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Lincoln's Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac
Narrated by George Guidall
From the bestselling author of Gettysburg comes a multilayered group biography of the commanders who led the Army of the Potomac. The high command of the Army of the Potomac was a changeable, often dysfunctional band of brothers, going through the fires of war under seven commanding generals in three years, until Grant came east in 1864. President Lincoln oversaw, argued with, and finally tamed his unruly team of generals as the eastern army was stabilized by an unsung supporting cast of corps, division, and brigade generals.
From the bestselling author of Gettysburg comes a multilayered group biography of the commanders who led the Army of the Potomac. The high command of the Army of the Potomac was a changeable, often dysfunctional band of brothers, going through the fires of war under seven commanding generals in three years, until Grant came east in 1864. President Lincoln oversaw, argued with, and finally tamed his unruly team of generals as the eastern army was stabilized by an unsung supporting cast of corps, division, and brigade generals.
Audio CD
First published April 25, 2017
About the author
Stephen W. Sears
51 books201 followersStephen Ward Sears is an American historian specializing in the American Civil War.
A graduate of Lakewood High School and Oberlin College, Sears attended a journalism seminar at Radcliffe-Harvard. As an author he has concentrated on the military history of the American Civil War, primarily the battles and leaders of the Army of the Potomac. He was employed as editor of the Educational Department at the American Heritage Publishing Company.
Sears resides in Norwalk, Connecticut.
A graduate of Lakewood High School and Oberlin College, Sears attended a journalism seminar at Radcliffe-Harvard. As an author he has concentrated on the military history of the American Civil War, primarily the battles and leaders of the Army of the Potomac. He was employed as editor of the Educational Department at the American Heritage Publishing Company.
Sears resides in Norwalk, Connecticut.
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January 22, 2022
“The high command that closed the war in April 1865 was a world apart from the high command that opened the war. This had become a largely self-taught army led by volunteer officers from civilian life. Four years of fighting cost twenty-one of its generals their lives, but somehow, through trial and tribulation unimagined, the Army of the Potomac kept its identity and its purpose and its resolution steadfast until final victory.”
- Stephen Sears, Lincoln’s Lieutenants
The Army of the Potomac might be one of the most maligned victorious armies in history. Despite being the last men standing, even serious students of the subject can be forgiven for imagining them as the Washington Generals of the American Civil War. While Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia twirled the ball on their fingertips, made spectacular trick shots, and did that thing where they keep running in circles passing the ball off to their teammates, the Army of the Potomac continually stumbled as though their shoelaces had been tied together. Time and again, with numerical and materiel superiority, “Mr. Lincoln’s Army” either lost disastrously, or failed to close the deal.
That, at least, is the received wisdom of the Army of the Potomac. And like all received wisdom pertaining to the Civil War, it is comprised of both facts and mythology. Nothing can change its ultimate record. No amount of revisionism can reframe the disaster at – to take one instance – Fredericksburg. Yet for all that, the Army of the Potomac is treated unfairly. For instance: Gettysburg is a seminal victory, in which an invading army was stopped cold, gravely injured, and sent retreating. But the victory is diminished by many historians because it was not a “decisive battle,” which failed to immediately end the war (though the lack of a “decisive victory” has never bothered Lee’s partisans). Furthermore, the series of hammer blows delivered by Ulysses Grant and George Meade during the Overland Campaign are maligned as butchery and attrition, rather than an extreme example of endurance and tenacity.
The Army of the Potomac has had its defenders, of course, including Bruce Catton, whose trilogy of books can be summed up in a phrase from World War I: “Lions led by donkeys.” According to Catton, the mettle of the Army of the Potomac’s rank-and-file has been obscured by the indecisiveness of George McClellan, the incompetence of Ambrose Burnside, and the arrogance of Joseph Hooker.
Sears’s approach to the Army of the Potomac is different than Catton’s. Self-consciously patterned off of Douglas Southall Freeman’s Lee’s Lieutenants – the classic study of Lee’s subordinates – Lincoln’s Lieutenants is focused on the Army of the Potomac’s “high command.”
What does this mean? Well, there are no intimate tales of combat as told by sergeants, or corporals, or privates (or lieutenants or colonels, for that matter). This is the opposite of the grunt’s-eye-view that is often celebrated in today’s popular histories. Instead, it is a study in leadership at the upper echelons, and how that evolved during the Army of the Potomac’s many fits and false starts. To that end, Sears’s focus in on command of the entire army itself, along with the commanders of the Army of the Potomac’s divisions and brigades. This means that there is no mention of regimental commanders, and there is no time spent on the Western Theater, naval operations, or the Confederate opponents.
Lincoln’s Lieutenants is not a book on quantum mechanics or molecular cell biology. If you can read – and I bet you can! – then you will understand it just fine. That said, it’s not really directed at a general readership. While Sears is a fantastic writer and renowned historian, with a number of exceptional volumes on individual Civil War battles in his haversack, this is a pointedly focused volume. You probably want to have an abiding interest in the Army of the Potomac’s evolving leadership before picking this up. There are literally entire pages devoted solely to telling you which brigade commander took over a division, which division commander received a corps, and which corps commander was sent far away, to a place where he’d be less dangerous to himself and his men.
Though my wife has drawn the line at pursuing a side-gig as a reenactor, I classify myself as a pretty serious student of the Civil War, and for me, this was a must-read. Sears is too careful a historian for a wholesale reevaluation of the Army of the Potomac, but he brings a lot of insights to bear, some subtle, some more profound. He takes you through the thicket of Potomac Army politics, finding McClellan’s dalliance with a coup to be far more dangerous than typically presented. He defends poor Ambrose Burnside’s performance at Antietam, while otherwise seeing him as an absolute lost cause (pun intended) who should never have gone beyond divisional command (a judgment Burnside likely would have agreed with). He reminds you of fighting men such as Samuel Heintzelman, a tough old cob who steadied the Potomac Army in its early struggles, and was then unceremoniously shuttled off to command Washington’s defenses. And he disproves the notion, time and again, that the Confederates had a monopoly on adept and inspiring leaders. Sears tells you the stories of tough, professional warriors, the “iron core” of the Army of the Potomac, that you might not have heard much about. Men like John Gibbon, Francis Channing Barlow, and artilleryman Henry Hunt, who all survived, and others with much potential, such as Isaac Stevens, who did not.
Sears is known for his willingness to make contrary judgments, and he does that here. He is down on General Grant, who he deems “impatient,” but bullish on General George Meade, the victor at Gettysburg and the last commander of the Army of the Potomac, who has often been overshadowed because Grant accompanied Meade and the Potomac Army during the Overland Campaign. It’s nice to see Meade finally get his due. Sears also continues his rehabilitation of Joseph Hooker, who Lee vanquished at Chancellorsville. In Sears’s telling, Hooker was not only a fine divisional and corps commander, but did an excellent job reorganizing the Army of the Potomac after Burnside got drunk and drove it into a ditch (in a manner of speaking). He also believes that Hooker came extremely close to succeeding in his Chancellorsville campaign, only to be utterly failed by his subordinates (chiefly Oliver Otis Howard, who Sears’s dislikes intensely) and felled with a serious concussion. In all honesty, I disagreed with many of Sears’s assertions, especially with regard to Grant and the Overland Campaign, which is rather rushed. But that only heightened my engagement.
As I read this, I was reminded of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s The Light of the Stars: “O fear not in a world like this / And thou shalt know erelong / Know how sublime a thing it is / To suffer and be strong.”
That was nearly the fate of the Army of the Potomac: to suffer and be strong. In the end, they definitely suffered, they were inarguably strong, and they somehow prevailed, but as Sears demonstrates, they often did so in spite of their leaders, rather than because of them. Lincoln’s Lieutenants is a hefty look at generalship, focusing on the heads of a great army. Though it is unavoidable given its design, it misses any consideration of the men who formed its heart.
- Stephen Sears, Lincoln’s Lieutenants
The Army of the Potomac might be one of the most maligned victorious armies in history. Despite being the last men standing, even serious students of the subject can be forgiven for imagining them as the Washington Generals of the American Civil War. While Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia twirled the ball on their fingertips, made spectacular trick shots, and did that thing where they keep running in circles passing the ball off to their teammates, the Army of the Potomac continually stumbled as though their shoelaces had been tied together. Time and again, with numerical and materiel superiority, “Mr. Lincoln’s Army” either lost disastrously, or failed to close the deal.
That, at least, is the received wisdom of the Army of the Potomac. And like all received wisdom pertaining to the Civil War, it is comprised of both facts and mythology. Nothing can change its ultimate record. No amount of revisionism can reframe the disaster at – to take one instance – Fredericksburg. Yet for all that, the Army of the Potomac is treated unfairly. For instance: Gettysburg is a seminal victory, in which an invading army was stopped cold, gravely injured, and sent retreating. But the victory is diminished by many historians because it was not a “decisive battle,” which failed to immediately end the war (though the lack of a “decisive victory” has never bothered Lee’s partisans). Furthermore, the series of hammer blows delivered by Ulysses Grant and George Meade during the Overland Campaign are maligned as butchery and attrition, rather than an extreme example of endurance and tenacity.
The Army of the Potomac has had its defenders, of course, including Bruce Catton, whose trilogy of books can be summed up in a phrase from World War I: “Lions led by donkeys.” According to Catton, the mettle of the Army of the Potomac’s rank-and-file has been obscured by the indecisiveness of George McClellan, the incompetence of Ambrose Burnside, and the arrogance of Joseph Hooker.
Sears’s approach to the Army of the Potomac is different than Catton’s. Self-consciously patterned off of Douglas Southall Freeman’s Lee’s Lieutenants – the classic study of Lee’s subordinates – Lincoln’s Lieutenants is focused on the Army of the Potomac’s “high command.”
What does this mean? Well, there are no intimate tales of combat as told by sergeants, or corporals, or privates (or lieutenants or colonels, for that matter). This is the opposite of the grunt’s-eye-view that is often celebrated in today’s popular histories. Instead, it is a study in leadership at the upper echelons, and how that evolved during the Army of the Potomac’s many fits and false starts. To that end, Sears’s focus in on command of the entire army itself, along with the commanders of the Army of the Potomac’s divisions and brigades. This means that there is no mention of regimental commanders, and there is no time spent on the Western Theater, naval operations, or the Confederate opponents.
Lincoln’s Lieutenants is not a book on quantum mechanics or molecular cell biology. If you can read – and I bet you can! – then you will understand it just fine. That said, it’s not really directed at a general readership. While Sears is a fantastic writer and renowned historian, with a number of exceptional volumes on individual Civil War battles in his haversack, this is a pointedly focused volume. You probably want to have an abiding interest in the Army of the Potomac’s evolving leadership before picking this up. There are literally entire pages devoted solely to telling you which brigade commander took over a division, which division commander received a corps, and which corps commander was sent far away, to a place where he’d be less dangerous to himself and his men.
Though my wife has drawn the line at pursuing a side-gig as a reenactor, I classify myself as a pretty serious student of the Civil War, and for me, this was a must-read. Sears is too careful a historian for a wholesale reevaluation of the Army of the Potomac, but he brings a lot of insights to bear, some subtle, some more profound. He takes you through the thicket of Potomac Army politics, finding McClellan’s dalliance with a coup to be far more dangerous than typically presented. He defends poor Ambrose Burnside’s performance at Antietam, while otherwise seeing him as an absolute lost cause (pun intended) who should never have gone beyond divisional command (a judgment Burnside likely would have agreed with). He reminds you of fighting men such as Samuel Heintzelman, a tough old cob who steadied the Potomac Army in its early struggles, and was then unceremoniously shuttled off to command Washington’s defenses. And he disproves the notion, time and again, that the Confederates had a monopoly on adept and inspiring leaders. Sears tells you the stories of tough, professional warriors, the “iron core” of the Army of the Potomac, that you might not have heard much about. Men like John Gibbon, Francis Channing Barlow, and artilleryman Henry Hunt, who all survived, and others with much potential, such as Isaac Stevens, who did not.
Sears is known for his willingness to make contrary judgments, and he does that here. He is down on General Grant, who he deems “impatient,” but bullish on General George Meade, the victor at Gettysburg and the last commander of the Army of the Potomac, who has often been overshadowed because Grant accompanied Meade and the Potomac Army during the Overland Campaign. It’s nice to see Meade finally get his due. Sears also continues his rehabilitation of Joseph Hooker, who Lee vanquished at Chancellorsville. In Sears’s telling, Hooker was not only a fine divisional and corps commander, but did an excellent job reorganizing the Army of the Potomac after Burnside got drunk and drove it into a ditch (in a manner of speaking). He also believes that Hooker came extremely close to succeeding in his Chancellorsville campaign, only to be utterly failed by his subordinates (chiefly Oliver Otis Howard, who Sears’s dislikes intensely) and felled with a serious concussion. In all honesty, I disagreed with many of Sears’s assertions, especially with regard to Grant and the Overland Campaign, which is rather rushed. But that only heightened my engagement.
As I read this, I was reminded of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s The Light of the Stars: “O fear not in a world like this / And thou shalt know erelong / Know how sublime a thing it is / To suffer and be strong.”
That was nearly the fate of the Army of the Potomac: to suffer and be strong. In the end, they definitely suffered, they were inarguably strong, and they somehow prevailed, but as Sears demonstrates, they often did so in spite of their leaders, rather than because of them. Lincoln’s Lieutenants is a hefty look at generalship, focusing on the heads of a great army. Though it is unavoidable given its design, it misses any consideration of the men who formed its heart.
December 16, 2018
3.5 rounded up to 4 stars
I won this audiobook in a Goodreads giveaway 18 months ago. This is my first audiobook and it took me this long to finish it. I apologize to the publisher, Recorded Books, for taking so long. I thought that it was print book when I entered the giveaway contest. I purchased a portable cd player and listened to all 26 discs(32 hours).
Pros: The narrator was excellent. The author has done an impressive amount of research in primary sources, I.e., letters. diaries and War Department records. Based on this book, I think George McClellan was a pompous jerk afraid of his own shadow. He routinely inflated the forces opposing him by 100%. He would write Lincoln that he needed more men because Lee had 200,000 men and he only had 120,000 men. In reality Lee's army never rose above 100,000.
Cons: The author would list all the generals from the head of the army down to division commanders(about 15 men) before each battle causing my ears/brain to glaze over.
I won this audiobook in a Goodreads giveaway 18 months ago. This is my first audiobook and it took me this long to finish it. I apologize to the publisher, Recorded Books, for taking so long. I thought that it was print book when I entered the giveaway contest. I purchased a portable cd player and listened to all 26 discs(32 hours).
Pros: The narrator was excellent. The author has done an impressive amount of research in primary sources, I.e., letters. diaries and War Department records. Based on this book, I think George McClellan was a pompous jerk afraid of his own shadow. He routinely inflated the forces opposing him by 100%. He would write Lincoln that he needed more men because Lee had 200,000 men and he only had 120,000 men. In reality Lee's army never rose above 100,000.
