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Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence
A uniquely comprehensive and rich account of the Soviet intelligence services, Jonathan Haslam's Near and Distant Neighbors charts the labyrinthine story of Soviet intelligence from the October Revolution to the end of the Cold War.
Previous histories have focused on the KGB, leaving military intelligence and the special service--which focused on codes and ciphers--lurking in the shadows. Drawing on previously neglected Russian sources, Haslam reveals how both were in fact crucial to the survival of the Soviet state. This was especially true after Stalin's death in 1953, as the Cold War heated up and dedicated Communist agents the regime had relied upon--Klaus Fuchs, the Rosenbergs, Donald Maclean--were betrayed. In the wake of these failures, Nikita Khrushchev and his successors discarded ideological recruitment in favor of blackmail and bribery. The tactical turn was so successful that we can draw only one the West ultimately triumphed despite, not because of, the espionage war.
In bringing to light the obscure inhabitants of an undercover intelligence world, Haslam offers a surprising and unprecedented portrayal of Soviet success that is not only fascinating but also essential to understanding Vladimir Putin's power today.
Previous histories have focused on the KGB, leaving military intelligence and the special service--which focused on codes and ciphers--lurking in the shadows. Drawing on previously neglected Russian sources, Haslam reveals how both were in fact crucial to the survival of the Soviet state. This was especially true after Stalin's death in 1953, as the Cold War heated up and dedicated Communist agents the regime had relied upon--Klaus Fuchs, the Rosenbergs, Donald Maclean--were betrayed. In the wake of these failures, Nikita Khrushchev and his successors discarded ideological recruitment in favor of blackmail and bribery. The tactical turn was so successful that we can draw only one the West ultimately triumphed despite, not because of, the espionage war.
In bringing to light the obscure inhabitants of an undercover intelligence world, Haslam offers a surprising and unprecedented portrayal of Soviet success that is not only fascinating but also essential to understanding Vladimir Putin's power today.
400 pages, Hardcover
First published September 24, 2015
About the author
Jonathan Haslam
22 books14 followersJonathan Haslam is George F. Kennan Professor in the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and Professor of the History of International Relations at the University of Cambridge.
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Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
February 3, 2018
This book is an attempt to describe the history of Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence, from creation of the Cheka to the fall of the USSR. It is based to a large extent on new Russian sources in addition to the more ‘classical’ western sources.
I haven’t read any other similar studies on the topic, so it is hard to compare it to the other books, but taken “as is” I think it is not very good and biased. The biasness maybe not intentional but appears from the fact that the author relies too much on the sources supplied by Russian intelligence agencies, which open their archives quite selectively to show them in a good light.
There are a few minor errors as well, for example:
• Boris Lago-Kolpakov is in reality is Lago-Ozerov
• Naming Spanish POUM members “Trotskyists” goes only from Soviet and related sources. Actually they fell apart with Leo Trotsky before the war and calling them that shows author’s bias in general reading
• Yevhen Konovalets was killed not by a bomb in a cake but in a box of chocolates.
• To see anti-Soviet movements in Baltic and Ukraine as only pawns of foreign intelligence agencies is at least a bit strange
Another major problem with audiobook is that narrator doesn’t know Russian a bit and says all names and places so wrong, you have to check with print version.
One of the minor interesting stories I haven’t been aware of is about Yuri Totrov, who worked with open data long before it become mainstream.
One crucial breakthrough was in realising that the agency’s bureaucracy, not unlike Totrov’s own, was a creature enslaved by habit. To a bureaucrat, change was always disruptive and to be avoided. So when an officer was assigned to a particular mission, the tendency was to place him at the same rank as his predecessor. More than that, from bureaucratic inertia, intelligence officers were then allocated the same apartments, even the same car, as previous incumbents.
Totrov’s first challenge was to build the model. This was followed by a slow process of testing and fine-tuning until he felt confident enough to present his conclusions. The old hands, including his superiors, took some convincing, however, as they steadfastly believed they always knew best and that intuition guided by direct experience in the field was a far better guide than systematic research. “Unfortunately,” Totrov recalled, “even one of my chiefs, not wishing to make a special effort to get into the essence of the system, for a long time could not believe that with its help one could with surgical precision establish which people belonged to CIA.” The system worked even on those under deep cover.
The model contained twenty-six indicators that in combination enabled the identification of an officer from CIA under cover as a genuine foreign service officer (FSO).
