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Meat Grinder: The Battles for the Rzhev Salient, 1942–43
An engrossing history of the desperate battles for the Rzhev Salient, a forgotten story brought to life by the harrowing memoirs of German and Russian soldiers.
The fighting between the German and Russian armies in the Rzhev Salient during World War II was so grisly, so murderous, and saw such vast losses that the troops called the campaign 'The Meat Grinder'. Though millions of men would fight and die there, the Rzhev Salient does not have the name recognition of Leningrad or Moscow. It was simply a vast tract of forests and swamps in the heart of Mother Russia that has been largely ignored by Western historians…until now.
Prit Buttar, a world expert on the Eastern Front during World War II, reveals the depth and depravity of the bitter fighting for the Rzhev Salient in this astonishing new history. He details how the long-ignored region held the promise of a renewed drive on the Soviet capital for the German Army – a chance to turn the tide of war. Using both German and Russian first-hand accounts, Buttar examines the four major offensives launched by the Red Army against the salient, all of which were defeated with heavy losses, exceeding two million killed, wounded or missing, until eventually, the Germans were forced to evacuate the salient in March 1943.
Drawing on the latest research, Meat Grinder provides a new study of these horrific battles but also examines how the Red Army did ultimately learn from its colossal failures and how its analysis of these failures at the time helped pave the way for the eventual Soviet victory against Army Group Centre in the summer of 1944, leaving the road to Berlin clear.
The fighting between the German and Russian armies in the Rzhev Salient during World War II was so grisly, so murderous, and saw such vast losses that the troops called the campaign 'The Meat Grinder'. Though millions of men would fight and die there, the Rzhev Salient does not have the name recognition of Leningrad or Moscow. It was simply a vast tract of forests and swamps in the heart of Mother Russia that has been largely ignored by Western historians…until now.
Prit Buttar, a world expert on the Eastern Front during World War II, reveals the depth and depravity of the bitter fighting for the Rzhev Salient in this astonishing new history. He details how the long-ignored region held the promise of a renewed drive on the Soviet capital for the German Army – a chance to turn the tide of war. Using both German and Russian first-hand accounts, Buttar examines the four major offensives launched by the Red Army against the salient, all of which were defeated with heavy losses, exceeding two million killed, wounded or missing, until eventually, the Germans were forced to evacuate the salient in March 1943.
Drawing on the latest research, Meat Grinder provides a new study of these horrific battles but also examines how the Red Army did ultimately learn from its colossal failures and how its analysis of these failures at the time helped pave the way for the eventual Soviet victory against Army Group Centre in the summer of 1944, leaving the road to Berlin clear.
464 pages, Hardcover
Published October 25, 2022
About the author
Prit Buttar
16 books89 followersPrit Buttar studied medicine at Oxford and London before joining the British Army as a doctor. After leaving the army, he has worked as a GP, first near Bristol and now in Abingdon. He is extensively involved in medical politics, both at local and national level, and served on the GPs’ Committee of the British Medical Association. He appears from time to time on local and national TV and radio, speaking on a variety of medical issues. He contributes regularly to the medical press. He is an established expert on the Eastern Front in 20th century military history.
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Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
July 5, 2024
Prit Buttar is one of those historians who never fails to deliver comprehensive, thoughtful research that illuminates a well-known subject in a new light. Unlike Anthony Beevor's or Roger Moorhouse's books, he vehemently sticks to facts and dry yet deep analysis; an obstacle for one category of readers and delight to delve in for others.
MEAT GRINDER: THE BATTLES FOR THE RZHEV SALIENT, 1942-1943 debunks the prevalent myth that Soviet counteroffensives on the central front, and especially Operation Mars, diverged German reserves from the south and ultimately led to the destruction of the Sixth Army in Stalingrad. The author describes the day-by-day strategic decisions of both German and Soviet commands as well as shows how those decisions were implemented on the ground. The last two chapters are dedicated to the multi-layered examinations of the causes of Soviet failure (and Pyrrhic German victory).
MEAT GRINDER is not only an engaging read but also a reminder of the high price of ultimate Soviet triumph. Due to the rigidity of decision-making, Soviet soldiers attacked the same German-fortified defenses over and over again (in what my husband called, a meat storm). Again and again, there was no coordination between different arms; commanders were afraid to take initiative and followed Stavka's plans even realizing that these plans didn't reflect the needs of the moment. Subsequentially, the Soviet losses were thrice, four times bigger than that of their counterparts. Around 1.3 million soldiers died in the senseless struggle to stop the German advance toward Moscow - the advance that had never materialized. After huge losses, one may expect the Soviet Union to commemorate the fallen in every way possible. Instead, Rzhev salient's battles were largely forgotten because their acknowledgment would mean admitting Stavka's miscalculations.
I'd definitely recommend the book to experienced history buffs. I'd not recommend it as the first-ever read about WW2: one could start with popular history and overall research of the Eastern Front, then try more detailed Prit Buttar's MEAT GRINDER.