Cons: The author would list all the generals from the head of the army down to division commanders(about 15 men) before each battle causing my ears/brain to glaze over.
May 31, 2017
Flagpole Leadership: Lincoln’s Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac by Stephen W. Sears, reviewed by Colonel (ret) Mike Kershaw
With all the attention being paid recently to the political activity of general officers, both active duty and recently retired, Stephen Sears’ accounting of the high command of one of our most notable armies seems unnervingly familiar. Sears, a well-known Civil War historian, as well as author of an abridgment to Douglass Southall Freeman’s Lee’s Lieutenants (the similarity is deliberate) has drafted what I found to be an engaging and revealing study of the indispensable army to Union victory in our War Between the States.
Lincoln’s Lieutenants focus is the general officer leadership of the Union’s Army of the Potomac, including its predecessors and in its other appellations. It follows this army throughout its many campaigns, with an accounting of the leadership down to the brigade-level. As such, it is concerned more with its various reorganizations, promotions, courts martial and reliefs than it is with its battles. Personality, politics and maturation of the army are its three consistent themes. For all who complain today about over-centralization and over-supervision, probably no other army in our history literally fought in view of its ‘flagpole’ (higher headquarters) for so long with so many ramifications.
The Generals commanding dominate the narrative – McDowell, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade – as we’re fed short biopics of the army’s division and corps commanders as they rise and fall. For those generally unfamiliar with the Army of the Potomac, we're introduced to the various personalities that put their stamp initially on the Army, many who are only now only historical asterisks – Heintzelman, Kearny, etc… McClellan dominates most of the first half of this book, initially with his gift for organizing the Army, his drive to consolidate power and attempts to empower his cronies. His repeated exaggeration of his enemy’s strength and his incessant feuding with his own generals inevitably leads to conflict with both the General-in-Chief and his political leaders. Consolidation of military power, in this case, however, doesn’t lead to a more effective employment of the army. He assumes the General in Chief position in addition to command of the Potomac Army shortly before Antietam -- arguably the only battle he fought himself. His relief follows shortly thereafter, amid great scandal. Many of the army’s early campaigns were failures or setbacks. However, certain junior leaders begin to distinguish themselves and the more determined senior leaders inspire toughness in the army that only becomes apparent after they have departed. Common throughout these initial phases, however, is discord in the upper levels of the Army’s command and among its political leadership. While the WSJ reviewer recounts with some frustration Sears tendency to list every general officer by name to some distraction, I found this attention to detail helps the reader track both attrition and the rise of numerous regimental and brigade commanders as they move to positions of increased responsibility in the army amidst it’s turmoil.
If you think contemporary historians and pundits argue about the ‘real’ reasons for the Civil War, you’ll find they are in good company with those that prosecuted it. Sears recounts the role politics played not just in the making of war – the policy – but also in who would do the leading of the army. While the internecine nature of the war probably made political squabbles within the army inevitable to some extent, the familiar struggles between civilian-soldiers, politicians and regulars are overlaid on domestic politics (Democrats vs Republicans) as well as the various cronies who serve specific civilian members of the cabinet and the Congress. The book by necessity gives one an overview of the army and its relationship with the various characters – the General-in-Chief, the Secretary of War, the President and the Congress – and the various state leaders to an extent that whoever named their book Team of Rivals may have been understating their case. At one point, it seemed, the only officer that seemed to want to command the Potomac Army – McClellan – was also the one seemingly least suited to lead it in anything other than a parade.
Finally, although clearly a supporting theme and undoubtedly recounted better elsewhere, Sears follows the maturation of the army throughout its campaigns. Part of McClellan’s reputation – particularly that which survived the war, was in large part based on his ability to organize the army. Sears follows the efforts to bring efficiency and effectiveness to the Army, reorganize it in the face of various challenges and sustain it as enlistments expired, conscription was enacted and other requirements were levied. Perhaps not surprisingly, several of the other less famous commanders made significant contributions to its efficiency, welfare and morale. All this takes place with a rising trajectory as the overall ‘professionalization’ of the various Corps of the Army – Intelligence, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. While the story of the Union cavalry’s rising competence throughout the war is well-known (although Sears criticizes Sheridan on several occasions), more revealing was the development of a professional intelligence arm in light of early setbacks. The artillery’s great innovations and contributions, he argues, are very much gainsaid in the aftermath of the war and he demonstrates, with some degree of confidence the critical role played by this role, even in the final year of the war.
Sears also brings perspective the final year of the conflict, when Grant assumes the General-in-Chief role and positions himself with the Potomac Army. Sears points out where Grant stumbles and where credit is due – his constancy, persistence and loyalty to the President are largely vindicated. But he faced a different opponent in the Army of Northern Virginia, on much different terrain and found, as many commanders inevitably do, that a greater force doesn’t necessarily equate into greater freedom of action. Sears documents his missteps –offering criticism of some of the tactics employed in the 1864 campaign as well as poor handling of the cavalry by Sheridan – but credits him for keeping Meade in command and maintaining what he terms ‘cordial’ relations with the army. Meade also gets a sort of historical makeover. Often viewed as marginalized with Grant’s decision to stay in the field with his army, Sears puts Meade’s contributions into perspective. Meade was probably considered a ‘toxic’ leader to some; but those closest to him forgave him because they 1) didn’t covet his job and 2) he maintained good relations with his subordinates in spite of this aspect of his personality. His rough treatment of a reporter gets him ‘blackballed’ by the northern press during the Overland Campaign, thus putting Grant in position to receive some undeserved credit. Grant’s genius is in keeping Meade at the head of the army that he best knew and knew him best. In spite of Lincoln’s support, he is constantly distracted by threats to Washington, political squabbles and inadequate generalship elsewhere. This cordiality between Meade, Grant and Lincoln will pay great dividends when the army confronts morale problems as the 1864 campaign grinds to an indecisive conclusion – entire regiments surrendering (remember this is the Union Army), combat refusals, difficulties in bringing to bear the Unions manpower advantage, and most telling, the effect of heavy casualties on brigade/regimental leadership. At a time of great trial, the Army of the Potomac is for once in relative harmony in its higher ranks.
As the other reviewer noted, the maps can be a little difficult but they are well-positioned in the book. The only shortcoming I would level is a relative lack of analysis which just may be beyond today's historian. Southall Freeman, writing in 1944 about the Potomac Army’s battlefield nemesis, The Army of Northern Virginia, opens the 3d and final volume of Lee’s Lieutenants with an assessment of the lessons learned from his study on general officer leadership. Sears chooses to conclude the story of the Army of the Potomac with the post-war histories of the leaders he has so carefully followed (Freeman does this in an appendix as well). However, he doesn’t offer the kind of concise analysis Freeman offers. Freeman finished Lee’s Lieutenants in the midst of World War II, undoubtedly with hopes the lessons of one American Army could benefit the one currently waging a world-wide struggle. How, for example, did the maintenance of a United States Regular Army (and its formations) affect the Potomac Army? Were there distinctions between the effectiveness of the professional and citizen-soldiers who led the army? What were the common traits shared by the most successful corps and division commanders? Which commanders functioned best under the direct supervision of the commanding general and which of those failed to demonstrate initiative required for independent leadership? I felt compelled on a number of occasions to pull out Freeman’s volumes -- when McClellan stumbles in the Peninsula campaign, for example and at Second Manassas as another. I believe these lessons are in this book as well, I just didn’t see Sears bring them out as eloquently and concisely as Freeman did some 70 years ago. I’d mark this down, however, as a small criticism. Overall, I found this to be an exceptional book that kept my interest throughout. While it is undoubtedly lengthy, I recommended for any serious student of the War of Rebellion or leader interested in senior leadership.
With all the attention being paid recently to the political activity of general officers, both active duty and recently retired, Stephen Sears’ accounting of the high command of one of our most notable armies seems unnervingly familiar. Sears, a well-known Civil War historian, as well as author of an abridgment to Douglass Southall Freeman’s Lee’s Lieutenants (the similarity is deliberate) has drafted what I found to be an engaging and revealing study of the indispensable army to Union victory in our War Between the States.
Lincoln’s Lieutenants focus is the general officer leadership of the Union’s Army of the Potomac, including its predecessors and in its other appellations. It follows this army throughout its many campaigns, with an accounting of the leadership down to the brigade-level. As such, it is concerned more with its various reorganizations, promotions, courts martial and reliefs than it is with its battles. Personality, politics and maturation of the army are its three consistent themes. For all who complain today about over-centralization and over-supervision, probably no other army in our history literally fought in view of its ‘flagpole’ (higher headquarters) for so long with so many ramifications.
The Generals commanding dominate the narrative – McDowell, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade – as we’re fed short biopics of the army’s division and corps commanders as they rise and fall. For those generally unfamiliar with the Army of the Potomac, we're introduced to the various personalities that put their stamp initially on the Army, many who are only now only historical asterisks – Heintzelman, Kearny, etc… McClellan dominates most of the first half of this book, initially with his gift for organizing the Army, his drive to consolidate power and attempts to empower his cronies. His repeated exaggeration of his enemy’s strength and his incessant feuding with his own generals inevitably leads to conflict with both the General-in-Chief and his political leaders. Consolidation of military power, in this case, however, doesn’t lead to a more effective employment of the army. He assumes the General in Chief position in addition to command of the Potomac Army shortly before Antietam -- arguably the only battle he fought himself. His relief follows shortly thereafter, amid great scandal. Many of the army’s early campaigns were failures or setbacks. However, certain junior leaders begin to distinguish themselves and the more determined senior leaders inspire toughness in the army that only becomes apparent after they have departed. Common throughout these initial phases, however, is discord in the upper levels of the Army’s command and among its political leadership. While the WSJ reviewer recounts with some frustration Sears tendency to list every general officer by name to some distraction, I found this attention to detail helps the reader track both attrition and the rise of numerous regimental and brigade commanders as they move to positions of increased responsibility in the army amidst it’s turmoil.
If you think contemporary historians and pundits argue about the ‘real’ reasons for the Civil War, you’ll find they are in good company with those that prosecuted it. Sears recounts the role politics played not just in the making of war – the policy – but also in who would do the leading of the army. While the internecine nature of the war probably made political squabbles within the army inevitable to some extent, the familiar struggles between civilian-soldiers, politicians and regulars are overlaid on domestic politics (Democrats vs Republicans) as well as the various cronies who serve specific civilian members of the cabinet and the Congress. The book by necessity gives one an overview of the army and its relationship with the various characters – the General-in-Chief, the Secretary of War, the President and the Congress – and the various state leaders to an extent that whoever named their book Team of Rivals may have been understating their case. At one point, it seemed, the only officer that seemed to want to command the Potomac Army – McClellan – was also the one seemingly least suited to lead it in anything other than a parade.
Finally, although clearly a supporting theme and undoubtedly recounted better elsewhere, Sears follows the maturation of the army throughout its campaigns. Part of McClellan’s reputation – particularly that which survived the war, was in large part based on his ability to organize the army. Sears follows the efforts to bring efficiency and effectiveness to the Army, reorganize it in the face of various challenges and sustain it as enlistments expired, conscription was enacted and other requirements were levied. Perhaps not surprisingly, several of the other less famous commanders made significant contributions to its efficiency, welfare and morale. All this takes place with a rising trajectory as the overall ‘professionalization’ of the various Corps of the Army – Intelligence, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. While the story of the Union cavalry’s rising competence throughout the war is well-known (although Sears criticizes Sheridan on several occasions), more revealing was the development of a professional intelligence arm in light of early setbacks. The artillery’s great innovations and contributions, he argues, are very much gainsaid in the aftermath of the war and he demonstrates, with some degree of confidence the critical role played by this role, even in the final year of the war.
Sears also brings perspective the final year of the conflict, when Grant assumes the General-in-Chief role and positions himself with the Potomac Army. Sears points out where Grant stumbles and where credit is due – his constancy, persistence and loyalty to the President are largely vindicated. But he faced a different opponent in the Army of Northern Virginia, on much different terrain and found, as many commanders inevitably do, that a greater force doesn’t necessarily equate into greater freedom of action. Sears documents his missteps –offering criticism of some of the tactics employed in the 1864 campaign as well as poor handling of the cavalry by Sheridan – but credits him for keeping Meade in command and maintaining what he terms ‘cordial’ relations with the army. Meade also gets a sort of historical makeover. Often viewed as marginalized with Grant’s decision to stay in the field with his army, Sears puts Meade’s contributions into perspective. Meade was probably considered a ‘toxic’ leader to some; but those closest to him forgave him because they 1) didn’t covet his job and 2) he maintained good relations with his subordinates in spite of this aspect of his personality. His rough treatment of a reporter gets him ‘blackballed’ by the northern press during the Overland Campaign, thus putting Grant in position to receive some undeserved credit. Grant’s genius is in keeping Meade at the head of the army that he best knew and knew him best. In spite of Lincoln’s support, he is constantly distracted by threats to Washington, political squabbles and inadequate generalship elsewhere. This cordiality between Meade, Grant and Lincoln will pay great dividends when the army confronts morale problems as the 1864 campaign grinds to an indecisive conclusion – entire regiments surrendering (remember this is the Union Army), combat refusals, difficulties in bringing to bear the Unions manpower advantage, and most telling, the effect of heavy casualties on brigade/regimental leadership. At a time of great trial, the Army of the Potomac is for once in relative harmony in its higher ranks.
As the other reviewer noted, the maps can be a little difficult but they are well-positioned in the book. The only shortcoming I would level is a relative lack of analysis which just may be beyond today's historian. Southall Freeman, writing in 1944 about the Potomac Army’s battlefield nemesis, The Army of Northern Virginia, opens the 3d and final volume of Lee’s Lieutenants with an assessment of the lessons learned from his study on general officer leadership. Sears chooses to conclude the story of the Army of the Potomac with the post-war histories of the leaders he has so carefully followed (Freeman does this in an appendix as well). However, he doesn’t offer the kind of concise analysis Freeman offers. Freeman finished Lee’s Lieutenants in the midst of World War II, undoubtedly with hopes the lessons of one American Army could benefit the one currently waging a world-wide struggle. How, for example, did the maintenance of a United States Regular Army (and its formations) affect the Potomac Army? Were there distinctions between the effectiveness of the professional and citizen-soldiers who led the army? What were the common traits shared by the most successful corps and division commanders? Which commanders functioned best under the direct supervision of the commanding general and which of those failed to demonstrate initiative required for independent leadership? I felt compelled on a number of occasions to pull out Freeman’s volumes -- when McClellan stumbles in the Peninsula campaign, for example and at Second Manassas as another. I believe these lessons are in this book as well, I just didn’t see Sears bring them out as eloquently and concisely as Freeman did some 70 years ago. I’d mark this down, however, as a small criticism. Overall, I found this to be an exceptional book that kept my interest throughout. While it is undoubtedly lengthy, I recommended for any serious student of the War of Rebellion or leader interested in senior leadership.