I haven’t read any other similar studies on the topic, so it is hard to compare it to the other books, but taken “as is” I think it is not very good and biased. The biasness maybe not intentional but appears from the fact that the author relies too much on the sources supplied by Russian intelligence agencies, which open their archives quite selectively to show them in a good light.
There are a few minor errors as well, for example:
• Boris Lago-Kolpakov is in reality is Lago-Ozerov
• Naming Spanish POUM members “Trotskyists” goes only from Soviet and related sources. Actually they fell apart with Leo Trotsky before the war and calling them that shows author’s bias in general reading
• Yevhen Konovalets was killed not by a bomb in a cake but in a box of chocolates.
• To see anti-Soviet movements in Baltic and Ukraine as only pawns of foreign intelligence agencies is at least a bit strange
Another major problem with audiobook is that narrator doesn’t know Russian a bit and says all names and places so wrong, you have to check with print version.
One of the minor interesting stories I haven’t been aware of is about Yuri Totrov, who worked with open data long before it become mainstream.
One crucial breakthrough was in realising that the agency’s bureaucracy, not unlike Totrov’s own, was a creature enslaved by habit. To a bureaucrat, change was always disruptive and to be avoided. So when an officer was assigned to a particular mission, the tendency was to place him at the same rank as his predecessor. More than that, from bureaucratic inertia, intelligence officers were then allocated the same apartments, even the same car, as previous incumbents.
Totrov’s first challenge was to build the model. This was followed by a slow process of testing and fine-tuning until he felt confident enough to present his conclusions. The old hands, including his superiors, took some convincing, however, as they steadfastly believed they always knew best and that intuition guided by direct experience in the field was a far better guide than systematic research. “Unfortunately,” Totrov recalled, “even one of my chiefs, not wishing to make a special effort to get into the essence of the system, for a long time could not believe that with its help one could with surgical precision establish which people belonged to CIA.” The system worked even on those under deep cover.
The model contained twenty-six indicators that in combination enabled the identification of an officer from CIA under cover as a genuine foreign service officer (FSO).
February 26, 2016
A comprehensive review of Soviet intelligence - while there are a number of interesting anecdotes scattered throughout, this is generally not a book for the uninitiated (like myself). The acronyms and names are very difficult to keep track of, and the book comes across as a series of short vignettes about the various actors involved, rather than a narrative arc (although this does change somewhat as it develops - I found the second half to be significantly more engaging and interesting than the first).
If you have a background in this area, I imagine this would be much more approachable. If not...while I respect the scholarly achievement, I'm not sure that I would recommend it.
If you have a background in this area, I imagine this would be much more approachable. If not...while I respect the scholarly achievement, I'm not sure that I would recommend it.
September 16, 2019
(3.5 Stars) This books attempts to explain the history of Soviet Intelligence, from the Russian Revolution to the collapse of the USSR. The work is very readable as it covers the history. There is a lot of personal drama and personal conflicts, with names that some may know, and others that people may not recall. Of note, the author assess the Soviet Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities as its strongest asset, especially with the network of British and American contacts who offers incredible insight and capabilities. Yet, it is fascinating to see that even when the traitors and double agents provided such damaging material, Soviet Intelligence and political leaders did not trust the information they were receiving.
There were some comparison attempts between the strengths and weaknesses of US intelligence vs. Soviet intelligence. Overall, the USSR was better at HUMINT, but the US was stronger in signals intelligence (SIGINT). There were periods where USSR Intelligence was strong and did a lot of great work, but they had just as many down periods. At times, the role of the intelligence agencies were in flux, whereas some thought the emphasis should be on counter-intelligence vs. foreign intelligence, and those interagency fights could sometimes turn fatal for the participants.
One difficulty for this subject is that a lot of material is still locked up in archives, and there is no certainty that this information will ever see the light of day. Perhaps in the years ahead, more will come out and further add to this story. Until then, it is a solid read, but perhaps not the end-all/be-all for Soviet Intelligence.
There were some comparison attempts between the strengths and weaknesses of US intelligence vs. Soviet intelligence. Overall, the USSR was better at HUMINT, but the US was stronger in signals intelligence (SIGINT). There were periods where USSR Intelligence was strong and did a lot of great work, but they had just as many down periods. At times, the role of the intelligence agencies were in flux, whereas some thought the emphasis should be on counter-intelligence vs. foreign intelligence, and those interagency fights could sometimes turn fatal for the participants.
One difficulty for this subject is that a lot of material is still locked up in archives, and there is no certainty that this information will ever see the light of day. Perhaps in the years ahead, more will come out and further add to this story. Until then, it is a solid read, but perhaps not the end-all/be-all for Soviet Intelligence.
