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The Fall of Carthage
The greatest conflict of antiquity, the struggle for supremacy between Rome and Carthage.
The struggle between Rome and Carthage in the Punic Wars was arguably the greatest and most desperate conflict of antiquity. The forces involved and the casualties suffered by both sides were far greater than in any wars fought before the modern era, while the eventual outcome had far-reaching consequences for the history of the Western World, namely the ascendancy of Rome. An epic of war and battle, this is also the story of famous generals and leaders: Hannibal, Fabius Maximus, Scipio Africanus, and his grandson Scipio Aemilianus, who would finally bring down the walls of Carthage.
The struggle between Rome and Carthage in the Punic Wars was arguably the greatest and most desperate conflict of antiquity. The forces involved and the casualties suffered by both sides were far greater than in any wars fought before the modern era, while the eventual outcome had far-reaching consequences for the history of the Western World, namely the ascendancy of Rome. An epic of war and battle, this is also the story of famous generals and leaders: Hannibal, Fabius Maximus, Scipio Africanus, and his grandson Scipio Aemilianus, who would finally bring down the walls of Carthage.
416 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 2000
About the author
Adrian Goldsworthy
41 books1,281 followersAdrian Goldsworthy, born in 1969, is the author of numerous acclaimed books, including biographies of Julius Caesar and Augustus. He lectures widely and consults on historical documentaries for the History Channel, National Geographic, and the BBC. He lives in the UK.
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November 28, 2017
The study of history is dead. That may seem an odd assertion, given that I am reviewing a very good work of history, Adrian Goldsworthy’s "The Punic Wars." But books like this are read by a tiny audience—hard to say how big, but I would be shocked if more than ten thousand people had read this book, and it is by a known author. As far as I can tell, nearly nobody in public life, whether in politics, the media, popular entertainment, big business, or even most of the academic world, knows anything about actual history.
Sure, most “educated” people generally know about Hitler. He was bad. And maybe they can distinguish, more or less, between World War I and World War II. Perhaps they know that Japan was involved in one of those, because it keeps getting brought up in the context of nuclear weapons. Those are bad too. There are exceptions—as a result of Lin-Manuel Miranda’s musical, many people know, for now, something about Alexander Hamilton. He was good (if you’re not a Jeffersonian). But there is so precious little discussion of real history in most people’s lives that even if they once learn the history of a particular era or event, they forget it, since the knowledge is never reinforced by any other reference to it. Goldsworthy’s Preface touches on this problem. “Until well into the twentieth century Greek and Latin language and literature lay at the heart of Western education, and the major events and personalities of the Graeco-Roman world, especially those described by one of the great ancient authors, were familiar and frequently alluded to in art and literature.” It is this frequent allusion that makes it possible for most people to absorb and use history. Without allusion and consequent reinforcement, reading history is just a way for those blessed with good memories (which does not include me) to win trivia competitions.
This loss of knowledge removes a central pillar from society. It is not like forgetting how to play canasta (a card game of the 1950s, of which I have only heard because my mother taught me how to play in the 1980s). Such ephemera are merely part of the constantly changing surface of a culture, which has little to say about the culture itself and each example of which is replaced by something else (video games, say, replacing canasta). History, or lack of history, is another thing entirely—it seems to me that you cannot run a society if its ruling class, and the educated classes more generally, no longer know or care to know any history. True enough, it does not matter if the lower classes know any history. Lack of the type of knowledge that characterizes the educated, ruling, classes is one reason why they’re the lower classes. But the study of history has always been deemed a matter of critical importance for the formation of those who dominate a society. Until now—or, perhaps, until 1975 or so, for reasons that appear complex, but certainly are related to the broad attack in the West on all social norms that gained traction around that date.
The historian Niall Ferguson, a popularizer like Goldsworthy (though more famous, more academically connected, and, not coincidentally, a tireless self-promoter), offered insights on this topic in 2016, when accepting an award from an academic organization. He noted that only a tiny fraction of American students (1.7%) major in history as undergraduates; and that the percentage has dropped by about 20% in just the past five years. And what they are studying has also precipitously declined in value. The problem is not just that the vast majority of courses offered at top schools are worthless on their face, except as amusement, such as Stanford’s “Madwomen: The History of Women and Mental Illness in the U.S.” The problem is, as Ferguson points out, that almost zero courses on actual history are offered at any college. A student, through his university, simply cannot acquire what would until recently have been regarded as the very basic elements of a history education. There is essentially nothing taught of American history, British history, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, or any similar topic—or even of the World Wars. All classes are mere fluff like Stanford’s class about crazy women, or wholly politicized offerings of pseudo-history, mostly focusing on oppression and emancipation (not the Proclamation—instead, putative emancipation of those supposedly oppressed today, an ever expanding group of embarkees on the ship of fools).
The very few substantive courses that are taught focus on extremely narrow areas (e.g., “the makeup of various Caribbean ethnic groups in the areas of Brooklyn that made up the West Indian Day Parade in the 1960s”), so that the subject matter fails to offer what the study of history is meant to offer, which is the ability to contrast and compare any given period, especially today, to other periods, earning lessons and insights. Or, as Ferguson cites R. G. Collingwood, “We study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called upon to act.” If we cannot see clearly, we cannot act competently. Looking around America for the past twenty years or so, I’m pretty sure there’s a tight correlation between ruling class failures and lack of historical knowledge. And I suspect that in China students destined for the ruling class still learn a lot of history, and hard-edged, substantive history at that. Failure to study history is not a winning strategy. This may not be our biggest ruling class problem we have today, but it’s not the smallest.
So, back to this book, or on to this book, since my monologue has had little to do with it so far! Until very recently, the Punic Wars (between Rome and Carthage, taking place between 265 and 146 B.C.) were regarded as offering critical historical insights. Naturally, as with all history, the Punic Wars offer illustrations and principles, not cut-and-paste solutions. But, for example, there are clear parallels between the restart of hostilities in the Second Punic War and the restart of hostilities in World War II. Goldsworthy does an excellent job of drawing out of his detailed, yet readable, history basic principles about the protagonists, especially the Romans. It is not that he applies those principles to today; he does not regard that as his job. But to know, to take what is perhaps the author’s most emphatic point, that the Romans were unique in their time and place in their approach to warfare, seeking decisive and permanent victories rather than negotiated peace, regardless of risk or cost, gives us insight into Rome’s later history, and offers us further insight into that attitude as a possible choice today.
For a ruling class, history does not have merely an instrumental purpose tied narrowly to foreign policy. Yes, if you’re Henry Kissinger, you care about history mostly because it informs your choices and the advice you give your masters. But history offers moral lessons for broader society—not just George Washington and the cherry tree, but George Washington and how he approached, and formed, the office of the Presidency. Or, in this book, how the consul Marcus Atilius Regulus was captured by the Carthaginians, and was released to negotiate peace, on oath to return to Carthage. He went to Rome and urged the citizens (peace treaties had to be approved by the Centuriate Assembly) to reject peace in favor of a war to the finish, which they did. And then he returned to Carthage, to be tortured to death, and also to be held up for two thousand years as a model of civic and personal virtue. Sure, maybe the story is made up or exaggerated. That’s not the point. The point is that moral lessons, of what to do, and of what not to do, come from historical actions of men and women as seen by us today. No history, no moral lessons, at least none with any punch or staying power.
As Goldsworthy notes, we know little about the Carthaginians. The Romans won decisively, and while they did not try to destroy Punic culture as such (that’s a modern innovation), just Punic power, in the natural course of things little historical memory remained. We are missing details for most of Roman history, and have lost most of the writings of Rome, so it is no surprise we have essentially no knowledge about Carthage, other than that gained by archaeology and that reported by their enemies. We do know that the Carthaginians engaged in evil practices, including massive amounts of infant sacrifice, by burning alive, and that “the proportion of sacrifices where a lamb or other animal was substituted for the child decreased rather than increased over the centuries.” The modern revisionist attempt to claim that child sacrifice was a myth has been crushed by archaeology (just like the myth that the Maya were peaceful flower contemplators, a myth I was taught as a child, although I suppose they still were by comparison with the ferociously bloodthirsty Aztecs). Maybe this was exaggerated by the Romans, or maybe not. But even on less controversial topics, such as Carthaginian political organization, we know little other than the broad outlines—which are not wholly dissimilar to Rome, in that Carthage had “a balanced constitution combining elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.”
What the Carthaginians did not have was an effective citizen military or, in general, competent military leaders (a fact masked by Hannibal being the only military leader we remember). The Romans had citizens who served in the field, along with reliable allies. When tens of thousands were killed, as at Cannae, they raised more legions from the citizenry (and by offering slaves freedom). The Carthaginians relied almost exclusively on mercenaries and on allies of highly dubious loyalty, such as the Numidians, with Punic citizens only fighting in desperate circumstances. To them, and most of the Hellenistic world by this time, war was a calculation, where money was spent to achieve goals, and where if you lost, a peace not to your advantage, but not crippling, would be signed. The Romans assigned senior magistrates as military leaders—not professional soldiers, but invariably men with military experience, unalterably loyal (like Regulus) to the State, but rarely punished for failure. The Carthaginians seem to have picked military chieftains based on the politics of the moment, who were often crucified if they failed. On balance, the Roman system worked a lot better—but the Carthaginians were rich enough and lucky enough to engage in more than a hundred years of war.
Goldsworthy begins with an overview of Rome and Carthage, in particular their political and military organizational structures (his knowledge of the Roman military and its practices over time is voluminous, and particularly on display in his later book, How Rome Fell). Here he introduces some of his common themes. He rejects the idea that, in any meaningful way, Roman politics was divided into political parties of the type with which we are familiar. Rather, extended family and patron/client groups were what mattered, and elections were often, or even usually, decided on the basis of the prestige and past deeds of a family, with the assumption that the current generation could be relied on to uphold and extend those past deeds. All politically active citizens of Rome, and all military leaders, were unswervingly loyal to the State—unlike in Carthage, the idea of a turncoat general was essentially unthinkable. The poor, with limited political power, were still active participants in and supporters of the State. And “even the most politically advanced ancient states went to war frequently and with enthusiasm, especially when they expected to win and eagerly anticipated the benefits victory would bring.”
For the rest of the book, Goldsworthy marches through the three successive Punic Wars. The First Punic War often gets short shrift; we have the least information about it and its conclusion was somewhat equivocal. The author tries to correct this by both offering a complete analysis and tying it to the later conflicts. This war, which like so many wars was mostly stumbled into as a result of pre-existing tensions and inherent conflicting aims, centered around Sicily, with extensive naval battles in the surrounding seas. These included what may have been the biggest naval battle in history, the Battle of Cape Ecnomus, where as many as 300,000 men may have fought, and the Romans used a new invention, the corvus, a boarding bridge mounted on a swivel, with a metal spike head. There was a little land fighting in Africa, but none of it decisive, and in 241 B.C. the war ended in Punic defeat, with the Carthaginians expelled from Sicily (most of which they had controlled) and paying a substantial indemnity to Rome.
Over the next few decades ill-will simmered, with the Romans unhappy that Carthage was not just not wholly subordinated, but clearly growing in wealth and power. Low-level conflicts occurred over places like Sardinia. In 218, this erupted into the Second Punic War, when Hannibal attacked a Roman client city in Spain (an area into which both the Romans and the Carthaginians were expanding). This is the war most of us think about when we think about the Punic Wars, involving Hannibal Barca (although every third Carthaginian seems to have been named Hannibal), elephants going over the Alps, the Battle of Cannae (probably the most disastrous Roman defeat of all time), the delaying tactics of Fabius, Scipio Africanus, and the eventual final defeat of the Carthaginians at the Battle of Zama, near Carthage. (I also learned that there was a battle in Italy at “Narnia,” and Wikipedia tells me “The imaginary land of Narnia, described in the works of C. S. Lewis, was named after the town of Narni [Narnia in Latin] after he came across the name in an atlas as a child.”) And, finally, it ended with the total defeat of Carthage and its reduction to a rump state under the domination of Rome.
Over the next fifty years Carthage stabilized and showed some signs of resurgence, as well as some signs of overly much independence of action and thought. It was this time period that Cato the Elder kept demanding “Carthago delenda est” (“Carthage must be destroyed”). Which it ultimately was, just because the Romans thought it would be a good idea, although sowing the site with salt is a later invention. This was the Third Punic War, which was more of a siege and destruction of Carthage than anything else, and the outcome was never in doubt (unlike the Second Punic War, which could easily have resulted in Rome’s destruction).
All this, of which I have only scratched the surface in my summary, makes fascinating reading. Many interesting lessons are contained within, both for today, and for tomorrow. To paraphrase Trotsky, you may not be interested in history, but history is interested in you, and reading books like this is invaluable in today’s uneducated world. Not to mention that, as the one-eyed man in the kingdom of the blind is king, the educated man in the uneducated world is more likely to be able to make himself king.
