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George F. Kennan: An American Life
Widely and enthusiastically acclaimed, this is the authorized, definitive biography of one of the most fascinating but troubled figures of the twentieth century by the nation's leading Cold War historian. In the late 1940s, George F. Kennan—then a bright but, relatively obscure American diplomat—wrote the "long telegram" and the "X" article. These two documents laid out United States' strategy for "containing" the Soviet Union—a strategy which Kennan himself questioned in later years. Based on exclusive access to Kennan and his archives, this landmark history illuminates a life that both mirrored and shaped the century it spanned.
Winner of the 2012 Pulitzer Prize in Biography
Winner of the 2012 Pulitzer Prize in Biography
800 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2011
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January 13, 2021
"George F. Kennan: An American Life" by John Lewis Gaddis, is everything one could ever want from a biography. Incredibly detailed, and thoughtfully written. It feels much of the time as if Kennan himself is speaking directly to you. This is a stellar book about an incredibly complex man, and an often times deeply troubled man, during an incredibly troubling and dangerous time in human history. I highly recommend this to anyone who wants to understand better the behind the scenes of both the Second World War, and the Cold War. Five Stars.
January 30, 2012
It's a pity, as with so many modern biographers who seek to be definitive, that Gaddis could not have done the short version for those of us with a job and a life. Having said that, I was engrossed from beginning to end, and couldn't bear to skip even one of the 700 pages, despite the book consuming all my free time for weeks. Gaddis writes well; Kennan wrote with a wonderful, powerful, novelistic excellence - even in his diary. And there's so much here: run-ins with Martha Gellhorn in Prague just before WWII; being the brilliant but darkly troubled young diplomat in horrible conditions in Moscow; helping to craft the Marshall Plan (his greatest achievement?); being on chatting terms with everyone from Tito to Kennedy; steering Reagan towards a saner, slightly less lethal attitude in foreign policy. He was a mass of contradictions, and knew it: loved and loathed both America and Russia; was a charming and resilient depressive; managed to be a faithful philanderer; a liberal-minded, snobbery-free elitist; clear-sighted about totalitarianism yet impatient of democracy; despised the reckless war-mongering of Bush II yet admired "Killer" Kissinger. Despite the subtitle (Kennan's was, in several different ways, a strikingly un-American life), this is a very fine biography of an extraordinary man. As Isaiah Berlin put it, in a particularly gorgeous letter of reference: "one of the most attractive human beings I have ever met... and he has that rarest of virtues: something to say."
December 11, 2020
John Lewis Gaddis became Kennan's biographer in 1981, thirty years before this book appeared, and his "strange" – as he described it – relationship with the diplomat went on for many years in which Kennan granted Gaddis unrestricted access to himself, his papers, and his mostly handwritten diaries that "alone fill twelve boxes"; in addition, with Kennan’s encouragement, many of his friends and most of his family talked with Gaddis after he began this project. Thus, the book that emerged from this whole mass of materiel is a highly detailed and insightful political biography.
George Frost Kennan was a diplomat, grand strategist, historian, memoirist, and cultural critic, who graduated from Princeton in 1925 and immediately entered the foreign service. Six feet tall, thin, with engaging blue eyes and a smile “chilling or charming as its owner decrees,” (some of those who knew him used to call him Frost) an emotional, even melancholic intellectual, he had what at times seemed an all-consuming empathy for Russia. Fascinated by foreign peoples in general, or more specifically by those living outside the United States, Kennan – whose great-uncle of the same name had traveled Russia and written popular books on Siberian life and tsarist authoritarianism – had a powerful affinity for Russians. "It gave me an indescribable sort of satisfaction to feel myself again in the midst of these people – with their tremendous pulsating warmth and vitality," said he after returning from Moscow, where he had filled diplomatic posts throughout the Second World War.
Even deeper was Kennan’s love for the Russia of literary renderings – of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and Chekhov (of whom he was writing a biography, never finished). (He attempted to visit Tolstoy in Yasnaya Polyana, but failed because of bad road conditions.) His facility with the Russian language, buoyed as it was by his literary engagement with it, astonished Russians and even Stalin himself.
Kennan’s warm sentiments for the country and its culture, however, did not extend to its leadership. He abominated it. Like Dean Acheson, he was as unnerved by Moscow’s brutal subjugation of “liberated” Poland after 1945, as he was by the massacre of thousands of Polish officers at Katyn five years prior. He saw these as harbingers of more large-scale aggression to come.
He had had two postings to the embassy in Moscow, the first from 1933, right after FDR normalized relations with the Communist government, to 1937, and the second from 1944 to 1946. On May 9, 1945, he watched the city’s frenzied celebration of the war’s end from the embassy’s balcony. Terrified of being swept away by the surging crowd of celebrators, he, as deputy chief of mission with Ambassador Harriman away, felt he had no choice but to engage them, lest silence be interpreted as official indifference or hostility. Walking downstairs and "stepping out onto the pedestal of one of the building’s large columns", he summoned his courage. “Congratulations on the day of victory!” he shouted in Russian. “All honor to the Soviet allies!” The crowd roared. Kennan, "heart pounding, dashed back inside."
Harriman, the former banker—pragmatic, businesslike, monolingual – was Kennan’s temperamental and intellectual opposite, and while he had great regard for his deputy’s insights, he was put off by his impractical tendency to ruminate. George Kennan, he said, was “a man who understood Russia but didn’t understand the United States.”
Indeed Kennan did not understand his government, or more specifically what he considered its absurd belief that it could conclude a Grand Alliance with Moscow to preside over a peaceful postwar world. In February 1946 he set out to disabuse Washington of its notions in what is considered the most famous and influential diplomatic cable in history – the Long Telegram. In the message, he condemned the communist leadership if the USSR and called on the United States to forcefully resist Soviet expansion. As his words flowed through the Washington foreign policy apparatus the effect was rapid, widespread, and consequential. “The year 1946,” Acheson would later write, “was for the most part a year of learning that minds in the Kremlin worked very much as George F. Kennan had predicted they would."
In Spring 1947, he transformed the Telegram into an article, which was published in the July edition of Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "Mr. X", and this article – despite the fake name – was recognized by nearly everyone in the State Department and the White House as Kennan's work.
In the article, "Mr. X" argued that the the Soviet leaders were determined to spread the communist doctrine all over the world, and were highly patient and pragmatic in the pursuing of this objective. "In the face of a superior force," asserted Kennan, the Russians would retreat and wait for a more opportune moment, so the West should not be lulled into triumph by temporary Soviet misfortunes. According to him, Soviet foreign policy "is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever permitted to do so, toward a given goal." In terms of US Foreign Policy, he gave clearcut advice: the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian "expansive tendencies".
The X Article had a tremendous impact and became the core of the US policy toward the Soviet Union in the years after its publication. Harry Truman's administration embraced Kennan's philosophy and subsequently attempted to "contain" Soviet expansion through various programs, including the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.
In 1949 Kennan accepted appointment as counselor to the State Department, but resigned the following year to join the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Throughout his life, he also delivered many lectures to the National War College, describing foreign policy to his students as a largish farm on which several crises are happening simultaneously and one cannot decide which crisis to attend first. In 1952 he returned to Moscow as US ambassador, but was expelled by the Soviet Government due to remarks he had made about wrong Soviet treatment of Western diplomats. By the 60s, with the States hopelessly bogged down in the Vietnam War, Kennan began to question some of his own fundamental assumptions expressed in the X Article, and became an outspoken critic of US involvement in Vietnam. In particular, he disapproved of US policymakers' focus on military containment of the Soviet Union instead of on economic and political programs.
Although Gaddis' work is mainly a political biography, he vividly shows there was more to Kennan than he's "grand-strategist" image. In addition to his diplomatic career, George F. Kennan also had an impressive one as a historian. He never trained formally for this profession – "perhaps that’s why he was good at it", remarks the author – but the study of history was at the center of his preparation for diplomacy and strategy in several ways: first, through his understanding of European and American history, acquired as a Princeton undergraduate; second, through his immersion in the history and culture of Russia as a young Foreign Service officer, and finally, through his reading in the classics of grand strategy while organizing the curriculum at the National War College in 1946-47. He was awarded two National Book Awards, two Pulitzers, and a Bancroft Prize for his historical and autobiographical writing.
His life as a historian evoked another quality for which he is likely to be remembered – his skill as a writer. According to Gaddis, not the least of the reasons Kennan succeeded as a strategist and a historian is that he used words well. There was passion, luminosity, vigor, and originality in almost all of his prose. Yet, according to George's beloved wife, Annelise, his writing was full of "gloom and doom", and therefore was much more personal than political. Wonderful is the insight Gaddis gives us into the stabilizing role she played in her husband's life.
John Lewis Gaddis's book is the perfect blend of personal and political, of a biography of an extraordinary man and a reflection of the turbulent times on which that man had left his considerable impact. It tells the history of the dawn of the Cold War just as evocatively as it traces the intriguing career of George Frost Kennan. Outstanding.
*Note: George F. Kennan's Soviet-American Relations, Vol. 1: Russia Leaves the War, 1917-1920 is a highly insightful study of Soviet-American relations throughout WWI, which demonstrates how they went downhill long before the Cold War.
George Frost Kennan was a diplomat, grand strategist, historian, memoirist, and cultural critic, who graduated from Princeton in 1925 and immediately entered the foreign service. Six feet tall, thin, with engaging blue eyes and a smile “chilling or charming as its owner decrees,” (some of those who knew him used to call him Frost) an emotional, even melancholic intellectual, he had what at times seemed an all-consuming empathy for Russia. Fascinated by foreign peoples in general, or more specifically by those living outside the United States, Kennan – whose great-uncle of the same name had traveled Russia and written popular books on Siberian life and tsarist authoritarianism – had a powerful affinity for Russians. "It gave me an indescribable sort of satisfaction to feel myself again in the midst of these people – with their tremendous pulsating warmth and vitality," said he after returning from Moscow, where he had filled diplomatic posts throughout the Second World War.
Even deeper was Kennan’s love for the Russia of literary renderings – of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and Chekhov (of whom he was writing a biography, never finished). (He attempted to visit Tolstoy in Yasnaya Polyana, but failed because of bad road conditions.) His facility with the Russian language, buoyed as it was by his literary engagement with it, astonished Russians and even Stalin himself.
Kennan’s warm sentiments for the country and its culture, however, did not extend to its leadership. He abominated it. Like Dean Acheson, he was as unnerved by Moscow’s brutal subjugation of “liberated” Poland after 1945, as he was by the massacre of thousands of Polish officers at Katyn five years prior. He saw these as harbingers of more large-scale aggression to come.
He had had two postings to the embassy in Moscow, the first from 1933, right after FDR normalized relations with the Communist government, to 1937, and the second from 1944 to 1946. On May 9, 1945, he watched the city’s frenzied celebration of the war’s end from the embassy’s balcony. Terrified of being swept away by the surging crowd of celebrators, he, as deputy chief of mission with Ambassador Harriman away, felt he had no choice but to engage them, lest silence be interpreted as official indifference or hostility. Walking downstairs and "stepping out onto the pedestal of one of the building’s large columns", he summoned his courage. “Congratulations on the day of victory!” he shouted in Russian. “All honor to the Soviet allies!” The crowd roared. Kennan, "heart pounding, dashed back inside."
Harriman, the former banker—pragmatic, businesslike, monolingual – was Kennan’s temperamental and intellectual opposite, and while he had great regard for his deputy’s insights, he was put off by his impractical tendency to ruminate. George Kennan, he said, was “a man who understood Russia but didn’t understand the United States.”
Indeed Kennan did not understand his government, or more specifically what he considered its absurd belief that it could conclude a Grand Alliance with Moscow to preside over a peaceful postwar world. In February 1946 he set out to disabuse Washington of its notions in what is considered the most famous and influential diplomatic cable in history – the Long Telegram. In the message, he condemned the communist leadership if the USSR and called on the United States to forcefully resist Soviet expansion. As his words flowed through the Washington foreign policy apparatus the effect was rapid, widespread, and consequential. “The year 1946,” Acheson would later write, “was for the most part a year of learning that minds in the Kremlin worked very much as George F. Kennan had predicted they would."
In Spring 1947, he transformed the Telegram into an article, which was published in the July edition of Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "Mr. X", and this article – despite the fake name – was recognized by nearly everyone in the State Department and the White House as Kennan's work.
In the article, "Mr. X" argued that the the Soviet leaders were determined to spread the communist doctrine all over the world, and were highly patient and pragmatic in the pursuing of this objective. "In the face of a superior force," asserted Kennan, the Russians would retreat and wait for a more opportune moment, so the West should not be lulled into triumph by temporary Soviet misfortunes. According to him, Soviet foreign policy "is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever permitted to do so, toward a given goal." In terms of US Foreign Policy, he gave clearcut advice: the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian "expansive tendencies".
The X Article had a tremendous impact and became the core of the US policy toward the Soviet Union in the years after its publication. Harry Truman's administration embraced Kennan's philosophy and subsequently attempted to "contain" Soviet expansion through various programs, including the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.
In 1949 Kennan accepted appointment as counselor to the State Department, but resigned the following year to join the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Throughout his life, he also delivered many lectures to the National War College, describing foreign policy to his students as a largish farm on which several crises are happening simultaneously and one cannot decide which crisis to attend first. In 1952 he returned to Moscow as US ambassador, but was expelled by the Soviet Government due to remarks he had made about wrong Soviet treatment of Western diplomats. By the 60s, with the States hopelessly bogged down in the Vietnam War, Kennan began to question some of his own fundamental assumptions expressed in the X Article, and became an outspoken critic of US involvement in Vietnam. In particular, he disapproved of US policymakers' focus on military containment of the Soviet Union instead of on economic and political programs.
Although Gaddis' work is mainly a political biography, he vividly shows there was more to Kennan than he's "grand-strategist" image. In addition to his diplomatic career, George F. Kennan also had an impressive one as a historian. He never trained formally for this profession – "perhaps that’s why he was good at it", remarks the author – but the study of history was at the center of his preparation for diplomacy and strategy in several ways: first, through his understanding of European and American history, acquired as a Princeton undergraduate; second, through his immersion in the history and culture of Russia as a young Foreign Service officer, and finally, through his reading in the classics of grand strategy while organizing the curriculum at the National War College in 1946-47. He was awarded two National Book Awards, two Pulitzers, and a Bancroft Prize for his historical and autobiographical writing.
His life as a historian evoked another quality for which he is likely to be remembered – his skill as a writer. According to Gaddis, not the least of the reasons Kennan succeeded as a strategist and a historian is that he used words well. There was passion, luminosity, vigor, and originality in almost all of his prose. Yet, according to George's beloved wife, Annelise, his writing was full of "gloom and doom", and therefore was much more personal than political. Wonderful is the insight Gaddis gives us into the stabilizing role she played in her husband's life.
John Lewis Gaddis's book is the perfect blend of personal and political, of a biography of an extraordinary man and a reflection of the turbulent times on which that man had left his considerable impact. It tells the history of the dawn of the Cold War just as evocatively as it traces the intriguing career of George Frost Kennan. Outstanding.
*Note: George F. Kennan's Soviet-American Relations, Vol. 1: Russia Leaves the War, 1917-1920 is a highly insightful study of Soviet-American relations throughout WWI, which demonstrates how they went downhill long before the Cold War.
March 17, 2013
I don't generally enjoy biographies, but Gaddis sure did a terrific job with this one.
It puts the spotlight on a key figure in American foreign policy. Even though Keenan was often critical of the United States and of particular political administrations, he has to be ranked as a dedicated public servant and statesman. It is not just a matter of agreeing or disagreeing, but of noting his life-long labors in foreign policy.
Gaddis provides us with a superb sense of Kennan's remarkable personality and especially drives home the fact that George Kennan was a man of contradictions. Throughout his life Kennan held resolute opinions about the events he observed and orchestrated, yet he could be troubled by self-doubt and uncertainty. He went to great lengths to make sure his government and people understood their relations with the world. Yet he always remained deeply ambivalent about America and especially the young generation which he sometimes saw as superficial and self-centered. He alternated between professing a love for his country and constantly considering himself as an outsider who was more comfortable among foreign peoples. This dichotomy between being intimately familiar with the internal workings of the system and preferring to remain on the outside also carried over into Kennan's role as a diplomat and advisor. Kennan probably knew more about Russian culture and history than any other American of his generation and his insights were incalculably unique. But although he was instrumental in charting the course of American policy during the early Cold War and seemed like the ultimate insider, in some sense he remained the perpetual outsider, never at ease in the corridors of Washington and always convinced of the flaws in his government's policies. Personally too Kennan displayed contradictions. He was a family man devoted to his wife for seventy years, yet had affairs. He suffered from ulcers throughout his life and could be easily stressed, yet he was a remarkably hardy individual who used to work long hours on his farm and traveled to inhospitable places alone. And he could be an intellectual elitist who could still shun the trappings of influence and wealth (as an undergraduate he stayed out of all the elite clubs at Princeton for instance) and who could understand the pain, hopes and suffering of the common man.
The book balances the diplomat with the man. Kennan's own Presbyterian heritage would affirm that we are all sinners and human. Keenan slipped on many occasions. He fell into marital infidelity on several occasions, and he suffered from lots of personal angst over his views, his political relationships, and other areas of life. The survey of his life as a totality is what matters.
This book's subject also parallels all the major events of the twentieth century. Quite often, Keenan was in or near the center of major events. He had an impact on every Presidential administration from Truman to Clinton. Some he praised and some praised him.
Unfortunately, Gaddis could not help but downplay as much as permissible Kennan's acerbic attitude toward policies that Gaddis himself publicly supported, going so far as publishing a book that justified preemptive war as something deep in the American tradition. Gaddis wants us to believe that Kennan's famous penchant for relentless self-criticism explains why he harshly condemned the Vietnam War, the Reagan administration, or the extension of NATO in the 1990s. That is too much psychology and too little policy analysis. Gaddis is also puzzled why Kennan failed to see that Ronald Reagan's saber rattling and adventurous anti-communism were in the tradition of containment as envisioned by Kennan. To many readers this is not so mysterious. Archival findings of recent years do show that Reagan was sincere in his desire to abolish all nuclear weapons, as was Kennan. They also document the shocking degree of bureaucratic hostility in the U.S. policy-making establishment against Reagan's summit diplomacy with Mikhail Gorbachev. These findings will improve Reagan's standing among diplomatic historians (see Michael Mann's book "The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan"). But they don't contradict the fact that the Reagan administration--with emphasis on administration--did not have a coherent policy of containment as Gaddis wishes to see it, and that in the end it was not Washington--and certainly not grand-standing speeches by the president--that brought down the Iron Curtain, but the self-implosion of the communist system, which Kennan had foreseen, and the actions of Gorbachev, about whom we also don't learn much in this biography, other than the fact that he had two brief encounters with Kennan and apparently knew who Kennan was.
See also The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War by Nicholas Thompson.
It puts the spotlight on a key figure in American foreign policy. Even though Keenan was often critical of the United States and of particular political administrations, he has to be ranked as a dedicated public servant and statesman. It is not just a matter of agreeing or disagreeing, but of noting his life-long labors in foreign policy.
Gaddis provides us with a superb sense of Kennan's remarkable personality and especially drives home the fact that George Kennan was a man of contradictions. Throughout his life Kennan held resolute opinions about the events he observed and orchestrated, yet he could be troubled by self-doubt and uncertainty. He went to great lengths to make sure his government and people understood their relations with the world. Yet he always remained deeply ambivalent about America and especially the young generation which he sometimes saw as superficial and self-centered. He alternated between professing a love for his country and constantly considering himself as an outsider who was more comfortable among foreign peoples. This dichotomy between being intimately familiar with the internal workings of the system and preferring to remain on the outside also carried over into Kennan's role as a diplomat and advisor. Kennan probably knew more about Russian culture and history than any other American of his generation and his insights were incalculably unique. But although he was instrumental in charting the course of American policy during the early Cold War and seemed like the ultimate insider, in some sense he remained the perpetual outsider, never at ease in the corridors of Washington and always convinced of the flaws in his government's policies. Personally too Kennan displayed contradictions. He was a family man devoted to his wife for seventy years, yet had affairs. He suffered from ulcers throughout his life and could be easily stressed, yet he was a remarkably hardy individual who used to work long hours on his farm and traveled to inhospitable places alone. And he could be an intellectual elitist who could still shun the trappings of influence and wealth (as an undergraduate he stayed out of all the elite clubs at Princeton for instance) and who could understand the pain, hopes and suffering of the common man.
The book balances the diplomat with the man. Kennan's own Presbyterian heritage would affirm that we are all sinners and human. Keenan slipped on many occasions. He fell into marital infidelity on several occasions, and he suffered from lots of personal angst over his views, his political relationships, and other areas of life. The survey of his life as a totality is what matters.
This book's subject also parallels all the major events of the twentieth century. Quite often, Keenan was in or near the center of major events. He had an impact on every Presidential administration from Truman to Clinton. Some he praised and some praised him.
Unfortunately, Gaddis could not help but downplay as much as permissible Kennan's acerbic attitude toward policies that Gaddis himself publicly supported, going so far as publishing a book that justified preemptive war as something deep in the American tradition. Gaddis wants us to believe that Kennan's famous penchant for relentless self-criticism explains why he harshly condemned the Vietnam War, the Reagan administration, or the extension of NATO in the 1990s. That is too much psychology and too little policy analysis. Gaddis is also puzzled why Kennan failed to see that Ronald Reagan's saber rattling and adventurous anti-communism were in the tradition of containment as envisioned by Kennan. To many readers this is not so mysterious. Archival findings of recent years do show that Reagan was sincere in his desire to abolish all nuclear weapons, as was Kennan. They also document the shocking degree of bureaucratic hostility in the U.S. policy-making establishment against Reagan's summit diplomacy with Mikhail Gorbachev. These findings will improve Reagan's standing among diplomatic historians (see Michael Mann's book "The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan"). But they don't contradict the fact that the Reagan administration--with emphasis on administration--did not have a coherent policy of containment as Gaddis wishes to see it, and that in the end it was not Washington--and certainly not grand-standing speeches by the president--that brought down the Iron Curtain, but the self-implosion of the communist system, which Kennan had foreseen, and the actions of Gorbachev, about whom we also don't learn much in this biography, other than the fact that he had two brief encounters with Kennan and apparently knew who Kennan was.
See also The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War by Nicholas Thompson.
July 19, 2018
This exhaustive 700 page biography was made possible by the author having access to the journals that Kennan kept during his 101 year old life.
Kennan was brilliant, won 2 Pulitzers and his input helped shape the Marshall Plan that Europe received after World War 2 to get over that devastation, Cold War policy that accurately predicted that the Soviet Union would self destruct and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty that helped stop and remove nuclear weapons. His philosophy was that America should NOT get involved in any country that did not pose a threat to the America.
This philosophy was curiously and unbelievably suspended for Kennedy who authorized the Bay of Pigs in Cuba which, obviously posed no threat to America and ordered the coup that killed the elected President of South Vietnam, Diem. Kennan blasts every other President as being beneath him in intellect.
While i admired Kennan for his brilliance, I would have detested working for him as his various illicit affairs, egotism and horrible outlook on life would have been too much to take.
Kennan was brilliant, won 2 Pulitzers and his input helped shape the Marshall Plan that Europe received after World War 2 to get over that devastation, Cold War policy that accurately predicted that the Soviet Union would self destruct and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty that helped stop and remove nuclear weapons. His philosophy was that America should NOT get involved in any country that did not pose a threat to the America.
This philosophy was curiously and unbelievably suspended for Kennedy who authorized the Bay of Pigs in Cuba which, obviously posed no threat to America and ordered the coup that killed the elected President of South Vietnam, Diem. Kennan blasts every other President as being beneath him in intellect.
While i admired Kennan for his brilliance, I would have detested working for him as his various illicit affairs, egotism and horrible outlook on life would have been too much to take.
December 27, 2012
Kennan's major claim to fame is to have anticipated by several years the American response to post-war Soviet expansionism, and to have given that response an intelligent and articulate high-brow exposition. On any given foreign policy issue, however, he was no more likely than chance to be correct, and his increasingly shrill denunciations of the folly and stupidity of American policy-making as the book progresses were born only out of an enormous vanity. Those presidents who consulted with Kennan and fed his ego were more likely to receive his support, regardless of the issue at hand.
Many people with left sympathies took (and maybe still take, if he is remembered at all) great comfort in hearing Kennan, who was supposedly a non-ideological expert, endorse a somewhat more conciliatory and anti-militaristic approach to the Soviet Union, and foreign policy in general, later in his career, but if they only knew how truly reactionary his views were (more like Henry Adams than Henry Wallace), his name would be unmentionable. But it seems he was smart enough not to leave any smoking guns, or at least cloud them in such a wave of literary references, circumlocution, etc., as to deprive anyone with an axe to grind of usable ammunition.
Many people with left sympathies took (and maybe still take, if he is remembered at all) great comfort in hearing Kennan, who was supposedly a non-ideological expert, endorse a somewhat more conciliatory and anti-militaristic approach to the Soviet Union, and foreign policy in general, later in his career, but if they only knew how truly reactionary his views were (more like Henry Adams than Henry Wallace), his name would be unmentionable. But it seems he was smart enough not to leave any smoking guns, or at least cloud them in such a wave of literary references, circumlocution, etc., as to deprive anyone with an axe to grind of usable ammunition.
March 25, 2017
Extremely thorough biography of George Kennan, the intellectual architect of containment. Oddly enough, the book left me disliking Kennan more and less convinced of the importance of his role in establishing U.S. Cold War strategy. He got the big picture right in his famous "Long Telegram" and Mr. X article--but more often than not his judgment of numerous contemporary crises during his life seems to have been wrong. This is a well-written but dense book--I would recommend it for people very interested in U.S. diplomatic history and strategy in the 20th century.
January 11, 2016
For those of us who are interested in global affairs, John Lewis Gaddis has written a marvelous biography of the diplomat George F. Kennan. A former U.S. ambassador to Russia, Kennan, an expert on that country, died in 2005 at the age of 101, having served his country in various diplomatic posts, including Moscow and Belgrade in the former Yugoslavia.
We have almost forgotten how terrifying were the 1960's and other years in the long Cold War with the Soviet Union. The world came perilously close to nuclear catastrophe several times, as the two superpowers jockeyed for power. Yet the catastrophe was avoided. Diplomats like Kennan are part of the reason. Kennan was not always right, but he often was. His wisdom about not being drawn into war when American interests are not directly affected rings true today, in our struggle with terrorists. He recognized the limits of our resources and that we should husband them with care.
Kennan reckoned that our best defense was to be a nation that lived the truths we have preached in our better moments: freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the avoidance of seeking more power than necessary. He worried that the public often undermined its best interests by yielding to rampant consumerism. He feared we pandered to excessive emotionalism and neglected to spend the time to understand complex issues.
We cannot, he believed, right all wrongs, but rather “distinguish lesser from greater evils.” We should strive to be true to our ideals and in that way be an example that others might aspire to.
We have almost forgotten how terrifying were the 1960's and other years in the long Cold War with the Soviet Union. The world came perilously close to nuclear catastrophe several times, as the two superpowers jockeyed for power. Yet the catastrophe was avoided. Diplomats like Kennan are part of the reason. Kennan was not always right, but he often was. His wisdom about not being drawn into war when American interests are not directly affected rings true today, in our struggle with terrorists. He recognized the limits of our resources and that we should husband them with care.
Kennan reckoned that our best defense was to be a nation that lived the truths we have preached in our better moments: freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the avoidance of seeking more power than necessary. He worried that the public often undermined its best interests by yielding to rampant consumerism. He feared we pandered to excessive emotionalism and neglected to spend the time to understand complex issues.
We cannot, he believed, right all wrongs, but rather “distinguish lesser from greater evils.” We should strive to be true to our ideals and in that way be an example that others might aspire to.
May 17, 2014
Advice by and for the Middle-aged former Liberal Arts Major
Nobody warned me about growing older, which is to say, of course they did, I just didn't listen. In any case, I don't think any of the advice was very practical. I write you today in part to repair this lamentable situation.
When you reach a certain age you realize, on your way to your job at the Olive Garden, that you haven't thought about certain historical figures in months, even years. Soon after, you realize that your knowledge of said historical figures (once so voluminous that you could speedily empty a dorm room by deploying only a fraction of it) has been reduced to a comparative nubbins during the long years of pre-early-bird-special napkin folding. The question: how to refresh your knowledge of history geekery while still earning your crust?
Answer: Listen to long, long biographies of beloved (to you) historical figures on unabridged audio book. The advantages are many. First of all, a thirty-one-hour (in this case) reading of a 700+-page-biography costs the same on Audible as the latest five-hour, 175-page thriller by whatever hack is cranking out the stuff to popular acclaim this year. That is what we used to call value for money.