March 12, 2023
O istorie complicată și destul de greoaie a serviciilor de informații sovietice. Pentru un subiect atât de complex, evident că nici istoria nu putea fi una simplă. Cartea e bine documentată, chiar dacă uneori este copleșitor de plină de detalii.
Cartea e super interesantă dacă vreți să înțelegeți de unde s-au creat reflexele securistice, cu toate limitările și întinderile lor, dar și cum a influențat Războiul Rece cursa asta în care URSS, SUA, UK au alergat după tehnici de supraveghere, spioni și tehnologie.
Cartea e super interesantă dacă vreți să înțelegeți de unde s-au creat reflexele securistice, cu toate limitările și întinderile lor, dar și cum a influențat Războiul Rece cursa asta în care URSS, SUA, UK au alergat după tehnici de supraveghere, spioni și tehnologie.
May 23, 2018
This is a highly detailed, immersive and wonderful exploration of Soviet intelligence and its performance over the decades. The book goes into a lot of detail, with the author breaking it up along key themes in Soviet intelligence history.
The main trap with this book is it is not a simple or easy read. As it can bounce around by year and names are added constantly (which may be even more confusing if you are not used to Russian names) it can feel as though you may have missed something, or you have rapidly changed time period and characters.
As a history book this definitely leans more to the academic in nature, which if you are interested in the subject is a wonderful thing. If you are looking for a light read covering Soviet intelligence, this is not the book for you. unlike a light enjoyable read on public transport, this book requires a level of concentration to get the most out of it.
Despite these characteristics, I found this to be a thoroughly enjoyable read and would highly recommend it!
The main trap with this book is it is not a simple or easy read. As it can bounce around by year and names are added constantly (which may be even more confusing if you are not used to Russian names) it can feel as though you may have missed something, or you have rapidly changed time period and characters.
As a history book this definitely leans more to the academic in nature, which if you are interested in the subject is a wonderful thing. If you are looking for a light read covering Soviet intelligence, this is not the book for you. unlike a light enjoyable read on public transport, this book requires a level of concentration to get the most out of it.
Despite these characteristics, I found this to be a thoroughly enjoyable read and would highly recommend it!
August 5, 2017
In no way do I question the authoritative nature of this work. I do question the writing employed. There is a deluge of names presented within the various Soviet Intelligence agencies that are not presented in a clear linear narrative. For someone, like myself, who is new to this particular subject matter, confusion ensues. However, if you have prior knowledge of the subject matter, I'd guess that it is a superlative read.
August 27, 2016
Interesting overall but hard to follow the timeline and names. Focuses more on people rather than events and techniques. The author follows the history of Soviet Union but quite a few times goes chronologically back and forth which makes the series of events had to follow. I wish that all the book was like the introduction.
December 11, 2015
Abandoned quite early on. Not really a book for amateurs on the topic. I was hoping for some sweet espionage a la The Americans, but alas I just got confused about who everybody was and declared it hopeless.
Read
December 31, 2016Very interesting book. The last chapter is unfortunately extremely relevant for current affairs.
December 18, 2023
During the Cold War, there was a tendency to imagine Soviet spies and spy agencies as hypercompetent masterminds. The truth was, shall we say, far more grubby, and at times outright absurd.
Not to say that they didn't pose a danger, since they did induce a number of people on our side to betray their country, typically by passing our nuclear secrets. But by and large their successes were either with people who were already ideologically aligned toward the Soviet system or people whose weaknesses and inadequacies made them easy to sway. Money problems proved a surprisingly powerful inducement to compromise oneself and one's country's security, as America progressively lost the aversion to debt which the Great Depression had created. Others were swayed by pretty women or various vices.
But when we look at the actual internal workings of the intelligence services of the KGB (and to a lesser degree the GRU, the military intelligence community, although less information is available about them), we see an astonishing degree of incompetence and slipshod work. Some of the senior officers of the KGB's intelligence service come across as bumbling amateurs, and more than a few of them tended to drunkenness to the point that they made stupid, careless mistakes, even blabbing information like the code names of various agents.