September 28, 2017
Thick tomes relating in great detail the history of the American Civil War or even the Army of the Potomac are not hard to come by. There have been enough published to fill a good-sized library. So what makes Stephen W. Sears’ history of ‘Lincoln’s Lieutenants’ unique? After spending 32 hours listening to an audio recording of this excellent book, I can safely say that it is all in the perspective. If you were to describe a tree trunk you wouldn’t have too much difficulty. You would describe its width, its color, its texture. Is it straight or crooked? Is it easy to climb? But if you were to move up into the tree, the task of describing each of its hundreds and then thousands of branches becomes daunting. Many people would be tempted to say they were all similar. But that would not be entirely true.
So it is with the task that Sears undertook. Before George Meade took over command of the Army of the Potomac in 1863, shortly before Gettysburg, the position was held by six other officers, all of whom found the much smaller, ill-equipped Army of Northern Virginia more than they could handle. One would think that with an army of a hundred thousand soldiers it would be a simple matter to march on and seize Richmond, but one would be wrong. An army is made up of several corps. Each corps is made up of several divisions which are, made up of several regiments which are, in turn made up of brigades. Each of these units needed a commander and the sad truth was that Lincoln’s army suffered from a severe lack of experienced officers. The pre-war standing army was a fraction of the size of what was needed and the majority of the qualified officers came from the southern states with their almost feudal agrarian society that left younger sons little opportunities other than the military.
Sears does an excellent job of describing how these many sub-commanders worked together, or didn’t, and how their actions contributed to or detracted from the war effort. Few had any military experience. Many were politicians with typical politician’s shortcomings. Some were vain, petty, ignorant, venial and just plain despicable. Others, though, found themselves in a challenging position and rose to the occasion.
Sears’ book was ably narrated by the incomparable George Guidall. Unfortunately, I have come to the conclusion that audio recordings are not the best medium for most nonfiction books. Often when reading a nonfiction book, I like to highlight certain passages and refer back to them in the future. This is not convenient in audio. Also, I would like to how characters names are spelled so that I can do further research on them. Finally, many nonfiction books include photographs and maps of the subjects that missing from an audio recording. I must give cudos to the great folks at Recorded Books though. When I discovered that two of the 26 discs in this book were blank, they quickly sent me replacements and they were in my mailbox within a week.
*Quotations are cited from an advanced reading copy and may not be the same as appears in the final published edition. The review was based on an advanced reading copy obtained at no cost from the publisher in exchange for an unbiased review. While this does take any ‘not worth what I paid for it’ statements out of my review, it otherwise has no impact on the content of my review.
FYI: On a 5-point scale I assign stars based on my assessment of what the book needs in the way of improvements:
*5 Stars – Nothing at all. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
*4 Stars – It could stand for a few tweaks here and there but it’s pretty good as it is.
*3 Stars – A solid C grade. Some serious rewriting would be needed in order for this book to be considered great or memorable.
*2 Stars – This book needs a lot of work. A good start would be to change the plot, the character development, the writing style and the ending.
*1 Star - The only thing that would improve this book is a good bonfire.
So it is with the task that Sears undertook. Before George Meade took over command of the Army of the Potomac in 1863, shortly before Gettysburg, the position was held by six other officers, all of whom found the much smaller, ill-equipped Army of Northern Virginia more than they could handle. One would think that with an army of a hundred thousand soldiers it would be a simple matter to march on and seize Richmond, but one would be wrong. An army is made up of several corps. Each corps is made up of several divisions which are, made up of several regiments which are, in turn made up of brigades. Each of these units needed a commander and the sad truth was that Lincoln’s army suffered from a severe lack of experienced officers. The pre-war standing army was a fraction of the size of what was needed and the majority of the qualified officers came from the southern states with their almost feudal agrarian society that left younger sons little opportunities other than the military.
Sears does an excellent job of describing how these many sub-commanders worked together, or didn’t, and how their actions contributed to or detracted from the war effort. Few had any military experience. Many were politicians with typical politician’s shortcomings. Some were vain, petty, ignorant, venial and just plain despicable. Others, though, found themselves in a challenging position and rose to the occasion.
Sears’ book was ably narrated by the incomparable George Guidall. Unfortunately, I have come to the conclusion that audio recordings are not the best medium for most nonfiction books. Often when reading a nonfiction book, I like to highlight certain passages and refer back to them in the future. This is not convenient in audio. Also, I would like to how characters names are spelled so that I can do further research on them. Finally, many nonfiction books include photographs and maps of the subjects that missing from an audio recording. I must give cudos to the great folks at Recorded Books though. When I discovered that two of the 26 discs in this book were blank, they quickly sent me replacements and they were in my mailbox within a week.
*Quotations are cited from an advanced reading copy and may not be the same as appears in the final published edition. The review was based on an advanced reading copy obtained at no cost from the publisher in exchange for an unbiased review. While this does take any ‘not worth what I paid for it’ statements out of my review, it otherwise has no impact on the content of my review.
FYI: On a 5-point scale I assign stars based on my assessment of what the book needs in the way of improvements:
*5 Stars – Nothing at all. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
*4 Stars – It could stand for a few tweaks here and there but it’s pretty good as it is.
*3 Stars – A solid C grade. Some serious rewriting would be needed in order for this book to be considered great or memorable.
*2 Stars – This book needs a lot of work. A good start would be to change the plot, the character development, the writing style and the ending.
*1 Star - The only thing that would improve this book is a good bonfire.
November 22, 2023
Stephen W. Sears' Lincoln's Lieutenants is a detailed exploration of the leadership and internal politics of the Union Army of the Potomac during the Civil War. Sears has already written a shelf full of books on this conflict already, some excellent, others workmanlike; certainly one wouldn't expect him to break fresh ground. Sears, who often stumbles in overly detailed battle summaries, excels when exploring the feuds and personalities which divided the Union high command from the start. Fighting an intensely political war, politics was never far from the surface: the officer corps were largely conservative Democrats who opposed secession but distrusted the Republican Lincoln and his opposition to slavery. After the Republican-leading Irvin McDowell faltered at Bull Run, command passed to George McClellan, the charismatic young "Little Napoleon" whose massive ego caused him to imagine himself dictator of the United States. He never achieved that ambition, nor did his overcautious campaign style defeat Robert E. Lee's Confederates; McClellan did, however, leave an indelible stamp on the Army, both in its organization and in the deep-seated rivalries he encouraged within his corps commanders. Capable men like Samuel P. Heintzelman and Erasmus D. Keyes were relieved of corps positions due to McClellan's dislike, while incompetent cronies like William Franklin and Fitz-John Porter attained high command (Porter losing his to a vengeful Edwin Stanton). While McClellan was finally sacked after failing to destroy Lee at Antietam, the rivalries he'd sewn outlasted him; Ambrose Burnside was almost immediately beset by backbiting from his subordinates, while Joe Hooker, who shared McClellan's ego but not his politics, earned the enmity both for his poor personal character and his closeness to the Lincoln Administration - while Hooker was ousted days before Gettysburg due to a longstanding feud with Henry Halleck, Lincoln's general-in-chief. These command changes, Sears stresses, were driven less by military failure than the inability of the generals to retain loyalty among their officers and men (Burnside, in particular, was victimized by a vicious letter-writing campaign); then again, McClellan's successors faced an uphill battle in obtaining loyalty from those who still desire Little Mac's return. Only when Ulysses Grant arrived from the West were the old rivalries submerged, and the Army of the Potomac retooled into a functional command - though it still took winnowing out incompetents like Burnside and Benjamin Butler to achieve final victory. The narrative is familiar enough ground, but the fine-grain detail Sears provides about the men who fought each other with nearly as much as the enemy offers an illuminating perspective on the War Between the States.
July 19, 2017
For over 400 pages of this 750+ page book, George Brinton McClellan dominates the action (or lack thereof). For a man who left the Army of the Potomac in November of 1862, I think this says a great deal. He was a superb organizer, but not much of a fighting man. He was a Democrat surrounded by Republicans, but most of all, he had an ego that would not let him see the truth about a situation once it had settled in his mind. His persistent belief that his army was outnumbered allowed to make inexcusable mistakes, but for a time there seemed to be no one who could do better so he stayed in command of the Army of the Potomac, despite Pope's own arrogant efforts. With the quasi-victory of Antietam and its lackadaisical follow-up, Lincoln finally gave up on the Little Napoleon.
From there he gave Burnside and Hooker a try, but again their efforts were short of success, quite short in truth. But this book is not just about the commanding generals, Sears details the generals who led corps, divisions and brigades as well. Many of these men lasted only a short time before being killed or replaced. The Potomac Army was a continual work-in-progress, even after Meade's victory at Gettysburg and Grant's elevation to Commander-in-Chief.
I have read quite a bit about the Army of the Potomac, and each time I read a new book, I sometimes wonder how they managed to pull it out since the generals were often less than inspired, and they kept having to deal with interference from Washington. Perhaps the answer is that there was a core of men and officers who would not let them be beaten, even if they were fighting a determined foe.
From there he gave Burnside and Hooker a try, but again their efforts were short of success, quite short in truth. But this book is not just about the commanding generals, Sears details the generals who led corps, divisions and brigades as well. Many of these men lasted only a short time before being killed or replaced. The Potomac Army was a continual work-in-progress, even after Meade's victory at Gettysburg and Grant's elevation to Commander-in-Chief.
I have read quite a bit about the Army of the Potomac, and each time I read a new book, I sometimes wonder how they managed to pull it out since the generals were often less than inspired, and they kept having to deal with interference from Washington. Perhaps the answer is that there was a core of men and officers who would not let them be beaten, even if they were fighting a determined foe.
February 19, 2020
An insightful, well-written and well-researched history of the Army of the Potomac at the command level.
Sears looks at the interactions among the Army of the Potomac’s often dysfunctional high command, the personalities of the commanders and their subordinates, and the army’s structure as an institution. The army’s campaigns are basically the background to this material. There is little on the soldiers’ experience.
The subject might sound dull, but Sears is, of course, a good writer, and his coverage of the campaigns and battles is good. If you’ve read Sears’ other works, a lot of the material will be familiar (maybe most of it, actually), but it’s not a huge issue since Sears succeeds in providing such a comprehensive picture. His portraits of the generals are great. He also covers diverse topics, such as why the army’s cavalry was often of such poor quality, why the army’s leadership struggled to find a strategic vision, or Winfield Scott’s contributions to Union strategy. He also covers the political dimensions of the war and how they influenced the conduct of the Army’s leadership and the conflicts among them.
The maps are OK, but they don’t show any troop movements. These are covered in the book, of course, but they’re often hard to picture, and they don’t always make it easy to understand Sears’ points. Some of the tactical detail seems overwhelming at times. The writing can get a little dry at times. Also, sometimes the book feels like the group biography it is billed as, while at other times it just feels like a campaign history of the Army. About half of the book is about McClellan. Also, as the narrative goes along, Sears’ sentences become a little stranger, some information is skimmed or passed over, almost like Sears got bored with the project (maybe he used a ghostwriter to finish it)
A broad, readable and balanced work.
Sears looks at the interactions among the Army of the Potomac’s often dysfunctional high command, the personalities of the commanders and their subordinates, and the army’s structure as an institution. The army’s campaigns are basically the background to this material. There is little on the soldiers’ experience.
The subject might sound dull, but Sears is, of course, a good writer, and his coverage of the campaigns and battles is good. If you’ve read Sears’ other works, a lot of the material will be familiar (maybe most of it, actually), but it’s not a huge issue since Sears succeeds in providing such a comprehensive picture. His portraits of the generals are great. He also covers diverse topics, such as why the army’s cavalry was often of such poor quality, why the army’s leadership struggled to find a strategic vision, or Winfield Scott’s contributions to Union strategy. He also covers the political dimensions of the war and how they influenced the conduct of the Army’s leadership and the conflicts among them.
The maps are OK, but they don’t show any troop movements. These are covered in the book, of course, but they’re often hard to picture, and they don’t always make it easy to understand Sears’ points. Some of the tactical detail seems overwhelming at times. The writing can get a little dry at times. Also, sometimes the book feels like the group biography it is billed as, while at other times it just feels like a campaign history of the Army. About half of the book is about McClellan. Also, as the narrative goes along, Sears’ sentences become a little stranger, some information is skimmed or passed over, almost like Sears got bored with the project (maybe he used a ghostwriter to finish it)
A broad, readable and balanced work.
November 24, 2020
Certainly the capstone to a magnificent career of expertise on the Civil War, Sears published this book in his mid-80s (in 2017) after all time great books on Antietam, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg.
It's a full look at the Civil War (framed by the old guard Winfield Scott beginning to advise on potential military mobilization if Lincoln were to win the 1860 election and secession declared) to the great post war march of the Grand Army of the Potomac in Washington in May 1865.
In-between 766 pages of prose are detailed depictions of major sections, battalions, and divisions of the war called out by number. Most of the embedded illustrations are photos of the major commanding officers, beautiful sketches by Charles Waud, and drawn maps of major campaigns. Its tight focus is on the Army of the Potomac so the Eastern theater is focused on throughout, only broken by depictions of the western generals who were drawn east, such as - obviously - Grant and Sherman.
What is particularly illuminating is how the carousel of commanders led to such humiliating defeats in the early years of backdoor disagreements and fighting among jealous and sometimes obstinate generals who thought they had the answer to winning the war. Most were wrong. Some are killed, some are disgraced - whether fairly of unfairly, and some achieve rightful fame. It's a specialized portrait of the military chain of command, and during the Civil War, it was a messy, fractious, and argumentative place. For those wanting to know how so many specialized generals could be so incompetent for the Union, this will uncover in detail the personalities and flaws that led to those failures. I would recommend it for serious Civil War buffs with a military emphasis, and though I did not serve in the military, I would consider that military vets with a big passion for the Civil War will love this book. It's definitely an all time book, though I hear that pervious generations of great scholars did something similar. Nonetheless, an extraordinary work of scholarship in the area of military history.
It's a full look at the Civil War (framed by the old guard Winfield Scott beginning to advise on potential military mobilization if Lincoln were to win the 1860 election and secession declared) to the great post war march of the Grand Army of the Potomac in Washington in May 1865.
In-between 766 pages of prose are detailed depictions of major sections, battalions, and divisions of the war called out by number. Most of the embedded illustrations are photos of the major commanding officers, beautiful sketches by Charles Waud, and drawn maps of major campaigns. Its tight focus is on the Army of the Potomac so the Eastern theater is focused on throughout, only broken by depictions of the western generals who were drawn east, such as - obviously - Grant and Sherman.
