 at 396-397.

¹⁴ See, Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U.S. 177 (2004).

After being given several opportunities to voluntarily leave the store, the officers advised F.N. that he was being arrested for trespassing. He insisted that he needed to get his prescription from the Walmart pharmacy but was told he would have to use a different pharmacy because he was being “trespassed” from the location.

Low-level control tactics were used to overcome resistance from F.N. to handcuff him. He was escorted to a police cruiser, but refused to get inside. SGT#1 pushed F.N.’s hip to get him to a seated position inside the police car. When F.N. refused to lift his legs into the car, PFC#1 physically lifted his legs into the car, and F.N. kicked at her. No other force was used.

While PFC#1 was driving F.N. to the ADC, he complained of a broken “hand.”¹⁵ Rescue personnel were called and F.N. was transported to a hospital for evaluation. A second FCPD sergeant responded to the hospital and determined that F.N. was not complaining about the minimal force used on him, only that his arm hurt. After being cleared at the Emergency Room—with no injuries or broken bones identified—F.N. was taken to the ADC.

The FCPD investigation into the use of force included interviews of the three officers on the scene of F.N.’s arrest; an interview of the loss prevention officer who witnessed the arrest; a review of Walmart security camera footage (unfortunately, the camera did not capture F.N.’s arrest); a review of the incident reports prepared by officers following the incident; and a review of the hospital medical records reflecting the evaluation of F.N. Based on the thorough investigation, the lack of injury to F.N., and the fact that F.N. made no complaint about the force used on him, both SGT#1 and PFC#1 were found to have complied with the law and FCPD policy. I agree with that conclusion, and opine that the investigation was complete, thorough, impartial, objective, and accurate.

IPA-20-12R

At approximately 11:00 p.m., on May 16, 2020, FCPD Police Officer First Class #1 (“PFC#1”) and his police canine partner (“Lobo”) responded to a request from the City of Fairfax Police Department (“FPD”).¹⁶ The FPD had identified a stolen car; but, the driver of the stolen car sped away from officers and then got out and ran from them, leaving the stolen car abandoned. The FPD requested assistance from PFC#1 and Lobo to track the driver using his scent from the abandoned vehicle. While Lobo obtained the driver’s scent from the abandoned car, PFC#1 smelled the odor of marijuana inside the vehicle.

PFC#1 determined that FPD’s request for assistance met the legal and departmental criteria for Lobo to be involved in tracking the individual. An FPD officer (“FPD#1”) accompanied PFC#1 and Lobo during the entire incident.

¹⁵ F.N. was difficult to understand, and PFC#1 initially thought he was complaining of a “broken heart.” She was unsure if he was referring to a physical or an emotional “broken heart.”

¹⁶ The FPD does not have its own canine program. The FCPD regularly responds to requests from other departments for canine assistance.

After a lengthy track in the vicinity of the abandoned car, Lobo located an individual lying on the ground near a fence opening adjacent to a hotel. Lobo was ahead of PFC#1 but on his lead (15 feet in length). Lobo bit the person on his head, above his right ear. PFC#1 immediately pulled Lobo back with the lead, and gave the “release” command. Lobo released his bite within two seconds.

FPD#1 immediately recognized the individual (identified by his initials “W.A.”) as someone from the area with whom he had interacted in the past. It was clear to both FPD#1 and to PFC#1 that W.A. was intoxicated, had been sleeping, and was not the driver who fled from the abandoned stolen car. W.A. was transported to a hospital, where he required a total of twenty-five stitches in five separate locations on his head. FCPD Second Lieutenant #1 responded to the scene of the dog bite and to the hospital to investigate.

The FCPD’s IAB continued the investigation and determined that PFC#1 complied with departmental policy addressing both the use of a police canine and the use of force, specifically FCPD G.O. 530.1 and G.O. 540.

The FCPD policy governing canine operations at the time of this incident recognized that a police canine sometimes “causes ... injury to a citizen not suspected of any crime;” that “caution needs to be exercised to avoid the possibility of an unintended bite;” and that [p]atrol dogs go through extensive training, but the possibility of an unintentional bite always exists.”¹⁷ Unfortunately, W.A. was the victim of an unintended bite. However, PFC#1 did not violate any policy when he utilized Lobo at 11:00 p.m. in a desolate area to track for a person on foot who had just fled from a stolen vehicle with the odor of marijuana in it.

The FCPD considers the utilization of a patrol service dog for apprehension to be the use of “less-lethal” force. Less-lethal force options are authorized in various circumstances, including when used to “[e]ffect an investigative stop or arrest.”¹⁸ Additionally, FCPD G.O. 530.1 V. B. 1. f., in effect when this incident occurred, provided that “felonies [e.g. auto theft] and serious misdemeanors such as . . . fleeing after driving while intoxicated would justify the use of the patrol dog for apprehension.”

The erroneous dog bite of W.A. resulted in injuries considered non-serious.¹⁹ In spite of the unfortunate result of Lobo biting W.A., PFC#1 did not violate any law or departmental policy when this incident occurred.

IPA-21-05R

On October 1, 2021, FCPD officers responded to a two-vehicle accident in Chantilly, Virginia. A truck involved in the accident had overturned on its side, and its contents had scattered in, and

¹⁷ FCPD G.O. 530.1 IV. B. 5. b. and G.O. 530.1 V. 2. c., in effect on May 16, 2020. Canine operations are now covered in FCPD G.O. 531, which became effective on August 11, 2022.

