What do you think?
Rate this book
Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present
As fitting for the twenty-first century as von Clausewitz’s On War was in its own time, Invisible Armies is a complete global history of guerrilla uprisings through the ages. Beginning with the first insurgencies in the ancient world―when Alexander the Great discovered that fleet nomads were harder to defeat than massive conventional armies―Max Boot, best-selling author and military advisor in Iraq and Afghanistan, masterfully guides us from the Jewish rebellion against the Roman Empire up through the horrors of the French-Indochina War and the shadowy, post-9/11 battlefields of today. Relying on a diverse cast of unforgettable characters―not only Mao and Che but also the legendary Italian nationalist Giuseppe Garibaldi, the archaeologist-turned–military commander T. E. Lawrence, and the “Quiet American” Edward Lansdale, among others―Boot explodes everything we thought we knew about unconventional combat. The result is both an enthralling read and our most important work on nontraditional warfare. 70 illustrations; 8 maps
784 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 2002
About the author
Max Boot
11 books184 followersAmerican author, consultant, editorialist, lecturer, and military historian. He self-identifies as a conservative, once joking that "I grew up in the 1980s, when conservatism was cool".Boot worked as a writer and editor for Christian Science Monitor and then for The Wall Street Journal in the 1990s. He is now Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He has written for numerous publications such as The Weekly Standard, The Los Angeles Times, and The New York Times, and he has also authored well-reviewed books of military history.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 140 reviews
February 7, 2017
It makes no difference what men think of war, said the judge. War endures. As well ask men what they think of stone. War was always here. Before man was, war waited for him. The ultimate trade awaiting its ultimate practitioner. That is the way it was and will be. That way and not some other way.
- Cormac McCarthy, Blood Meridian, or the Evening Redness in the West
With all due respect to prostitutes, war is mankind’s oldest profession. And guerrillas, Max Boot writes in Invisible Armies, were the oldest warriors, predating the conventional warfare made possible by the development of agricultural societies. Think David (of the sling) and his raids on Amalekite and Philistine settlements. Think Scythians pestering the Persians under Darius in Mesopotamia. Even with the creation of professional standing armies, guerrillas remained an important force. A way for the weak to stand up to the strong, using tactics such as assassination, terror, ambush, and attrition. Guerrillas existed at the dawn of recorded history. They are with us still today, refining their tactics with Twitter and Facebook and YouTube, along with old standbys such as homemade bombs.
Boot’s stated purpose in Invisible Armies was to produce a history of these guerrillas for the general reading public. I’ve seen some negative reviews bemoaning Invisible Armies’ perceived lack of military-scientific rigor. It’s not at all like On War by Clausewitz! they cry. Well, boo-hoo. This isn’t written for a professional audience; this isn’t a textbook for Staff College. This is an accessible survey of a somewhat esoteric subject, and I applaud Boot for attempting it. If you're interested in the topic, start here. Then check out the massive bibliography for more dedicated reading.
These guerrillas go by many names: insurgents; freedom fighters; terrorists. Their legitimacy, as Boot rightly notes, depends on your worldview. It's a thorny question that Boot ignores almost entirely. Invisible Armies spends precious little time on the context in which insurgencies erupt. You do not, for instance, get a lot of background on why American colonists revolted against Great Britain, or why the Vietcong turned on France. The root causes of Fidel's Cuban Revolution are barely hinted at. Instead, Boot focuses on the contours of the insurgency itself. He looks at how the insurgency was conducted and combated, and the lessons that can be drawn therefrom. The lack of context is unfortunate, if understandable due to Boot's ambitious scope and page limitations.
The first issue, before you can even start any insurgent history, is defining the parameters of what constitutes a guerrilla. Boot takes three pages to explain that there really isn’t a definition, aside from the literal meaning of guerrilla, which is “small war.” Thus, state actors such as the Vietcong, quasi-state actors such as American Indians, and non-state terrorists all sort of get lumped together. In the end, Boot gives up on precision. Like pornography, you know guerrillas when you see them.
The scope of Invisible Armies is massive. It has 555 pages of text, and spans from 2334 BC to 2011. Boot does a good job corralling this mass of information by carefully structuring the book into thematic sections. The chapters within these sections are short and typically chronological. The table of contents is an excellent road map. Getting lost is not a problem.
The problem is inconsistency.
Not all chapters are equally well done. Some of them should have been excised altogether. The chapters set in the ancient world, for instance, are entirely unnecessary. They are usually really brief and lacking in information. I understand Boot’s desire to have classical antecedents, but I found the early going to be a bit of a slog. The pacing picks up a lot once we leave Book I (on the origins of guerrilla warfare) and move into Book II (on the rise of liberal revolutions).
At its best Invisible Armies is entertaining history. Boot relies on set-piece storytelling and personalities. He hones in on individual battles and does a good job with thumbnail portraits of the participants, from Robert the Bruce to Che Guevara. While the overall sweep is epic, the in-chapter coverage is rather more intimate and human scaled.
Boot is a conservative historian who believes in a robust foreign policy. I suppose this probably colors his interpretations of events. Vietnam, for instance, is an example of an insurgency he thinks could have been successfully defeated, if only a little more elbow grease had been applied. This is a debatable proposition, but one that he passes off with glib self-assurance. His bias bleeds into his presentation of characters. When he talks about Che, he is sure to highlight his poor hygiene; meanwhile, when introducing David Petraeus, he goes into raptures about how many pushups he is able to pump out at a time. I didn't think this was a huge deal. I don’t like books where the history is interpreted through modern-day politics. You should follow the evidence, rather than shaping the evidence to fit the thesis. I didn't sense Boot trying to cram a worldview down my throat. This isn’t Carnage and Culture, which twisted, ignored, or misstated facts in order to prove a thesis. He is definitely advancing his viewpoint, but not in an off-putting, polemical fashion.
Boot provides what he calls his “Twelve Articles” (borrowed from T.E. Lawrence’s “27 Articles”) summing up the lessons of Invisible Armies. He talks about and applies these lessons throughout the book; however, he does not do so in a methodical way. The comparisons he makes between insurgencies are often fairly breezy. He doesn’t go into great depth. Certainly, this isn’t structured as a technical analysis. Like I said before, this is foremost a popular history meant for laypeople interested in the subject. Decent storytelling is its primary goal. Still, I found value in many of Boot’s insights. Certainly, it is interesting to apply Boot’s Articles to events such as the American Revolution or the American Indian Wars, and to view them through the paradigm of insurgency/counterinsurgency.
Invisible Armies was published in 2013, meaning that Boot could still write about David Petraeus’ ability to avoid “indiscretions” with a straight face. Of course, this means that ISIS - now the world’s preeminent insurgency – is not covered. Still, this feels a timely volume. Boot’s observations transfer neatly, making Invisible Armies a helpful tool in understanding a planet atremble with asymmetrical warfare.
- Cormac McCarthy, Blood Meridian, or the Evening Redness in the West
With all due respect to prostitutes, war is mankind’s oldest profession. And guerrillas, Max Boot writes in Invisible Armies, were the oldest warriors, predating the conventional warfare made possible by the development of agricultural societies. Think David (of the sling) and his raids on Amalekite and Philistine settlements. Think Scythians pestering the Persians under Darius in Mesopotamia. Even with the creation of professional standing armies, guerrillas remained an important force. A way for the weak to stand up to the strong, using tactics such as assassination, terror, ambush, and attrition. Guerrillas existed at the dawn of recorded history. They are with us still today, refining their tactics with Twitter and Facebook and YouTube, along with old standbys such as homemade bombs.
Boot’s stated purpose in Invisible Armies was to produce a history of these guerrillas for the general reading public. I’ve seen some negative reviews bemoaning Invisible Armies’ perceived lack of military-scientific rigor. It’s not at all like On War by Clausewitz! they cry. Well, boo-hoo. This isn’t written for a professional audience; this isn’t a textbook for Staff College. This is an accessible survey of a somewhat esoteric subject, and I applaud Boot for attempting it. If you're interested in the topic, start here. Then check out the massive bibliography for more dedicated reading.
These guerrillas go by many names: insurgents; freedom fighters; terrorists. Their legitimacy, as Boot rightly notes, depends on your worldview. It's a thorny question that Boot ignores almost entirely. Invisible Armies spends precious little time on the context in which insurgencies erupt. You do not, for instance, get a lot of background on why American colonists revolted against Great Britain, or why the Vietcong turned on France. The root causes of Fidel's Cuban Revolution are barely hinted at. Instead, Boot focuses on the contours of the insurgency itself. He looks at how the insurgency was conducted and combated, and the lessons that can be drawn therefrom. The lack of context is unfortunate, if understandable due to Boot's ambitious scope and page limitations.
The first issue, before you can even start any insurgent history, is defining the parameters of what constitutes a guerrilla. Boot takes three pages to explain that there really isn’t a definition, aside from the literal meaning of guerrilla, which is “small war.” Thus, state actors such as the Vietcong, quasi-state actors such as American Indians, and non-state terrorists all sort of get lumped together. In the end, Boot gives up on precision. Like pornography, you know guerrillas when you see them.
The scope of Invisible Armies is massive. It has 555 pages of text, and spans from 2334 BC to 2011. Boot does a good job corralling this mass of information by carefully structuring the book into thematic sections. The chapters within these sections are short and typically chronological. The table of contents is an excellent road map. Getting lost is not a problem.
The problem is inconsistency.
Not all chapters are equally well done. Some of them should have been excised altogether. The chapters set in the ancient world, for instance, are entirely unnecessary. They are usually really brief and lacking in information. I understand Boot’s desire to have classical antecedents, but I found the early going to be a bit of a slog. The pacing picks up a lot once we leave Book I (on the origins of guerrilla warfare) and move into Book II (on the rise of liberal revolutions).
At its best Invisible Armies is entertaining history. Boot relies on set-piece storytelling and personalities. He hones in on individual battles and does a good job with thumbnail portraits of the participants, from Robert the Bruce to Che Guevara. While the overall sweep is epic, the in-chapter coverage is rather more intimate and human scaled.
Boot is a conservative historian who believes in a robust foreign policy. I suppose this probably colors his interpretations of events. Vietnam, for instance, is an example of an insurgency he thinks could have been successfully defeated, if only a little more elbow grease had been applied. This is a debatable proposition, but one that he passes off with glib self-assurance. His bias bleeds into his presentation of characters. When he talks about Che, he is sure to highlight his poor hygiene; meanwhile, when introducing David Petraeus, he goes into raptures about how many pushups he is able to pump out at a time. I didn't think this was a huge deal. I don’t like books where the history is interpreted through modern-day politics. You should follow the evidence, rather than shaping the evidence to fit the thesis. I didn't sense Boot trying to cram a worldview down my throat. This isn’t Carnage and Culture, which twisted, ignored, or misstated facts in order to prove a thesis. He is definitely advancing his viewpoint, but not in an off-putting, polemical fashion.
Boot provides what he calls his “Twelve Articles” (borrowed from T.E. Lawrence’s “27 Articles”) summing up the lessons of Invisible Armies. He talks about and applies these lessons throughout the book; however, he does not do so in a methodical way. The comparisons he makes between insurgencies are often fairly breezy. He doesn’t go into great depth. Certainly, this isn’t structured as a technical analysis. Like I said before, this is foremost a popular history meant for laypeople interested in the subject. Decent storytelling is its primary goal. Still, I found value in many of Boot’s insights. Certainly, it is interesting to apply Boot’s Articles to events such as the American Revolution or the American Indian Wars, and to view them through the paradigm of insurgency/counterinsurgency.
Invisible Armies was published in 2013, meaning that Boot could still write about David Petraeus’ ability to avoid “indiscretions” with a straight face. Of course, this means that ISIS - now the world’s preeminent insurgency – is not covered. Still, this feels a timely volume. Boot’s observations transfer neatly, making Invisible Armies a helpful tool in understanding a planet atremble with asymmetrical warfare.
February 11, 2013
Who writes that stuff, the publisher's PR person?
".......As fitting for the twenty-first century as von Clausewitz’s On War was in its own time, Invisible Armies is a complete global history of guerrilla uprisings through the ages......."
Whoever wrote this has never read a single page of On War (Vom Kriege).
Mr Boot has put together a collection of anecdotes but no structural analysis. Von Clausewitz's masterpiece does the opposite. Calling Boot's compilation "epic" is bordering on the ridiculous - must be the same PR person who did that - and never mentioning his vile systematic bias against Islam due to whatever personal issues afflict the author really lets the reader down.
The only reason I gave this book 2 stars is that I believe the author is genuinely incapable of assessing his own bias - not least because it leads to policy prescription directly opposing the principles on which the United States was founded. No piling on of detail can alter that fundamental flaw.
".......As fitting for the twenty-first century as von Clausewitz’s On War was in its own time, Invisible Armies is a complete global history of guerrilla uprisings through the ages......."