I received an advance review copy from Netgalley, and I am leaving this review voluntarily.
MEAT GRINDER: THE BATTLES FOR THE RZHEV SALIENT, 1942-1943 debunks the prevalent myth that Soviet counteroffensives on the central front, and especially Operation Mars, diverged German reserves from the south and ultimately led to the destruction of the Sixth Army in Stalingrad. The author describes the day-by-day strategic decisions of both German and Soviet commands as well as shows how those decisions were implemented on the ground. The last two chapters are dedicated to the multi-layered examinations of the causes of Soviet failure (and Pyrrhic German victory).
MEAT GRINDER is not only an engaging read but also a reminder of the high price of ultimate Soviet triumph. Due to the rigidity of decision-making, Soviet soldiers attacked the same German-fortified defenses over and over again (in what my husband called, a meat storm). Again and again, there was no coordination between different arms; commanders were afraid to take initiative and followed Stavka's plans even realizing that these plans didn't reflect the needs of the moment. Subsequentially, the Soviet losses were thrice, four times bigger than that of their counterparts. Around 1.3 million soldiers died in the senseless struggle to stop the German advance toward Moscow - the advance that had never materialized. After huge losses, one may expect the Soviet Union to commemorate the fallen in every way possible. Instead, Rzhev salient's battles were largely forgotten because their acknowledgment would mean admitting Stavka's miscalculations.
I'd definitely recommend the book to experienced history buffs. I'd not recommend it as the first-ever read about WW2: one could start with popular history and overall research of the Eastern Front, then try more detailed Prit Buttar's MEAT GRINDER.
I received an advance review copy from Netgalley, and I am leaving this review voluntarily.
October 31, 2022
My prior knowledge on the fighting in this area was largely informed by the David Glantz book Zhukov's Greatest Defeat. A lot of people criticize that book for being too dry, but I love the detailed accounting of the units involved and their day by day movements. This book is not as dry, but the writing is still not going to be compared with James Hornfischer, Ian Toll or Rick Atkinson (some of my favorites). While Glantz's book is almost exclusively about Operation Mars (Nov 25- Dec 20), Buttar goes into more detail about how the salient was formed from Operation Typhoon through the Soviet winter counter-offensive. The maps are good. A lot easier to follow than Glantz's, though they are greatly simplified. Lower level unit accounts cover each side with many more recent Soviet era sources included (the bibliography is a great place to find future reading material). This is the kind of military history I really enjoy reading.
January 3, 2023
As per his usual Prit Buttar has written a truly phenomenal study of a lesser known aspect of the titanic struggle waged on The Eastern Front. The Rzhev Salient, so named as the Germans held a bulge, or salient, jutting towards Moscow, with its focal point being a rail link town known as Rzhev. It acted as a magnet for Soviet offensives, as Stalin saw it as a springboard for German offensives towards Moscow.
The Germans saw it as a convenient place to draw Soviet forces towards, away from the main theater of operations in the south, where the Germans could then, bluntly, kill them.
And, tragically, this was largely what went down.
Utilizing numerous first hand accounts, after action reports, as well as his own narrative and analysis (Mr. Buttar avoids the all too common British trope of merely quote harvesting to write his books. Easily my worst pet peeve in modern military history, thankfully Mr. Buttar avoids this.) tells the tale of the grinding battles of attrition that resulted around the German held salient, and the surrounding areas.
One aspect of the authors works, perhaps because he himself is a former soldier (British Army), is that his adroit analysis offers numerous lessons to be learned and absorbed by current military officers and NCO's.
Easily the most striking thing about the Rzhev battles is the lack of adaptability of the Red Army to the fluid nature of modern warfare. While the Soviets certainly evolved their art of war throughout the conflict, improving in many areas, in others they seemed stuck in a morass of intellectual malaise, where they simply couldn't grasp the why of their setbacks.
This is showcased by the symmetrical nature of their major offensives. While they would, wisely, chose different sectors to strike, they always struck in the same fashion, and the Germans merely, in rapid fashion, learned to separate the infantry from the madly charging Soviet armor via defensive fire.
The Germans would allow the tanks to go wildly charging into their deeper lines, where they would be picked off by Pak fronts (multiple batteries of pre-sited anti-tank guns, usually well dug in), 88's and assault guns. Then they would typically slaughter the infantry, saving their mobile forces for counterattacks against truly threatening breakthroughs.
If all of that sounds stolidly formulaic, it's because it was. Time and again the Red Army would hurl itself at the German lines, achieve next to nothing, absorb horrific losses in the process, only to make the same thick headed mistakes a few miles down the line a few days later or so. While the Germans were certainly hard pressed, and in the case of Belov's Cavalry Corps, which formed a roving pocket behind German lines which couldn't be pinned down and annihilated despite numerous German efforts to do just that, at no point was the German front ever in danger of collapse.
What is truly striking about all of this is that the chief Soviet officer in charge has always been considered their greatest General. And yet Marshal Georgi Zhukov performed absolutely terribly in these operations. So badly did he mismanage these several disasters that he all but ignored them in his memoirs, and flat out lied about German strength in the area (nowhere were the Germans even remotely to a parity of strength with the Soviets in terms of manpower, or equipment, in the totality of Army Group Center. The German victories here were not due to mass or superior firepower, but rather the superior utilization of what it was they had, and the far greater sophistication of their tactics), which was actually significantly less than his own.
The author goes to some lengths to analyze as to why these major Soviet efforts (waged coterminus with the major battles in the south, and along the Volga, and later the Stalingrad pocket) were as catastrophic as they were. Just a few of the reasons he lists are illuminating, and might be explanations for some of the current Russian Army's setbacks in Ukraine.
Lack of reconaissance, lack of sophistication in reconaissance, a military culture which put low priority on NCO's, as well as individual initiative (both of which were things the Germans excelled at, and helped them in truly bad situations, outnumbered and outgunned, to outwit, and outfight, their foes), a lack of detailed planning for logistics including ignoring the parlous state of the road network in the region, as well as ignoring the layout of the terrain of the region.
That last is especially egregious as a mistake as Zhukov himself grew up in the area!
What helps to really drive home the terrible consequences of the mediocre Red Army leadership at this stage of the war, is that Mr. Buttar chose to write this predominantly from the Soviet perspective. While the German side is covered, it’s at most a third of the book, closer to a quarter. The rest is from the Red Army side of things.
And that helps to reinforce the final point of the book.
The German victories were, in the end pyrrhic ones. They eventually abandoned the salient in later 1943 in Operation Büffel (Buffalo), scorching the earth as they went. And as they left, they rather smugly were convinced of their ultimate superiority as soldiers. The intelligence reports that Mr. Buttar quotes are utterly dripping with a heavy dose of smug when discussing the qualities of the Red Army. And in truth, they had every right to be smug in their arrogant pride in success. Outnumbered, outgunned, with limited armored forces, they inflicted over four times as many losses on their foes (far more than that in terms of armor and equipment), and won nearly every one of the tactical engagements in the region for over a year.
The German commander, Field Marshal Walther Model, earned his reputation for brilliant defensive operations here at Rzhev, and this reputation would carry him all over Europe for the next few years, winning most of his battles against the Red Army, the British, and the Americans, in the process before his Army Group would be encircled in the Ruhr, and destroyed, by the Americans in 1945, and he would commit suicide rather than be taken prisoner.
Despite his lofty mythos, Model never really grew in his art of war. Largely because he was nearly always successful wherever he went. He could get away with fighting via formula, until the American juggernaut overwhelmed him in early 1945, and he met his demise. Zhukov, on the other hand, though he worked strenuously to recover his reputation following the disasters around Rzhev (a reputation rescued by Kursk some six months later), and to keep the tale of Rzhev quiet during the post war years, he at least learned from his mistakes.
And, on a broader scale, so did the Red Army. Rzhev, as painful of a series of disastrous defeats as they were for the Red Army, was the reforging process needed to turn the Red Army into a modern fighting force. And though they were never as sophisticated in the art of war as their foes, they proved that they could adapt, and at least approach as equals by the end of the war.
This does highlight a seeming cultural trend within the Russian armed forces. An inability to rapidly absorb lessons, and a natural loathing to adapt to change, and to accept individual initiative to allow the seizure of dynamic situations in a rapidly moving environment that modern warfare is. Since the days of Napoleon the Russian armed forces, while never being the mindless drones that Western propaganda paints them as, has always had a problem fighting more maneuverable, more dynamic foes. And even if seriously outmassing and outgunning them, will need to be hit over the head, numerous times, and quite hard to boot, to finally come to accept that they have to relinquish, at least in this instance, the grasping on to traditions and top down command structures, and mimic their foes to achieve victory.
That they usually have, at least in the end, should be a warning to those who would write them out in the current situation in Ukraine. Time will tell if they have learned the lessons they needed to in order to achieve a decisive success in the coming year.
As for this book, as as normal for Prit Buttar, it's a given. Even if you're like me, and more of a black powder era warfare enthusiast, your still going to want to own every title the man writes. His writing is excellent, his analysis clear and always sharp, and he doesn't quote harvest to pad out the page counts of his books.
Really, this was a great book to wind up my studies in 2022. Highly recommended.
The Germans saw it as a convenient place to draw Soviet forces towards, away from the main theater of operations in the south, where the Germans could then, bluntly, kill them.
And, tragically, this was largely what went down.
Utilizing numerous first hand accounts, after action reports, as well as his own narrative and analysis (Mr. Buttar avoids the all too common British trope of merely quote harvesting to write his books. Easily my worst pet peeve in modern military history, thankfully Mr. Buttar avoids this.) tells the tale of the grinding battles of attrition that resulted around the German held salient, and the surrounding areas.
One aspect of the authors works, perhaps because he himself is a former soldier (British Army), is that his adroit analysis offers numerous lessons to be learned and absorbed by current military officers and NCO's.