Also, if you choose historical figures who interested you strangely in your younger days, you never have the problem of being lost in the narrative. If circs. demand, you can leave off the narrative for days or even weeks (Mother's Day weekend is a prolonged rush period at The Garden), secure in the knowledge that a fine liberal arts education has left you with an uneraseable timeline of, in this case, Kennan, etched indelibly on your brainpan. You can pick up with the thread again in 15 seconds, saying to yourself: “Oh, yeah, this is the bit where Dean Acheson treats Kennan like something Acheson found on the bottom of his shoe. I remember it well.”
There, that's my advice for the middle-aged former liberal arts major: Listen to long audio books on great historic figures, like this one (another example: FDR by Jean Smith). It won't give you the nest egg you should already have for your old age but don't, but it will make the commute to The Garden both more enjoyable and more edifying, plus, you never know when you might need to empty a room again.
Nobody warned me about growing older, which is to say, of course they did, I just didn't listen. In any case, I don't think any of the advice was very practical. I write you today in part to repair this lamentable situation.
When you reach a certain age you realize, on your way to your job at the Olive Garden, that you haven't thought about certain historical figures in months, even years. Soon after, you realize that your knowledge of said historical figures (once so voluminous that you could speedily empty a dorm room by deploying only a fraction of it) has been reduced to a comparative nubbins during the long years of pre-early-bird-special napkin folding. The question: how to refresh your knowledge of history geekery while still earning your crust?
Answer: Listen to long, long biographies of beloved (to you) historical figures on unabridged audio book. The advantages are many. First of all, a thirty-one-hour (in this case) reading of a 700+-page-biography costs the same on Audible as the latest five-hour, 175-page thriller by whatever hack is cranking out the stuff to popular acclaim this year. That is what we used to call value for money.
Also, if you choose historical figures who interested you strangely in your younger days, you never have the problem of being lost in the narrative. If circs. demand, you can leave off the narrative for days or even weeks (Mother's Day weekend is a prolonged rush period at The Garden), secure in the knowledge that a fine liberal arts education has left you with an uneraseable timeline of, in this case, Kennan, etched indelibly on your brainpan. You can pick up with the thread again in 15 seconds, saying to yourself: “Oh, yeah, this is the bit where Dean Acheson treats Kennan like something Acheson found on the bottom of his shoe. I remember it well.”
There, that's my advice for the middle-aged former liberal arts major: Listen to long audio books on great historic figures, like this one (another example: FDR by Jean Smith). It won't give you the nest egg you should already have for your old age but don't, but it will make the commute to The Garden both more enjoyable and more edifying, plus, you never know when you might need to empty a room again.
June 1, 2012
This is a fabulous biography of one of the most influential US diplomats ever that was written by the best and most readable historian of the Cold War. That made me wait attentively for this book to come out. It is a long book - nearly 700 pages - but it reads easily and I ended up not wanting to quit. The book works on many levels.
First, on a personal level, it is the story of a middle class kid from Milwaukee, with language aptitude, who ends up at Princeton and then joins the State Department, just as the modern more professional idea of the Foreign Service was developing. He decides to specialize in Russian and gets advanced training in Berlin. Then by some good fortune he is around just when the US was establishing its first embassy in the new Soviet Union and ends up doing most of the establishment work himself. His career takes off from there but it is intriguing how great careers get started. Of course there is some element of luck and happenstance, but he also seems to make enough good and thoughtful choices along the way to think he did not just stumble into his position.
A second aspect of the bio is the evolving role of the diplomat, who is the representative of his/her country is generally not a policy makers. The difference here was that nobody in power in the US seemed to know much about Stalin's Soviet Union and so ended up listening to Kennan. The tensions involved with Kennan serving as a diplomat but yearning to influence policy in spite of the bureaucracy is a central theme of the book. During this time, it should be noted, the modern US national security bureaucracy was evolving and had little precedent, short of the US domestic militarization during the last year of WWI.
A third story line of the book is the growth of Kennan as an intellectual - a thinker. To become influential you need to have something you wish to say, even if you have the right credentials and wind up where the action is. Kennan is justly famous for his "long telegram" and the subsequent "X" article in Foreign Affairs. These papers established the intellectual foundation for US poliy to the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War - a policy that moved between the extremes of war on the one hand and appeasement on the other. The outcome of the Cold War post 1989 suggests that Kennan basically called it correctly, over forty years before it happened!
A fourth story is the broader global political/military environment of the Cold War. Gaddis is very knowledgeable and thoughtful and weaves the micro and macro stories together well. There is lots of history going on, however. Kennan lived to be over 100. This was also covered a few years ago in a joint bio of Kennan and Paul Nitze in the book "The Hawk and the Dove" -- although Kannan and Nitze agreed on some matters and Kennan was not really a Dove at all.
A final story line that should be noted follows his marriage. Kennan married well with a partner who enabled him to reach greatness. Their marriage lasted over 70 years ! Gaddis brings out many of the dynamics but does not go into detail on Kennan's failings - of which there were a few.
This book is well written and extremely thoughtful. It is clear that Gaddis has thought a lot about Kennan. The interesting issue here is that Kennan lived a long time and Gaddis did not want to publish until after his death, which did not come for a while. There were queries about whether he would outlast his subject.
These comments only scratch the surface. This is one of the best biographies I have ever read and its subject was a real titan. Well worth the read!
A final major
First, on a personal level, it is the story of a middle class kid from Milwaukee, with language aptitude, who ends up at Princeton and then joins the State Department, just as the modern more professional idea of the Foreign Service was developing. He decides to specialize in Russian and gets advanced training in Berlin. Then by some good fortune he is around just when the US was establishing its first embassy in the new Soviet Union and ends up doing most of the establishment work himself. His career takes off from there but it is intriguing how great careers get started. Of course there is some element of luck and happenstance, but he also seems to make enough good and thoughtful choices along the way to think he did not just stumble into his position.
A second aspect of the bio is the evolving role of the diplomat, who is the representative of his/her country is generally not a policy makers. The difference here was that nobody in power in the US seemed to know much about Stalin's Soviet Union and so ended up listening to Kennan. The tensions involved with Kennan serving as a diplomat but yearning to influence policy in spite of the bureaucracy is a central theme of the book. During this time, it should be noted, the modern US national security bureaucracy was evolving and had little precedent, short of the US domestic militarization during the last year of WWI.
A third story line of the book is the growth of Kennan as an intellectual - a thinker. To become influential you need to have something you wish to say, even if you have the right credentials and wind up where the action is. Kennan is justly famous for his "long telegram" and the subsequent "X" article in Foreign Affairs. These papers established the intellectual foundation for US poliy to the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War - a policy that moved between the extremes of war on the one hand and appeasement on the other. The outcome of the Cold War post 1989 suggests that Kennan basically called it correctly, over forty years before it happened!
A fourth story is the broader global political/military environment of the Cold War. Gaddis is very knowledgeable and thoughtful and weaves the micro and macro stories together well. There is lots of history going on, however. Kennan lived to be over 100. This was also covered a few years ago in a joint bio of Kennan and Paul Nitze in the book "The Hawk and the Dove" -- although Kannan and Nitze agreed on some matters and Kennan was not really a Dove at all.
A final story line that should be noted follows his marriage. Kennan married well with a partner who enabled him to reach greatness. Their marriage lasted over 70 years ! Gaddis brings out many of the dynamics but does not go into detail on Kennan's failings - of which there were a few.
This book is well written and extremely thoughtful. It is clear that Gaddis has thought a lot about Kennan. The interesting issue here is that Kennan lived a long time and Gaddis did not want to publish until after his death, which did not come for a while. There were queries about whether he would outlast his subject.
These comments only scratch the surface. This is one of the best biographies I have ever read and its subject was a real titan. Well worth the read!
A final major
November 16, 2015
With how large the Federal government has grown since the New Deal and World War II, it has become very rare for any bureaucrat working in that system to be able to make any kind of significant impact on policy without credit being taken by more senior officials or work being lost in the milieu of democratic and bureaucratic politics. George Kennan, with his years of service in Russia with the State Department's Foreign Service, his legendary Long Telegram and "Mr. X" article in Foreign Affairs , and his creation of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, is one of those few legendary figures. But Mr. Kennan could also be incredibly inconsistent and self-flagellating over the years, making it difficult to get at the heart of what he truly believed. Thus, any biography on Mr. Kennan would be difficult under the best circumstances. However, Mr. Gaddis does an impeccable job of weaving Mr. Kennan's life, career, writings, and thoughts together. But the best thing about this biography is that Mr. Gaddis never divorces Mr. Kennan from his historical and personal context. For example, Mr. Kennan was notoriously declared persona non grata as American Ambassador to the Soviet Union by the Kremlin in 1952 due to some incredibly bone-headed remarks he gave about life in Russia while visiting Berlin. Many of Kennan's contemporaries had no idea why he would say something so outrageous and others may have dismissed it as a public relations snafu. But Mr. Gaddis shows how Mr. Kennan's brief and frustrating tenure as ambassador opened the door for such remarks and how it was more where he said it than what he said that irritated the Kremlin. This is just one small example of how Mr. Gaddis weaves Mr. Kennan's life with the his historical & personal context. This is probably due to the fact that Mr. Gaddis had access to Mr. Kennan, his papers, diaries, letters, and family members for such a long period of time before the subject's death and the book's publication (He became Kennan's biographer in 1981, Kennan died in 2005, and this book was first published in 2011). One interesting oversight(?) though is in regards to Kennan's infidelities. It is clear from this book that one of Mr. Kennan's weaknesses was a wandering eye towards the opposite sex, a fact that Mr. Kennan flogged himself over throughout his life. And it does seem clear that Mr. Kennan had at least one affair, but Mr. Gaddis never goes into details about it, nor does he dig any deeper into other potential affairs Mr. Kennan might have had. In a day and age where there seems to be no shame about uncovering the intimate details about a person's life (ex. we now know Presidents Harding and Johnson had nicknames for their penises), this is rather unusual and, dare I say, refreshing. After all, not everything needs to be exposed to the light of day. In short, this is a fine biography that deftly weaves its way through the life, work, and thoughts of a most complicated, but important, public figure in American history.
January 6, 2013
Strangely, most reviews of this book center on Kennan instead of Gaddis. In any case, the biography is informative and sympathetic, making allowances for Kennan's solipsism while never excusing his errors and misconceptions. It sits with American Prometheus as the best biographies I have had the pleasure or reading.
February 8, 2023
Really long but amazing look at a very important American. It took a sobering look at the way his genius was driven by his emotional ups and downs. He was a part of so many historic events and actually on the ground when that history was being made, highly recommended to anyone that loves history and international relations.
April 3, 2017
One of America's most famous diplomats, George Kennan lived an incredibly long life (1904-2005) during which he saw an amazing amount of important changes, places, and people. John Lewis Gaddis is able to capture all of this life in a well-researched biography that takes full advantage of having complete access to all of Kennan's papers - both public and private - as well as his voluminous diary entries (Kennan kept a diary, more on than off, 1916-2003) and even a notebook that he kept detailing disturbing or odd dreams that he had. Kennan had chosen Gaddis as his official biographer, but in a refreshing break from usual procedure, imposed the condition that Gaddis not complete the biography until after Kennan had died - thereby freeing Gaddis to write unencumbered. Kennan did not pressure Gaddis to make the book favorable or not, simply to write it as he saw it.
Gaddis' use of Kennan's almost never-ending correspondence, speeches, and diary entries, as well as multiple lengthy interviews with Kennan himself and his wife Annelise, gives the book a comprehensive feel. Given Kennan's longevity and with his career taking him to so many important places, this is hard to do. Gaddis' specialty is Cold War history, and it shows as he is in command of both his subject and the issues that dominated his subject's life. He clearly respects Kennan, as most people who encountered him did even if they disagreed with his policies and thinking (and there were many people who did), but he is also able to maintain a sensible detachment throughout most of the book, not hesitating to bring to the fore Kennan's faults or mistakes, oftentimes questioning his judgment or behavior.
Kennan started his foreign service career in the 1920s, after enduring a somewhat lonely childhood (Kennan never knew his mother as she died when he very young; his dad was distant) in Milwaukee and then transferring that loneliness with him to Princeton. Kennan attempted to resign from the Foreign Service many times over the years but, through some fluke or another, ended up staying on and becoming the country's foremost Russian expert. Kennan had a remarkable ease with languages, quickly learning to speak German and Russian, as well as several other languages, fluently. Even Josef Stalin commented on how excellent Kennan's Russian was.
Kennan had a propensity to run afoul of the policymakers in Washington, even when he was one himself as head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Kennan usually brought a long-range view to American foreign policy but at the expense of practicality and political considerations. Many of his predictions turned out to be correct, but he was ahead of his time. For instance, he accurately determined that the Soviet Union would collapse after first failing to keep an iron hand on its Eastern European satellites. The only president that he had a close relationship with was John F. Kennedy, despite also working for FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower. Gaddis astutely points out that Kennan's affection for Kennedy came not so much for the policies that Kennedy espoused (Kennan thought that JFK too easily acceded to Congress and American political necessities) but that Kennedy frequently sought his counsel and paid attention to him in a way that none of the other presidents ever bothered to do (this included Nixon and George Bush who both had high regard for him).
Why I didn't give this book a higher rating has little to do with Gaddis. There were a few things that I wish he would have discussed more: why Kennan played no role whatsoever in the Nixon administration despite being respected by Nixon and having a mutual high regard for Henry Kissinger, even lunching occasionally with Kissinger. Also, what happened to Kennan's relationship with Dean Acheson after the latter viciously criticized him publicly in 1958 following the Reith Series lectures. Despite working so closely together a decade before, Gaddis does not mention Acheson again. But the main reason this gets three stars is due to the subject himself: Kennan was one gloomy and, Gaddis uses the word "brooding", individual. Even when he had successes, he could not allow himself to enjoy them. He had a devoted wife, yet apparently had numerous affairs. He understood Russia better than many Russians probably did, yet seemed like a fish out of water when living in and talking about his own country. After awhile, it becomes annoying, then depressing.
Recommended for anyone interested in Cold War history, U.S.-Russian relations, or State Department policy formation immediately after WWII.
Grade: B
Gaddis' use of Kennan's almost never-ending correspondence, speeches, and diary entries, as well as multiple lengthy interviews with Kennan himself and his wife Annelise, gives the book a comprehensive feel. Given Kennan's longevity and with his career taking him to so many important places, this is hard to do. Gaddis' specialty is Cold War history, and it shows as he is in command of both his subject and the issues that dominated his subject's life. He clearly respects Kennan, as most people who encountered him did even if they disagreed with his policies and thinking (and there were many people who did), but he is also able to maintain a sensible detachment throughout most of the book, not hesitating to bring to the fore Kennan's faults or mistakes, oftentimes questioning his judgment or behavior.