¹⁸ FCPD G.O. 540.6 I. A. 1.

¹⁹ See fn. 2, *supra*, for FCPD’s definition of “serious injury.” This is not intended to minimize suffering a dog bite requiring twenty-five stitches.

adjacent to, the street where the accident occurred. The driver of the truck was taken to a nearby hospital, but his passengers remained at the scene.

The officers investigated the accident by speaking to the truck's passengers, the driver of the other vehicle involved, and an uninvolved motorist who witnessed the accident. They did not cordon off the area—to include the debris field of the truck's contents—while speaking to the individuals. Initially, nobody entered the crash or debris field area despite the absence of evidence or crime-scene tape.

After several minutes of speaking with the people at the accident site, Master Police Officer #1 (“MPO#1”) noticed an individual (identified by his initials “G.J.”) standing amid the spilled contents of the truck. G.J. was using his phone to film the scene. MPO#1 was not concerned about the filming, but did not want the accident scene or the spilled contents of the truck to be disturbed. Therefore, MPO#1 asked G.J. to move away from where he stood. G.J. immediately questioned MPO#1's request for him to move, and stated that he had a right to be where he was because there was no police tape cordoning off the area. MPO#1 explained that he had been busy getting information and had not put up any tape. G.J. insisted that because there was no police tape, he could not be ordered to move away from the area.

Master Police Officer #2 (“MPO#2”) went to his car to retrieve tape while MPO#1 explained to G.J. that he would be allowed to remain in the area, but not in the midst of the truck's spilled contents. He also told G.J. that he could continue filming as long as he moved out of the debris field. When G.J. refused to leave where he stood, MPO#1 pushed G.J. with his hands to get him to move away. When he still refused to move on his own, MPO#1 pushed G.J. one more time, again using empty hands. G.J. then tried to hurriedly get past MPO#1 and back into the accident site. At this point, MPO#1 and MPO#2 arrested G.J. for obstruction of justice.²⁰

Police Officer First Class #1 (“PFC#1”) transported G.J. to the ADC. Before G.J. was placed into PFC#1's police car, the officers combined a second set of handcuffs with the first one to avoid injury or discomfort during the ride. The cuffs around G.J.'s wrists were checked for proper fit and were double-locked so they would not tighten any further. In spite of this, while being transported from the arrest scene to the ADC, G.J. can be heard (on ICV footage) telling PFC#1: “My hands are numb,” and “I can't feel my hands.” PFC#1 only heard one of G.J.'s complaints,²¹ at which point they were only minutes away from the ADC. The intake paperwork prepared by ADC staff upon G.J.'s arrival at the ADC reflects a “No” response to questions posed to G.J. about him being injured, in an accident, or in pain.

On October 21, 2021, G.J. submitted an online complaint to the FCPD alleging that the “open hand push” of him was excessive force. In the complaint, he said that the incident left him “jarred, physically injured, and distraught.” During a subsequent interview with an FCPD investigator, G.J. alleged that he sustained nerve damage in his left hand from being handcuffed.

²⁰ Va. Code § 18.2-460.

²¹ During the drive to the ADC, G.J. can be heard on the ICV footage engaging in a monologue as though he were speaking to a camera. He later explained that he had been trying to film the accident location because he was working on a documentary about traffic accidents in Virginia.

The administrative investigation into G.J.'s complaints included interviews of G.J. and the officers involved in his arrest; review of body-worn camera ("BWC") and ICV footage of both the incident and G.J. being transported to the ADC; review of the paperwork prepared at the ADC upon G.J.'s arrival; and review of medical records provided by G.J. documenting care he received from his personal doctor after the incident. The administrative investigation concluded that both MPO#1 and PFC#1 complied with the department's G.O. 203.1, which addresses prisoner care and safety; and that MPO#1's use of force against G.J. complied with G.O. 540.5, which addresses whether an officer's use of force was objectively reasonable.²²

MPO#1 pushed G.J. after several minutes of explaining to him why G.J. needed to leave the immediate area where he stood, and that he was free to record after leaving that immediate area. G.J. was verbally argumentative from the outset and ignored MPO#1's repeated requests for him to move. After viewing the BWC footage of the incident, I agree that MPO#1's use of force was objectively reasonable. Initially, MPO#1 had no intention of arresting G.J. and was simply trying to maintain the integrity of the accident scene. He decided to arrest G.J. only when G.J. aggressively approached him in an effort to get past him and back into the immediate scene.

After G.J.'s arrest and initial handcuffing, a second set of handcuffs was used to prevent discomfort during the ride to the ADC. Additionally, the cuffs securing G.J.'s wrists were checked to ensure their proper fit and to prevent any injury.²³ Consequently, I agree with the FCPD's conclusion that MPO#1 and PFC#1 complied with departmental policy (G.O. 203.1) governing prisoner care and safety. The investigation which led to these conclusions was, in my opinion, complete, thorough, objective, impartial, and accurate.

cc: Chief Kevin Davis, Chief of Police
Commander John Lieb, Internal Affairs Bureau

²² FCPD G.O. 540, effective March 1, 2021, was in effect during this incident.

²³ The medical records provided by G.J. did not indicate any nerve damage to his hand(s).