What is particularly illuminating is how the carousel of commanders led to such humiliating defeats in the early years of backdoor disagreements and fighting among jealous and sometimes obstinate generals who thought they had the answer to winning the war. Most were wrong. Some are killed, some are disgraced - whether fairly of unfairly, and some achieve rightful fame. It's a specialized portrait of the military chain of command, and during the Civil War, it was a messy, fractious, and argumentative place. For those wanting to know how so many specialized generals could be so incompetent for the Union, this will uncover in detail the personalities and flaws that led to those failures. I would recommend it for serious Civil War buffs with a military emphasis, and though I did not serve in the military, I would consider that military vets with a big passion for the Civil War will love this book. It's definitely an all time book, though I hear that pervious generations of great scholars did something similar. Nonetheless, an extraordinary work of scholarship in the area of military history.
January 22, 2018
The best thing about this book is that it probably cured my natural bias towards the "latest and greatest" work on a particular subject, especially when written by somebody with the reputation in their field that Sears enjoys.
If you have only a cursory knowledge of the military history of the Civil War and want a one-volume (though still voluminous) history of the war in the East as seen through the eyes of the principal Union Army and its high command, read this. As with Sears' other works, it is eminently readable, well-researched, and combines the high-level and individual perspectives very well. However, if you're already well-versed in the campaigns in the East, and particularly the politics and intrigue surrounding the Army of the Potomac and its leadership up through Gettysburg, you can safely skip it.
There's very little here in terms of perspective that Catton's trilogy on the Army of the Potomac or any number of other works lack, even nearly 70 years later. The closest Sears comes to offering a new or fresh perspective is in pointing out just how devastating were the Army of the Potomac's huge officer losses throughout the war, and how they crippled the development of the kind of home-grown leadership cadre that (although he doesn't make this comparison explicitly) helped make the Western armies seemingly so much more effective. The bloodletting of company, field, regimental, brigade, and division commanders simply killed off too many of the good officers. But again, Catton noted in Grant Takes Command how the reorganization of the Army of the Potomac down to three infantry corps came from the realization that there were barely three decent corps commanders in the army, let alone five or six.
3 stars, since it is hardly a bad book, it's just not a necessary one.
If you have only a cursory knowledge of the military history of the Civil War and want a one-volume (though still voluminous) history of the war in the East as seen through the eyes of the principal Union Army and its high command, read this. As with Sears' other works, it is eminently readable, well-researched, and combines the high-level and individual perspectives very well. However, if you're already well-versed in the campaigns in the East, and particularly the politics and intrigue surrounding the Army of the Potomac and its leadership up through Gettysburg, you can safely skip it.
There's very little here in terms of perspective that Catton's trilogy on the Army of the Potomac or any number of other works lack, even nearly 70 years later. The closest Sears comes to offering a new or fresh perspective is in pointing out just how devastating were the Army of the Potomac's huge officer losses throughout the war, and how they crippled the development of the kind of home-grown leadership cadre that (although he doesn't make this comparison explicitly) helped make the Western armies seemingly so much more effective. The bloodletting of company, field, regimental, brigade, and division commanders simply killed off too many of the good officers. But again, Catton noted in Grant Takes Command how the reorganization of the Army of the Potomac down to three infantry corps came from the realization that there were barely three decent corps commanders in the army, let alone five or six.
3 stars, since it is hardly a bad book, it's just not a necessary one.
January 1, 2021
This is a MASSIVE group biography of the generals of the Army of the Potomac. It is very readable (at 766 pages, it had better be) and is not hagiographic about any of the generals, including Grant. Sears offers clear accounts of the battles fought by the Army of the Potomac and clear (sometimes scathing) accounts of the politicking and cliques and bad behavior of the generals (also the egregious Edwin Stanton). Also the endless frustrations of President Lincoln. It is not and does not attempt to be anything but well-researched biographical military history.
July 12, 2017
In this age of twitter, I can follow the political machinations of the Trump Administration from moment to moment, from every imaginable side, and with the perspective of a variety of viewpoints. I have often wished that we could have the same level of information about historic periods.
This massive and detailed study by Civil War historian Stephen Sears makes me feel as if my wishes had been granted, at least with respect to the creation and ongoing development of the Union Army during the Civil War. By focusing on the processes by which generals and officers were selected, trained, honed, and culled, Sears catalogues the evolution of a self-taught army led by volunteers into the experienced and efficient fighting machine that was in place by the end of the struggle. His is a story of backbiting, jealousy, outright sabotage, lapses, blunders, meddling, timidity, inexperience, disjointedness, miscommunications, resentment, and paranoia. But it is also a tale of courage; personal growth of many actors, both political and military; and ultimately of triumph. Mostly though, one may think of this book as an organizational history.
To my surprise, my opinion of George McClellan actually improved from this account (although I feel a bit like Senator Al Franken on Ted Cruz, who said on CNN, ”I probably like Ted Cruz more than most of my colleagues like Ted Cruz, and I hate Ted Cruz.”). Sears demonstrates rather convincingly that McClellan, for all his faults, took on the leadership of an inadequately-sized army with few officers and helped form it into something workable.
In 1860 the U.S. Army was small - less than 15,000 present for duty, with most of the army posted west of the Mississippi River, and having just 372 line officers and five general officers. Nearly a quarter of West Pointers on active duty in 1861, and close to 37 percent of cadets at the time of the secession crisis, joined the Confederacy. The General-In-Chief was 74-year-old Winfield Scott, an erratic and quarrelsome man in bad shape and ill health who was not up to much more than broadly overseeing the course of the army.
As Sears writes, when McClellan was called to Washington to assume command of the new Division of the Potomac in July, 1861, “Ahead of McClellan loomed an enormous task, no less than building a new army upon the ruins of an old one.” Morale was also in tatters. George McClellan may have not liked to fight, and he was certainly paranoid and delusional, but he was good at organizing, and at restoring the army’s confidence in itself. He revamped the army’s officer corps (incidentally creating a group of men fiercely loyal to him). He structured the army into divisions and set up programs for drilling recruits. Although he could not entirely evade (much to his chagrin), the popular political patronage process of the appointment of company and regimental officers, he supported examining boards for officer competency, and widened the use of courts-martial.
McClellan didn’t take kindly to any second-guessing of his decisions, nor could he abide the administration’s unwillingness to respond “appropriately” to his call for massive numbers of new recruits based on his wildly inaccurate assessments of enemy strength. But ultimately, it was his stubborn reluctance to fight that led to his replacement. It was not an easy decision for Lincoln, given McClellan’s popularity with the army he had virtually created from scratch. But it was the right decision to win the war.
Ulysses S. Grant, who eventually took over as head of the army, also found that serving as the top commander did not insulate him from political pressures, especially as he was compelled to keep on less than competent and/or compliant division leaders. But Grant was there to fight a war, and he did what he could to work around political realities.
Typical of Grant’s military leadership vis-a-vis others that came before him was this description of Grant’s behavior at the end of the Wilderness campaign:
“May 7 marked a watershed. It did not occur to Grant that day . . . to pull back across the Rapidan, in the manner of Hooker or Burnside (or McClellan, changing his base), to lick wounds and regroup and plot some next campaign.”
Grant’s attitude, Sears notes, was not lost on the men of the Army of the Potomac.
Grant was as eager to work with other generals as McClellan had been to run every operation himself. Grant, a humble and generous man, worked well with Meade, Sherman, Sheridan, and others in a way that showed respect for these men and their talents, allowing them to blossom and thrive under his direction. He made mistakes, but for the most part owned them, and did not cast off blame on others. He welcomed Lincoln’s counsel rather than eschewing it as did McClellan, and in return received Lincoln’s utmost confidence and support.
Sears reports that “…the Potomac army that marched down Pennsylvania Avenue in spring 1865 [after the surrender of Lee’s army at Appomattox] was almost a completely new army, top to bottom, from the Potomac army that went to war on the Virginia Peninsula in spring 1862.” Only a handful of officers of position from those early days remained by the end. Whole army corps had come and gone…. “For all the turnover at the top,” Sears writes, “the Army of the Potomac conquered, forcing the surrender of its renowned opponent. Obscured by the extensive turnover of generals, a vital, solid core of leadership remained, survived, prevailed. It was this lesser-known half of the high command that held the Potomac army together through one battlefield hellfire after another.”
And it is this story he tells in great detail in this valuable addition to Civil War scholarship.
The book includes blow-by-blow accounts of many battles, extensive notes and more than 150 illustrations.
Evaluation: There isn’t anything really “new” in this book, but the detail lends a feel of immediacy to the story by the author’s incorporation of extracts from journals, diaries, letters, wires, congressional post-mortems and other documents. Sears reports Stanton and Lincoln hanging onto updates by wire just as we now flock to twitter to see what is happening from moment to moment. With this book, we too are behind the scenes, privy even to more than Stanton and Lincoln, as we follow the ins and outs of the history of a great fighting machine.
This massive and detailed study by Civil War historian Stephen Sears makes me feel as if my wishes had been granted, at least with respect to the creation and ongoing development of the Union Army during the Civil War. By focusing on the processes by which generals and officers were selected, trained, honed, and culled, Sears catalogues the evolution of a self-taught army led by volunteers into the experienced and efficient fighting machine that was in place by the end of the struggle. His is a story of backbiting, jealousy, outright sabotage, lapses, blunders, meddling, timidity, inexperience, disjointedness, miscommunications, resentment, and paranoia. But it is also a tale of courage; personal growth of many actors, both political and military; and ultimately of triumph. Mostly though, one may think of this book as an organizational history.
To my surprise, my opinion of George McClellan actually improved from this account (although I feel a bit like Senator Al Franken on Ted Cruz, who said on CNN, ”I probably like Ted Cruz more than most of my colleagues like Ted Cruz, and I hate Ted Cruz.”). Sears demonstrates rather convincingly that McClellan, for all his faults, took on the leadership of an inadequately-sized army with few officers and helped form it into something workable.
In 1860 the U.S. Army was small - less than 15,000 present for duty, with most of the army posted west of the Mississippi River, and having just 372 line officers and five general officers. Nearly a quarter of West Pointers on active duty in 1861, and close to 37 percent of cadets at the time of the secession crisis, joined the Confederacy. The General-In-Chief was 74-year-old Winfield Scott, an erratic and quarrelsome man in bad shape and ill health who was not up to much more than broadly overseeing the course of the army.
As Sears writes, when McClellan was called to Washington to assume command of the new Division of the Potomac in July, 1861, “Ahead of McClellan loomed an enormous task, no less than building a new army upon the ruins of an old one.” Morale was also in tatters. George McClellan may have not liked to fight, and he was certainly paranoid and delusional, but he was good at organizing, and at restoring the army’s confidence in itself. He revamped the army’s officer corps (incidentally creating a group of men fiercely loyal to him). He structured the army into divisions and set up programs for drilling recruits. Although he could not entirely evade (much to his chagrin), the popular political patronage process of the appointment of company and regimental officers, he supported examining boards for officer competency, and widened the use of courts-martial.
McClellan didn’t take kindly to any second-guessing of his decisions, nor could he abide the administration’s unwillingness to respond “appropriately” to his call for massive numbers of new recruits based on his wildly inaccurate assessments of enemy strength. But ultimately, it was his stubborn reluctance to fight that led to his replacement. It was not an easy decision for Lincoln, given McClellan’s popularity with the army he had virtually created from scratch. But it was the right decision to win the war.
Ulysses S. Grant, who eventually took over as head of the army, also found that serving as the top commander did not insulate him from political pressures, especially as he was compelled to keep on less than competent and/or compliant division leaders. But Grant was there to fight a war, and he did what he could to work around political realities.
Typical of Grant’s military leadership vis-a-vis others that came before him was this description of Grant’s behavior at the end of the Wilderness campaign:
“May 7 marked a watershed. It did not occur to Grant that day . . . to pull back across the Rapidan, in the manner of Hooker or Burnside (or McClellan, changing his base), to lick wounds and regroup and plot some next campaign.”
Grant’s attitude, Sears notes, was not lost on the men of the Army of the Potomac.
Grant was as eager to work with other generals as McClellan had been to run every operation himself. Grant, a humble and generous man, worked well with Meade, Sherman, Sheridan, and others in a way that showed respect for these men and their talents, allowing them to blossom and thrive under his direction. He made mistakes, but for the most part owned them, and did not cast off blame on others. He welcomed Lincoln’s counsel rather than eschewing it as did McClellan, and in return received Lincoln’s utmost confidence and support.
Sears reports that “…the Potomac army that marched down Pennsylvania Avenue in spring 1865 [after the surrender of Lee’s army at Appomattox] was almost a completely new army, top to bottom, from the Potomac army that went to war on the Virginia Peninsula in spring 1862.” Only a handful of officers of position from those early days remained by the end. Whole army corps had come and gone…. “For all the turnover at the top,” Sears writes, “the Army of the Potomac conquered, forcing the surrender of its renowned opponent. Obscured by the extensive turnover of generals, a vital, solid core of leadership remained, survived, prevailed. It was this lesser-known half of the high command that held the Potomac army together through one battlefield hellfire after another.”
And it is this story he tells in great detail in this valuable addition to Civil War scholarship.
The book includes blow-by-blow accounts of many battles, extensive notes and more than 150 illustrations.
Evaluation: There isn’t anything really “new” in this book, but the detail lends a feel of immediacy to the story by the author’s incorporation of extracts from journals, diaries, letters, wires, congressional post-mortems and other documents. Sears reports Stanton and Lincoln hanging onto updates by wire just as we now flock to twitter to see what is happening from moment to moment. With this book, we too are behind the scenes, privy even to more than Stanton and Lincoln, as we follow the ins and outs of the history of a great fighting machine.
April 22, 2017
I must preface this review by saying that I received a review copy of this book from NetGalley.
Stephen W. Sears is one of a rare breed of historian who can weave deep analysis with compelling narrative, with a long career with many highlights including Landscape Turned Red, on the Battle of Antietam, which in the opinion of this reviewer is one of the best battle narratives ever written. He’s written extensively on the Army of the Potomac and its campaigns, which puts him in an ideal position for being authoritative in Lincoln’s Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac, the volume under review.
Between 1942 and 1944, Douglas Southall Freeman published a three volume history and analysis of the command of the Army of Northern Virginia—Lee’s Lieutenants—which, despite the writer’s allegiance to Lost Cause mythology, represented a towering achievement. There have been some Union-oriented responses, most notably by Lincoln and His Generals by T. Harry Williams, which mostly looked at command relationships and outlined work yet to be done. More recently, works have filled in parts of the picture, such as Stephen Taaffe’s Commanding the Army of the Potomac, which provides personal histories of many members of the high command of that army. However, works on the subject are not nearly as all-encompassing as Freeman’s. Lincoln’s Lieutenants is finally a complete answer. Sears has been writing for fifty years, has covered the entire war from a multitude of angles and the nearly 900 pages (text ends at page 766, much of the rest are copious notes) of Lincoln’s Lieutenants represents a condensation of Sear’s career and a wide selection of additional works.
