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Revolutionary Roads: Searching for the War That Made America Independent...and All the Places It Could Have Gone Terribly Wrong
In the ride-along tradition of Sarah Vowell, Tony Horwitz and Bill Bryson, this insightful history revisits the pivotal figures and key turning points of the American Revolutionary War.
Revolutionary Roads takes readers on a time-traveling adventure through the crucial places American independence was won and might have been lost. You’ll ride shotgun with Bob Thompson as he puts more than 20,000 miles on his car, not to mention his legs; walks history-shaping battlefields from Georgia to Quebec; and hangs out with passionate lovers of revolutionary history whose vivid storytelling and deep knowledge of their subject enrich his own. Braiding these elements together into a wonderfully entertaining whole – and with a reporter’s abiding concern for getting the story straight – he has written an American Revolution book like no other.
The Revolutionary War is one of the greatest stories in all history, an eight-year epic filled with self-sacrificing heroes, self-interested villains, and, more interestingly, all the shades of complex humanity in between. It boasts large-scale gambles that sometimes paid off but usually didn’t, as well as countless tiny, fraught tipping points like a misunderstood order in a South Carolina cow pasture that could have altered the course of the war. The drama is magnified when you consider what was at the fate of a social and political experiment that would transform the world. Yet we don’t know this story as well as we should, or how easily the ending could have changed.
Revolutionary Roads takes readers on a time-traveling adventure through the crucial places American independence was won and might have been lost. You’ll ride shotgun with Bob Thompson as he puts more than 20,000 miles on his car, not to mention his legs; walks history-shaping battlefields from Georgia to Quebec; and hangs out with passionate lovers of revolutionary history whose vivid storytelling and deep knowledge of their subject enrich his own. Braiding these elements together into a wonderfully entertaining whole – and with a reporter’s abiding concern for getting the story straight – he has written an American Revolution book like no other.
The Revolutionary War is one of the greatest stories in all history, an eight-year epic filled with self-sacrificing heroes, self-interested villains, and, more interestingly, all the shades of complex humanity in between. It boasts large-scale gambles that sometimes paid off but usually didn’t, as well as countless tiny, fraught tipping points like a misunderstood order in a South Carolina cow pasture that could have altered the course of the war. The drama is magnified when you consider what was at the fate of a social and political experiment that would transform the world. Yet we don’t know this story as well as we should, or how easily the ending could have changed.
448 pages, Hardcover
Published February 7, 2023
About the author
Bob Thompson
66 books5 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
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Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
December 2, 2022
Road trip! In Revolutionary Roads, Bob Thompson decides to quite literally head to the battlefields. He visits many of the major sites of the American Revolution and listens to the many experts he comes across along the way.
Thompson's style is free and easy. He writes about history in a mostly non-serious way and adds some flair to the drier sections. There is a fair amount of summing up the battles although a few like Saratoga get in-depth analysis. Benedict Arnold just begs to be examined with a microscope.
If you are a big Revolution buff, you will not find too much you don't already know. This is more of a "cheat sheet" to the war but you will still find some nuggets which are ignored in most books. Thompson's chapter on Black soldiers in the war is a particular standout.
For someone whose experience with the American Revolution is entirely confined to grade school, this is the perfect book for you. Thompson makes the war come alive and targets an audience who vaguely remembers the facts but is willing to give this time period another look. Thompson brings these revolutionary characters back to life for a casual audience.
(This book was provide as an advance copy by Netgalley and Twelve Books. The full review will be posted to HistoryNerdsUnited.com on 2/7/2023.)
Thompson's style is free and easy. He writes about history in a mostly non-serious way and adds some flair to the drier sections. There is a fair amount of summing up the battles although a few like Saratoga get in-depth analysis. Benedict Arnold just begs to be examined with a microscope.
If you are a big Revolution buff, you will not find too much you don't already know. This is more of a "cheat sheet" to the war but you will still find some nuggets which are ignored in most books. Thompson's chapter on Black soldiers in the war is a particular standout.
For someone whose experience with the American Revolution is entirely confined to grade school, this is the perfect book for you. Thompson makes the war come alive and targets an audience who vaguely remembers the facts but is willing to give this time period another look. Thompson brings these revolutionary characters back to life for a casual audience.
(This book was provide as an advance copy by Netgalley and Twelve Books. The full review will be posted to HistoryNerdsUnited.com on 2/7/2023.)
May 27, 2023
An interesting look at the Revolutionary War in which it becomes clear, among other things, that 1) Washington wasn't such a great general as he's made out to be, 2) state militias were often worse than worthless, and 3) it's a miracle we all aren't still speaking with British accents given how horribly bad we were at fighting the war (luckily, the British were worse). While we've made a parlor game of trashing the French since WWII, without them we probably would never have become a country.
David J. Kent
Author, Lincoln: The Fire of Genius
President, Lincoln Group of DC
David J. Kent
Author, Lincoln: The Fire of Genius
President, Lincoln Group of DC
Read
August 8, 2023"You are there!"
“Revolutionary Roads” is a well-researched, enlightening, entertaining, and engaging read. Along with plenty of period facts, there’s plenty of context color coming from the author’s site visits, “staff rides” (tours led by experts, often National Park Rangers), and conversations with local battle experts who have spent years researching their respective battles. Compared to other Rev War books, this gives one a relatively unique opportunity to view the battles through numerous prisms to get to exactly what happened and what was important to the outcome of the battles covered. All in all, if you will, it’s a Revolutionary War extended version of a Walter Cronkite “You Are There!” program.
Here are some particulars:
Coverage of the Saratoga battles with “dueling views” of the rangers interviewed reveals new information that could change the prevailing view of the relationship between Arnold and Gates and their roles in this major turning point of the war.
Along with the local color comes a generous dose of humor. For example, North Carolina’s motto “First in Flight” could be said to apply not to the Wrights at Kittyhawk but to NC’s militia fleeing the field in panic at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse.
My comments about several items throughout the book:
P 337 “He [Mad Anthony Wayne] had acquired his famous nickname by now [1781], for noncombat reasons nobody seems quite sure of, though.” Other sources discount one naming occasion: the Battle of Stony Point (1779), Wayne’s supposedly wild enthusiasm and disregard for his personal safety during the attack of the British-held fort. Possibly: Per a credible book, during the period of the Pennsylvania Line Mutiny in 1781, when a disobedient spy used by Wayne was outraged that his commander refused to lift the punishment of 29 lashes for his disorderly conduct and desertion and muttered: "Anthony is mad. He must be mad or he would help me.”
P 373 “October 19 was six and a half years to the day after some unknown person at Lexington fired the first shot of the war; after citizen-soldiers marched down a Concord hillside to the North Bridge; and after minute men and militia from all over northeastern Massachusetts converged on the Battle Road to drive the redcoats back to Boston.”
P 375 “Because after at least trying to trace the steps of so many people who fought that war—with Washington, against him, or without him—I came to understand something he unquestionably knew. Which is that at any number of times and places, a different step could have taken our story down an unknowable path.”
But…here, twice, I have a problem:
P 195 “In short, the Hero of Saratoga [Gates] and his allies posed a real threat to a bad tactical general [presumably Washington] on a losing streak. And in fending it off, which took a while, Washington showed more political savvy than all his opponents combined.”
and
P 200 “Modern historians I’ve read or talked with are united in their view that marching a couple thousand guys out of Valley Forge to scope out what the Brits were up to was ‘foolhardy,’ ‘bizarre,’ ‘as useless as it was perilous,’ and ‘an invitation to the British high command.’ Lafayette’s detachment, like Burgoyne’s at Second Saratoga, was ‘too large for a scouting expedition and too small to face a major attack.’ So why did Washington commit this act of folly? Was it only because he was a bad tactical general?”
With apologies, I’d like to take the opportunity to contest what I see as the author’s joining in the increasingly popular, amateur military historian trend to downplay Washington’s military skills and toy with him as a punching bag, damning him with faint or tongue-in-cheek praise, writing about him in hit pieces with a half-empty vs half-full perspective as if one were emphasizing Babe Ruth’s many strike-outs vis a vis astounding home runs.
While the author immediately goes on to try to soften the blow, he does not retract that he thinks Washington was bad at tactics. Nor does he change his tune that Washington’s goal at Monmouth was “to scope out what the Brits were up to.” Lee’s force was thus not a Reconnaissance-in-Force, just one that was to follow Clinton and look for opportunities to attack and strike a heavy blow.
About Washington:
When one looks at the Wikipedia entry on the Battle of Monmouth, one doesn’t get that all the generals involved thought the effort was stupid: “Washington's senior officers urged varying degrees of caution, but it was politically important for him not to allow the British to withdraw unscathed. Washington detached around a third of his army and sent it ahead under the command of Major General Charles Lee, hoping to land a heavy blow on the British without becoming embroiled in a major engagement.” Wikipedia says Washington had 14K vs Clinton’s 17K (other sources differ): More from Wikipedia:
“Washington was criticized in some quarters within the army and Congress for relying on a Fabian strategy to wear the British down in a long war of attrition instead of defeating it decisively in a pitched battle. … Nevertheless, the doubts about his leadership remained, and he needed success on the battlefield if he was to be sure of his position. … In the end, a compromise was agreed in which 1,500 picked men would reinforce the vanguard to "act as occasion may serve."
“The professional conduct of the American troops gained widespread recognition even among the British; Clinton's secretary wrote, "the Rebels stood much better than ever they did", and [British] Brigadier General Sir William Erskine, who as commander of the light infantry had traded blows with the Continentals, characterized the battle as a "handsome flogging" for the British, adding, "We had not receiv'd such a one in America."
