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Volcker: The Triumph of Persistence
Over the course of nearly half a century, five American presidents --- three Democrats and two Republicans --- have relied on the financial acumen, and the integrity, of Paul A. Volcker. During his tenure as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, when he battled the Great Inflation of the 1970s, Volcker did nothing less than restore the reputation of an American financial system on the verge of collapse. After the 2008 financial meltdown, the nation turned again to Volcker to restore trust in a shaky financial system: President Obama would name his centerpiece Wall Street regulation the Volcker Rule. Volcker's career demonstrated that a determined central banker can prevail over economic turmoil--so long as he can resist relentless political pressure. His resolve and independent thinking--sorely tested by Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan--laid the foundation for a generation of economic stability. Indeed, William L. Silber argues, it was only Volcker's toughness on monetary policy that "forced Reagan to be Reagan" and to rein in America's deficit.
Noted scholar and finance expert Silber draws on hours of candid personal interviews and complete access to Volcker's personal papers to render dramatic behind-the-scenes accounts from Volcker's career at the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve: secret negotiations with European ministers; confrontations with the White House; crisis conferences with Wall Street titans, and even tense boardroom rebellions within the Fed itself. Filled with frank commentary from Volcker himself--including why he was personally irked with the "Volcker Rule" label--this will be the definitive account of Volcker's indispensable role in American economic history.
Noted scholar and finance expert Silber draws on hours of candid personal interviews and complete access to Volcker's personal papers to render dramatic behind-the-scenes accounts from Volcker's career at the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve: secret negotiations with European ministers; confrontations with the White House; crisis conferences with Wall Street titans, and even tense boardroom rebellions within the Fed itself. Filled with frank commentary from Volcker himself--including why he was personally irked with the "Volcker Rule" label--this will be the definitive account of Volcker's indispensable role in American economic history.
464 pages, Hardcover
First published September 4, 2012
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September 2, 2017
Silber wrote this book after conducting almost 100 hours of interviews with former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Adolph Volcker. Even if it is not officially an authorized biography, it certainly is given from Volcker's perspective and with him firmly in the hero's chair. Nonetheless, Silber has also done his homework, and given his own honest opinions. The book comes across as a worthy tribute to an admirable figure.
Volcker, the son of a New Jersey city manager, worked at Chase Manhattan and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the 1950s, where he met the central banking wunderkind Robert Roosa, who then brought Volcker on in 1962 to John F. Kennedy's Treasury Department. Volcker remembered his entry into the political world fondly: "It's hard to re-create the excitement of working for a young vibrant John F. Kennedy. My main concern was that they would solve all the problems before I got there to help." He shouldn't have worried. He spent most of the next decade, deep into Richard Nixon's less idealistic years, trying to defend the U.S. gold standard. Volcker was a believer in gold, but one of the big revelations in this book is that he also the impetus for the U.S. leaving it. After Germany, Switzerland and other countries stopped trying to peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar in May 1971, Volcker submitted a plan to Treasury Secretary John Connally (including a fake plan in the front of it and a section for a nonexistent plan B, to fool any leakers) that would have the US suspend redemptions in gold and impose a 90 day wage and price freeze. John Connally took the plan to Nixon and added his own 10% import surcharge idea, to help provide some leverage for his future negotiations with the Europeans. The book shows that Connally and Volcker truly aimed for stable exchange rates after the end of the gold standard, and Volcker became a front-page, globe-trotting financial ambassador for the U.S., helping to organize the Azores and Smithsonian agreements to stabilize rates. But they all fell apart in the face of rampaging U.S. inflation in 1973.
The chapters on Paul Volcker's fight against inflation as chair of the Federal Reserve cover more familiar territory, but are well told. One surprising story is that few people knew how much of a financial sacrifice Volcker made in becoming the chief conductor of the world's money supply. After he had been asked by then Fed Chairman Arthur Burns to lead the New York Federal Reserve Bank (from where he soon lead opposition to Burns's inflation), he at least got a reasonable bankers salary. But this salary was cut in half after he agreed to take the Chair. His wife Barbara had diabetes and arthritis, and she stayed in New York City and had to take borders to make ends meet. Meanwhile Paul rented a tiny apartment, in a college dorm type building, close to the Fed for weekdays. It was a shocking situation for the man with more power over money than any other, and a tribute to his sense of public service. Another surprise in the book is that, due to Volcker's years fighting for gold and international exchange stability, Volcker paid close attention to these prices throughout his term at the Fed, which seemed to show that his battle against inflation was winning. He was more disappointed, however, by persistently high long-term bond rates. In 1975 he had watched these rise to 8% after the Federal Reserve drastically loosened monetary policy, due to increased inflation expectations, and he thought tighter money starting in October 1979 would bring down long-term rates. Yet despite declining inflation and gold prices, these rates stayed above 10% up through 1984. Despite wanting to leave earlier and restore his earnings, he felt he couldn't leave until these had been brought down, which they were by the end of his second term in 1987.
One finishes this book filled with admiration for Volcker's courage in the fight against inflation against political attacks; Democratic Representative Henry Gonzalez filed bills of impeachment against him and the rest of the Federal Reserve Board. Majority Leader Jim Wright, when asked to describe Volcker's tenure, said merely "long." Homebuilders mailed him wood they said they couldn't use because his high interest rates crimped house-building. But one also leaves this book little unsure of Volcker's economic judgment. His strong continuing beliefs in the value of the gold standard and stable exchange rates goes against the economic consensus, and other of his ideas seem more than a little antediluvian. His more recent "Volcker Rule" against proprietary trading, adopted by President Obama, looks headed for the ash heap after sustained academic attack. Yet Volcker was the right man at the right time to fight inflation in the 1970s and 1980s. While nearly forgotten today, back in the late 1970s a majority of Americans described inflation as the nation's single biggest problem. When Volcker retired, he was flooded with mail from ordinary Americans who thanked him for saving the currency. He deserved their thanks.
Volcker, the son of a New Jersey city manager, worked at Chase Manhattan and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the 1950s, where he met the central banking wunderkind Robert Roosa, who then brought Volcker on in 1962 to John F. Kennedy's Treasury Department. Volcker remembered his entry into the political world fondly: "It's hard to re-create the excitement of working for a young vibrant John F. Kennedy. My main concern was that they would solve all the problems before I got there to help." He shouldn't have worried. He spent most of the next decade, deep into Richard Nixon's less idealistic years, trying to defend the U.S. gold standard. Volcker was a believer in gold, but one of the big revelations in this book is that he also the impetus for the U.S. leaving it. After Germany, Switzerland and other countries stopped trying to peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar in May 1971, Volcker submitted a plan to Treasury Secretary John Connally (including a fake plan in the front of it and a section for a nonexistent plan B, to fool any leakers) that would have the US suspend redemptions in gold and impose a 90 day wage and price freeze. John Connally took the plan to Nixon and added his own 10% import surcharge idea, to help provide some leverage for his future negotiations with the Europeans. The book shows that Connally and Volcker truly aimed for stable exchange rates after the end of the gold standard, and Volcker became a front-page, globe-trotting financial ambassador for the U.S., helping to organize the Azores and Smithsonian agreements to stabilize rates. But they all fell apart in the face of rampaging U.S. inflation in 1973.
The chapters on Paul Volcker's fight against inflation as chair of the Federal Reserve cover more familiar territory, but are well told. One surprising story is that few people knew how much of a financial sacrifice Volcker made in becoming the chief conductor of the world's money supply. After he had been asked by then Fed Chairman Arthur Burns to lead the New York Federal Reserve Bank (from where he soon lead opposition to Burns's inflation), he at least got a reasonable bankers salary. But this salary was cut in half after he agreed to take the Chair. His wife Barbara had diabetes and arthritis, and she stayed in New York City and had to take borders to make ends meet. Meanwhile Paul rented a tiny apartment, in a college dorm type building, close to the Fed for weekdays. It was a shocking situation for the man with more power over money than any other, and a tribute to his sense of public service. Another surprise in the book is that, due to Volcker's years fighting for gold and international exchange stability, Volcker paid close attention to these prices throughout his term at the Fed, which seemed to show that his battle against inflation was winning. He was more disappointed, however, by persistently high long-term bond rates. In 1975 he had watched these rise to 8% after the Federal Reserve drastically loosened monetary policy, due to increased inflation expectations, and he thought tighter money starting in October 1979 would bring down long-term rates. Yet despite declining inflation and gold prices, these rates stayed above 10% up through 1984. Despite wanting to leave earlier and restore his earnings, he felt he couldn't leave until these had been brought down, which they were by the end of his second term in 1987.
One finishes this book filled with admiration for Volcker's courage in the fight against inflation against political attacks; Democratic Representative Henry Gonzalez filed bills of impeachment against him and the rest of the Federal Reserve Board. Majority Leader Jim Wright, when asked to describe Volcker's tenure, said merely "long." Homebuilders mailed him wood they said they couldn't use because his high interest rates crimped house-building. But one also leaves this book little unsure of Volcker's economic judgment. His strong continuing beliefs in the value of the gold standard and stable exchange rates goes against the economic consensus, and other of his ideas seem more than a little antediluvian. His more recent "Volcker Rule" against proprietary trading, adopted by President Obama, looks headed for the ash heap after sustained academic attack. Yet Volcker was the right man at the right time to fight inflation in the 1970s and 1980s. While nearly forgotten today, back in the late 1970s a majority of Americans described inflation as the nation's single biggest problem. When Volcker retired, he was flooded with mail from ordinary Americans who thanked him for saving the currency. He deserved their thanks.
November 11, 2016
Rather than a biography, this book is a blow-by-blow account of Volcker's life as a public servant. It is truly gripping. If you enjoyed books like "Too Big to Fail" and "Lords of Finance" or even "Barbarians at the Gate," beware of picking it up, you will not rest until you have finished it.
I sure couldn't.
While I was at it, I managed to pick up some international economic history. I already knew, for example, that by the end of the sixties the US was running out of gold to stand behind the convertibility of the dollar: at the parities to gold of the dollar and the Deutschemark, for example, people in the US were finding it irresistible to "buy VW Beetles instead of Buicks." But I had no idea that it was Volcker's idea to rattle France and Germany with the threat of a free-float to force the 15% devaluation of the dollar which he deemed adequate to stop the run on the Treasury's gold. Or that the 8% devaluation that was negotiated as a compromise (with Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, no less) was the beginning of the end for Bretton Woods because it caused tremendous instability while proving inadequate to achieve its primary goal. Or that the stab in the back came from the UK! Volcker basically was the midwife for the end of Bretton Woods, but in his heart he wanted it to continue. That's what the book alleges, at any rate, and I have every reason to believe it.
Somehow, the author, who is clearly in Volcker's thrall, deems this to have been a success. Regardless, you cannot help falling for Volcker too. The principal theme of the book is that Volcker was a tireless, persistent and highly principled pragmatist. The first example, which I mention above, is probably the only questionable example, the rest are good enough for me.
Further down in the book you learn how a less principled pragmatist, Nixon, forced the Fed to keep rates inappropriately low so he could win the 1972 election, how Volcker's most famous policy decision, a surprise change of focus to the money supply (as opposed to interest rates) was designed to combat the expectations of ever-rising inflation, how the policy famously won the day, how it cost Carter his presidency, how Reagan almost failed to reappoint Volcker and how James Baker undermined him. Volcker also gets credit for the now forgotten Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation, which kind of, sort of put a bit of a break on government spending. And he actually comes under criticism for planting the seeds of "too big to fail" when Continental Illinois was saved. The Volcker rule gets a chapter too, and the author tells us how he played a role, stuff that simply does not fit in here, but hey...
You also find out a hell of a lot about the people involved. How much Volcker respected Martin, how much he learned from Connally, how he played Kissinger, how friendly he was with Burns, how he sparred with Friedman, what tattoo can be found where on George Schultz's body. You can't help marvel at how little Volcker was prepared to earn relative to what he could have done, how much his family had to sacrifice as a result, and you can't help wonder where we'd be now if he had not been succeeded by Alan Greenspan.
Overall, this is a tremendous book. You get the horse's mouth account of what was comfortably the Fed's finest hour, and that alone warrants a five star rating. If that leaves you a bit despondent about where we find ourselves today, that's probably also part of the author's intention.
Before I forget: the Paul Volcker described in this book shall be reading this. Hi there Paul, you rock!
I sure couldn't.
While I was at it, I managed to pick up some international economic history. I already knew, for example, that by the end of the sixties the US was running out of gold to stand behind the convertibility of the dollar: at the parities to gold of the dollar and the Deutschemark, for example, people in the US were finding it irresistible to "buy VW Beetles instead of Buicks." But I had no idea that it was Volcker's idea to rattle France and Germany with the threat of a free-float to force the 15% devaluation of the dollar which he deemed adequate to stop the run on the Treasury's gold. Or that the 8% devaluation that was negotiated as a compromise (with Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, no less) was the beginning of the end for Bretton Woods because it caused tremendous instability while proving inadequate to achieve its primary goal. Or that the stab in the back came from the UK! Volcker basically was the midwife for the end of Bretton Woods, but in his heart he wanted it to continue. That's what the book alleges, at any rate, and I have every reason to believe it.
Somehow, the author, who is clearly in Volcker's thrall, deems this to have been a success. Regardless, you cannot help falling for Volcker too. The principal theme of the book is that Volcker was a tireless, persistent and highly principled pragmatist. The first example, which I mention above, is probably the only questionable example, the rest are good enough for me.
Further down in the book you learn how a less principled pragmatist, Nixon, forced the Fed to keep rates inappropriately low so he could win the 1972 election, how Volcker's most famous policy decision, a surprise change of focus to the money supply (as opposed to interest rates) was designed to combat the expectations of ever-rising inflation, how the policy famously won the day, how it cost Carter his presidency, how Reagan almost failed to reappoint Volcker and how James Baker undermined him. Volcker also gets credit for the now forgotten Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation, which kind of, sort of put a bit of a break on government spending. And he actually comes under criticism for planting the seeds of "too big to fail" when Continental Illinois was saved. The Volcker rule gets a chapter too, and the author tells us how he played a role, stuff that simply does not fit in here, but hey...
You also find out a hell of a lot about the people involved. How much Volcker respected Martin, how much he learned from Connally, how he played Kissinger, how friendly he was with Burns, how he sparred with Friedman, what tattoo can be found where on George Schultz's body. You can't help marvel at how little Volcker was prepared to earn relative to what he could have done, how much his family had to sacrifice as a result, and you can't help wonder where we'd be now if he had not been succeeded by Alan Greenspan.
Overall, this is a tremendous book. You get the horse's mouth account of what was comfortably the Fed's finest hour, and that alone warrants a five star rating. If that leaves you a bit despondent about where we find ourselves today, that's probably also part of the author's intention.
Before I forget: the Paul Volcker described in this book shall be reading this. Hi there Paul, you rock!
January 23, 2015
If you've ever read a Zagat restaurant guide, you know that they use quotes in a really weird way, so that the fact of them being quotes is almost irrelevant. Like, "This 'classic' downtown bistro serves up 'meat and potatoes' without any 'fuss,' though some say the decor is 'a little lacking.'" I kind of felt the same way about Silber's book. According to the author, he recorded a hundred hours of interviews with Volcker, yet I felt that the quotes he included tended to be completely unremarkable. Like (I'm just mimicking here), "I always watched the gold price as a warning signal for inflation expectations." Well, great. Perhaps this is a drawback of the author being a finance professor rather than a journalist or professional writer.
Part of my problem may have been having already read Meltzer's exhaustive "History of the Federal Reserve," which covers many of the same events in far greater detail. Meltzer works almost entirely off minutes and transcripts, and he does an extremely close reading of them, to tell the stories in a way that no one else has. Silber, on the other hand, tends to cover the events of Volcker's career at about the level of a business magazine, so I finished the book feeling like I hadn't learned much. What's more, this is a "professional biography," so we get very little in the way of information on Volcker's personal life, the things that shaped his thinking--beyond numerous folksy cracks about his love of cheap cigars. In fact, among the most striking things about the book to me were the few remarks that Silber makes about Volcker's wife. Essentially, she stayed in New York while he was Fed chairman, suffered from a number of medical problems, and had to take on a boarder to pay the bills because of the salary cut he took. When Volcker was asked about serving a second term as chairman, she urged him not to, and he compromised with her by saying that he would accept but only stay for 18 months or 2 years (of 4)--and ended up breaking his promise. It's really a sad story that just kind of darkened the rest of the book for me. It's clear that Volcker is a heroic figure to Silber, but for all that the man accomplished good things, I couldn't feel the same way about him.
Part of my problem may have been having already read Meltzer's exhaustive "History of the Federal Reserve," which covers many of the same events in far greater detail. Meltzer works almost entirely off minutes and transcripts, and he does an extremely close reading of them, to tell the stories in a way that no one else has. Silber, on the other hand, tends to cover the events of Volcker's career at about the level of a business magazine, so I finished the book feeling like I hadn't learned much. What's more, this is a "professional biography," so we get very little in the way of information on Volcker's personal life, the things that shaped his thinking--beyond numerous folksy cracks about his love of cheap cigars. In fact, among the most striking things about the book to me were the few remarks that Silber makes about Volcker's wife. Essentially, she stayed in New York while he was Fed chairman, suffered from a number of medical problems, and had to take on a boarder to pay the bills because of the salary cut he took. When Volcker was asked about serving a second term as chairman, she urged him not to, and he compromised with her by saying that he would accept but only stay for 18 months or 2 years (of 4)--and ended up breaking his promise. It's really a sad story that just kind of darkened the rest of the book for me. It's clear that Volcker is a heroic figure to Silber, but for all that the man accomplished good things, I couldn't feel the same way about him.
December 17, 2012
Until I got the press release from the publisher about this book, I had no idea who Paul Volcker was or the influential role he'd played in shaping the US -- and, therefore, the world's -- economy.
Volcker's public life centred around three crises: cutting the link of the US dollar's value to gold, curbing extreme inflation in the 1980s, and preventing the collapse of the US economy during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
This laudatory biography limits its probings into Volcker's life to these crises. It's honest enough to recognise the role Volcker's earlier decisions played in the GFC, but as the author writes, "this is not an authorized biography: Paul did not think it appropriate to exercise editorial control over the final product. Nevertheless, Volcker's presence towered over this project despite his efforts to impose distance. He is alive and well at the writing of this final draft, and that surely had an impact on my thinking." It's this acknowledged brown-nosing that made me feel like the Volcker's life was being retold in a way to keep Paul Volcker happy.
Still, if you have an interest in business or economics, this is a must-read of 2012.
Volcker's public life centred around three crises: cutting the link of the US dollar's value to gold, curbing extreme inflation in the 1980s, and preventing the collapse of the US economy during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
This laudatory biography limits its probings into Volcker's life to these crises. It's honest enough to recognise the role Volcker's earlier decisions played in the GFC, but as the author writes, "this is not an authorized biography: Paul did not think it appropriate to exercise editorial control over the final product. Nevertheless, Volcker's presence towered over this project despite his efforts to impose distance. He is alive and well at the writing of this final draft, and that surely had an impact on my thinking." It's this acknowledged brown-nosing that made me feel like the Volcker's life was being retold in a way to keep Paul Volcker happy.
Still, if you have an interest in business or economics, this is a must-read of 2012.
November 17, 2019
This had an excellent start and continued to be that way but I had to set it aside some times because of it's seriously straightforward writing. I like that: persistence.
William Silber, the author is promising. He also included Volcker's love for Baseball; Dodgers Fan and a fan of player Lou Gehrig. The author also noted that Volcker learned to love fishing especially Bass Fishing from his father.
"Gold has served as a store of value ever since King Tut passed into the afterlife with a treasure chest of the metal, in addition to his famous mask. Gold developed into money something useful for making payments, in part because it is a good store of value. But many things are valuable as the New York Yankees, Buckingham Palace, and French antiques. Gold serve as money because in addition to holding its value, it is easily divisible and standardized." Page 35
In March 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to allow banks to expand credit without the limitations of gold, to help rescue the economy from the ravages of the Great Depression.