The Army of the Potomac was the main Union army in the Eastern Theater of the war and was the focus of the most political and media attention. The East had the capitol cities of both belligerents, and was naturally the most attention-grabbing. That the South’s most well-known commander was centered there only made it more important. Sears looks at the history of that army through the lens of its general officers, with especial focus on higher levels—division, corps, and army commanders—from the genesis of the army, as the Army of Virginia in 1861, through the Grand Review after the surrender of the South’s principal armies.
You should not go into this work expecting battle narrative—no drums and trumpets—or, as John Keegan termed it: pornography of violence. Sears does discuss battles, but in the context of the interaction within, and effect on, the general officers of that army. And his sources reflect his focus: primary sources from those officers who wrote after the war, correspondence, the Official Records, and so on. There isn’t much of a view from below, because this is a work aimed from above.
In Sears’ narrative, the chief Union field army was the inevitable site of meddling. Politics consumed the army and its commanders. For much of the war, these officers were perhaps more paranoid about enemies in Washington City as they were about Bobby Lee. Sears argues, however, that while politics never ended in the army, it did transform. Originally a bastion of the Democratic Party, it slowly transformed into a force which not only answered to Abraham Lincoln, but which viewed itself as Lincon’s own. This was accomplished over time as political appointees and Old Army elites, jealous of their prerogatives and positions, were replaced by new officers who earned their positions by virtue of their abilities, often paid for in their own blood. The army moved from a force which represented a threat to Lincoln to being a major instrument of his reelection.
From a perspective of over half a century of scholarship, Sears is very understanding of mistakes made. While many historians are harsh toward, for instance, Ambrose Burnside or Joe Hooker, Sears has the long view of human limitations and is quite understanding of failure. Being reasonable does not mean Sears restrains himself from pointing out serious errors: Burnside and Hooker did fail. He also shows compassion for the failures of common soldiers even when their officers have good reputations: for instance, the collapse of Second Corps in late 1864 and 1865. Used as the Army of the Potomac’s shock troops for battle after battle, their veteran units were reduced to skeletons, and fresh regiments were shattered in their first engagements. For instance, the 36th Wisconsin—which joined the army in the summer of 1864, led by a hero of Gettysburg, Frank Haskell and the ranks filled about evenly with fresh recruits and reenlisted veterans—was first bloodied at Cold Harbor. They took 400 casualties in an afternoon; their colonel killed, more than half their number removed from the ranks, and yet they dug in within a rock’s throw of rebel lines. They then remained in contact with the enemy for nine more months. Their experience was normal. Is it any wonder that Second Corps collapsed? Sears thinks that the collapse was reasonable, and he’s right.
The book has a large number of maps and illustrations. Maps are a common problem in books: there aren’t enough, and many are simply not functional. But at no point in Lincoln’s Lieutenants did I find myself needful of a better map. They are, however, not always well placed. There were occasions when the maps or illustrations were not situated at their most relevant location. This was compounded in the advance copy I was provided with by the lack of a listing of illustrations. In some cases, I found myself paging back and forth looking for context or for a map I wanted to reference. Additionally, the copy lacks an index. Hopefully, this deficiency will be corrected.
Lincoln’s Lieutenants is a magisterial work. In the opinion of this reviewer, it is the best work on the command of an army in the Civil War; it eclipses Freeman in historical merit and skilled prose, and is more complete than any work between the two. Sears’ newest volume should be on your bookshelf.
Stephen W. Sears is one of a rare breed of historian who can weave deep analysis with compelling narrative, with a long career with many highlights including Landscape Turned Red, on the Battle of Antietam, which in the opinion of this reviewer is one of the best battle narratives ever written. He’s written extensively on the Army of the Potomac and its campaigns, which puts him in an ideal position for being authoritative in Lincoln’s Lieutenants: The High Command of the Army of the Potomac, the volume under review.
Between 1942 and 1944, Douglas Southall Freeman published a three volume history and analysis of the command of the Army of Northern Virginia—Lee’s Lieutenants—which, despite the writer’s allegiance to Lost Cause mythology, represented a towering achievement. There have been some Union-oriented responses, most notably by Lincoln and His Generals by T. Harry Williams, which mostly looked at command relationships and outlined work yet to be done. More recently, works have filled in parts of the picture, such as Stephen Taaffe’s Commanding the Army of the Potomac, which provides personal histories of many members of the high command of that army. However, works on the subject are not nearly as all-encompassing as Freeman’s. Lincoln’s Lieutenants is finally a complete answer. Sears has been writing for fifty years, has covered the entire war from a multitude of angles and the nearly 900 pages (text ends at page 766, much of the rest are copious notes) of Lincoln’s Lieutenants represents a condensation of Sear’s career and a wide selection of additional works.
The Army of the Potomac was the main Union army in the Eastern Theater of the war and was the focus of the most political and media attention. The East had the capitol cities of both belligerents, and was naturally the most attention-grabbing. That the South’s most well-known commander was centered there only made it more important. Sears looks at the history of that army through the lens of its general officers, with especial focus on higher levels—division, corps, and army commanders—from the genesis of the army, as the Army of Virginia in 1861, through the Grand Review after the surrender of the South’s principal armies.
You should not go into this work expecting battle narrative—no drums and trumpets—or, as John Keegan termed it: pornography of violence. Sears does discuss battles, but in the context of the interaction within, and effect on, the general officers of that army. And his sources reflect his focus: primary sources from those officers who wrote after the war, correspondence, the Official Records, and so on. There isn’t much of a view from below, because this is a work aimed from above.
In Sears’ narrative, the chief Union field army was the inevitable site of meddling. Politics consumed the army and its commanders. For much of the war, these officers were perhaps more paranoid about enemies in Washington City as they were about Bobby Lee. Sears argues, however, that while politics never ended in the army, it did transform. Originally a bastion of the Democratic Party, it slowly transformed into a force which not only answered to Abraham Lincoln, but which viewed itself as Lincon’s own. This was accomplished over time as political appointees and Old Army elites, jealous of their prerogatives and positions, were replaced by new officers who earned their positions by virtue of their abilities, often paid for in their own blood. The army moved from a force which represented a threat to Lincoln to being a major instrument of his reelection.
From a perspective of over half a century of scholarship, Sears is very understanding of mistakes made. While many historians are harsh toward, for instance, Ambrose Burnside or Joe Hooker, Sears has the long view of human limitations and is quite understanding of failure. Being reasonable does not mean Sears restrains himself from pointing out serious errors: Burnside and Hooker did fail. He also shows compassion for the failures of common soldiers even when their officers have good reputations: for instance, the collapse of Second Corps in late 1864 and 1865. Used as the Army of the Potomac’s shock troops for battle after battle, their veteran units were reduced to skeletons, and fresh regiments were shattered in their first engagements. For instance, the 36th Wisconsin—which joined the army in the summer of 1864, led by a hero of Gettysburg, Frank Haskell and the ranks filled about evenly with fresh recruits and reenlisted veterans—was first bloodied at Cold Harbor. They took 400 casualties in an afternoon; their colonel killed, more than half their number removed from the ranks, and yet they dug in within a rock’s throw of rebel lines. They then remained in contact with the enemy for nine more months. Their experience was normal. Is it any wonder that Second Corps collapsed? Sears thinks that the collapse was reasonable, and he’s right.
The book has a large number of maps and illustrations. Maps are a common problem in books: there aren’t enough, and many are simply not functional. But at no point in Lincoln’s Lieutenants did I find myself needful of a better map. They are, however, not always well placed. There were occasions when the maps or illustrations were not situated at their most relevant location. This was compounded in the advance copy I was provided with by the lack of a listing of illustrations. In some cases, I found myself paging back and forth looking for context or for a map I wanted to reference. Additionally, the copy lacks an index. Hopefully, this deficiency will be corrected.
Lincoln’s Lieutenants is a magisterial work. In the opinion of this reviewer, it is the best work on the command of an army in the Civil War; it eclipses Freeman in historical merit and skilled prose, and is more complete than any work between the two. Sears’ newest volume should be on your bookshelf.
July 6, 2018
Years ago I had the privilege of having the late Civil War historian, Jay Luvaas, as a guide touring the battlefield at Antietam. After the tour I asked him which book he considered to be the best source for studying the Maryland battle and, without hesitation, he answered Stephen Sears’ The Landscape Turned Red. I believe that Mr. Luvaas would consider Lincoln’s Lieutenants to be the authoritative guide to the President’s relationships to his military hierarchy. I found Sears’ insightful evaluations of the North’s Generals to be most interesting, particularly the comments these leaders would publicly make about each other as ambition, jealousy, reputation, etc. affected their conduct in battle as well as their relationships with the Commander-in-Chief and each other. It was surprising that there were so many instances of revolts amongst the senior military officers and numerous accounts of their bypassing the chain of command while jockeying for advancement or settling past quarrels. (President Lincoln had similar problems with his cabinet which was not a focus of this book and perhaps all those kinds of problems were a ‘sign of the troubled times’.)
The maps provided by the author were not helpful and I resorted to using a Civil War atlas to assist my understanding of the author’s points.
This is a compelling study for anyone interested in the U.S. Civil War and to anyone interested in leadership studies.
The maps provided by the author were not helpful and I resorted to using a Civil War atlas to assist my understanding of the author’s points.
This is a compelling study for anyone interested in the U.S. Civil War and to anyone interested in leadership studies.
December 15, 2023
I finished this book back when I have it started on this site, December 7. I read it over a course of about 2 weeks, so, I started it in mid November. All that aside, this is a wonderful read.
While not heavy in battle detail, that wasn’t the focus, rather the focus was on the command relationships between the several Army of the Potomac Army, Corps, Division and Brigade commanders. Being that the army was created in 1861 to protect Washington DC and defeat the Rebels in the field, it was always a very political army. It was close, too close, to the politics of the nation for its own good.
Often, generals were placed in command because certain Governors, Senators and Congressmen needed to have favors done. Some of these men worked out, many others did not. Some were slandered, some killed, many were wounded, most fought, and almost all of them tried to do the best they could. This is their story.
Mr. Sears has written many fine books, and this is one of them. He is not a fan of General George McClellan. It’s easy to why in this and his other writings. But, as Sears points out, the General was an excellent organizer and the army that he put together in late 1861-62 was the army that eventually beat Robert E. Lee at Appomattox. While not under McClellan at that point, he still must have smiled that his creation prevailed in the end.
Read this book.
While not heavy in battle detail, that wasn’t the focus, rather the focus was on the command relationships between the several Army of the Potomac Army, Corps, Division and Brigade commanders. Being that the army was created in 1861 to protect Washington DC and defeat the Rebels in the field, it was always a very political army. It was close, too close, to the politics of the nation for its own good.
Often, generals were placed in command because certain Governors, Senators and Congressmen needed to have favors done. Some of these men worked out, many others did not. Some were slandered, some killed, many were wounded, most fought, and almost all of them tried to do the best they could. This is their story.
Mr. Sears has written many fine books, and this is one of them. He is not a fan of General George McClellan. It’s easy to why in this and his other writings. But, as Sears points out, the General was an excellent organizer and the army that he put together in late 1861-62 was the army that eventually beat Robert E. Lee at Appomattox. While not under McClellan at that point, he still must have smiled that his creation prevailed in the end.
Read this book.
February 17, 2022
A great study on leadership in the Civil War. Sears looks at the senior leaders in the Army of the Potomac and evaluates their performance in battle. Lincoln’s army had an incredible turnover at the Corps, Division, and Brigade level due to combat death and injuries and relief for incompetence. Much better than Lee’s Lieutenants as it looks at the the leadership of the Army as well as the campaigns and battles.
November 13, 2023
Whew, this was long, and I was never so happy to get to Appomattox Court House, but boy was it a good read! Moving at times, frustrating, and sometimes funny. If anything could go wrong with the Union Army, it sure seemed to. And even though I came prepared for McClellan costing years and wasting big chunks of people's early enlistment zeal, he still made me want to wring his neck. I imagine if Lee had stayed with the Union, the war would have been over in about six months.
I read this on my Kindle, which meant I couldn't see any of the maps, so I ended up having my giant road atlas open next to me and have already invited myself to someone's house who lives near Antietem. Highly recommend, for those who like this sort of thing.
I read this on my Kindle, which meant I couldn't see any of the maps, so I ended up having my giant road atlas open next to me and have already invited myself to someone's house who lives near Antietem. Highly recommend, for those who like this sort of thing.
January 24, 2022
This was such a well-written and well-researched book. The author was really able to focus on the commanders in the Army of the Potomac and the strengths and weaknesses that each man had. Many lives would probably have been saved if these generals could have stopped with their petty squabbling and back stabbing and done there job.
July 16, 2017
A detailed look at those who served in the high command of the Army of the Potomac. Only Meade is viewed in a positive light as the rest were found wanting for one reason or another. According to Lincoln's Lieutenants many of the officers were not very capable.
It is well worth the time to read this interesting and detailed coverage of the High Command of the Army of the Potomac.
It is well worth the time to read this interesting and detailed coverage of the High Command of the Army of the Potomac.
June 28, 2019
Lincoln’s Lieutenants is a fantastic piece of nonfiction by Stephen Sears, a work which sets a high bar when it comes to weaving an incredibly detailed account of the U.S. Civil War’s Eastern theater. Few corners were cut in constructing this history of the Army of the Potomac. It is chock full of rich accounts from 1861’s First Bull Run all the way to the siege of Petersburg and ultimate Southern surrender at Appomattox Courthouse. The narrative is rounded out by succinct biographies of numerous high and lower level Union Army commanders.
The manner in which this book walks readers through battles is both a strength and weakness. Pages upon pages are expended for critical battles/campaigns like the Peninsula Campaign, Antietam and Gettysburg, a tactic toward which no one can take exception. Even some smaller fights like the Mine Run campaign are amply described. But the manner in which Sears expounds upon some battles, though admirable in its eagle-eyed descriptions of corps and brigade movements, becomes borderline tiresome and tedious to read.
Many readers of Lincoln’s Lieutenants will be surprised at just how shoddy and unprepared Union generals managed to be at times. Getting lost on the way to rendezvous, drunkenness before and possibly during battle, poor coordination which seemingly cost lives; unprofessional behavior and shocking screw ups are recorded alongside acts of valor and bravery.
While Sears steers clear of excessive overt opinion-inserting, he still does it (albeit tastefully) on occasion. One general who does not come across well-unsurprisingly-is George McClellan. It is difficult for any Civil War historian to make the initial Army of the Potomac head come across well, and Sears probably did the best he could to give him a balanced presentation. He is painted, as he often is by historians, as full of his own hype and hesitant to engage the enemy.
Lincoln's Lieutenants demonstrates how McClellan's (the "Little Napoleon") bond with fellow aide Fitz John Porter was often stronger than his relationship with the president and the president’s staff; he frequently expressed contempt for his commander-in-chief and eventually ran against him for president in 1864.