Easily the most striking thing about the Rzhev battles is the lack of adaptability of the Red Army to the fluid nature of modern warfare. While the Soviets certainly evolved their art of war throughout the conflict, improving in many areas, in others they seemed stuck in a morass of intellectual malaise, where they simply couldn't grasp the why of their setbacks.
This is showcased by the symmetrical nature of their major offensives. While they would, wisely, chose different sectors to strike, they always struck in the same fashion, and the Germans merely, in rapid fashion, learned to separate the infantry from the madly charging Soviet armor via defensive fire.
The Germans would allow the tanks to go wildly charging into their deeper lines, where they would be picked off by Pak fronts (multiple batteries of pre-sited anti-tank guns, usually well dug in), 88's and assault guns. Then they would typically slaughter the infantry, saving their mobile forces for counterattacks against truly threatening breakthroughs.
If all of that sounds stolidly formulaic, it's because it was. Time and again the Red Army would hurl itself at the German lines, achieve next to nothing, absorb horrific losses in the process, only to make the same thick headed mistakes a few miles down the line a few days later or so. While the Germans were certainly hard pressed, and in the case of Belov's Cavalry Corps, which formed a roving pocket behind German lines which couldn't be pinned down and annihilated despite numerous German efforts to do just that, at no point was the German front ever in danger of collapse.
What is truly striking about all of this is that the chief Soviet officer in charge has always been considered their greatest General. And yet Marshal Georgi Zhukov performed absolutely terribly in these operations. So badly did he mismanage these several disasters that he all but ignored them in his memoirs, and flat out lied about German strength in the area (nowhere were the Germans even remotely to a parity of strength with the Soviets in terms of manpower, or equipment, in the totality of Army Group Center. The German victories here were not due to mass or superior firepower, but rather the superior utilization of what it was they had, and the far greater sophistication of their tactics), which was actually significantly less than his own.
The author goes to some lengths to analyze as to why these major Soviet efforts (waged coterminus with the major battles in the south, and along the Volga, and later the Stalingrad pocket) were as catastrophic as they were. Just a few of the reasons he lists are illuminating, and might be explanations for some of the current Russian Army's setbacks in Ukraine.
Lack of reconaissance, lack of sophistication in reconaissance, a military culture which put low priority on NCO's, as well as individual initiative (both of which were things the Germans excelled at, and helped them in truly bad situations, outnumbered and outgunned, to outwit, and outfight, their foes), a lack of detailed planning for logistics including ignoring the parlous state of the road network in the region, as well as ignoring the layout of the terrain of the region.
That last is especially egregious as a mistake as Zhukov himself grew up in the area!
What helps to really drive home the terrible consequences of the mediocre Red Army leadership at this stage of the war, is that Mr. Buttar chose to write this predominantly from the Soviet perspective. While the German side is covered, it’s at most a third of the book, closer to a quarter. The rest is from the Red Army side of things.
And that helps to reinforce the final point of the book.
The German victories were, in the end pyrrhic ones. They eventually abandoned the salient in later 1943 in Operation Büffel (Buffalo), scorching the earth as they went. And as they left, they rather smugly were convinced of their ultimate superiority as soldiers. The intelligence reports that Mr. Buttar quotes are utterly dripping with a heavy dose of smug when discussing the qualities of the Red Army. And in truth, they had every right to be smug in their arrogant pride in success. Outnumbered, outgunned, with limited armored forces, they inflicted over four times as many losses on their foes (far more than that in terms of armor and equipment), and won nearly every one of the tactical engagements in the region for over a year.
The German commander, Field Marshal Walther Model, earned his reputation for brilliant defensive operations here at Rzhev, and this reputation would carry him all over Europe for the next few years, winning most of his battles against the Red Army, the British, and the Americans, in the process before his Army Group would be encircled in the Ruhr, and destroyed, by the Americans in 1945, and he would commit suicide rather than be taken prisoner.
Despite his lofty mythos, Model never really grew in his art of war. Largely because he was nearly always successful wherever he went. He could get away with fighting via formula, until the American juggernaut overwhelmed him in early 1945, and he met his demise. Zhukov, on the other hand, though he worked strenuously to recover his reputation following the disasters around Rzhev (a reputation rescued by Kursk some six months later), and to keep the tale of Rzhev quiet during the post war years, he at least learned from his mistakes.
And, on a broader scale, so did the Red Army. Rzhev, as painful of a series of disastrous defeats as they were for the Red Army, was the reforging process needed to turn the Red Army into a modern fighting force. And though they were never as sophisticated in the art of war as their foes, they proved that they could adapt, and at least approach as equals by the end of the war.
This does highlight a seeming cultural trend within the Russian armed forces. An inability to rapidly absorb lessons, and a natural loathing to adapt to change, and to accept individual initiative to allow the seizure of dynamic situations in a rapidly moving environment that modern warfare is. Since the days of Napoleon the Russian armed forces, while never being the mindless drones that Western propaganda paints them as, has always had a problem fighting more maneuverable, more dynamic foes. And even if seriously outmassing and outgunning them, will need to be hit over the head, numerous times, and quite hard to boot, to finally come to accept that they have to relinquish, at least in this instance, the grasping on to traditions and top down command structures, and mimic their foes to achieve victory.
That they usually have, at least in the end, should be a warning to those who would write them out in the current situation in Ukraine. Time will tell if they have learned the lessons they needed to in order to achieve a decisive success in the coming year.
As for this book, as as normal for Prit Buttar, it's a given. Even if you're like me, and more of a black powder era warfare enthusiast, your still going to want to own every title the man writes. His writing is excellent, his analysis clear and always sharp, and he doesn't quote harvest to pad out the page counts of his books.
Really, this was a great book to wind up my studies in 2022. Highly recommended.
August 13, 2024
Good, but not as good as other military books where more is happening or changing. The Germans during WWII or the 'Patriotic Great War', attack Russia and go as far as Rzhev trying to get to Moscow. The Russians had killed anyone in their military who knew anything in Stalin's purges prior to the attack. The Russians strategy was just steam rolling attacks. They never changed their tactics and learned very little over the course of the engagement to improve their chances. The Germans had much better tactics. Even when the Russians did take some ground, counter-attacks from the Germans would take it back.
In addition to tanks, which the Russians had pretty good ones but never learned to coordinate with their infantry, cavalry was also used. Cavalry may be better to navigate the bad terrain, but against machine guns and artillery? Even the SS on the German side had some cavalry as well.
Seems like if the devil wanted to kill as many people as possible, having two maniacs (Hitler and Stalin) that don't care about people, throwing their populations into a meat grinder form of battle was the way to do it. Always the Russians lost far more in every battle. Each major battle is discussed so it was interesting to see how many ways the author could say 'heavy losses' suffered by the Russians. From Wikipedia 'Russian historian Svetlana Gerasimova the official casualty figures of the four offensive operations, the total losses approach 2,300,000 men. For the other side, according to German reports 'the casualties of the 2nd, 4th, 9th, 2nd Panzer, 3rd Panzer and 4th Panzer Armies (the latter only having data from March to April 1942) amount to 162,713 killed, 35,650 missing, and 469,747 wounded.
Finally the Germans just retreated back so that they could deploy their forces somewhere else and were never defeated. Of course Stalingrad was another story.
Well written and documented, but tales of attacks and massive casualties are repeated over and over and over again through the progression of the almost 2 years of fighting. If that wasn't enough, the last two chapters summarized the failures all over again.
Those chapters also debunked the excuse that they weren't so much meant to win in the Rzhev Salient, but to pin down German soldiers so they couldn't be used at Stalingrad.
So great book if you really want to know more about Russia's role in WWII. The Allied win of WWII was primarily due to Hitler attacking Russia, and both sides there expending so much equipment and lives there which then weren't there to fight everyone else. However, as how interesting the book is, I would say almost all other WWII books out there are probably more interesting because of more variety of things going on.
Lastly, one little fact I learned from my Dad before hearing it in other places. You may ask, why was Hitler so stupid to attack Russia? A big reason was because of Finland. Little Finland was attacked by Russian forces and was able to drive them off. Hitler saw that and thought that Russia was weak and grossly underestimated the will power and forces that they would throw at his army.
In addition to tanks, which the Russians had pretty good ones but never learned to coordinate with their infantry, cavalry was also used. Cavalry may be better to navigate the bad terrain, but against machine guns and artillery? Even the SS on the German side had some cavalry as well.
Seems like if the devil wanted to kill as many people as possible, having two maniacs (Hitler and Stalin) that don't care about people, throwing their populations into a meat grinder form of battle was the way to do it. Always the Russians lost far more in every battle. Each major battle is discussed so it was interesting to see how many ways the author could say 'heavy losses' suffered by the Russians. From Wikipedia 'Russian historian Svetlana Gerasimova the official casualty figures of the four offensive operations, the total losses approach 2,300,000 men. For the other side, according to German reports 'the casualties of the 2nd, 4th, 9th, 2nd Panzer, 3rd Panzer and 4th Panzer Armies (the latter only having data from March to April 1942) amount to 162,713 killed, 35,650 missing, and 469,747 wounded.
Finally the Germans just retreated back so that they could deploy their forces somewhere else and were never defeated. Of course Stalingrad was another story.
Well written and documented, but tales of attacks and massive casualties are repeated over and over and over again through the progression of the almost 2 years of fighting. If that wasn't enough, the last two chapters summarized the failures all over again.
Those chapters also debunked the excuse that they weren't so much meant to win in the Rzhev Salient, but to pin down German soldiers so they couldn't be used at Stalingrad.
So great book if you really want to know more about Russia's role in WWII. The Allied win of WWII was primarily due to Hitler attacking Russia, and both sides there expending so much equipment and lives there which then weren't there to fight everyone else. However, as how interesting the book is, I would say almost all other WWII books out there are probably more interesting because of more variety of things going on.
Lastly, one little fact I learned from my Dad before hearing it in other places. You may ask, why was Hitler so stupid to attack Russia? A big reason was because of Finland. Little Finland was attacked by Russian forces and was able to drive them off. Hitler saw that and thought that Russia was weak and grossly underestimated the will power and forces that they would throw at his army.
August 26, 2022
Dr. Buttar continues his excellent history of the Second World War. I truly appreciate his incisive nature and writing style. This is excellent and well worth reading.
July 31, 2022
A fascinating look at the little known battle in Russia during WW2. The firsthand accounts from individuals at the battles really enhances the stories and draws you in. The hardships and loss of life was horrifying. This is a great read for the history and WW2 enthusiast.
Thank you to #NetGalley for the ARC in exchange for my honest review.
Thank you to #NetGalley for the ARC in exchange for my honest review.
June 5, 2023
Listen, it’s a tough read whenever it’s the Nazis vs. the Soviet Union. Both of these powers were the masters of unimaginable cruelty. History holds the Nazis up as the apex of evil (rightly), but then you will read about a Soviet tactic or two and feel horribly conflicted. But don’t worry, Prit Buttar is here to help!
What makes Meat Grinder readable is Buttar’s ability (and willingness) to never lose sight of the everyday soldier. Sure, Stalin and Hitler should rot in hell for eternity. However, the battles were fought by men who were put in impossible positions in a battle for their very survival. Buttar tells the story of the battles outside Stalingrad from their point of view while never losing sight of the overall war. Yes, you will read about despicable acts by both sides, but Buttar finds the humanity in a sea of desolation. You won’t be happy the Soviet Union won, but you will be happy the Nazis lost.
(This book was provided as an advance copy by Osprey Publishing.)
What makes Meat Grinder readable is Buttar’s ability (and willingness) to never lose sight of the everyday soldier. Sure, Stalin and Hitler should rot in hell for eternity. However, the battles were fought by men who were put in impossible positions in a battle for their very survival. Buttar tells the story of the battles outside Stalingrad from their point of view while never losing sight of the overall war. Yes, you will read about despicable acts by both sides, but Buttar finds the humanity in a sea of desolation. You won’t be happy the Soviet Union won, but you will be happy the Nazis lost.
(This book was provided as an advance copy by Osprey Publishing.)
February 21, 2024
This is an absolutely amazing book that you should absolutely read but which, be warned, suffers from the same flaw that nearly every book of its kind does. It doesn't have nearly enough maps and the maps it has aren't labelled with nearly enough detail. Those who don't have the geography west of Moscow memorized might struggle to keep the positions of countless dozens of units, Sixth Guards Tank Army, 41st Infantry Army, 5th Panzer Army, 9th Panzer Army, etc etc in mind as they shuffle around the salient.
The prose is really very good and not dry at all. The story of the battles is told almost completely from the Soviet perspective, we're given a lot of fascinating diary entries from infrantrymen to generals, but the author doesn't make much effort to humanize the Germans in the same way. That may be because the author is as interested in the place the battles occupies in Soviet/Russian historiography, as he is in the events themselves. He ends with interesting remarks on how Vladimir Putin chose to characterize the battle in a public address in 2019, which is interesting in light od recent events.
Overall highly recommended.
The prose is really very good and not dry at all. The story of the battles is told almost completely from the Soviet perspective, we're given a lot of fascinating diary entries from infrantrymen to generals, but the author doesn't make much effort to humanize the Germans in the same way. That may be because the author is as interested in the place the battles occupies in Soviet/Russian historiography, as he is in the events themselves. He ends with interesting remarks on how Vladimir Putin chose to characterize the battle in a public address in 2019, which is interesting in light od recent events.
Overall highly recommended.
December 11, 2022
An excellent account of a forgotten sector of the Eastern Front. Buttar does a brilliant job of showcasing what the fighting was like on the ground for both sides with his excellent use of primary sources (German and Soviet). Likewise Buttar does a great job of running through the two biggest questions about The Rzhev Salient and Operation Mars in particular Was Operation Mars a diversion to tie down Army Group centre's divisions or was it a full blown offensive as grand as Operation Uranus? He also discusses whether or not The German should have or could have released divisions to aid Army group South. A brilliant book that I've learned a ton from. Buttar is consistently delivering top tier books on both world wars!
July 23, 2023
This is a numbing slog of a book -- and I mean that in a good way. It chronicles the most carniverous battle of the Second World War, dubbed by both sides "the Rzhev Meat Grinder," which took place over 500 blood-soaked days between 1942 - 1943 on the Eastern Front, about 100 miles from Moscow. It was Verdun on an even larger scale, with the Soviets losing about 2.3 million casualties to German losses of around 700,000, all for a series of obscure villages and towns set in swamp-infested terrain. A battle on this scale should be infamous, but there is surprisingly little written about it, and this book is a welcome examination of this staggering carnage.