Whoever wrote this has never read a single page of On War (Vom Kriege).
Mr Boot has put together a collection of anecdotes but no structural analysis. Von Clausewitz's masterpiece does the opposite. Calling Boot's compilation "epic" is bordering on the ridiculous - must be the same PR person who did that - and never mentioning his vile systematic bias against Islam due to whatever personal issues afflict the author really lets the reader down.
The only reason I gave this book 2 stars is that I believe the author is genuinely incapable of assessing his own bias - not least because it leads to policy prescription directly opposing the principles on which the United States was founded. No piling on of detail can alter that fundamental flaw.
September 27, 2013
This is an all-encompassing look at irregular warfare thru the ages. In the opening chapter Mr. Boot recounts the destruction of a Roman legion by what would now be termed irregular forces in Palestine before the epic Jewish Revolt in 66-70 AD. He then traces the conflicts between established militaries of the various states in history and irregular forces thru to the present day conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In looking at irregular warfare through the ages, Mr. Boot makes the assertion that while regular armies don’t want to fight these types of enemies and wars, they are the normal type of warfare. Irregular wars have been much more common that set piece battles. I personally thought it started slowly, but as it progressed to more modern times it picked up steam.
Not only does the author look at the evolution of guerrilla/irregular warfare he looks at the evolution of terrorism as a mode of war, starting from the Hassani, the Moslem sect that gave the world the word Assassin, through to the modern Islamic terrorists. Some of the terrorist groups he looks at include the KKK of the Post American Civil War, The Anarchists of Eastern Europe of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the German Bader-Meinhof gang/Red Brigades of the 1970s/’80s. While some were successful in obtaining there goals, specifically the KKK, for the most part the purely terrorist groups were failures.
In exploring the guerrilla wars, the author looks at those that were successful, specifically the North Vietnamese against the French and US and Castro in Cuba and draws some lessons on what it takes to run a successful guerrilla/insurgency operation. He also looks at the guerilla operations that were not successful, especially Malaysia and draws conclusions on how to fight a guerrilla enemy and conduct counter insurgency operations (COIN).
In looking at modern insurgencies, Mr. Boot explores the importance the media has gained to both the insurgents and the gov't. He makes the point that the media war has almost become more important than what is happening on the battlefield. He uses the American experience in Viet Nam and the French experience in Algeria to illustrate this point. In both cases the gov't forces had militarily defeated the insurgents, but lost the media war and thus lost the overall war.
The author also looks at the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East how COIN operations are working in the current conflicts.
Of necessity, some of the material is a bit superficial – Mr. Boot covers 3000 yrs in 570 pages, but I found this tome both enlightening and a good read. Solid 4 stars
In looking at irregular warfare through the ages, Mr. Boot makes the assertion that while regular armies don’t want to fight these types of enemies and wars, they are the normal type of warfare. Irregular wars have been much more common that set piece battles. I personally thought it started slowly, but as it progressed to more modern times it picked up steam.
Not only does the author look at the evolution of guerrilla/irregular warfare he looks at the evolution of terrorism as a mode of war, starting from the Hassani, the Moslem sect that gave the world the word Assassin, through to the modern Islamic terrorists. Some of the terrorist groups he looks at include the KKK of the Post American Civil War, The Anarchists of Eastern Europe of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the German Bader-Meinhof gang/Red Brigades of the 1970s/’80s. While some were successful in obtaining there goals, specifically the KKK, for the most part the purely terrorist groups were failures.
In exploring the guerrilla wars, the author looks at those that were successful, specifically the North Vietnamese against the French and US and Castro in Cuba and draws some lessons on what it takes to run a successful guerrilla/insurgency operation. He also looks at the guerilla operations that were not successful, especially Malaysia and draws conclusions on how to fight a guerrilla enemy and conduct counter insurgency operations (COIN).
In looking at modern insurgencies, Mr. Boot explores the importance the media has gained to both the insurgents and the gov't. He makes the point that the media war has almost become more important than what is happening on the battlefield. He uses the American experience in Viet Nam and the French experience in Algeria to illustrate this point. In both cases the gov't forces had militarily defeated the insurgents, but lost the media war and thus lost the overall war.
The author also looks at the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East how COIN operations are working in the current conflicts.
Of necessity, some of the material is a bit superficial – Mr. Boot covers 3000 yrs in 570 pages, but I found this tome both enlightening and a good read. Solid 4 stars
Read
April 5, 2013As with all nonfiction, no rating. Although if I did rate this book, it wouldn’t be very highly.
What initially attracted me to Invisible Armies was really the subtitle, An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present . My impression was that this would be a serious work of scholarship that would provide some sort of a well researched, well thought out survey of the evolution of guerrilla warfare from its ancient roots to the present, looking at both insurgency and counterinsurgency and how each side has adapted both to new technologies and new tactics deployed by the other. Looking at the prologue, I’m sure that was Max Boot’s goal as well.
Ultimately though, I’m disappointed because this is more of a superficial look behind the history of guerrilla warfare that goes from some basic facts about each conflict mentioned to a conclusory chapter at the end of each of the eight parts that makes some bold assertions based on the facts provided, but follows only on a generic level. It’s also quite clear that ancient history is way outside of Boot’s area of expertise, and Part One is a total mess as a result. The other parts are better as Boot’s familiarity with the subject matter improves, but most chapters still read like a mix between a history lesson, a bio of the important figures involved in the given conflict, and some political shilling, with not nearly enough emphasis on the tactics and takeaways of what actually happened. The best chapters deal with the Iraq War and War on Terrorism, which seems to be Boot’s real area of expertise, but they end up reading more like cheer-leading for the US government’s current counterinsurgency policies than an actual critique or analysis.
Basically, this would’ve been a much better book had Boot focused on the modern conflicts and then introduced lessons learned from conflicts past, rather than trying to write about so many different guerrilla wars and getting this really superficial and not at all epic ‘history’ instead.
What initially attracted me to Invisible Armies was really the subtitle, An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present . My impression was that this would be a serious work of scholarship that would provide some sort of a well researched, well thought out survey of the evolution of guerrilla warfare from its ancient roots to the present, looking at both insurgency and counterinsurgency and how each side has adapted both to new technologies and new tactics deployed by the other. Looking at the prologue, I’m sure that was Max Boot’s goal as well.
Ultimately though, I’m disappointed because this is more of a superficial look behind the history of guerrilla warfare that goes from some basic facts about each conflict mentioned to a conclusory chapter at the end of each of the eight parts that makes some bold assertions based on the facts provided, but follows only on a generic level. It’s also quite clear that ancient history is way outside of Boot’s area of expertise, and Part One is a total mess as a result. The other parts are better as Boot’s familiarity with the subject matter improves, but most chapters still read like a mix between a history lesson, a bio of the important figures involved in the given conflict, and some political shilling, with not nearly enough emphasis on the tactics and takeaways of what actually happened. The best chapters deal with the Iraq War and War on Terrorism, which seems to be Boot’s real area of expertise, but they end up reading more like cheer-leading for the US government’s current counterinsurgency policies than an actual critique or analysis.
Basically, this would’ve been a much better book had Boot focused on the modern conflicts and then introduced lessons learned from conflicts past, rather than trying to write about so many different guerrilla wars and getting this really superficial and not at all epic ‘history’ instead.
June 18, 2013
A total letdown. If your back of the book blurb is going to compare your book to Clausewitz, you'd better bring something better organized, better researched, and better executed than this. If you can't carry off an 'epic history of guerrilla warfare from ancient times to the present', it's perfectly fine to limit yourself to a particular timeframe you can handle with competence and coherence. Having chapters (or sections, or whatever the author intended them to be) a page and a half long that dispose of entire wars or even centuries' worth of history is ridiculous. Immensely disappointed in this, as it was a waste of time.
February 25, 2013
Probably the worst book I've read this year. The author makes many assertions, and provides nothing to back it up (I've reviewed his book elsewhere). What do I mean by this?
For example, Boot notes how Bin Laden's rag-tag militia botched an attempt to capture Jalalabad in 1989. What happened? Well, Boot tells us Bin Laden experienced a "costly" lost. How? We'll never know. But, rest assured, Bin Laden "knew how to turn battlefield defeats into propaganda victories" (p 519). How? Again, Boot leaves it to the reader's imagination to fill in the vast blank.
Boot discusses how Bin Laden rebuilds his organization during the early 1990s, while coping with severe financial constraints. How? He "raised funds" from "Gulf businessmen" and "Muslim charities" (p 522). What did he do? Boot never specifies, nor refers the reader to other literature.
Just horrible for anyone interested in military theory/history...
For example, Boot notes how Bin Laden's rag-tag militia botched an attempt to capture Jalalabad in 1989. What happened? Well, Boot tells us Bin Laden experienced a "costly" lost. How? We'll never know. But, rest assured, Bin Laden "knew how to turn battlefield defeats into propaganda victories" (p 519). How? Again, Boot leaves it to the reader's imagination to fill in the vast blank.
Boot discusses how Bin Laden rebuilds his organization during the early 1990s, while coping with severe financial constraints. How? He "raised funds" from "Gulf businessmen" and "Muslim charities" (p 522). What did he do? Boot never specifies, nor refers the reader to other literature.
Just horrible for anyone interested in military theory/history...
November 3, 2013
"A Cursory History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present" would have been a more apt subtitle. This book would have been better served if Mr. Boot spent half as many words detailing actual battles as he does giving biographies of the personalities involved. While it's a fun bit of trivia that Robert the Bruce had a dog trained so well that he could track Robert's scent from miles away, this hardly gives insight into his military strategy. Furthermore, I don't care that T.E. Lawrence was considered a "misfit" by his countrymen due to the nature of his birth, at least not in the context of this book. I would much rather read detailed accounts of their battlefield accomplishments and failings than of their personal lives.
July 28, 2021
According to pervasive belief, guerrilla warfare is a new way of conducting alternative war, discovered by a stroke of brilliance by Mao in the Yenan period, and later productively applied to other parts of the world by left-wing revolutionary movements. Observers with a longer memory point to Τ. E. Lawrence as the grand pioneer of modern guerrilla warfare; some go even further back recalling the Spanish confrontation against Napoleon.
As it happens, guerrilla warfare is as old as the hills and predates customary warfare. Primitive warfare was, in any case, habitually rooted in surprise, the ambush and similar tactics. But too little is known about the subject.
‘Guerrilla’ plainly means “small war”; the name derives from the struggles of Spanish irregulars against Napoleon from 1808 to 1814, but the practice is as antique as mankind. It is conventionally used to depict the use of hit-and-run methods by an armed group directed principally against a government and its security forces for political or religious reasons.
Bandits in search of nothing more than lucre are excluded; they are as a rule not interested in shaking up the established order, just in profiting from it.
Most guerrillas belong to nonstate groups, but some are part of formal military units (nowadays known as Special Operations Forces) that are dispatched to operate behind enemy lines. Other irregulars may cooperate closely with conventional armies even if they are not officially enrolled in their ranks.
At the lowest level, guerrilla war has much in common with the small-unit tactics of conventional armies: both rely on ambush and rapid movement. The difference is that guerrilla warfare lacks front lines and large-scale, set-piece battles—the defining characteristics of conventional conflict.
Irregular forces and guerrilla tactics are mentioned, perhaps for the first time in recorded history, in the Anastas Papyrus of the 15th century B.C. Mursilis, the Hittite king, complains in a letter that "the irregulars did not dare to attack me in the daylight and preferred to fall on me by night." While peeved, Mursilis obviously lived to tell the tale.
Guerrilla tactics, evidently, predate recorded history, as indeed they predate regular warfare. In Melanesia, the chosen practice was for the warriors to attack when the enemy was at its sleepiest and most unwary; the same approach was used by the Kiwai in New Guinea. The southeastern Indians of North America liked to be pursued by the foe so that they could lure him into the hollow of a crescent formation. The mock retreat and the ambush were also known to many other tribes; a classic description is in Joshua 8.
Generally speaking, primitive people had an aversion to open fighting. But shock and trick have their use in every military conflict and there are fundamental differences between primitive and guerrilla wars. Far more often than not, the former consisted of intermittent, unorganized sorties, hit-and-run raids, the object being either to plunder or to seek retribution for some complaint such as trespass, personal injury, or wife stealing.
Primitive warfare evolved in small tribal social groups who had no capacity for any sustained effort such as protracted war; the scope of movement was quite restricted, and ideological issues were certainly not involved.
The Bible too, mentions guerrilla leaders such as Jiftah and David.
In the Introduction to his book, the author Max Boot notes: ‘The aim of Invisible Armies is to deliver precisely such a narrative, telling the story of irregular warfare from its origins in the prehistoric world to the contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. The aim is to show low-intensity conflict in its most important variations and manifestations over the centuries. The primary focus is on the last two centuries, but the first part of the book examines guerrilla warfare in the ancient and medieval worlds in order to place more recent developments in perspective.’