And of course the people at the top often did as much harm as good to their own cause. Stalin was so distrustful of his own intelligence agencies that many of his best agents ended up dead on the basis of having turned double-agents on behalf of Western powers (especially the UK during the Terror, and the US in the early Cold War). Khrushchev couldn't restrain his love of boasting, and thus there was a tendency to keep highly sensitive material away from him so he couldn't blab about it -- but he also couldn't act upon it either. Brezhnev did know how to keep his mouth shut, but he was never the brightest bulb in the chandelier, and as his health went into sharp decline, he became less and less capable of actual governance -- and thus it became increasingly possible for the CIA to plant disinformation that would lead the gerontocracy astray.
If the information in this book is correct, the CIA was responsible for the final push that led to the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan in December of 1979, and there was delight at Langley when they took the bait. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the power of ideology in Soviet governance, and how it led "fraternal aid" to become military intervention with an inadequate logistical train to sustain it.
On the whole, it's a decent overview of the Soviet intelligence agencies, but there are several points at which the sequence of events is not as clear as it could be. Earlier events are discussed after ones that came much later, which can lead to confusion if one is not reading closely.
Not to say that they didn't pose a danger, since they did induce a number of people on our side to betray their country, typically by passing our nuclear secrets. But by and large their successes were either with people who were already ideologically aligned toward the Soviet system or people whose weaknesses and inadequacies made them easy to sway. Money problems proved a surprisingly powerful inducement to compromise oneself and one's country's security, as America progressively lost the aversion to debt which the Great Depression had created. Others were swayed by pretty women or various vices.
But when we look at the actual internal workings of the intelligence services of the KGB (and to a lesser degree the GRU, the military intelligence community, although less information is available about them), we see an astonishing degree of incompetence and slipshod work. Some of the senior officers of the KGB's intelligence service come across as bumbling amateurs, and more than a few of them tended to drunkenness to the point that they made stupid, careless mistakes, even blabbing information like the code names of various agents.
And of course the people at the top often did as much harm as good to their own cause. Stalin was so distrustful of his own intelligence agencies that many of his best agents ended up dead on the basis of having turned double-agents on behalf of Western powers (especially the UK during the Terror, and the US in the early Cold War). Khrushchev couldn't restrain his love of boasting, and thus there was a tendency to keep highly sensitive material away from him so he couldn't blab about it -- but he also couldn't act upon it either. Brezhnev did know how to keep his mouth shut, but he was never the brightest bulb in the chandelier, and as his health went into sharp decline, he became less and less capable of actual governance -- and thus it became increasingly possible for the CIA to plant disinformation that would lead the gerontocracy astray.
If the information in this book is correct, the CIA was responsible for the final push that led to the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan in December of 1979, and there was delight at Langley when they took the bait. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the power of ideology in Soviet governance, and how it led "fraternal aid" to become military intervention with an inadequate logistical train to sustain it.
On the whole, it's a decent overview of the Soviet intelligence agencies, but there are several points at which the sequence of events is not as clear as it could be. Earlier events are discussed after ones that came much later, which can lead to confusion if one is not reading closely.
March 31, 2023
Near and Distant Neighbors is a good overview of Soviet Intelligence, ably accomplishing the goal of describing the shared history and intersections of the different Soviet intelligence services (GRU and KGB) and different intelligence disciplines. However, in covering so much ground in a relatively short book Haslam only provides relatively short summaries of the key events in Soviet intelligence collection, focusing on Soviet HUMINT and counterintelligence collection against the US and UK at the expense of deeper or broader examinations of the Soviet model of intelligence collection. With Haslam focusing on the high-profile incidents of the Cold War he does not ultimately provide the comprehensive history, or a comprehensive model, of Soviet intelligence. Given that there are several good books on US intelligence collection and disciplines and Haslam's research, it should have been possible for Haslam to have provided a counterpart book focused on the Soviet / Russian model, covering the evolution of the Soviet model of the intelligence process from establishing requirements, training operatives, conducting operations, and informing policy. In the end, we do not get a comprehensive model while the series of anecdotes, covered ably, can be reviewed in more detail in other works.
July 4, 2020
This was an interesting read that provided a short but broad timeline of the intelligence services from the Bolsheviks to the fall of the USSR. Haslam also described how aspects of state intelligence hold from tsarist Russia, to the USSR, and the modern day. It's definitely an easy to read book that gives the reader a general understanding of Russian intelligence.
I'm not an expert in the Soviet Union or Russia, so I'm not sure how inaccurate this book was. However, I do know that Ames did not head counter intelligence at the CIA, so Haslam was at least careless in that regard. He also treated the theory that the US baited the USSR into invading Afghanistan as a fact without providing enough evidence for this claim. Given that, the reader should double check the information provided in this book, though it is well written.