Kennan started his foreign service career in the 1920s, after enduring a somewhat lonely childhood (Kennan never knew his mother as she died when he very young; his dad was distant) in Milwaukee and then transferring that loneliness with him to Princeton. Kennan attempted to resign from the Foreign Service many times over the years but, through some fluke or another, ended up staying on and becoming the country's foremost Russian expert. Kennan had a remarkable ease with languages, quickly learning to speak German and Russian, as well as several other languages, fluently. Even Josef Stalin commented on how excellent Kennan's Russian was.
Kennan had a propensity to run afoul of the policymakers in Washington, even when he was one himself as head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Kennan usually brought a long-range view to American foreign policy but at the expense of practicality and political considerations. Many of his predictions turned out to be correct, but he was ahead of his time. For instance, he accurately determined that the Soviet Union would collapse after first failing to keep an iron hand on its Eastern European satellites. The only president that he had a close relationship with was John F. Kennedy, despite also working for FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower. Gaddis astutely points out that Kennan's affection for Kennedy came not so much for the policies that Kennedy espoused (Kennan thought that JFK too easily acceded to Congress and American political necessities) but that Kennedy frequently sought his counsel and paid attention to him in a way that none of the other presidents ever bothered to do (this included Nixon and George Bush who both had high regard for him).
Why I didn't give this book a higher rating has little to do with Gaddis. There were a few things that I wish he would have discussed more: why Kennan played no role whatsoever in the Nixon administration despite being respected by Nixon and having a mutual high regard for Henry Kissinger, even lunching occasionally with Kissinger. Also, what happened to Kennan's relationship with Dean Acheson after the latter viciously criticized him publicly in 1958 following the Reith Series lectures. Despite working so closely together a decade before, Gaddis does not mention Acheson again. But the main reason this gets three stars is due to the subject himself: Kennan was one gloomy and, Gaddis uses the word "brooding", individual. Even when he had successes, he could not allow himself to enjoy them. He had a devoted wife, yet apparently had numerous affairs. He understood Russia better than many Russians probably did, yet seemed like a fish out of water when living in and talking about his own country. After awhile, it becomes annoying, then depressing.
Recommended for anyone interested in Cold War history, U.S.-Russian relations, or State Department policy formation immediately after WWII.
Grade: B
January 3, 2015
Hard to imagine anyone will top this study of Kennan, one of the most impressive American diplomats, and definitely the most important of the Cold War era.
December 31, 2018
George F. Kennan: An American Life
I learned a lot from this authorized biography, the author was given "unrestricted access" to Kennan's journals, writings, and personal friends with the understanding that this book would be published after his death.
Kennan's thoughts and work have much to offer 2014 as we see an inter-Slavic conflict in Ukraine as well as the U.S. battling Islamic extremists in Iraq and Syria. Kennan would have understood very well Former Secretary of State Clinton's criticisms of the President for not having a coherent, consistent foreign policy. But he would also have been sympathetic to FDR's struggle with a hostile congress just as he was with JFK's struggles with Congress. After the breakup of the USSR, Kennan had argued for its non-alignment with NATO and criticized NATO expansion to Eastern Europe in the 1990s as unnecessarily provocative. He would probably see the current conflict as inevitable given the tensions that had built up. He would also see Putin's strongarm tactics as continuation of Russian history. Kennan was one of the first to recognize that the USSR was just the latest face on the flow of Russian history, led by strong autocrats with empirical ambitions and deep phobias about the Western world. He noted that dispatches written by diplomat Neal Brown from Russia in the 1850s could have just as easily been written in the 1950s, very little had changed.
But Kennan always quoted John Adams on foreign policy: Don't go abroad looking for monsters to destroy. The U.S. should be strong and set a definitive alternative vision for the world in contrast to Soviets, Islamic extremists, etc. Fight for freedom and democracy where feasible, but not every monster was a Hitler and some conflicts (like Vietnam, which he was fervently against) are best left avoided. Military strategy should be made concordant with political policy, and this is a theme I saw echoed in Robert Gates' recent memoir.
Kennan essentially had three fathers: His own, George Kennan (one of the first Americans to widely travel Russia and the Caucasus) who was Kennan's grandfather's cousin but shared both his birthday, name, and affinity for Russia, and Chekov. Every man has suffered a wound that shaped his development, Kennan's came from the loss of his mother in his infancy and rejection by family members-- including the above George Kennan's wife who made sure her husband had nothing to do with him (a shame, really). Nonetheless he was a "happy child" and a "normal boy" who got his first taste of overseas life (and learned fluent German) when his family lived in Germany for a time. From that he developed an appreciation of foreign culture and a wanderlust.
After a military high school, Kennan barely makes it into Princeton and wrote mix feelings about it, mainly finding it "homogenous" and remarks on the lack of foreigners or broader world view. He begins writing letters to his sister while at school, a lifelong endeavor that would be the source for many of his memories in this book. He got passport, took a boat to Europe one summer and fell upon the mercy of the U.S. consulate in Italy. After returning, he graduated from Princeton in 1925 and joins the newly-formed Foreign Service. After passing his exams, he is posted to Geneva, then Hamburg. Not enamored with complaints and lives of expats, he fell in love with a girl, and wanted to resign and also pursue graduate studies.
Kennan as bored, frustrated, physically exhausted, and cynical is a recurring theme. He often grows whimsical about doing other things, like farming, writing, or teaching. He is usually given a way out and a new chapter begins. This time, the FS sent to US for 6 months of leave where he elected to join a new program to train in critical languages-- he chose Russian in part out of family affiliation, even though the elder Kennan would have little to do with him. He was then stationed in Talinn, Estonia.
While studying in Germany, Kennan passes his Russian exam and marries a Swedish girl (Anna Sorensen). The Depression hits, bankrupting his parents, and Kennan begins to write very pessimistically about civilization. This would continue throughout his life. While professional and stable at home and the office, Kennan is crankily pessimistic, insecure, and often depressed. From 1931-1936, Kennan would be a part of the first U.S. diplomatic mission to Moscow after FDR officially normalized relations with the USSR in 1932. Kennan became one of State Department's most respected Russian experts. When FDR negotiated diplomatic recognition of Moscow in 1932, Kennan warned that Russians would break any agreements signed. This would also be a recurring theme of 20th century history.
While Kennan made a decent salary, he was often physically ill, could not stand working for political appointee ambassadors, and received a transfer to Jerusalem only to later be sent back to Moscow when the State Department reorganized its affairs. The depth at which the Soviets had penetrated the State Department and other branches of government during this time was truly remarkable and disturbing. Kennan was definitely anti-McCarthy but recognized areas where he saw Soviet influence.
Kennan is the ultimate expatriate, who knows one can never truly go home again. While he loves America, he also loathes its bad characteristics increasingly on every home visit. Kennan was fluent in Russian and well-versed in its history but remarkably ignorant of U.S. history. In 1938 he writes of how America needs a stronger central government led by elites with women and blacks kept from voting. It echoes the "Gentleman" concept of the late 1700s and the Founding Fathers but the author doesn't mention this; Kennan was just ignorant of previous American thought. Kennan later softens after seeing the brutality of fascism, Stalin's purges, and other acts of brutality by non-democratic governments. But he hopes America can rebuild from the Depression in such a way that the proletariat doesn't take the reigns as they did under Hitler in Germany. His journal writings come across as fairly anti-semitic, but he did work to get Jews out of Eastern Europe and Germany before America entered World War II, something he did not get much credit for.
Kennan is stationed in Prague during early days of the war and witnesses Nazi occupation. His wife's father was tortured by Germans when they took over Norway. Kennan Meets Germans in Prague who are against Hitler, but little anyone can do. He found the hypocrisy of the German army toward the Jews detestable. Kennan had missed the Soviet-Nazi pact, didn't forsee it. He is transferred to Berlin where he is later interred with other Americans after Pearl Harbor. While in Berlin, Kennan had affairs, which led his wife to leave kids with sister in U.S. and return to Europe. The details of Kennan's affairs are always a mystery but he has a roving eye his entire life, despite loving his wife. After being released, Kennan is stationed in Portugal where he negotiates on behalf of FDR for the use of Portugese land and bases. Eventually, he returns to Moscow under Ambassador Harriman. He is disturbed by the Roosevelt administration's lack of concern with human rights, especially with how FDR quashed talk of Polish mistreatment by Russia for election purposes. Kennan called Russia correctly, writing that they cared/talked only of international cooperation when they needed Western assistance, otherwise it was about grabbing power. Kennan warned various administrations not to let atomic knowledge fall into hands of Soviets for this reason.
Kennan again grows frustrated and weary. He tried again to resign in 1945 but was discouraged by his superiors because of his expertise and value. After Stalin's 1946 speech denouncing rest of the world, Kennan wrote "the long telegram," and 8,000 word document that essentially explained Soviet policy and established U.S. policy in addressing it. This made Kennan famous in Washington and then England and USSR compelled own ambassadors to write similar reports. It essentially launched Kennan's modern career. However, in 1947 he again wanted to resign again from foreign service, felt he could only do so much as diplomat. He had traveled Russia, Siberia (for his namesake) and seen more of the country and read more of its literature than any other American. Eventually, he was given an appointment at the newly-established War College in D.C., being paid well and able to teach/lecture to Army, Navy, and FSOs. Was making $15,000, a decent sum for the time.
An article penned anonymously by him appeared in the July 1947 edition of Foreign Affairs that outlined a policy of containment, which essentially became the Truman Doctrine. Kennan, more than any other diplomat before or since, had shaped U.S. foreign policy for the century. Kennan worked Worked under Sec. of State Marshall, and I enjoyed that this book gave me a different chapter on Marshall after reading Thomas Ricks' The Generals which focused much on Marshall's leadership and management style. Kennan helped craft the Marshall Plan, basically saying that U.S. policy should be to confront Russia on every front politically, even clandestinely. His recommendations in regards to Yugoslavia and China were also accepted-- China was to be left alone. Kennan was even sent to Japan and did brilliant end-run around McArthur and his "psychophants." He recommended independence for Japan along with aid, like Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan took Stalin by surprise.
However, in 1948 Kennan began a "great reversal," going back on previous recommendations after becoming alarmed by the U.S.'s increasingly militarized response to Soviet aggression and fear of a third World War. Kennan had recommended pushing for a unified, neutral Germany and wanted to formulate an end of the Cold War rather than it go on indefinitely.
He was Director of Policy Planning-- and the book shows importance of this role in light of today. In 1949 Dean Acheson replaces Marshall as Secretary of State. Kennan advocates separating Communism from Russian Emperialism, which would help isolate Kremlin from places like Tito's Yugoslavia. He also recommends supporting Tito's communism as affront to Kremlin. However, many in Congress do not distinguish "good communists" from "bad communists" and Kennan's views are out-of-step again. He comes to loathe McCarthyism and the far right-wing of the Republican party. Sec. Acheson viewed Russian threat as primarily military and disregarded much of Kennan's policy advice. Kennan believed the Russian people would eventually "come around," and generally wanted peace, but was pessimistic that a peaceful outcome would be reached by the powers.
Kennan befriends Robert Oppenheimer and worked for the Institute for Advanced Study, writing and lecturing. Both Kennan and Oppenheimer publicly opposed developing a hydrogen bomb, convinced they would be used if they were ever made. He got onto the Princeton faculty with some considerable controversy and eventually his published books are acclaimed enough to justify his position there. Kennan also sponsored Russian dissident organizations, helping exiles get incorporated into American life. He published book, a "realist" view of foreign policy based on his surprisingly very popular lectures at U. of Chicago. Kennan's works would win a couple Pulitzer prizes. While lecturing at Princeton, he advises the State Dept. to negotiate an end to the Korean War. Kennan ends up being the conduit the Soviets choose to send the message--the Russians told him in a private meeting that they urged N. Korea & China to accept American truce proposal. This earned Kennan more favor with the Truman Administration, and Kennan is appointed Ambassador to the USSR in 1951.
Kennan found life in Moscow harder, like being in prison. He was lonely and isolated. At one point he requested the CIA provide him with suicide pills ostensibly because he thought war was inevitable, didn't want to be tortured and put in solitary. He also possibly had an affair and feared the news leaking. His wife eventually was able to come and didn't find it so intolerable. Kennan took everything personally, thought Stalin was out for him; indeed he was given a test by a fake dissident proposing assassination. Like a later Ambassador McFaul, Kennan made statements that enraged Kremlin and was banned. Kennan said his ambassadorship reminded him of his internment in Berlin (said while in Berlin). This comparison with the Nazis engraged the Kremlin and it Seems Stalin himself made the call to banish him.
Kennan eventually retired in 1953. He was succeeded in Moscow by Charles Bohlen, who was a long-time colleague and intellectual adversary that was also seen as too much of an "appeaser." Bohlen was later demoted, forced out in 1957, and Kennan had to defend him and others from accusations of collaboration with the Communists. Kennan lives the life of an expatriate and scholar. He becomes critical, almost spiteful, of his own country and its faults. "I didn't leave my country. It left me."
After Kennedy's election, Kennan is consulted for advice by JFK, who would meet with him 14 times in his Administration and exchange many letters. JFK gives Kennan the choice of ambassodorships, Poland or Yugoslavia, and Kennan chooses Yugoslavia. JFK pushes a crucial Trade Act through Congress, but the conservatives strip provisions in the bill that would maintain Poland and Yugoslavia's most favored nation status, something that would be a brutal blow to those countries. JFK gave promises about aid to Poland, Yugoslavia, but reneges. Kennan himself had lobbied Congress in person and made calls from Yugoslavia. JFK even promises to criticize while signing, and further reneges. Oddly, Kennan did not fault the President for not keeping his word, or the political situation. Domestic politics wins, and JFK wanted to look tough on communism. JFK later meets with Tito and apologizes while Kennan resigns his post. Kennan writes an article for Foreign Affairs on how the lack JFK's foreign policy is actually the fault of a paralyzing Congress eager to block the President at all turns (sounds familiar). LBJ is mentioned only briefly and comes across as distant, brooding.
The Kennans became world travelers while George lectured and wrote his memoirs. He also cultivated "friendships" with various ladies, including Stalin's daughter who defected in India. He became increasingly concerned about policy toward Southeast Asia and testifies before Congress (on national television) against intervention in Vietnam, which polls showed actually swayed public opinion.
Kissinger spoke highly of Kennan and Kennan had apparently tracked Kissinger's intellectual progress. Kennan was initially critical of detante but supported the idea of greater dialogue. Natan Sharansky (whose Case for Democracy I remember) and Alexander Solzhenitsyn later widely criticized Kennan. I would agree with them on this point, according to dissidents life got better for them when the U.S. took a harder line; it got worse when it got what it wanted through detant. Kennan was criticized for lack of moral clarity, but Kennan believed the U.S. could have little impact on what USSR did with its citizens. He appears to misjudge the U.S.'s influence on this point.
Reagan oddly enough echoed Kennan's writing, speeches, and policy-- negotiating arms reduction with USSR, but Kennan gave him no credit and was constantly critical. The author contrasts this with Kennan's affections for JFK who lied and did nothing, while Reagan actually opened dialogues and reduced the danger. Kennan was simply more cranky and vain in his old age. He probably hated Reagan for being from movies and ads, part of what he hated about America. He still assumed nuclear war inevitable.
To understand Kennan's worldview one need read a lot of Russian literature, primarily Chekov, along with Carl Von Clausewitz and Gibbon's Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire. Gibbon's work was instructive in developing Kennan's thoughts on the USSR. He felt that, like Rome, the Soviets had conquered too widely and spread their defenses too thin. Eventually the Soviet bloc territories and sattelites would be too expensive to maintain.
One weakness of this book is the lack of mention of hardly anything else in the State Department at this time, and how Kennan's work influenced other Russian/Soviet policy experts who came afterward. I would look for that aspect in another book, this one solely focuses on the man and his immediate impacts.
I give this book 4.5 stars and recommend it, especially to those interested in foreign policy vis a vis Russia.
I learned a lot from this authorized biography, the author was given "unrestricted access" to Kennan's journals, writings, and personal friends with the understanding that this book would be published after his death.
Kennan's thoughts and work have much to offer 2014 as we see an inter-Slavic conflict in Ukraine as well as the U.S. battling Islamic extremists in Iraq and Syria. Kennan would have understood very well Former Secretary of State Clinton's criticisms of the President for not having a coherent, consistent foreign policy. But he would also have been sympathetic to FDR's struggle with a hostile congress just as he was with JFK's struggles with Congress. After the breakup of the USSR, Kennan had argued for its non-alignment with NATO and criticized NATO expansion to Eastern Europe in the 1990s as unnecessarily provocative. He would probably see the current conflict as inevitable given the tensions that had built up. He would also see Putin's strongarm tactics as continuation of Russian history. Kennan was one of the first to recognize that the USSR was just the latest face on the flow of Russian history, led by strong autocrats with empirical ambitions and deep phobias about the Western world. He noted that dispatches written by diplomat Neal Brown from Russia in the 1850s could have just as easily been written in the 1950s, very little had changed.
But Kennan always quoted John Adams on foreign policy: Don't go abroad looking for monsters to destroy. The U.S. should be strong and set a definitive alternative vision for the world in contrast to Soviets, Islamic extremists, etc. Fight for freedom and democracy where feasible, but not every monster was a Hitler and some conflicts (like Vietnam, which he was fervently against) are best left avoided. Military strategy should be made concordant with political policy, and this is a theme I saw echoed in Robert Gates' recent memoir.
Kennan essentially had three fathers: His own, George Kennan (one of the first Americans to widely travel Russia and the Caucasus) who was Kennan's grandfather's cousin but shared both his birthday, name, and affinity for Russia, and Chekov. Every man has suffered a wound that shaped his development, Kennan's came from the loss of his mother in his infancy and rejection by family members-- including the above George Kennan's wife who made sure her husband had nothing to do with him (a shame, really). Nonetheless he was a "happy child" and a "normal boy" who got his first taste of overseas life (and learned fluent German) when his family lived in Germany for a time. From that he developed an appreciation of foreign culture and a wanderlust.
After a military high school, Kennan barely makes it into Princeton and wrote mix feelings about it, mainly finding it "homogenous" and remarks on the lack of foreigners or broader world view. He begins writing letters to his sister while at school, a lifelong endeavor that would be the source for many of his memories in this book. He got passport, took a boat to Europe one summer and fell upon the mercy of the U.S. consulate in Italy. After returning, he graduated from Princeton in 1925 and joins the newly-formed Foreign Service. After passing his exams, he is posted to Geneva, then Hamburg. Not enamored with complaints and lives of expats, he fell in love with a girl, and wanted to resign and also pursue graduate studies.
Kennan as bored, frustrated, physically exhausted, and cynical is a recurring theme. He often grows whimsical about doing other things, like farming, writing, or teaching. He is usually given a way out and a new chapter begins. This time, the FS sent to US for 6 months of leave where he elected to join a new program to train in critical languages-- he chose Russian in part out of family affiliation, even though the elder Kennan would have little to do with him. He was then stationed in Talinn, Estonia.
While studying in Germany, Kennan passes his Russian exam and marries a Swedish girl (Anna Sorensen). The Depression hits, bankrupting his parents, and Kennan begins to write very pessimistically about civilization. This would continue throughout his life. While professional and stable at home and the office, Kennan is crankily pessimistic, insecure, and often depressed. From 1931-1936, Kennan would be a part of the first U.S. diplomatic mission to Moscow after FDR officially normalized relations with the USSR in 1932. Kennan became one of State Department's most respected Russian experts. When FDR negotiated diplomatic recognition of Moscow in 1932, Kennan warned that Russians would break any agreements signed. This would also be a recurring theme of 20th century history.
While Kennan made a decent salary, he was often physically ill, could not stand working for political appointee ambassadors, and received a transfer to Jerusalem only to later be sent back to Moscow when the State Department reorganized its affairs. The depth at which the Soviets had penetrated the State Department and other branches of government during this time was truly remarkable and disturbing. Kennan was definitely anti-McCarthy but recognized areas where he saw Soviet influence.
Kennan is the ultimate expatriate, who knows one can never truly go home again. While he loves America, he also loathes its bad characteristics increasingly on every home visit. Kennan was fluent in Russian and well-versed in its history but remarkably ignorant of U.S. history. In 1938 he writes of how America needs a stronger central government led by elites with women and blacks kept from voting. It echoes the "Gentleman" concept of the late 1700s and the Founding Fathers but the author doesn't mention this; Kennan was just ignorant of previous American thought. Kennan later softens after seeing the brutality of fascism, Stalin's purges, and other acts of brutality by non-democratic governments. But he hopes America can rebuild from the Depression in such a way that the proletariat doesn't take the reigns as they did under Hitler in Germany. His journal writings come across as fairly anti-semitic, but he did work to get Jews out of Eastern Europe and Germany before America entered World War II, something he did not get much credit for.
Kennan is stationed in Prague during early days of the war and witnesses Nazi occupation. His wife's father was tortured by Germans when they took over Norway. Kennan Meets Germans in Prague who are against Hitler, but little anyone can do. He found the hypocrisy of the German army toward the Jews detestable. Kennan had missed the Soviet-Nazi pact, didn't forsee it. He is transferred to Berlin where he is later interred with other Americans after Pearl Harbor. While in Berlin, Kennan had affairs, which led his wife to leave kids with sister in U.S. and return to Europe. The details of Kennan's affairs are always a mystery but he has a roving eye his entire life, despite loving his wife. After being released, Kennan is stationed in Portugal where he negotiates on behalf of FDR for the use of Portugese land and bases. Eventually, he returns to Moscow under Ambassador Harriman. He is disturbed by the Roosevelt administration's lack of concern with human rights, especially with how FDR quashed talk of Polish mistreatment by Russia for election purposes. Kennan called Russia correctly, writing that they cared/talked only of international cooperation when they needed Western assistance, otherwise it was about grabbing power. Kennan warned various administrations not to let atomic knowledge fall into hands of Soviets for this reason.
Kennan again grows frustrated and weary. He tried again to resign in 1945 but was discouraged by his superiors because of his expertise and value. After Stalin's 1946 speech denouncing rest of the world, Kennan wrote "the long telegram," and 8,000 word document that essentially explained Soviet policy and established U.S. policy in addressing it. This made Kennan famous in Washington and then England and USSR compelled own ambassadors to write similar reports. It essentially launched Kennan's modern career. However, in 1947 he again wanted to resign again from foreign service, felt he could only do so much as diplomat. He had traveled Russia, Siberia (for his namesake) and seen more of the country and read more of its literature than any other American. Eventually, he was given an appointment at the newly-established War College in D.C., being paid well and able to teach/lecture to Army, Navy, and FSOs. Was making $15,000, a decent sum for the time.
An article penned anonymously by him appeared in the July 1947 edition of Foreign Affairs that outlined a policy of containment, which essentially became the Truman Doctrine. Kennan, more than any other diplomat before or since, had shaped U.S. foreign policy for the century. Kennan worked Worked under Sec. of State Marshall, and I enjoyed that this book gave me a different chapter on Marshall after reading Thomas Ricks' The Generals which focused much on Marshall's leadership and management style. Kennan helped craft the Marshall Plan, basically saying that U.S. policy should be to confront Russia on every front politically, even clandestinely. His recommendations in regards to Yugoslavia and China were also accepted-- China was to be left alone. Kennan was even sent to Japan and did brilliant end-run around McArthur and his "psychophants." He recommended independence for Japan along with aid, like Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan took Stalin by surprise.
However, in 1948 Kennan began a "great reversal," going back on previous recommendations after becoming alarmed by the U.S.'s increasingly militarized response to Soviet aggression and fear of a third World War. Kennan had recommended pushing for a unified, neutral Germany and wanted to formulate an end of the Cold War rather than it go on indefinitely.
He was Director of Policy Planning-- and the book shows importance of this role in light of today. In 1949 Dean Acheson replaces Marshall as Secretary of State. Kennan advocates separating Communism from Russian Emperialism, which would help isolate Kremlin from places like Tito's Yugoslavia. He also recommends supporting Tito's communism as affront to Kremlin. However, many in Congress do not distinguish "good communists" from "bad communists" and Kennan's views are out-of-step again. He comes to loathe McCarthyism and the far right-wing of the Republican party. Sec. Acheson viewed Russian threat as primarily military and disregarded much of Kennan's policy advice. Kennan believed the Russian people would eventually "come around," and generally wanted peace, but was pessimistic that a peaceful outcome would be reached by the powers.
Kennan befriends Robert Oppenheimer and worked for the Institute for Advanced Study, writing and lecturing. Both Kennan and Oppenheimer publicly opposed developing a hydrogen bomb, convinced they would be used if they were ever made. He got onto the Princeton faculty with some considerable controversy and eventually his published books are acclaimed enough to justify his position there. Kennan also sponsored Russian dissident organizations, helping exiles get incorporated into American life. He published book, a "realist" view of foreign policy based on his surprisingly very popular lectures at U. of Chicago. Kennan's works would win a couple Pulitzer prizes. While lecturing at Princeton, he advises the State Dept. to negotiate an end to the Korean War. Kennan ends up being the conduit the Soviets choose to send the message--the Russians told him in a private meeting that they urged N. Korea & China to accept American truce proposal. This earned Kennan more favor with the Truman Administration, and Kennan is appointed Ambassador to the USSR in 1951.
Kennan found life in Moscow harder, like being in prison. He was lonely and isolated. At one point he requested the CIA provide him with suicide pills ostensibly because he thought war was inevitable, didn't want to be tortured and put in solitary. He also possibly had an affair and feared the news leaking. His wife eventually was able to come and didn't find it so intolerable. Kennan took everything personally, thought Stalin was out for him; indeed he was given a test by a fake dissident proposing assassination. Like a later Ambassador McFaul, Kennan made statements that enraged Kremlin and was banned. Kennan said his ambassadorship reminded him of his internment in Berlin (said while in Berlin). This comparison with the Nazis engraged the Kremlin and it Seems Stalin himself made the call to banish him.
Kennan eventually retired in 1953. He was succeeded in Moscow by Charles Bohlen, who was a long-time colleague and intellectual adversary that was also seen as too much of an "appeaser." Bohlen was later demoted, forced out in 1957, and Kennan had to defend him and others from accusations of collaboration with the Communists. Kennan lives the life of an expatriate and scholar. He becomes critical, almost spiteful, of his own country and its faults. "I didn't leave my country. It left me."
After Kennedy's election, Kennan is consulted for advice by JFK, who would meet with him 14 times in his Administration and exchange many letters. JFK gives Kennan the choice of ambassodorships, Poland or Yugoslavia, and Kennan chooses Yugoslavia. JFK pushes a crucial Trade Act through Congress, but the conservatives strip provisions in the bill that would maintain Poland and Yugoslavia's most favored nation status, something that would be a brutal blow to those countries. JFK gave promises about aid to Poland, Yugoslavia, but reneges. Kennan himself had lobbied Congress in person and made calls from Yugoslavia. JFK even promises to criticize while signing, and further reneges. Oddly, Kennan did not fault the President for not keeping his word, or the political situation. Domestic politics wins, and JFK wanted to look tough on communism. JFK later meets with Tito and apologizes while Kennan resigns his post. Kennan writes an article for Foreign Affairs on how the lack JFK's foreign policy is actually the fault of a paralyzing Congress eager to block the President at all turns (sounds familiar). LBJ is mentioned only briefly and comes across as distant, brooding.
The Kennans became world travelers while George lectured and wrote his memoirs. He also cultivated "friendships" with various ladies, including Stalin's daughter who defected in India. He became increasingly concerned about policy toward Southeast Asia and testifies before Congress (on national television) against intervention in Vietnam, which polls showed actually swayed public opinion.
Kissinger spoke highly of Kennan and Kennan had apparently tracked Kissinger's intellectual progress. Kennan was initially critical of detante but supported the idea of greater dialogue. Natan Sharansky (whose Case for Democracy I remember) and Alexander Solzhenitsyn later widely criticized Kennan. I would agree with them on this point, according to dissidents life got better for them when the U.S. took a harder line; it got worse when it got what it wanted through detant. Kennan was criticized for lack of moral clarity, but Kennan believed the U.S. could have little impact on what USSR did with its citizens. He appears to misjudge the U.S.'s influence on this point.
Reagan oddly enough echoed Kennan's writing, speeches, and policy-- negotiating arms reduction with USSR, but Kennan gave him no credit and was constantly critical. The author contrasts this with Kennan's affections for JFK who lied and did nothing, while Reagan actually opened dialogues and reduced the danger. Kennan was simply more cranky and vain in his old age. He probably hated Reagan for being from movies and ads, part of what he hated about America. He still assumed nuclear war inevitable.