Sure, most “educated” people generally know about Hitler. He was bad. And maybe they can distinguish, more or less, between World War I and World War II. Perhaps they know that Japan was involved in one of those, because it keeps getting brought up in the context of nuclear weapons. Those are bad too. There are exceptions—as a result of Lin-Manuel Miranda’s musical, many people know, for now, something about Alexander Hamilton. He was good (if you’re not a Jeffersonian). But there is so precious little discussion of real history in most people’s lives that even if they once learn the history of a particular era or event, they forget it, since the knowledge is never reinforced by any other reference to it. Goldsworthy’s Preface touches on this problem. “Until well into the twentieth century Greek and Latin language and literature lay at the heart of Western education, and the major events and personalities of the Graeco-Roman world, especially those described by one of the great ancient authors, were familiar and frequently alluded to in art and literature.” It is this frequent allusion that makes it possible for most people to absorb and use history. Without allusion and consequent reinforcement, reading history is just a way for those blessed with good memories (which does not include me) to win trivia competitions.
This loss of knowledge removes a central pillar from society. It is not like forgetting how to play canasta (a card game of the 1950s, of which I have only heard because my mother taught me how to play in the 1980s). Such ephemera are merely part of the constantly changing surface of a culture, which has little to say about the culture itself and each example of which is replaced by something else (video games, say, replacing canasta). History, or lack of history, is another thing entirely—it seems to me that you cannot run a society if its ruling class, and the educated classes more generally, no longer know or care to know any history. True enough, it does not matter if the lower classes know any history. Lack of the type of knowledge that characterizes the educated, ruling, classes is one reason why they’re the lower classes. But the study of history has always been deemed a matter of critical importance for the formation of those who dominate a society. Until now—or, perhaps, until 1975 or so, for reasons that appear complex, but certainly are related to the broad attack in the West on all social norms that gained traction around that date.
The historian Niall Ferguson, a popularizer like Goldsworthy (though more famous, more academically connected, and, not coincidentally, a tireless self-promoter), offered insights on this topic in 2016, when accepting an award from an academic organization. He noted that only a tiny fraction of American students (1.7%) major in history as undergraduates; and that the percentage has dropped by about 20% in just the past five years. And what they are studying has also precipitously declined in value. The problem is not just that the vast majority of courses offered at top schools are worthless on their face, except as amusement, such as Stanford’s “Madwomen: The History of Women and Mental Illness in the U.S.” The problem is, as Ferguson points out, that almost zero courses on actual history are offered at any college. A student, through his university, simply cannot acquire what would until recently have been regarded as the very basic elements of a history education. There is essentially nothing taught of American history, British history, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, or any similar topic—or even of the World Wars. All classes are mere fluff like Stanford’s class about crazy women, or wholly politicized offerings of pseudo-history, mostly focusing on oppression and emancipation (not the Proclamation—instead, putative emancipation of those supposedly oppressed today, an ever expanding group of embarkees on the ship of fools).
The very few substantive courses that are taught focus on extremely narrow areas (e.g., “the makeup of various Caribbean ethnic groups in the areas of Brooklyn that made up the West Indian Day Parade in the 1960s”), so that the subject matter fails to offer what the study of history is meant to offer, which is the ability to contrast and compare any given period, especially today, to other periods, earning lessons and insights. Or, as Ferguson cites R. G. Collingwood, “We study history in order to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called upon to act.” If we cannot see clearly, we cannot act competently. Looking around America for the past twenty years or so, I’m pretty sure there’s a tight correlation between ruling class failures and lack of historical knowledge. And I suspect that in China students destined for the ruling class still learn a lot of history, and hard-edged, substantive history at that. Failure to study history is not a winning strategy. This may not be our biggest ruling class problem we have today, but it’s not the smallest.
So, back to this book, or on to this book, since my monologue has had little to do with it so far! Until very recently, the Punic Wars (between Rome and Carthage, taking place between 265 and 146 B.C.) were regarded as offering critical historical insights. Naturally, as with all history, the Punic Wars offer illustrations and principles, not cut-and-paste solutions. But, for example, there are clear parallels between the restart of hostilities in the Second Punic War and the restart of hostilities in World War II. Goldsworthy does an excellent job of drawing out of his detailed, yet readable, history basic principles about the protagonists, especially the Romans. It is not that he applies those principles to today; he does not regard that as his job. But to know, to take what is perhaps the author’s most emphatic point, that the Romans were unique in their time and place in their approach to warfare, seeking decisive and permanent victories rather than negotiated peace, regardless of risk or cost, gives us insight into Rome’s later history, and offers us further insight into that attitude as a possible choice today.
For a ruling class, history does not have merely an instrumental purpose tied narrowly to foreign policy. Yes, if you’re Henry Kissinger, you care about history mostly because it informs your choices and the advice you give your masters. But history offers moral lessons for broader society—not just George Washington and the cherry tree, but George Washington and how he approached, and formed, the office of the Presidency. Or, in this book, how the consul Marcus Atilius Regulus was captured by the Carthaginians, and was released to negotiate peace, on oath to return to Carthage. He went to Rome and urged the citizens (peace treaties had to be approved by the Centuriate Assembly) to reject peace in favor of a war to the finish, which they did. And then he returned to Carthage, to be tortured to death, and also to be held up for two thousand years as a model of civic and personal virtue. Sure, maybe the story is made up or exaggerated. That’s not the point. The point is that moral lessons, of what to do, and of what not to do, come from historical actions of men and women as seen by us today. No history, no moral lessons, at least none with any punch or staying power.
As Goldsworthy notes, we know little about the Carthaginians. The Romans won decisively, and while they did not try to destroy Punic culture as such (that’s a modern innovation), just Punic power, in the natural course of things little historical memory remained. We are missing details for most of Roman history, and have lost most of the writings of Rome, so it is no surprise we have essentially no knowledge about Carthage, other than that gained by archaeology and that reported by their enemies. We do know that the Carthaginians engaged in evil practices, including massive amounts of infant sacrifice, by burning alive, and that “the proportion of sacrifices where a lamb or other animal was substituted for the child decreased rather than increased over the centuries.” The modern revisionist attempt to claim that child sacrifice was a myth has been crushed by archaeology (just like the myth that the Maya were peaceful flower contemplators, a myth I was taught as a child, although I suppose they still were by comparison with the ferociously bloodthirsty Aztecs). Maybe this was exaggerated by the Romans, or maybe not. But even on less controversial topics, such as Carthaginian political organization, we know little other than the broad outlines—which are not wholly dissimilar to Rome, in that Carthage had “a balanced constitution combining elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.”
What the Carthaginians did not have was an effective citizen military or, in general, competent military leaders (a fact masked by Hannibal being the only military leader we remember). The Romans had citizens who served in the field, along with reliable allies. When tens of thousands were killed, as at Cannae, they raised more legions from the citizenry (and by offering slaves freedom). The Carthaginians relied almost exclusively on mercenaries and on allies of highly dubious loyalty, such as the Numidians, with Punic citizens only fighting in desperate circumstances. To them, and most of the Hellenistic world by this time, war was a calculation, where money was spent to achieve goals, and where if you lost, a peace not to your advantage, but not crippling, would be signed. The Romans assigned senior magistrates as military leaders—not professional soldiers, but invariably men with military experience, unalterably loyal (like Regulus) to the State, but rarely punished for failure. The Carthaginians seem to have picked military chieftains based on the politics of the moment, who were often crucified if they failed. On balance, the Roman system worked a lot better—but the Carthaginians were rich enough and lucky enough to engage in more than a hundred years of war.
Goldsworthy begins with an overview of Rome and Carthage, in particular their political and military organizational structures (his knowledge of the Roman military and its practices over time is voluminous, and particularly on display in his later book, How Rome Fell). Here he introduces some of his common themes. He rejects the idea that, in any meaningful way, Roman politics was divided into political parties of the type with which we are familiar. Rather, extended family and patron/client groups were what mattered, and elections were often, or even usually, decided on the basis of the prestige and past deeds of a family, with the assumption that the current generation could be relied on to uphold and extend those past deeds. All politically active citizens of Rome, and all military leaders, were unswervingly loyal to the State—unlike in Carthage, the idea of a turncoat general was essentially unthinkable. The poor, with limited political power, were still active participants in and supporters of the State. And “even the most politically advanced ancient states went to war frequently and with enthusiasm, especially when they expected to win and eagerly anticipated the benefits victory would bring.”
For the rest of the book, Goldsworthy marches through the three successive Punic Wars. The First Punic War often gets short shrift; we have the least information about it and its conclusion was somewhat equivocal. The author tries to correct this by both offering a complete analysis and tying it to the later conflicts. This war, which like so many wars was mostly stumbled into as a result of pre-existing tensions and inherent conflicting aims, centered around Sicily, with extensive naval battles in the surrounding seas. These included what may have been the biggest naval battle in history, the Battle of Cape Ecnomus, where as many as 300,000 men may have fought, and the Romans used a new invention, the corvus, a boarding bridge mounted on a swivel, with a metal spike head. There was a little land fighting in Africa, but none of it decisive, and in 241 B.C. the war ended in Punic defeat, with the Carthaginians expelled from Sicily (most of which they had controlled) and paying a substantial indemnity to Rome.
Over the next few decades ill-will simmered, with the Romans unhappy that Carthage was not just not wholly subordinated, but clearly growing in wealth and power. Low-level conflicts occurred over places like Sardinia. In 218, this erupted into the Second Punic War, when Hannibal attacked a Roman client city in Spain (an area into which both the Romans and the Carthaginians were expanding). This is the war most of us think about when we think about the Punic Wars, involving Hannibal Barca (although every third Carthaginian seems to have been named Hannibal), elephants going over the Alps, the Battle of Cannae (probably the most disastrous Roman defeat of all time), the delaying tactics of Fabius, Scipio Africanus, and the eventual final defeat of the Carthaginians at the Battle of Zama, near Carthage. (I also learned that there was a battle in Italy at “Narnia,” and Wikipedia tells me “The imaginary land of Narnia, described in the works of C. S. Lewis, was named after the town of Narni [Narnia in Latin] after he came across the name in an atlas as a child.”) And, finally, it ended with the total defeat of Carthage and its reduction to a rump state under the domination of Rome.
Over the next fifty years Carthage stabilized and showed some signs of resurgence, as well as some signs of overly much independence of action and thought. It was this time period that Cato the Elder kept demanding “Carthago delenda est” (“Carthage must be destroyed”). Which it ultimately was, just because the Romans thought it would be a good idea, although sowing the site with salt is a later invention. This was the Third Punic War, which was more of a siege and destruction of Carthage than anything else, and the outcome was never in doubt (unlike the Second Punic War, which could easily have resulted in Rome’s destruction).
All this, of which I have only scratched the surface in my summary, makes fascinating reading. Many interesting lessons are contained within, both for today, and for tomorrow. To paraphrase Trotsky, you may not be interested in history, but history is interested in you, and reading books like this is invaluable in today’s uneducated world. Not to mention that, as the one-eyed man in the kingdom of the blind is king, the educated man in the uneducated world is more likely to be able to make himself king.
March 25, 2019
This is about the Punic Wars (264BC –146BC) between Rome and Carthage. Much has been written about this epic ancient conflict. The result of the Punic Wars led to the ascendancy of Rome.
The book is well written and researched. Goldsworthy does write in an academic style of a historian, but is easily readable for a lay person like me. The author covers the three Punic Wars. (Punicus in Latin for Phoenician as Carthage was part of the old Phoenician Empire.) The book is strong on military history and techniques. Goldsworthy does a good job analyzing the cultural differences between Rome and Carthage. The author also explains about the Roman Army of the period and the Roman political system of the day. Goldsworthy does an excellent job explaining the factors that brought about the wars. I learned more about some key people of the time such as: Hannibal, Fabius Maximus and lastly Scipio Aemilianus. If you would like to know about the Punic Wars this book will provide a good understanding of the Wars. I enjoyed reading about the ancient history.
I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is sixteen hours and twenty-six minutes. The well-known British audiobook narrator Derek Perkins does an excellent job. Perkins has won the Audie Award and many Earphone Awards for audiobook narrations. He also narrates in the following languages: Russian, French and Welsh as well as in English.
The book is well written and researched. Goldsworthy does write in an academic style of a historian, but is easily readable for a lay person like me. The author covers the three Punic Wars. (Punicus in Latin for Phoenician as Carthage was part of the old Phoenician Empire.) The book is strong on military history and techniques. Goldsworthy does a good job analyzing the cultural differences between Rome and Carthage. The author also explains about the Roman Army of the period and the Roman political system of the day. Goldsworthy does an excellent job explaining the factors that brought about the wars. I learned more about some key people of the time such as: Hannibal, Fabius Maximus and lastly Scipio Aemilianus. If you would like to know about the Punic Wars this book will provide a good understanding of the Wars. I enjoyed reading about the ancient history.
I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is sixteen hours and twenty-six minutes. The well-known British audiobook narrator Derek Perkins does an excellent job. Perkins has won the Audie Award and many Earphone Awards for audiobook narrations. He also narrates in the following languages: Russian, French and Welsh as well as in English.
August 28, 2023
Una de las características más destacadas del libro es su enfoque profundo y detallado en los tres conflictos principales que marcaron el destino de la antigua ciudad de Cartago. Goldsworthy logra sumergir al lector en las Guerras Púnicas con una precisión que refleja una cuidadosa investigación basada en fuentes históricas y estudios recientes.
Lo que realmente resalta en esta obra, en mi opinión, es cómo aborda cada uno de los tres enfrentamientos entre Cartago y Roma con una perspectiva que toma en cuenta los poderíos muy distintos de los contendientes (bien traído el estudio del desarrollo de la marina Romana). A través de una narrativa bien fundamentada, el autor logra transmitir la evolución de estas guerras y cómo cambian las dinámicas entre las dos potencias a lo largo del tiempo; desde la inicial incertidumbre de la primera guerra hasta la aplastante superioridad de Roma con la lucha desesperada de Cartago por sobrevivir, Goldsworthy captura la esencia de cada conflicto con un nivel de detalle que da vida a la historia. Mención especial a que por fin alguien se centre también en el papel que los Siracusanos tuvieron en la primera y segunda guerra.
Otro punto muy interesante es cómo se destaca la dinámica única entre las visiones de los romanos y los cartagineses sobre el término de las guerras. Los romanos, resistentes y obstinados, nunca consideraban claudicar, lo que añade un matiz fascinante a su narrativa. En contraste, los cartagineses y otros pueblos con más mentalidad griega quienes a menudo veían las negociaciones como una posibilidad para poner fin a los conflictos.
El punto culminante llega en la tercera guerra, cuando Roma adopta una postura abusiva y confrontacional, buscando un conflicto que asegurara la aniquilación de su rival de una vez por todas. Goldsworthy explora esta faceta con profundidad, resaltando cómo Roma, a medida que crecía en poder y ambición, cambió su enfoque hacia una estrategia más agresiva y dominante.
En cuanto al aspecto militar, seremos testigos de cómo los diferentes ejércitos fueron evolucionando y cuán distintos podían llegar ser dependiendo de sus respectivos generales. Su entrenamiento, el cambio de tácticas entre una guerra y otra (detalle muy curioso la ausencia de exploradores en el primer conflicto...) es algo que merece unas páginas que muy pocas veces se refleja en su conjunto.
En resumen, "La Caída de Cartago" de Adrian Goldsworthy es un estudio que hay que leer si te gusta este período crucial en la historia. Me ha gustado mucho y creo que merece la pena dedicarle una lectura, sin embargo, como solemos decir, "quien mucho abarca, poco aprieta" y aquí he echado de menos más detalle e la investigación profunda a que nos tenía acostumbrados en otras obras como la de César o la de Augusto.
Lo que realmente resalta en esta obra, en mi opinión, es cómo aborda cada uno de los tres enfrentamientos entre Cartago y Roma con una perspectiva que toma en cuenta los poderíos muy distintos de los contendientes (bien traído el estudio del desarrollo de la marina Romana). A través de una narrativa bien fundamentada, el autor logra transmitir la evolución de estas guerras y cómo cambian las dinámicas entre las dos potencias a lo largo del tiempo; desde la inicial incertidumbre de la primera guerra hasta la aplastante superioridad de Roma con la lucha desesperada de Cartago por sobrevivir, Goldsworthy captura la esencia de cada conflicto con un nivel de detalle que da vida a la historia. Mención especial a que por fin alguien se centre también en el papel que los Siracusanos tuvieron en la primera y segunda guerra.
Otro punto muy interesante es cómo se destaca la dinámica única entre las visiones de los romanos y los cartagineses sobre el término de las guerras. Los romanos, resistentes y obstinados, nunca consideraban claudicar, lo que añade un matiz fascinante a su narrativa. En contraste, los cartagineses y otros pueblos con más mentalidad griega quienes a menudo veían las negociaciones como una posibilidad para poner fin a los conflictos.
El punto culminante llega en la tercera guerra, cuando Roma adopta una postura abusiva y confrontacional, buscando un conflicto que asegurara la aniquilación de su rival de una vez por todas. Goldsworthy explora esta faceta con profundidad, resaltando cómo Roma, a medida que crecía en poder y ambición, cambió su enfoque hacia una estrategia más agresiva y dominante.
En cuanto al aspecto militar, seremos testigos de cómo los diferentes ejércitos fueron evolucionando y cuán distintos podían llegar ser dependiendo de sus respectivos generales. Su entrenamiento, el cambio de tácticas entre una guerra y otra (detalle muy curioso la ausencia de exploradores en el primer conflicto...) es algo que merece unas páginas que muy pocas veces se refleja en su conjunto.
En resumen, "La Caída de Cartago" de Adrian Goldsworthy es un estudio que hay que leer si te gusta este período crucial en la historia. Me ha gustado mucho y creo que merece la pena dedicarle una lectura, sin embargo, como solemos decir, "quien mucho abarca, poco aprieta" y aquí he echado de menos más detalle e la investigación profunda a que nos tenía acostumbrados en otras obras como la de César o la de Augusto.
March 1, 2014
The Fall of Carthage is a very readable account of the three Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage. The Second War takes up most of the narrative, as it was the most dramatic and bloody episode, but the other episodes are also given their due according to their relevance. Sources are limited of course, and all from the Roman or sometimes Greek perspective, but overall this is a very accessible book on the conflict for supremacy in the ancient Western Mediterranean.
The Punic Wars and Ancient History in general are not well known by the general public these days, but even those with only a slight interest will immediately mention Hannibal crossing the Alps with elephants (though someone in my personal circle keeps thinking Hannibal crossed the Bosporus – I assume it’s a false association he just can’t shake). There is something legendary and almost mythical about history that old, and events on such a scale. There is spectacle, and the rise of Rome as the main power of the Mediterranean – something which was not a given at the time, although it may seem only natural to us. There is lots and lots of blood, and some anecdotes which were to become the staple for histories of the ancient world, like Appius Claudius throwing the ‘holy chickens’ in the sea to drink since they refused to eat the grain reserved for the ritual to ascertain divine favour for the coming battle (a battle which was of course lost), the Roman ambassador giving Carthage a choice of letting slip either war or peace from the folds of his toga, Hannibal managing to pass Fabius Maximus’ army in the passes of the Apennines by stampeding a herd of oxen at night and following up on them, the Carthaginian senate showered with golden senators’ rings taken from the dead of Cannae, Rome refusing to treat with Hannibal after said tremendous defeat, Cato with his ceterum censeo, Carthaginem esse delendam and dropping ‘Carthaginian’ figs from his toga (again the toga), and Scipio Aemilianus crying at the destruction of Carthage.
Goldsworthy analyzes and discusses the reasons for the conflict, the sources, and the events that took place to shape the narrative. The author is well known for his books on the Roman army, so he’s right at home here. He has a strong grasp of the sources, and takes the time to point out why X or Y is to be preferred without bogging the narrative down in academic detail. One does note, however, that although Goldsworthy warns us that Livius (as a traditionalist and moral critic) and especially Polybius (in favouring the Scipiones and Aemiliani because he was a member of Scipio Aemilianus’ inner circle) are not always reliable, he still paints a very rosy picture of Scipio Aemilianus in the Third War. Perhaps he just wanted to finish, or he simply chose to go with the sources we have, as there are no Punic sources left (and nothing to replace the unreliable ones with). Maybe a minor fault, but it made the part about the Third War read a bit like a cheap novel. Alternatively, Scipio Aemilianus could have been a Roman Superman – he certainly was a better politician that Scipio Africanus, who had trouble getting by in the Roman senate after his successes as a general.
Sectioning in the book in three parts (one for each installment of the war) makes sense, because the three wars were very different. The First War was centered around the fight for Sicily, with only a few battles on land, including a short and unsuccessful Roman excursion into Northern Africa and a number of naval battles. Control of Sicily was all that was at stake. The Second War was a war for control of the Western Mediterranean, with battlegrounds in Spain, Italy, Africa and even Greece and the Balkans. This was a war for dominance, and for survival. The Third War however was the result of Roman unease about an enemy not meek enough and plain opportunity.
Goldsworthy does a good job of pointing out how we should interpret what actually happened, and gives a strong analysis of especially the Roman strengths and weaknesses (the Punic ones are far harder to grasp, again because Carthage was utterly destroyed and there are no Punic sources left). Where there are gaps in our sources or narrative, Goldsworthy tells us what he thinks is most likely to be what happened, giving his reasons for us to consider for ourselves. He also keeps from imagining about the more prosaic, or romantic aspects that earlier historians have inserted, and warns us when all we have is Roman propaganda. All in all I think this is a great read, both for those unfamiliar with the subject who want to learn, and those who are familiar and want a good modern approach of a monumental topic of the Ancient world.
The Punic Wars and Ancient History in general are not well known by the general public these days, but even those with only a slight interest will immediately mention Hannibal crossing the Alps with elephants (though someone in my personal circle keeps thinking Hannibal crossed the Bosporus – I assume it’s a false association he just can’t shake). There is something legendary and almost mythical about history that old, and events on such a scale. There is spectacle, and the rise of Rome as the main power of the Mediterranean – something which was not a given at the time, although it may seem only natural to us. There is lots and lots of blood, and some anecdotes which were to become the staple for histories of the ancient world, like Appius Claudius throwing the ‘holy chickens’ in the sea to drink since they refused to eat the grain reserved for the ritual to ascertain divine favour for the coming battle (a battle which was of course lost), the Roman ambassador giving Carthage a choice of letting slip either war or peace from the folds of his toga, Hannibal managing to pass Fabius Maximus’ army in the passes of the Apennines by stampeding a herd of oxen at night and following up on them, the Carthaginian senate showered with golden senators’ rings taken from the dead of Cannae, Rome refusing to treat with Hannibal after said tremendous defeat, Cato with his ceterum censeo, Carthaginem esse delendam and dropping ‘Carthaginian’ figs from his toga (again the toga), and Scipio Aemilianus crying at the destruction of Carthage.
Goldsworthy analyzes and discusses the reasons for the conflict, the sources, and the events that took place to shape the narrative. The author is well known for his books on the Roman army, so he’s right at home here. He has a strong grasp of the sources, and takes the time to point out why X or Y is to be preferred without bogging the narrative down in academic detail. One does note, however, that although Goldsworthy warns us that Livius (as a traditionalist and moral critic) and especially Polybius (in favouring the Scipiones and Aemiliani because he was a member of Scipio Aemilianus’ inner circle) are not always reliable, he still paints a very rosy picture of Scipio Aemilianus in the Third War. Perhaps he just wanted to finish, or he simply chose to go with the sources we have, as there are no Punic sources left (and nothing to replace the unreliable ones with). Maybe a minor fault, but it made the part about the Third War read a bit like a cheap novel. Alternatively, Scipio Aemilianus could have been a Roman Superman – he certainly was a better politician that Scipio Africanus, who had trouble getting by in the Roman senate after his successes as a general.
Sectioning in the book in three parts (one for each installment of the war) makes sense, because the three wars were very different. The First War was centered around the fight for Sicily, with only a few battles on land, including a short and unsuccessful Roman excursion into Northern Africa and a number of naval battles. Control of Sicily was all that was at stake. The Second War was a war for control of the Western Mediterranean, with battlegrounds in Spain, Italy, Africa and even Greece and the Balkans. This was a war for dominance, and for survival. The Third War however was the result of Roman unease about an enemy not meek enough and plain opportunity.
Goldsworthy does a good job of pointing out how we should interpret what actually happened, and gives a strong analysis of especially the Roman strengths and weaknesses (the Punic ones are far harder to grasp, again because Carthage was utterly destroyed and there are no Punic sources left). Where there are gaps in our sources or narrative, Goldsworthy tells us what he thinks is most likely to be what happened, giving his reasons for us to consider for ourselves. He also keeps from imagining about the more prosaic, or romantic aspects that earlier historians have inserted, and warns us when all we have is Roman propaganda. All in all I think this is a great read, both for those unfamiliar with the subject who want to learn, and those who are familiar and want a good modern approach of a monumental topic of the Ancient world.
May 26, 2012
Carthage Must be Destroyed those most famous words were spoken by Marcus Porcius Cato in the 2nd Century BC. In this new book on the Punic Wars by Adrian Goldsworthy we are taken back into this most fascinating period of history. We follow in the steps of Hannibal, Hasdrubal, Hamilcar, Scipio Africanus and many more famous and infamous commanders and leaders as the Roman Legions and the soldiers and sailors of Carthage clash in this gigantic struggle of the Ancient World.
Each of the three wars are described in as much detail as possible bearing in mind the lack of primary sources for some periods. We follow the stalemate in Sicily during the First Punic War (264-241 BC). Then the more famous struggle in Spain and Italy during the Second Punic War (218-202 BC), followed by the final Roman victory in the Third Punic War (149-146 BC).
The author provides details of all the famous battles, Trebia, Lake Trasimene, Cannae and of course Zama. He also follows the lesser-known campaigns in Spain, Macedonia and Sicily. I found the author to be very fair in his assessment of the commanders and their decisions and offers comments on the sources used in his book and others.
I would compare this book favourably with Nigel Bagnall's 'Punic Wars' and both books sit proudly in my library. The author took the time to explain the military traditions, training and tactics of the two opponents, which assisted greatly when it came to follow the battles. 16 maps are provided to assist in the narrative and all where of a decent standard however, no illustrations were to be found in the book.
The book was easy to read and the narrative flowed along faultlessly. Overall this is a very decent one-volume account of the Punic Wars and I would recommend it to anyone who enjoys decent history or who has a love for this period.
Each of the three wars are described in as much detail as possible bearing in mind the lack of primary sources for some periods. We follow the stalemate in Sicily during the First Punic War (264-241 BC). Then the more famous struggle in Spain and Italy during the Second Punic War (218-202 BC), followed by the final Roman victory in the Third Punic War (149-146 BC).
The author provides details of all the famous battles, Trebia, Lake Trasimene, Cannae and of course Zama. He also follows the lesser-known campaigns in Spain, Macedonia and Sicily. I found the author to be very fair in his assessment of the commanders and their decisions and offers comments on the sources used in his book and others.
I would compare this book favourably with Nigel Bagnall's 'Punic Wars' and both books sit proudly in my library. The author took the time to explain the military traditions, training and tactics of the two opponents, which assisted greatly when it came to follow the battles. 16 maps are provided to assist in the narrative and all where of a decent standard however, no illustrations were to be found in the book.
The book was easy to read and the narrative flowed along faultlessly. Overall this is a very decent one-volume account of the Punic Wars and I would recommend it to anyone who enjoys decent history or who has a love for this period.
July 23, 2023
🏺 Excellent account of the many wars between Carthage and the fledgling Roman Republic. I always cheer for Carthage, Hannibal and the fighting elephants 🐘
⚔️ No matter how far in the past ancient history is, it always maintains its connections with our present day world 🛡️
⚔️ No matter how far in the past ancient history is, it always maintains its connections with our present day world 🛡️
Read
September 26, 2022A really fascinating and well laid out analysis and commentary on the Three Punic Wars between the great powers of Rome rising to its prime, and the gradual downfall of Carthage. Really interesting non-fiction which Adrian Goldsworthy clearly depicts what we know and what is conjecture.
September 21, 2018
Goldsworthy wisely uses the Osprey technique of reviewing the opposing forces before he tackles the narrative of the Punic Wars. The First war and its unresolved consequences gets adequate coverage. The Second war inevitably forms the bulk, which is not a bad thing; the bibliography caters to the needs of every other focus of interest. Hannibal disappears into the background a year after Cannae, tough. The Third war comes off as a bit rushed.
Goldsworthy switches perspectives effortlessly. He can place you in the heat of battle one moment & show how the events in Sicily, Spain & Italy interact the next. He does a fine job of offering different plausible theses where the ancient sources stay silent. Unfortunately, sometimes our knowledge is simply too sketchy; he admits as much regarding the Carthaginian side of the story. The book could've used more maps ànd a synopsis of the discussion on Hannibal's route through the Alps. Too many authors skip it.
Goldsworthy switches perspectives effortlessly. He can place you in the heat of battle one moment & show how the events in Sicily, Spain & Italy interact the next. He does a fine job of offering different plausible theses where the ancient sources stay silent. Unfortunately, sometimes our knowledge is simply too sketchy; he admits as much regarding the Carthaginian side of the story. The book could've used more maps ànd a synopsis of the discussion on Hannibal's route through the Alps. Too many authors skip it.
October 28, 2019
The Punic Wars by Adrian Goldsworthy, is a fantastic look at the Punic Wars - three wars between the City States turned Empires from the mid 200 BC to the mid 100's BC. This conflict was fought between the states of Carthage and Rome, two powerful states in this period. Carthage was a maritime states in modern Tunisia that controlled large portions of the North African coast, and had colonies in Spain, Sicily and Sardinia. Rome was a land based power at the time that had conquered or subordinated most of mainland Italy.
The two powers first clashed over Sicily due to a conflict between mercenary groups in the independent despot of Syracuse. Rome and Carthage sided with opposing groups, although the conflict swiftly became a conflagration of shifting alliances, as Carthage's original ally - Syracuse, switched sides due to long term mutual hostility. Carthage had been extending its control over Sicily's Greek city states, much to the resentment of Syracuse, the local power. Rome, as a new actor on the island, was seen as more trustworthy at the time. This war saw overwhelming Punic naval superiority at the beginning of the conflict, ensuring Rome built up a large navy at great expense, eventually turning the tide. Rome defeated Carthage in this war, seizing Punic possessions in Sicily. Furthermore, after the end of the First Punic War, the Carthaginian state entered a period of internal turmoil due to a rebellion from recently returned mercenary armies. This Mercenary War occupied Carthage, and allowed Rome to take advantage of a similar rebellion in Sardinia to seize the island - breaking the spirit of the peace agreement. The differences between the two sides are marked: Carthage utilized large contingents of mercenaries from Celtic and Gaulic tribes who shared a mutual hostility with Rome. They also made use of soldiers from their colonies and subordinate possessions. Numidian cavalry, Libyan foot soldiers, Balearic slingers, and tribal forces made up the bulk of Carthaginian forces. Carthaginian citizens rarely participated in battle in the first two wars, except as ready soldiers when Carthage or the homeland in North Africa was threatened. The first war was also fought mainly outside both Roman and Carthaginian home territory, except for a brief invasion attempt into North Africa by a consular army from Rome - which was decisively defeated. This war was largely a confrontation between two relatively equal colonial powers looking to expand their dominion over more of the Mediterranean.
The Second Punic war is the most famous of the two. It contains the two legendary generals - Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, who led massive campaigns and innovated warfare in the ancient world. Hannibal was a fantastic general; skilled at logistics, pitched battle maneuvers, crafty strategy, and long campaigns. His victorious army, made up mostly of Spanish, Libyan, Gaul and Numidian soldiers from Carthaginian colonies, was undefeated in Italy. His strategy was bold; raise a large army from his base in Spain, and travel over two mountain ranges to reach the Italian heartland. Hannibal believed that only by defeating Rome at home, and ensuring its alliance system in Italy fell apart, would Carthage be able to force a peace. Hannibal's strategy was largely successful for many years. He defeated multiple armies in pitched battles, depleting the ranks of Roman senators and elites by such a huge margin, that the political traditions of Rome had to be altered to ensure political positions were filled. He sacked many cities, and burned the Italian countryside - especially in the south - embarrassing Rome, and showing her allies that Rome could not always guarantee their protection. Many Roman allies, including Syracuse in Sicily, and Capua in Italy, would defect. Even by remaining undefeated in Italy, and running a campaign that lasted over a decade and created a veteran and skilled fighting force, Hannibal could not succeed. The manpower, determination, and traditions of Rome were successful enough to ensure a war of attrition benefited the Romans.
Rome held its own for a few reasons. The first, Goldsworthy posits, was from its relatively mobile social traditions (for the time). Rome had both powerful aristocrats and novus homo - new men - who often stepped in when the ranks were thinned. In Rome during the war, no faction emerged that pushed for detente or capitulation, as all were invested in the survival of the Roman state. Even Roman allies - although many defected, remained staunchly loyal. Cities like Naples, Marseilles and more never wavered in their alliance. Rome at this time also had naval superiority over Carthage, ensuring that Hannibal's forces in Italy were difficult to resupply, and had to rely on foraging and mobility for survival. Rome's military organization was also superior in a few ways. It used citizen soldiers to fill the ranks, and steadily lowered the requirements to join after the repeated defeats at Cannae and the like. This helped solidify a veteran and professional standing army with common cultural and political identity - something the varying nationalities in the Punic armies lacked. Rome, backed into a corner, kept fighting for a decade and more, even after horrifying losses. Carthage, on the other hand, lacked the solid identity that Rome had, and its citizens did not participate directly in the war until Scipio's soldiers were at the gates of Carthage.
The war ended after Roman forces had taken Carthage's colonies in Spain, and landed soldiers in Africa, defeating Hannibal's hastily returned army - his only loss in the war. Carthage capitulated, and gave up its provinces in Spain. Rome also defeated Carthage's ally of convenience - Macedonia, during this war. Carthage lost its Imperial status, and became a subordinate ally to Rome - a situation that would last in some form for 50 years, until 150 BC when the Roman Senate decided to finish them off in the Third Punic War. Although a tough slog, this war was not the large conflict that the Second had been. Rome ended up defeating Carthage and annexing its remaining African territory. Similar events happened to the Macedonian Kingdom, which after four wars in this period was finally turned into Roman provinces. The Punic Wars were a major event that turned Rome from a regional into a world power, and was the beginning of its eventual conquest of much of Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. If Rome had lost these wars, much would be different. Many of the worlds languages are Latin based, our Western law codes are based on Roman law, and our philosophy often of the Greco-Roman tradition.
Goldsworthy has written an excellent, bite sized history of the Punic Wars. Well researched and considering multiple sources, as well as discounting bias from both ancient and modern scholars, Goldsworthy maintains as one of my favourite Roman historians of the modern world. This book is interesting, easy to read and comprehend, and contains a wealth of information on the subject, from military formation and strategy, to the politics, historiography, social and economic aspects of the conflict. Goldsworthy does a great job avoiding using modern logic to try and determine the motivations of many of the players in this conflict; even our ancient sources that were more contemporary have clear bias and the logic of why tings were done should be taken with a grain of salt. The important bits are the results of events, and the impact they had on the world at the time. A fascinating book, and very enjoyable read. Easily recommended for those looking for a solid read on the Romans.
The two powers first clashed over Sicily due to a conflict between mercenary groups in the independent despot of Syracuse. Rome and Carthage sided with opposing groups, although the conflict swiftly became a conflagration of shifting alliances, as Carthage's original ally - Syracuse, switched sides due to long term mutual hostility. Carthage had been extending its control over Sicily's Greek city states, much to the resentment of Syracuse, the local power. Rome, as a new actor on the island, was seen as more trustworthy at the time. This war saw overwhelming Punic naval superiority at the beginning of the conflict, ensuring Rome built up a large navy at great expense, eventually turning the tide. Rome defeated Carthage in this war, seizing Punic possessions in Sicily. Furthermore, after the end of the First Punic War, the Carthaginian state entered a period of internal turmoil due to a rebellion from recently returned mercenary armies. This Mercenary War occupied Carthage, and allowed Rome to take advantage of a similar rebellion in Sardinia to seize the island - breaking the spirit of the peace agreement. The differences between the two sides are marked: Carthage utilized large contingents of mercenaries from Celtic and Gaulic tribes who shared a mutual hostility with Rome. They also made use of soldiers from their colonies and subordinate possessions. Numidian cavalry, Libyan foot soldiers, Balearic slingers, and tribal forces made up the bulk of Carthaginian forces. Carthaginian citizens rarely participated in battle in the first two wars, except as ready soldiers when Carthage or the homeland in North Africa was threatened. The first war was also fought mainly outside both Roman and Carthaginian home territory, except for a brief invasion attempt into North Africa by a consular army from Rome - which was decisively defeated. This war was largely a confrontation between two relatively equal colonial powers looking to expand their dominion over more of the Mediterranean.
The Second Punic war is the most famous of the two. It contains the two legendary generals - Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, who led massive campaigns and innovated warfare in the ancient world. Hannibal was a fantastic general; skilled at logistics, pitched battle maneuvers, crafty strategy, and long campaigns. His victorious army, made up mostly of Spanish, Libyan, Gaul and Numidian soldiers from Carthaginian colonies, was undefeated in Italy. His strategy was bold; raise a large army from his base in Spain, and travel over two mountain ranges to reach the Italian heartland. Hannibal believed that only by defeating Rome at home, and ensuring its alliance system in Italy fell apart, would Carthage be able to force a peace. Hannibal's strategy was largely successful for many years. He defeated multiple armies in pitched battles, depleting the ranks of Roman senators and elites by such a huge margin, that the political traditions of Rome had to be altered to ensure political positions were filled. He sacked many cities, and burned the Italian countryside - especially in the south - embarrassing Rome, and showing her allies that Rome could not always guarantee their protection. Many Roman allies, including Syracuse in Sicily, and Capua in Italy, would defect. Even by remaining undefeated in Italy, and running a campaign that lasted over a decade and created a veteran and skilled fighting force, Hannibal could not succeed. The manpower, determination, and traditions of Rome were successful enough to ensure a war of attrition benefited the Romans.
Rome held its own for a few reasons. The first, Goldsworthy posits, was from its relatively mobile social traditions (for the time). Rome had both powerful aristocrats and novus homo - new men - who often stepped in when the ranks were thinned. In Rome during the war, no faction emerged that pushed for detente or capitulation, as all were invested in the survival of the Roman state. Even Roman allies - although many defected, remained staunchly loyal. Cities like Naples, Marseilles and more never wavered in their alliance. Rome at this time also had naval superiority over Carthage, ensuring that Hannibal's forces in Italy were difficult to resupply, and had to rely on foraging and mobility for survival. Rome's military organization was also superior in a few ways. It used citizen soldiers to fill the ranks, and steadily lowered the requirements to join after the repeated defeats at Cannae and the like. This helped solidify a veteran and professional standing army with common cultural and political identity - something the varying nationalities in the Punic armies lacked. Rome, backed into a corner, kept fighting for a decade and more, even after horrifying losses. Carthage, on the other hand, lacked the solid identity that Rome had, and its citizens did not participate directly in the war until Scipio's soldiers were at the gates of Carthage.
The war ended after Roman forces had taken Carthage's colonies in Spain, and landed soldiers in Africa, defeating Hannibal's hastily returned army - his only loss in the war. Carthage capitulated, and gave up its provinces in Spain. Rome also defeated Carthage's ally of convenience - Macedonia, during this war. Carthage lost its Imperial status, and became a subordinate ally to Rome - a situation that would last in some form for 50 years, until 150 BC when the Roman Senate decided to finish them off in the Third Punic War. Although a tough slog, this war was not the large conflict that the Second had been. Rome ended up defeating Carthage and annexing its remaining African territory. Similar events happened to the Macedonian Kingdom, which after four wars in this period was finally turned into Roman provinces. The Punic Wars were a major event that turned Rome from a regional into a world power, and was the beginning of its eventual conquest of much of Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. If Rome had lost these wars, much would be different. Many of the worlds languages are Latin based, our Western law codes are based on Roman law, and our philosophy often of the Greco-Roman tradition.
Goldsworthy has written an excellent, bite sized history of the Punic Wars. Well researched and considering multiple sources, as well as discounting bias from both ancient and modern scholars, Goldsworthy maintains as one of my favourite Roman historians of the modern world. This book is interesting, easy to read and comprehend, and contains a wealth of information on the subject, from military formation and strategy, to the politics, historiography, social and economic aspects of the conflict. Goldsworthy does a great job avoiding using modern logic to try and determine the motivations of many of the players in this conflict; even our ancient sources that were more contemporary have clear bias and the logic of why tings were done should be taken with a grain of salt. The important bits are the results of events, and the impact they had on the world at the time. A fascinating book, and very enjoyable read. Easily recommended for those looking for a solid read on the Romans.
January 21, 2009
Reading The Punic Wars, I was reminded of Rick Atkinson’s An Army at Dawn, which I had read just prior to this book. Both are largely straightforward and well written accounts of epochal wars and both have to do with campaigns in North Africa and Italy (if one were to stretch the comparison to include Atkinson’s Day of Battle, his account of the Allied invasion of Italy). The only reservation I have against the current book (at least the edition I read) is not one of content but of editing – there are far too many easily caught typos, at least two instances where battle sites are confused (the one I noted because I was near pen and paper at the time was confusing Cannae with Zama), and they misspell the North African city of Hadrumetum as “Hadrumentum.”
The Punic Wars were a series of conflicts between the rising state of Rome and the dominant power of the Western Mediterranean, the Phoenician city of Carthage. It comprised three officially declared wars and lasted from 264-146 BC. Naturally enough, Goldsworthy divides the book into three parts corresponding to the three wars, and I will follow suit in this review.
First though, as in all histories of the Ancient World, a note on sources – or, better, their lack. We truly have only a handful of sources, and the closest in time to the periods under discussion (Polybius) breaks off at Cannae and only survives in fragments thereafter. Beyond that all surviving sources are Roman or pro-Roman (though we know of at least two histories written by Greeks who traveled with Hannibal). Unfortunately, archaeology is of little help since the politics of the period, the organization of armies, the economies, and all that other interesting stuff is not preserved in the rock strata. Despite these handicaps, Prof. Goldsworthy does an admirable job of synthesizing what we can know and reasonably speculating about what we can’t.
1st Punic War (264-241)
The first war happened almost by accident; there’s little evidence that Carthage and Rome’s relations were particularly hostile prior to 264. Nevertheless, both sides found themselves drawn into a direct confrontation over the disposition of Sicily. Goldsworthy argues that the escalation was largely the result of the nature of Roman politics. (pp. 74-5) Consuls served for only one year and, before these wars, pro-magistracies (extensions of authority beyond the stipulated term) were rare. Thus to win glory and honor, magistrates were compelled to move quickly, and the consuls for 264, Claudius Caudex and Fulvius Flaccus, saw opportunities in Sicily. I won’t begin to narrate the course of the first war but what emerges from Goldsworthy’s account are two distinct differences between the foes, which proved decisive in all three wars. The first was the nature of the armies involved. The Carthaginians relied almost entirely on mercenaries, primarily Spanish, Numidian and Libyan. In fact, it’s only the final army that faced Rome in the third war where a sizable Punic contingent is noted. While individual units may have been well-trained and led, the armies as a whole were composites where communication between units was difficult and coordination awkward. One of the factors in Hannibal’s success in the second war was that he managed to forge a unified fighting force but only after years of preparatory warfare in Spain. In contrast, the force he led at Zama had only been marshaled recently, lacking the esprit de corps that his Italian army enjoyed.
Roman armies, on the other hand, though made up of citizen conscripts and allies, were far more homogeneous and spoke related languages so communication was easier. Beyond that, they were highly trained to work together.
The second factor that ultimately led to Rome’s success was how both sides viewed war. Carthage’s view was the quintessential Hellenistic one – wars were fought between rival states to secure advantages. They often boiled down to a single, decisive battle (after much maneuvering), and the subsequent peace treaty left both sides intact and didn’t change the nature of their relationship. For Rome, though, war was “total.” The only conceivable outcome was unconditional victory for Rome (the enemy being destroyed or reduced to dependency) or her utter defeat. The idea of a “negotiated settlement” between equals was foreign to Roman ideas of diplomacy. Thus, what was a standard, Hellenistic style war to the Carthaginians was an existential threat to the Romans. The difference is clear in Rome’s response to defeat in battle – They lose a fleet? They rebuild it! They lose 50,000 men at Cannae? They recruit younger and older men and reconstitute the legions! Hannibal appears before the walls of Rome? They have a land sale, which includes the ground he camps on!
The first war was fought and won at sea. From a solely land-based Italian power in 264, Rome became a formidable naval one by 241 and dictated harsh terms to the Carthaginians. Rome was still not powerful enough and its political constitution and military organization not flexible enough to fully exploit its new found dominance. Despite Carthage’s defeat, it remained a power to be reckoned with. Though it was forced to abandon its designs in Sicily, Carthage immediately began to exploit opportunities in Spain.
The Second Punic War (218-201)
The second war is one of the relatively best documented periods in ancient history. Hannibal was the “devil” of Roman nightmares and Scipio Africanus, who defeats him at Zama, one of Rome’s greatest generals. Hannibal started it deliberately when he marched out of Spain, across modern-day Provence and down into Italy, where he terrorized Rome and her allies for the next sixteen years. (Even at the end, cornered in Italy’s boot heel, no Roman general relished confronting him so they sent legions to invade Africa instead.)
Unfortunately for Hannibal’s efforts, Carthage was still fighting a Hellenistic war and he received almost no support from the city and, despite a potentially powerful fleet, there was never any serious attempt to contest Rome’s mastery of the seas. With any other state any of Hannibal’s three great battles – Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae – would have brought both sides to the negotiating table. Instead, Rome dug in her heels, raised more legions and avoided engaging Hannibal in battle. As Goldsworthy points out, forcing unwilling armies to fight was extremely difficult. Most battles were fought between commanders who felt they enjoyed the upper hand and wanted to do so. Absent this attitude, most wars settled into maneuvering to control towns, disrupt supply lines, and win allies. All conditions which favored Rome. Adding to the Punic general’s woes and critical to his eventual failure in Italy was the political situation among the city-states that defected to his side. Though anti-Roman, they weren’t necessarily pro-Carthaginian and they proved unable to work together (indeed, freed from Rome’s oversight, some went to war with each other).
More so than the first, the second war fundamentally changed Roman society and set it firmly on the path to empire. Among other things, I’ll mention two notable developments. First, the army evolved into a highly professional organization. Under Scipio, it achieved miracles that would have been unthinkable in the first war and at the start of the second, and impossible in the Carthaginian ranks. Second, the heavy losses amongst the ranks of the Roman elite changed the makeup of the legions – unpropertied and poorer men in the ranks (at the lowest ebb, even slaves) and the promotion of middle-ranking citizens to the senatorial class. That, combined with the increasing custom of multiple magistracies and pro-magistracies, sowed the seeds that would bring down the Republic 150 years later.
The Third Punic War (149-146)
The third war was almost an afterthought. As a political power and threat to Rome, Carthage was impotent. So why the war? Goldsworthy argues that Rome “needed” the war because her position in the Mediterranean was slipping. It had been over 50 years since Rome’s legions had so thoroughly triumphed at Zama. The veterans were all dead and the legions’ professionalism was long gone. Roman prestige was at stake, and it was not helped by the arrogant, rapacious and brutal policies of its politicians and soldiers.
Despite its weakness and because of Rome’s ill preparedness, Carthage mounted a doomed but effective resistance for three long years before admitting defeat. Rome enslaved its citizens, razed most of the city (there’s evidence the harbor remained in operation after 146) and incorporated Africa into its growing network of provinces.
For Goldsworthy, the legacy of the wars was threefold:
(1)Overall, it marked Rome’s emergence as a world power and arbiter of foreign affairs throughout the Mediterranean.
(2) It accustomed Rome to long-term commitments of troops and resources overseas, and made an already highly militarized society even more so.
(3) And the need for such long-term military service destroyed the small-farmer class of citizens that had formed the bulk of the legions. By the end of the Republic they had been replaced by the vast, slave-worked estates of the Roman elite and a professional army was increasingly estranged from the State, becoming personally loyal only to its generals.
Enthusiastically and most definitely recommended to any interested in the period.
The Punic Wars were a series of conflicts between the rising state of Rome and the dominant power of the Western Mediterranean, the Phoenician city of Carthage. It comprised three officially declared wars and lasted from 264-146 BC. Naturally enough, Goldsworthy divides the book into three parts corresponding to the three wars, and I will follow suit in this review.
First though, as in all histories of the Ancient World, a note on sources – or, better, their lack. We truly have only a handful of sources, and the closest in time to the periods under discussion (Polybius) breaks off at Cannae and only survives in fragments thereafter. Beyond that all surviving sources are Roman or pro-Roman (though we know of at least two histories written by Greeks who traveled with Hannibal). Unfortunately, archaeology is of little help since the politics of the period, the organization of armies, the economies, and all that other interesting stuff is not preserved in the rock strata. Despite these handicaps, Prof. Goldsworthy does an admirable job of synthesizing what we can know and reasonably speculating about what we can’t.
1st Punic War (264-241)
The first war happened almost by accident; there’s little evidence that Carthage and Rome’s relations were particularly hostile prior to 264. Nevertheless, both sides found themselves drawn into a direct confrontation over the disposition of Sicily. Goldsworthy argues that the escalation was largely the result of the nature of Roman politics. (pp. 74-5) Consuls served for only one year and, before these wars, pro-magistracies (extensions of authority beyond the stipulated term) were rare. Thus to win glory and honor, magistrates were compelled to move quickly, and the consuls for 264, Claudius Caudex and Fulvius Flaccus, saw opportunities in Sicily. I won’t begin to narrate the course of the first war but what emerges from Goldsworthy’s account are two distinct differences between the foes, which proved decisive in all three wars. The first was the nature of the armies involved. The Carthaginians relied almost entirely on mercenaries, primarily Spanish, Numidian and Libyan. In fact, it’s only the final army that faced Rome in the third war where a sizable Punic contingent is noted. While individual units may have been well-trained and led, the armies as a whole were composites where communication between units was difficult and coordination awkward. One of the factors in Hannibal’s success in the second war was that he managed to forge a unified fighting force but only after years of preparatory warfare in Spain. In contrast, the force he led at Zama had only been marshaled recently, lacking the esprit de corps that his Italian army enjoyed.