As a few other historians have pointed out, the entire narrative of the Eastern Front is basically wrong, since it was originally framed by Stalin, and this narrative became the basis of the English narrative, which in turn became the basis of the American. By the time the Soviet Union fell in 1991, numerous lies, half-truths, omissions and so forth had hardened into "reality" and it has taken some hard hammer-and-chiseling to crack them at the edges. In short, Buttar makes the point that this colossal bloodbath has been forgotten, and when remembered, lied about, in large part because it could never be reconciled with the truth. The Stalinist narrative parroted by so many is that Rzhev was, ultimately, the Soviet army's strategy for tying German forces down on the central front so they could not join the fight at Stalingrad, and so it was a "victory" despite the slaughter. Sometimes it is grudgingly referred to as "proving ground" where the Red Army learned how to fight and win. Alternatively, it is downplayed or unmentioned because it was a staggering loss of human lives for almost no material gain and couldn't be reconciled with the glamorized, sanitized version of the war the communist party, and later nationalist Russian historians, presented to the world. Occupying these conflicting spaces, it has turned transparent to historical view.
Buttar meticulously but rather deftly describes how the strategic situation at the end of 1941 left the Germans dangerously close to Moscow, and how Stalin and Zhukov became obsessed with destroying the enemy salient at Rzhev, which pointed to the Soviet capital like a dagger. Month after month, they sent waves of men, horses and tanks crashing into the German lines, and month after month, these waves broke against a rigid, almost WWI-style defense. The Germans suffered terrible losses, especially of experienced men, but were able almost always to either hold off or recapture any lost territory. Even at the height of the Stalingrad battle, Zhukov was unable to crack the German defense at Rzhev and, being unable to admit defeat, used the ex post facto excuse that he was pinning German troops in place so they couldn't go elsewhere, when in fact he was actually trying, and failing, to destroy Hitler's Army Group Center. The descriptions of all this bloody, frantic fighting over destroyed towns and pestilential swamps full of rotting corpses and bloated horses and burned-out tanks are horrifying. Whole divisions were wiped out, reconstituted, thrown back into battle, and wiped out again -- and in some cases, again. The same areas were captured, lost, and recaptured endlessly, until the towns being fought over were nothing but rubble. Hitler's policy of inflexibility was rewarded here in the broad sense, but his army paid a steep price for standing its ground: the men he lost here were among the last of the victorious class of 1939 - 1941, and could not be replaced.
In the end, the Germans voluntarily abandoned the salient so they could release more divisions to fight at the Battle of Kursk in July of 1943. The Soviets claimed victory, but inherited a wasteland which had consumed a huge part of their nations' manhood. While I don't personally agree with every one of Buttar's conclusions, I do feel he has done a grand job of reconstructing this conflict, and in a literary style which places him in the company of Keegan, Irving, Foote, Gilbert, and a handful of others who actually know how to do scholarly work and form sentences in a pleasing way. This is not an "easy" book in the sense that the sheer volume of massacre is punishing to contemplate, but it's a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject.
As a few other historians have pointed out, the entire narrative of the Eastern Front is basically wrong, since it was originally framed by Stalin, and this narrative became the basis of the English narrative, which in turn became the basis of the American. By the time the Soviet Union fell in 1991, numerous lies, half-truths, omissions and so forth had hardened into "reality" and it has taken some hard hammer-and-chiseling to crack them at the edges. In short, Buttar makes the point that this colossal bloodbath has been forgotten, and when remembered, lied about, in large part because it could never be reconciled with the truth. The Stalinist narrative parroted by so many is that Rzhev was, ultimately, the Soviet army's strategy for tying German forces down on the central front so they could not join the fight at Stalingrad, and so it was a "victory" despite the slaughter. Sometimes it is grudgingly referred to as "proving ground" where the Red Army learned how to fight and win. Alternatively, it is downplayed or unmentioned because it was a staggering loss of human lives for almost no material gain and couldn't be reconciled with the glamorized, sanitized version of the war the communist party, and later nationalist Russian historians, presented to the world. Occupying these conflicting spaces, it has turned transparent to historical view.
Buttar meticulously but rather deftly describes how the strategic situation at the end of 1941 left the Germans dangerously close to Moscow, and how Stalin and Zhukov became obsessed with destroying the enemy salient at Rzhev, which pointed to the Soviet capital like a dagger. Month after month, they sent waves of men, horses and tanks crashing into the German lines, and month after month, these waves broke against a rigid, almost WWI-style defense. The Germans suffered terrible losses, especially of experienced men, but were able almost always to either hold off or recapture any lost territory. Even at the height of the Stalingrad battle, Zhukov was unable to crack the German defense at Rzhev and, being unable to admit defeat, used the ex post facto excuse that he was pinning German troops in place so they couldn't go elsewhere, when in fact he was actually trying, and failing, to destroy Hitler's Army Group Center. The descriptions of all this bloody, frantic fighting over destroyed towns and pestilential swamps full of rotting corpses and bloated horses and burned-out tanks are horrifying. Whole divisions were wiped out, reconstituted, thrown back into battle, and wiped out again -- and in some cases, again. The same areas were captured, lost, and recaptured endlessly, until the towns being fought over were nothing but rubble. Hitler's policy of inflexibility was rewarded here in the broad sense, but his army paid a steep price for standing its ground: the men he lost here were among the last of the victorious class of 1939 - 1941, and could not be replaced.
In the end, the Germans voluntarily abandoned the salient so they could release more divisions to fight at the Battle of Kursk in July of 1943. The Soviets claimed victory, but inherited a wasteland which had consumed a huge part of their nations' manhood. While I don't personally agree with every one of Buttar's conclusions, I do feel he has done a grand job of reconstructing this conflict, and in a literary style which places him in the company of Keegan, Irving, Foote, Gilbert, and a handful of others who actually know how to do scholarly work and form sentences in a pleasing way. This is not an "easy" book in the sense that the sheer volume of massacre is punishing to contemplate, but it's a valuable contribution to the literature on the subject.
June 1, 2023
Rzhev is a most curious set of battles. I have read now a couple books on the topic They all echo similar themes about the relative neglect of these battles until after 2000, its unclear significance to Stalingrad etc. Buttar goes into greater detail but there is much repetition , redundancy. The conclusion is thoughtful, however, and brings into focus the purposeful historiography of the Soviet military historians and the emergence of revisionism in the Putin era. Buttar may be onto the right road, that Zukhov and indirectly Stalin became obsessed with the Rzhev front; and his insights into Red Army problems with logistics, communications, recon , loss of officers and weak air operations are serious points re.Soviet military operations and their clumsy, costly modes. But I wonder, may be Rzhev/Moscow was not so readily related to Stalingrad due to severed N/S rail lines in 1942 (cut by Germans along the Don).
November 21, 2022
very detailed view of a little know but important series of battles in front of Moscow
A series of battles lasting 502 days detailed in very good form. The author talks about both sides their tactics and strategy and mistakes and successes. For both sides he shows how the official post war view has changed or even covered up mistakes and atrocities. For instance only in 2018 did the Russians erect a memorial on the battle field. In reading about the battle one is reminded of WWI or two men grappling with each other and both strangling each other in a fight. The author has many tales from the individual soldiers. Soviets talking about wagging tails. Rear echelon types or German talking about not shooting German dogs when home on leave as German dogs only bite they don’t blow up. I highly recommend this book. Another great work from Prit Buttar.
A series of battles lasting 502 days detailed in very good form. The author talks about both sides their tactics and strategy and mistakes and successes. For both sides he shows how the official post war view has changed or even covered up mistakes and atrocities. For instance only in 2018 did the Russians erect a memorial on the battle field. In reading about the battle one is reminded of WWI or two men grappling with each other and both strangling each other in a fight. The author has many tales from the individual soldiers. Soviets talking about wagging tails. Rear echelon types or German talking about not shooting German dogs when home on leave as German dogs only bite they don’t blow up. I highly recommend this book. Another great work from Prit Buttar.
September 7, 2022
An extremely well-researched book covering the little know campaign at the Rzhev Salient, on the Eastern Front during WW2, The author clearly knows his stuff!
The casualty figures in the millions are quite staggering and very difficult to comprehend. The Russians lost 10,000 men per kilometer of ground regained. 72% of all German casualties were suffered in the EAst fighting the Russians.
I really valued the insight of eyewitness accounts from both sides of the conflict. These brought the bloody battles to life.
It's a must-read book for military historians.
The casualty figures in the millions are quite staggering and very difficult to comprehend. The Russians lost 10,000 men per kilometer of ground regained. 72% of all German casualties were suffered in the EAst fighting the Russians.
I really valued the insight of eyewitness accounts from both sides of the conflict. These brought the bloody battles to life.
It's a must-read book for military historians.
December 12, 2023
A really good book overall about the Cental Front in the Nazi Soviet War. Too little has been written about this long bloody front that lasted 502 days. All German victories until they withdrew from the Rzhev salient in April 1943. There were probably over 1 million Soviet casualties, more than twice the number that America had in all of WWII. Soldiers didn't call it the meat grinder for mo reason.
PHIL Kuhn
PHIL Kuhn
June 2, 2024
Highly recommended
Excellent account of a bitter struggle by the Soviets to reduce the Rzhev salient. The operations to eliminate this bulge are often overlooked by the successful effort to surround the 6th army at Stalingrad but the fighting and looses incurred were brutal. Only other work that concentrates on the area and period is D. Glantz.
Excellent account of a bitter struggle by the Soviets to reduce the Rzhev salient. The operations to eliminate this bulge are often overlooked by the successful effort to surround the 6th army at Stalingrad but the fighting and looses incurred were brutal. Only other work that concentrates on the area and period is D. Glantz.
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