To understand Kennan's worldview one need read a lot of Russian literature, primarily Chekov, along with Carl Von Clausewitz and Gibbon's Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire. Gibbon's work was instructive in developing Kennan's thoughts on the USSR. He felt that, like Rome, the Soviets had conquered too widely and spread their defenses too thin. Eventually the Soviet bloc territories and sattelites would be too expensive to maintain.
One weakness of this book is the lack of mention of hardly anything else in the State Department at this time, and how Kennan's work influenced other Russian/Soviet policy experts who came afterward. I would look for that aspect in another book, this one solely focuses on the man and his immediate impacts.
I give this book 4.5 stars and recommend it, especially to those interested in foreign policy vis a vis Russia.
September 25, 2019
George F. Kennan is one of America’s most storied titans of Cold War strategy and diplomacy in the 20th century, having played an almost unimaginably large role in writing policy on containing the Soviet Union and reconstructing Europe and Japan in the years following World War II. He was a key architect of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe along U.S.-desired ends. He outsmarted MacArthur in Japan. He served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. He pioneered the concept of covert operations to underwrite fledgling liberal democracies. He dispatched the most famous telegram in State Department history, which later appeared in the 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym “X.” The piece was entitled, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” and swept the country as the definitive work on Soviet behavior and containment.
And he was prolific. During his career, Kennan wrote 17 books, two of which earned Pulitzer’s. Historian Ronald Steel described him as “the nearest thing to a legend that this country's diplomatic service has ever produced.”
It’s impossible to look at U.S. diplomatic history in the last century without seeing Kennan’s fingerprints everywhere, and John Lewis Gaddis makes that clear.
But aside from hagiographic accounts of his diplomatic accomplishments, there’s a side to Kennan that has been buried in his official papers stored at Princeton: that he advocated for authoritarianism in America, that he wanted aggressive disenfranchisement, that he wanted women out of the public sphere, that he was skeptical of individualism and industrialized capitalism. Kennan fits no past or contemporary categories in American political life. He is a label to himself, and Gaddis captures this well.
In general, Gaddis’ writing is very engaging and penetrating, though it’s clear that the memoir is at least somewhat a result of back-and-forth negotiation between Gaddis and Kennan. After all, Kennan was very careful about access to his personal archives, if only because there were some papers he wrote that were inflammatory in the earlier part of the 20th century and much more so in the 21st. And that’s what I’m going to focus on here, since other reviews have discussed at length his other accomplishments and extended interactions with the Soviet Union.
For example, in 1938, Kennan wrote two chapters of his unfinished book The Prerequisites. While mentioned in brief snippets and excerpts, no full copy of the work exists online.
I had a look at Kennan’s Princeton archive for the full document. It’s short, running about 8 pages in sometimes unclear handwriting. When Kennan originally opened his papers to researchers in 1970, he had forgotten that he had ever written this previous work. According to Gaddis, he declared the unfinished work a sketch, an esquisse, stating that “It was to be modified, polished, pushed in other directions.” It was a series a diary entries, he further protested, nothing more. And yet, it’s absolutely clear that key elements of The Prerequisites are embedded in his later thought—all the way up to his 1993 book Around the Cragged Hill.
For Kennan, it begins with the Constitution—a 150-year-old document much more suited to the post-1789 era than 1938, an argument not uncommon at the time, given Woodrow Wilson’s earlier calls for an updated governing document to reflect his conception of government as living organism, rather than machine.
Kennan argued that complexity had been injected into the system to the point where entropy was building and the Constitution was unable to dissipate it:
“Our economic machine refuses to continue to run itself in the old smooth manner. Its creaks and groans were detectable long before Government began to tamper with it to the present degree, and the busy monkey wrenches of government power have been able to restore the even workings of its parts. Nasty and uncontrolled industrialization has introduced ugly social and political problems which refuse to be ignored. Our agricultural population is largely indebted or disposed. Our great cities and industrial communities are not pleasant to contemplate. Our population as a whole no longer has its old fiber or its old ideals. Few of us are untouched by the problems of crime, corruption and class and race antagonizers.”
Absolute democracy and absolute dictatorship were for Kennan total misnomers and applied mostly for purposes of political propaganda:
“All in all, it is obvious that neither of these terms is more than a vague cliché, loosely applied for emotional reasons wherever people find it convenient to apply it. Neither will serve us as a precise conception of political life. For this reason, we propose to drop them completely – both the angel of democracy and bogey-man of dictatorship – in our consideration of American problems.”
Given complexity and entropy, the existing Constitution is unfit. Neither absolute democracy, nor absolute dictatorship are coherent concepts. But Kennan believed the problems of the 20th century could and should be solved. People could flourish more. They could have better housing, better food, better athletic enjoyment and relaxation. Their individual participation could matter to a “common program” that aims at both individual and societal flourishing. Kennan decisively takes the engineering approach by asking: “what type of government is best calculated to assure such progress?”
In answering the question, Kennan independently stumbled across the iron law of oligarchy coined in 1911 by the German sociologist Robert Michels, which states that all organizations, democratic or otherwise, tend to become dominated by a leadership class, which comprises a minority of that organization.
This is no less true when analyzing the American state:
“The responsibility of government is largely exercised by a conglomerate minority composed of professional politicians and powerfully-organized special interests. We take issue with this system not because it constitutes rule by minority. We take issue with it because it is rule by the wrong minority, by a minority which does not have national interest at heart and which – would in large part – be incapable of recognizing such interests even if it cared to do so.”
The option isn’t whether a minority should rule; it’s which minority should rule. According to Kennan, the Marxists are wrong. Failed farmers and industrial workers are incapable of governing. The Democratic Party has no solution. The Republican Party suggests “business.” Some “bewildered” theorists suggest “the old Anglo-Saxon element.”
For Kennan, there is no element in American society capable of holding the torch. It does not exist. But it should be created:
“We feel that this country can be effectively and properly government only by a minority selected from all sections and classes of the population, and selected on the basis of individual fitness for the exercise of authority. This fitness must be determined by character, education and inclination. It must be supplemented, once the original selection is made, by training and experience. In other words, an element capable of bearing political responsibility in this country does not yet exist as an entity. It must be created. Its members must be selected, organized and trained. The necessity of training them means that they can be selected, organized and trained. The necessity of training them means that they can be selected, in the main only, from the youth. And this election can be carried out only by a political organization, unconnected with any existing political party or any vested interest, an organization professional indifferent to the size of its population backing and unhampered by the necessity of seeking votes, an organization capable of commanding the undivided loyalty and confidence its followers.”
To join this organization is to abandon the pursuit of money, of “keeping up with the Joneses.” It is to develop a discipline only found in religious orders. It is the pursuit of absolute political power to guide civilization to the next heights.
But supposing a cadre of politically educated, coordinated, and disciplined youth exist unmarred by epistemic corruption foisted on them by existing political parties and interests, how will they beat the vote machine?
Kennan is utterly unconcerned:
“We propose to leave this question unanswered. It does not bother us. We know of no instance in history where a highly-disciplined, energetic and determined minority has failed eventually to find means of coming into power in a state where political power was corrupt, chaotic and diffused.”
Kennan’s biographer, John Gaddis, largely writes off these observations by claiming that this work was emblematic of a larger problem with Kennan, namely that his analyses of the Soviet Union were always vastly superior to his analyses of the United States. For Gaddis, Kennan’s personal grievances about America colored his understanding of--and lack of extended familiarity with--America. But in the book, this move comes off as a B+ attempt at handwaving away ideas that the modern reader finds almost impossible to view with any kind of sympathy. The stuff is just *too* much. Kennan is an American diplomatic titan, after all, so it’s uncomfortable to dwell on Kennan’s less-than-salutary views of his home country and his view of what government ought to look like.
It’s not clear that that’s the right move, especially since--as mentioned above—traces of Kennan’s early work can be found in his later work.
If I don't cut the review off here, I'll continue on for a few more thousand words, so I'll just end with saying that the biography is masterful and spans dozens of crucial moments in American diplomatic history. This review narrowed in on a particular moment in Kennan's life that Gaddis devoted no more than a few pages to out of a total of about 700.
And he was prolific. During his career, Kennan wrote 17 books, two of which earned Pulitzer’s. Historian Ronald Steel described him as “the nearest thing to a legend that this country's diplomatic service has ever produced.”
It’s impossible to look at U.S. diplomatic history in the last century without seeing Kennan’s fingerprints everywhere, and John Lewis Gaddis makes that clear.
But aside from hagiographic accounts of his diplomatic accomplishments, there’s a side to Kennan that has been buried in his official papers stored at Princeton: that he advocated for authoritarianism in America, that he wanted aggressive disenfranchisement, that he wanted women out of the public sphere, that he was skeptical of individualism and industrialized capitalism. Kennan fits no past or contemporary categories in American political life. He is a label to himself, and Gaddis captures this well.
In general, Gaddis’ writing is very engaging and penetrating, though it’s clear that the memoir is at least somewhat a result of back-and-forth negotiation between Gaddis and Kennan. After all, Kennan was very careful about access to his personal archives, if only because there were some papers he wrote that were inflammatory in the earlier part of the 20th century and much more so in the 21st. And that’s what I’m going to focus on here, since other reviews have discussed at length his other accomplishments and extended interactions with the Soviet Union.
For example, in 1938, Kennan wrote two chapters of his unfinished book The Prerequisites. While mentioned in brief snippets and excerpts, no full copy of the work exists online.
I had a look at Kennan’s Princeton archive for the full document. It’s short, running about 8 pages in sometimes unclear handwriting. When Kennan originally opened his papers to researchers in 1970, he had forgotten that he had ever written this previous work. According to Gaddis, he declared the unfinished work a sketch, an esquisse, stating that “It was to be modified, polished, pushed in other directions.” It was a series a diary entries, he further protested, nothing more. And yet, it’s absolutely clear that key elements of The Prerequisites are embedded in his later thought—all the way up to his 1993 book Around the Cragged Hill.
For Kennan, it begins with the Constitution—a 150-year-old document much more suited to the post-1789 era than 1938, an argument not uncommon at the time, given Woodrow Wilson’s earlier calls for an updated governing document to reflect his conception of government as living organism, rather than machine.
Kennan argued that complexity had been injected into the system to the point where entropy was building and the Constitution was unable to dissipate it:
“Our economic machine refuses to continue to run itself in the old smooth manner. Its creaks and groans were detectable long before Government began to tamper with it to the present degree, and the busy monkey wrenches of government power have been able to restore the even workings of its parts. Nasty and uncontrolled industrialization has introduced ugly social and political problems which refuse to be ignored. Our agricultural population is largely indebted or disposed. Our great cities and industrial communities are not pleasant to contemplate. Our population as a whole no longer has its old fiber or its old ideals. Few of us are untouched by the problems of crime, corruption and class and race antagonizers.”
Absolute democracy and absolute dictatorship were for Kennan total misnomers and applied mostly for purposes of political propaganda:
“All in all, it is obvious that neither of these terms is more than a vague cliché, loosely applied for emotional reasons wherever people find it convenient to apply it. Neither will serve us as a precise conception of political life. For this reason, we propose to drop them completely – both the angel of democracy and bogey-man of dictatorship – in our consideration of American problems.”
Given complexity and entropy, the existing Constitution is unfit. Neither absolute democracy, nor absolute dictatorship are coherent concepts. But Kennan believed the problems of the 20th century could and should be solved. People could flourish more. They could have better housing, better food, better athletic enjoyment and relaxation. Their individual participation could matter to a “common program” that aims at both individual and societal flourishing. Kennan decisively takes the engineering approach by asking: “what type of government is best calculated to assure such progress?”
In answering the question, Kennan independently stumbled across the iron law of oligarchy coined in 1911 by the German sociologist Robert Michels, which states that all organizations, democratic or otherwise, tend to become dominated by a leadership class, which comprises a minority of that organization.
This is no less true when analyzing the American state:
“The responsibility of government is largely exercised by a conglomerate minority composed of professional politicians and powerfully-organized special interests. We take issue with this system not because it constitutes rule by minority. We take issue with it because it is rule by the wrong minority, by a minority which does not have national interest at heart and which – would in large part – be incapable of recognizing such interests even if it cared to do so.”
The option isn’t whether a minority should rule; it’s which minority should rule. According to Kennan, the Marxists are wrong. Failed farmers and industrial workers are incapable of governing. The Democratic Party has no solution. The Republican Party suggests “business.” Some “bewildered” theorists suggest “the old Anglo-Saxon element.”
For Kennan, there is no element in American society capable of holding the torch. It does not exist. But it should be created:
“We feel that this country can be effectively and properly government only by a minority selected from all sections and classes of the population, and selected on the basis of individual fitness for the exercise of authority. This fitness must be determined by character, education and inclination. It must be supplemented, once the original selection is made, by training and experience. In other words, an element capable of bearing political responsibility in this country does not yet exist as an entity. It must be created. Its members must be selected, organized and trained. The necessity of training them means that they can be selected, organized and trained. The necessity of training them means that they can be selected, in the main only, from the youth. And this election can be carried out only by a political organization, unconnected with any existing political party or any vested interest, an organization professional indifferent to the size of its population backing and unhampered by the necessity of seeking votes, an organization capable of commanding the undivided loyalty and confidence its followers.”
To join this organization is to abandon the pursuit of money, of “keeping up with the Joneses.” It is to develop a discipline only found in religious orders. It is the pursuit of absolute political power to guide civilization to the next heights.
But supposing a cadre of politically educated, coordinated, and disciplined youth exist unmarred by epistemic corruption foisted on them by existing political parties and interests, how will they beat the vote machine?
Kennan is utterly unconcerned:
“We propose to leave this question unanswered. It does not bother us. We know of no instance in history where a highly-disciplined, energetic and determined minority has failed eventually to find means of coming into power in a state where political power was corrupt, chaotic and diffused.”
Kennan’s biographer, John Gaddis, largely writes off these observations by claiming that this work was emblematic of a larger problem with Kennan, namely that his analyses of the Soviet Union were always vastly superior to his analyses of the United States. For Gaddis, Kennan’s personal grievances about America colored his understanding of--and lack of extended familiarity with--America. But in the book, this move comes off as a B+ attempt at handwaving away ideas that the modern reader finds almost impossible to view with any kind of sympathy. The stuff is just *too* much. Kennan is an American diplomatic titan, after all, so it’s uncomfortable to dwell on Kennan’s less-than-salutary views of his home country and his view of what government ought to look like.
It’s not clear that that’s the right move, especially since--as mentioned above—traces of Kennan’s early work can be found in his later work.
If I don't cut the review off here, I'll continue on for a few more thousand words, so I'll just end with saying that the biography is masterful and spans dozens of crucial moments in American diplomatic history. This review narrowed in on a particular moment in Kennan's life that Gaddis devoted no more than a few pages to out of a total of about 700.
January 8, 2019
George Kennan, the analyst behind the containment doctrine, is a fascinating figure who, during the height of his relevance especially during and after World War II, is one of the most interesting subjects of a biography that I’ve ever read about. The author deserves top marks for being consistently passionate about Kennan. He is also refreshingly up front about the times in Kennan’s life when the man came across as inconsistent or petulant, which I found to be unusual when compared to the hagiographic tendencies of the typical biographer
The only downside of the book is that Kennan turns out to be the Eeyore of US Foreign Policy analysts. About halfway through the tome, Kennan’s unending negativity about the world and America’s role in it began to rub me the wrong way. The vibrant moments of his life seemed to come less and less often. The last few hundred pages became more of a slog. As a result, I can say that the first half of this biography is one of the best books I’ve ever read. Sadly, the second half, like the man himself in the post-Cold War age, fades away into the mists of history.
The only downside of the book is that Kennan turns out to be the Eeyore of US Foreign Policy analysts. About halfway through the tome, Kennan’s unending negativity about the world and America’s role in it began to rub me the wrong way. The vibrant moments of his life seemed to come less and less often. The last few hundred pages became more of a slog. As a result, I can say that the first half of this biography is one of the best books I’ve ever read. Sadly, the second half, like the man himself in the post-Cold War age, fades away into the mists of history.
July 2, 2024
A special read
December 14, 2023
まじで長かったけど素晴らしい本。弱みもあり、しかしとてつもなく優秀な外交官の物語。何回も読み続けたい。
July 15, 2022
It is amazing that a 700 page book can still leave plenty of blank spaces. Kennan is enigmatic even at this length. His role as partner, parent, friend and relative remain obscure. It is as though there is some information missing - perhaps a long-term and very intense affair or a string of them, or perhaps a strong misanthropic quality to his personality. For such a profound and public figure, a lot remains in shadow.
The twin elements of character and impact are brought to life. At first, it may not be clear how these reconcile in Kennan, but his circumspection and cautiousness about human actions and motives (including doubt about his own) clearly informed his approach to foreign policy and diplomacy. He sought pragmatism, affordability, flexibility and sustainability over high principle. It allowed him to profoundly influence (if not author) many crucial elements of 20th Century American global strategy. The Marshall Plan and containment may not have been without Kennan, and it is very likely human (and particularly Western) history would have been far worse for it.
Although later associated with American overconfidence, brashness and adventurism (like Vietnam) the essence of Kennan's approach was different - more subtle and humane. He had experienced the grandiose, inhuman visions of Stalin and Hitler at first hand, and knew that allowing democracy and empathy to have a chance would take a very careful response.
Kennan came to believe that Soviet Communism had overreached - he had observed (again at first hand) that the USSR could not politically satisfy those it governed, and would resort to external aggression to achieve internal credibility. He concluded that, with sufficient commitment from the West, "the USSR would probably not be able to maintain its hold on "all the territory over which it today (late 1940s) staked out a claim" ".
Kennan also understood the Krelim's perception that "confronted with the life-size wolf of Soviet displeasure standing at the door and threatening to blow our house in", the West would buckle. His answer was ingenious but not perhaps aligned with the national zeitgeist.
" We are in peculiar position of having to defend ourselves against mortal attack, but yet not wishing to inflict mortal defeat on our attacker. We cannot be carried too far away by attractive conception of "the flashing sword of vengeance." We must be like the porcupine who only gradually convinces the carnivorous beast of prey that he is not a fit object of attack." More explicitly, Kennan encapsulates his analysis in the task of planning and executing "our strategic dispositions in such a way as to compel Sov. Govt. either to accept combat under unfavorable conditions (which it will never do), or withdraw. In this way, we can 'contain' (emphasis added) Soviet power until Russians tire of the game."
This was a remarkable assertion founded on astute insight, now largely vindicated by history. There were a lot of moving parts. Kennan had his hands in almost all of them - although rarely to his satisfaction. The Marshall Plan, NATO and the Truman doctrine, combined with a range of other policies and measures were instruments of "containment", and did much to shape the post-WWII world.
His lack of satisfaction was founded on some uncertainty about Western values - certainly ambivalence about their universality. Kennan simply didn't see it in the black and white of so many Cold warriors.
"[We] have freedom of elections, freedom of speech, freedom to live out your life politically; but a great many people in this world would say that is not enough; we are tired; we are hungry; we are bewildered; to hell with freedom to elect somebody; to hell with freedom of speech; what we want is to be shown the way; we want to be guided. [You] don't believe in abstract freedoms but only in freedom to something; and what is it you are showing us the freedom to?"
Against this unanswered query, he also expressed his perception of Western vulnerability:
"The fact of the matter is that there is a little bit of totalitarian buried somewhere, way down deep, in each and every one of us. It is only the cheerful light of confidence and security which keeps this evil genius down at the usual helpless and invisible depth. If confidence and security were to disappear, don't think that he would not be waiting to take their place."
Kennan struggled with these thoughts throughout his life - tempering his judgment and writing. Ultimately, unsurprisingly, he seems to have resolved these dilemmas (somewhat equivocally) with faith in his country and its potential. In echoes of the Gettysburg address, he made a Veteran's Day address in the 1950s that is remarkable for its thoughtfulness and poignancy:
"Under each of these stones there lies the remains of a son of this township. Each had half a life behind him, and each should have had another half a life before him. Someone had guided each of them through the trials and illnesses of early childhood. Each of these boys passed, before he died, through the wonder of adolescence. Each had felt in his hands, at one time or another, the same soil we know so well. The same winds blew. The same hills were visible to them in the distance. The same sky was overhead.
When death finally faced them, each had to reconcile himself to the thought that all this should come to be as nothing, that all the love and sacrifice and hope others had placed in them should be in vain, that all the promise of life should suddenly be rendered, to all outward appearances, meaningless. With each of these deaths, some parent died a little bit, too. And to the agony of death, there must have been added the trial of knowing that many other young men did not die but were permitted to live on and complete their lives, as though nothing had happened.
These young men did not die voluntarily or gladly. Like most men who die in war, they probably died in pain and misery and horror and bewilderment. The only thought that could have helped them was that perhaps because or their death this country would be a tiny bit nearer to what they knew, and we know, it ought to be, than it would have been had they not died at all.
And for this reason, the act of faith that they performed was not really complete with their passing. Part of its meaning remained to be written in by other people, and notably by ourselves. Every time we reply with selfishness and cynicism and cowardice to the demands which are placed upon us, we deal another blow to the men that lie here and to those who loved them. Every time we reply to these demands with generosity and faith and courage, we bring comfort and recompense to the souls of these people."
Ultimately, Kennan was a pragmatist - policies should aim for the best achievable outcomes with the resources reasonably at hand, and not be unduly constrained by high morality. Trying to resolve dire problems with "rigid standards risked making things worse. Evil existed, to be sure: the Soviet regime reflected it, as had Nazi Germany. Sometimes you had to fight it, sometimes you had to deal with it." "We should be prepared to talk to the devil himself... if he controls enough of the world to make it worth our while." "The mechanical and scientific creations of modern man tend to conceal from him the nature of his own humanity and to encourage him in all sorts of Promethean ambitions and illusions."
So how to reconcile this with Kennan's inner person - the choices and actions in his personal life? This book's great success is to give a strong impression of how Kennan's complexity, penetrating mind and his contradictions come together across his professional and private lives. The picture is not a simple one, but is it ever? Still there are many threads. Kennan clearly recognized this and expressed it in a self-obituary:
"Giving full recognition to the fact that no one fully understands himself, that no one can conceivably be fully objective about himself, I would like to tell you - I'm now quite old, most of my life lies behind me - how I view myself, and my usefulness, or lack of it, in this world. I realize the delicacy of my nervous structure. I don't think I would have been well qualified for a high office, especially not a political one. I see, in other words, certain of my weaknesses.
Somebody once said to me: "George, you are by nature really a teacher." I think that there's a lot to that. I have certain [other] things going for me. First of all, that I am independent, and have always kept my independence. I've always revolted against trying to say things as a member of a collective group, simply because it's what the others said. I don't belong to any organization where I feel that I have to say things they decide they want said. That is a relatively rare quality for anybody who writes and speaks a lot.
I think I have certain insights, from time to time. They are not organized. I've never tried to put them in the strait jacket of an intellectual discipline of any sort. But they would have been more useful to people than they have been. How much that's my fault and how much theirs I don't know. I leave that alone.
And finally, I credit myself with having been honest all my life. This is a very simple virtue, but outside of that I see all my faults. How much it's going to mean, when looked back on, I have no idea. I hope that I'm right about these qualities. They exist on the surface of a great many which are no better than anybody else's, and sometimes worse."
The incisive candor of his self-assessment is stunning - almost certainly accurate for almost anyone despite "all sorts of Promethean ambitions and illusions" prompting extravagant embellishments of our own narratives - and all the more so for someone who objectively had an outsized influence over the human affairs of his time.
The twin elements of character and impact are brought to life. At first, it may not be clear how these reconcile in Kennan, but his circumspection and cautiousness about human actions and motives (including doubt about his own) clearly informed his approach to foreign policy and diplomacy. He sought pragmatism, affordability, flexibility and sustainability over high principle. It allowed him to profoundly influence (if not author) many crucial elements of 20th Century American global strategy. The Marshall Plan and containment may not have been without Kennan, and it is very likely human (and particularly Western) history would have been far worse for it.
Although later associated with American overconfidence, brashness and adventurism (like Vietnam) the essence of Kennan's approach was different - more subtle and humane. He had experienced the grandiose, inhuman visions of Stalin and Hitler at first hand, and knew that allowing democracy and empathy to have a chance would take a very careful response.
Kennan came to believe that Soviet Communism had overreached - he had observed (again at first hand) that the USSR could not politically satisfy those it governed, and would resort to external aggression to achieve internal credibility. He concluded that, with sufficient commitment from the West, "the USSR would probably not be able to maintain its hold on "all the territory over which it today (late 1940s) staked out a claim" ".
Kennan also understood the Krelim's perception that "confronted with the life-size wolf of Soviet displeasure standing at the door and threatening to blow our house in", the West would buckle. His answer was ingenious but not perhaps aligned with the national zeitgeist.
" We are in peculiar position of having to defend ourselves against mortal attack, but yet not wishing to inflict mortal defeat on our attacker. We cannot be carried too far away by attractive conception of "the flashing sword of vengeance." We must be like the porcupine who only gradually convinces the carnivorous beast of prey that he is not a fit object of attack." More explicitly, Kennan encapsulates his analysis in the task of planning and executing "our strategic dispositions in such a way as to compel Sov. Govt. either to accept combat under unfavorable conditions (which it will never do), or withdraw. In this way, we can 'contain' (emphasis added) Soviet power until Russians tire of the game."
This was a remarkable assertion founded on astute insight, now largely vindicated by history. There were a lot of moving parts. Kennan had his hands in almost all of them - although rarely to his satisfaction. The Marshall Plan, NATO and the Truman doctrine, combined with a range of other policies and measures were instruments of "containment", and did much to shape the post-WWII world.
His lack of satisfaction was founded on some uncertainty about Western values - certainly ambivalence about their universality. Kennan simply didn't see it in the black and white of so many Cold warriors.
"[We] have freedom of elections, freedom of speech, freedom to live out your life politically; but a great many people in this world would say that is not enough; we are tired; we are hungry; we are bewildered; to hell with freedom to elect somebody; to hell with freedom of speech; what we want is to be shown the way; we want to be guided. [You] don't believe in abstract freedoms but only in freedom to something; and what is it you are showing us the freedom to?"
Against this unanswered query, he also expressed his perception of Western vulnerability:
"The fact of the matter is that there is a little bit of totalitarian buried somewhere, way down deep, in each and every one of us. It is only the cheerful light of confidence and security which keeps this evil genius down at the usual helpless and invisible depth. If confidence and security were to disappear, don't think that he would not be waiting to take their place."
Kennan struggled with these thoughts throughout his life - tempering his judgment and writing. Ultimately, unsurprisingly, he seems to have resolved these dilemmas (somewhat equivocally) with faith in his country and its potential. In echoes of the Gettysburg address, he made a Veteran's Day address in the 1950s that is remarkable for its thoughtfulness and poignancy:
"Under each of these stones there lies the remains of a son of this township. Each had half a life behind him, and each should have had another half a life before him. Someone had guided each of them through the trials and illnesses of early childhood. Each of these boys passed, before he died, through the wonder of adolescence. Each had felt in his hands, at one time or another, the same soil we know so well. The same winds blew. The same hills were visible to them in the distance. The same sky was overhead.
When death finally faced them, each had to reconcile himself to the thought that all this should come to be as nothing, that all the love and sacrifice and hope others had placed in them should be in vain, that all the promise of life should suddenly be rendered, to all outward appearances, meaningless. With each of these deaths, some parent died a little bit, too. And to the agony of death, there must have been added the trial of knowing that many other young men did not die but were permitted to live on and complete their lives, as though nothing had happened.
These young men did not die voluntarily or gladly. Like most men who die in war, they probably died in pain and misery and horror and bewilderment. The only thought that could have helped them was that perhaps because or their death this country would be a tiny bit nearer to what they knew, and we know, it ought to be, than it would have been had they not died at all.
And for this reason, the act of faith that they performed was not really complete with their passing. Part of its meaning remained to be written in by other people, and notably by ourselves. Every time we reply with selfishness and cynicism and cowardice to the demands which are placed upon us, we deal another blow to the men that lie here and to those who loved them. Every time we reply to these demands with generosity and faith and courage, we bring comfort and recompense to the souls of these people."
Ultimately, Kennan was a pragmatist - policies should aim for the best achievable outcomes with the resources reasonably at hand, and not be unduly constrained by high morality. Trying to resolve dire problems with "rigid standards risked making things worse. Evil existed, to be sure: the Soviet regime reflected it, as had Nazi Germany. Sometimes you had to fight it, sometimes you had to deal with it." "We should be prepared to talk to the devil himself... if he controls enough of the world to make it worth our while." "The mechanical and scientific creations of modern man tend to conceal from him the nature of his own humanity and to encourage him in all sorts of Promethean ambitions and illusions."
So how to reconcile this with Kennan's inner person - the choices and actions in his personal life? This book's great success is to give a strong impression of how Kennan's complexity, penetrating mind and his contradictions come together across his professional and private lives. The picture is not a simple one, but is it ever? Still there are many threads. Kennan clearly recognized this and expressed it in a self-obituary:
"Giving full recognition to the fact that no one fully understands himself, that no one can conceivably be fully objective about himself, I would like to tell you - I'm now quite old, most of my life lies behind me - how I view myself, and my usefulness, or lack of it, in this world. I realize the delicacy of my nervous structure. I don't think I would have been well qualified for a high office, especially not a political one. I see, in other words, certain of my weaknesses.
Somebody once said to me: "George, you are by nature really a teacher." I think that there's a lot to that. I have certain [other] things going for me. First of all, that I am independent, and have always kept my independence. I've always revolted against trying to say things as a member of a collective group, simply because it's what the others said. I don't belong to any organization where I feel that I have to say things they decide they want said. That is a relatively rare quality for anybody who writes and speaks a lot.
I think I have certain insights, from time to time. They are not organized. I've never tried to put them in the strait jacket of an intellectual discipline of any sort. But they would have been more useful to people than they have been. How much that's my fault and how much theirs I don't know. I leave that alone.
And finally, I credit myself with having been honest all my life. This is a very simple virtue, but outside of that I see all my faults. How much it's going to mean, when looked back on, I have no idea. I hope that I'm right about these qualities. They exist on the surface of a great many which are no better than anybody else's, and sometimes worse."
The incisive candor of his self-assessment is stunning - almost certainly accurate for almost anyone despite "all sorts of Promethean ambitions and illusions" prompting extravagant embellishments of our own narratives - and all the more so for someone who objectively had an outsized influence over the human affairs of his time.
April 16, 2014
(FROM MY BLOG) "Norwegians don't enjoy, they endure." So replied a woman of Norwegian background when I asked her if she had enjoyed the experience she was describing to me.
George F. Kennan was Scots-Irish in ancestry, but he married a Norwegian, spent holidays in Norway, and might as well have been Norwegian. As told by his biographer, John Lewis Gaddis, Kennan merely endured his 101 years of diplomatic service, historical scholarship, world travel, consultations with presidents and secretaries of state, reputation as perhaps the foremost American expert on Soviet affairs, and fame as the originator of America's post-war policy of Soviet "containment." Besides his professional activities, he was an amateur poet, a sailor, a man who thought deeply about religion, a devotee of Russian literature, and a hands-on Pennsylvania farmer. He lived a life that causes most of us to gasp with admiration.
But his life, from childhood to death, was troubled with feelings of guilt, inferiority, self-consciousness, and rejection. He served America nobly, but didn't really like Americans. Although he called himself a Christian, he doubted almost everything (and was perhaps unique among Christians in believing deeply in Christ, but not being so sure about the existence of God the Father). And he had no hopes for the future -- not his own future, not America's, and not that of mankind.
He was not a happy man, and his life might have been unendurable except for the continuous support of his Norwegian wife, Annelise, to whom he was married for 73 years -- despite occasional strayings on his part.
Some books one swallows happily in one sitting. Gaddis's biography,1 at 698 pages, is not one of them. I began reading it last November, shortly after writing my blog post based on book reviews of the biography, and I finished it today. It was a wine made for sipping, not chugging.
Gaddis is a distinguished Yale professor, but he had close ties with the first President Bush, and has had kind words to say about the foreign policy of the Reagan administration -- a president whom Kennan himself loathed. Much of the latter part of the biography attempts to show that President Reagan effectively put Keenan's views on "containment" into practice, thus giving both Reagan and Kennan credit for the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union.
It is Kennan's half-century influence, and often unfortunate lack of influence, on American foreign policy that will attract many readers. But some will also be attracted by the tragedy of a great but flawed human being, a public figure of great reputation who nonetheless never felt that he'd received the respect from either the government or the public that he deserved. Gaddis's portrait, if we assume its accuracy, shows a thinker who perhaps thought too much, an analyst whose analyses were too often affected by his emotions, and a diplomat with a deep understanding of nations and peoples who often failed to understand both the legitimate concerns and the selfish egos of individuals.
He was, as he concluded near the end of his life, a teacher, but not a politician.
George F. Kennan was Scots-Irish in ancestry, but he married a Norwegian, spent holidays in Norway, and might as well have been Norwegian. As told by his biographer, John Lewis Gaddis, Kennan merely endured his 101 years of diplomatic service, historical scholarship, world travel, consultations with presidents and secretaries of state, reputation as perhaps the foremost American expert on Soviet affairs, and fame as the originator of America's post-war policy of Soviet "containment." Besides his professional activities, he was an amateur poet, a sailor, a man who thought deeply about religion, a devotee of Russian literature, and a hands-on Pennsylvania farmer. He lived a life that causes most of us to gasp with admiration.
But his life, from childhood to death, was troubled with feelings of guilt, inferiority, self-consciousness, and rejection. He served America nobly, but didn't really like Americans. Although he called himself a Christian, he doubted almost everything (and was perhaps unique among Christians in believing deeply in Christ, but not being so sure about the existence of God the Father). And he had no hopes for the future -- not his own future, not America's, and not that of mankind.
He was not a happy man, and his life might have been unendurable except for the continuous support of his Norwegian wife, Annelise, to whom he was married for 73 years -- despite occasional strayings on his part.
Some books one swallows happily in one sitting. Gaddis's biography,1 at 698 pages, is not one of them. I began reading it last November, shortly after writing my blog post based on book reviews of the biography, and I finished it today. It was a wine made for sipping, not chugging.
Gaddis is a distinguished Yale professor, but he had close ties with the first President Bush, and has had kind words to say about the foreign policy of the Reagan administration -- a president whom Kennan himself loathed. Much of the latter part of the biography attempts to show that President Reagan effectively put Keenan's views on "containment" into practice, thus giving both Reagan and Kennan credit for the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union.
It is Kennan's half-century influence, and often unfortunate lack of influence, on American foreign policy that will attract many readers. But some will also be attracted by the tragedy of a great but flawed human being, a public figure of great reputation who nonetheless never felt that he'd received the respect from either the government or the public that he deserved. Gaddis's portrait, if we assume its accuracy, shows a thinker who perhaps thought too much, an analyst whose analyses were too often affected by his emotions, and a diplomat with a deep understanding of nations and peoples who often failed to understand both the legitimate concerns and the selfish egos of individuals.
He was, as he concluded near the end of his life, a teacher, but not a politician.
When asked unexpectedly to sum up and connect the various careers of George Kennan, he laced them all under the heading of teacher: on understanding Russia; on shaping a strategy for dealing with that country; on the danger that in pursuing that strategy too aggressively, the United States could endanger itself; on what the past suggested about societies that had done just this; on how to study history; on how to write; on how to live.
George F. Kennan's life was, perhaps from his point of view, tragic. But his life serves as a model to others who follow -- a model of one man's making the maximum use of his talents, of achieving power and influence without losing his humility and sense of proportion, of maintaining his curiosity and love of learning throughout a long and active life. And also, perhaps, a cautionary story of a man's asking too much of himself, of driving himself daily to the point that he cannot sit back and simply enjoy his accomplishments, his family, and the world about him.
June 3, 2017
An excellent biography and history of the time. It’s a wonderful experience, reading history of a time that I grew up in. Incidentally, it’s one of the rare biographies that doesn’t end in decline, and whose end in death doesn’t feel like death’s defeat of our common striving.
May 22, 2014
I came to this biography of George Kennan through my interest in international relations and the history of the Cold War but also as one who admires good biography. I expected satisfaction on both counts and got it first because Kennan is well-known as one of the more influential voices for the policy of containment which drove our actions in regard to the Soviet Union and secondly because Gaddis has written one of the handful of outstanding biographies I've read in recent years.
In describing Kennan's life and work as diplomat and historian, Gaddis necessarily has to discuss in detail the foreign policy issues and developments as the intense east-west competition after WWII locked down into the bone-chilling Cold War. Kennan, a Russian and Soviet expert and diplomat who'd served in Moscow more than once, sat at the heart of the confrontation. And so he famously was able to offer his government an analysis of Soviet intent and capability underlain by his deep understanding of Russian character and the basic motivations of its leadership, which led, at his urging, to the U. S. policy of containment of Russia rather than direct confrontation. His prescience and vision of a Soviet Union unable to keep up with the social and economic advances of the west's free societies became reality 40 years later. The middle section of the biography is thick with discussion of these issues and with how Kennan was a primary actor in forging a grand strategy where none had existed before, one which became the narrative controlling the international tensions of those years.
Understandably, the geopolitical story is the central focus in telling Kennan's life. But Gaddis doesn't neglect the rest of his story: husband, father, historian, and public intellectual. One thing that makes this admirable biography is that Gaddis avoids the sensational. Many biographies bring focus on the personal failings of their subjects. Kennan had his, too. Gaddis doesn't put the spotlight on them, merely mentioning them to hurry past to sink his analysis in the meaty public affairs importance of the man he's chosen to write about. There is enough of the good Kennan to fill 698 pages, and the story of the influential diplomat-historian who wrote America's Cold War strategy is fascinating by itself.
In describing Kennan's life and work as diplomat and historian, Gaddis necessarily has to discuss in detail the foreign policy issues and developments as the intense east-west competition after WWII locked down into the bone-chilling Cold War. Kennan, a Russian and Soviet expert and diplomat who'd served in Moscow more than once, sat at the heart of the confrontation. And so he famously was able to offer his government an analysis of Soviet intent and capability underlain by his deep understanding of Russian character and the basic motivations of its leadership, which led, at his urging, to the U. S. policy of containment of Russia rather than direct confrontation. His prescience and vision of a Soviet Union unable to keep up with the social and economic advances of the west's free societies became reality 40 years later. The middle section of the biography is thick with discussion of these issues and with how Kennan was a primary actor in forging a grand strategy where none had existed before, one which became the narrative controlling the international tensions of those years.
Understandably, the geopolitical story is the central focus in telling Kennan's life. But Gaddis doesn't neglect the rest of his story: husband, father, historian, and public intellectual. One thing that makes this admirable biography is that Gaddis avoids the sensational. Many biographies bring focus on the personal failings of their subjects. Kennan had his, too. Gaddis doesn't put the spotlight on them, merely mentioning them to hurry past to sink his analysis in the meaty public affairs importance of the man he's chosen to write about. There is enough of the good Kennan to fill 698 pages, and the story of the influential diplomat-historian who wrote America's Cold War strategy is fascinating by itself.
May 28, 2012
A very interesting look at an American original- a diplomat who wanted to be a writer, a historian who couldn't help but meddle in world affairs, especially anything Russian. In his originality and universalism, as well as his love of women, he reminded me of Einstein, but while the latter was sunny of disposition, Kennan tended to be depressed, especially in writing. Kennan relied on history to teach him and often referred to the classics to explain current events, and in that way reminded me of Miss Marple. He had great insight into Russian psychology, but as any psychologist could tell you, insight doesn't always predict behavior in specific instances, and Kennan seemed to be respected as much for his refusal to conform (Einstein again) as for his policy suggestions. Actually, it seemed to me that he was above all a pragmatist, or even a contrarian. He would push for the reunification of Germany right after the war, and opposed NATO. But 20 years later, he was on the opposite shore. I enjoyed this book very much and it was a solid four, maybe it would have been a five if it hadn't glossed over Kennan's extramarital private life so determinedly.
January 5, 2014
Great biography that I highly recommend to anyone with an interest in U.S. foreign policy or diplomatic or Cold War history. Kennan was a career Foreign Service Officer when he wrote his long telegram on how to handle relations with the Soviet Union shortly after the end of WWII. He more than anyone else articulated what became the U.S.'s containment strategy that allowed us to successfully navigate the Cold War with only a few misadventures (most of which were contrary to Kennan's advice). He was also the principal architect of the Marshall Plan, the main instigator and first director of the State Department's Policy Planning office which prioritizes and coordinates long-term foreign policy objectives, instrumental in the early National Security Council, an essential voice in the first years of the Navy War College, and an ambassador personally PNG'd (found persona non grata) by Stalin and an important part of President Kennedy's foreign policy team serving as the ambassador to Yugoslavia. Oh, and a brilliant writer who won two Pulitzer prizes. Despite so much to praise in Kennan's life, Gaddis was critical and fair in dealing with his subject.
September 1, 2024
"Despite two National Book Awards, two Pulitzers, and a Bancroft Prize for his historical and autobiographical writing, Kennan was for years more widely thought of as a theorist of international relations--indeed, with Lippmann, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau, than as a founding father of post-World War II realism. But Kennan disliked theory and never regarded himself as practicing that dark art. What he did believe in was the capacity of those who have studied the past to know themselves better for having done so. The "mechanical and scientific creations of modern man," he once wrote, "tend to conceal from him the nature of his own humanity and to encourage him in all sorts of Promethean ambitions and illusions." Reminders were needed, therefore, "of the limitations that rest on him, of the essential elements, both tragic and helpful, of his own condition. It is these reminders that history, and history alone, can give." --George F. Kennan, An American Life, John Lewis Gaddis
June 5, 2016
This was an excellent biography from the start. A good biographer lets the subject tell the story and not add anything except the subjects thoughts and experiences. This was it.
Most Americans have no idea who George Kennan was. It's unfortunate for sure because his life is an interesting one and the events that he influenced are still important to this day in regards to Russia.
The other really enjoyable part of this book were the excerpts from mr Kennan himself. From the very beginning of the book, one can gather that mr. Kennan had an excellent grasp of the English language. His thoughts really add to the story.
This was an excellent book and I can understand why it was so highly awarded.
Most Americans have no idea who George Kennan was. It's unfortunate for sure because his life is an interesting one and the events that he influenced are still important to this day in regards to Russia.
The other really enjoyable part of this book were the excerpts from mr Kennan himself. From the very beginning of the book, one can gather that mr. Kennan had an excellent grasp of the English language. His thoughts really add to the story.
This was an excellent book and I can understand why it was so highly awarded.
June 28, 2012
A must read for any student or historian of twentieth century diplomatic history. Gaddis skillfully develops the character and genius of this gifted and complex man. Any teacher that covers the Cold War must read this book! Kennan seemed to love Russia but also knew its leaders were difficulty to deal with and hard to trust. This book zeros in on the twisted path of Soviet/American relations over a sixty year stretch.
March 10, 2012
Thirty years of work, with Gaddis able to interview Kennan and have access to intimate diaries (which Kennan kept meticulously, turning his analytic abilities often on himself, like his obsession with suicide pills, or deep impatience) make this an unusually frank and personality-driven biography with fully contextualized crucial events in 20th century foreign policy.
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