Roman armies, on the other hand, though made up of citizen conscripts and allies, were far more homogeneous and spoke related languages so communication was easier. Beyond that, they were highly trained to work together.
The second factor that ultimately led to Rome’s success was how both sides viewed war. Carthage’s view was the quintessential Hellenistic one – wars were fought between rival states to secure advantages. They often boiled down to a single, decisive battle (after much maneuvering), and the subsequent peace treaty left both sides intact and didn’t change the nature of their relationship. For Rome, though, war was “total.” The only conceivable outcome was unconditional victory for Rome (the enemy being destroyed or reduced to dependency) or her utter defeat. The idea of a “negotiated settlement” between equals was foreign to Roman ideas of diplomacy. Thus, what was a standard, Hellenistic style war to the Carthaginians was an existential threat to the Romans. The difference is clear in Rome’s response to defeat in battle – They lose a fleet? They rebuild it! They lose 50,000 men at Cannae? They recruit younger and older men and reconstitute the legions! Hannibal appears before the walls of Rome? They have a land sale, which includes the ground he camps on!
The first war was fought and won at sea. From a solely land-based Italian power in 264, Rome became a formidable naval one by 241 and dictated harsh terms to the Carthaginians. Rome was still not powerful enough and its political constitution and military organization not flexible enough to fully exploit its new found dominance. Despite Carthage’s defeat, it remained a power to be reckoned with. Though it was forced to abandon its designs in Sicily, Carthage immediately began to exploit opportunities in Spain.
The Second Punic War (218-201)
The second war is one of the relatively best documented periods in ancient history. Hannibal was the “devil” of Roman nightmares and Scipio Africanus, who defeats him at Zama, one of Rome’s greatest generals. Hannibal started it deliberately when he marched out of Spain, across modern-day Provence and down into Italy, where he terrorized Rome and her allies for the next sixteen years. (Even at the end, cornered in Italy’s boot heel, no Roman general relished confronting him so they sent legions to invade Africa instead.)
Unfortunately for Hannibal’s efforts, Carthage was still fighting a Hellenistic war and he received almost no support from the city and, despite a potentially powerful fleet, there was never any serious attempt to contest Rome’s mastery of the seas. With any other state any of Hannibal’s three great battles – Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae – would have brought both sides to the negotiating table. Instead, Rome dug in her heels, raised more legions and avoided engaging Hannibal in battle. As Goldsworthy points out, forcing unwilling armies to fight was extremely difficult. Most battles were fought between commanders who felt they enjoyed the upper hand and wanted to do so. Absent this attitude, most wars settled into maneuvering to control towns, disrupt supply lines, and win allies. All conditions which favored Rome. Adding to the Punic general’s woes and critical to his eventual failure in Italy was the political situation among the city-states that defected to his side. Though anti-Roman, they weren’t necessarily pro-Carthaginian and they proved unable to work together (indeed, freed from Rome’s oversight, some went to war with each other).
More so than the first, the second war fundamentally changed Roman society and set it firmly on the path to empire. Among other things, I’ll mention two notable developments. First, the army evolved into a highly professional organization. Under Scipio, it achieved miracles that would have been unthinkable in the first war and at the start of the second, and impossible in the Carthaginian ranks. Second, the heavy losses amongst the ranks of the Roman elite changed the makeup of the legions – unpropertied and poorer men in the ranks (at the lowest ebb, even slaves) and the promotion of middle-ranking citizens to the senatorial class. That, combined with the increasing custom of multiple magistracies and pro-magistracies, sowed the seeds that would bring down the Republic 150 years later.
The Third Punic War (149-146)
The third war was almost an afterthought. As a political power and threat to Rome, Carthage was impotent. So why the war? Goldsworthy argues that Rome “needed” the war because her position in the Mediterranean was slipping. It had been over 50 years since Rome’s legions had so thoroughly triumphed at Zama. The veterans were all dead and the legions’ professionalism was long gone. Roman prestige was at stake, and it was not helped by the arrogant, rapacious and brutal policies of its politicians and soldiers.
Despite its weakness and because of Rome’s ill preparedness, Carthage mounted a doomed but effective resistance for three long years before admitting defeat. Rome enslaved its citizens, razed most of the city (there’s evidence the harbor remained in operation after 146) and incorporated Africa into its growing network of provinces.
For Goldsworthy, the legacy of the wars was threefold:
(1)Overall, it marked Rome’s emergence as a world power and arbiter of foreign affairs throughout the Mediterranean.
(2) It accustomed Rome to long-term commitments of troops and resources overseas, and made an already highly militarized society even more so.
(3) And the need for such long-term military service destroyed the small-farmer class of citizens that had formed the bulk of the legions. By the end of the Republic they had been replaced by the vast, slave-worked estates of the Roman elite and a professional army was increasingly estranged from the State, becoming personally loyal only to its generals.
Enthusiastically and most definitely recommended to any interested in the period.
June 9, 2020
While this might be more of a 4.5/5 star book, I bumped it up to 5/5 because this is such an interesting nonfiction analysis of this often-overlooked period on Mediterranean military history.
"The Fall of Carthage" sets up the sociopolitical atmosphere that led to the three Punic Wars, and describes key engagements and historical figures with an impressive amount of detail. I am not an expert in this field, so I detected no inaccuracies in Goldsworthy's account and do not disagree with any of his depictions. I never felt like a dry textbook was just being read to me, so Goldsworthy brings these events to life through his balanced descriptions and infectious fascination.
However, because I am not a student in this era, I read this purely for entertainment, not study, and so I was not stressed about having to remember everything being read. I became interested in the Punic Wars because of YouTube Channel @Invicta (https://www.youtube.com/results?searc... account of these battles, so I had the visuals of those maps in mind while listening to this audio book.
Most people are aware of Hannibal, his elephants, and Carthage through its ultimate defeat by Rome. My prior knowledge of Gaul and Carthage came from the characterization of certain gladiators in the "Spartacus" TV show. Goldsworthy does an excellent job of explaining what we know of Carthage culture, religion, and politics. He analyzes the outcomes of important military engagements, describes Carthage vs. Rome strategy & tactics, and organizes his discussion by both chronology and regional importance (land and navel engagements get their own chapters).
Overall, the structure, approach to, and execution of this subject matter is exceptionally well done. I love history works that realistically assess the mistakes and vulnerabilities of Ancient Rome. How different our world would be had Carthage defeated Rome--and it was a close one! I recommend to all those interested in Ancient Rome, Carthaginian history, the classic Hellenistic world, and Mediterranean military history.
"The Fall of Carthage" sets up the sociopolitical atmosphere that led to the three Punic Wars, and describes key engagements and historical figures with an impressive amount of detail. I am not an expert in this field, so I detected no inaccuracies in Goldsworthy's account and do not disagree with any of his depictions. I never felt like a dry textbook was just being read to me, so Goldsworthy brings these events to life through his balanced descriptions and infectious fascination.
However, because I am not a student in this era, I read this purely for entertainment, not study, and so I was not stressed about having to remember everything being read. I became interested in the Punic Wars because of YouTube Channel @Invicta (https://www.youtube.com/results?searc... account of these battles, so I had the visuals of those maps in mind while listening to this audio book.
Most people are aware of Hannibal, his elephants, and Carthage through its ultimate defeat by Rome. My prior knowledge of Gaul and Carthage came from the characterization of certain gladiators in the "Spartacus" TV show. Goldsworthy does an excellent job of explaining what we know of Carthage culture, religion, and politics. He analyzes the outcomes of important military engagements, describes Carthage vs. Rome strategy & tactics, and organizes his discussion by both chronology and regional importance (land and navel engagements get their own chapters).
Overall, the structure, approach to, and execution of this subject matter is exceptionally well done. I love history works that realistically assess the mistakes and vulnerabilities of Ancient Rome. How different our world would be had Carthage defeated Rome--and it was a close one! I recommend to all those interested in Ancient Rome, Carthaginian history, the classic Hellenistic world, and Mediterranean military history.
November 16, 2014
I had the urge to learn more about Carthage and its enmity with rome and, as a couple of people had recommended Adrian Goldsworthy to me, thought this would be a good place to start. I have to say that I was disappointed.
Goldsworthy says in the preface that he is a military historian, and it is largely this focus that failed for me; the author focuses on the battles themselves and, within them, on the minutiae of tactics and technologies that made the opposing sides feel like miniatures on a gameboard. I got no real sense of the generals involved - although he does mention them and their supposed attributes this is not done in a way that brings them to life at all. I read thoroughly through the introduction and the first section about the combatants, and then on into the chapters on the First Punic War, hoping that this was leading to more analysis and depth, but soon I found that my eyes were glazing and I was skim-reading, forcing myself to remain interested.
It is not that the history of a conflict cannot be written interestingly, giving a thorough idea of the way the battles themselves were fought whilst bringing to life the cultures, and even the characters, involved - take, for instance, Persian Fire, about the attempted invasion of the Greek peninsula by mighty Persia, including the battles of Thermopylae and Marathon. And, perhaps, this is the main difference; I didn’t think Goldsworthy a very good writer. Aside from being peppered with dry academicisms (“In this chapter we shall see…”) the writing itself is often clumsy (the word “began” used three times in two consecutive sentences) and, I’m afraid, just not engaging. The big disappointment, though, is that I was left feeling I learnt little about the cultures fighting this conflict which would set one up to be amongst the greatest powers the world has ever seen and utterly destroy the other.
Goldsworthy says in the preface that he is a military historian, and it is largely this focus that failed for me; the author focuses on the battles themselves and, within them, on the minutiae of tactics and technologies that made the opposing sides feel like miniatures on a gameboard. I got no real sense of the generals involved - although he does mention them and their supposed attributes this is not done in a way that brings them to life at all. I read thoroughly through the introduction and the first section about the combatants, and then on into the chapters on the First Punic War, hoping that this was leading to more analysis and depth, but soon I found that my eyes were glazing and I was skim-reading, forcing myself to remain interested.
It is not that the history of a conflict cannot be written interestingly, giving a thorough idea of the way the battles themselves were fought whilst bringing to life the cultures, and even the characters, involved - take, for instance, Persian Fire, about the attempted invasion of the Greek peninsula by mighty Persia, including the battles of Thermopylae and Marathon. And, perhaps, this is the main difference; I didn’t think Goldsworthy a very good writer. Aside from being peppered with dry academicisms (“In this chapter we shall see…”) the writing itself is often clumsy (the word “began” used three times in two consecutive sentences) and, I’m afraid, just not engaging. The big disappointment, though, is that I was left feeling I learnt little about the cultures fighting this conflict which would set one up to be amongst the greatest powers the world has ever seen and utterly destroy the other.
January 7, 2015
A brilliant book. The initial part of the book, especially the first Punic war may not have had the pulse racing but once Hannibal comes into the picture, the story moves at a thrilling pace. It is the story of the Super Power of the day, Rome against its Mediterranean rival Carthage. The battle is of relatively unequal before the arrival of Hannibal, but the genius of the Punic General turns the table on the Romans in the Second Punic War. How Rome responds to this humiliation, and is able find a brilliant General of its own, in Scipio Africanus makes for quite a read. It is history written at an easy to read style. So fascinating and utterly engrossing. A must read for History genre fans.
March 17, 2024
Adrian Goldsworthy is a superb Roman historian. In this wonderful book he tackles the amazing conflict that would be called "The Punic Wars". Just a bit of background- The name Punic comes from the word Phoenician (Phoinix in the Greek, Poenus from Punicus in Latin) as applied to the citizens of Carthage, who were of Phoenician ethnicity. These people were centralized in the city-state of Carthage, as the Latinized people were in the city-state of Rome. Both of these City-States were powerful and wealthy. Both possessed a strong military force and able commanders. It seems, in hindsight, that conflict between these two powers for hegemony was inevitable.
The Punic Wars was a conflict in three parts. Two major powers with hegemonic outlooks, one Hellenistic and one Latin, had not always been enemies. There is evidence that the two powers were strong trading partners. During the Roman Pyrrhic wars (280-275 BCE), Carthage even aided the Romans. Thus their conflict, centered on mutual interest in control over the Sicilian city-state of of Messana (modern Messina), seemed almost a stumbling into a larger conflict, that morphed into a conflict of cultures that could lead to only one outcome.
The First Punic War lasted from 264-241 and was primarily a naval engagement fought in the waters off of Sicily. Away from the coasts, its hilly and rugged terrain made maneuvering large forces difficult and so encouraged defensive strategies. Land operations were largely confined to raids, sieges, and interdiction; in 23 years of war on Sicily, there were only two full-scale pitched battles. At first, the Romans were inexperienced at naval warfare compared to the Carthaginians, but in the end, remade their navy and destroyed the Carthaginian fleet at the battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 BC.
This caused both exhausted foes to sign a peace treaty. Yet, the Romans in an unHellenistic mode of thought, viewed themselves as victor and the preeminent power now.