There are a laundry list of command failures detailed by Sears. The “Little Napoleon’s” successor, Ambrose Burnside, twice refused the promotion to Army of the Potomac top dog before finally succeeding McClellan. If Lincoln’s Lieutenants account is taken at face value, he would have been better off sticking to his initial promotion refusals. Like his predecessor, Burnside’s shortcomings in command are many and by no means not glossed over. His competency as a leader is called into question by decisions made when the heat of battle was on.
Wrangling between abolitionists and those in the military who merely wanted to preserve the Union for the sake of preservation alone is particularly prevalent. These divisions seem to be especially prominent in the early years of the war.
Sears appears to take up for Meade’s stewardship of the Army of the Potomac, but the anti-Meade cabal which distorted the native Pennsylvanian’s decision-making at Gettysburg to suit their own purposes during congressional testimony receives the benefit of no such water carrying. (It seemed Meade, like Ambrose Burnside, was frequently being undercut by those under his authority). Men with sharp-elbowed partisanship and a propensity for cheap shots, Meade’s subordinates Daniel Sickles and Abner Doubleday wind up as twin examples among many underscoring the extent to which undermining of superiors went on during the war.
Meade’s post-Gettysburg decision not to finish pursuing Lee’s men while they are trapped against a flooding Potomac River is an episode which at first infuriates Lincoln, mirroring McClellan’s hesitancy to pursue the enemy at all costs and to finish pursuit after Antietam (the bloodiest single day of fighting in U.S. history and a failure of pursuit which ultimately cost McClellan his post at the head of the army).
Civilian leaders near the top do not have their blind spots excused. For example, instead of being a rock of reliability during a turbulent period, Henry Halleck’s presence in the War Department instead seems to generate issues related to delegation of authority.
Lesser known commanders like Judson Kilpatrick and Ulrich Dahlgren, ringleaders of a failed effort to free Union prisoners inside of Richmond and lay waste to the Confederate capital city afterwards, are also not spared condemnation. Accordingly, Generals Edwin Sumner and William French are individuals whose battlefield struggles and off-the-battlefield lack of ability to work well with others sullies their contributions to the Army of the Potomac’s ultimate victory.
Not to be outdone by other mistake-ridden commanders, General John Pope might never have commanded the Army of the Potomac, -instead leading the Shenandoah Valley campaign for a time-but he also frequently comes across as a poor commander who seemingly okayed the committing of war crimes by his troops.
But the bright spots feature prominently as well.
In contrast to the men previously mentioned, Winfield Scott Hancock comes across as a Union hero. His performance at the Battle of Gettysburg is a particular bright spot, and he appears to be a leader capable of rallying his fighting men to their potential. Chief Union engineer turned-Meade Chief of Staff Andrew Humphreys also comes across a reliable and capable military leader. Ulysses S. Grant's arrival on the scene seems to finally provide the impetus for pursuing Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia General at all costs.
Since the book focuses on the eastern theater, men like William T. Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant do not make a substantial entrance until the endgame gets underway. The latter, although technically not at the head of the Army of the Potomac, nevertheless figures substantially when he is moved to the eastern theater in the war’s final year.
Phil Kearny is a daring figure willing to expose himself to danger during battle, a trait which cost him his life during the Battle of Chantilly.
Furthermore, General John Sedgwick is a lesser known general who shows command promise before being killed at the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse. These are just a few of a shocking number of high-ranking commanders (twenty-one in all) who lost their lives in service to their country. Some, like First Bull Run veteran Israel Richardson, died fairly early on in the war. This death toll reveals how devoted many Union generals were to their nation’s cause and the extent to which they would put their lives on the line to usher that cause across the finish line.
Joseph Hooker, the third Army of the Potomac commander following Burnside’s demotion after the Fredericksburg disaster, rightfully earns the nickname “Fighting Joe.” Such a title is apt when one considers he had already seen combat in the battles of Williamsburg, Seven Pines, Oak Grove, Glendale, Second Bull Run, Turner’s Gap, Antietam, and Fredericksburg! His tenure is mixed, and questions regarding his moral makeup abound. Yet Hooker receives credit for positive changes to the army which boosted its morale, and his setting up of the Bureau of Military Information (B.M.I.) is shown to be a big contributor to future success.
The near-revolts against the civilian leadership in D.C. by generals in the field after the replacement of McClellan and Burnside, followed by the lack of pot-stirring on the part of these two demoted men, appears to give credit to their loyalty to the U.S. system of command structure.
Highly readable anecdotes, like the 1861 arrests of potential secessionist Democrats in the Maryland legislature and the seemingly politically-inspired imprisonment of General Charles Pomeroy Stone, could make for small books in and of themselves. Sears makes necessary mention of these, but like his decision not to overemphasize the civilian leadership in an effort to keep the book under one thousand pages, cannot delve into such back stories as much as he might like to
A Union win against a determined opposition seemed in no way preordained. This is especially true when readers are shown how poorly things began with First Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff, when they take into account how embarrassed the Army of the Potomac was after Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, when the failure of the Peninsula Campaign to end with the army in Richmond after a string of victories is revealed. That the war ended with a positive outcome for the North was not a sure bet before April 1865.
As Civil War-centric as it is, be aware that this is not a book about Abraham Lincoln. Though the sixteenth president’s leadership was of course critical for the war effort, this book remains focused on the Army of the Potomac's numerous military commanders. As interesting as men like Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase, the civilian leadership in D.C. is understandably only mentioned in relation to back-and-forths with their generals.
Lincoln's Lieutenants is a wonderful accomplishment.
The amount of information packed into the book is impressive, and the revolving cast of characters is managed in an effective way. Sears's format is to thank for keeping the book from going off the rails; instead of becoming an overstuffed mess, this book is instead a highly recommendable read.
Readers are sure to come away with a rich understanding of the Army of the Potomac's bright and weak spots, enlivened with fantastic and flowing narratives of the very real people who composed that fighting force.
-Andrew Canfield Denver, Colorado
The manner in which this book walks readers through battles is both a strength and weakness. Pages upon pages are expended for critical battles/campaigns like the Peninsula Campaign, Antietam and Gettysburg, a tactic toward which no one can take exception. Even some smaller fights like the Mine Run campaign are amply described. But the manner in which Sears expounds upon some battles, though admirable in its eagle-eyed descriptions of corps and brigade movements, becomes borderline tiresome and tedious to read.
Many readers of Lincoln’s Lieutenants will be surprised at just how shoddy and unprepared Union generals managed to be at times. Getting lost on the way to rendezvous, drunkenness before and possibly during battle, poor coordination which seemingly cost lives; unprofessional behavior and shocking screw ups are recorded alongside acts of valor and bravery.
While Sears steers clear of excessive overt opinion-inserting, he still does it (albeit tastefully) on occasion. One general who does not come across well-unsurprisingly-is George McClellan. It is difficult for any Civil War historian to make the initial Army of the Potomac head come across well, and Sears probably did the best he could to give him a balanced presentation. He is painted, as he often is by historians, as full of his own hype and hesitant to engage the enemy.
Lincoln's Lieutenants demonstrates how McClellan's (the "Little Napoleon") bond with fellow aide Fitz John Porter was often stronger than his relationship with the president and the president’s staff; he frequently expressed contempt for his commander-in-chief and eventually ran against him for president in 1864.
There are a laundry list of command failures detailed by Sears. The “Little Napoleon’s” successor, Ambrose Burnside, twice refused the promotion to Army of the Potomac top dog before finally succeeding McClellan. If Lincoln’s Lieutenants account is taken at face value, he would have been better off sticking to his initial promotion refusals. Like his predecessor, Burnside’s shortcomings in command are many and by no means not glossed over. His competency as a leader is called into question by decisions made when the heat of battle was on.
Wrangling between abolitionists and those in the military who merely wanted to preserve the Union for the sake of preservation alone is particularly prevalent. These divisions seem to be especially prominent in the early years of the war.
Sears appears to take up for Meade’s stewardship of the Army of the Potomac, but the anti-Meade cabal which distorted the native Pennsylvanian’s decision-making at Gettysburg to suit their own purposes during congressional testimony receives the benefit of no such water carrying. (It seemed Meade, like Ambrose Burnside, was frequently being undercut by those under his authority). Men with sharp-elbowed partisanship and a propensity for cheap shots, Meade’s subordinates Daniel Sickles and Abner Doubleday wind up as twin examples among many underscoring the extent to which undermining of superiors went on during the war.
Meade’s post-Gettysburg decision not to finish pursuing Lee’s men while they are trapped against a flooding Potomac River is an episode which at first infuriates Lincoln, mirroring McClellan’s hesitancy to pursue the enemy at all costs and to finish pursuit after Antietam (the bloodiest single day of fighting in U.S. history and a failure of pursuit which ultimately cost McClellan his post at the head of the army).
Civilian leaders near the top do not have their blind spots excused. For example, instead of being a rock of reliability during a turbulent period, Henry Halleck’s presence in the War Department instead seems to generate issues related to delegation of authority.
Lesser known commanders like Judson Kilpatrick and Ulrich Dahlgren, ringleaders of a failed effort to free Union prisoners inside of Richmond and lay waste to the Confederate capital city afterwards, are also not spared condemnation. Accordingly, Generals Edwin Sumner and William French are individuals whose battlefield struggles and off-the-battlefield lack of ability to work well with others sullies their contributions to the Army of the Potomac’s ultimate victory.
Not to be outdone by other mistake-ridden commanders, General John Pope might never have commanded the Army of the Potomac, -instead leading the Shenandoah Valley campaign for a time-but he also frequently comes across as a poor commander who seemingly okayed the committing of war crimes by his troops.
But the bright spots feature prominently as well.
In contrast to the men previously mentioned, Winfield Scott Hancock comes across as a Union hero. His performance at the Battle of Gettysburg is a particular bright spot, and he appears to be a leader capable of rallying his fighting men to their potential. Chief Union engineer turned-Meade Chief of Staff Andrew Humphreys also comes across a reliable and capable military leader. Ulysses S. Grant's arrival on the scene seems to finally provide the impetus for pursuing Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia General at all costs.
Since the book focuses on the eastern theater, men like William T. Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant do not make a substantial entrance until the endgame gets underway. The latter, although technically not at the head of the Army of the Potomac, nevertheless figures substantially when he is moved to the eastern theater in the war’s final year.
Phil Kearny is a daring figure willing to expose himself to danger during battle, a trait which cost him his life during the Battle of Chantilly.
Furthermore, General John Sedgwick is a lesser known general who shows command promise before being killed at the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse. These are just a few of a shocking number of high-ranking commanders (twenty-one in all) who lost their lives in service to their country. Some, like First Bull Run veteran Israel Richardson, died fairly early on in the war. This death toll reveals how devoted many Union generals were to their nation’s cause and the extent to which they would put their lives on the line to usher that cause across the finish line.
Joseph Hooker, the third Army of the Potomac commander following Burnside’s demotion after the Fredericksburg disaster, rightfully earns the nickname “Fighting Joe.” Such a title is apt when one considers he had already seen combat in the battles of Williamsburg, Seven Pines, Oak Grove, Glendale, Second Bull Run, Turner’s Gap, Antietam, and Fredericksburg! His tenure is mixed, and questions regarding his moral makeup abound. Yet Hooker receives credit for positive changes to the army which boosted its morale, and his setting up of the Bureau of Military Information (B.M.I.) is shown to be a big contributor to future success.
The near-revolts against the civilian leadership in D.C. by generals in the field after the replacement of McClellan and Burnside, followed by the lack of pot-stirring on the part of these two demoted men, appears to give credit to their loyalty to the U.S. system of command structure.
Highly readable anecdotes, like the 1861 arrests of potential secessionist Democrats in the Maryland legislature and the seemingly politically-inspired imprisonment of General Charles Pomeroy Stone, could make for small books in and of themselves. Sears makes necessary mention of these, but like his decision not to overemphasize the civilian leadership in an effort to keep the book under one thousand pages, cannot delve into such back stories as much as he might like to
A Union win against a determined opposition seemed in no way preordained. This is especially true when readers are shown how poorly things began with First Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff, when they take into account how embarrassed the Army of the Potomac was after Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, when the failure of the Peninsula Campaign to end with the army in Richmond after a string of victories is revealed. That the war ended with a positive outcome for the North was not a sure bet before April 1865.
As Civil War-centric as it is, be aware that this is not a book about Abraham Lincoln. Though the sixteenth president’s leadership was of course critical for the war effort, this book remains focused on the Army of the Potomac's numerous military commanders. As interesting as men like Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase, the civilian leadership in D.C. is understandably only mentioned in relation to back-and-forths with their generals.
Lincoln's Lieutenants is a wonderful accomplishment.
The amount of information packed into the book is impressive, and the revolving cast of characters is managed in an effective way. Sears's format is to thank for keeping the book from going off the rails; instead of becoming an overstuffed mess, this book is instead a highly recommendable read.
Readers are sure to come away with a rich understanding of the Army of the Potomac's bright and weak spots, enlivened with fantastic and flowing narratives of the very real people who composed that fighting force.
-Andrew Canfield Denver, Colorado
August 25, 2017
The Army of the Potomac’s failures was the source of great frustration for President Lincoln, the Congress and the nation. The North had significant war-making advantages over the Confederacy in manpower and material, but what it didn’t have – at least until the arrival of U.S. Grant in the spring of 1864 – was inspired, effective generalship. Sears’s book gives insight into the weaknesses of military leadership that unquestionably led to lengthening the duration of the war.
At the war’s onset the regular army was small and mostly deployed in the western territories. Its commanding general was the aging Winfield Scott, first serving in the War of 1812 and admired for his leadership in the Mexican War. Scott devised a strategic approach to conducting the war – the “Anaconda” plan that called for encircling (constricting) the South at the Mississippi and the Atlantic coast. From a broad-term perspective this was, in essence, what transpired over the war years. Scott drew criticism by offering his views on the political aims he felt should underlie the North’s goals for reunification. Despite his military reputation Scott, now in his mid-60’s, no longer had the physical capacity to lead the army in the field.
After several minor engagements that did not bring satisfaction to the North, the two armies faced off in Manassas, practically at the back door of Washington. Here began a pattern of Northern failures in which the Federal forces were out maneuvered and outgeneraled by the rebel opponents. In the ensuring search for new leadership after Manassas, George McClellan emerged. McClellan had had several small-scale victories in western Virginia and was perceived to be the fresh and vigorous leader the army needed. McClellan proved to be excellent at organizing his army, now expanded to many times its prewar size, but he soon evidenced several characteristics that would hugely frustrate the North’s political leadership. He was utterly dismissive of the views of his civilian superiors and displayed an arrogance and disdain toward Lincoln and war secretary Stanton that, probably in their desperation for military success, they tolerated. Plausible suggestions for attacking Confederate forces encamped within miles of Washington were rejected outright and, instead, an elaborate and complex plan to attack the Confederate capital at Richmond was advanced by McClellan. Contained in this strategy was a notion that dominated military thinking for quite a long time – that the war could be won by capturing the capital of the Confederacy. Lincoln fairly quickly realized that it was not the “place” of the Confederacy that was important; it was the “army”; that by destroying the army of the South the rebellion would be suppressed.