This enormously detailed book is chiefly divided into eight parts, each part possessing detailed sub-sections. The primary eight sections are:
1. BARBARIANS AT THE GATE - The Origins of Guerrilla Warfare
2. LIBERTY OR DEATH - The Rise of the Liberal Revolutionaries
3. THE SPREADING OIL SPOT - The Wars of Empire
4. THE BOMB THROWERS - The First Age of International Terrorism
5. THE SIDESHOWS - Guerrillas and Commandos in the World Wars
6. THE END OF EMPIRE - The Wars of “National Liberation”
7. RADICAL CHIC - The Romance of the Leftist Revolutionaries
8. GOD’S KILLERS - The Rise of Radical Islam
The first part of this book ‘BARBARIANS AT THE GATE’ looks at the sources of the oldest form of warfare, beginning in the mists of time with prehistoric tribal warfare, continuing to primeval Mesopotamia, Rome, and China, and concluding with the medieval scuffles between the Scots and the English.
The second section ‘LIBERTY OR DEATH’ focuses on the guerrilla campaigns that resulted from the liberal revolutions that swept the world from roughly the 1770s to the 1870s. Meticulous stress is placed on 1) American War of Independence, 2) but on the Spanish struggle against Napoleon, the Haitian slave revolt, the Greek War of Independence against the Ottomans, and Garibaldi’s campaigns for Italian unification. Many of these campaigns are as revealing as the U.S. Revolution, and yet in recent years they have received far less attention than they deserve—an omission that this book attempts to address.
The third part of the book ‘THE SPREADING OIL SPOT’ scrutinizes another facet of 19th century guerrilla warfare — the crusades waged by Europeans to repress “native” resistance to imperial rule. In this part, the author focuses on 1) the American Indian wars, 2) the Russian war in Chechnya and Dagestan against Muslim insurgents, 3) the First Afghan War and subsequent campaigns pitting Britons against Pashtuns on the Northwest Frontier of India, 4) the French pacification of Morocco, and, lastly, 5) the Boer War, which revealed the first signs of the frailty of European rule.
In section four, ‘THE BOMB THROWERS’ the narrative heads off from guerrilla warfare and closely monitors the related growth of terrorism. The preliminary focus is on one of the first terrorist campaigns ever, waged by the Assassins in the medieval Middle East. Thereafter, the author takes a peek at two terrorist campaigns in 19th century America that were among the most successful ever but are often neglected in discussions of the subject —explicitly, 1) John Brown’s attacks on proslavery interests and 2) the Ku Klux Klan’s efforts to undermine Reconstruction. The discussion then switches to Europe, exclusively 1) the assaults by Russian Nihilists and socialists on the tsarist state and 2) by the IRA on British rule in Ireland.
The fifth part of the book ‘THE SIDESHOWS’ examines the guerrilla campaigns that arose out of World Wars I and II, focusing on T. E. Lawrence, Orde Wingate, and Josip Broz Tito — all amazing leaders of irregulars who left a big mark on the postwar world.
With a focus on the Asian and African theaters, the sixth part of the book ‘THE END OF EMPIRE’ chronicles the Chinese revolution in addition to the post-1945 decolonization struggles in Indochina, Algeria, and Malaya that were inspired by Mao Zedong’s model.
The seventh section ‘RADICAL CHIC’ investigates the the leftist guerrilla and terrorist groups since the 1950s. The focus is first on the Huks in the Philippines and the Vietcong in Vietnam. This is followed by Fidel Castro’s uprising in Cuba and Che Guevara’s failed attempts to spread the Cuban revolution elsewhere. Then the author initiates an examination of the terrorist groups of the 1970s, such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and, to conclude, the long, up-and-down career of Yasser Arafat and of the PLO.
The last part of the narrative ‘GOD’S KILLERS’ deals with the rise of Islamist militancy, which circa 1979 displaced leftist ideology as the prime rousing force for the guerrillas and terrorists who inspired the most dread in the West. The author looks at the efforts of the mujahideen to drive the Red Army out of Afghanistan, then at the emergence of Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, and ends with the rise and fall of the Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Out of this 5000-year historical narrative, the following underscored points come into view:
1. The geographical milieu has always been of importance. Guerrilla movements have more often than not preferred regions that are not effortlessly accessible (such as mountain ranges, forests, jungles, swamps) in which they are difficult to locate, and in which the enemy cannot deploy his full strength.
2. The etiology of guerrilla wars shows that it very often occurs in areas in which such wars have occurred before.
3• There is a (negative) correlation between guerrilla warfare and the degree of economic development. There have been few peasant guerrilla wars in modern times in which acute agrarian demands constituted the central issue (Mexico, the Philippines). On the other hand, in many more countries the peasantry has been the main reservoir of manpower for guerrilla armies led by nonpeasant elites.
4• Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries there have been three main species of guerrilla wars:
a) They have been directed against foreign occupants, either in the framework of a general war or after the defeat of the regular army and against colonial rule;
b) Guerrilla warfare has been the favourite tactic of separatist, minority movements fighting the central government (the Vendée, IMRO, IRA, ELF, the Basques, the Kurds, the FLQ, etc.);
c) Guerrilla warfare against native incumbents has been the rule in Latin America and in a few other countries (Burma, Thailand, etc.).
5• The nature of guerrilla war has undergone insightful changes during the last 200 years and so has regular war on the one hand, and the technique of revolution on the other. However, there is no explanation regarding modern guerrilla warfare (or "people's war," or revolutionary insurgency) as a totally new phenomenon which has little connection with the guerrilla wars of former periods.
6. The leadership of 19th and early 20th century guerrilla movements was usually in the hands of men of the people (Mina, the Empecinado, Andreas Hofer, Zapata, the Boer leaders, the IMRO). In backward countries they were conventionally led by tribal chiefs or religious dignitaries. More recently they have become, in general, the preserve of young intellectuals or semi-intellectuals; this refers particularly to Latin America and Africa with only a very few exceptions (Fabio Vasquez, Samora Machel).
7• To the extent that social composition is concerned, attention has been drawn to the fact that peasants conventionally constituted the most important mass basis of guerrilla movements, but conditions varied considerably from country to country even in the 19th century and there have been further changes since.
8. The motives that have induced men and women to join guerrilla bands are diverse. Historically, patriotism has been the single most important factor. Other chief factors include: a) the occupation of the homeland by foreigners, b) the resentment directed against the colonial power, c) personal complaints such as disgrace, material deprivation, brutalities committed by the occupying forces.
9. Organization, misinformation and terror have always been indispensable parts of guerrilla warfare, but their importance has to a great extent increased over the years and the techniques have been refined. Organization implies the existence of a political party or movement or at least a noncombatant fringe, semilegal or underground, providing assistance to the guerrillas — money, intelligence and special services.
10. The techniques and organizational forms of guerrilla warfare have varied extremely from country to country according to terrain, size and density of population, political constellation, etc. Thus, fairly perceptibly, guerrilla units in small countries have normally been small whereas in big countries they have been large.
11. Urban terrorism in different forms has existed throughout history; during the past decade it has become more frequent than rural guerrilla warfare. Some modern guerrilla movements were principally city-based; for instance, the IRA, EOKA, 1ZL and the Stern Gang, others were part urban (Algeria).
12. Guerrilla movements have commonly been beset by internal strife, within their own ranks or between rival groups. Internal dissent has been caused by wrangles about the strategy to be pursued (China, Greece) or by the conflicting ambitions of individual leaders (Frelimo, Columbia).
Guerrilla wars have been fought all through history by small peoples against invading or occupying armies, by regular soldiers operating in the enemy's rear, by peasants rising against big landowners, by bandits both "social" and asocial. They were infrequent in the 18th century, when austere rules for the conduct of warfare were generally observed.
Guerrilla methods were used in the southern theater in the American War of Independence and in the Napoleonic age by partisans in countries occupied by the French (Spain, southern Italy, Tyrol, Russia). With the appearance of mass armies in the nineteenth century, guerrilla warfare again declined but it lingered on in the wake of major wars (the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the Boer War) and in the crusades of national liberation movements (Italy, Poland, Ireland, Macedonia).
This book, though wearisome and data-drenched on occasion, makes for an inquisitive read.
As it happens, guerrilla warfare is as old as the hills and predates customary warfare. Primitive warfare was, in any case, habitually rooted in surprise, the ambush and similar tactics. But too little is known about the subject.
‘Guerrilla’ plainly means “small war”; the name derives from the struggles of Spanish irregulars against Napoleon from 1808 to 1814, but the practice is as antique as mankind. It is conventionally used to depict the use of hit-and-run methods by an armed group directed principally against a government and its security forces for political or religious reasons.
Bandits in search of nothing more than lucre are excluded; they are as a rule not interested in shaking up the established order, just in profiting from it.
Most guerrillas belong to nonstate groups, but some are part of formal military units (nowadays known as Special Operations Forces) that are dispatched to operate behind enemy lines. Other irregulars may cooperate closely with conventional armies even if they are not officially enrolled in their ranks.
At the lowest level, guerrilla war has much in common with the small-unit tactics of conventional armies: both rely on ambush and rapid movement. The difference is that guerrilla warfare lacks front lines and large-scale, set-piece battles—the defining characteristics of conventional conflict.
Irregular forces and guerrilla tactics are mentioned, perhaps for the first time in recorded history, in the Anastas Papyrus of the 15th century B.C. Mursilis, the Hittite king, complains in a letter that "the irregulars did not dare to attack me in the daylight and preferred to fall on me by night." While peeved, Mursilis obviously lived to tell the tale.
Guerrilla tactics, evidently, predate recorded history, as indeed they predate regular warfare. In Melanesia, the chosen practice was for the warriors to attack when the enemy was at its sleepiest and most unwary; the same approach was used by the Kiwai in New Guinea. The southeastern Indians of North America liked to be pursued by the foe so that they could lure him into the hollow of a crescent formation. The mock retreat and the ambush were also known to many other tribes; a classic description is in Joshua 8.
Generally speaking, primitive people had an aversion to open fighting. But shock and trick have their use in every military conflict and there are fundamental differences between primitive and guerrilla wars. Far more often than not, the former consisted of intermittent, unorganized sorties, hit-and-run raids, the object being either to plunder or to seek retribution for some complaint such as trespass, personal injury, or wife stealing.
Primitive warfare evolved in small tribal social groups who had no capacity for any sustained effort such as protracted war; the scope of movement was quite restricted, and ideological issues were certainly not involved.
The Bible too, mentions guerrilla leaders such as Jiftah and David.
In the Introduction to his book, the author Max Boot notes: ‘The aim of Invisible Armies is to deliver precisely such a narrative, telling the story of irregular warfare from its origins in the prehistoric world to the contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. The aim is to show low-intensity conflict in its most important variations and manifestations over the centuries. The primary focus is on the last two centuries, but the first part of the book examines guerrilla warfare in the ancient and medieval worlds in order to place more recent developments in perspective.’
This enormously detailed book is chiefly divided into eight parts, each part possessing detailed sub-sections. The primary eight sections are:
1. BARBARIANS AT THE GATE - The Origins of Guerrilla Warfare
2. LIBERTY OR DEATH - The Rise of the Liberal Revolutionaries
3. THE SPREADING OIL SPOT - The Wars of Empire
4. THE BOMB THROWERS - The First Age of International Terrorism
5. THE SIDESHOWS - Guerrillas and Commandos in the World Wars
6. THE END OF EMPIRE - The Wars of “National Liberation”
7. RADICAL CHIC - The Romance of the Leftist Revolutionaries
8. GOD’S KILLERS - The Rise of Radical Islam
The first part of this book ‘BARBARIANS AT THE GATE’ looks at the sources of the oldest form of warfare, beginning in the mists of time with prehistoric tribal warfare, continuing to primeval Mesopotamia, Rome, and China, and concluding with the medieval scuffles between the Scots and the English.
The second section ‘LIBERTY OR DEATH’ focuses on the guerrilla campaigns that resulted from the liberal revolutions that swept the world from roughly the 1770s to the 1870s. Meticulous stress is placed on 1) American War of Independence, 2) but on the Spanish struggle against Napoleon, the Haitian slave revolt, the Greek War of Independence against the Ottomans, and Garibaldi’s campaigns for Italian unification. Many of these campaigns are as revealing as the U.S. Revolution, and yet in recent years they have received far less attention than they deserve—an omission that this book attempts to address.
The third part of the book ‘THE SPREADING OIL SPOT’ scrutinizes another facet of 19th century guerrilla warfare — the crusades waged by Europeans to repress “native” resistance to imperial rule. In this part, the author focuses on 1) the American Indian wars, 2) the Russian war in Chechnya and Dagestan against Muslim insurgents, 3) the First Afghan War and subsequent campaigns pitting Britons against Pashtuns on the Northwest Frontier of India, 4) the French pacification of Morocco, and, lastly, 5) the Boer War, which revealed the first signs of the frailty of European rule.
In section four, ‘THE BOMB THROWERS’ the narrative heads off from guerrilla warfare and closely monitors the related growth of terrorism. The preliminary focus is on one of the first terrorist campaigns ever, waged by the Assassins in the medieval Middle East. Thereafter, the author takes a peek at two terrorist campaigns in 19th century America that were among the most successful ever but are often neglected in discussions of the subject —explicitly, 1) John Brown’s attacks on proslavery interests and 2) the Ku Klux Klan’s efforts to undermine Reconstruction. The discussion then switches to Europe, exclusively 1) the assaults by Russian Nihilists and socialists on the tsarist state and 2) by the IRA on British rule in Ireland.
The fifth part of the book ‘THE SIDESHOWS’ examines the guerrilla campaigns that arose out of World Wars I and II, focusing on T. E. Lawrence, Orde Wingate, and Josip Broz Tito — all amazing leaders of irregulars who left a big mark on the postwar world.
With a focus on the Asian and African theaters, the sixth part of the book ‘THE END OF EMPIRE’ chronicles the Chinese revolution in addition to the post-1945 decolonization struggles in Indochina, Algeria, and Malaya that were inspired by Mao Zedong’s model.
The seventh section ‘RADICAL CHIC’ investigates the the leftist guerrilla and terrorist groups since the 1950s. The focus is first on the Huks in the Philippines and the Vietcong in Vietnam. This is followed by Fidel Castro’s uprising in Cuba and Che Guevara’s failed attempts to spread the Cuban revolution elsewhere. Then the author initiates an examination of the terrorist groups of the 1970s, such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and, to conclude, the long, up-and-down career of Yasser Arafat and of the PLO.
The last part of the narrative ‘GOD’S KILLERS’ deals with the rise of Islamist militancy, which circa 1979 displaced leftist ideology as the prime rousing force for the guerrillas and terrorists who inspired the most dread in the West. The author looks at the efforts of the mujahideen to drive the Red Army out of Afghanistan, then at the emergence of Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, and ends with the rise and fall of the Al Qaeda in Iraq.
Out of this 5000-year historical narrative, the following underscored points come into view:
1. The geographical milieu has always been of importance. Guerrilla movements have more often than not preferred regions that are not effortlessly accessible (such as mountain ranges, forests, jungles, swamps) in which they are difficult to locate, and in which the enemy cannot deploy his full strength.
2. The etiology of guerrilla wars shows that it very often occurs in areas in which such wars have occurred before.
3• There is a (negative) correlation between guerrilla warfare and the degree of economic development. There have been few peasant guerrilla wars in modern times in which acute agrarian demands constituted the central issue (Mexico, the Philippines). On the other hand, in many more countries the peasantry has been the main reservoir of manpower for guerrilla armies led by nonpeasant elites.
4• Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries there have been three main species of guerrilla wars:
a) They have been directed against foreign occupants, either in the framework of a general war or after the defeat of the regular army and against colonial rule;
b) Guerrilla warfare has been the favourite tactic of separatist, minority movements fighting the central government (the Vendée, IMRO, IRA, ELF, the Basques, the Kurds, the FLQ, etc.);
c) Guerrilla warfare against native incumbents has been the rule in Latin America and in a few other countries (Burma, Thailand, etc.).
5• The nature of guerrilla war has undergone insightful changes during the last 200 years and so has regular war on the one hand, and the technique of revolution on the other. However, there is no explanation regarding modern guerrilla warfare (or "people's war," or revolutionary insurgency) as a totally new phenomenon which has little connection with the guerrilla wars of former periods.
6. The leadership of 19th and early 20th century guerrilla movements was usually in the hands of men of the people (Mina, the Empecinado, Andreas Hofer, Zapata, the Boer leaders, the IMRO). In backward countries they were conventionally led by tribal chiefs or religious dignitaries. More recently they have become, in general, the preserve of young intellectuals or semi-intellectuals; this refers particularly to Latin America and Africa with only a very few exceptions (Fabio Vasquez, Samora Machel).
7• To the extent that social composition is concerned, attention has been drawn to the fact that peasants conventionally constituted the most important mass basis of guerrilla movements, but conditions varied considerably from country to country even in the 19th century and there have been further changes since.
8. The motives that have induced men and women to join guerrilla bands are diverse. Historically, patriotism has been the single most important factor. Other chief factors include: a) the occupation of the homeland by foreigners, b) the resentment directed against the colonial power, c) personal complaints such as disgrace, material deprivation, brutalities committed by the occupying forces.
9. Organization, misinformation and terror have always been indispensable parts of guerrilla warfare, but their importance has to a great extent increased over the years and the techniques have been refined. Organization implies the existence of a political party or movement or at least a noncombatant fringe, semilegal or underground, providing assistance to the guerrillas — money, intelligence and special services.
10. The techniques and organizational forms of guerrilla warfare have varied extremely from country to country according to terrain, size and density of population, political constellation, etc. Thus, fairly perceptibly, guerrilla units in small countries have normally been small whereas in big countries they have been large.
11. Urban terrorism in different forms has existed throughout history; during the past decade it has become more frequent than rural guerrilla warfare. Some modern guerrilla movements were principally city-based; for instance, the IRA, EOKA, 1ZL and the Stern Gang, others were part urban (Algeria).
12. Guerrilla movements have commonly been beset by internal strife, within their own ranks or between rival groups. Internal dissent has been caused by wrangles about the strategy to be pursued (China, Greece) or by the conflicting ambitions of individual leaders (Frelimo, Columbia).
Guerrilla wars have been fought all through history by small peoples against invading or occupying armies, by regular soldiers operating in the enemy's rear, by peasants rising against big landowners, by bandits both "social" and asocial. They were infrequent in the 18th century, when austere rules for the conduct of warfare were generally observed.
Guerrilla methods were used in the southern theater in the American War of Independence and in the Napoleonic age by partisans in countries occupied by the French (Spain, southern Italy, Tyrol, Russia). With the appearance of mass armies in the nineteenth century, guerrilla warfare again declined but it lingered on in the wake of major wars (the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the Boer War) and in the crusades of national liberation movements (Italy, Poland, Ireland, Macedonia).
This book, though wearisome and data-drenched on occasion, makes for an inquisitive read.
Shelved as 'books-i-m-not-going-to-finish'
August 21, 2013Meh. I'm not giving it a rating, since I didn't read enough to do so fairly, but here are my thoughts.
First, this was a "first this happened then that happened then another thing happened" kind of history. Not especially interesting.
Second, I'm not sure that the author says anything all that new. Yes, guerrilla warfare (or asymmetrical warfare) has been around for a long time and is challenging to fight against. I read the newspaper, I get it.
Third, it's very disorganized and the chapters are too short to have any heft to them. Chapter 1, Romans vs. Jews, AD 66, was 3 pages long. The next chapter (4 pages) then covers 426 BC to 132 AD, and covers the material in the first chapter, in part.
Maybe it gets better after page 75, but I'm not going to find out.
First, this was a "first this happened then that happened then another thing happened" kind of history. Not especially interesting.
Second, I'm not sure that the author says anything all that new. Yes, guerrilla warfare (or asymmetrical warfare) has been around for a long time and is challenging to fight against. I read the newspaper, I get it.
Third, it's very disorganized and the chapters are too short to have any heft to them. Chapter 1, Romans vs. Jews, AD 66, was 3 pages long. The next chapter (4 pages) then covers 426 BC to 132 AD, and covers the material in the first chapter, in part.
Maybe it gets better after page 75, but I'm not going to find out.
March 12, 2013
Didn't finish this one, kinda boring.
April 9, 2020
Summary:
This is a survey of how guerrilla warfare (and/or terrorism) has been used by various groups to try to usurp a larger foe. By extension, it also highlights the counterinsurgency attempted to quell such insurrections. It in no way attempts to be the end-all-be-all authority on guerrilla warfare. It is giving an overview of guerrilla warfare throughout history and the people who fought. This is NOT a military analysis of the tactics used, being broken down and examined in West Point fashion. This is a summary of how guerrilla warfare has been implemented over time and the key players involved.
Layout: It is divided into eight parts, with roughly 6 to 12 chapters in each part. Each chapter gives a summary of the guerrilla group (or groups) and the historical event in which they played a role. Throughout the book, Boot goes over what makes a guerrilla versus a terrorist; what ploys and tactics worked the best; and how the overall core of guerrilla warfare has stayed the same over centuries yet uses the advancements of the times to its advantage.
Here is the breakdown of the book:
Part 1, Barbarians at the Gate: Origins of Guerrilla Warfare (ancient examples)
-Romans vs. Jews, AD 66
-The Peloponnesian War, Alexander the Great in Central Asia, the Maccabees, and the Bar Kokhba Revolt, 426 BC-AD 132
-Tribal Wars of Mass Destruction
-Mesopotamia, 2334-2005 BC
-Persians vs. Scythians, 512 BC
-Origins of Counterinsurgency in Assyria and Rome, 1100 BC-AD 212
-The Barbarian Invasions, AD 370-476
-Ancient Chinese Warfare beyond Sun Tzu
-Xiongnu vs. Han, 200 BC-AD 48
-Why the Weak Beat the Strong
-Scotland vs. England, 1296-1746
-The Counterinsurgents' Advantage (summary of Part 1)
Part 2, Liberty or Death: The Rise of the Liberal Revolutionaries
-Hussars, Pandours, and Rangers, 1648-1775
-The Revolution against Britain, 1775-1783
-The Peninsular War, 1808-1814
-The Haitian War of Independence, 1791-1804
-The Greek War of Independence, 1821-1832
-Giuseppe Garibaldi and the Struggle for Italian Unification, 1833-1872
-The Liberal Achievement (summary of Part 2)
Part 3, The Spreading Oil Spot: The Wars of Empire
-Why Did So Few Guerrillas Resist the European Advance?
-The "Forest Wars" in Eastern North America, 1622-1842
-Braves vs. Bluecoats, 1848-1890
-The Holy War against Russia in Chechnya and Dagestan, 1829-1859
-The First Anglo-Afghan War, 1838-1842
-Britain and the Pashtuns, 1897-1947
-Lyautey in Morocco, 1912-1925
-Britain's Near-Defeat in South Africa, 1899-1902
-Why Imperialism Carried the Seeds of Its Own Destruction (summary of Part 3)
Part 4, The Bomb Throwers: The First Age of International Terrorism
-The Assassins, AD 1090-1256
-John Brown: The Terrorist Who Helped Start the Civil War, 1856-1859
-Ku Kluxers and the War against Civil Rights, 1866-1876
-Anarchists, ca. 1880 -ca. 1939
-The Nihilists on the Trail of Alexander II, 1879-1881
-Socialist Revolutionaries in Russia, 1902-1917
-The Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921
-Sinners or Saints? (summary of Part 4)
Part 5, The Sideshows: Guerrillas and Commandos in the World Wars
-Blood Brothers and Brownshirts, 1914-1945
-"Lawrence of Arabia," 1916-1935
-The Birth of the Special Forces in World War II
-Wingate: A "Wayward Genius" in Palestine, Abyssinia, and Burma, 1936-1944
-Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, and the Limits of Scorched-Earth Counterinsurgency
-Did Commandos Make a Difference? (summary of Part 5)
Part 6, The End of Empire: The Wars of "National Liberation"
-The Slipping European Grip
-Mao Zedong's Long March to Power, 1921-1949
-The Indochina War, 1945-1954
-The Algerian War of Independence, 1954-1962
-Briggs, Templer, and the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960
-Why the British Succeeded - at Least Sometimes (summary of Part 6)
Part 7, Radical Chic: The Romance of the Leftist Revolutionaries
-The Guerrilla Mystique in the 1960s-1970s
-Edward Lansdale and the Huk Rebellion, 1945-1954
-South Vietnam: Lansdale and Diem, 1954-1956
-The Limitations of Firepower in Vietnam, 1960-1973
-Castro's Improbable Comeback, 1952-1959
-Che's Quixotic Quest, 1965-1967
-The Raid on Entebbe and the Terrorism of the 1970s
-Arafat: What Terrorism Did and Did Not Achieve for the Palestinians
-The End of the (Marxist) Affair in the 1980s (summary of Part 7)
Part 8, God's Killers: The Rise of Radical Islam
-Tehran, Mecca, Islamabad, and Kabul, November 4-December 24, 1979
-The Red Army vs. the Mujahideen, 1980-1989
-The "Party of God" (Hezbollah) in Lebanon, 1982-2006
-Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, 1988-2011
-Al Qaeda in Iraq since 2003
-David Petraeus and the Surge, 2007-2008
-The Failures and Successes of the Global Islamist Insurgency (summary of Part 8)
Epilogue
Twelve Articles, or the Lessons of Five Thousand Years (12 lessons learned from the book)
My Review: Overall, I found this book to be well-researched and in-depth in terms of an overview of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and counterinsurgency. Yes, each chapter had to be very concise on the subject addressed, otherwise this book would have needed to be multiple volumes long. For a single-volume study encompassing five thousand years of irregular warfare, I think it did a good job. It gives you a good jumping-off point to start at. From there, I think it's your job to look into the subject further by deciding which sub-topic or era you want to pinpoint your studies.
Layout: It is divided into eight parts, with roughly 6 to 12 chapters in each part. Each chapter gives a summary of the guerrilla group (or groups) and the historical event in which they played a role. Throughout the book, Boot goes over what makes a guerrilla versus a terrorist; what ploys and tactics worked the best; and how the overall core of guerrilla warfare has stayed the same over centuries yet uses the advancements of the times to its advantage.
Here is the breakdown of the book:
Part 1, Barbarians at the Gate: Origins of Guerrilla Warfare (ancient examples)
-Romans vs. Jews, AD 66
-The Peloponnesian War, Alexander the Great in Central Asia, the Maccabees, and the Bar Kokhba Revolt, 426 BC-AD 132
-Tribal Wars of Mass Destruction
-Mesopotamia, 2334-2005 BC
-Persians vs. Scythians, 512 BC
-Origins of Counterinsurgency in Assyria and Rome, 1100 BC-AD 212
-The Barbarian Invasions, AD 370-476
-Ancient Chinese Warfare beyond Sun Tzu
-Xiongnu vs. Han, 200 BC-AD 48
-Why the Weak Beat the Strong
-Scotland vs. England, 1296-1746
-The Counterinsurgents' Advantage (summary of Part 1)
Part 2, Liberty or Death: The Rise of the Liberal Revolutionaries
-Hussars, Pandours, and Rangers, 1648-1775
-The Revolution against Britain, 1775-1783
-The Peninsular War, 1808-1814
-The Haitian War of Independence, 1791-1804
-The Greek War of Independence, 1821-1832
-Giuseppe Garibaldi and the Struggle for Italian Unification, 1833-1872
-The Liberal Achievement (summary of Part 2)
Part 3, The Spreading Oil Spot: The Wars of Empire
-Why Did So Few Guerrillas Resist the European Advance?
-The "Forest Wars" in Eastern North America, 1622-1842
-Braves vs. Bluecoats, 1848-1890
-The Holy War against Russia in Chechnya and Dagestan, 1829-1859
-The First Anglo-Afghan War, 1838-1842
-Britain and the Pashtuns, 1897-1947
-Lyautey in Morocco, 1912-1925
-Britain's Near-Defeat in South Africa, 1899-1902
-Why Imperialism Carried the Seeds of Its Own Destruction (summary of Part 3)
Part 4, The Bomb Throwers: The First Age of International Terrorism
-The Assassins, AD 1090-1256
-John Brown: The Terrorist Who Helped Start the Civil War, 1856-1859
-Ku Kluxers and the War against Civil Rights, 1866-1876
-Anarchists, ca. 1880 -ca. 1939
-The Nihilists on the Trail of Alexander II, 1879-1881
-Socialist Revolutionaries in Russia, 1902-1917
-The Irish War of Independence, 1919-1921
-Sinners or Saints? (summary of Part 4)
Part 5, The Sideshows: Guerrillas and Commandos in the World Wars
-Blood Brothers and Brownshirts, 1914-1945
-"Lawrence of Arabia," 1916-1935
-The Birth of the Special Forces in World War II
-Wingate: A "Wayward Genius" in Palestine, Abyssinia, and Burma, 1936-1944
-Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, and the Limits of Scorched-Earth Counterinsurgency
-Did Commandos Make a Difference? (summary of Part 5)
Part 6, The End of Empire: The Wars of "National Liberation"
-The Slipping European Grip
-Mao Zedong's Long March to Power, 1921-1949
-The Indochina War, 1945-1954
-The Algerian War of Independence, 1954-1962
-Briggs, Templer, and the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960
-Why the British Succeeded - at Least Sometimes (summary of Part 6)
Part 7, Radical Chic: The Romance of the Leftist Revolutionaries
-The Guerrilla Mystique in the 1960s-1970s
-Edward Lansdale and the Huk Rebellion, 1945-1954
-South Vietnam: Lansdale and Diem, 1954-1956
-The Limitations of Firepower in Vietnam, 1960-1973
-Castro's Improbable Comeback, 1952-1959
-Che's Quixotic Quest, 1965-1967
-The Raid on Entebbe and the Terrorism of the 1970s
-Arafat: What Terrorism Did and Did Not Achieve for the Palestinians
-The End of the (Marxist) Affair in the 1980s (summary of Part 7)
Part 8, God's Killers: The Rise of Radical Islam
-Tehran, Mecca, Islamabad, and Kabul, November 4-December 24, 1979
-The Red Army vs. the Mujahideen, 1980-1989
-The "Party of God" (Hezbollah) in Lebanon, 1982-2006
-Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, 1988-2011
-Al Qaeda in Iraq since 2003
-David Petraeus and the Surge, 2007-2008
-The Failures and Successes of the Global Islamist Insurgency (summary of Part 8)
Epilogue
Twelve Articles, or the Lessons of Five Thousand Years (12 lessons learned from the book)
My Review: Overall, I found this book to be well-researched and in-depth in terms of an overview of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and counterinsurgency. Yes, each chapter had to be very concise on the subject addressed, otherwise this book would have needed to be multiple volumes long. For a single-volume study encompassing five thousand years of irregular warfare, I think it did a good job. It gives you a good jumping-off point to start at. From there, I think it's your job to look into the subject further by deciding which sub-topic or era you want to pinpoint your studies.
March 14, 2021
I will begin with the positive aspect of this book - it does a good job of collecting a large variety of historical examples of guerilla and irregular warfare from history into one volume. In a way, it's a good reference for examples to learn more about through more detailed reading, presented as a collection of graduate level essays on examples of irregular warfare.
Ok, that's out of the way.
This is not a good history book. The problems mount irreparably in the Prologue, where Boot defines guerilla groups and terrorist groups. This is a good standard to have in a complex discussion - define your terms. The problem is when you define them in an objectively false way such as "terrorist groups don't hold territory or govern" which blatantly ignores both contemporary and historical examples of precisely this. Of course, when the author then discusses the IRA in the early 20th century, and specifically highlights "many areas [...] Even ran a shadow government, complete with its own police force and courts, that was more effective in dispensing justices than the crown." If you're invalidating your core definitions that frame the entire work, the work is rendered suspect.
Then we get to the fact that it's incredibly clear that Boot came into this book with conclusions in mind. Public opinion being a big factor in post 1775 insurgency, which he notes as clearly being a sea change through the British capitulation in America post Yorktown. It was public sentiment in the UK that drove this, in his "interesting" reading of history. Boot reiterates this in the epilogue, as well. Of course, this completely ignores the fact that the war in America was not existential to the British Empire and was burning money at such a rate as to threaten the solvency of the Crown. All while a war was ongoing with the French. This is classic writing to a conclusion, and is really disappointing. Then there is the example of the Nazi counter-insurgency failures in the Balkans, showing that autocratic regimes with no need to mitigate violent tactics fail. Of course, Boot doesn't contrast this with the Nazi successes in counter-insurgency in Austria, Poland, Italy, or France (for the majority of the war). Maybe it's because of space constraints (this book is too long to believe that). But more likely, it's because that muddies his desired conclusion.
Throughout the tome, Boot tosses in little historical points of fact that lend credence to his overall thesis. The problem is, so many of these factoids are blatantly false. "Reconstruction Era terrorism was rural" - no, no it really was not. Torture not working is a "myth" as "if that were the case, the prevalence of harsh interrogation methods [...] would be inexplicable." What's inexplicable is the fact that there is actual historical and psychological research on precisely this point going back many, many decades that specifically show this to empirically be false! Iran gave up on hostage taking in 1992. As Boot wrote this book, Iran was continuing its hostage taking with the arrest of three American hikers in a VERY public disputed case, and specifically used that point in ongoing negotiations with the West.
But the most egregious portion of this book comes in Iraq. As written in the epilogue, insurgencies tend to run long in length, especially post-1945. As of the writing of this book, the Iraq insurgency would have reached the halfway point of the average length, per Boot. He defines this insurgency as being done and defeated in a chapter filled with hagiography for General David Patreaus.
The descriptions of Patreaus, naturally, did not age well - much of what was praised are now seen as massive red flags that contributed directly to his downfall as a leader. Then there is the fact that the insurgency was not, in fact, defeated, and actually ballooned into a successful governing terrorist movement that seized and governed much of Eastern Syria (again, note how this shows the predictive nature of that objectively wrong prologue definition stacks up with events).
This is really an unnecessary book. It would function better as a detailed reference outline/bibliography for further reading, as the analytic portions of the book are riddled with basic errors or say virtually nothing of consequence. This review of Boot's "The Savage Wars of Peace" from the Journal of Cold War Studies is the perfect summation of Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present - "Boot did none of the critical research, and thus the inferences he draws from his uncritical rendition of history are essentially meaningless."
Ok, that's out of the way.
This is not a good history book. The problems mount irreparably in the Prologue, where Boot defines guerilla groups and terrorist groups. This is a good standard to have in a complex discussion - define your terms. The problem is when you define them in an objectively false way such as "terrorist groups don't hold territory or govern" which blatantly ignores both contemporary and historical examples of precisely this. Of course, when the author then discusses the IRA in the early 20th century, and specifically highlights "many areas [...] Even ran a shadow government, complete with its own police force and courts, that was more effective in dispensing justices than the crown." If you're invalidating your core definitions that frame the entire work, the work is rendered suspect.
Then we get to the fact that it's incredibly clear that Boot came into this book with conclusions in mind. Public opinion being a big factor in post 1775 insurgency, which he notes as clearly being a sea change through the British capitulation in America post Yorktown. It was public sentiment in the UK that drove this, in his "interesting" reading of history. Boot reiterates this in the epilogue, as well. Of course, this completely ignores the fact that the war in America was not existential to the British Empire and was burning money at such a rate as to threaten the solvency of the Crown. All while a war was ongoing with the French. This is classic writing to a conclusion, and is really disappointing. Then there is the example of the Nazi counter-insurgency failures in the Balkans, showing that autocratic regimes with no need to mitigate violent tactics fail. Of course, Boot doesn't contrast this with the Nazi successes in counter-insurgency in Austria, Poland, Italy, or France (for the majority of the war). Maybe it's because of space constraints (this book is too long to believe that). But more likely, it's because that muddies his desired conclusion.
Throughout the tome, Boot tosses in little historical points of fact that lend credence to his overall thesis. The problem is, so many of these factoids are blatantly false. "Reconstruction Era terrorism was rural" - no, no it really was not. Torture not working is a "myth" as "if that were the case, the prevalence of harsh interrogation methods [...] would be inexplicable." What's inexplicable is the fact that there is actual historical and psychological research on precisely this point going back many, many decades that specifically show this to empirically be false! Iran gave up on hostage taking in 1992. As Boot wrote this book, Iran was continuing its hostage taking with the arrest of three American hikers in a VERY public disputed case, and specifically used that point in ongoing negotiations with the West.
But the most egregious portion of this book comes in Iraq. As written in the epilogue, insurgencies tend to run long in length, especially post-1945. As of the writing of this book, the Iraq insurgency would have reached the halfway point of the average length, per Boot. He defines this insurgency as being done and defeated in a chapter filled with hagiography for General David Patreaus.
The descriptions of Patreaus, naturally, did not age well - much of what was praised are now seen as massive red flags that contributed directly to his downfall as a leader. Then there is the fact that the insurgency was not, in fact, defeated, and actually ballooned into a successful governing terrorist movement that seized and governed much of Eastern Syria (again, note how this shows the predictive nature of that objectively wrong prologue definition stacks up with events).
This is really an unnecessary book. It would function better as a detailed reference outline/bibliography for further reading, as the analytic portions of the book are riddled with basic errors or say virtually nothing of consequence. This review of Boot's "The Savage Wars of Peace" from the Journal of Cold War Studies is the perfect summation of Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present - "Boot did none of the critical research, and thus the inferences he draws from his uncritical rendition of history are essentially meaningless."
March 30, 2017
A compelling survey of irregular warfare from the pre-Christian era to the present, "Invisible Armies" covers both guerrilla fighting, which Boot calls "the oldest form of warfare," and terrorism, which he considers "strikingly modern." While exhaustively researched, this is not a scholarly tome, but a lively account, betraying Boot's journalistic training, of when and how non-regular armies, be they partisans, guerrillas, or terrorists, have managed to achieve their aims--and when they haven't.
In a nutshell, Boot's argument is that small, irregular forces can win against larger armies when the smaller forces have popular support at home, ideally combined with external support and/or the approval of the broader public. Foreign occupiers trying to impose their will by main force will, no matter how great their firepower, have an uphill battle to fight, as the US found to its dismay in Vietnam. Successful counterinsurgency tactics will almost always rely on a combination of force with public relations; apparent exceptions, such as the Russian use of scorched-earth techniques in the Second Chechen War, actually prove the rule, as the Russian army was, technically, on its own territory, and was allied with the Kadyrov family.
While the concept is simple, arriving at it has not been, and Boot traces the fortunes of various insurgents and counterinsurgents through the ages, from ancient Mesopotamia to medieval Scotland, the American West, Algeria, Indochina, Afghanistan, and back to modern Mesopotamia, aka the Middle East. The circular structure is no accident, as Boot is, above all else, a master storyteller, and every chapter in the book is full of punchy phrases and vivid action. As I said above, this is an exhaustively researched piece of non-fiction, as well as weighing in at in impressive 700+ pages, but it is anything but dry. Serious scholars of warfare may find it too shallow for their liking, but readers looking for an introduction to the topic of irregular warfare are likely to find this informative, thought-provoking, and an absolutely cracking read.
In a nutshell, Boot's argument is that small, irregular forces can win against larger armies when the smaller forces have popular support at home, ideally combined with external support and/or the approval of the broader public. Foreign occupiers trying to impose their will by main force will, no matter how great their firepower, have an uphill battle to fight, as the US found to its dismay in Vietnam. Successful counterinsurgency tactics will almost always rely on a combination of force with public relations; apparent exceptions, such as the Russian use of scorched-earth techniques in the Second Chechen War, actually prove the rule, as the Russian army was, technically, on its own territory, and was allied with the Kadyrov family.
While the concept is simple, arriving at it has not been, and Boot traces the fortunes of various insurgents and counterinsurgents through the ages, from ancient Mesopotamia to medieval Scotland, the American West, Algeria, Indochina, Afghanistan, and back to modern Mesopotamia, aka the Middle East. The circular structure is no accident, as Boot is, above all else, a master storyteller, and every chapter in the book is full of punchy phrases and vivid action. As I said above, this is an exhaustively researched piece of non-fiction, as well as weighing in at in impressive 700+ pages, but it is anything but dry. Serious scholars of warfare may find it too shallow for their liking, but readers looking for an introduction to the topic of irregular warfare are likely to find this informative, thought-provoking, and an absolutely cracking read.
July 3, 2018
A very thorough, comprehensive and fascinatingly readable treatise on the history of guerrilla warfare, Max Boot del vets his Opus on the subject. Boot expertly traces the history of the topic in detail yet does so in a manner the reader wants to continue turning on ages to the end. From antiquity to present day, Boot’s flair for research and detail shines through. Not content to stop at this history review, he provides a complete implications and database at the end, allowing readers and researchers alike to continue their personal and/or professional studies and satisfy their curiosities, making it a true gem for the genre.
January 4, 2018
A difficult task it is; I can't deny it: thousands of years of fighting history into one single book... how can that be done? Only by making short chapters and each one filled with interesting pieces of information. And so has this book been created. But that is not enough for my taste. It's in the end a collection of many little chapters, however amusing, that sooner or later will wear you down. Sometimes adding subtracts.
April 18, 2020
This is one of the worst books I have ever read, by one of the most consistently terrible political writers active today.
June 8, 2013
A superb and comprehensive review of over 4,000 years of guerrilla warfare. Detailed and thoroughly researched. Through the force of scholarship he describes the successes and failures of insurgents and counter-insurgents over the centuries. Providing invaluable insights available for policy-makers and policy-implementers alike should they choose to seek them.
Had the pleasure of meeting the author during my time in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2010. The scope and sweep of this historic survey of irregular warfare is reminiscent of a much shorter paper written by George S. Patton as a young officer at the War College.
By breaking this history into five era Boot shows the evolution of the guerrilla form of irregular warfare and its companion use of terrorism. He makes a compelling case that "low intensity" irregular and unconventional warfare rather than the conventional war of tanks and artillery has been the most prevalent form of warfare in history. His use of narrative provide case-studies that illustrate historic trends and recurring patterns.
Boot's first-hand observation and experience lend credibility, context, and texture to "Invisible Armies." His work builds on insights from his earlier work, "The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (2002)." The word "guerrilla" he explains literally means "small war." His prescriptions for success in this type of conflict are easily stated but far more difficult to implement.
Knowledge, or intelligence, he observes has been "a cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations since the days of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar," echoing the dictum of Army doctrine that operations need to be driven by detailed and accurate intelligence. But gaining insights on foreign culture present huge challenges as operations over the past decade can attest.
He provides five key points that describe the common insights which this work illustrates:
1) Low-intensity conflict has been ubiquitous throughout history and of vital importance in shaping the world.
2) Political organizing and propaganda have been rising in importance as factors in low-intensity conflict over the past two centuries.
3) Guerrillas and terrorists have been growing more successful since 1945, in large part because of their ability to play on public opinion, a relatively new factor in warfare.
4) Outside assistance - whether in the form of arms supplies and safe havens, or even better, the provision of conventional forces to operate in conjunction with the guerrilla - has been one of the most important factors in the success of insurgent campaigns.
5) "Population-centric" counterinsurgency has been an essential part of most successful counterguerrilla campaigns.
Had the pleasure of meeting the author during my time in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2010. The scope and sweep of this historic survey of irregular warfare is reminiscent of a much shorter paper written by George S. Patton as a young officer at the War College.
By breaking this history into five era Boot shows the evolution of the guerrilla form of irregular warfare and its companion use of terrorism. He makes a compelling case that "low intensity" irregular and unconventional warfare rather than the conventional war of tanks and artillery has been the most prevalent form of warfare in history. His use of narrative provide case-studies that illustrate historic trends and recurring patterns.
Boot's first-hand observation and experience lend credibility, context, and texture to "Invisible Armies." His work builds on insights from his earlier work, "The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (2002)." The word "guerrilla" he explains literally means "small war." His prescriptions for success in this type of conflict are easily stated but far more difficult to implement.
Knowledge, or intelligence, he observes has been "a cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations since the days of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar," echoing the dictum of Army doctrine that operations need to be driven by detailed and accurate intelligence. But gaining insights on foreign culture present huge challenges as operations over the past decade can attest.
He provides five key points that describe the common insights which this work illustrates:
1) Low-intensity conflict has been ubiquitous throughout history and of vital importance in shaping the world.
2) Political organizing and propaganda have been rising in importance as factors in low-intensity conflict over the past two centuries.
3) Guerrillas and terrorists have been growing more successful since 1945, in large part because of their ability to play on public opinion, a relatively new factor in warfare.
4) Outside assistance - whether in the form of arms supplies and safe havens, or even better, the provision of conventional forces to operate in conjunction with the guerrilla - has been one of the most important factors in the success of insurgent campaigns.
5) "Population-centric" counterinsurgency has been an essential part of most successful counterguerrilla campaigns.
August 25, 2013
This summary of guerilla warfare and terrorism from the Roman occupation of Palestine to America’s ongoing misadventure in Afghanistan is a sobering testament to the stubborn destructiveness of mankind. It is peppered with interesting historical comparisons, between 19th Century Anarchists and 20th Century Radical Islamists (neither of which cared one whit about murdering innocent men, women and children), Zionist terrorists blowing up British diplomats and Arab terrorists blowing up Jews (what goes around . . .), the flamboyantly effective Garibaldi versus the grossly overrated Guevara (why is that murderous incompetent on anyone's t-shirt?), and many others. There are also very efficient summaries of the counter-insurgency campaigns waged by various imperialists and occupiers, including the British in America, the French in Algeria, the Americans in Viet Nam, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Americans (we distressingly keep turning up like a bad penny) in Iraq.
However, what the author does not offer much of, despite expending an inordinate amount of text as to same, are many compelling conclusions. Indeed, while I was not expecting a magic formula to effectively combat insurgents and terrorists, I would have thought that the author could offer more insight than the obvious fact that: “an occupying power cannot subdue an insurgency which is popular with the majority of citizens and supplied by an extra-national source.” No kidding. Perhaps the author’s time would have been better spent examining the differences between the Occidental and Oriental and the fool’s errand each side engages in when it attempts to impose its completely different belief systems on the other.
Anyway, the larger annoyance is that, for a book on asymmetrical warfare, the book is suffocatingly conventional in organization and presentation. Also, the author has an unfortunate professorial tendency to endlessly summarize and repeat himself.
Nevertheless, despite its flaws, this is a very informative book which every civilian and military leader should read. It should also be on every responsible citizen’s bookshelf since it relentlessly highlights the consistent failure of leaders to learn the costly lessons of History. Finally, it might also provide valuable insight into the ongoing American question of “why do they hate us?” (spoiler: it is not because of our freedom).
However, what the author does not offer much of, despite expending an inordinate amount of text as to same, are many compelling conclusions. Indeed, while I was not expecting a magic formula to effectively combat insurgents and terrorists, I would have thought that the author could offer more insight than the obvious fact that: “an occupying power cannot subdue an insurgency which is popular with the majority of citizens and supplied by an extra-national source.” No kidding. Perhaps the author’s time would have been better spent examining the differences between the Occidental and Oriental and the fool’s errand each side engages in when it attempts to impose its completely different belief systems on the other.
Anyway, the larger annoyance is that, for a book on asymmetrical warfare, the book is suffocatingly conventional in organization and presentation. Also, the author has an unfortunate professorial tendency to endlessly summarize and repeat himself.
Nevertheless, despite its flaws, this is a very informative book which every civilian and military leader should read. It should also be on every responsible citizen’s bookshelf since it relentlessly highlights the consistent failure of leaders to learn the costly lessons of History. Finally, it might also provide valuable insight into the ongoing American question of “why do they hate us?” (spoiler: it is not because of our freedom).
April 15, 2018
There are at least two issues that one can have with reading epic histories [1] like this one. First, one has to allot the time to read them, which can be a challenge when one has a pace of a couple of books to finish per day and lives a relatively busy life. Additionally, how does one account for the balance of what one thinks and feels about such a volume as this one where there is inevitably some level of disagreement but also a considerable amount of respect for the obvious achievement of such a sprawling text. There are about 600 pages of readable material in this book, including an appendix that gives a look at the guerrilla conflicts known to history over the course of human history and their outcome. One thing I greatly appreciate about this book is the way the author is totally open about his agenda in writing this book, and spells out his points and his perspective openly, something I can get behind. In reading this book one does not have to worry about ulterior motives because the author's agenda is both sensible and reasonable as well as transparently obvious, which are qualities I definitely appreciate.
The book's contents definitely deserve the overused term epic to describe them. The author takes an in-depth look at five thousand years of guerrilla history from its beginnings in the empire of Sargon the Great and his successors to contemporary conflicts. This book is divided into eight smaller "books" with a total of 64 chapters. Here goes: The author begins with the origins of guerilla warfare (I), with essays the Jewish revolt of 66-70AD (1), guerrilla warfare in classical conflicts (2), tribal wars of self-destruction (3), the origins of insurgency in Akkad (4), asymmetric warfare between the Persians and Scythians (5), the origins of counterinsurgency in Assyria and Rome (6), Rome's downfall due to barbarian invasions (7), refutations of guerrilla warfare as a quintessentially Eastern way of war (8), warfare between the Xiongnu and Han (9), an examination of the guerilla paradox (10), a look at Scottish versus English warfare (11), and the advantage counterinsurgents face because of preservation of historical memory (12). After this the author looks at the rise of liberal revolutionaries (II) with a discussion of colonial and European irregulars (13), guerrilla warfare during the American Revolution (14), the Peninsular War (15), the Haitian War of Independence (16), the Greek War of Independence (17), Garibaldi's role in Italian Unification (18), and the liberal achievement in adding the angle of international pressure to guerrilla warfare (19). After this the author looks at the wars of imperialism (III) and discusses the many guerrilla wars that weren't during this period (20) as well as the forest wars against native Americans (21), the winning of the West against plains Indians (22), the Chechen and Dagestani holy war against Russian expansion (23), the first Anglo-Afghan War (24), the Pashtun insurgency in the Northwest frontier of Pakistan (25), winning hearts and minds in French Morocco (26), the Boer War (27), and the way that imperialism was often self-defeating (28). After this the author discusses the first age of international terrorism (IV) with a look at the medieval Assassins (29), John Brown of Civil War fame (30), the successful effort of Southern whites to end reconstruction (31), anarchist anarchy (32), Russian nihilists (33), Russian socialist revolutionaries (34), Irish revolutionaries (35), and a look at the terrorist mind (36). The author then covers guerrilla and commando sideshows during the World Wars (V) like European efforts during the so-called "thirty years war" (37), Lawrence of Arabia (38), British special forces (39), Wingate's wars (40), Yugoslavian resistance in World War II (41), and the difference that "supersoldiers" made (42). The author moves on to the wars of national liberation after World War II (VI) with an examination of the slipping European grip over the world (43), the rise of Communist China (44), the end of French Indochina at Dien Bien Phu (45), the Algerian War of Independence (46), the successful efforts against the Malayan Emergency (47), and a look at occasional British success in counterinsurgency (48). The author takes a harsh look at the romance of leftist revolutionaries (VII) with a discussion of guerrilla mystique (49), the Quiet American's success against the Huk Rebellion (50), the Quiet American in South Vietnam (51), limitations of firepower in Vietnam (52), Castro's comeback in Cuba (53), loco focos in Bolivia (54), the raid on Entebbe and terrorism in the 70's (55), Arafat's mixed record (56), and the end of Marxist romances in the 1980's (57). Finally, the author turns to the rise of radical Islam (VIII) with a discussion of the end of 1979 (58), Russia's Afghan adventure (59), the Lebanon problem (60), Al Qaeda (61), Al Qaeda in Iraq (62), Patraeus' surge (63), and the mixed record of the Islamist insurgency (64), after which the author gives a lengthy and detailed appendix showing guerrilla attempts and their success rate.
There are at least a few massive takeaways of considerable importance that one can gain from this massive book. For one, the author makes it pretty clear that guerrilla warfare is not a quintessentially "Eastern" or "non-Western" way of war but that there is a clear set of preferences that all states or would-be states have for warfare where the stronger prefer conventional warfare, the weaker fight as guerrillas because they must, and those who cannot fight even as guerrillas resort to terrorism. Additionally, the author takes a great deal of time and attention to examine what is necessary to win as a counterinsurgent by gaining legitimacy and combining targeted rather than indiscriminate violence against terrorists or insurgents with efforts at building up states and infrastructure and demonstrating to others that supporting them is clearly supporting the winning side. Given the disproportionate strength of the contemporary American military, this sort of warfare isn't going away anytime soon, and so since we are going to be engaged in counterinsurgency we had better be prepared to win it consistently and well.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2015...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2015...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2010...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
The book's contents definitely deserve the overused term epic to describe them. The author takes an in-depth look at five thousand years of guerrilla history from its beginnings in the empire of Sargon the Great and his successors to contemporary conflicts. This book is divided into eight smaller "books" with a total of 64 chapters. Here goes: The author begins with the origins of guerilla warfare (I), with essays the Jewish revolt of 66-70AD (1), guerrilla warfare in classical conflicts (2), tribal wars of self-destruction (3), the origins of insurgency in Akkad (4), asymmetric warfare between the Persians and Scythians (5), the origins of counterinsurgency in Assyria and Rome (6), Rome's downfall due to barbarian invasions (7), refutations of guerrilla warfare as a quintessentially Eastern way of war (8), warfare between the Xiongnu and Han (9), an examination of the guerilla paradox (10), a look at Scottish versus English warfare (11), and the advantage counterinsurgents face because of preservation of historical memory (12). After this the author looks at the rise of liberal revolutionaries (II) with a discussion of colonial and European irregulars (13), guerrilla warfare during the American Revolution (14), the Peninsular War (15), the Haitian War of Independence (16), the Greek War of Independence (17), Garibaldi's role in Italian Unification (18), and the liberal achievement in adding the angle of international pressure to guerrilla warfare (19). After this the author looks at the wars of imperialism (III) and discusses the many guerrilla wars that weren't during this period (20) as well as the forest wars against native Americans (21), the winning of the West against plains Indians (22), the Chechen and Dagestani holy war against Russian expansion (23), the first Anglo-Afghan War (24), the Pashtun insurgency in the Northwest frontier of Pakistan (25), winning hearts and minds in French Morocco (26), the Boer War (27), and the way that imperialism was often self-defeating (28). After this the author discusses the first age of international terrorism (IV) with a look at the medieval Assassins (29), John Brown of Civil War fame (30), the successful effort of Southern whites to end reconstruction (31), anarchist anarchy (32), Russian nihilists (33), Russian socialist revolutionaries (34), Irish revolutionaries (35), and a look at the terrorist mind (36). The author then covers guerrilla and commando sideshows during the World Wars (V) like European efforts during the so-called "thirty years war" (37), Lawrence of Arabia (38), British special forces (39), Wingate's wars (40), Yugoslavian resistance in World War II (41), and the difference that "supersoldiers" made (42). The author moves on to the wars of national liberation after World War II (VI) with an examination of the slipping European grip over the world (43), the rise of Communist China (44), the end of French Indochina at Dien Bien Phu (45), the Algerian War of Independence (46), the successful efforts against the Malayan Emergency (47), and a look at occasional British success in counterinsurgency (48). The author takes a harsh look at the romance of leftist revolutionaries (VII) with a discussion of guerrilla mystique (49), the Quiet American's success against the Huk Rebellion (50), the Quiet American in South Vietnam (51), limitations of firepower in Vietnam (52), Castro's comeback in Cuba (53), loco focos in Bolivia (54), the raid on Entebbe and terrorism in the 70's (55), Arafat's mixed record (56), and the end of Marxist romances in the 1980's (57). Finally, the author turns to the rise of radical Islam (VIII) with a discussion of the end of 1979 (58), Russia's Afghan adventure (59), the Lebanon problem (60), Al Qaeda (61), Al Qaeda in Iraq (62), Patraeus' surge (63), and the mixed record of the Islamist insurgency (64), after which the author gives a lengthy and detailed appendix showing guerrilla attempts and their success rate.
There are at least a few massive takeaways of considerable importance that one can gain from this massive book. For one, the author makes it pretty clear that guerrilla warfare is not a quintessentially "Eastern" or "non-Western" way of war but that there is a clear set of preferences that all states or would-be states have for warfare where the stronger prefer conventional warfare, the weaker fight as guerrillas because they must, and those who cannot fight even as guerrillas resort to terrorism. Additionally, the author takes a great deal of time and attention to examine what is necessary to win as a counterinsurgent by gaining legitimacy and combining targeted rather than indiscriminate violence against terrorists or insurgents with efforts at building up states and infrastructure and demonstrating to others that supporting them is clearly supporting the winning side. Given the disproportionate strength of the contemporary American military, this sort of warfare isn't going away anytime soon, and so since we are going to be engaged in counterinsurgency we had better be prepared to win it consistently and well.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2015...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2015...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2010...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2017...
July 21, 2022
I did not think I would ever find myself writing a 5-star review for a staunchly conservative author and journalist -- formerly of the Wall St Journal, more recently of the Council on Foreign Relations). In my defense, I have to point out that Max Boot is the sort of conservative who said that he would "sooner vote for Josef Stalin than he would vote for Donald Trump". Alas, he is also the sort of conservative who thought that invading Iraq in 2003 was a terrific idea. But, to make things more complicated, he's in favor of LGBT rights and abortion rights. So, in short, he's a bit of a maverick: socially liberal, fiscally conservative, and generally enthusiastic about US military adventures abroad.
Boot's academic background is that of a historian, and Invisible Armies is history on a grand scale, spanning roughly 4300 years of wars of the weak against the strong -- guerilla wars, in other words. In a series of short and snappy chapters, he roams from the distant past's counter-insurgency wars of the Akkadian Empire in Mesopotamia, to the Romans suppressing the Jewish revolts and battling barbarian incursions ... all the way to the guerilla wars of the 20th century in Cuba, the Philippines, Vietnam, Algeria, Malaya ... and on into the 21st century's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He tells these stories well as a narrative historian who knows how to add just the right quantity of telling details to keep the reader engaged without adding unnecessarily to the length of what is already a 600-page book. Sample detail: Edward Lansdale, famed American anti-guerilla warfare adviser with the CIA and other agencies in multiple wars in the Philippines and Vietnam and elsewhere, spoke no foreign languages, and so when all other communication with villagers and guerillas failed, he would whip out his harmonica and entertain them.
Boot is also enough of a strategist to delve into the various theories of counter-insurgency warfare, drawing from the writings of French, British and American writers, and is particularly enamored of French theorists such as Lyautey and Galula as well the American general, David Petraeus.
An interesting aspect of the book is the database of guerilla wars included as an appendix, which rates the outcomes of these wars based on whether the insurgents or the incumbent regime won, lost or fought to a draw. Overwhelmingly, the guerillas lost roughly 75% of the time, though their win-loss ratio has improved since WW2, so that they are only losing 60% of the time. Some of the big factors affecting the guerillas' success: availability of support from an outside power, quality of their propaganda effort, nature of the internal divisions of society (class, ethnicity, race ...) and quality of leadership on each side.
The basic principles of counter-insurgency warfare revolve around winning the support of the population as opposed to trying to run up the body count of dead guerillas, which typically kills more civilians than it does guerillas, and in the process creates more guerillas. A rule of thumb: if you're dropping bombs on villages, you're not doing counter-insurgency right. Famously, the US dropped three times more tonnage of bombs on Vietnam and its Indochina neighbors than the Allies dropped in all of WW2. This worked poorly as a strategy, and ended with US personnel being ignominiously evacuated by helicopter from the roof of its embassy in Saigon in 1975.
In contrast, counter-insurgency warfare de-emphasizes firepower, and puts much more focus on getting out among the population and meeting the needs that neither the guerillas nor local governments are currently meeting, such as providing better roads, schools, clinics, electricity service, clean water and of course, security. Some criticize this as social work, public works or as nation-building, which to a large degree it is, but if unwilling to do this work, better not to get involved in the first place, especially as a foreign power intervening in the wars of other countries.
The US tried both the conventional and the counter-insurgency approaches in Iraq, for example. The conventional approach was very effective against conventional Iraqi forces, bringing down Saddam Hussein's government in less than a month. Thereafter, things did not go well when trying to apply similar methods to suppressing insurgents -- many of whom were former soldiers and officers of the Iraqi army, left unemployed when the US dissolved the Iraqi army after the invasion. Things did not really begin to go better until Gen. Petraeus was put in charge, and then put into practice the theories of counter-insurgency he had been working on -- and writing about -- for years. A troop escalation put several tens of thousands of additional US soldiers in the country, they got out beyond the fortified Green Zone in Baghdad, and Petraeus' new strategy largely improved the security situation by decreasing both civilian and military deaths dramatically.
A decade later, it is unclear whether Iraq will ever turn into a liberal democracy or even a fully functional state, but what is clear is that the 2003 invasion de-stabilized the entire region, from Iran to Egypt and perhaps even as far as Libya and Tunisia.
Overall, US strategy in the region has been an epic disaster for decades, particularly in the last 20 years since the start of this century. Boot does not really address any of these issues of grand strategy, such as asking whether or not these wars should have been fought in the first place. Generally, I think he avoids asking such questions because his overriding assumption is that of course the US should act as the world's cop, even if most of the time it is an ignorant cop with very little understanding of the local beat it is patrolling.
Better theories of how to wage wars are not as useful as better theories of how not to blunder into pointless wars in the first place.
Boot's academic background is that of a historian, and Invisible Armies is history on a grand scale, spanning roughly 4300 years of wars of the weak against the strong -- guerilla wars, in other words. In a series of short and snappy chapters, he roams from the distant past's counter-insurgency wars of the Akkadian Empire in Mesopotamia, to the Romans suppressing the Jewish revolts and battling barbarian incursions ... all the way to the guerilla wars of the 20th century in Cuba, the Philippines, Vietnam, Algeria, Malaya ... and on into the 21st century's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He tells these stories well as a narrative historian who knows how to add just the right quantity of telling details to keep the reader engaged without adding unnecessarily to the length of what is already a 600-page book. Sample detail: Edward Lansdale, famed American anti-guerilla warfare adviser with the CIA and other agencies in multiple wars in the Philippines and Vietnam and elsewhere, spoke no foreign languages, and so when all other communication with villagers and guerillas failed, he would whip out his harmonica and entertain them.
Boot is also enough of a strategist to delve into the various theories of counter-insurgency warfare, drawing from the writings of French, British and American writers, and is particularly enamored of French theorists such as Lyautey and Galula as well the American general, David Petraeus.
An interesting aspect of the book is the database of guerilla wars included as an appendix, which rates the outcomes of these wars based on whether the insurgents or the incumbent regime won, lost or fought to a draw. Overwhelmingly, the guerillas lost roughly 75% of the time, though their win-loss ratio has improved since WW2, so that they are only losing 60% of the time. Some of the big factors affecting the guerillas' success: availability of support from an outside power, quality of their propaganda effort, nature of the internal divisions of society (class, ethnicity, race ...) and quality of leadership on each side.
The basic principles of counter-insurgency warfare revolve around winning the support of the population as opposed to trying to run up the body count of dead guerillas, which typically kills more civilians than it does guerillas, and in the process creates more guerillas. A rule of thumb: if you're dropping bombs on villages, you're not doing counter-insurgency right. Famously, the US dropped three times more tonnage of bombs on Vietnam and its Indochina neighbors than the Allies dropped in all of WW2. This worked poorly as a strategy, and ended with US personnel being ignominiously evacuated by helicopter from the roof of its embassy in Saigon in 1975.
In contrast, counter-insurgency warfare de-emphasizes firepower, and puts much more focus on getting out among the population and meeting the needs that neither the guerillas nor local governments are currently meeting, such as providing better roads, schools, clinics, electricity service, clean water and of course, security. Some criticize this as social work, public works or as nation-building, which to a large degree it is, but if unwilling to do this work, better not to get involved in the first place, especially as a foreign power intervening in the wars of other countries.
The US tried both the conventional and the counter-insurgency approaches in Iraq, for example. The conventional approach was very effective against conventional Iraqi forces, bringing down Saddam Hussein's government in less than a month. Thereafter, things did not go well when trying to apply similar methods to suppressing insurgents -- many of whom were former soldiers and officers of the Iraqi army, left unemployed when the US dissolved the Iraqi army after the invasion. Things did not really begin to go better until Gen. Petraeus was put in charge, and then put into practice the theories of counter-insurgency he had been working on -- and writing about -- for years. A troop escalation put several tens of thousands of additional US soldiers in the country, they got out beyond the fortified Green Zone in Baghdad, and Petraeus' new strategy largely improved the security situation by decreasing both civilian and military deaths dramatically.
A decade later, it is unclear whether Iraq will ever turn into a liberal democracy or even a fully functional state, but what is clear is that the 2003 invasion de-stabilized the entire region, from Iran to Egypt and perhaps even as far as Libya and Tunisia.
Overall, US strategy in the region has been an epic disaster for decades, particularly in the last 20 years since the start of this century. Boot does not really address any of these issues of grand strategy, such as asking whether or not these wars should have been fought in the first place. Generally, I think he avoids asking such questions because his overriding assumption is that of course the US should act as the world's cop, even if most of the time it is an ignorant cop with very little understanding of the local beat it is patrolling.
Better theories of how to wage wars are not as useful as better theories of how not to blunder into pointless wars in the first place.
March 14, 2013
Full disclosure. I have never been a big fan of anthologies. This book, however, may change my thinking. I found Boot’s collection of stories to be a terrific way to fill gaps in my knowledge. For example, I probably would never make the time to read a whole book about Mesopotamia 2000 years before Christ. But the section Boot devoted to it was still fascinating. And I much enjoyed his look at insurgencies in eras and parts of the world I’m more familiar with such as 1960s Vietnam. All in all, a great read for somebody who either has a real interest in Guerrilla warfare or wants to hop, skip and jump around global history.
August 5, 2023
Only read about 1/4 of this book. Extremely interesting subject matter and the author has done an incredible feat in cataloging so many historical conflicts and the role that guerrilla warfare played in them. The book unfortunately is written so that it only dedicates 5 or 10 pages to a given conflict and so each conflict is given only a quick summary with very little exciting detail about the tactics, politics, personalities, etc. Starts to get repetitive quickly and none of it feels very memorable. Worth checking out I think for the subject matter.
May 11, 2013
Boot's account of the history of guerilla warfare may not be exhaustive, but it does cover a lot of ground. Though, as with any overview volume, there were aspects I wish he'd spent more time on, but the later chapters in particular, where he covers US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, offer some new insights. Of particular interest to writers: his twelve articles which deliver in brief the key elements of nonconventional warfare.
April 26, 2013
Extremely readable, relevant history of guerrilla warfare. Tries to do too much and as a result is spread thin on some very interesting sections. While most sections attempt to be balanced, sections on certain leaders (such as Mao) tend to be veiled in retrospective contempt. Worth reading as a "history repeats itself" treatise.
January 18, 2015
Did not finish. The history may be OK but once it gets into more modern stuff it simply becomes a mouthpiece for the official version of American foreign policy. Waste of time and money
June 11, 2015
Fascinating
October 22, 2021
This is definitely a captivating read and one that covers a little discussed topic, particularly in its historical scope. However, it is victim to treating guerrillas with the same lens as the regular armies. It is the typical moderate “neutrality” that poses a false symmetry between the two forces, as if they are both fighting on the same terms and with the same objectives. This is most obvious in its treatment of US and Israeli aggression, which is never called that. In fact, the whole concept of imperialism is cast as a European phenomenon with little to no hint of its later Neo-characteristics favored by US corporations. There was also the perfunctory talk of communist leaders personal hygiene and sexuality - which no piece of Western propaganda would be complete without. It seems almost impossible to read Western history without hearing every sordid detail about Communist warfare but only the frills concerning the American military-industrial complex. Which is to say these authors aren’t always wrong in what they say the communist guerrillas and leaders did, but we did and still do today similar things and more often on a grander scale. Once again we are faced with an issue of parity. Much as in the way that a false symmetry was shown for guerrilla forces to imperial ones, a false asymmetry is created around liberal and communist countries. The author never fails to remind the reader that Mao was “the worse mass murderer” in history, all the while having nothing to say about President Truman despite dropping 2 nuclear weapons on civilian populations. I would even go so far as to say that this author, if one were to put his treatment of fascists and communists side-by-side, is sympathetic to the former in comparison. What starts off as an intriguing history of guerrilla warfare turns into a rather garish defense of Neo-colonialism and its progenitor, Neo-liberalism. The author seems to take every pain possible to paint Western aggression and decisions as, though sometimes ill-thought, still benevolent and virtuous. Tactics such as Mao’s principle of being gracious and helpful to the people on whom’s behalf one is fighting are derided as disingenuous coming from the communists but when the US tries but fails to live up to being nearly as good to the people of Indochina they get all the credit for having given it a shot. Those pesky communists though - they’re the one with the ulterior motives! Honestly by the time I got to the Cuban revolutionaries I was laughing out loud at how blatant the rhetoric had become. Little wonder the section on Palestine is just a prolonged apologia for Israel. Whereas every tenuous connection is highlighted to connect virtually any terrorist activity with the PLO, if and when Israel’s crimes are mentioned they are always referred to as “restrained,” just as the author will do concerning US crimes in the Middle East. By making the claim that the Palestinians should have “appealed to the conscience” of their oppressor like King or Ghandi, he elides all the desolation laid upon the Palestinians as well as that King’s successes in the US were aided by radicals and riots - with arguably not anywhere near the success that liberal writers like to attribute to the civil rights era. Just look at Black rights in the US today.
I foolishly expected something better from this book given its unconventional lens at an important world historic phenomenon. I’m sure most people will hate my review as simply being by an indoctrinated leftist, but if you take anything away from my review have it be that liberal democratic “history” and “scholarship” is nowhere near as free from equal amounts of propaganda and ideology.
I foolishly expected something better from this book given its unconventional lens at an important world historic phenomenon. I’m sure most people will hate my review as simply being by an indoctrinated leftist, but if you take anything away from my review have it be that liberal democratic “history” and “scholarship” is nowhere near as free from equal amounts of propaganda and ideology.
May 27, 2019
It’s quite thorough. Really too thorough. There’s just too much to digest. He goes through a full history of guerrilla warfare, and then some.
He defines it, more or less, as irregular fighting against a regular (representative of some state actor) army. In contrast to terrorism, which is more like irregular fighting but against civilians instead of an army. He talks about that, too. Because how else to get to 550 pages? I carp a little on this, but, well, that’s the impression.
He doesn’t do a very deep dive into any particular uprisong/rebellion/whatever. He makes some attempt to tie things together into a theme of some sort, but it doesn’t quite work. It even detracts a little, as then we have to scurry to remember what he’s comparing things to. (The book is arranged chronologically, so if he’s comparing to something in the future, well, you’d better sort of know about it already.)
It did certainly fill in some gaps in my knowledge: about Mao’s long march; about Castro’s rise (apparently he had only a few hundred ‘soldiers’ on his side at the time that Batista had to flee); about Russia’s difficulties in Afghanistan (apparently they went in originally because they were trying to prop up a Communist leader), as well as England’s; about how the Communist Vietnamese beat the French and then the Americans (it helped to have Russia and China nearby helping).
The author seemed to be overly fond of David Petraeus.
Maybe I learned about the fall of the Roman empire, but I mostly forgot it by the end of the book.
I don’t doubt the author’s great knowledge of the material. Somehow it’s a (long) series of magazine articles, or a dissertation, more than it is a book.
He defines it, more or less, as irregular fighting against a regular (representative of some state actor) army. In contrast to terrorism, which is more like irregular fighting but against civilians instead of an army. He talks about that, too. Because how else to get to 550 pages? I carp a little on this, but, well, that’s the impression.
He doesn’t do a very deep dive into any particular uprisong/rebellion/whatever. He makes some attempt to tie things together into a theme of some sort, but it doesn’t quite work. It even detracts a little, as then we have to scurry to remember what he’s comparing things to. (The book is arranged chronologically, so if he’s comparing to something in the future, well, you’d better sort of know about it already.)
It did certainly fill in some gaps in my knowledge: about Mao’s long march; about Castro’s rise (apparently he had only a few hundred ‘soldiers’ on his side at the time that Batista had to flee); about Russia’s difficulties in Afghanistan (apparently they went in originally because they were trying to prop up a Communist leader), as well as England’s; about how the Communist Vietnamese beat the French and then the Americans (it helped to have Russia and China nearby helping).
The author seemed to be overly fond of David Petraeus.
Maybe I learned about the fall of the Roman empire, but I mostly forgot it by the end of the book.
I don’t doubt the author’s great knowledge of the material. Somehow it’s a (long) series of magazine articles, or a dissertation, more than it is a book.
January 31, 2019
5 for research, 4 for style
Max Boot's Invisible Armies deserves 5 stars for his thorough research. I would recommend this book to a casual student of history interested in conceptual military history. To enjoy this book, you must have a broad, if superficial, knowledge of major world events during the years ~150BC-2010. Without this, the book would be unreadable as Boot references a famous event, person, or process in nearly every paragraph. I found myself highlighting passages to research later, but since I had at least heard of a majority of these references, the book helped cement them in my memory rather than frustrate me. The prologue and Twelve Articles were well done, thoughtful bookends to prepare you for and remind you of the book's arguments. That said, these arguments sometimes got lost in the intervening chapters; especially when Boot wrote of a specific person (e.g. David Petraeus as a general/individual vs the war in Afghanistan as a whole). He described these individuals well and I would probably read a biography written by Boot. I enjoyed learning a bit about key figures (e.g. Lansdale, Guervera, Michael Collins, etc.) , but felt that certain descriptions went on to the point they felt like mini-biographies separate from the book rather than a supportive element to the overall history of guerrilla warfare.
Max Boot's Invisible Armies deserves 5 stars for his thorough research. I would recommend this book to a casual student of history interested in conceptual military history. To enjoy this book, you must have a broad, if superficial, knowledge of major world events during the years ~150BC-2010. Without this, the book would be unreadable as Boot references a famous event, person, or process in nearly every paragraph. I found myself highlighting passages to research later, but since I had at least heard of a majority of these references, the book helped cement them in my memory rather than frustrate me. The prologue and Twelve Articles were well done, thoughtful bookends to prepare you for and remind you of the book's arguments. That said, these arguments sometimes got lost in the intervening chapters; especially when Boot wrote of a specific person (e.g. David Petraeus as a general/individual vs the war in Afghanistan as a whole). He described these individuals well and I would probably read a biography written by Boot. I enjoyed learning a bit about key figures (e.g. Lansdale, Guervera, Michael Collins, etc.) , but felt that certain descriptions went on to the point they felt like mini-biographies separate from the book rather than a supportive element to the overall history of guerrilla warfare.
September 25, 2017
Mr. Max Boot earns five stars for accomplishing exactly what he set out to; "The aim of Invisible Armies is [tell] the story of irregular warfare from its origins in the prehistoric world to the contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. The aim is to show low-intensity conflict in its most important variations and manifestations over the centuries. The primary focus is on the last two centuries, but the first part of the book examines guerrilla warfare in the ancient and medieval worlds in order to place more recent developments in perspective.
Mr. Boot has written an insightful narrative that illustrates the outsized effect irregular warfare has on history and current events. Even as I consider myself a student of military history, this book has changed the way I look at conflicts.
Mr. Boot has written an insightful narrative that illustrates the outsized effect irregular warfare has on history and current events. Even as I consider myself a student of military history, this book has changed the way I look at conflicts.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 140 reviews