During the peace, the Carthaginians expanded their influence into the Iberian peninsula. This would lead to the Second Punic War lasting from 218-201 BCE. This is the one most laymen know due to the famous exploits of the brilliant Carthaginian general Hannibal and his leading elephants across the Alps to ravage Roman lands. However, in time, the Romans under the leadership of Publius Cornelius Scipio would triumph, thus Scipio was awarded a triumph and received the agnomen "Africanus". This saw a massive power reduction for Carthage.
The Third Punic War, from 149-146 BCE, was a result of encroachment on Carthaginian lands by the Numidian leader Masinissa. Whenever Carthage petitioned Rome for redress, or permission to take military action, Rome backed its ally, Masinissa, and refused. When Carthage responded, Rome went to war. The Third Punic War is best epitomized by the saying of Cato the Censor's utterance of "Carthago delenda est " ("Carthage must be destroyed"). Though to be historically accurate, that's the abbreviated version. The full quote is "Ceterum (autem) censeo Carthaginem esse delendam" ("Furthermore, I consider that Carthage must be destroyed"). The result of this war is indeed the utter destruction of Carthage as, in 146 BCE, Carthage was razed by Scipio Aemilianus (Africanus's grandson), and its entire remaining population was sold into slavery. Africa then became a Roman province. The notion that Roman forces then sowed the city with salt is a 19th-century invention.
This excellent history is covered by Goldsworthy who shows his military history bona fides with an excellent description of the strategy and tactics of these wars. But this also may make this a bit of a dry history for laymen who aren't that interested in the tactics or the strategy. For me? This is a superb history book. Highly recommended.
The Punic Wars was a conflict in three parts. Two major powers with hegemonic outlooks, one Hellenistic and one Latin, had not always been enemies. There is evidence that the two powers were strong trading partners. During the Roman Pyrrhic wars (280-275 BCE), Carthage even aided the Romans. Thus their conflict, centered on mutual interest in control over the Sicilian city-state of of Messana (modern Messina), seemed almost a stumbling into a larger conflict, that morphed into a conflict of cultures that could lead to only one outcome.
The First Punic War lasted from 264-241 and was primarily a naval engagement fought in the waters off of Sicily. Away from the coasts, its hilly and rugged terrain made maneuvering large forces difficult and so encouraged defensive strategies. Land operations were largely confined to raids, sieges, and interdiction; in 23 years of war on Sicily, there were only two full-scale pitched battles. At first, the Romans were inexperienced at naval warfare compared to the Carthaginians, but in the end, remade their navy and destroyed the Carthaginian fleet at the battle of the Aegates Islands in 241 BC.
This caused both exhausted foes to sign a peace treaty. Yet, the Romans in an unHellenistic mode of thought, viewed themselves as victor and the preeminent power now.
During the peace, the Carthaginians expanded their influence into the Iberian peninsula. This would lead to the Second Punic War lasting from 218-201 BCE. This is the one most laymen know due to the famous exploits of the brilliant Carthaginian general Hannibal and his leading elephants across the Alps to ravage Roman lands. However, in time, the Romans under the leadership of Publius Cornelius Scipio would triumph, thus Scipio was awarded a triumph and received the agnomen "Africanus". This saw a massive power reduction for Carthage.
The Third Punic War, from 149-146 BCE, was a result of encroachment on Carthaginian lands by the Numidian leader Masinissa. Whenever Carthage petitioned Rome for redress, or permission to take military action, Rome backed its ally, Masinissa, and refused. When Carthage responded, Rome went to war. The Third Punic War is best epitomized by the saying of Cato the Censor's utterance of "Carthago delenda est " ("Carthage must be destroyed"). Though to be historically accurate, that's the abbreviated version. The full quote is "Ceterum (autem) censeo Carthaginem esse delendam" ("Furthermore, I consider that Carthage must be destroyed"). The result of this war is indeed the utter destruction of Carthage as, in 146 BCE, Carthage was razed by Scipio Aemilianus (Africanus's grandson), and its entire remaining population was sold into slavery. Africa then became a Roman province. The notion that Roman forces then sowed the city with salt is a 19th-century invention.
This excellent history is covered by Goldsworthy who shows his military history bona fides with an excellent description of the strategy and tactics of these wars. But this also may make this a bit of a dry history for laymen who aren't that interested in the tactics or the strategy. For me? This is a superb history book. Highly recommended.
January 5, 2017
-No está entre lo mejor del autor, pero desde la perspectiva de las formas.-
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Aproximación eminentemente militar al enfrentamiento entre la Antigua Roma y Cartago por ser la potencia dominante en el área mediterránea y estructurado de forma cronológica siguiendo el orden de las tres guerras púnicas.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
https://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com...
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Aproximación eminentemente militar al enfrentamiento entre la Antigua Roma y Cartago por ser la potencia dominante en el área mediterránea y estructurado de forma cronológica siguiendo el orden de las tres guerras púnicas.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
https://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com...
March 11, 2020
There’s not too much more I could ask for from Adrian Goldsworthy’s The Fall of Carthage. The book is pitched just right, at a level of great engagement with history for public consumption – thorough enough to be professional and offer an academically rigorous deconstruction of the Punic Wars, but also accessible enough for newcomers to understand, with Goldsworthy taking the time to clearly explain key concepts about how warfare and politics was conducted by both sides at this time. He additionally delves into an area that far too many popular histories don’t, confining themselves to straight up narratives of what happened: assessment of the sources. Goldsworthy doesn’t just tell us what happened, he tells us what the evidence is for it happening, and encourages us to critique the sources’ reliability in order to assess how plausible or improbable different versions are. This is so important. Whenever I come to a new area of history that I’m not familiar with, I’m looking for a good introduction that includes grilling the sources, otherwise I’m left with a good deal of uncertainty as to whether this or that really happened because two different authors in two different books will flat out tell me contradictory versions without explaining how and why they interpreted the evidence in that manner. It’s surprising how many popular histories leave this out because they feel that catering to the general public means their audience will be incapable of comprehending these difficulties and all they really want is to be told a straightforward story.
True, this book could be more detailed and denser. You probably won’t find anything new here if you’re already extremely familiar with the Punic Wars. Partially because Goldsworthy does make judicious choices to simplify for his readership, and partially because in his choice to cover all three wars, Goldsworthy seeks to create overarching context rather than intense debate. Conversely, those unfamiliar with history non-fiction may find the book a little on the dry side, since the author focuses more on strategy and tactics, explaining context, and reviewing sources than he does on grand charismatic personalities. You won’t be swept away by Hannibal’s charisma and genius in this book. But, for me, it mixes the right amount of academic professionalism with general accessibility, and that made it a good read.
7 out of 10
January 5, 2017
-No está entre lo mejor del autor, pero desde la perspectiva de las formas.-
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Aproximación eminentemente militar al enfrentamiento entre la Antigua Roma y Cartago por ser la potencia dominante en el área mediterránea y estructurado de forma cronológica siguiendo el orden de las tres guerras púnicas.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
https://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com...
Género. Historia.
Lo que nos cuenta. Aproximación eminentemente militar al enfrentamiento entre la Antigua Roma y Cartago por ser la potencia dominante en el área mediterránea y estructurado de forma cronológica siguiendo el orden de las tres guerras púnicas.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
https://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com...
October 23, 2022
Excellent book about the Punic Wars. He helps to clarify the events. He is able to bring together the various ancient literary sources in an understandable way. I have read the sources and now find the Era more understandable.
January 31, 2016
I find military history tough going. This one wasn't bad and managed to keep me going to the end. I think someone who did like military history would like it more. Goldsworthy gave enough information about the cultures (as much as he could anyway with the lack of knowledge) and their attitudes towards war to give me a little bit more than just strategy and troop deployment.
September 1, 2016
The best book, fiction or non-fiction, about the Punic Wars.
February 4, 2022
This book seemed to be written for an audience of historians, not general readers. I wanted a very thorough book, that's not the complaint. But I didn't want him to spend time discussing the various historical approaches to each portion of the history and comment on them. I wanted him to pick what he believed to be the most credible and tell me that tale.
So, instead of what could have been a really gripping narrative, this came across as dry and slow. Even the truly epic battles (the world's largest naval battle still to this day) were interrupted by discussions of the different theories on the ship design and the actual tactics were skimmed over.
The actual history is fascinating, so it wasn't all bad. But the presentation wasn't as good as I've gotten in other historical books.
So, instead of what could have been a really gripping narrative, this came across as dry and slow. Even the truly epic battles (the world's largest naval battle still to this day) were interrupted by discussions of the different theories on the ship design and the actual tactics were skimmed over.
The actual history is fascinating, so it wasn't all bad. But the presentation wasn't as good as I've gotten in other historical books.
January 23, 2020
This is the third or, depending on how you look at it, the fourth book about the Punic Wars that I have read. I enjoyed this one just as I enjoyed the others. I think this one is perhaps the most scholarly of the bunch. One could hardly expect anything less from Adrian Goldsworthy.
There are endless layers to unpack and the story of these ancient Mediterranean world wars. It’s always a fascinating story.
There are endless layers to unpack and the story of these ancient Mediterranean world wars. It’s always a fascinating story.
July 3, 2024
A comprehensive history of the Punic wars - a series of three wars that pitted Rome against Carthage and ended with the complete destruction of Carthage and Rome well on the way to Mare Nostrum - our sea (the Mediterranean)
Wars one and two were close run, but the sheer bloody mindedness of the Romans allowed them to prevail. War three was vindictive, kicking an enemy when they were down and no real threat.
Goldsworthy presents the facts (and also what we don't know) in an erudite and thorough way. A little too much on Roman Army organisation for my taste, but an accessible and enjoyable book.
Worth a read
Wars one and two were close run, but the sheer bloody mindedness of the Romans allowed them to prevail. War three was vindictive, kicking an enemy when they were down and no real threat.
Goldsworthy presents the facts (and also what we don't know) in an erudite and thorough way. A little too much on Roman Army organisation for my taste, but an accessible and enjoyable book.
Worth a read
January 7, 2016
The great Carthaginian general, Hannibal, was an unsurpassed genius. That, above all, is made clear in this narrative history of the three Punic Wars. Hannibal laid trap after trap for the overly-aggressive Roman legionary commanders during the Second Punic Wars--and the Romans repeatedly fell for it. The Battle of Cannae, Rome's worst military defeat and one of the most pored-over battles in history (Napoleon, two thousand years later, had a great great many thoughts) comes to life in this book. After reading Adrian Goldsworthy's description of the battle, I like to imagine I'm nearly conversant enough to explain it to my fellow laymen.
In any case, Hannibal had his day, but the overwhelming might of Rome eventually wore his forces down. And, as the Second Punic War wore on, the Romans did what they did best: adapt. It's fascinating to watch the Roman army and civilian leadership grow over time, developing a coherent strategic and tactical response to the exigencies of war. Rome nearly lost, but persevered past a point where most other civilizations would have surrendered, finally achieving victory under the Roman general Scipio Africanus.
Bookending the more interesting Second war, the First Punic War was an accident of escalation, while the Third was almost an afterthought, and a brutal and unjustifiable one at that. "Cartago delenda est" indeed; Carthage's existence as a political entity was utterly destroyed. It's a noteworthy and telling historical coincidence that Rome defeated and demolished Carthage in the very same year, 146 BC, that Rome did likewise to the last holdout among the Greek cities states--Corinth. The Punic Wars, stretching over a century and a half, marked Rome's passage from a regional power in Italy to a true Mediterranean colossus. Even while it was still an oligarchic "republic," Rome had already become an "empire."
Finally, if I may be permitted one excessively normative observation. Admittedly, the the Romans would never, as a people, be mistaken for a group of flowering, gentle sweethearts. Yet, there was great value in their civilization and culture, particularly compared with some of the barbarism still so prevalent throughout much of the Mediterranean world at the time. One fact, which I hadn't known before reading this book, struck me in particular: the Carthaginians, a Phoenician people, practiced ritualized infanticide. Archaeologists have discovered far too many remains of babies and children in religious, ritualized settings for there to be any other explanation. State-sanctioned, ritualized killing of innocent children, for centuries. One overriding thought remained in the back of my mind while reading this book: "Thank god these people were defeated." The Romans, far from innocent in most respects, never engaged in such revolting practices.
Again, I admit I'm imposing a normative value judgment absurdly on a people gone for more than twenty-one centuries, but I can't help but shudder to think of the subsequent history of the world had Rome ultimately lost to Carthage in the great Punic Wars.
In any case, Hannibal had his day, but the overwhelming might of Rome eventually wore his forces down. And, as the Second Punic War wore on, the Romans did what they did best: adapt. It's fascinating to watch the Roman army and civilian leadership grow over time, developing a coherent strategic and tactical response to the exigencies of war. Rome nearly lost, but persevered past a point where most other civilizations would have surrendered, finally achieving victory under the Roman general Scipio Africanus.