Furthermore, I’ve consulted several retired-military widely-read, widely-published, expert military historian friends (a colonel and a general) to weigh in on the Battle of Monmouth….
From the colonel:
“Washington was committed to creating an army that could stand up to British regulars – principally to gain ‘legitimacy’ for the infant United States (domestic, international and from our British enemy) – and I see Monmouth as another attempt to try to demonstrate that.”
“Washington was totally committed to showing ‘the world’ that American troops could stand up, face to face, to trained British troops and hold their own. … Washington always sought to form and train American troops to fight a Frederician battle but who nonetheless had to, from circumstances beyond his control, fight a militia-heavy “Fabian” campaign that wore down British forces by using the ubiquitous Patriot militia to ‘control’ territory that the Brits could only hold temporarily, but inevitably had to withdraw, leaving the territory to the Patriots. In fact, that ‘seeking the Frederician battle’ is exactly why Washington considered the Yorktown siege/battle so vitally important to winning the revolution outright.”
“Most of the criticism from the new book is based on speculation: “What if?” the Brits had done this or done that or been better led at all echelons of command, etc. What we do know is that – whether he intended and plotted to get these results or they were serendipitous in the aftermath – Washington certainly gained several benefits (coming at a time when Congress and Washington’s growing ranks of critics were criticizing his Continental Army leadership and muttering about whether he should be replaced).”
“Although clearly, the battle’s outcome was ‘indecisive,’ the British left the Americans holding the field and kept on marching to Sandy Hook to be picked up by the Royal Navy and transported to NYC. Even though moving from Philadelphia was the Brit plan all along, Washington and his supporters claimed it a ‘stunning victory’ by ‘holding the field’ and that’s how it was presented to Congress and the Army and the American public at large. … Portraying publicly and widely Monmouth as a ‘Washington victory’ brought thousands of new recruits into the Continental Army. When Monmouth was fought, Continentals numbered 15,000. A month later they numbered over 19,000, and the numbers kept rising until December 1778, when they peaked at over 23,000. In September 1778, the number was 23,552, which was only slightly exceeded only once during the remainder of the war … A ‘tactical draw’ or not, Monmouth was trumpeted by Washington’s supporters as a great victory, due only to his generalship – the fallout/aftermath of Monmouth, true or not, created the “Indispensable Man” image of Washington and, in general, silenced his nagging critics.”
“Along that same line, Monmouth essentially ‘eliminated’ Charles Lee as a possible Continental Army commander replacement for Washington – for all practical purposes, Lee was Washington’s only real rival at that time and was the replacement Washington’s critics were mainly backing. Lee’s failed attack on the British rearguard and his subsequent retreat, and then Lee’s ill-advised public criticism of Washington, led to Lee’s court-martial (convicted on all three charges) and Lee was out. Washington was secure.”
“Those ‘benefits’ actually happened, and although the ‘what ifs?’ can be argued until folks are blue in the face, the real results were beneficial to Washington’s reputation and to the Continental Army (greater numbers via recruitment and higher morale).”
“Washington realized that the only way the American colonies could ‘win’ the Revolution was to maintain a standing army in the field and, essentially, ‘outlast’ Britain until it was in the ‘Mother Country’s’ best interest to ‘let them go their way.’ It was a brilliant deduction of what was necessary to win but it also took a tremendous, unprecedented effort of pure will on Washington’s part to see it through and make it happen. He never wavered, and brilliantly combined regular combat by the Continental Regulars with absolutely essential constantly active, continual operations by local/state militia units to eventually wear down British forces until final victory. It was a total, unexpected, but certain ‘victory’ of Washington’s perseverance and character against seemingly overwhelming odds that puts George Washington at the head of the list of brilliant military commanders.”
From the general:
“A confused retreat of about three miles resulted [after Lee and his advanced detachment lost control of the initial American attack at Monmouth]. Washington, galloping to the sound of the guns, rode headlong into the midst of the reeling Continentals, at once assumed command, rallied the shaken troops, and stopped the British short. After reinforcing his stalled units, Clinton launched several attacks only to be repulsed each time by disciplined and stead Americans. Washington then organized a counterattack, but the day was done.”
From another general:
“Washington then arrived on the battlefield at the head of two divisions under Green and Stirling. Furiously castigating Lee, Washington rode forward to halt the retreat and organize a line of defense. As some indication of the transformed relationship between Washington and his soldiers since Valley Forge, his appearance on the field caused the Continentals to break out cheering. Unlike previous engagements such as Kips Bay, the retreating troops halted and instantly obeyed his commands. In the subsequent fighting, Washington steadied his hard-pressed infantry. … Monmouth’s consequences extended beyond the battlefield. By successfully portraying the battle as an American victory, Washington erased the embarrassments and 1777 and secured his place as commander in chief. His most vocal critics had for various reasons been forced out of the Army. … The continuity thus established at the head of the army, and the additional time given to Washington to develop his significant skills would prove decisive for American victory in the war.”
My thoughts:
The American attack upon the retreating British at Monmouth was only supposed to happen when they saw an advantage and not move into a major engagement. Lee’s inept generalship allowed an uncoordinated attack with men out of proper formation. After the war, it was discovered that Lee, while earlier a prisoner, had sent the Howe brothers a plan by which the British might defeat the rebellion. Might bungling the attack then have been Lee’s plan all along?
Also, “…In forging a nation, Washington had seen not only feats but failures. These mistakes have often been blamed on his “indecisiveness” in the fog and confusion of war, where few battle plans survive first contact with the enemy. Yet Washington was a sound thinker and integrator not prone to make hasty decisions. He had no problem consulting the best of minds, unlike Cornwallis, who usually made his decisions alone. Washington’s manner of thinking and system of operating, together with his genius of character, served him quite well, drawing supporters impressed with his honesty, rationality, and habit of seeing that virtue was rewarded. “In George we trust” could have been the nation’s motto. His mistakes, if one could call them that, were often made in trying to balance the complex and often conflicting requirements of his civilian leaders, politicians, and representatives of the people, especially when they wanted him to defend their cities, which were often, like New York City, indefensible against the combined forces of Britain’s army and navy. As well, Washington’s attempts to fight near Philadelphia at Brandywine and Germantown can be viewed not just as regrettable tactical defeats, but as strategic victories in helping to bring the French into the war by proving America was willing to fight. And by deferring to civilian leaders, Washington gained their trust and support and so made it not only his but the people’s war…and with that most significant factor that Lafayette delivered (French help), eventually came victory and peace.
But, again, “a bad tactical general”?
Congress assigned to Washington’s command generals of dubious and unproven reputations. His officer class comprised many young and inexperienced individuals. Along the way, Washington assembled and maintained an underpaid, undertrained, underfed Army in the midst of a civil war and a British invasion with the world’s mightiest army and navy. Remember that, except for the likes of the problematic generals Lee and Gates, virtually all of his American generals had been out of military service since the end of the French and Indian War, 12 years earlier (1775-1763), and at much lower levels of command.
Washington’s battle record was, depending upon how one counts them, either 6 wins, 6 losses, and 2 ties or, as per Wikipedia: 6 wins, 7 losses (an extra small battle/skirmish included), and 2 ties. All in all, close to batting .500. Washington’s most glorious wins were associated with Trenton/Princeton in the “10 Days that Changed the World” and Yorktown. His defeats in New York related to Congress’ command to defend NYC. The New Jersey battles of Brandywine and Germantown, while tactical defeats, were related to the strategic victory of helping to bring on the French alliance by proving that Americans were willing to fight.
Also, Washington oversaw a masterful retreat from Long Island into NYC. Middlebrook, NJ, where he helped to bring about the Saratoga victory by delaying for months Howe’s reaching Philadelphia before trying to help Burgoyne, was also a masterpiece, He also had a masterpiece of maneuver and logistics in taking his troops from New York to Virginia in the Yorktown campaign, outwitting British General Clinton.
Finally, and emphatically, the “Old Fox” Washington face-to-face-bested the much later honored British “fighting [tactical] general” Cornwallis at 2nd Trenton and Yorktown.
About Greene
It is said that Nathanael Greene, usually recognized as Washington’s most talented and dependable officer and, by Washington’s critics, was a military genius. However, Greene was the one who advised Washington to defend Fort Washington (resulting in a virtual American catastrophe both there and later across the river at Ft. Lee). As well, “…as army commander, [Greene] never won a battle but did win the war [in the South]. Remember Greene’s famous quote: “We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again.” Said like another bad tactical general?
Cornwallis wrote that Greene was "as dangerous as Washington. He is vigilant, enterprising, and full of resources–there is but little hope of gaining an advantage over him." Obviously, by praising Greene, Cornwallis is also praising Washington. Washington and Greene, bad tactical generals?
As regards Greene’s own thoughts about Washington: “His Excellency, General Washington, never appeared to so much advantage as in the hour of distress [tactics].”
Summary:
Both Washington and Greene were master learners. They always strived to perfect their skills. They both had “The Right Stuff.” As well, remember the Teddy Roosevelt quote:
“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; ….
So, hopefully with your patience not exhausted, enough of Washington and his tactical skills or his lack thereof. Back to the book.
The valuable Amazon resource of “Look inside” is available for the book’s hardcover version, and while the print version has an index, the Kindle version doesn’t. OTOH, the Kindle version does have a search function.
Bottom-line, and my extended defense of Washington aside, because of the unique material this book contains coming from the onsite visits and local experts, I’d classify it as a must-read for Revolutionary War enthusiasts.
Of possible interest, the 14 military strategies George Washington and his lieutenants used during the Revolutionary War are identified and explained as part of the following book:Strategic Advantage: How to Win in War, Business, and Life
“Revolutionary Roads” is a well-researched, enlightening, entertaining, and engaging read. Along with plenty of period facts, there’s plenty of context color coming from the author’s site visits, “staff rides” (tours led by experts, often National Park Rangers), and conversations with local battle experts who have spent years researching their respective battles. Compared to other Rev War books, this gives one a relatively unique opportunity to view the battles through numerous prisms to get to exactly what happened and what was important to the outcome of the battles covered. All in all, if you will, it’s a Revolutionary War extended version of a Walter Cronkite “You Are There!” program.
Here are some particulars:
Coverage of the Saratoga battles with “dueling views” of the rangers interviewed reveals new information that could change the prevailing view of the relationship between Arnold and Gates and their roles in this major turning point of the war.
Along with the local color comes a generous dose of humor. For example, North Carolina’s motto “First in Flight” could be said to apply not to the Wrights at Kittyhawk but to NC’s militia fleeing the field in panic at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse.
My comments about several items throughout the book:
P 337 “He [Mad Anthony Wayne] had acquired his famous nickname by now [1781], for noncombat reasons nobody seems quite sure of, though.” Other sources discount one naming occasion: the Battle of Stony Point (1779), Wayne’s supposedly wild enthusiasm and disregard for his personal safety during the attack of the British-held fort. Possibly: Per a credible book, during the period of the Pennsylvania Line Mutiny in 1781, when a disobedient spy used by Wayne was outraged that his commander refused to lift the punishment of 29 lashes for his disorderly conduct and desertion and muttered: "Anthony is mad. He must be mad or he would help me.”
P 373 “October 19 was six and a half years to the day after some unknown person at Lexington fired the first shot of the war; after citizen-soldiers marched down a Concord hillside to the North Bridge; and after minute men and militia from all over northeastern Massachusetts converged on the Battle Road to drive the redcoats back to Boston.”
P 375 “Because after at least trying to trace the steps of so many people who fought that war—with Washington, against him, or without him—I came to understand something he unquestionably knew. Which is that at any number of times and places, a different step could have taken our story down an unknowable path.”
But…here, twice, I have a problem:
P 195 “In short, the Hero of Saratoga [Gates] and his allies posed a real threat to a bad tactical general [presumably Washington] on a losing streak. And in fending it off, which took a while, Washington showed more political savvy than all his opponents combined.”
and
P 200 “Modern historians I’ve read or talked with are united in their view that marching a couple thousand guys out of Valley Forge to scope out what the Brits were up to was ‘foolhardy,’ ‘bizarre,’ ‘as useless as it was perilous,’ and ‘an invitation to the British high command.’ Lafayette’s detachment, like Burgoyne’s at Second Saratoga, was ‘too large for a scouting expedition and too small to face a major attack.’ So why did Washington commit this act of folly? Was it only because he was a bad tactical general?”
With apologies, I’d like to take the opportunity to contest what I see as the author’s joining in the increasingly popular, amateur military historian trend to downplay Washington’s military skills and toy with him as a punching bag, damning him with faint or tongue-in-cheek praise, writing about him in hit pieces with a half-empty vs half-full perspective as if one were emphasizing Babe Ruth’s many strike-outs vis a vis astounding home runs.
While the author immediately goes on to try to soften the blow, he does not retract that he thinks Washington was bad at tactics. Nor does he change his tune that Washington’s goal at Monmouth was “to scope out what the Brits were up to.” Lee’s force was thus not a Reconnaissance-in-Force, just one that was to follow Clinton and look for opportunities to attack and strike a heavy blow.
About Washington:
When one looks at the Wikipedia entry on the Battle of Monmouth, one doesn’t get that all the generals involved thought the effort was stupid: “Washington's senior officers urged varying degrees of caution, but it was politically important for him not to allow the British to withdraw unscathed. Washington detached around a third of his army and sent it ahead under the command of Major General Charles Lee, hoping to land a heavy blow on the British without becoming embroiled in a major engagement.” Wikipedia says Washington had 14K vs Clinton’s 17K (other sources differ): More from Wikipedia:
“Washington was criticized in some quarters within the army and Congress for relying on a Fabian strategy to wear the British down in a long war of attrition instead of defeating it decisively in a pitched battle. … Nevertheless, the doubts about his leadership remained, and he needed success on the battlefield if he was to be sure of his position. … In the end, a compromise was agreed in which 1,500 picked men would reinforce the vanguard to "act as occasion may serve."
“The professional conduct of the American troops gained widespread recognition even among the British; Clinton's secretary wrote, "the Rebels stood much better than ever they did", and [British] Brigadier General Sir William Erskine, who as commander of the light infantry had traded blows with the Continentals, characterized the battle as a "handsome flogging" for the British, adding, "We had not receiv'd such a one in America."
Furthermore, I’ve consulted several retired-military widely-read, widely-published, expert military historian friends (a colonel and a general) to weigh in on the Battle of Monmouth….
From the colonel:
“Washington was committed to creating an army that could stand up to British regulars – principally to gain ‘legitimacy’ for the infant United States (domestic, international and from our British enemy) – and I see Monmouth as another attempt to try to demonstrate that.”
“Washington was totally committed to showing ‘the world’ that American troops could stand up, face to face, to trained British troops and hold their own. … Washington always sought to form and train American troops to fight a Frederician battle but who nonetheless had to, from circumstances beyond his control, fight a militia-heavy “Fabian” campaign that wore down British forces by using the ubiquitous Patriot militia to ‘control’ territory that the Brits could only hold temporarily, but inevitably had to withdraw, leaving the territory to the Patriots. In fact, that ‘seeking the Frederician battle’ is exactly why Washington considered the Yorktown siege/battle so vitally important to winning the revolution outright.”
“Most of the criticism from the new book is based on speculation: “What if?” the Brits had done this or done that or been better led at all echelons of command, etc. What we do know is that – whether he intended and plotted to get these results or they were serendipitous in the aftermath – Washington certainly gained several benefits (coming at a time when Congress and Washington’s growing ranks of critics were criticizing his Continental Army leadership and muttering about whether he should be replaced).”
“Although clearly, the battle’s outcome was ‘indecisive,’ the British left the Americans holding the field and kept on marching to Sandy Hook to be picked up by the Royal Navy and transported to NYC. Even though moving from Philadelphia was the Brit plan all along, Washington and his supporters claimed it a ‘stunning victory’ by ‘holding the field’ and that’s how it was presented to Congress and the Army and the American public at large. … Portraying publicly and widely Monmouth as a ‘Washington victory’ brought thousands of new recruits into the Continental Army. When Monmouth was fought, Continentals numbered 15,000. A month later they numbered over 19,000, and the numbers kept rising until December 1778, when they peaked at over 23,000. In September 1778, the number was 23,552, which was only slightly exceeded only once during the remainder of the war … A ‘tactical draw’ or not, Monmouth was trumpeted by Washington’s supporters as a great victory, due only to his generalship – the fallout/aftermath of Monmouth, true or not, created the “Indispensable Man” image of Washington and, in general, silenced his nagging critics.”
“Along that same line, Monmouth essentially ‘eliminated’ Charles Lee as a possible Continental Army commander replacement for Washington – for all practical purposes, Lee was Washington’s only real rival at that time and was the replacement Washington’s critics were mainly backing. Lee’s failed attack on the British rearguard and his subsequent retreat, and then Lee’s ill-advised public criticism of Washington, led to Lee’s court-martial (convicted on all three charges) and Lee was out. Washington was secure.”
“Those ‘benefits’ actually happened, and although the ‘what ifs?’ can be argued until folks are blue in the face, the real results were beneficial to Washington’s reputation and to the Continental Army (greater numbers via recruitment and higher morale).”
“Washington realized that the only way the American colonies could ‘win’ the Revolution was to maintain a standing army in the field and, essentially, ‘outlast’ Britain until it was in the ‘Mother Country’s’ best interest to ‘let them go their way.’ It was a brilliant deduction of what was necessary to win but it also took a tremendous, unprecedented effort of pure will on Washington’s part to see it through and make it happen. He never wavered, and brilliantly combined regular combat by the Continental Regulars with absolutely essential constantly active, continual operations by local/state militia units to eventually wear down British forces until final victory. It was a total, unexpected, but certain ‘victory’ of Washington’s perseverance and character against seemingly overwhelming odds that puts George Washington at the head of the list of brilliant military commanders.”
From the general:
“A confused retreat of about three miles resulted [after Lee and his advanced detachment lost control of the initial American attack at Monmouth]. Washington, galloping to the sound of the guns, rode headlong into the midst of the reeling Continentals, at once assumed command, rallied the shaken troops, and stopped the British short. After reinforcing his stalled units, Clinton launched several attacks only to be repulsed each time by disciplined and stead Americans. Washington then organized a counterattack, but the day was done.”
From another general:
“Washington then arrived on the battlefield at the head of two divisions under Green and Stirling. Furiously castigating Lee, Washington rode forward to halt the retreat and organize a line of defense. As some indication of the transformed relationship between Washington and his soldiers since Valley Forge, his appearance on the field caused the Continentals to break out cheering. Unlike previous engagements such as Kips Bay, the retreating troops halted and instantly obeyed his commands. In the subsequent fighting, Washington steadied his hard-pressed infantry. … Monmouth’s consequences extended beyond the battlefield. By successfully portraying the battle as an American victory, Washington erased the embarrassments and 1777 and secured his place as commander in chief. His most vocal critics had for various reasons been forced out of the Army. … The continuity thus established at the head of the army, and the additional time given to Washington to develop his significant skills would prove decisive for American victory in the war.”
My thoughts:
The American attack upon the retreating British at Monmouth was only supposed to happen when they saw an advantage and not move into a major engagement. Lee’s inept generalship allowed an uncoordinated attack with men out of proper formation. After the war, it was discovered that Lee, while earlier a prisoner, had sent the Howe brothers a plan by which the British might defeat the rebellion. Might bungling the attack then have been Lee’s plan all along?
Also, “…In forging a nation, Washington had seen not only feats but failures. These mistakes have often been blamed on his “indecisiveness” in the fog and confusion of war, where few battle plans survive first contact with the enemy. Yet Washington was a sound thinker and integrator not prone to make hasty decisions. He had no problem consulting the best of minds, unlike Cornwallis, who usually made his decisions alone. Washington’s manner of thinking and system of operating, together with his genius of character, served him quite well, drawing supporters impressed with his honesty, rationality, and habit of seeing that virtue was rewarded. “In George we trust” could have been the nation’s motto. His mistakes, if one could call them that, were often made in trying to balance the complex and often conflicting requirements of his civilian leaders, politicians, and representatives of the people, especially when they wanted him to defend their cities, which were often, like New York City, indefensible against the combined forces of Britain’s army and navy. As well, Washington’s attempts to fight near Philadelphia at Brandywine and Germantown can be viewed not just as regrettable tactical defeats, but as strategic victories in helping to bring the French into the war by proving America was willing to fight. And by deferring to civilian leaders, Washington gained their trust and support and so made it not only his but the people’s war…and with that most significant factor that Lafayette delivered (French help), eventually came victory and peace.
But, again, “a bad tactical general”?
Congress assigned to Washington’s command generals of dubious and unproven reputations. His officer class comprised many young and inexperienced individuals. Along the way, Washington assembled and maintained an underpaid, undertrained, underfed Army in the midst of a civil war and a British invasion with the world’s mightiest army and navy. Remember that, except for the likes of the problematic generals Lee and Gates, virtually all of his American generals had been out of military service since the end of the French and Indian War, 12 years earlier (1775-1763), and at much lower levels of command.
Washington’s battle record was, depending upon how one counts them, either 6 wins, 6 losses, and 2 ties or, as per Wikipedia: 6 wins, 7 losses (an extra small battle/skirmish included), and 2 ties. All in all, close to batting .500. Washington’s most glorious wins were associated with Trenton/Princeton in the “10 Days that Changed the World” and Yorktown. His defeats in New York related to Congress’ command to defend NYC. The New Jersey battles of Brandywine and Germantown, while tactical defeats, were related to the strategic victory of helping to bring on the French alliance by proving that Americans were willing to fight.
Also, Washington oversaw a masterful retreat from Long Island into NYC. Middlebrook, NJ, where he helped to bring about the Saratoga victory by delaying for months Howe’s reaching Philadelphia before trying to help Burgoyne, was also a masterpiece, He also had a masterpiece of maneuver and logistics in taking his troops from New York to Virginia in the Yorktown campaign, outwitting British General Clinton.
Finally, and emphatically, the “Old Fox” Washington face-to-face-bested the much later honored British “fighting [tactical] general” Cornwallis at 2nd Trenton and Yorktown.
About Greene
It is said that Nathanael Greene, usually recognized as Washington’s most talented and dependable officer and, by Washington’s critics, was a military genius. However, Greene was the one who advised Washington to defend Fort Washington (resulting in a virtual American catastrophe both there and later across the river at Ft. Lee). As well, “…as army commander, [Greene] never won a battle but did win the war [in the South]. Remember Greene’s famous quote: “We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again.” Said like another bad tactical general?
Cornwallis wrote that Greene was "as dangerous as Washington. He is vigilant, enterprising, and full of resources–there is but little hope of gaining an advantage over him." Obviously, by praising Greene, Cornwallis is also praising Washington. Washington and Greene, bad tactical generals?
As regards Greene’s own thoughts about Washington: “His Excellency, General Washington, never appeared to so much advantage as in the hour of distress [tactics].”
Summary:
Both Washington and Greene were master learners. They always strived to perfect their skills. They both had “The Right Stuff.” As well, remember the Teddy Roosevelt quote:
“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; ….
So, hopefully with your patience not exhausted, enough of Washington and his tactical skills or his lack thereof. Back to the book.
The valuable Amazon resource of “Look inside” is available for the book’s hardcover version, and while the print version has an index, the Kindle version doesn’t. OTOH, the Kindle version does have a search function.
Bottom-line, and my extended defense of Washington aside, because of the unique material this book contains coming from the onsite visits and local experts, I’d classify it as a must-read for Revolutionary War enthusiasts.
Of possible interest, the 14 military strategies George Washington and his lieutenants used during the Revolutionary War are identified and explained as part of the following book:Strategic Advantage: How to Win in War, Business, and Life
August 8, 2023
"You are there!"
“Revolutionary Roads” is a well-researched, enlightening, entertaining, and engaging read. Along with plenty of period facts, there’s plenty of context color coming from the author’s site visits, “staff rides” (tours led by experts, often National Park Rangers), and conversations with local battle experts who have spent years researching their respective battles. Compared to other Rev War books, this gives one a relatively unique opportunity to view the battles through numerous prisms to get to exactly what happened and what was important to the outcome of the battles covered. All in all, if you will, it’s a Revolutionary War extended version of a Walter Cronkite “You Are There!” program.
Here are some particulars:
Coverage of the Saratoga battles with “dueling views” of the rangers interviewed reveals new information that could change the prevailing view of the relationship between Arnold and Gates and their roles in this major turning point of the war.
Along with the local color comes a generous dose of humor. For example, North Carolina’s motto “First in Flight” could be said to apply not to the Wrights at Kittyhawk but to NC’s militia fleeing the field in panic at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse.
My comments about several items throughout the book:
P 337 “He [Mad Anthony Wayne] had acquired his famous nickname by now [1781], for noncombat reasons nobody seems quite sure of, though.” Other sources discount one naming occasion: the Battle of Stony Point (1779), Wayne’s supposedly wild enthusiasm and disregard for his personal safety during the attack of the British-held fort. Possibly: Per a credible book, during the period of the Pennsylvania Line Mutiny in 1781, when a disobedient spy used by Wayne was outraged that his commander refused to lift the punishment of 29 lashes for his disorderly conduct and desertion and muttered: "Anthony is mad. He must be mad or he would help me.”
P 373 “October 19 was six and a half years to the day after some unknown person at Lexington fired the first shot of the war; after citizen-soldiers marched down a Concord hillside to the North Bridge; and after minute men and militia from all over northeastern Massachusetts converged on the Battle Road to drive the redcoats back to Boston.”
P 375 “Because after at least trying to trace the steps of so many people who fought that war—with Washington, against him, or without him—I came to understand something he unquestionably knew. Which is that at any number of times and places, a different step could have taken our story down an unknowable path.”
But…here, twice, I have a problem:
P 195 “In short, the Hero of Saratoga [Gates] and his allies posed a real threat to a bad tactical general [presumably Washington] on a losing streak. And in fending it off, which took a while, Washington showed more political savvy than all his opponents combined.”
and
P 200 “Modern historians I’ve read or talked with are united in their view that marching a couple thousand guys out of Valley Forge to scope out what the Brits were up to was ‘foolhardy,’ ‘bizarre,’ ‘as useless as it was perilous,’ and ‘an invitation to the British high command.’ Lafayette’s detachment, like Burgoyne’s at Second Saratoga, was ‘too large for a scouting expedition and too small to face a major attack.’ So why did Washington commit this act of folly? Was it only because he was a bad tactical general?”
With apologies, I’d like to take the opportunity to contest what I see as the author’s joining in the increasingly popular, amateur military historian trend to downplay Washington’s military skills and toy with him as a punching bag, damning him with faint or tongue-in-cheek praise, writing about him in hit pieces with a half-empty vs half-full perspective as if one were emphasizing Babe Ruth’s many strike-outs vis a vis astounding home runs.
While the author immediately goes on to try to soften the blow, he does not retract that he thinks Washington was bad at tactics. Nor does he change his tune that Washington’s goal at Monmouth was “to scope out what the Brits were up to.” Lee’s force was thus not a Reconnaissance-in-Force, just one that was to follow Clinton and look for opportunities to attack and strike a heavy blow.
About Washington:
When one looks at the Wikipedia entry on the Battle of Monmouth, one doesn’t get that all the generals involved thought the effort was stupid: “Washington's senior officers urged varying degrees of caution, but it was politically important for him not to allow the British to withdraw unscathed. Washington detached around a third of his army and sent it ahead under the command of Major General Charles Lee, hoping to land a heavy blow on the British without becoming embroiled in a major engagement.” Wikipedia says Washington had 14K vs Clinton’s 17K (other sources differ): More from Wikipedia:
“Washington was criticized in some quarters within the army and Congress for relying on a Fabian strategy to wear the British down in a long war of attrition instead of defeating it decisively in a pitched battle. … Nevertheless, the doubts about his leadership remained, and he needed success on the battlefield if he was to be sure of his position. … In the end, a compromise was agreed in which 1,500 picked men would reinforce the vanguard to "act as occasion may serve."
“The professional conduct of the American troops gained widespread recognition even among the British; Clinton's secretary wrote, "the Rebels stood much better than ever they did", and [British] Brigadier General Sir William Erskine, who as commander of the light infantry had traded blows with the Continentals, characterized the battle as a "handsome flogging" for the British, adding, "We had not receiv'd such a one in America."
Furthermore, I’ve consulted several retired-military widely-read, widely-published, expert military historian friends (a colonel and a general) to weigh in on the Battle of Monmouth….
From the colonel:
“Washington was committed to creating an army that could stand up to British regulars – principally to gain ‘legitimacy’ for the infant United States (domestic, international and from our British enemy) – and I see Monmouth as another attempt to try to demonstrate that.”
“Washington was totally committed to showing ‘the world’ that American troops could stand up, face to face, to trained British troops and hold their own. … Washington always sought to form and train American troops to fight a Frederician battle but who nonetheless had to, from circumstances beyond his control, fight a militia-heavy “Fabian” campaign that wore down British forces by using the ubiquitous Patriot militia to ‘control’ territory that the Brits could only hold temporarily, but inevitably had to withdraw, leaving the territory to the Patriots. In fact, that ‘seeking the Frederician battle’ is exactly why Washington considered the Yorktown siege/battle so vitally important to winning the revolution outright.”
“Most of the criticism from the new book is based on speculation: “What if?” the Brits had done this or done that or been better led at all echelons of command, etc. What we do know is that – whether he intended and plotted to get these results or they were serendipitous in the aftermath – Washington certainly gained several benefits (coming at a time when Congress and Washington’s growing ranks of critics were criticizing his Continental Army leadership and muttering about whether he should be replaced).”
“Although clearly, the battle’s outcome was ‘indecisive,’ the British left the Americans holding the field and kept on marching to Sandy Hook to be picked up by the Royal Navy and transported to NYC. Even though moving from Philadelphia was the Brit plan all along, Washington and his supporters claimed it a ‘stunning victory’ by ‘holding the field’ and that’s how it was presented to Congress and the Army and the American public at large. … Portraying publicly and widely Monmouth as a ‘Washington victory’ brought thousands of new recruits into the Continental Army. When Monmouth was fought, Continentals numbered 15,000. A month later they numbered over 19,000, and the numbers kept rising until December 1778, when they peaked at over 23,000. In September 1778, the number was 23,552, which was only slightly exceeded only once during the remainder of the war … A ‘tactical draw’ or not, Monmouth was trumpeted by Washington’s supporters as a great victory, due only to his generalship – the fallout/aftermath of Monmouth, true or not, created the “Indispensable Man” image of Washington and, in general, silenced his nagging critics.”
“Along that same line, Monmouth essentially ‘eliminated’ Charles Lee as a possible Continental Army commander replacement for Washington – for all practical purposes, Lee was Washington’s only real rival at that time and was the replacement Washington’s critics were mainly backing. Lee’s failed attack on the British rearguard and his subsequent retreat, and then Lee’s ill-advised public criticism of Washington, led to Lee’s court-martial (convicted on all three charges) and Lee was out. Washington was secure.”
“Those ‘benefits’ actually happened, and although the ‘what ifs?’ can be argued until folks are blue in the face, the real results were beneficial to Washington’s reputation and to the Continental Army (greater numbers via recruitment and higher morale).”
“Washington realized that the only way the American colonies could ‘win’ the Revolution was to maintain a standing army in the field and, essentially, ‘outlast’ Britain until it was in the ‘Mother Country’s’ best interest to ‘let them go their way.’ It was a brilliant deduction of what was necessary to win but it also took a tremendous, unprecedented effort of pure will on Washington’s part to see it through and make it happen. He never wavered, and brilliantly combined regular combat by the Continental Regulars with absolutely essential constantly active, continual operations by local/state militia units to eventually wear down British forces until final victory. It was a total, unexpected, but certain ‘victory’ of Washington’s perseverance and character against seemingly overwhelming odds that puts George Washington at the head of the list of brilliant military commanders.”
From the general:
“A confused retreat of about three miles resulted [after Lee and his advanced detachment lost control of the initial American attack at Monmouth]. Washington, galloping to the sound of the guns, rode headlong into the midst of the reeling Continentals, at once assumed command, rallied the shaken troops, and stopped the British short. After reinforcing his stalled units, Clinton launched several attacks only to be repulsed each time by disciplined and stead Americans. Washington then organized a counterattack, but the day was done.”
From another general:
“Washington then arrived on the battlefield at the head of two divisions under Green and Stirling. Furiously castigating Lee, Washington rode forward to halt the retreat and organize a line of defense. As some indication of the transformed relationship between Washington and his soldiers since Valley Forge, his appearance on the field caused the Continentals to break out cheering. Unlike previous engagements such as Kips Bay, the retreating troops halted and instantly obeyed his commands. In the subsequent fighting, Washington steadied his hard-pressed infantry. … Monmouth’s consequences extended beyond the battlefield. By successfully portraying the battle as an American victory, Washington erased the embarrassments and 1777 and secured his place as commander in chief. His most vocal critics had for various reasons been forced out of the Army. … The continuity thus established at the head of the army, and the additional time given to Washington to develop his significant skills would prove decisive for American victory in the war.”
My thoughts:
The American attack upon the retreating British at Monmouth was only supposed to happen when they saw an advantage and not move into a major engagement. Lee’s inept generalship allowed an uncoordinated attack with men out of proper formation. After the war, it was discovered that Lee, while earlier a prisoner, had sent the Howe brothers a plan by which the British might defeat the rebellion. Might bungling the attack then have been Lee’s plan all along?
Also, “…In forging a nation, Washington had seen not only feats but failures. These mistakes have often been blamed on his “indecisiveness” in the fog and confusion of war, where few battle plans survive first contact with the enemy. Yet Washington was a sound thinker and integrator not prone to make hasty decisions. He had no problem consulting the best of minds, unlike Cornwallis, who usually made his decisions alone. Washington’s manner of thinking and system of operating, together with his genius of character, served him quite well, drawing supporters impressed with his honesty, rationality, and habit of seeing that virtue was rewarded. “In George we trust” could have been the nation’s motto. His mistakes, if one could call them that, were often made in trying to balance the complex and often conflicting requirements of his civilian leaders, politicians, and representatives of the people, especially when they wanted him to defend their cities, which were often, like New York City, indefensible against the combined forces of Britain’s army and navy. As well, Washington’s attempts to fight near Philadelphia at Brandywine and Germantown can be viewed not just as regrettable tactical defeats, but as strategic victories in helping to bring the French into the war by proving America was willing to fight. And by deferring to civilian leaders, Washington gained their trust and support and so made it not only his but the people’s war…and with that most significant factor that Lafayette delivered (French help), eventually came victory and peace.
But, again, “a bad tactical general”?
Congress assigned to Washington’s command generals of dubious and unproven reputations. His officer class comprised many young and inexperienced individuals. Along the way, Washington assembled and maintained an underpaid, undertrained, underfed Army in the midst of a civil war and a British invasion with the world’s mightiest army and navy. Remember that, except for the likes of the problematic generals Lee and Gates, virtually all of his American generals had been out of military service since the end of the French and Indian War, 12 years earlier (1775-1763), and at much lower levels of command.
Washington’s battle record was, depending upon how one counts them, either 6 wins, 6 losses, and 2 ties or, as per Wikipedia: 6 wins, 7 losses (an extra small battle/skirmish included), and 2 ties. All in all, close to batting .500. Washington’s most glorious wins were associated with Trenton/Princeton in the “10 Days that Changed the World” and Yorktown. His defeats in New York related to Congress’ command to defend NYC. The New Jersey battles of Brandywine and Germantown, while tactical defeats, were related to the strategic victory of helping to bring on the French alliance by proving that Americans were willing to fight.
Also, Washington oversaw a masterful retreat from Long Island into NYC. Middlebrook, NJ, where he helped to bring about the Saratoga victory by delaying for months Howe’s reaching Philadelphia before trying to help Burgoyne, was also a masterpiece, He also had a masterpiece of maneuver and logistics in taking his troops from New York to Virginia in the Yorktown campaign, outwitting British General Clinton.
Finally, and emphatically, the “Old Fox” Washington face-to-face-bested the much later honored British “fighting [tactical] general” Cornwallis at 2nd Trenton and Yorktown.
About Greene
It is said that Nathanael Greene, usually recognized as Washington’s most talented and dependable officer and, by Washington’s critics, was a military genius. However, Greene was the one who advised Washington to defend Fort Washington (resulting in a virtual American catastrophe both there and later across the river at Ft. Lee). As well, “…as army commander, [Greene] never won a battle but did win the war [in the South]. Remember Greene’s famous quote: “We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again.” Said like another bad tactical general?
Cornwallis wrote that Greene was "as dangerous as Washington. He is vigilant, enterprising, and full of resources–there is but little hope of gaining an advantage over him." Obviously, by praising Greene, Cornwallis is also praising Washington. Washington and Greene, bad tactical generals?
As regards Greene’s own thoughts about Washington: “His Excellency, General Washington, never appeared to so much advantage as in the hour of distress [tactics].”
Summary:
Both Washington and Greene were master learners. They always strived to perfect their skills. They both had “The Right Stuff.” As well, remember the Teddy Roosevelt quote:
“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; ….
So, hopefully with your patience not exhausted, enough of Washington and his tactical skills or his lack thereof. Back to the book.
The valuable Amazon resource of “Look inside” is available for the book’s hardcover version, and while the print version has an index, the Kindle version doesn’t. OTOH, the Kindle version does have a search function.
Bottom-line, and my extended defense of Washington aside, because of the unique material this book contains coming from the onsite visits and local experts, I’d classify it as a must-read for Revolutionary War enthusiasts.
Of possible interest, the 14 military strategies George Washington and his lieutenants used during the Revolutionary War are identified and explained as part of the following book:
“Revolutionary Roads” is a well-researched, enlightening, entertaining, and engaging read. Along with plenty of period facts, there’s plenty of context color coming from the author’s site visits, “staff rides” (tours led by experts, often National Park Rangers), and conversations with local battle experts who have spent years researching their respective battles. Compared to other Rev War books, this gives one a relatively unique opportunity to view the battles through numerous prisms to get to exactly what happened and what was important to the outcome of the battles covered. All in all, if you will, it’s a Revolutionary War extended version of a Walter Cronkite “You Are There!” program.
Here are some particulars:
Coverage of the Saratoga battles with “dueling views” of the rangers interviewed reveals new information that could change the prevailing view of the relationship between Arnold and Gates and their roles in this major turning point of the war.
Along with the local color comes a generous dose of humor. For example, North Carolina’s motto “First in Flight” could be said to apply not to the Wrights at Kittyhawk but to NC’s militia fleeing the field in panic at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse.
My comments about several items throughout the book:
P 337 “He [Mad Anthony Wayne] had acquired his famous nickname by now [1781], for noncombat reasons nobody seems quite sure of, though.” Other sources discount one naming occasion: the Battle of Stony Point (1779), Wayne’s supposedly wild enthusiasm and disregard for his personal safety during the attack of the British-held fort. Possibly: Per a credible book, during the period of the Pennsylvania Line Mutiny in 1781, when a disobedient spy used by Wayne was outraged that his commander refused to lift the punishment of 29 lashes for his disorderly conduct and desertion and muttered: "Anthony is mad. He must be mad or he would help me.”
P 373 “October 19 was six and a half years to the day after some unknown person at Lexington fired the first shot of the war; after citizen-soldiers marched down a Concord hillside to the North Bridge; and after minute men and militia from all over northeastern Massachusetts converged on the Battle Road to drive the redcoats back to Boston.”
P 375 “Because after at least trying to trace the steps of so many people who fought that war—with Washington, against him, or without him—I came to understand something he unquestionably knew. Which is that at any number of times and places, a different step could have taken our story down an unknowable path.”
But…here, twice, I have a problem:
P 195 “In short, the Hero of Saratoga [Gates] and his allies posed a real threat to a bad tactical general [presumably Washington] on a losing streak. And in fending it off, which took a while, Washington showed more political savvy than all his opponents combined.”
and
P 200 “Modern historians I’ve read or talked with are united in their view that marching a couple thousand guys out of Valley Forge to scope out what the Brits were up to was ‘foolhardy,’ ‘bizarre,’ ‘as useless as it was perilous,’ and ‘an invitation to the British high command.’ Lafayette’s detachment, like Burgoyne’s at Second Saratoga, was ‘too large for a scouting expedition and too small to face a major attack.’ So why did Washington commit this act of folly? Was it only because he was a bad tactical general?”
With apologies, I’d like to take the opportunity to contest what I see as the author’s joining in the increasingly popular, amateur military historian trend to downplay Washington’s military skills and toy with him as a punching bag, damning him with faint or tongue-in-cheek praise, writing about him in hit pieces with a half-empty vs half-full perspective as if one were emphasizing Babe Ruth’s many strike-outs vis a vis astounding home runs.
While the author immediately goes on to try to soften the blow, he does not retract that he thinks Washington was bad at tactics. Nor does he change his tune that Washington’s goal at Monmouth was “to scope out what the Brits were up to.” Lee’s force was thus not a Reconnaissance-in-Force, just one that was to follow Clinton and look for opportunities to attack and strike a heavy blow.
About Washington:
When one looks at the Wikipedia entry on the Battle of Monmouth, one doesn’t get that all the generals involved thought the effort was stupid: “Washington's senior officers urged varying degrees of caution, but it was politically important for him not to allow the British to withdraw unscathed. Washington detached around a third of his army and sent it ahead under the command of Major General Charles Lee, hoping to land a heavy blow on the British without becoming embroiled in a major engagement.” Wikipedia says Washington had 14K vs Clinton’s 17K (other sources differ): More from Wikipedia:
“Washington was criticized in some quarters within the army and Congress for relying on a Fabian strategy to wear the British down in a long war of attrition instead of defeating it decisively in a pitched battle. … Nevertheless, the doubts about his leadership remained, and he needed success on the battlefield if he was to be sure of his position. … In the end, a compromise was agreed in which 1,500 picked men would reinforce the vanguard to "act as occasion may serve."
“The professional conduct of the American troops gained widespread recognition even among the British; Clinton's secretary wrote, "the Rebels stood much better than ever they did", and [British] Brigadier General Sir William Erskine, who as commander of the light infantry had traded blows with the Continentals, characterized the battle as a "handsome flogging" for the British, adding, "We had not receiv'd such a one in America."
Furthermore, I’ve consulted several retired-military widely-read, widely-published, expert military historian friends (a colonel and a general) to weigh in on the Battle of Monmouth….
From the colonel:
“Washington was committed to creating an army that could stand up to British regulars – principally to gain ‘legitimacy’ for the infant United States (domestic, international and from our British enemy) – and I see Monmouth as another attempt to try to demonstrate that.”
“Washington was totally committed to showing ‘the world’ that American troops could stand up, face to face, to trained British troops and hold their own. … Washington always sought to form and train American troops to fight a Frederician battle but who nonetheless had to, from circumstances beyond his control, fight a militia-heavy “Fabian” campaign that wore down British forces by using the ubiquitous Patriot militia to ‘control’ territory that the Brits could only hold temporarily, but inevitably had to withdraw, leaving the territory to the Patriots. In fact, that ‘seeking the Frederician battle’ is exactly why Washington considered the Yorktown siege/battle so vitally important to winning the revolution outright.”
“Most of the criticism from the new book is based on speculation: “What if?” the Brits had done this or done that or been better led at all echelons of command, etc. What we do know is that – whether he intended and plotted to get these results or they were serendipitous in the aftermath – Washington certainly gained several benefits (coming at a time when Congress and Washington’s growing ranks of critics were criticizing his Continental Army leadership and muttering about whether he should be replaced).”
“Although clearly, the battle’s outcome was ‘indecisive,’ the British left the Americans holding the field and kept on marching to Sandy Hook to be picked up by the Royal Navy and transported to NYC. Even though moving from Philadelphia was the Brit plan all along, Washington and his supporters claimed it a ‘stunning victory’ by ‘holding the field’ and that’s how it was presented to Congress and the Army and the American public at large. … Portraying publicly and widely Monmouth as a ‘Washington victory’ brought thousands of new recruits into the Continental Army. When Monmouth was fought, Continentals numbered 15,000. A month later they numbered over 19,000, and the numbers kept rising until December 1778, when they peaked at over 23,000. In September 1778, the number was 23,552, which was only slightly exceeded only once during the remainder of the war … A ‘tactical draw’ or not, Monmouth was trumpeted by Washington’s supporters as a great victory, due only to his generalship – the fallout/aftermath of Monmouth, true or not, created the “Indispensable Man” image of Washington and, in general, silenced his nagging critics.”
“Along that same line, Monmouth essentially ‘eliminated’ Charles Lee as a possible Continental Army commander replacement for Washington – for all practical purposes, Lee was Washington’s only real rival at that time and was the replacement Washington’s critics were mainly backing. Lee’s failed attack on the British rearguard and his subsequent retreat, and then Lee’s ill-advised public criticism of Washington, led to Lee’s court-martial (convicted on all three charges) and Lee was out. Washington was secure.”
“Those ‘benefits’ actually happened, and although the ‘what ifs?’ can be argued until folks are blue in the face, the real results were beneficial to Washington’s reputation and to the Continental Army (greater numbers via recruitment and higher morale).”
“Washington realized that the only way the American colonies could ‘win’ the Revolution was to maintain a standing army in the field and, essentially, ‘outlast’ Britain until it was in the ‘Mother Country’s’ best interest to ‘let them go their way.’ It was a brilliant deduction of what was necessary to win but it also took a tremendous, unprecedented effort of pure will on Washington’s part to see it through and make it happen. He never wavered, and brilliantly combined regular combat by the Continental Regulars with absolutely essential constantly active, continual operations by local/state militia units to eventually wear down British forces until final victory. It was a total, unexpected, but certain ‘victory’ of Washington’s perseverance and character against seemingly overwhelming odds that puts George Washington at the head of the list of brilliant military commanders.”
From the general:
“A confused retreat of about three miles resulted [after Lee and his advanced detachment lost control of the initial American attack at Monmouth]. Washington, galloping to the sound of the guns, rode headlong into the midst of the reeling Continentals, at once assumed command, rallied the shaken troops, and stopped the British short. After reinforcing his stalled units, Clinton launched several attacks only to be repulsed each time by disciplined and stead Americans. Washington then organized a counterattack, but the day was done.”
From another general:
“Washington then arrived on the battlefield at the head of two divisions under Green and Stirling. Furiously castigating Lee, Washington rode forward to halt the retreat and organize a line of defense. As some indication of the transformed relationship between Washington and his soldiers since Valley Forge, his appearance on the field caused the Continentals to break out cheering. Unlike previous engagements such as Kips Bay, the retreating troops halted and instantly obeyed his commands. In the subsequent fighting, Washington steadied his hard-pressed infantry. … Monmouth’s consequences extended beyond the battlefield. By successfully portraying the battle as an American victory, Washington erased the embarrassments and 1777 and secured his place as commander in chief. His most vocal critics had for various reasons been forced out of the Army. … The continuity thus established at the head of the army, and the additional time given to Washington to develop his significant skills would prove decisive for American victory in the war.”
My thoughts:
The American attack upon the retreating British at Monmouth was only supposed to happen when they saw an advantage and not move into a major engagement. Lee’s inept generalship allowed an uncoordinated attack with men out of proper formation. After the war, it was discovered that Lee, while earlier a prisoner, had sent the Howe brothers a plan by which the British might defeat the rebellion. Might bungling the attack then have been Lee’s plan all along?
Also, “…In forging a nation, Washington had seen not only feats but failures. These mistakes have often been blamed on his “indecisiveness” in the fog and confusion of war, where few battle plans survive first contact with the enemy. Yet Washington was a sound thinker and integrator not prone to make hasty decisions. He had no problem consulting the best of minds, unlike Cornwallis, who usually made his decisions alone. Washington’s manner of thinking and system of operating, together with his genius of character, served him quite well, drawing supporters impressed with his honesty, rationality, and habit of seeing that virtue was rewarded. “In George we trust” could have been the nation’s motto. His mistakes, if one could call them that, were often made in trying to balance the complex and often conflicting requirements of his civilian leaders, politicians, and representatives of the people, especially when they wanted him to defend their cities, which were often, like New York City, indefensible against the combined forces of Britain’s army and navy. As well, Washington’s attempts to fight near Philadelphia at Brandywine and Germantown can be viewed not just as regrettable tactical defeats, but as strategic victories in helping to bring the French into the war by proving America was willing to fight. And by deferring to civilian leaders, Washington gained their trust and support and so made it not only his but the people’s war…and with that most significant factor that Lafayette delivered (French help), eventually came victory and peace.
But, again, “a bad tactical general”?
Congress assigned to Washington’s command generals of dubious and unproven reputations. His officer class comprised many young and inexperienced individuals. Along the way, Washington assembled and maintained an underpaid, undertrained, underfed Army in the midst of a civil war and a British invasion with the world’s mightiest army and navy. Remember that, except for the likes of the problematic generals Lee and Gates, virtually all of his American generals had been out of military service since the end of the French and Indian War, 12 years earlier (1775-1763), and at much lower levels of command.
Washington’s battle record was, depending upon how one counts them, either 6 wins, 6 losses, and 2 ties or, as per Wikipedia: 6 wins, 7 losses (an extra small battle/skirmish included), and 2 ties. All in all, close to batting .500. Washington’s most glorious wins were associated with Trenton/Princeton in the “10 Days that Changed the World” and Yorktown. His defeats in New York related to Congress’ command to defend NYC. The New Jersey battles of Brandywine and Germantown, while tactical defeats, were related to the strategic victory of helping to bring on the French alliance by proving that Americans were willing to fight.
Also, Washington oversaw a masterful retreat from Long Island into NYC. Middlebrook, NJ, where he helped to bring about the Saratoga victory by delaying for months Howe’s reaching Philadelphia before trying to help Burgoyne, was also a masterpiece, He also had a masterpiece of maneuver and logistics in taking his troops from New York to Virginia in the Yorktown campaign, outwitting British General Clinton.
Finally, and emphatically, the “Old Fox” Washington face-to-face-bested the much later honored British “fighting [tactical] general” Cornwallis at 2nd Trenton and Yorktown.
About Greene
It is said that Nathanael Greene, usually recognized as Washington’s most talented and dependable officer and, by Washington’s critics, was a military genius. However, Greene was the one who advised Washington to defend Fort Washington (resulting in a virtual American catastrophe both there and later across the river at Ft. Lee). As well, “…as army commander, [Greene] never won a battle but did win the war [in the South]. Remember Greene’s famous quote: “We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again.” Said like another bad tactical general?
Cornwallis wrote that Greene was "as dangerous as Washington. He is vigilant, enterprising, and full of resources–there is but little hope of gaining an advantage over him." Obviously, by praising Greene, Cornwallis is also praising Washington. Washington and Greene, bad tactical generals?
As regards Greene’s own thoughts about Washington: “His Excellency, General Washington, never appeared to so much advantage as in the hour of distress [tactics].”
Summary:
Both Washington and Greene were master learners. They always strived to perfect their skills. They both had “The Right Stuff.” As well, remember the Teddy Roosevelt quote:
“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; ….
So, hopefully with your patience not exhausted, enough of Washington and his tactical skills or his lack thereof. Back to the book.
The valuable Amazon resource of “Look inside” is available for the book’s hardcover version, and while the print version has an index, the Kindle version doesn’t. OTOH, the Kindle version does have a search function.
Bottom-line, and my extended defense of Washington aside, because of the unique material this book contains coming from the onsite visits and local experts, I’d classify it as a must-read for Revolutionary War enthusiasts.
Of possible interest, the 14 military strategies George Washington and his lieutenants used during the Revolutionary War are identified and explained as part of the following book:
June 23, 2023
I struggled with giving this 4 or 5 stars since Goodreads won't do half or quarter stars, and I think I'm happy to leave it here. Just know I questioned it. The reason is that this book is probably meant for people more generally interested in this history than where I'm at at this point, but it is just so much fun to read. I'm at the point in this journey where I really like speculating about the what-ifs, so I enjoyed that aspect. If that's not for you, then this book isn't for you. I also really enjoyed the literal on-the-ground nature of this book, as Thompson goes to the battlefields and explores the actual terrain of the battle he's talking about. He is also a funny, colloquial writer that made me laugh. That style certainly makes this book more general interest than detailed history, but it also made me want to keep listening to the audiobook because it felt like a funny friend was telling me stories. If you want a history book that isn't dense and feels like you are traveling along with a friend through major Revolutionary War events, definitely pick this up!
April 11, 2024
"You had me at the introduction!"
Probably somewhere between 4.5 and 4.75 on quarter stars, so it gets the bump to 5.
This is sort of like Nathaniel Philbrick's "Travels with George" but much broader ranging, and about the Revolutionary War itself, not a couple of Washington's presidential excursions.
It's about 75 percent medium-weight history in essay form and level and 25 percent travelogue. Thompson, a journalist, hits a number of sites in both North and South that were arguably turning points in the Revolution. Saratoga is still the turning point, but ...
“You had me at the introduction!”
And, you did. I already knew that Cowpens was the key battle in the South during the Cornwallis campaign. It wrecked Tarleton’s Bloody Legion, and when Nathaniel Greene later refused to get trapped into a general engagement, it left Cornwallis thinking his best answer was Virginia.
I knew the basics of Daniel Morgan’s tactics.
I did NOT know that the battle was won because of a misunderstood order, but one where the misunderstanding saved the right wing, and where Morgan and Col John Howard managed to pivot off that misunderstood order (the Continentals under Howard’s command on the right flank were supposed to execute a 90-degree wheel and instead retreated), and reformed to crush Tarleton’s left. (This is discussed more in a chapter on Cowpens and nearby and connected battles such as King's Mountain.)
Saratoga? Definitely some stuff new to me and:
Thompson also has the latest information on how many "people of color" fought at Bunker Hill, and even at Concord, how the whole Southern theater after the fall of Charleston involved slaves flocking to Cornwallis and other tidbits on Black-White 1770s America. It also has tidbits on Cornwallis, Clinton, Washington, Charles Lee and more.
The travelogue part is him interacting with interpreters at various battlefield sites, and also before or after at the occasional diner or pub, etc.
Probably somewhere between 4.5 and 4.75 on quarter stars, so it gets the bump to 5.
This is sort of like Nathaniel Philbrick's "Travels with George" but much broader ranging, and about the Revolutionary War itself, not a couple of Washington's presidential excursions.
It's about 75 percent medium-weight history in essay form and level and 25 percent travelogue. Thompson, a journalist, hits a number of sites in both North and South that were arguably turning points in the Revolution. Saratoga is still the turning point, but ...
“You had me at the introduction!”
And, you did. I already knew that Cowpens was the key battle in the South during the Cornwallis campaign. It wrecked Tarleton’s Bloody Legion, and when Nathaniel Greene later refused to get trapped into a general engagement, it left Cornwallis thinking his best answer was Virginia.
I knew the basics of Daniel Morgan’s tactics.
I did NOT know that the battle was won because of a misunderstood order, but one where the misunderstanding saved the right wing, and where Morgan and Col John Howard managed to pivot off that misunderstood order (the Continentals under Howard’s command on the right flank were supposed to execute a 90-degree wheel and instead retreated), and reformed to crush Tarleton’s left. (This is discussed more in a chapter on Cowpens and nearby and connected battles such as King's Mountain.)
Saratoga? Definitely some stuff new to me and:
Thompson also has the latest information on how many "people of color" fought at Bunker Hill, and even at Concord, how the whole Southern theater after the fall of Charleston involved slaves flocking to Cornwallis and other tidbits on Black-White 1770s America. It also has tidbits on Cornwallis, Clinton, Washington, Charles Lee and more.
The travelogue part is him interacting with interpreters at various battlefield sites, and also before or after at the occasional diner or pub, etc.
July 2, 2023
Bob Thompson's book, "Revolutionary Roads," takes readers on a dual journey through the paths of the American Revolutionary War. On one hand, his travelogue narrates the actual troop movements of the war, providing an on-the-ground, real-time unfolding perspective. It begins with the initial shots fired in Lexington and culminates in the decisive battle in Yorktown. Simultaneously, Thompson retraces these historical routes himself, map in hand, adding 12,000 miles to his odometer in the process. His ability to peer past the factory buildings, fast-food joints, and schoolyards that have obfuscated the landscape of 247 years ago allows us to see the battlegrounds as the combatants themselves once did.
Thompson's pithy writing style, exemplified by phrases like "What if those cannon hadn't gotten to Washington in time?," warmly engages readers while remaining informative. He seamlessly blends historical analysis with insightful observations from docents, curators, historians, and fellow history enthusiasts. As we walk the fields beside Thompson, he expertly weaves together historical analysis, strategic insights, and personal anecdotes to bring the battlefields to life.
One of the strengths of "Revolutionary Roads" lies in its ability to highlight the significance of seemingly small moments in history. Through the examination of these "tiny, fraught tipping points," Thompson showcases how the course of the war could have been altered with different outcomes. He acknowledges the allure and unanswerability of "what-if" questions, emphasizing their essential role in challenging the assumption that events happened because they were destined to.
Thompson skillfully avoids presenting the entire book as an 'alternative history.' However, his fascination with the countless possibilities for unexpected outcomes is palpable. He recognizes that even the smallest events, comparable to a butterfly's wing flap in chaos theory, hold the potential to profoundly alter subsequent developments.
"Revolutionary Roads" successfully addresses gaps in our collective knowledge, exposing the limited understanding of important events, figures, and consequences. Thompson acknowledges the complexities of historical research, including inadequate information, conflicting sources, political bias, wartime propaganda, and conspiracy theories. He highlights that these issues apply not only to the classroom view of the Battle of Lexington but also to all theaters of the war.
In addressing popular myths, Thompson fact-checks whether anyone actually said, "Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes." He candidly admits, "If so, we have no proof."
Thompson's pithy writing style, exemplified by phrases like "What if those cannon hadn't gotten to Washington in time?," warmly engages readers while remaining informative. He seamlessly blends historical analysis with insightful observations from docents, curators, historians, and fellow history enthusiasts. As we walk the fields beside Thompson, he expertly weaves together historical analysis, strategic insights, and personal anecdotes to bring the battlefields to life.
One of the strengths of "Revolutionary Roads" lies in its ability to highlight the significance of seemingly small moments in history. Through the examination of these "tiny, fraught tipping points," Thompson showcases how the course of the war could have been altered with different outcomes. He acknowledges the allure and unanswerability of "what-if" questions, emphasizing their essential role in challenging the assumption that events happened because they were destined to.
Thompson skillfully avoids presenting the entire book as an 'alternative history.' However, his fascination with the countless possibilities for unexpected outcomes is palpable. He recognizes that even the smallest events, comparable to a butterfly's wing flap in chaos theory, hold the potential to profoundly alter subsequent developments.
"Revolutionary Roads" successfully addresses gaps in our collective knowledge, exposing the limited understanding of important events, figures, and consequences. Thompson acknowledges the complexities of historical research, including inadequate information, conflicting sources, political bias, wartime propaganda, and conspiracy theories. He highlights that these issues apply not only to the classroom view of the Battle of Lexington but also to all theaters of the war.
In addressing popular myths, Thompson fact-checks whether anyone actually said, "Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes." He candidly admits, "If so, we have no proof."
June 14, 2023
Washington Post writer Bob Thompson has authored an intriguing exploration of the American Revolutionary War. He chronicles his travels across more than twenty thousand miles, from sites as far north as Quebec and as far south as Georgia, that he visited to gain an understanding of why the revolution took the course it did. As Tony Horwitz did for the Civil War in his book Confederates in the Attic, Thompson gives readers a chance to tag along with him as he comes face to face with various markers and modern day experts that offer him a window into understanding the events of 1775 to 1781. The common theme he finds is that the war could have so easily taken different, and possibly disastrous paths, for the rebels if seemingly minor details had not gone in their favor. Some examples of this include the British giving American forces just enough time to construct adequate defenses prior to the Battle of Bunker Hill in 1775, the narrow escape of George Washington and his army from New York City in 1776, and the arrival of French naval forces prior to the battle of Yorktown in 1781. Thompson takes readers through all of these potential turning points with an irreverent and sometimes humorous style that will appeal to readers who do not want to read highly formal writing. One issue that I think he could have focused upon in this book is the significance of the war for the various Native American tribes that occupied the continent. But I think the book will appeal to readers who are new to studying the revolution or want to understand the war in American memory as expressed through memorials to it in the present day.
July 4, 2023
If you want the condensed version of the American Revolution - with tongue-in-cheek commentary at times and comments that make you laugh out loud - then this is your summer read. Thompson takes the reader to all the familiar sites (Valley Forge, Saratoga, Yorktown) and many smaller, almost unknown sites. His coverage of the war in the southern colonies made me realize how very little I knew about those battles. For those of us here in the North, it's Lexington/Concord, crossing the Delaware, Valley Forge (and probably Brandywine, Paoli, and Germantown), then Yorktown and the British surrender. Thompson has made me want to read more and understand, better, the coming 250th celebration (over several years). Enjoy, enjoy!!
September 7, 2023
Somewhat different than the usual history books. The author visited the sites where the various revolutionary war encounters happened and looked at where things could go wrong. It is amazing all the touch points where the young republic's rebels could have completely lost the war. It was also interesting how much support they received from the French, although it is not clear why. Really enjoyed this book and the insight into what happened during those 6 1/2 years of the revolution. The final battle that sent the British home was especially interesting. The book looked at a number of heroes of the skirmishes as well as those who betrayed the fledging country. It is not simply a story of George Washington, although he is included. Amazing and eye opening survey.
July 14, 2023
This "traveling history" recounts the author's visits to many key battlegrounds of the Revolutionary War. He also includes accounts of his discussions with various experts on the war - who describe how the standard version of history we learn doesn't always capture what actually happened. And the author spends a lot of the book exploring how differently things could have turned out but didn't due to luck or huge mistakes by British generals. Despite what seems like an interesting topic, I found the book a slog to get through - too long and it really needed a lot more maps - there's only 4 in the entire book.
August 17, 2023
The author did all of the exhaustive research and collated into a mobile course and a highly readable text so that all sorts of us can learn and enjoy. Not only does he point out how things might have turned out differently at various points, but also gave us the correct information that refutes some of the myths and legends that we hold dear.
I requested and received a digital galley edition from Twelve Books via NetGalley. Thank you!
After finishing I sent a print copy to our son who was raised in the Northwest Territory Alliance and graduated from Duluth, MN with History Honors.
I requested and received a digital galley edition from Twelve Books via NetGalley. Thank you!
After finishing I sent a print copy to our son who was raised in the Northwest Territory Alliance and graduated from Duluth, MN with History Honors.
February 15, 2024
I enjoyed this book, the style of Thompson's writing, digging into the minutia of obscure Revolutionary war battles and getting to know the "players" of the war better. But the real heroes of this book, and Thompson recognizes this in his acknowledgements, are the number of citizen historians who have done the hard work to keep these stories afloat. it was amazing to read of what people will get interested in and go to great lengths to satisfy their own curiosity and the willingness to pass that information on to others that we wouldn't forget. Great job to all.
April 5, 2023
4.25 stars. For me, a modern-day ramble across historical battlefields and grounds is almost catnip. Thompson does an excellent job mixing modern observations and descriptions w/ the historical ghostly images hidden behind sites. I also appreciated his narrative theme of the precarious nature of the ultimate outcome of independence. Well worth your time.
June 7, 2023
I am usually not a fan of the "what if" school of history, but this work, showing how many times during the Revolution a simple change in the actions of one person would have changed everything, makes this an entertaining and engaging read. I am also tempted to go back through the book and count the number of places and/or battles that claim to be "the turning point of the revolution."
October 30, 2023
Mixed Bag
The book has a wealth of detailed information that the author has researched thoroughly. Unfortunately, he distracts the reader with parenthetical remarks. It's one of these deals where a person thinks they're funny, and continues to attempt to make you laugh, when you don't really enjoy them.
The book has a wealth of detailed information that the author has researched thoroughly. Unfortunately, he distracts the reader with parenthetical remarks. It's one of these deals where a person thinks they're funny, and continues to attempt to make you laugh, when you don't really enjoy them.
June 10, 2024
The idea of traveling the road and discovering that important battle sites of the American Revolution are now McDonalds and Jiffy Lubes was fun to know. Also explaining the geography, as well as the topography of the battles was very well done. A nice overall synopsis of the Revolution from a different angle
Read
April 5, 2023An absolutely outstanding volume! Explores all of the key battles and events and what could have gone wrong - and by happenstance what went right. Well written and researched. Highly recommended.
August 14, 2023
Seemed like a good book, but I got bored with it quickly.
August 21, 2023
Kinda uninteresting too much author exposition
April 1, 2024
Solid book. Loved the idea behind it. Just wish there were some more pictures of the battlefields and monuments the author saw on his tour.
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