Imagine citizens had to give up their accumulated gold coins in exchange for Federal Reserve notes.
"Loosening the link with gold provided some leeway for the central bank to expand credit during a crisis, such as the Great Depression.
...
The 1934 legislation also devalued the dollar, reducing its gold content to 13.714 grains of pure gold, which translated into the price or $35.00 per ounce rather than $20.67."
When JFK took office in 1961, he assigned Robert Roosa in charge of defending America's gold reserve.
It was a challenging job. Roosa assigned the job of helping him protect the gold stock to Paul Volcker.
The 1934 prohibition against U.S. citizens investing in gold lasted forty years, until 1974 and Vlocker had to prevent gold from entering the country without a proper visa.
"Charles de Gaulle pursued gold the way Henry VIII pursued wives." page 42
Paul Volcker had two children then, Janice was ten and Jimmy seven. The story of Jimmy is fascinating especially the relationship with parents Paul and Barbara. Jimmy was born with cerebral palsy.
Paul got him very interested in baseball.
"On Friday, March 15, 1968, Queen Elizabeth shut down the London gold market in response to an emergency request from President Lyndon Johnson."
By 1969, Paul Volcker now doing Robert Roosa's job and determined to follow his father's path to rescue the country from the financial setbacks "that threatened to diminish America's stature in the world." page 54
May 1972 John Connally announces his resignations secretary of the treasury -and Volcker testifies on the future of the international monetary system saying the reform must have a wide agenda including related issues of trading rules, investment and development -Volcker was disappointed in and displeased with Britain's allowing its currency to float.
Shultz and Volcker shared a commitment to implement a workable solution
page 121
Volcker should have known that Richard Nixon would never appoint him secretary of the treasury. Despite his public status as the president's monetary diplomat, he was not part of the inner circle. Instead Nixon appointed John Connally.
Volcker is at the federal Reserve Bank. Jimmy Carter beat Gerald Ford November 2, 1976. Inflation dropped to 5%; High unemployment and high inflation were two reasons.
Volcker pulled the levers and pressed the buttons that largely determined the flow of money in America. ... He had deliberately orchestrated a stratospheric rise in interest rates ... in a determined campaign to crush inflation. according to author, Joseph B. Treaster
This caused a great uproar, some even declaring that Volcker should be impeached.
In 1987 after 30 years with the Federal Reserve, Volcker stepped down.
Then he went fishing I suppose; a hobby passed ion from his father.
The author details meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) - with Volcker's input on setting targets
In December 1980, Inflation stood at 12% per annum. and the economy had just recovered from a brief recession.
Leading economists across the country were involved in the debate and discussion.
Volcker met with Ronald Reagan on Friday January 23rd, 1981 three days after the inauguration.
No journey is ever smooth and the author points out where Volcker felt disappointments leading up to March 1987, when Volcker made his departure announcement.
This book is good for the person interested in the discussions at meetings concerning the inflation talks. And, of course the ramifications around setting the Volcker Rule*. I liked the handwritten notes, the photographs of the young Volcker and the cartoon, "Repent The End Is Near" on page 334 and Paul Volcker putting President Ronald Reagan on hold (page 332). Acknowledgments and Index are included on the last 120 pages of this 454-page hard cover copy.
If the reader aspires to read a biography of Paul A. Volcker then, Keeping At It: The Quest for Sound Money and Good Government by Paul Volcker, himself is very suitable.
*The Volcker Rule prohibits banks from using their own accounts for short-term proprietary trading of securities, derivatives and commodity futures, as well as options on any of these instruments. The rule also bars banks, or insured depository institutions, from acquiring or retaining ownership interests in hedge funds or private equity funds, subject to certain exemptions. In other words, the rule aims to discourage banks from taking too much risk by barring them from using their own funds to make these types of investments to increase profits. The Volcker Rule relies on the premise that these speculative trading activities do not benefit banks’ customers.
The rule went into effect on April 1, 2014, with banks' full compliance required by July 21, 2015 — although the Federal Reserve has since set procedures for banks to request extended time to transition into full compliance for certain activities and investments. On May 30, 2018, members of the Federal Reserve Board, led by Chairman Jerome (Jay) Powell, voted unanimously to push forward a proposal to loosen the restrictions around the Volcker Rule and reduce the costs for banks that need to comply with it. See Investopaedia.
A 5-star read.
William Silber, the author is promising. He also included Volcker's love for Baseball; Dodgers Fan and a fan of player Lou Gehrig. The author also noted that Volcker learned to love fishing especially Bass Fishing from his father.
"Gold has served as a store of value ever since King Tut passed into the afterlife with a treasure chest of the metal, in addition to his famous mask. Gold developed into money something useful for making payments, in part because it is a good store of value. But many things are valuable as the New York Yankees, Buckingham Palace, and French antiques. Gold serve as money because in addition to holding its value, it is easily divisible and standardized." Page 35
In March 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to allow banks to expand credit without the limitations of gold, to help rescue the economy from the ravages of the Great Depression.
Imagine citizens had to give up their accumulated gold coins in exchange for Federal Reserve notes.
"Loosening the link with gold provided some leeway for the central bank to expand credit during a crisis, such as the Great Depression.
...
The 1934 legislation also devalued the dollar, reducing its gold content to 13.714 grains of pure gold, which translated into the price or $35.00 per ounce rather than $20.67."
When JFK took office in 1961, he assigned Robert Roosa in charge of defending America's gold reserve.
It was a challenging job. Roosa assigned the job of helping him protect the gold stock to Paul Volcker.
The 1934 prohibition against U.S. citizens investing in gold lasted forty years, until 1974 and Vlocker had to prevent gold from entering the country without a proper visa.
"Charles de Gaulle pursued gold the way Henry VIII pursued wives." page 42
Paul Volcker had two children then, Janice was ten and Jimmy seven. The story of Jimmy is fascinating especially the relationship with parents Paul and Barbara. Jimmy was born with cerebral palsy.
Paul got him very interested in baseball.
"On Friday, March 15, 1968, Queen Elizabeth shut down the London gold market in response to an emergency request from President Lyndon Johnson."
By 1969, Paul Volcker now doing Robert Roosa's job and determined to follow his father's path to rescue the country from the financial setbacks "that threatened to diminish America's stature in the world." page 54
May 1972 John Connally announces his resignations secretary of the treasury -and Volcker testifies on the future of the international monetary system saying the reform must have a wide agenda including related issues of trading rules, investment and development -Volcker was disappointed in and displeased with Britain's allowing its currency to float.
Shultz and Volcker shared a commitment to implement a workable solution
page 121
Volcker should have known that Richard Nixon would never appoint him secretary of the treasury. Despite his public status as the president's monetary diplomat, he was not part of the inner circle. Instead Nixon appointed John Connally.
Volcker is at the federal Reserve Bank. Jimmy Carter beat Gerald Ford November 2, 1976. Inflation dropped to 5%; High unemployment and high inflation were two reasons.
Volcker pulled the levers and pressed the buttons that largely determined the flow of money in America. ... He had deliberately orchestrated a stratospheric rise in interest rates ... in a determined campaign to crush inflation. according to author, Joseph B. Treaster
This caused a great uproar, some even declaring that Volcker should be impeached.
In 1987 after 30 years with the Federal Reserve, Volcker stepped down.
Then he went fishing I suppose; a hobby passed ion from his father.
The author details meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) - with Volcker's input on setting targets
In December 1980, Inflation stood at 12% per annum. and the economy had just recovered from a brief recession.
Leading economists across the country were involved in the debate and discussion.
Volcker met with Ronald Reagan on Friday January 23rd, 1981 three days after the inauguration.
No journey is ever smooth and the author points out where Volcker felt disappointments leading up to March 1987, when Volcker made his departure announcement.
This book is good for the person interested in the discussions at meetings concerning the inflation talks. And, of course the ramifications around setting the Volcker Rule*. I liked the handwritten notes, the photographs of the young Volcker and the cartoon, "Repent The End Is Near" on page 334 and Paul Volcker putting President Ronald Reagan on hold (page 332). Acknowledgments and Index are included on the last 120 pages of this 454-page hard cover copy.
If the reader aspires to read a biography of Paul A. Volcker then, Keeping At It: The Quest for Sound Money and Good Government by Paul Volcker, himself is very suitable.
*The Volcker Rule prohibits banks from using their own accounts for short-term proprietary trading of securities, derivatives and commodity futures, as well as options on any of these instruments. The rule also bars banks, or insured depository institutions, from acquiring or retaining ownership interests in hedge funds or private equity funds, subject to certain exemptions. In other words, the rule aims to discourage banks from taking too much risk by barring them from using their own funds to make these types of investments to increase profits. The Volcker Rule relies on the premise that these speculative trading activities do not benefit banks’ customers.
The rule went into effect on April 1, 2014, with banks' full compliance required by July 21, 2015 — although the Federal Reserve has since set procedures for banks to request extended time to transition into full compliance for certain activities and investments. On May 30, 2018, members of the Federal Reserve Board, led by Chairman Jerome (Jay) Powell, voted unanimously to push forward a proposal to loosen the restrictions around the Volcker Rule and reduce the costs for banks that need to comply with it. See Investopaedia.
A 5-star read.
August 22, 2018
After a lot of research and 42 lengthy interviews with the subject of this book Mr William L. Silber, a professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business, has a better understanding than most of two major economic events; the introduction of fiat currencies (The Nixon chock 1971) and the end of double digit inflation in the US (first half of 1980’s). To know more about these events is highly relevant, not least in order to better understand political processes in general and their interaction with basic economic fundamentals.
The book is written chronologically in four parts besides an initial prologue which neatly sums up the three crises Paul Volcker had to endure. Part 1 is about Mr Volcker’s formative years, not least his experience at the New York FED. Part 2 gives an excellent insight into America’s break with the gold standard and introduction of the fiat currency system. Volcker considers this the most significant event in his career. Part 3 deals with his actions as FED chairman 1979-1987, a period in which he despite numerous headwinds still saw some of his finest moments. Part 4 is about more recent events, not least the “Volcker rule”.
Of the over 450 pages, roughly 100 pages are notes and references to various sources, i.e. it’s easy to drill further in whatever interests you. For the most part however, the level of details is already high enough, and sometimes it might be excessive. When it comes to the main events I don’t mind, I actually enjoy it, but sometimes the author spends a bit too much time on less relevant events.
We are now a few year into a financial crisis which some would say started with US house prices rolling over late 2006. Reading about more dated crises gives you some perspective, both in terms of adding complexity to something you thought was easy to understand (most think of the 70’s as Vietnam War => inflation, Volcker => higher rates, eventually lower inflation) and of how much that could have gone wrong. Large crises also require a lot of time to get resolved. This book gives tremendous colour to what actually happened, and you realise how much of the happy ending in reality was luck.
My interest was mostly caught by the two middle parts and that’s also where the book has its main focus. Part 2, Confronting Gold 1969-1974, is all about the problems of a semi fixed currency regime, with gold convertibility as a centrepiece. As most people will recall Bretton Woods was implemented after WW2. At that time, most of the gold in the world was held by the US so it was natural to have a system where other currencies were pegged to the dollar and the dollar was then convertible in to gold. However, due to large and lengthy balance of payment deficits, the US was eventually going to run out of gold. Mr Volcker saw this coming and it was mostly his solution that Mr Nixon brought to the public august 15th, 1971.
In part 3 we learn how Volcker by accident became FED chairman, and despite few supporters managed to change the way FED worked completely. During three years FED set targets for money supply, not interest rates. Very few supported this, not Milton Friedman, not Paul Samuelsson or Henry Kaufman which all said Fed could not bring down inflation. Inflation in 1980 was at 12% and six years later inflation was 3.4%, and Volcker became the hero. He still is.
So who is the Paul Volcker of 2012/2013? Is it Ben Bernanke or Mario Draghi? Both are rewriting the rules for how conventional central banks operate when the economy stops working like it used to work. Let’s hope some professor writes a book about their successes a few decades ahead.
The book is written chronologically in four parts besides an initial prologue which neatly sums up the three crises Paul Volcker had to endure. Part 1 is about Mr Volcker’s formative years, not least his experience at the New York FED. Part 2 gives an excellent insight into America’s break with the gold standard and introduction of the fiat currency system. Volcker considers this the most significant event in his career. Part 3 deals with his actions as FED chairman 1979-1987, a period in which he despite numerous headwinds still saw some of his finest moments. Part 4 is about more recent events, not least the “Volcker rule”.
Of the over 450 pages, roughly 100 pages are notes and references to various sources, i.e. it’s easy to drill further in whatever interests you. For the most part however, the level of details is already high enough, and sometimes it might be excessive. When it comes to the main events I don’t mind, I actually enjoy it, but sometimes the author spends a bit too much time on less relevant events.
We are now a few year into a financial crisis which some would say started with US house prices rolling over late 2006. Reading about more dated crises gives you some perspective, both in terms of adding complexity to something you thought was easy to understand (most think of the 70’s as Vietnam War => inflation, Volcker => higher rates, eventually lower inflation) and of how much that could have gone wrong. Large crises also require a lot of time to get resolved. This book gives tremendous colour to what actually happened, and you realise how much of the happy ending in reality was luck.