Bookending the more interesting Second war, the First Punic War was an accident of escalation, while the Third was almost an afterthought, and a brutal and unjustifiable one at that. "Cartago delenda est" indeed; Carthage's existence as a political entity was utterly destroyed. It's a noteworthy and telling historical coincidence that Rome defeated and demolished Carthage in the very same year, 146 BC, that Rome did likewise to the last holdout among the Greek cities states--Corinth. The Punic Wars, stretching over a century and a half, marked Rome's passage from a regional power in Italy to a true Mediterranean colossus. Even while it was still an oligarchic "republic," Rome had already become an "empire."
Finally, if I may be permitted one excessively normative observation. Admittedly, the the Romans would never, as a people, be mistaken for a group of flowering, gentle sweethearts. Yet, there was great value in their civilization and culture, particularly compared with some of the barbarism still so prevalent throughout much of the Mediterranean world at the time. One fact, which I hadn't known before reading this book, struck me in particular: the Carthaginians, a Phoenician people, practiced ritualized infanticide. Archaeologists have discovered far too many remains of babies and children in religious, ritualized settings for there to be any other explanation. State-sanctioned, ritualized killing of innocent children, for centuries. One overriding thought remained in the back of my mind while reading this book: "Thank god these people were defeated." The Romans, far from innocent in most respects, never engaged in such revolting practices.
Again, I admit I'm imposing a normative value judgment absurdly on a people gone for more than twenty-one centuries, but I can't help but shudder to think of the subsequent history of the world had Rome ultimately lost to Carthage in the great Punic Wars.
January 27, 2022
An excellent account of the war between Rome and Carthage. I was not aware of how different the modern world would be had Carthage won the war. Goldsworthy provides very detailed and interesting accounts of the movements of individuals in the war, as well as the personal and political events that transpired at that time. He does this with little information to go off of compared to more modern wars, which have been recorded with much more detail and accuracy. Goldsworthy also does a good job of explaining the political structures of each nation, and comparing them both to each other, and to the political structure we have in the modern day
August 11, 2022
Goldsworthy is both a very good historian and an excellent writer. His narrative of the Punic Wars is based on the sources (with copious references) and a solid knowledge of modern scholarship. He notes the key problems and scholarly disputes (Hannibal's route across the Alps, sites of battles, etc.), but does not get bogged down in them; there are always references for those who wish to follow up. One of Goldsworthy's great strengths is his insistence on looking at the Romans in the context of their own times and not distorting this with modern predispositions. As L.P. Harley wrote,“the past is a foreign country: they do things differently there.”
January 26, 2022
Good overall, but dense. A lot of detailed recounting of military operations, the size of forces, tactics, etc. I found a lot of it interesting, and I suppose covering these 3 hugely important conflicts in 370 pages is a feat, but I just found it a bit dry. There's little effort to build the historical characters or add color to what it truly an awesome story. Still, you learn a ton about warfare in that period, the basic flow of this extended conflict, and especially about the remarkably martial and stubborn Roman approach to warfare in this period. I would have liked more on the social effects of the war on Rome; AG touches on it at the end but to me the poli/social effects are more compelling. Also, I just can't bring myself to care that much about what minutia Livy or Polybius disagreed on or exactly how many troops where where at what point. This is all valuable stuff to have in a single volume, but it doesn't make it a great read. This may seem like a petty and unprofessional comment, but I was totally gripped by Dan Carlin's podcast on the Punic Wars, and while this was probably one of its main sources, the drama of it just doesn't come across. Obviously I'm not a historian of the ancient world! Recommend for true military buffs.
December 8, 2017
In 272 BCE the Roman Republic had conquered all of Italy south of the Po River and was undisputed ruler from the Straits of Messina to the hills of Tuscany. The consolidation took about 250 years and was actually the result of many wars fought and won by the Romans against other city-states. Eight years after the end of these wars the consul Appius Claudius Caudex led an army across the straits to Sicily—this marked the beginning of the Punic Wars. These three wars against Carthage spanned over a century from the first clash in 265 down to the final destruction of Carthage in 146.
The First and Second Wars were fought on a continental scale, larger than any conflict until the modern era. More than 300 oared warships crewed by over 100,000 were deployed by both sides in the First War while armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands fought for each side in the Second War. The cost of building so many galleys and paying and equipping such large armies took the better part of the resources of the two richest states in the western Mediterranean and by the end of the Third (and final) War Carthage had been put to the torch and lie in ruins, it no longer was a functioning state and its culture was all but obliterated. Rome went from a regional power controlling Italy to unrivaled dominance across the Mediterranean basin and had laid the material, political and cultural basis for an empire that ruled Western Europe, Northern Africa and the Middle East and that lasted for five centuries. Roman rulers and the Roman public became accustomed to waging war on an enormous scale, to sending large armies much farther than before and to fighting on several fronts simultaneously.
Goldsworthy’s book is a military history, concerned more with how the wars were fought than with why. He writes that it isn’t aimed at an academic audience—there isn’t much, if any, original research—and he doesn’t mention most of the theories or interpretation advanced by scholars in the past few hundred years but concentrates on some of the more or less original (or at least ancient) sources. He can do academic history with a First in ancient and modern history from Oxford (St. John’s) and a Ph.D. from the same school. His dissertation was “The Roman Army as a Fighting Force, 100 BC to 200 AD”. He has had several academic appointments but gave up teaching for writing full time.
I won’t try to summarize all the battles and campaigns that Goldsworthy covers—I couldn’t do them justice. His accounts are clear and not difficult to follow—no easy task. There are shelves full of military history that show how challenging it is to write understandable descriptions of warfare. My only caveat here is the usual one with Kindle books—the maps aren’t scalable and aren’t very useful given the small page size they are embedded in. Goldsworthy’s text is written for the interested layman although very little prior knowledge of ancient Rome on the part of the reader is assumed. If you have a couple of years of high school Latin and are—or were—able to read Julius Caesar’s “Commentaries on the Gallic Wars” (which I realized describes hardly anyone in the United States under the age of 65) you will be ahead of the game.
One real strength of the book is the accounts of how Rome, with no shipyards, no corps of naval officers, no experience with war at sea, with no one able to design and build a warship, no cadre of sailors and oarsmen, essentially no navy at all was able to transform itself into a maritime power defeat the Carthaginian navy which had ruled the western Mediterranean for centuries. Carthage depended on its navy to maintain supply lines from Sicily and Sardinia, to blockade enemies in coastal forts and force them to surrender and to flank land based armies by attacking from the sea. They had a productive hinterland in what is now Libya and Tunisia, but looked to the sea and their island possessions as the most important source of food. In addition to the Roman industrial mobilization to create a navy they were able to adapt their advantages in land fighting to naval battles, especially the corvus.
The corvus (a Latin word meaning “raven” even though it is a modern term and doesn’t appear in any ancient sources) was a boarding bridge the like of which had never been seen before. It was about four feet wide and 36 feet long that was raised by pulleys against a long pole in the prow of the Roman ship. Beneath the raised end of the bridge was a heavy, pointed spike, like a bird’s beak hence the name raven. When released it dropped to the deck of the enemy ship and the spike embedded itself in its planking. Once secured the bridge allowed Roman marines to swarm across and defeat the enemy crew their skill as swordsmen, their ferocity in combat and their weight of numbers. It was a simple, practical device that allowed the Romans to overcome their initial disadvantages in the quality of their galleys and more importantly the lack of skill and training of the crews by using engineering skill and land warfare techniques and expertise.
This is one example of how Goldsworthy uses the planning and execution of warfare to show how Roman ingenuity was a key to their ultimate victory over Carthage. There is also plenty of minutia—for example discussions of how many rowers per oar used by each of the different sizes of galleys deployed by either side for those who enjoy that level of granularity in historical narrative.
Highly recommended for Goldsworthy’s knowledge of the ancient sources and for his almost conversational writing style.
The First and Second Wars were fought on a continental scale, larger than any conflict until the modern era. More than 300 oared warships crewed by over 100,000 were deployed by both sides in the First War while armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands fought for each side in the Second War. The cost of building so many galleys and paying and equipping such large armies took the better part of the resources of the two richest states in the western Mediterranean and by the end of the Third (and final) War Carthage had been put to the torch and lie in ruins, it no longer was a functioning state and its culture was all but obliterated. Rome went from a regional power controlling Italy to unrivaled dominance across the Mediterranean basin and had laid the material, political and cultural basis for an empire that ruled Western Europe, Northern Africa and the Middle East and that lasted for five centuries. Roman rulers and the Roman public became accustomed to waging war on an enormous scale, to sending large armies much farther than before and to fighting on several fronts simultaneously.
Goldsworthy’s book is a military history, concerned more with how the wars were fought than with why. He writes that it isn’t aimed at an academic audience—there isn’t much, if any, original research—and he doesn’t mention most of the theories or interpretation advanced by scholars in the past few hundred years but concentrates on some of the more or less original (or at least ancient) sources. He can do academic history with a First in ancient and modern history from Oxford (St. John’s) and a Ph.D. from the same school. His dissertation was “The Roman Army as a Fighting Force, 100 BC to 200 AD”. He has had several academic appointments but gave up teaching for writing full time.
I won’t try to summarize all the battles and campaigns that Goldsworthy covers—I couldn’t do them justice. His accounts are clear and not difficult to follow—no easy task. There are shelves full of military history that show how challenging it is to write understandable descriptions of warfare. My only caveat here is the usual one with Kindle books—the maps aren’t scalable and aren’t very useful given the small page size they are embedded in. Goldsworthy’s text is written for the interested layman although very little prior knowledge of ancient Rome on the part of the reader is assumed. If you have a couple of years of high school Latin and are—or were—able to read Julius Caesar’s “Commentaries on the Gallic Wars” (which I realized describes hardly anyone in the United States under the age of 65) you will be ahead of the game.
One real strength of the book is the accounts of how Rome, with no shipyards, no corps of naval officers, no experience with war at sea, with no one able to design and build a warship, no cadre of sailors and oarsmen, essentially no navy at all was able to transform itself into a maritime power defeat the Carthaginian navy which had ruled the western Mediterranean for centuries. Carthage depended on its navy to maintain supply lines from Sicily and Sardinia, to blockade enemies in coastal forts and force them to surrender and to flank land based armies by attacking from the sea. They had a productive hinterland in what is now Libya and Tunisia, but looked to the sea and their island possessions as the most important source of food. In addition to the Roman industrial mobilization to create a navy they were able to adapt their advantages in land fighting to naval battles, especially the corvus.
The corvus (a Latin word meaning “raven” even though it is a modern term and doesn’t appear in any ancient sources) was a boarding bridge the like of which had never been seen before. It was about four feet wide and 36 feet long that was raised by pulleys against a long pole in the prow of the Roman ship. Beneath the raised end of the bridge was a heavy, pointed spike, like a bird’s beak hence the name raven. When released it dropped to the deck of the enemy ship and the spike embedded itself in its planking. Once secured the bridge allowed Roman marines to swarm across and defeat the enemy crew their skill as swordsmen, their ferocity in combat and their weight of numbers. It was a simple, practical device that allowed the Romans to overcome their initial disadvantages in the quality of their galleys and more importantly the lack of skill and training of the crews by using engineering skill and land warfare techniques and expertise.
This is one example of how Goldsworthy uses the planning and execution of warfare to show how Roman ingenuity was a key to their ultimate victory over Carthage. There is also plenty of minutia—for example discussions of how many rowers per oar used by each of the different sizes of galleys deployed by either side for those who enjoy that level of granularity in historical narrative.
Highly recommended for Goldsworthy’s knowledge of the ancient sources and for his almost conversational writing style.
June 18, 2024
A very interesting military-focused look on Carthage and Rome during the Punic Wars. Goldsworthy keeps the Punic Wars far removed from the complex mires which ancient history sometimes finds itself in.
What was really surprising to me is how little we know of the Punic Wars, in particular the First and the latter half of the Second. With Hannibal and Scipio being such famous characters in Late Antiquity, it’s interesting to see how much of their careers are still shrouded in some mystery.
I really would recommend this as an introduction to the Punic Wars, and more in general to anyone wanting to understand how The Roman Republic came to grow outside of Italy during the 3rd and 2nd Centuries BC.
What was really surprising to me is how little we know of the Punic Wars, in particular the First and the latter half of the Second. With Hannibal and Scipio being such famous characters in Late Antiquity, it’s interesting to see how much of their careers are still shrouded in some mystery.
I really would recommend this as an introduction to the Punic Wars, and more in general to anyone wanting to understand how The Roman Republic came to grow outside of Italy during the 3rd and 2nd Centuries BC.
February 11, 2021
Do not miss the last pages. Eye-opening analysis with implications for today's civil and social unrest.
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