McClellan’s other command deficiency appeared in the Peninsula campaign. He grossly overestimated the size of his opponent and exercised slowness and caution instead of aggressiveness. His constant complaints about the need for additional troops were a pretext for inaction. It was at the end of the campaign along the York and James Rivers that Lincoln relieved McClellan from overall command of the Federal armies, replacing him with Henry Halleck, who had achieved some success in the West directing field generals. Halleck proved as ineffective in directing McClellan as Lincoln (more on Halleck later). McClellan was directed to take forces north to aid Gen. John Pope’s efforts around Manassas. His failure to do so, combined with Pope’s ineptitude that led to the second defeat at Manassas. Robert E. Lee determined to invade Maryland and the Federals followed him, always shielding Washington from the rebel army. In central Maryland, the armies collided at Antietam. McClellan had the great fortune of coming across a lost copy of Lee’s battle plan, but did not take full advantage of his good luck principally by not engaging his forces enmasse. What followed was Lee’s withdrawal after devastating losses on both sides. This was perceived by the administration to be enough of a victory to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, but Lincoln’s hope that McClellan would pursue Lee’s army was frustrated by his inaction.
At long last Lincoln could no longer abide with McClellan’s temerity. He searched for a replacement, settling on Ambrose Burnside who protested that he had not the capacity for so great an assignment. He was correct in his self-assessment. The catastrophe of the Fredericksburg campaign and the subsequent ludicrous “mud march” in the mire away from the Rappahannock prompted Lincoln to select Joseph Hooker for overall command. “Fighting Joe” Hooker had performed well at Antietam and better that most at Fredericksburg and had a reputation for the kind of aggressiveness sought by Lincoln. In early 1863 Hooker conceived a sound plan to outflank Lee near Chancellorsville, but following a bold counter flanking maneuver by Stonewall Jackson and a near miss from cannon fire that left Hooker temporarily incapacitated, the rebels again prevailed.
Lee again forayed North and on the eve of a great engagement Lincoln switched leadership by appointing George Meade to command. At Gettysburg Meade determined to fight Lee on the defensive and through the combination of strong defensive positions and good luck was able to repel Lee. Here again, though, was the lack of pursuit of the defeated rebel army that so frustrated Lincoln. Meade probably wisely eschewed attacking Lee’s strongly fortified position at Williamsport, MD and the rebel army made its reentry into Virginia.
Throughout the fall and early winter of 1863 there were desultory Federal campaign efforts that came to nothing. In the spring of 1864 Lincoln determined to appoint Grant as general-in-chief. Grant had received praise for his fighting in the West, notably Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Halleck was demoted the chief of staff to Lincoln. Grant wisely decided to exercise command leadership from the field, retaining Meade in charge of the Army of the Potomac. This proved to be a great success as the two men had a good working relationship and, most importantly, being away from Washington buffered Grant from the intrusions of politicians. Grant had a straight-ahead approach that brought huge casualties to the army, but ultimately forced the rebels to defensive positions outside Petersburg. (It was in the late war years that the value of entrenchment in combating offensive action became the preferred method of resistance.) Petersburg was a stalemate throughout the remainder of 1864 and early 1865 until the Federals were finally able to sever rebel communications lines and outflank Lee’s lines causing his retreat and ultimate capture at Appomattox.
Sears devotes considerable space to the army’s corps and division commanders. He finds most of them wanting in leadership skill. The top command was stacked with political generals, most of whom were ineffective military leaders. (Some of these political generals retained command because of their purported political influence on pending elections, e.g. Butler, Banks and Siegel.) Two of the most promising corps leaders – Reynolds and Sedgwick – were killed. Slocum was reasonably effective; Warren was not; Burnside in a corps command role was not. Overall, the casualty rate among division and brigade leaders was quite high. Sears gives most praise to Winfield Scott Hancock and Philp Sheridan.
A fascinating element of this account is the interplay between the military commanders themselves and with the political sphere and the press. There were intense and dysfunctional jealousies among the generals. Their hubris led to undercutting of peers and superiors, often by appeals to political sponsors and directly to the press. We think today of military commanders as being politically neutral and professionally committed to following a chain of command without political intrigue, but this was decidedly not the case during the Civil War years. There were even instances of vague references to military action to depose the “incompetents” in Washington, probably not seriously contemplated but even the rumor is disquieting to consider.
A word about Halleck who, since he is a native of my hometown, I have studied. Sears’s treatment of Halleck is fair. Halleck did not live up to expectations Lincoln had for his role as commanding general. Halleck was generally reticent to overrule his field generals, but when he tried to do so was ineffective in having his direction followed. In is interesting to consider that Halleck did not succeed where Lincoln could not, i.e. in getting aggressive actions by McClellan and others. The political atmosphere in Washington was debilitating to Halleck, an atmosphere so charged and vicious that Grant’s decision to stay away from Washington was indeed wise. Halleck ended his war service as largely the administrative chief of the army and as Lincoln’s military adviser, roles that he performed quite well.
Although I was not interested so much in the movements of the battles as in Sears’s assessment of the military leaders, I found his descriptions hard to follow. The maps accompanying the battle narratives were not helpful.
At the war’s onset the regular army was small and mostly deployed in the western territories. Its commanding general was the aging Winfield Scott, first serving in the War of 1812 and admired for his leadership in the Mexican War. Scott devised a strategic approach to conducting the war – the “Anaconda” plan that called for encircling (constricting) the South at the Mississippi and the Atlantic coast. From a broad-term perspective this was, in essence, what transpired over the war years. Scott drew criticism by offering his views on the political aims he felt should underlie the North’s goals for reunification. Despite his military reputation Scott, now in his mid-60’s, no longer had the physical capacity to lead the army in the field.
After several minor engagements that did not bring satisfaction to the North, the two armies faced off in Manassas, practically at the back door of Washington. Here began a pattern of Northern failures in which the Federal forces were out maneuvered and outgeneraled by the rebel opponents. In the ensuring search for new leadership after Manassas, George McClellan emerged. McClellan had had several small-scale victories in western Virginia and was perceived to be the fresh and vigorous leader the army needed. McClellan proved to be excellent at organizing his army, now expanded to many times its prewar size, but he soon evidenced several characteristics that would hugely frustrate the North’s political leadership. He was utterly dismissive of the views of his civilian superiors and displayed an arrogance and disdain toward Lincoln and war secretary Stanton that, probably in their desperation for military success, they tolerated. Plausible suggestions for attacking Confederate forces encamped within miles of Washington were rejected outright and, instead, an elaborate and complex plan to attack the Confederate capital at Richmond was advanced by McClellan. Contained in this strategy was a notion that dominated military thinking for quite a long time – that the war could be won by capturing the capital of the Confederacy. Lincoln fairly quickly realized that it was not the “place” of the Confederacy that was important; it was the “army”; that by destroying the army of the South the rebellion would be suppressed.
McClellan’s other command deficiency appeared in the Peninsula campaign. He grossly overestimated the size of his opponent and exercised slowness and caution instead of aggressiveness. His constant complaints about the need for additional troops were a pretext for inaction. It was at the end of the campaign along the York and James Rivers that Lincoln relieved McClellan from overall command of the Federal armies, replacing him with Henry Halleck, who had achieved some success in the West directing field generals. Halleck proved as ineffective in directing McClellan as Lincoln (more on Halleck later). McClellan was directed to take forces north to aid Gen. John Pope’s efforts around Manassas. His failure to do so, combined with Pope’s ineptitude that led to the second defeat at Manassas. Robert E. Lee determined to invade Maryland and the Federals followed him, always shielding Washington from the rebel army. In central Maryland, the armies collided at Antietam. McClellan had the great fortune of coming across a lost copy of Lee’s battle plan, but did not take full advantage of his good luck principally by not engaging his forces enmasse. What followed was Lee’s withdrawal after devastating losses on both sides. This was perceived by the administration to be enough of a victory to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, but Lincoln’s hope that McClellan would pursue Lee’s army was frustrated by his inaction.
At long last Lincoln could no longer abide with McClellan’s temerity. He searched for a replacement, settling on Ambrose Burnside who protested that he had not the capacity for so great an assignment. He was correct in his self-assessment. The catastrophe of the Fredericksburg campaign and the subsequent ludicrous “mud march” in the mire away from the Rappahannock prompted Lincoln to select Joseph Hooker for overall command. “Fighting Joe” Hooker had performed well at Antietam and better that most at Fredericksburg and had a reputation for the kind of aggressiveness sought by Lincoln. In early 1863 Hooker conceived a sound plan to outflank Lee near Chancellorsville, but following a bold counter flanking maneuver by Stonewall Jackson and a near miss from cannon fire that left Hooker temporarily incapacitated, the rebels again prevailed.
Lee again forayed North and on the eve of a great engagement Lincoln switched leadership by appointing George Meade to command. At Gettysburg Meade determined to fight Lee on the defensive and through the combination of strong defensive positions and good luck was able to repel Lee. Here again, though, was the lack of pursuit of the defeated rebel army that so frustrated Lincoln. Meade probably wisely eschewed attacking Lee’s strongly fortified position at Williamsport, MD and the rebel army made its reentry into Virginia.
Throughout the fall and early winter of 1863 there were desultory Federal campaign efforts that came to nothing. In the spring of 1864 Lincoln determined to appoint Grant as general-in-chief. Grant had received praise for his fighting in the West, notably Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Halleck was demoted the chief of staff to Lincoln. Grant wisely decided to exercise command leadership from the field, retaining Meade in charge of the Army of the Potomac. This proved to be a great success as the two men had a good working relationship and, most importantly, being away from Washington buffered Grant from the intrusions of politicians. Grant had a straight-ahead approach that brought huge casualties to the army, but ultimately forced the rebels to defensive positions outside Petersburg. (It was in the late war years that the value of entrenchment in combating offensive action became the preferred method of resistance.) Petersburg was a stalemate throughout the remainder of 1864 and early 1865 until the Federals were finally able to sever rebel communications lines and outflank Lee’s lines causing his retreat and ultimate capture at Appomattox.
Sears devotes considerable space to the army’s corps and division commanders. He finds most of them wanting in leadership skill. The top command was stacked with political generals, most of whom were ineffective military leaders. (Some of these political generals retained command because of their purported political influence on pending elections, e.g. Butler, Banks and Siegel.) Two of the most promising corps leaders – Reynolds and Sedgwick – were killed. Slocum was reasonably effective; Warren was not; Burnside in a corps command role was not. Overall, the casualty rate among division and brigade leaders was quite high. Sears gives most praise to Winfield Scott Hancock and Philp Sheridan.
A fascinating element of this account is the interplay between the military commanders themselves and with the political sphere and the press. There were intense and dysfunctional jealousies among the generals. Their hubris led to undercutting of peers and superiors, often by appeals to political sponsors and directly to the press. We think today of military commanders as being politically neutral and professionally committed to following a chain of command without political intrigue, but this was decidedly not the case during the Civil War years. There were even instances of vague references to military action to depose the “incompetents” in Washington, probably not seriously contemplated but even the rumor is disquieting to consider.
A word about Halleck who, since he is a native of my hometown, I have studied. Sears’s treatment of Halleck is fair. Halleck did not live up to expectations Lincoln had for his role as commanding general. Halleck was generally reticent to overrule his field generals, but when he tried to do so was ineffective in having his direction followed. In is interesting to consider that Halleck did not succeed where Lincoln could not, i.e. in getting aggressive actions by McClellan and others. The political atmosphere in Washington was debilitating to Halleck, an atmosphere so charged and vicious that Grant’s decision to stay away from Washington was indeed wise. Halleck ended his war service as largely the administrative chief of the army and as Lincoln’s military adviser, roles that he performed quite well.
Although I was not interested so much in the movements of the battles as in Sears’s assessment of the military leaders, I found his descriptions hard to follow. The maps accompanying the battle narratives were not helpful.
November 1, 2017
I've always been a Stephen Sears fan ever since Landscape Turned Red. His latest effort recasts the stories he has told of the Army of the Potomac via campaign books and his McClellan into a new point of view: The ambitions, rivalries, conspiracies, and emotions of the high command - from Army commander down to corps and division commanders.
The narrative arc won't be unfamiliar to any half-way versed student of the Civil War. It is told chronologically from pre-Fort Sumter all the way to Appomatox. Most of the book (in pages) covers up to Gettysburg but Grant's assumption of the war effort is included as well.
This is not a battle history although battles are covered. Rather, it describes in quite some detail how the military leadership worked, and didn't work with each other. Petty jealousies, drunkenness, favoritism, alignment with calumniating newspaper reporters, sheer incompetence, as well as genuine leadership pepper the narrative.
You also get a good sense of why the campaigns unfolded as they did, especially their slow pace. Logistics, bad intelligence, troop training, mustering out of two and three year regiments, and weather all played a significant role.
As with all things historical, one can't help but make comparisons to modern day US military leadership and wonder if the same character traits are in contemporary leadership.
Worth reading? Definitely, but you should be already familiar with the general historical arc of the Civil War and its Union leaders - especially in the Eastern theatre.
The narrative arc won't be unfamiliar to any half-way versed student of the Civil War. It is told chronologically from pre-Fort Sumter all the way to Appomatox. Most of the book (in pages) covers up to Gettysburg but Grant's assumption of the war effort is included as well.
This is not a battle history although battles are covered. Rather, it describes in quite some detail how the military leadership worked, and didn't work with each other. Petty jealousies, drunkenness, favoritism, alignment with calumniating newspaper reporters, sheer incompetence, as well as genuine leadership pepper the narrative.
You also get a good sense of why the campaigns unfolded as they did, especially their slow pace. Logistics, bad intelligence, troop training, mustering out of two and three year regiments, and weather all played a significant role.
As with all things historical, one can't help but make comparisons to modern day US military leadership and wonder if the same character traits are in contemporary leadership.
Worth reading? Definitely, but you should be already familiar with the general historical arc of the Civil War and its Union leaders - especially in the Eastern theatre.
October 6, 2020
It's hard to come up with enough superlatives for what would seem to be the summation of all his previous works about the battles and commanders of the Army of the Potomac. "Cattonesque" comes to mind. I think Sears was a little hard on O.O. Howard but, other than that, this is a book that simply cannot be missed by those with an interest in the American Civil War's eastern theater.
September 22, 2023
A fine book, and the subtitle is really important. It's not all of Lincoln's lieutenants. It's the story of the Army of the Potomac, and not any other aspect of the war, as told as a succession of the commanders thereof.
Sears' biggest hero in his telling is probably Meade, and the bad guys maybe a combination of McClellan, Secretary of War Stanton, and a couple of other back stabbers. Sears makes a great case for what was a surprise to me - I had always taken it as undisputed fact that after Gettysburg Meade had a chance to pin Lee against the Potomac without bridges available and the river swollen, but Meade truly did know more about the situation, and how trench warfare was evolving, than Lincoln or the press. Meade, together with his generals in a council of war, came to the consensus that keeping their army between Lee's army and Washington/Baltimore was imperative, even though it cost time. And once Lee's army was 'dug in,' Meade understood that attacking Lee at Williamsport would be about as successful as Pickett's charge had been. There's a reason the Civil War is called the 'first modern war,' and groking that charges across open land on entrenched positions amount to slaughter, is part of it.
George Guidall's narration of the audio book, is, not surprisingly, excellent.
Anyhoo, comprehensive and engaging.
Sears' biggest hero in his telling is probably Meade, and the bad guys maybe a combination of McClellan, Secretary of War Stanton, and a couple of other back stabbers. Sears makes a great case for what was a surprise to me - I had always taken it as undisputed fact that after Gettysburg Meade had a chance to pin Lee against the Potomac without bridges available and the river swollen, but Meade truly did know more about the situation, and how trench warfare was evolving, than Lincoln or the press. Meade, together with his generals in a council of war, came to the consensus that keeping their army between Lee's army and Washington/Baltimore was imperative, even though it cost time. And once Lee's army was 'dug in,' Meade understood that attacking Lee at Williamsport would be about as successful as Pickett's charge had been. There's a reason the Civil War is called the 'first modern war,' and groking that charges across open land on entrenched positions amount to slaughter, is part of it.
George Guidall's narration of the audio book, is, not surprisingly, excellent.
Anyhoo, comprehensive and engaging.
April 5, 2024
While I'm giving this book four stars if I could give it three & three-quarters that would be about right, as while there is nothing else quite like it in terms of following the twists and turns of how Union's main field force in Virginia evolved over time, and I'm inclined to trust Sears' judgement on military matters, I'm not so sure in regards to the flying of sparks when political and military matters clashed. To put it another way, while Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and the congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War might not be the most attractive people in the world, it's understandable why at the time there would be chronic distrust of an officer corps dominated by conservative Democrats. To cut to the chase, Sears gives fellow historian William Marvel as his first acknowledgment and my impression of Marvel's biography of Stanton was that it was a caricature of the man; and it's not as though I hold any particular brief for Stanton. With that in mind though this work does serve well as a good overview of the war in the east.
Originally written: August 13, 2018.
Originally written: August 13, 2018.
September 6, 2017
Sears' ambition is clear from the title - and he delivers. Tremendous book that traces the evolution of the high command of the Army of the Potomac. My only regret is that he didn't follow Douglas Freeman's outline completely and go with a 3 volume set.
June 26, 2017
I liked it because I learned a lot of neat stuff, mainly about the guys who commanded the army and corps, what they did right and not so right and why they moved up or out.
There are 766 pages of text, covering the Army of the Potomac’s campaigns from 1st Bull Run (it wasn’t called the Army of the Potomac then) to Appomattox. The author looks at the battles from the viewpoint of the Federal commanding generals and not from the Confederates, much as Douglas Southall Freeman did with his biography of Lee and in Lee’s Lieutenants (only from the opposite side). The battles are not play-by-plays at the regimental level. Of course, superior resources and their proper employment helped but they were important for all Union forces; we are concerned with the command of the Army of the Potomac.
Sears has a lot of prior work to draw from. He has written books on the Peninsular Campaign (To the Gates of Richmond), Antietam (Landscape Turned Red), Chancellorsville (Chancellorsville), and Gettysburg (Gettysburg). His favorite bête noire seems to be George Brinton McClellan, about whom he has also written a book (George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon).
If one is familiar with the campaigns and battles in the eastern theater, the names of those who did well or not will also be familiar. Almost half of the book, some 358 pages, is devoted to the army under McClellan. Burnside gets a chapter and Hooker a chapter and a half. The rest of the story goes to Meade and then the Grant-Meade combination.
.
Of interest to me were positive descriptions of General Hunt’s contributions to the artillery arm. General Heintzelman didn’t come off so bad during the Peninsular Campaign and I wonder why he was shelved (other than not being one of Little Mac’s boys). Young Barlow was a fine aggressive sort and I was sorry there wasn’t more about Nelson Miles and Wesley Merritt.
Not so hot, and why was fairly new to me, were Generals Howard, Slocum (although both did well enough under Sherman in Georgia), Kearny, and Sheridan. Sears gives corps commanders Warrren and Sedgwick an even-handed treatment, and Army commander Hooker, too.
Read the introduction and final pages to find Sears’ point, how the Army of the Potomac’s high command ultimately succeeded. It did, and it wasn’t just numbers.
I confess to not liking the maps; the font is too small.
There are 766 pages of text, covering the Army of the Potomac’s campaigns from 1st Bull Run (it wasn’t called the Army of the Potomac then) to Appomattox. The author looks at the battles from the viewpoint of the Federal commanding generals and not from the Confederates, much as Douglas Southall Freeman did with his biography of Lee and in Lee’s Lieutenants (only from the opposite side). The battles are not play-by-plays at the regimental level. Of course, superior resources and their proper employment helped but they were important for all Union forces; we are concerned with the command of the Army of the Potomac.
Sears has a lot of prior work to draw from. He has written books on the Peninsular Campaign (To the Gates of Richmond), Antietam (Landscape Turned Red), Chancellorsville (Chancellorsville), and Gettysburg (Gettysburg). His favorite bête noire seems to be George Brinton McClellan, about whom he has also written a book (George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon).
If one is familiar with the campaigns and battles in the eastern theater, the names of those who did well or not will also be familiar. Almost half of the book, some 358 pages, is devoted to the army under McClellan. Burnside gets a chapter and Hooker a chapter and a half. The rest of the story goes to Meade and then the Grant-Meade combination.
.
Of interest to me were positive descriptions of General Hunt’s contributions to the artillery arm. General Heintzelman didn’t come off so bad during the Peninsular Campaign and I wonder why he was shelved (other than not being one of Little Mac’s boys). Young Barlow was a fine aggressive sort and I was sorry there wasn’t more about Nelson Miles and Wesley Merritt.
Not so hot, and why was fairly new to me, were Generals Howard, Slocum (although both did well enough under Sherman in Georgia), Kearny, and Sheridan. Sears gives corps commanders Warrren and Sedgwick an even-handed treatment, and Army commander Hooker, too.
Read the introduction and final pages to find Sears’ point, how the Army of the Potomac’s high command ultimately succeeded. It did, and it wasn’t just numbers.
I confess to not liking the maps; the font is too small.
August 9, 2017
Like the Civil War, "Lincoln's Lieutenants" goes on for a long time. 26 CD's in the audio version. I could have listened to another 26. I don't know if any PHD candidate has done his or her thesis on the causal relationship between the discovery of grey hair and an interest in the Civil War, but we older white dudes just can't get enough of the war to preserve the Union. Or, the war of Northern aggression, should you live in a red state. My ancestors were in Scandinavia during this conflict, but I've met three people who claim lineage to generals whose names appear again and again in this story, which is an absolute Peyton Place of intrigues, alliances and egotism among a very large list of generals who supposedly answered to President Lincoln, but whom in reality had to improvise responses to a Southern enemy who could seldom be counted on to behave according to plan. Not having a name like "Longstreet" or "Sickles", I was free to designate General George Meade as "my guy".
I'd read "Gettysburg" before and I'd noticed that Sears is a fan of General Meade. In contrast to nearly all of the other generals, Grant included, Meade seems alone in his concern for the lives of the soldiers assigned to him. The shocking thing about the "Lincoln's Lieutenants" from the prospective of a modern reader is the sheer indifference with which the lives of thousands of soldiers might be expended not to gain any military advantage, but to shut up some critic in Washington or to curry favor with a superior after a poor performance during a previous engagement. 620,000 men in both armies died during the Civil War, during a time when the whole population of America was just 31 million. Upon listening to this book, I had to wonder how many of those men died not fighting for any ideal, but because they were hapless enough to land in a unit commanded by an officer who was over-confident, under-qualified, drunk or just plain stupid.
I'd read "Gettysburg" before and I'd noticed that Sears is a fan of General Meade. In contrast to nearly all of the other generals, Grant included, Meade seems alone in his concern for the lives of the soldiers assigned to him. The shocking thing about the "Lincoln's Lieutenants" from the prospective of a modern reader is the sheer indifference with which the lives of thousands of soldiers might be expended not to gain any military advantage, but to shut up some critic in Washington or to curry favor with a superior after a poor performance during a previous engagement. 620,000 men in both armies died during the Civil War, during a time when the whole population of America was just 31 million. Upon listening to this book, I had to wonder how many of those men died not fighting for any ideal, but because they were hapless enough to land in a unit commanded by an officer who was over-confident, under-qualified, drunk or just plain stupid.
December 28, 2018
Honestly this was just a great book to read as a fan of Civil War History. It had been a while since I last read a book on the Civil War and it was great to read this book and refresh some of my knowledge. As the book says, it is really a survey of the History of the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War. It doesn't really dwell much on the Army of Northern Virginia or any of the other armies outside of the Eastern Theater of the War.
It also tends to be a history of Generals and Units more than the average soldier, which I suppose the name reflects well on as well. The book seems to be written in response to Douglass Freeman's "Lee's Lieutenants" book from years ago. However, unlike that book which had the benefit of focusing on one major general and his army, the Potomac army had many generals to focus on, which lead to the somewhat clunky title (IMO).
I have always loved the history of the war in the east from roughly Antietam to Gettysburg (1862-63), however this book was great because it filled in some history before 1862 that I found fascinating. Unfortunately, perhaps because my heart wasn't that into it, much of the post-Gettysburg information was less than thrilling and sort of came at me in a blur. I don't think it was Sears's fault as much as it was my own interest and the mixed nature of the history itself. There really was only one complaint I had with the book and that was in Sears portrayal of Fighting Joe Hooker. I felt like his bias showed in his portrayal, which was never too critical. Other than that however, I felt like this was a solid survey for anyone wanting to be more familiar with the high command of the Army of the Potomac. I appreciated the way he handled the subject matter and would probably recommend this book to anyone who loves Civil War history, especially those who've read Freeman's book it is partially based on.
It also tends to be a history of Generals and Units more than the average soldier, which I suppose the name reflects well on as well. The book seems to be written in response to Douglass Freeman's "Lee's Lieutenants" book from years ago. However, unlike that book which had the benefit of focusing on one major general and his army, the Potomac army had many generals to focus on, which lead to the somewhat clunky title (IMO).
I have always loved the history of the war in the east from roughly Antietam to Gettysburg (1862-63), however this book was great because it filled in some history before 1862 that I found fascinating. Unfortunately, perhaps because my heart wasn't that into it, much of the post-Gettysburg information was less than thrilling and sort of came at me in a blur. I don't think it was Sears's fault as much as it was my own interest and the mixed nature of the history itself. There really was only one complaint I had with the book and that was in Sears portrayal of Fighting Joe Hooker. I felt like his bias showed in his portrayal, which was never too critical. Other than that however, I felt like this was a solid survey for anyone wanting to be more familiar with the high command of the Army of the Potomac. I appreciated the way he handled the subject matter and would probably recommend this book to anyone who loves Civil War history, especially those who've read Freeman's book it is partially based on.
December 3, 2017
This is not a review of the war, but only of the Army of the Potomac. It details the generals charged with commanding the Army of the Potomac over the course of the war.
Sears is a detail, fact based historian. I use this to contrast to Doris Kearns Goodwin and Max Hastings. You won't get a lot of high level overview, editorial opinion, or what ifs. What you will get is a lot of detail on how the players acted and how they did or didn't do their jobs. To quote Patrick Reardon's review of the book it's about, "arrogance, ineptitude, ambition, favoritism, pomposity, politicking, moral cowardice and flirtations with treason."
Sears does a good job of bringing the generals alive, and makes you wonder how the North managed to successfully prosecute the war, or even stay in it. It made me appreciate the difficulty of managing a staff, with a lot of politically appointed generals, many of which did little to advance the overall effort. In addition to inept generals, you have lost, delayed, misunderstood or just plain ignored orders, and a frightfully high rated of leaders killed or wounded on the battlefield. Few of the generals present at the start of the war were present at the end.
Sears is a detail, fact based historian. I use this to contrast to Doris Kearns Goodwin and Max Hastings. You won't get a lot of high level overview, editorial opinion, or what ifs. What you will get is a lot of detail on how the players acted and how they did or didn't do their jobs. To quote Patrick Reardon's review of the book it's about, "arrogance, ineptitude, ambition, favoritism, pomposity, politicking, moral cowardice and flirtations with treason."
Sears does a good job of bringing the generals alive, and makes you wonder how the North managed to successfully prosecute the war, or even stay in it. It made me appreciate the difficulty of managing a staff, with a lot of politically appointed generals, many of which did little to advance the overall effort. In addition to inept generals, you have lost, delayed, misunderstood or just plain ignored orders, and a frightfully high rated of leaders killed or wounded on the battlefield. Few of the generals present at the start of the war were present at the end.
March 24, 2018
A lengthy (766 pages, plus notes) study of the high command (brigade on up) in the Army of the Potomac. As you might expect, McClellan and, to a lesser degree, Meade dominate the book. The author describes, in considerable detail, the behind the scenes shenanigans of Baldy Smith, Joe Hooker, Dan Sickles, and others. To say that the high command of the Army of the Potomac was dysfunctional prior to Gettysburg is an understatement. And some of those dysfunctional behaviors continued well into the Overland Campaign and the Siege of Petersburg.
This book may change your opinions of some generals. While Phil Kearney was an inspirational leader, his tactical abilities had their limits and his reckless personal behavior under fire eventually got him killed at Chantilly. The author takes a dim view of Oliver Otis Howard. His defeat at Pickett's Mill during the Atlanta Campaign (after the XI & XII Corps were transferred to Tennessee before Chattanooga) reinforces this opinion.
If you want to read a less lengthy history, you might want to check out the author's previous book, Controversies and Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac. But if you want to read an in-depth study of the high command of the Army of the Potomac, this is the book for you.
This book may change your opinions of some generals. While Phil Kearney was an inspirational leader, his tactical abilities had their limits and his reckless personal behavior under fire eventually got him killed at Chantilly. The author takes a dim view of Oliver Otis Howard. His defeat at Pickett's Mill during the Atlanta Campaign (after the XI & XII Corps were transferred to Tennessee before Chattanooga) reinforces this opinion.
If you want to read a less lengthy history, you might want to check out the author's previous book, Controversies and Commanders: Dispatches from the Army of the Potomac. But if you want to read an in-depth study of the high command of the Army of the Potomac, this is the book for you.
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