My interest was mostly caught by the two middle parts and that’s also where the book has its main focus. Part 2, Confronting Gold 1969-1974, is all about the problems of a semi fixed currency regime, with gold convertibility as a centrepiece. As most people will recall Bretton Woods was implemented after WW2. At that time, most of the gold in the world was held by the US so it was natural to have a system where other currencies were pegged to the dollar and the dollar was then convertible in to gold. However, due to large and lengthy balance of payment deficits, the US was eventually going to run out of gold. Mr Volcker saw this coming and it was mostly his solution that Mr Nixon brought to the public august 15th, 1971.
In part 3 we learn how Volcker by accident became FED chairman, and despite few supporters managed to change the way FED worked completely. During three years FED set targets for money supply, not interest rates. Very few supported this, not Milton Friedman, not Paul Samuelsson or Henry Kaufman which all said Fed could not bring down inflation. Inflation in 1980 was at 12% and six years later inflation was 3.4%, and Volcker became the hero. He still is.
So who is the Paul Volcker of 2012/2013? Is it Ben Bernanke or Mario Draghi? Both are rewriting the rules for how conventional central banks operate when the economy stops working like it used to work. Let’s hope some professor writes a book about their successes a few decades ahead.
March 3, 2024
'Volcker' arranges the events of the undeniably historic figure’s life neatly but stops short of probing the depths. The book reads like a chronicle of his actions without delving sufficiently into the motives and ideologies that shaped or propelled him, portraying him less as a person of conviction and more as a historical bystander. Furthermore, the book's reluctance to explore the counterfactuals or the aftermath of Volcker's decisions leaves a gap in understanding his true impact. Effectively, one gets the timeline of events but without a discourse on the essence of Volcker's legacy.
What Volcker did was unprecedented, and would not be attempted by any of his followers even if they had faced a similar problem. There was something about him that was not just a historic accident. While he benefitted both from Carter’s fading months that allowed him to carry out actions that could have been stifled by a stronger administration or from Reagan’s fiscal policies that helped kill inflation comprehensively for decades cementing Volcker’s reputation, it still required a different level of courage of conviction to do what he did.
The book could have discussed the money supply experiments in so many ways, including where they could have proved disastrous. The author could have explored the pieces of training of the man that led to such unorthodox actions. There is some discussion on all these topics, including the real-time views of others in the heydays of his actions, but little that would stand out as new or insightful.
The same is true about the oft-discussed long-term effects of his policies. They are universally praised, and the author could have easily included them without efforts for completion, but there too the book appears rushed. The only thing the author appears comfortable with is when he is discussing the events as they happened, and that’s what makes the book inadequate.
What Volcker did was unprecedented, and would not be attempted by any of his followers even if they had faced a similar problem. There was something about him that was not just a historic accident. While he benefitted both from Carter’s fading months that allowed him to carry out actions that could have been stifled by a stronger administration or from Reagan’s fiscal policies that helped kill inflation comprehensively for decades cementing Volcker’s reputation, it still required a different level of courage of conviction to do what he did.
The book could have discussed the money supply experiments in so many ways, including where they could have proved disastrous. The author could have explored the pieces of training of the man that led to such unorthodox actions. There is some discussion on all these topics, including the real-time views of others in the heydays of his actions, but little that would stand out as new or insightful.
The same is true about the oft-discussed long-term effects of his policies. They are universally praised, and the author could have easily included them without efforts for completion, but there too the book appears rushed. The only thing the author appears comfortable with is when he is discussing the events as they happened, and that’s what makes the book inadequate.
July 12, 2023
This book focuses on his work, not his life. Very good.
Note: I now understand why Federal Reserve Chairman Powell invokes Volcker’s name. Volcker did what was thought impossible and lowered inflation even as the fiscal deficit exploded during the Reagan administration. This is the same position Powell is in now. Inflation is running hot and the fiscal deficit is out of control, arguably worst in its entire history.
This gives insight into where Powell may be going. Volcker believed in maintaining high interest rates as inflation fell or in other words maintaining a high real rate of interest for a long time. Powell recently declared that he would keep rates roughly where they are into 2025. I think we should believe him.
Furthermore, we shouldn’t be afraid of a few bank failures outside of systematically important banks (sibs). Volcker was not stopped by the failure of continental Illinois, one of the largest regional banks at the time, and I don’t think a few failures in California will stop Powell.
Note: I now understand why Federal Reserve Chairman Powell invokes Volcker’s name. Volcker did what was thought impossible and lowered inflation even as the fiscal deficit exploded during the Reagan administration. This is the same position Powell is in now. Inflation is running hot and the fiscal deficit is out of control, arguably worst in its entire history.
This gives insight into where Powell may be going. Volcker believed in maintaining high interest rates as inflation fell or in other words maintaining a high real rate of interest for a long time. Powell recently declared that he would keep rates roughly where they are into 2025. I think we should believe him.
Furthermore, we shouldn’t be afraid of a few bank failures outside of systematically important banks (sibs). Volcker was not stopped by the failure of continental Illinois, one of the largest regional banks at the time, and I don’t think a few failures in California will stop Powell.
September 10, 2019
Fifty years later, it would be crazy to think that countries with their different economies, different fiscal and monetary policies should exchange their currencies in a system of pre-determined fixed rates. It came to the point that the US no longer had enough gold to back the USD convertibility that threatened the international financial system. The US suffered from chronic deficit balance of payment, as Americans bought more from aboard than they sold to - this was because of the artificially strong dollar. Volcker made his enormous efforts to stop countries from robbing the US, as a piggy bank.
September 22, 2019
One of the best financial biographies I’ve read. Blows the previous Volcker biography I read out of the water. The book covers a few flashpoints in particular detail: the breakdown of the Breton-Woods System, initial salvos of the fight against inflation in 1979, and finally Volcker losing control of the FOMC towards the end of his tenure. The author tells a compelling story in a way that is faithful to the history and a reasonable theory.
September 10, 2021
Nice biography about the most important banker in history. Very detailed yet kept my attention most of the way. Good writing as well
November 21, 2021
nice book to learn what happened before and after gold standard was broken.
June 24, 2024
I have an interest in central banking and found it interesting how Volcker killed inflation.
But a bit academic not sure a normie would like the book but I enjoyed it.
But a bit academic not sure a normie would like the book but I enjoyed it.
July 3, 2024
Great insight into our best Fed Chairman. He saved the country in the late 70s early 80s.
July 12, 2013
By Martin Hutchinson
William Silber’s biography of Paul Volcker is rightly sympathetic to the man whose determination and integrity conquered U.S. inflation. When needed, he overcame opposition from politicians and academic economists. Yet once his work was done, policy slid back and his abilities were wasted.
Silber traces Volcker’s career from his earliest days at the money market desk of the New York Federal Reserve. He was a Democrat when he served in the Treasury Department in the 1960s, but even then he was skeptical of the administration’s Keynesians and their inflationary policies. The Republican President Richard Nixon brought him in as Treasury undersecretary for monetary affairs, where he helped negotiate the end of the Bretton Woods system and expressed distrust of the Fed’s expansionist policies.
Volcker was not promoted by Nixon, who valued his intellect but distrusted his party affiliation and independence. So he returned to the private sector in 1974, only to be appointed president of the New York Fed the next year. It was there that he established his reputation as an unswerving proponent of anti-inflationary policy. President Jimmy Carter promoted him to run the whole Fed in August 1979.
He showed both intelligence and boldness there. With only a tenuous majority on the Federal Open Market Committee, Volcker announced a new policy on Oct. 6 that year: the Fed would track money supply growth, wherever that might lead interest rates. Initially, it led them steeply upward, from around 12 percent to a peak close to 20 percent in April 1980. When the money supply shrank after Carter introduced direct controls on consumer credit in March 1980, Volcker responded with sharp rate cuts, 10 percentage points in two months.
Volcker stayed firm while Carter wavered. The president removed credit controls in May 1980, money supply increased rapidly, and the Fed increased rates in October, possibly costing Carter re-election a month later. Volcker kept squeezing the monetary tourniquet; the federal funds rate peaked above 20 percent in January 1981 and was reduced painfully slowly, remaining at 14 percent in July 1982, by which time inflation was running below 5 percent and the U.S. economy was in the deepest recession between 1937 and 2008.
During this period Volcker had steadfast support from President Ronald Reagan, but not from his more pragmatic economic advisers. Curiously, Volcker was also opposed by Milton Friedman, generally thought of as the most distinguished inflation-hating monetarist around. Friedman accused the Fed chairman of steering the economy towards the rocks through over-tight policy. Then again, Friedman supported Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan’s loosening of interest rates after 1995; the high priest of monetary orthodoxy was himself less than orthodox.
Despite a strong recovery and a rising stock market, by 1987 the Reagan administration pragmatists had tired of Volcker’s independence and offered little opposition when he decided to retire for a more lucrative career in the private sector.
It was an opportunity missed. Volcker could now be in his ninth term as Fed chairman – a tenure shorter, after all, than that of several U.S. senators. Silber does not explore this fascinating alternate history possibility and does not give us the means with which to do so, never telling us what Volcker thought about Greenspan’s abandonment of monetary targets in 1993 and the post-1995 expansionism of Greenspan and his successor Ben Bernanke. Instead, he concentrates on Volcker’s efforts after 2009 to promote the Volcker Rule separating proprietary trading from commercial banking – in which Volcker was only an adviser, not a principal.
President Bill Clinton could have appointed Volcker Treasury secretary in 1992, but didn’t. In the end, there was demand for Volcker’s determined intelligence and steadfastness only in a crisis. If the Fed’s current ultra-loose policies have the same effect as the policies of the 1960s and 1970s, a similarly-minded successor may be needed.
William Silber’s biography of Paul Volcker is rightly sympathetic to the man whose determination and integrity conquered U.S. inflation. When needed, he overcame opposition from politicians and academic economists. Yet once his work was done, policy slid back and his abilities were wasted.
Silber traces Volcker’s career from his earliest days at the money market desk of the New York Federal Reserve. He was a Democrat when he served in the Treasury Department in the 1960s, but even then he was skeptical of the administration’s Keynesians and their inflationary policies. The Republican President Richard Nixon brought him in as Treasury undersecretary for monetary affairs, where he helped negotiate the end of the Bretton Woods system and expressed distrust of the Fed’s expansionist policies.
Volcker was not promoted by Nixon, who valued his intellect but distrusted his party affiliation and independence. So he returned to the private sector in 1974, only to be appointed president of the New York Fed the next year. It was there that he established his reputation as an unswerving proponent of anti-inflationary policy. President Jimmy Carter promoted him to run the whole Fed in August 1979.
He showed both intelligence and boldness there. With only a tenuous majority on the Federal Open Market Committee, Volcker announced a new policy on Oct. 6 that year: the Fed would track money supply growth, wherever that might lead interest rates. Initially, it led them steeply upward, from around 12 percent to a peak close to 20 percent in April 1980. When the money supply shrank after Carter introduced direct controls on consumer credit in March 1980, Volcker responded with sharp rate cuts, 10 percentage points in two months.
Volcker stayed firm while Carter wavered. The president removed credit controls in May 1980, money supply increased rapidly, and the Fed increased rates in October, possibly costing Carter re-election a month later. Volcker kept squeezing the monetary tourniquet; the federal funds rate peaked above 20 percent in January 1981 and was reduced painfully slowly, remaining at 14 percent in July 1982, by which time inflation was running below 5 percent and the U.S. economy was in the deepest recession between 1937 and 2008.
During this period Volcker had steadfast support from President Ronald Reagan, but not from his more pragmatic economic advisers. Curiously, Volcker was also opposed by Milton Friedman, generally thought of as the most distinguished inflation-hating monetarist around. Friedman accused the Fed chairman of steering the economy towards the rocks through over-tight policy. Then again, Friedman supported Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan’s loosening of interest rates after 1995; the high priest of monetary orthodoxy was himself less than orthodox.
Despite a strong recovery and a rising stock market, by 1987 the Reagan administration pragmatists had tired of Volcker’s independence and offered little opposition when he decided to retire for a more lucrative career in the private sector.
It was an opportunity missed. Volcker could now be in his ninth term as Fed chairman – a tenure shorter, after all, than that of several U.S. senators. Silber does not explore this fascinating alternate history possibility and does not give us the means with which to do so, never telling us what Volcker thought about Greenspan’s abandonment of monetary targets in 1993 and the post-1995 expansionism of Greenspan and his successor Ben Bernanke. Instead, he concentrates on Volcker’s efforts after 2009 to promote the Volcker Rule separating proprietary trading from commercial banking – in which Volcker was only an adviser, not a principal.
President Bill Clinton could have appointed Volcker Treasury secretary in 1992, but didn’t. In the end, there was demand for Volcker’s determined intelligence and steadfastness only in a crisis. If the Fed’s current ultra-loose policies have the same effect as the policies of the 1960s and 1970s, a similarly-minded successor may be needed.
November 11, 2012
The book is a substantial look at recent economic history of the US, delivered by following the career of Paul A. Volcker. I think it is largely successful in telling a difficult story well, particularly for anyone having an interest in the field. It is likely to leave those for whom economics is only a "dismal science" rather indifferent. On substance, I think the subtitle is amiss. Volcker was, and is, exceptionally persistent in that he has had a worldview and set of guiding principles throughout his long and distinguished public career. On this ground he succeeded brilliantly, and on a personal level perhaps deserves the accolade "triumphant." But the book is really more of an economic treatise than a biography; personal details are overwhelmed by the mass of material about the ins and outs of public policy and monetary theory. In that sense, Volcker would be the first, given his reported propensity for regarding the glass and half full, to recognize that all victories in this field are only temporary.
May 15, 2015
The author does a nice job explaining technical details of economics which is critical toward understanding the scenarios that central bankers face. It seems like the author is more interested in the statistical scenarios that Paul Volcker faced throughout his career rather than diverting attention on telling anecdotes of the personalities he worked with. In this case, although it makes for a more sobering read, I think the author was correct in fashioning his narrative in this matter. One sees incredible parallels between our current economic situation and the potential difficult situations we are going to face after several years of low interest rates and large budget deficits, and, as a result, one hopes there is a Paul Volcker out there in the wings, willing to do what is needed rather than what is politically expedient.
September 2, 2015
FYI- listened to audiobook
I enjoy discussions about economics, especially macro concepts that shape the national economy. This book requires a deep curiosity and determination to stick through lackluster story telling and horrible narration. The areas I was most interested in (high inflation in the 70s and the crisis of 2008) were glossed over which blew me away. I kept with the book hoping the 2008 crisis would receive more attention than the early 70s and in the end it did if only in terms of describing the conversations surrounding the Volcker rule.
The man seems fascinating and honest which could lead to a compelling story but that is NOT what this was. I learned at the end that the writer is a member of the financial industry and has intimate knowledge of the subject. Dear Publishers, just because someone understands a subject does not mean they are equipped to write about it!!
I enjoy discussions about economics, especially macro concepts that shape the national economy. This book requires a deep curiosity and determination to stick through lackluster story telling and horrible narration. The areas I was most interested in (high inflation in the 70s and the crisis of 2008) were glossed over which blew me away. I kept with the book hoping the 2008 crisis would receive more attention than the early 70s and in the end it did if only in terms of describing the conversations surrounding the Volcker rule.
The man seems fascinating and honest which could lead to a compelling story but that is NOT what this was. I learned at the end that the writer is a member of the financial industry and has intimate knowledge of the subject. Dear Publishers, just because someone understands a subject does not mean they are equipped to write about it!!
November 11, 2012
A tour de force that illuminates exactly how the seeds of our own financial destruction were laid not only with Reagan's deregulating insanity but as early as back in the 60s. This was a great read since my dad was a Professor of Money & Banking at Columbia and became fast friends with Paul Volcker back in the 60s when both were at Treasury, he as Undersecretary for Monetary Policy and my dad in the Comptroller's Office. As a 12-year old I'd go down and add up national banking figures on an "old" Pitney-Bowes adding machine, then go out with the "crew" for one of their famous 5-martini lunches.
January 19, 2016
One of the few biographies I've picked up that I actually finished. The received wisdom is that macroeconomics is the glamorous part of economics. I never understood that, always finding (the study of, not the practice of) macroeconomics dull and removed from daily reality, unlike microeconomics and its cousins game theory, psychology and behavioural economics. This book changed my mind -- macroeconomics can be interesting after all. The book is also genuinely inspirational when it comes to the bits of Volcker's life it documents. Silber could have gone into a little more detail about Volcker's personal life, but I wouldn't say the lack of detail tarnishes the book.
November 12, 2012
Not the fastest read in the world and a bit jumbled in places. Nice to see another Jersey Boy do the right thing for the U.S. I was amazed to see the financial hardship he and his wife endured while he was saving us from the demons of inflation. Hard to believe that only 30 years ago the world was so upset about crossing the $2 Trillion debt mark. We have added twice that just in the first 4 years of the Obama administration and are now at $16.2 Trillion. It was helpful to read this to understand the current "Volcker Rule" prosposed as part of Dodd Frank.
October 6, 2013
This book is a reminder of how monetary policy, like the theory of relativity, is one of those things that I can understand while I read about it, only to lose all comprehension of it afterward.
Parts of this biography approached hagiography, like this passage I underlined:
"Volker flourishes under pressure. His methodical reasoning slows everything down inside his head, the way a professional quarterback dissects the defense at the line of scrimmage. Crisis control is his favorite pastime."
Parts of this biography approached hagiography, like this passage I underlined:
"Volker flourishes under pressure. His methodical reasoning slows everything down inside his head, the way a professional quarterback dissects the defense at the line of scrimmage. Crisis control is his favorite pastime."
March 15, 2015
Paul Volcker is the man that broke the back of inflation while serving as head of the Federal Reserve in the late 70s and into the 80s. This laudatory biography of the man known as "Tall Paul" is interesting and despite the arcane subject matter of monetary policy, William Silber keeps the discussion on point and explains things in a way that should be understandable to most readers. The book would make a nice companion to Bob Woodward's Maestro for those who have that book in their library.
May 31, 2015
This is the second book after Greenspan's 'the map and the territory 2.0'. I like Silber writing on how research writing translated in relation to historical events to the impact on realizing its happened, will, and future forecast-ed events. It is like going back and forth dramatically. It is a good biography i ever read on economics.
My next reading hopes to cover on monetary policy in inflation and globalization reviews by next few writers. Financial specific books on next target for relation in between economics.
My next reading hopes to cover on monetary policy in inflation and globalization reviews by next few writers. Financial specific books on next target for relation in between economics.
Read
January 4, 2016This biography is about Paul Volcker, who was the treasurer for the federal reserve for many years. This book is a bit dry and boring at times, however, the ideas are very interesting. If you are interested in history, and how the government operates, this is a book for you. This book talks about how Volcker revolutionized the treasurer position through persistence and intelligence. It talks about the stock market crash of 1989, how inflation works, and many other events crucial to understanding the financial history of this country. I would recommend this to anyone interested in finance.
May 14, 2019
I reread this book again because I want to understand more in depth on the history of the fed. The chapters on how volcker help ending the gold standard and his fight against inflation is informative. However, this book is not very well written. At time I need to research further to get the concept right, and his excessive use of quotation makes it very hard to read. The topic is good but the biographer did a subpar job. I’m disappointed. It doesn’t surprise me volcker wrote another book himself years later.
September 26, 2012
This is a fine biography that confirms one's high opinion of the man who tamed inflation in the 1980s. There are also many parallels to the Fed's situation today - not least the need to resist political pressure.
The book is agreeably short and does a good job of explaining the economics. It does lose a bit pace as it goes on, however, and the author falls into some distracting patterns, such as ending every passage with a declarative sentence about what's coming next.
February 7, 2013
Interesting to learn about a man that has been through the ups and downs of many presidencies. Held positions from the Treasury to the Fed under Democrats and Republicans. A book that paints a sympathetic portrait of Paul Volcker. However, unless you have interest in the gold standard and/or interest rates, there's not a great reason to pick this book up.
September 29, 2015
Too many quotes and way less of stories provided. Only talked about Volcker's professional career. Seldom provided other people's opinion. In order to stick to this book, it requires enormous curiosity and determination.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
May 8, 2013
A readable book on the most important banker in modern America. I like that it focused on policy and politics rather than on trivial personal details.
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