In this first volume of his memoirs, Dr Kissinger covers his first four years (1969-1973) as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs - and President Nixon's closest adviser on foreign policy. It is undoubtedly the most significant book to come out of the Nixon Administration. Among the countless great and critical moments Dr Kissinger recalls are his first meeting with Nixon, his secret trip to China, the first SALT negotiation, the Jordan crisis of 1970, the India-Pakistan war of 1971, and the historic summit meetings in Peking and Moscow. He covers the major controversies over Indochina policy during that period, including events in Laos, the overthrow of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, his secret talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris, his 'Peace is at hand' press conference, and the breakdown of the talks that led to the 'Christmas bombing' of 1972. He offers his insight s into the Middle East conflicts, Sadat's break with the Soviets, the election of Salvador Allende in Chile, issues of defense strategy, and relations with Europe and Japan.Other highlights are his relationship with Nixon, brilliant portraits of major foreign leaders, and his views as to the handling of crises and the art of diplomacy. Few men have wielded as much influence in the arena of American foreign policy as Henry Kissinger. This record makes an invaluable and lasting contribution to the history of this crucial time.
Henry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.
A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.
During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.
At 1,476 pages, I'm pretty certain its the longest book I've ever read --- and I was quite careful to not drop it on my foot (or my face, while reading in bed). It was a very impressive, and exhaustively detailed account of Kissinger's first 4 years in the Nixon administration, 1968-1972. So much went on in that time frame, and I see it with different eyes now than I did as a high school student during that same period. You'll learn as much about Nixon, and many other world leaders of the era, as you do about Kissinger, and as an historical account this book is a treasure trove for future generations. I know that for many, Nixon and Kissinger were polarizing figures, but there is still much insight to be gained from such a well-written, well-detailed first hand account from one who was at the center of the storm.
Noticed that someone rated it two stars saying that "it's a five star book as far as historic record but for regular folk a 2-star endeavor. " Well, that's the very reason why that there are extraordinary people like the author of this book living the most exciting life one can ever imagine and making history of the human race during one of the most exciting periods of human history, and there are regular folks writing reviews that make no sense and yet still questioning the wisdom or legacy of the former kind.
Full of fascinating detail ... 800+ pages ... Kissinger wrote the longest senior thesis in the history of Harvard University and he continues in that manner here ... but it is all interesting
كتاب سياسي وليس شخصي يحكي عن الحوادث السياسية في الحرب الباردة وكيف كان وزير الخارجية الأمريكي هنري كيسنجر يتعامل مع تلك الأحداث، أعتقد مفيد لمن يريد إجراء بحوث أو لمن يشغر وظيفة دبلوماسية
"الساسة الغرب لا يعنون ما يقولون في تصريحاتهم، وحين يعنونه ، يطبقونه بطريقة تجعل ما قالوه لا علاقة له بما طبقوه" هذا ما أوحت به مذكرات هذا الثعب بارد القلب الكثير من التفكير السياسي والكثير من الصراحة والكثير من المعلومات عن كيف يُتخذ القرار الأمريكي ، وشخصية هذا الرجل الطموح المغرور ، خريج هارفارد والباحث عن السلطة بقلبه وعقله .. ولعب توازنات القوى .. والسياسات الخلفية التي لا يعرف حقيقتها إلا بعد زمن.
Today, one can easily find a great deal about the 'darker' side of the Nixon Administration. However, in order to read this book and to allow the reader to judge its tale impartially, there is one rule that the reader must adhere to; that rule is to remove the most controversial part of Richard Nixon's Administration's tenure, from their minds. The reader MUST forget Watergate and remember that this account pre dates that incident. Once the reader has accomplished this, not so easy, feat then they may begin. This book recounts an unusual side, it portrays a different angle; it gives a defence, a complete mirror image of what many of us have read, watched and listened to about this fascinating part of late 20th Century American politics. In other words, it portrays the case for the defence.
Will, desire and time are without doubt what are also required to read this book. The 'will' and 'desire' is not understated, this is a gargantuan piece of work. For anyone that is interested, very interested, in late 20th Century American foreign policy, and has the 'time' to immerse themselves into a profound and contemporaneous source, then they must read this book. It's underlying theme of the justification of actions that posterity has much criticised and condemned, is the central thesis of Kissinger's first volume; yes there is a second volume! The challenge that the author has placed on himself is immense by virtue of the fact of the many varied situations that had to be dealt with at the time. As the reader begins to feel that he or she is perpetually turning pages of this book, they are reminded of how far the world has moved on. Viet Cong, Khymer Rouge and the 'Soviet Union' have no relevance in today's world. On the other hand, one is able to read between the lines many of the origins of the geopolitical problems of today.
One that has a powerful link to today is the analysis of China. Kissinger recounts in some detail Nixon's eagerness to allow the Totalitarian state back into the global fold. Although, Kissinger's argument can, once again, be seen from the point of view that the choices that his administration had in extracting themselves from the horrendous experience of Indo China, gave them very little choice as regards the rapprochement with China. In particular, using China in order to counter balance the geopolitics of the time with the shadow of the Soviet Union still very much a threat. Nevertheless, and without any great surprise, the one central thread that travels through the entire book is Vietnam. It is a subject that virtually dominates every decision, every move, every idea, in the attempt to achieve the goal of how to rid the American nation of the nightmare of Vietnam. Any other subject is engulfed by this philosophy. Even a detente with the Soviet Union all hinged on Vietnam. Added to the challenge, handed to this particular Administration, according to Kissinger, was the aggressively anti-government press, a war weary hostile public and a confrontational Congress. There lies the constant theme. Hanoi's duplicity coupled with American negativity and distrust of Nixon's efforts are repeated throughout the book and very much links the whole text together.
Any negatives about the book? Well, not many. Of course, the pre mentioned length of the book is I would say, for some, a drawback. Although the chapters are long they are, mercifully, broken down into sub chapters which is able to give at times a well earned rest for the reader. Nevertheless, by the time one reaches the one thousandth page you do get the feeling that this has been a challenge of Man v. Food proportions. On the other hand, one must always keep in mind that this is the work describes events that played a central role in the global history of our planet and at the time must have felt as if all depended on their outcome. It is also important to remember that these incidents, in a reasonably close, period of time, have in some cases moulded the political climate of today. Here, again, I very much refer to China. So if that invaluable will and desire can be found in any potential reader who also has a profound inclination to find out why we are in the world of today and importantly how we reached this point, they will find this book a fascinating read. Inevitably, one can not ignore the fact that there is a second volume, which apparently will contain an account of something called Watergate.
Wow - reading this book felt like I was taking a graduate-level college course on American foreign policy and diplomacy. A massive tome by Kissinger, one of the heavyweights of the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Incredibly, the 1,476 pages only takes the reader up the end of the first four years of his tenure as National Security Advisor.
I liked how Kissinger divided this book up: by year but - within the year - by subject matter (or, more specifically for this venture, by country). He deftly moves between trying to conclude the Vietnam War, establishing relationships with the USSR and China, arranging ground-breaking summits in both of those Communist-controlled countries, relationships with European countries, simmering issues in the Middle East, the India-Pakistan crisis of 1971, and Chile. Interspersed throughout all of the chapters are his assessments of the leaders that he was dealing with: their strengths, flaws, tendencies, and negotiating strategies.
This is, obviously, Kissinger's view of history and certainly nobody comes out looking better than he does. He mentions his ego so frequently that I think it almost became a character in the book. He does admit to vanity in several instances, specifically concerning his fight for attention and prominence with Secretary of State William Rogers. He also admits times when he was wrong, and he does give ample credit to other individuals on several occasions (Ellsworth Bunker, Nixon, Chou En-Lai, Dean Acheson, Melvin Laird, John Connally, to name a few).
For me, the most interesting parts of the book dealt with the Vietnamese peace negotiations (excruciating to be sure - I am not sure how anyone could have withstood the intense daily pressure that Kissinger and many others were subjected to), and his observations about Richard Nixon. I thought he was surprisingly forthcoming about their relationship, and he paints a well-formed portrait of a tortured, lonely, paranoid man. Reading about Nixon from Kissinger's viewpoint helps to understand why his presidency disintegrated shortly after the period that this book covers.
Overall, essential reading for anyone specifically interested in U.S. diplomacy, foreign policy, Cold War history, Vietnam War history, or the Nixon presidency.
OUTSTANDING MEMOIRS very detailed; very thorough, beautifully written. I do not want to judge Kissinger, yet it really sorrows me to what he did afterward: his shoughanate was really a disaster after Watergate. Nixon has built up everything for a successful and strong policy, yet Kissinger somehow screwed it all up… Seen him pass such a long way and knowing what that would result in brings a great sorrow to me. Nixon administration achieved peace with USSR, China, VIETNAM!!! (on good terms) and much more! This is a very helpful book for anyone researching Nixon-Kissinger Years and anyone who has time… It really took me a LOT to get through this. 5 Days is still a long time; I usually would go through something like this in three days, yet Kissinger writes so beautifully and at some points makes such great references and jokes that you just want to google every speech, every document, every image.
This is the other book that I closed-out last night (the first was Jon Meacham's "American Lion"). I was hoping, though lengthy, that Henry Kissinger's "White House Years" would be worth the time and effort. But I decided last night to call it an end. I do believe that Dr. Kissinger enjoys writing about his career more that I could enjoy reading about it. The farthest that I could drag myself was around page 150. (In Meacham's book I only read the first hundred or so pages; not nearly the 150 that I mentioned in my review).
Convinces this somewhat credulous yet clear-eyed American reader, who prides himself for being as clean-cute as Bob Haldeman, that the bombing campaign in southeast Asia which extending over Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam (whom we were defending against the North Vietnamese) was necessary because there was a viable Communist presence in these territories; and, furthermore, that the overthrowing of the Allende government in Chile was necessary because long-term accommodation of a second Cuba in the Western hemisphere was unacceptable. Today I purchased Pierre Bourdieu's Distinction on my Kindle, but it may be that I should prefer Kissinger's book on China instead, which was on sale for $14. Well, there's always next time.
This heavy volume could have been entitled “How I single-handedly solved both the Vietnam and the Cold War”… Dr. Kissinger has such a high opinion of himself that it almost makes this valuable review of this era too pathetic to read. And to ensure that Le Duc Tho, who shared his Nobel Peace Prize, would not be seen kindly, he repeatedly calls him “Ducky” or makes fun of how their interpreters pronounced “schedule”. Interestingly, while he writes that Nixon always agreed with his staff to avoid confrontation, it does not seem to occur to him that Nixon would do the same with him (ending up stating that Nixon agreed with his recommendations every fifth page or so…).
This book, due to length and level of detail, will not be for everyone. But it is a vitally important work for those who want to understand some of the critical foreign policy events in American history. This book deals with Kissinger's tenure as Richard Nixon's National Security Advisor from 1969-1972, and is the first volume of his memoirs. An astounding amount of history is compressed into that time period, including the Nixon opening to China, the intractable problems of the Middle East, with special focus on the triangular diplomacy involving the Soviet Union, Egypt, and the United States, the war in Vietnam, and the exceedingly tortured negotiations to end that war, (with a good look at the Nixon decisions on the excursion into Cambodia, the "Christmas Bombing", and the self described "brutal" treatment of the recalcitrant South Vietnamese as agreement neared), and the Indo-Pakistan war, and the "tilt" towards Pakistan. Any one of those items would be a book in itself, and the fact that Kissinger not only kept all of those balls in the air but manages, through this volume, to show how they were all "connected" is a testament to his brilliance. Dr. Kissinger has many detractors, and Nixon Administration policies, especially with regard to Vietnam, have drawn severe criticism over the years. Kissinger takes those critics on directly, and makes some strong and compelling arguments to justify his policy recommendations. Vietnam was a tragic error for the United States, but Kissinger brings an up close perspective to why many of the important players acted the way they did. Kissinger's devotion to the "realist" school of diplomacy is evident through his actions and policy prescriptions described in this volume. His hard headed and "realistic" approach to bargaining are laid out clearly in his approach to the negotiations with North Vietnam, where he recognized that an unfavorable "balance of forces" on the ground would lead to an unsatisfactory outcome from the perspective of the U.S. His devotion to "equilibrium" govern his negotiations on SALT, and advise his relationship and policy recommendations with the Soviets. For the historian this book is essential. Kissinger dealt with some of the very true giants of this (or any other era), including Chou En-Lai, Indira Ghandi, Le Duc Tho, Leonid Breznhev, Andrei Gromyko, Mao Tse Tung, Moshe Dayan, Anwar Sadat, Golda Meir, and so many others. He seems to me to be exceedingly honest about his relationship with Richard Nixon, who he described as brooding, lonely, and filled with resentment towards so many. He, in my opinion, fairly describes some of the dysfunction of the foreign policy methodology of the first term Nixon Administration, and takes some of the blame onto himself. (The relationship with Secretary of State William Rodgers is a big part of this dysfunction) Kissinger is writing to make sure history records his perspective, but he does so in a way that brings valuable insight to a critical time in U.S. foreign policy, when change and bold steps produced much disruption in this arena. Love them or hate them the Nixon-Kissinger team shook US foreign policy and produced real change that impacts us to this very day. A must read for those who love history or foreign policy.
في أحد الازمان وأحد البلدان …كان يدير مخزن للغلال ، مدير ناجح .. وفي يوم لم يعد يعرف المدير الناجح ماذا يعمل؟ الفئران احتلت المخزن .. المأكولات صارت تتناقص .. الفئران قرضت الجبن والخبز المقمر ..
المدير الناجح لا يجلس ويداه على خصره أبداً، حارب الفئران بكل ما أوتي من بأس، لكنه وبالرغم من كل ما بذله لم يكسب الحرب .. الصابون وقطع الجبن تتناقص يوماً بعد يوم، الملابس اصبحت مثقبة ومهبرة، أعشاش الفئران بنيت داخل أكياس الطحين ..
لم تكتفي الفئران بإلتهام المأكولات وقرض الملبوسات وقضم الجبن والسجق، بل إنها راحت تسن أسنانها واظافرها بالجلود والاحذية والخشب .. المدير الناجح أستمر في حربه مع الفئران دون هوادة .. وضع أكثر أنواع السموم قوة في كل جهة وكل صوب .. لم يستفد شيئاً !!! جمع مدير المخزن أفضل أنواع القطط وأفلتها في المخزن ليلاً .. وفي الصباح وجد وبر القطط المسكينة وبقايا عظامها، لم تستطع القطط مجابهة الفئران، ولم يقتلها أقوى السموم ..
بدأ المدير الناجح بزرع افخاخ كبيرة .. وصار يحدث أن يقع بعض الفئران فيها في الفخ … لكن إذا وقعت خمسة فئران في الفخ ليلاً … فإنها تلد مالا يقل عن عشرين أو ثلاثين فأراً في النهار ..
وفكر المدير …و اهتدى إلى طريقة فريدة : صنع ثلاث أقفاص جديدة .. رمى في كل منها ما كان يقع من الفئران الحية في الفخ .. امتلأ كل قفص من الاقفاص بالفئران .. لم يقدم للفئران طعاماً أو أي شيء ..
اختارت الفئران التي باتت على الموت ثلاث أيام .. خمسة ايام .. اختارت الفئران الأضعف بينها .. قطعتها، اكلتها واشبعت بطونها .. واعتادت على طعم الفئران وبعد وقت جاعت … بدأت تتصارع … وبنتيجة صراعها الدامي هذا … تسلطت على واحدة منها .. خنقتها .. قطعتها … اكلتها ..
وهكذا أخذ عدد الفئران يتناقص مع مرور الايام .. تبقى الفارة الاكبر، صاحبة العزم الأقوى التي اعتادت على طعم لحم الفئران ، وتتقطع الفأرات الضعيفات ويؤكلن ..
تحولت الاقفاص المملوءة بالفئران إلى ساحات حرب حقيقية … بقي في كل قفص من الاقفاص الثلاثة: ثلاث الى خمس فئران …
لذلك صارت كل فأرة من الفئران من أجل حماية نفسها تستغل فترة نوم أو سهو الفأرة الأخرى لتنقض عليها وتخنقها وتقطعها … وأكثر من ذلك … صارت تتحد فأرتان أو ثلاث في كل قفص ويهاجمن أخرى .. وتلك المتحدة في المطاف الأخير … تتحاين الفرصة ليأكل بعضها الآخر …
أخيراً بقي في كل قفص فأرة واحدة : الاقوى، الاذكى، الأكبر، الأكثر صموداً …
عندما بقي في كل قفص فأرة واحدة … فتح الرجل أبواب القفص وأفلت الفئران الثلاثة داخل المخزن .. واحدة واحدة ؟؟
بدأت تلك الفئران الثلاث، الضخمة، المغذاة … المتوحشة، المعتادة على أكل بنات جنسها، تنقض على فئران المخزن .. مهما بلغ عددها، تخنقها وتقطعها وتلتهمها .. ولكونها توحشت … صارت تأكل ما يؤكل من الفئران وتقتل الباقي من أجل حماية نفسها … كي لا تخنقها وتلتهمها الفأرات الأخريات … وهكذا ..
وخلال مدة قصيرة … تخلص المخزن الآنف الذكر من الفئران ...
الحكاية انتهت هنا .. سؤال أوجهه لكم أيها القراء الأعزاء: كيف خطر في بال المدير الناجح هذا المكر الذي لا يخطر ببال الشيطان ؟؟
الجواب : لأن مدير المخزن كان الفأر الأقوى الذي بقي سالماً بنتيجة تآكل أبناء جنسه .. لقد أصبح مديراً لذلك المخزن عن طريق التحايل والتخلص من أصدقائه ... طبق على الفئران أسلوب حياته الخاص .. الناجح من وجهة نظره. هكذا تفعل الدول الغنية تجعل الدول الفقيرة تحارب نفسها عن طريق إعطاء كل طائفة أو فئة سلاح لكي يقضوا على بعض وتصبح الساحة خالية للاستيلاء على ثروات البلاد. قصة "الفئران تأكل بعضها"
The White House Years is an excruciatingly detailed memoir of Kissinger’s statecraft from 1969 to 1973. This book is an invaluable resource, recounting our opening of China, the Vietnam peace talks and the Indo-Pakistan war. However if you are not a scholar of diplomacy (I most assuredly am not), I question if one’s time might be better spent than wading through 1,400 pages or relatively dry stuff. This is a 5 star book as far as historical record, but for regular folk it is a 2 star endeavor.
I slogged through this tome because I wanted to know what it was like to live at that level. This man made decisions that affected millions of lives and he did it with amazing discipline and intelligence. I know he is vilified as a war criminal in many circles. And of course he was not going to reveal any malice in his own retelling of his actions. But as pure history it is fascinating.
قرأت المذكرات بحثًا عن وجهة النظر الأخرى حول حرب أكتوبر.. لكن الجزء الأول لم يصل إلى وقت الحرب، وآخر ما فيه كان في سنة ١٩٧٠. يبقى أن الكتاب مليء بالتفاصيل، وفيه بعض الأجزاء حول حرب الاستزاف (حرب عصابات كما سماها كيسنجر) وعن الوضع في الدول العربية المحيطة بإسرائيل.
#مذكرات_هنري_كيسنجر الجزءالأول الكتاب رقم (١٦) من قائمة #تحدي_القراءة لعام ٢٠٢٢/٢٠٢٣ وهو من مقتنياتي من #معرض_الرياض_الدولي_للكتاب_2022 الناشر: #الأهلية_للنشر_و_التوزيع المؤلف: #هنري_كيسنجر ترجمة: #عاطف_أحمد_عمران سنة النشر:٢٠٠٥ عدد الصفحات:609 المدة المستغرقة لقراءة الكتاب: ٩ أيام (بعد جهد)
في هذا المجلد الأول من مذكراته، يغطي الدكتور كيسنجر سنواته الأربع الأولى (1969-1973) كمساعد للرئيس لشؤون الأمن القومي - وأقرب مستشار للرئيس نيكسون في السياسة الخارجية.
الكتاب يقع في 609 صفحة ، أنا متأكد من أنه أطول كتاب قرأته على الإطلاق واصعب كتاب قراءته من حيث حمله بين يدين، وكنت حريصًا جدًا على عدم إسقاطه . لقد كان سردًا مثيرًا للإعجاب ومفصلاً بشكل شامل عن السنوات الأربع الأولى لكيسنجر في إدارة نيكسون ، 1968-1972، هذه المذكرات تعلمنا الكثير عن نيكسون ، والعديد من قادة العالم الآخرين في ذلك الوقت.
شعرت وأنا أقرأ هذا الكتاب وكأنني أدرس حول السياسة الخارجية والدبلوماسية الأمريكية، وأعجبتني الطريقة التي قسّم بها كيسنجر هذا الكتاب: حسب السنة- حسب الموضوع.
بحسب قرائتي فيمكن أن تعتبر هذه المذكرات أهم كتاب تحدث عن إدارة نيكسون، فنجد خلال المذكرات تطرق كيسنجر إلى رحلته السرية إلى الصين ، والمفاوضات الأولى بشأن معاهدة سولت ، وأزمة الأردن عام 1970 ، والحرب الهندية الباكستانية عام 1971 ، واجتماعات القمة التاريخية في بكين وباكستان. وغطي العديد من الأحداث مثل، الأحداث في لاوس ، والإطاحة بأمير كمبوديا سيهانوك ، ومحادثاته السرية مع الفيتناميين الشماليين في باريس ، ومؤتمره الصحفي بعنوان "السلام في متناول اليد" ، وانهيار المحادثات التي أدت إلى "قصف عيد الميلاد" عام 1972.
وفي المذكرات نجد أن كيسنجر قدم رؤيته حول صراعات الشرق الأوسط ، و��نفصال السادات عن السوفييت ، وانتخاب سلفادور أليندي في تشيلي ، وقضايا استراتيجية الدفاع ، والعلاقات مع أوروبا واليابان.
سلبيات وايجابيات للكتاب:
الطول المذكور مسبقًا للكتاب هو ، بالنسبة للبعض ، عيب. على الرغم من أن الفصول طويلة ، إلا أنها لحسن الحظ ، مقسمة إلى فصول فرعية قادرة على منح في بعض الأحيان راحة..
بسبب الطول ومستوى التفاصيل ، لن يكون متاحًا للجميع. لكنه عمل مهم للغاية لأولئك الذين يريدون فهم بعض أحداث السياسة الخارجية الحاسمة في التاريخ الأمريكي.
بسبب حجم الكتاب فلا يمكنك أن تقراءه وأنت مستقلي على ظهرك فقد يقع الكتاب في أي لحظة عليك.
كلمة أقولها: فرحت بانتهاء الكتاب، ويبدو اني لن أقرأ الجزء الثاني مباشرة أحمد الله أن دراستي لم يكن بها هذا الكم من الكتب، فقراءته للمتعة شئ وللدراسة شي
This memoir was written before Kissinger setting up the consultancy firm that deals with sensitive geopolitical issues, so one is right to expect that this volume shall be free of conflict of interests with his clients, albeit always in a relative sense. Whether or not this memoir is more frank than other more recent publications by Kissinger, it is so common to observe his traits/convictions in foreign policy:
1) He regards human rights as a trivial issue and less important than maintaining balance of power. 2) Public opinion is considered to be an obstacle to successful foreign policy as it somewhat at odds with his secret style of dealing with foreign counterparts.
The controversies aside, with myriads of details, I appreciate his concerted effort in defending American interest in the midst of turmoil. His deep reflection in dealing with North Vietnam (as well as South Vietnam) is frank and thoughtful. With the hindsight one can dismiss his effort by the eventual fall of South Vietnam and the so-called "Domino Theory", but given the anti-war atmosphere in Congress and public, I think he already did his best in the formulation of Vietnamization policy at that time. He also justified the bombings while negotiation by pointing out the fact that the stance of North Vietnam Government softened by demonstration of American military power. This is a bold decision and cannot be free of controversy, but I wonder if there are any alternatives (say unilateral withdrawal?) to better serve the American national interest.
For opening with China, it is unfortunate that China has filled the vacuum of Soviet Union and becomes the main threat of global liberal order. The opening was also in the timing of Cultural Revolution when the violation of human right was so blatant (so is China now, probably). But one thing very clear is that the foreign policy of PRC, led by Zhou Enlai, was executed in a very pragmatic way and free of obsessions with ideological struggle, whereas the 'fighting spirit' initiated by Xi Jinping in foreign policy is considered to be complacent and threatening. Kissinger, praised to be an 'old friend of Chinese people' by PRC, probably won't criticised PRC in an open manner, but an intelligent scholar and an experienced diplomat like him shall have felt these not so subtle differences in Chinese foreign policy.
Apart from some minute technical details that he considered necessary, his narration of events is engrossing and page turning. His descriptions of personalities and interaction with his government colleagues (Nixon, Haldeman, Rogers, and his staff in NSC) and counterparts (Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Van Thieu, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Brezhnev, Drobynin) are insightful and often humorous. After all, while I agree with some other commenters that it won't be a book for everyone, you will learn a lot of wisdom by what he said (or what he omitted).
Perhaps Henry Kissinger was a man of tremendous intellect.
I don't know.
But I do know this is one of the worst books ever written outside the realm of management textbooks.
It's a double-barreled assault: tedium and self-justification.
It's the kind of book that gets so deep into bureaucratic rigmarole that Melvin Laird is described as a "dazzling spectacle." It's the kind of book that has a chapter called "The Textile Fiasco."
And then the clumsy, heavy-handed attempts to justify every Vietnam decision. For the love of God, let there never be another book like this one! (Alas, this book is merely one of three volumes.)
The most exhaustive memoirs and definitely the longest book ever read. Despite the length, White House Years is indeed an important recount of Henry Kissinger's beginning in the world of diplomacy and all the crucial events during the early 70s - China, SALT Treaty, India-Pakistan and Vietnam War. All this through Henry Kissinger's efforts and deft. A must-read and engaging read. A man of high intellect and great skill.
To be honest, I do not remember much about this book, except that I was rather proud of reading about one of our guys who has made it in the US. And I remember that he was a fan of Fürth. - I respect Christopher Hitchens but chose to have some doubts about his view about the man.
واحد من اههم الكتب السياسة , لعراب السياسة الخارجية الامريكية فى فترة مهمة من الحرب الباردة , ان صح ان يتم تلخيص الكتباب فى جملة فهى ادارة السياسة باسلوب علمى فصاحب المذكرات كان شغوف بتطبيق كل جديد حتى نظرية game theroy طبقها فى السياسة
RIP Henry , a masterpiece mind of strategic and foreign policy. If you want to learn the diplomacy and how to think like brilliant in this category , you will surly need to read these three books of his politics diary in the White House