I'm not an expert in the Soviet Union or Russia, so I'm not sure how inaccurate this book was. However, I do know that Ames did not head counter intelligence at the CIA, so Haslam was at least careless in that regard. He also treated the theory that the US baited the USSR into invading Afghanistan as a fact without providing enough evidence for this claim. Given that, the reader should double check the information provided in this book, though it is well written.
May 15, 2019
It was an interesting, although very factual and detail-oriented book. I found the style foggy at times. The interesting personal insights that I gained, that initially very many Russian spies were Jews. They worked for free, just for ideological reasons.
I found it also fascinating that propaganda, and misrepresenting country's real military potential were such powerful weapons. The interpretation of conflict in Afghanistan was very interesting. I'd like to read more about Chechens. Analysis of morale in espionage during 80s and 90s, as well as short piece about Putin sound also very true to me.
I found it also fascinating that propaganda, and misrepresenting country's real military potential were such powerful weapons. The interpretation of conflict in Afghanistan was very interesting. I'd like to read more about Chechens. Analysis of morale in espionage during 80s and 90s, as well as short piece about Putin sound also very true to me.
September 24, 2018
Full of lots of fascinating detail, and very eye-opening to those of us who grew up in the cold war era. Let's just say that real espionage is much messier (and often lower tech) than in a Bond film.
The author also makes interesting connections between the Soviet intelligence system and the Tsarist-era secret police.
The author also makes interesting connections between the Soviet intelligence system and the Tsarist-era secret police.
June 4, 2023
Very academic analysis of the effectiveness of Soviet intelligence operations with a special focus on bureaucratic architecture and personalities. Would not reccomend for someone not already familiar with major highlights of Soviet operations or without a strong background in 20th century Russuan history.
May 11, 2017
The Soviet Union operated the two largest intelligence organizations the world has ever seen, but their relationships - both cooperative and competitive - have not received sufficient scholarly attention.
June 20, 2018
This was an interesting, if scattered review of Soviet intelligence. It is a good resource for those looking for an overview of the history and activities of the Soviet intelligence services.
July 19, 2019
Used for research.
Read
May 25, 2016Get into this book in the winter, or at the start of a long stretch of free time, if you like taking notes on books you read, and only if you're very invested in the topic and its minutiae. This book is packed full of information. The problem is that the reader must work to unpack it, and sometimes the effort of that work overrides the potential satisfaction of learning about the subject.
Some reviewers stated that this book reads like a textbook. I don't think so. A textbook would break the topic down into more digestible parts. This book seems to take the expanse of Soviet intelligence and unravel it thread by thread in a manner that might have been logical in an initial outline but which becomes so tangled with diversions that you no longer know what thread you're following.
An abundance of acronyms and names are just par for the course when reading about Soviet history; it's an unavoidable obstacle which can only be solved through careful study of provided definitions, a good memory, or just not caring that much.
Some reviewers stated that this book reads like a textbook. I don't think so. A textbook would break the topic down into more digestible parts. This book seems to take the expanse of Soviet intelligence and unravel it thread by thread in a manner that might have been logical in an initial outline but which becomes so tangled with diversions that you no longer know what thread you're following.
An abundance of acronyms and names are just par for the course when reading about Soviet history; it's an unavoidable obstacle which can only be solved through careful study of provided definitions, a good memory, or just not caring that much.
May 17, 2016
While the information in the book was interesting and on a topic I knew very little about there were also some serious drawbacks. First, the book was not written as any sort of narrative it more seemed like a textbook in that it was just a collection of factual sentences group together. Moreover I felt there were too many people discussed in the story that it was very difficult to keep them all straight and it did not help that all the names were very difficult for me as a western reader to pronounce and remember. I feel it would have been better had to the scope of the book been reduced to do a more comprehensive job of telling about particular incidents and keeping a central theme to tie it all together or alternatively it could have been made much longer and marketed more as a textbook on the period rather than a book for casual reading.
February 11, 2017
A good history of Soviet Intelligence up to the late 1950s that benefitted from the brief opening of Soviet archives. After that period, the history is not as detailed
May 16, 2016
Fantastic. Owing to US and UK restriction on sensitive material to 75 years, the Russians have emerged as the definitive source in the cold war by opening their archives. I would be interested in hearing what someone who grew up on the other side of the iron curtain had to say about this material.
July 8, 2020
Aburrido
March 31, 2017
Kind of dry considering it is all about spies. Good frame for understanding the present though.
Shelved as 'might-read'
November 4, 2018Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews