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To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power
What would it feel like To Run the World? The Soviet rulers spent the Cold War trying desperately to find out. In this panoramic new history of the conflict that defined the postwar era, Sergey Radchenko provides an unprecedented deep dive into the psychology of the Kremlin's decision-making. He reveals how the Soviet struggle with the United States and China reflected its irreconcilable ambitions as a self-proclaimed superpower and the leader of global revolution. This tension drove Soviet policies from Stalin's postwar scramble for territory to Khrushchev's reckless overseas adventurism and nuclear brinksmanship, Brezhnev's jockeying for influence in the third world, and Gorbachev's failed attempts to reinvent Moscow's claims to greatness. Perennial insecurities, delusions of grandeur, and desire for recognition propelled Moscow on a headlong quest for global power, with dire consequences and painful legacies that continue to shape our world.
603 pages, Hardcover
First published May 31, 2024
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
April 9, 2024
Meticulously researched, scrupulously even handed, one of the best history books I’ve read recently.
July 15, 2024
TO RUN THE WORLD offers a radical new interpretation of the motivations of Soviet foreign policy from the end of World War Il to the dissolution of the USSR. Author Sergey Radchenko, the Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins, retells the story of the "making and breaking" of Soviet power politics, including its unsatiable and self-destructive quest to run the world. Mastering an exhaustive and unparalleled array of Soviet and Chinese archival sources, Radchenko provides the definitive history of the postwar Soviet period while incisively identifying the seeds of its own collapse.
Herein, Radchenko's command of Soviet history is masterfully put on display. Radchenko unravels convoluted historical developments over nearly five decades of Soviet history to distill the naked motivations of Soviet ambition. Radchenko finds that Soviet foreign policy was rooted in what he calls an "ontological insecurity" that framed its hubristic and aggressive foreign policy posture. This quest for legitimation could only be achieved through recognition (specifically by the West), and that recognition would then affirm the legality and righteousness of their place in the global pecking order. As Radchenko argues, this ambition catalyzed the Cold War and a zero-sum race to build competing spheres of influence around the globe.
Radchenko's scope is ambitious. He begins with the postwar race to control Europe, and the transition from great power collaboration to confrontation. He argues that Stalin's craving for power without legitimacy was reckless, leading to repression on unwilling Eastern Europeans and the beginning of a standoff with the West. Confrontation escalated during the 1950s under Khruschev, a boisterous opportunist who sought recognition and legitimacy wherever an opening occurred, including in Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean. The Soviet bid for global hegemony, Radchenko argues, is not complete without understanding its two-sided relationship with China, its largest competitor in the socialist camp.
Leveraging a multitude of Chinese archival sources, Radchenko discerns how both emerging powers vied for the mantle of Marxism by playing for credibility. As the author shows, this race often created tensions between the two powers, and detracted from Khruschev's (and later Brezhnev's) bid for unrivaled hegemony.
As the instability of the Khruschev years matured into the more tepid and conservative Brezhnev years, Radchenko finds that the Soviet need for legitimacy remained strong. The 1970s witnessed the emergence of a more geopolitically involved Soviet empire that leveraged détente to build its own spheres of power around the world. This period soon proved to be equally unstable, and the USSR, foundering on the shoals of its own economic mismanagement, foreign misadventures, and increasing power rivalries in its own backyard, needed reform. Gorbachev's New Thinking doctrine, which paired domestic liberalization with foreign nonintervention, proven insufficient. By the late 1980s, the writing was on the wall.
After 1991, the Empire was spoken of only in the past tense.
In this sweeping history, Radchenko argues that multiple successive Soviet leaders shared the common craving for legitimacy and admission into the camp of great powers. However, Radchenko also shows that this bid for hegemony often birthed misguided adventures and heightened the tension during the Cold War. Despite the rise and fall of the Soviet Empire, Radchenko argues that self-destructive strain of toxic nationalism is still latent in the post-Soviet psyche, ready to be weaponized again for another misguided adventure in its bid to "run the world."
Herein, Radchenko's command of Soviet history is masterfully put on display. Radchenko unravels convoluted historical developments over nearly five decades of Soviet history to distill the naked motivations of Soviet ambition. Radchenko finds that Soviet foreign policy was rooted in what he calls an "ontological insecurity" that framed its hubristic and aggressive foreign policy posture. This quest for legitimation could only be achieved through recognition (specifically by the West), and that recognition would then affirm the legality and righteousness of their place in the global pecking order. As Radchenko argues, this ambition catalyzed the Cold War and a zero-sum race to build competing spheres of influence around the globe.
Radchenko's scope is ambitious. He begins with the postwar race to control Europe, and the transition from great power collaboration to confrontation. He argues that Stalin's craving for power without legitimacy was reckless, leading to repression on unwilling Eastern Europeans and the beginning of a standoff with the West. Confrontation escalated during the 1950s under Khruschev, a boisterous opportunist who sought recognition and legitimacy wherever an opening occurred, including in Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean. The Soviet bid for global hegemony, Radchenko argues, is not complete without understanding its two-sided relationship with China, its largest competitor in the socialist camp.
Leveraging a multitude of Chinese archival sources, Radchenko discerns how both emerging powers vied for the mantle of Marxism by playing for credibility. As the author shows, this race often created tensions between the two powers, and detracted from Khruschev's (and later Brezhnev's) bid for unrivaled hegemony.
As the instability of the Khruschev years matured into the more tepid and conservative Brezhnev years, Radchenko finds that the Soviet need for legitimacy remained strong. The 1970s witnessed the emergence of a more geopolitically involved Soviet empire that leveraged détente to build its own spheres of power around the world. This period soon proved to be equally unstable, and the USSR, foundering on the shoals of its own economic mismanagement, foreign misadventures, and increasing power rivalries in its own backyard, needed reform. Gorbachev's New Thinking doctrine, which paired domestic liberalization with foreign nonintervention, proven insufficient. By the late 1980s, the writing was on the wall.
After 1991, the Empire was spoken of only in the past tense.
In this sweeping history, Radchenko argues that multiple successive Soviet leaders shared the common craving for legitimacy and admission into the camp of great powers. However, Radchenko also shows that this bid for hegemony often birthed misguided adventures and heightened the tension during the Cold War. Despite the rise and fall of the Soviet Empire, Radchenko argues that self-destructive strain of toxic nationalism is still latent in the post-Soviet psyche, ready to be weaponized again for another misguided adventure in its bid to "run the world."
August 5, 2024
I read this book to gain some understanding on what is happening between Russia and the Ukraine in 2024. It did that job very well. Perhaps too well? I would have gone with 4 stars if the author hadn't been fixated on the idea of legitimacy. But it is an excellent overview of post-war USSR foreign policy nonetheless.
The author covers each era of post WWII Soviet history, as defined by each era’s leader of the USSR: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev. First off, it is pretty amazing that there were really only four. Andropov was really a puppet master for senile Brezhnev and didn’t have a separate agenda. Chernenko, also a close Brezhnev man, was probably chosen because everyone knew he didn’t have long to live anyway.
The author has a specific overriding thesis that the main motivator of USSR foreign policy has always been to seek legitimacy on the world stage; in particular, to gain recognition from the USA as an equal world power. Brezhnev came the closest to accomplishing this for a brief period during the era of détente. It went downhill from there since the Soviet Union and its clients were falling farther and farther behind the west. The communist experiment finally collapsed in the end.
Ultimately it’s just too much to believe that all things USSR are explainable by this quest for legitimacy. In fact, the author was probably motivated by the current Russian quest for legitimacy and then worked backwards. But this does serve to shine a light on the current Russian/Ukraine situation nonetheless. Because in a bizarre way, the Ukraine war is really not fundamentally about Ukraine as much as it’s about Russia’s ability to influence world events. Putin sent out his list of demands in December of 2021. Like a return to the NATO borders of 1997 and removal of short and intermediate range missiles from Europe. Russia wants to negotiate these terms directly with the USA, leaving out western Europe allies. Clearly Russia wants to regain its status as a “decider” with the same authority as the USA. Putin talks about terms for a cease fire that includes negotiation with the USA over these same conditions. This shows that the plan is to use a war in Ukraine to force the USA to the bargaining table. As if Ukraine is actually an important US client. Man, that is delusional right there. I don’t see how any good will come from this.
The author covers each era of post WWII Soviet history, as defined by each era’s leader of the USSR: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev. First off, it is pretty amazing that there were really only four. Andropov was really a puppet master for senile Brezhnev and didn’t have a separate agenda. Chernenko, also a close Brezhnev man, was probably chosen because everyone knew he didn’t have long to live anyway.
The author has a specific overriding thesis that the main motivator of USSR foreign policy has always been to seek legitimacy on the world stage; in particular, to gain recognition from the USA as an equal world power. Brezhnev came the closest to accomplishing this for a brief period during the era of détente. It went downhill from there since the Soviet Union and its clients were falling farther and farther behind the west. The communist experiment finally collapsed in the end.
Ultimately it’s just too much to believe that all things USSR are explainable by this quest for legitimacy. In fact, the author was probably motivated by the current Russian quest for legitimacy and then worked backwards. But this does serve to shine a light on the current Russian/Ukraine situation nonetheless. Because in a bizarre way, the Ukraine war is really not fundamentally about Ukraine as much as it’s about Russia’s ability to influence world events. Putin sent out his list of demands in December of 2021. Like a return to the NATO borders of 1997 and removal of short and intermediate range missiles from Europe. Russia wants to negotiate these terms directly with the USA, leaving out western Europe allies. Clearly Russia wants to regain its status as a “decider” with the same authority as the USA. Putin talks about terms for a cease fire that includes negotiation with the USA over these same conditions. This shows that the plan is to use a war in Ukraine to force the USA to the bargaining table. As if Ukraine is actually an important US client. Man, that is delusional right there. I don’t see how any good will come from this.
July 9, 2024
Based on the review by John Lewis Gaddis
July/August, 2024 issue of Foreign Affairs
The USSR, the hope for worldwide communism under Stalin, could not manage the "Three-Body Problem" instability without brutal repression. 1) a solid external reputation, 2) Internal Control/Cohesion, and 3) Internal & External Legitimacy.
Do our US political processes reliably produce agile, adaptive leadership that can balance Reputation, Cohesion, and Legitimacy? Respect and consensus of those involved reduce this to a two-body problem.
Are we foolish enough to believe that our title entitles us to an agenda for action without the consent and support of others?
July/August, 2024 issue of Foreign Affairs
The USSR, the hope for worldwide communism under Stalin, could not manage the "Three-Body Problem" instability without brutal repression. 1) a solid external reputation, 2) Internal Control/Cohesion, and 3) Internal & External Legitimacy.
Do our US political processes reliably produce agile, adaptive leadership that can balance Reputation, Cohesion, and Legitimacy? Respect and consensus of those involved reduce this to a two-body problem.
Are we foolish enough to believe that our title entitles us to an agenda for action without the consent and support of others?
August 22, 2024
A good overview of the dynamics of the Cold War with an emphasis on Soviet leaders' goals, perceptions, and actions. This is a great companion to the study of the Cold War, great power competition, and diplomacy.
Want to read
June 24, 202423/603, 23/6
22/603—4% 21/6/24
22/603—4% 21/6/24
August 3, 2024
A provocative and exhaustive study of Soviet foreign policy from 1945.
Review: https://open.substack.com/pub/martind...
Interview with author:
http://historyasithappens.radio.washi...
Review: https://open.substack.com/pub/martind...
Interview with author:
http://historyasithappens.radio.washi...
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews