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Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II
A riveting, immersive account of the agonizing decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan--a crucial turning point in World War II and geopolitical history--with you-are-there immediacy by the New York Times bestselling author of Ike's Bluff and Sea of Thunder.
At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of May 30, General Groves receives a message to report to the office of the secretary of war "at once." Stimson is waiting for him. He wants to know: has Groves selected the targets yet?
So begins this suspenseful, impeccably researched history that draws on new access to diaries to tell the story of three men who were intimately involved with America's decision to drop the atomic bomb--and Japan's decision to surrender. They are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito's Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender.
Henry Stimson had served in the administrations of five presidents, but as the U.S. nuclear program progressed, he found himself tasked with the unimaginable decision of determining whether to deploy the bomb. The new president, Harry S. Truman, thus far a peripheral figure in the momentous decision, accepted Stimson's recommendation to drop the bomb. Army Air Force Commander Gen. Spaatz ordered the planes to take off. Like Stimson, Spaatz agonized over the command even as he recognized it would end the war. After the bombs were dropped, Foreign Minister Togo was finally able to convince the emperor to surrender.
To bring these critical events to vivid life, bestselling author Evan Thomas draws on the diaries of Stimson, Togo and Spaatz, contemplating the immense weight of their historic decision. In Road to Surrender, an immersive, surprising, moving account, Thomas lays out the behind-the-scenes thoughts, feelings, motivations, and decision-making of three people who changed history.
At 9:20 a.m. on the morning of May 30, General Groves receives a message to report to the office of the secretary of war "at once." Stimson is waiting for him. He wants to know: has Groves selected the targets yet?
So begins this suspenseful, impeccably researched history that draws on new access to diaries to tell the story of three men who were intimately involved with America's decision to drop the atomic bomb--and Japan's decision to surrender. They are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito's Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender.
Henry Stimson had served in the administrations of five presidents, but as the U.S. nuclear program progressed, he found himself tasked with the unimaginable decision of determining whether to deploy the bomb. The new president, Harry S. Truman, thus far a peripheral figure in the momentous decision, accepted Stimson's recommendation to drop the bomb. Army Air Force Commander Gen. Spaatz ordered the planes to take off. Like Stimson, Spaatz agonized over the command even as he recognized it would end the war. After the bombs were dropped, Foreign Minister Togo was finally able to convince the emperor to surrender.
To bring these critical events to vivid life, bestselling author Evan Thomas draws on the diaries of Stimson, Togo and Spaatz, contemplating the immense weight of their historic decision. In Road to Surrender, an immersive, surprising, moving account, Thomas lays out the behind-the-scenes thoughts, feelings, motivations, and decision-making of three people who changed history.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published June 6, 2023
About the author
Evan Thomas
73 books355 followersEvan Thomas is the author of nine books: The Wise Men (with Walter Isaacson), The Man to See, The Very Best Men, Robert Kennedy, John Paul Jones, Sea of Thunder, The War Lovers, Ike’s Bluff, and Being Nixon. Thomas was a writer, correspondent, and editor for thirty-three years at Time and Newsweek, including ten years (1986–96) as Washington bureau chief at Newsweek, where, at the time of his retirement in 2010, he was editor at large. He wrote more than one hundred cover stories and in 1999 won a National Magazine Award. He wrote Newsweek’s fifty-thousand-word election specials in 1996, 2000, 2004 (winner of a National Magazine Award), and 2008. He has appeared on many TV and radio talk shows, including Meet the Press and The Colbert Report, and has been a guest on PBS’s Charlie Rose more than forty times. The author of dozens of book reviews for The New York Times and The Washington Post, Thomas has taught writing and journalism at Harvard and Princeton, where, from 2007 to 2014, he was Ferris Professor of Journalism.
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July 9, 2024
Thomas gives us a detailed and nuanced account of the decisions to use the atomic bomb on Japanese cities. He takes us through numerous meetings and discussions, relying on diaries, written records, and personal accounts. Thomas also gives us insight into the highly contentious Japanese meetings and ploys that eventually led to surrender. We get more than just a review of the facts. He shows how private agendas played into the decisions. We see the motivations and relationships of the decision makers. I found it a fascinating read. Thomas profiles three people: Secretary of War Henry Stimson who issued the order to use the bombs, Commander of U.S. Strategic Air forces in the Pacific General Carl “Tooey” Spaatz who received and executed Stimson’s order, and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo who led the effort to get Japan’s ruling Supreme War Council to agree to surrender. Thomas brings in many other key participants including President Truman and General Leslie Groves who reported to Stimson, oversaw the Manhattan Project, and led the Target Committee. Groves later said Truman had little control because he assumed office after the decision process was already underway. My notes follow.
Stimson cared about civilian casualties. He was very upset when he learned that 85,000 Japanese residents had died in a single incendiary bomb attack on Tokyo on the night of March 9-10, 1945. Thomas states It is the largest death toll in a six-hour period in the history of war. 16 square miles of the city were destroyed in the subsequent firestorm leaving 1,000,000 homeless. More incendiary attacks followed. Stimson told his Assistant Secretary for Air Bob Lovett to have wide area firebombing attacks stopped and Lovett agreed. Lovett and others had touted to Stimson the air force’s “precision bombing” capability. But precision bombing did not work with B-29s at 30,000 feet in Japan with strong unpredictable winds. Bombs dropped at high altitudes commonly fell wide of specific targets. Thus, XXI Bomber Command chief General Curtis LeMay adopted wide area incendiary bombing at night by low flying aircraft. LeMay was under pressure to get results by his boss Army Air Commander General “Hap” Arnold. Lovett, LeMay and Arnold knew Precision bombing didn’t work in Japan but they never told Stimson.
Seventeen days after becoming president on April 29, 1945 Truman was informed of the Manhattan Project and the atom bomb by Stimson and Groves. Two days earlier Groves’ Target committee began setting criteria for selecting a target. Groves did not share this with Stimson or Truman. On May 11 the Target Committee decided that a military or industrial target by itself was unsuitable. The Committee decided the target should be the center of a city that had military or industrial sites. The center was important since bombs dropped from B-29s at 30,000 feet could veer well off target. The atom bomb had to be dropped from high altitude to avoid damaging the aircraft. Groves’ Target Committee did not use information about radiation and fallout in selecting a target, only the impact of the blast. Stimson had no idea about radiation. General Groves knew about radiation and how the Committee���s decision was made. But he, Oppenheimer, and the president’s science advisor James Conant didn’t share that information with Washington leaders.
When Stimson found out reading the newspaper that Tokyo had been firebombed again, he was caught completely unaware. He decided to bring in General Arnold to find out why. But first he called in General Groves on May 30 to make sure target selection for the atom bomb limited civilian casualties. Groves and his committee had already selected target cities (Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Niigata) and asked Army Air Commander General “Hap” Arnold to not firebomb them to save them for the atom bomb. Stimson was unaware of this. When Stimson asked Groves about targets, he found out there was a Target Committee report on it. Stimson demanded to see it at once. Stimson called in Chief of Staff General George Marshall to the meeting who also was unaware. Stimson vetoed all three cities. Both Stimson and Marshall had envisioned a strictly military target for the bomb. On June 1, Stimson called in Arnold who told him the incendiary area bombing was necessary because Japanese industry was spread out in small buildings throughout the city. Arnold used this explanation to hide the lack of precision bombing as did LeMay.
On May 31 Stimson attended a meeting with the Interim Committee which was established to advise the president on the atom bomb. Oppenheimer was on that committee. He described the two bombs under construction as equal to between 2,000 and 20,000 tons of TNT, but noted that future bombs could equal millions of tons of TNT. Stimson brought up the idea of international control of nuclear weapons. Oppenheimer was impressed with the idea. Stimson raised his concern over the large number of civilian casualties. Oppenheimer was asked how many civilian casualties would be incurred if the bomb being built was dropped on a Japanese city. Oppenheimer said 20,000 but no one really knew. He also said “the neutron effect” would threaten life extending “two- thirds of a mile” from the explosion. Stimson ruled out Kyoto which he had visited and fondly remembered. The conversation meandered around targets and impact. Notes of the meeting concluded “there was general agreement that we could not give the Japanese any warning, that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound impression on as many inhabitants as possible. At the suggestion of Dr. Conant, the Secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers’ houses.”
Jimmy Byrnes, soon to be Secretary of State, was the president’s representative to the Interim Committee. He was happy with the decision and reported the decision to Truman who seemed satisfied. Groves sat in on the Committee meeting as a guest. He said nothing but knew the Target Committee specified to hit a city’s center. Groves had Hiroshima in mind. It had a bridge in the center that stood out and would greatly assist in aiming. Also, the large area of wooden houses would maximize the damage. The goal was to make an impression sufficient to get the Japanese to surrender to avoid having to invade Japan. Truman was deeply upset by American casualties suffered taking Okinawa which would end up at 50,000. On June 18th meeting with his military leaders, Truman learned 700,000 Americans would invade Kyushu, the southernmost island defended by 350,000 Japanese soldiers. Estimates of American casualties to take all of Japan ranged from several hundred thousand up to one million. In fact, Japan had 900,000 regular soldiers and additional “volunteers” defending Kyushu.
Togo was the Japanese Foreign Minister in 1941 and opposed the attack on Pearl Harbor. He fell out of favor and went home. In April 1945 he was invited back to be Foreign Minister again, making him a member of the Big Six that sat on the Supreme War Council which ruled Japan. However, the military made up four of the Big Six. The military ruled Japan and a determined never-surrender cadre of younger officers effectively controlled military leaders through intimidation, threats and even assassination. Togo found stiff resistance to ending the war even though Japan’s position was clearly hopeless. He accepted the position anyway, believing the Prime Minister may have invited him back to find a way out. Different from the typically opaque other members, Togo said what he thought. He was rebuffed and on June 8th the Council recommended the “Fundamental Policy” of no surrender to the emperor.
In July Truman went to a meeting in Potsdam to discuss plans for the end of the war with Stalin and Churchill. Stimson was not invited and asked Truman if he could go separately which Truman agreed to. Truman was getting advice from Byrnes, a hardliner with his own connections in the military, instead of Stimson. Stimson suggested modifying the terms of surrender to allow Japan to keep its emperor. This idea had been floated by others to make surrender more palatable. Truman, likely on the advice of Byrnes, rejected the idea. On July 16 the successful Trinity test of the bomb was communicated to Truman’s entourage at Potsdam. They were exultant. Stimson immediately reached out to Groves to get the latest target list. At the top was Kyoto which Stimson had instructed Groves not to target. Groves referred to Kyoto as Stimson’s pet. Kyoto is Japan’s cultural center which the Japanese consider sacred. For the same reason Stimson wanted it preserved, Groves wanted to destroy it. Stimson explained to Truman that Kyoto was a civilian target, that bombing it would only make the Japanese bitter. Truman agreed. However General Arnold bypassed Stimson and took a new list to Truman with Hiroshima at the top showing it to be an “Army” city. Truman now believed that Hiroshima was a “purely military” target. Truman didn’t know that the bomb would be dropped in the residential city center or that 70,000 people, 90% civilians, would be killed immediately.
In early July General Arnold briefed General Spaatz on the atom bomb and his mission. Spaatz was concerned about civilian casualties, but accepted his role. His command of strategic bombing in Japan included the 509th Composite Group which would drop the atomic bombs. Colonel Paul Tibbets commanded the Group, which had practiced dropping atomic bomb lookalikes filled with high explosives to simulate the attacks. General Marshall gave the order verbally to drop the bomb to General Spaatz, but he demanded it in writing. On July 26 the Potsdam Declaration was issued demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan. On July 27 in Potsdam, Stimson signed the order for the bombs and sent it to Spaatz. Spaatz folded it up and kept it in his wallet. In August Spaatz gave the order to Tibbets and on August 6th the bomb was dropped. 70,000 died at once with another 70,000 to follow from radiation and fallout. Photos showed that four-square miles of the city had been eviscerated. Stimson presented the reports and photos to Truman who now understood there were only a few scattered military targets and that the civilian death toll would be extensive. Recognizing the moral implications of the civilian deaths, Truman toned down the radio address he planned to give the nation. Similarly concerned, General Marshall told General Arnold and General Groves not to gloat over the Hiroshima attack. Groves said his thoughts were about the American soldiers who died on the Bataan Death March. Arnold replied “It’s just the way I feel.”
On August 9th Russia invaded Manchuria. Learning of Russia’s entry into the war, Togo realized Japan must surrender. The Big Six met that day at 11am, but still only Togo called for surrender. Togo suspected some of the others were afraid to express their true feelings, out of fear of the hardliners or appearing to be weak or disloyal. At 1pm the meeting was interrupted with news of the bomb attack on Nagasaki. Still Togo was alone in wanting to surrender. Togo went to emperor Hirohito and told him they were deadlocked and the emperor would have to decide. Another meeting later that day which included the full cabinet produced more votes for surrender. Togo, now joined by the Prime Minister, went to the emperor who said he would call an unprecedented imperial conference. He met with the Big Six at 11:55pm. They remain deadlocked. At 2am Hirohito announced he had made a sacred decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration with one exception, that Japan be allowed to keep its emperor.
The bomb dropped on Nagasaki on August 9th was off target hitting an industrial area instead of the city center. The bomb was twice as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb, but it killed half as many people since it missed the center. The original target, Kokura, had been abandoned due to clouds, which also interfered with targeting Nagasaki. The crew had to drop the bomb. The B-29 bomber couldn’t land still carrying the five-ton bomb. Low on fuel it barely made it to Okinawa. Truman learned about the second bombing only after it happened. The Army was in control. Truman subsequently issued an order that no more atom bombs were to be dropped without his specific permission. On August 10th Japan broadcast its agreement to unconditional surrender with the exception that it retain its emperor. Stimson, Byrnes and military advisors met with Truman on how to respond. Stimson wanted to allow the exception. Byrnes wasn’t so sure, but ended up devising an acceptance allowing the emperor to stay but specifying that all terms will be set by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur. The response was received in Japan at 1am August 12th. Meanwhile Groves notified Spaatz the third bomb would be ready on August 17.
In Tokyo the military was still resistant and hardliners were frantically trying to engineer a coup to prevent surrender. The Big Six remained deadlocked with only Togo calling for accepting the new terms. On August 14th American bombers dropped leaflets over Japan including the imperial palace. The leaflets told the Japanese of the American response to the emperor’s offer to surrender, that Japan could choose to end the war now. When Hirohito read one, he knew he must act quickly before a coup was organized. He ordered a meeting of the Big Six immediately where he proclaimed another sacred decision to accept the new terms. In a dramatic session the holdouts acquiesced. On August 15th at noon Hirohito addressed the nation announcing the surrender of Japan.
Stimson cared about civilian casualties. He was very upset when he learned that 85,000 Japanese residents had died in a single incendiary bomb attack on Tokyo on the night of March 9-10, 1945. Thomas states It is the largest death toll in a six-hour period in the history of war. 16 square miles of the city were destroyed in the subsequent firestorm leaving 1,000,000 homeless. More incendiary attacks followed. Stimson told his Assistant Secretary for Air Bob Lovett to have wide area firebombing attacks stopped and Lovett agreed. Lovett and others had touted to Stimson the air force’s “precision bombing” capability. But precision bombing did not work with B-29s at 30,000 feet in Japan with strong unpredictable winds. Bombs dropped at high altitudes commonly fell wide of specific targets. Thus, XXI Bomber Command chief General Curtis LeMay adopted wide area incendiary bombing at night by low flying aircraft. LeMay was under pressure to get results by his boss Army Air Commander General “Hap” Arnold. Lovett, LeMay and Arnold knew Precision bombing didn’t work in Japan but they never told Stimson.
Seventeen days after becoming president on April 29, 1945 Truman was informed of the Manhattan Project and the atom bomb by Stimson and Groves. Two days earlier Groves’ Target committee began setting criteria for selecting a target. Groves did not share this with Stimson or Truman. On May 11 the Target Committee decided that a military or industrial target by itself was unsuitable. The Committee decided the target should be the center of a city that had military or industrial sites. The center was important since bombs dropped from B-29s at 30,000 feet could veer well off target. The atom bomb had to be dropped from high altitude to avoid damaging the aircraft. Groves’ Target Committee did not use information about radiation and fallout in selecting a target, only the impact of the blast. Stimson had no idea about radiation. General Groves knew about radiation and how the Committee���s decision was made. But he, Oppenheimer, and the president’s science advisor James Conant didn’t share that information with Washington leaders.
When Stimson found out reading the newspaper that Tokyo had been firebombed again, he was caught completely unaware. He decided to bring in General Arnold to find out why. But first he called in General Groves on May 30 to make sure target selection for the atom bomb limited civilian casualties. Groves and his committee had already selected target cities (Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Niigata) and asked Army Air Commander General “Hap” Arnold to not firebomb them to save them for the atom bomb. Stimson was unaware of this. When Stimson asked Groves about targets, he found out there was a Target Committee report on it. Stimson demanded to see it at once. Stimson called in Chief of Staff General George Marshall to the meeting who also was unaware. Stimson vetoed all three cities. Both Stimson and Marshall had envisioned a strictly military target for the bomb. On June 1, Stimson called in Arnold who told him the incendiary area bombing was necessary because Japanese industry was spread out in small buildings throughout the city. Arnold used this explanation to hide the lack of precision bombing as did LeMay.
On May 31 Stimson attended a meeting with the Interim Committee which was established to advise the president on the atom bomb. Oppenheimer was on that committee. He described the two bombs under construction as equal to between 2,000 and 20,000 tons of TNT, but noted that future bombs could equal millions of tons of TNT. Stimson brought up the idea of international control of nuclear weapons. Oppenheimer was impressed with the idea. Stimson raised his concern over the large number of civilian casualties. Oppenheimer was asked how many civilian casualties would be incurred if the bomb being built was dropped on a Japanese city. Oppenheimer said 20,000 but no one really knew. He also said “the neutron effect” would threaten life extending “two- thirds of a mile” from the explosion. Stimson ruled out Kyoto which he had visited and fondly remembered. The conversation meandered around targets and impact. Notes of the meeting concluded “there was general agreement that we could not give the Japanese any warning, that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound impression on as many inhabitants as possible. At the suggestion of Dr. Conant, the Secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers’ houses.”
Jimmy Byrnes, soon to be Secretary of State, was the president’s representative to the Interim Committee. He was happy with the decision and reported the decision to Truman who seemed satisfied. Groves sat in on the Committee meeting as a guest. He said nothing but knew the Target Committee specified to hit a city’s center. Groves had Hiroshima in mind. It had a bridge in the center that stood out and would greatly assist in aiming. Also, the large area of wooden houses would maximize the damage. The goal was to make an impression sufficient to get the Japanese to surrender to avoid having to invade Japan. Truman was deeply upset by American casualties suffered taking Okinawa which would end up at 50,000. On June 18th meeting with his military leaders, Truman learned 700,000 Americans would invade Kyushu, the southernmost island defended by 350,000 Japanese soldiers. Estimates of American casualties to take all of Japan ranged from several hundred thousand up to one million. In fact, Japan had 900,000 regular soldiers and additional “volunteers” defending Kyushu.
Togo was the Japanese Foreign Minister in 1941 and opposed the attack on Pearl Harbor. He fell out of favor and went home. In April 1945 he was invited back to be Foreign Minister again, making him a member of the Big Six that sat on the Supreme War Council which ruled Japan. However, the military made up four of the Big Six. The military ruled Japan and a determined never-surrender cadre of younger officers effectively controlled military leaders through intimidation, threats and even assassination. Togo found stiff resistance to ending the war even though Japan’s position was clearly hopeless. He accepted the position anyway, believing the Prime Minister may have invited him back to find a way out. Different from the typically opaque other members, Togo said what he thought. He was rebuffed and on June 8th the Council recommended the “Fundamental Policy” of no surrender to the emperor.
In July Truman went to a meeting in Potsdam to discuss plans for the end of the war with Stalin and Churchill. Stimson was not invited and asked Truman if he could go separately which Truman agreed to. Truman was getting advice from Byrnes, a hardliner with his own connections in the military, instead of Stimson. Stimson suggested modifying the terms of surrender to allow Japan to keep its emperor. This idea had been floated by others to make surrender more palatable. Truman, likely on the advice of Byrnes, rejected the idea. On July 16 the successful Trinity test of the bomb was communicated to Truman’s entourage at Potsdam. They were exultant. Stimson immediately reached out to Groves to get the latest target list. At the top was Kyoto which Stimson had instructed Groves not to target. Groves referred to Kyoto as Stimson’s pet. Kyoto is Japan’s cultural center which the Japanese consider sacred. For the same reason Stimson wanted it preserved, Groves wanted to destroy it. Stimson explained to Truman that Kyoto was a civilian target, that bombing it would only make the Japanese bitter. Truman agreed. However General Arnold bypassed Stimson and took a new list to Truman with Hiroshima at the top showing it to be an “Army” city. Truman now believed that Hiroshima was a “purely military” target. Truman didn’t know that the bomb would be dropped in the residential city center or that 70,000 people, 90% civilians, would be killed immediately.
In early July General Arnold briefed General Spaatz on the atom bomb and his mission. Spaatz was concerned about civilian casualties, but accepted his role. His command of strategic bombing in Japan included the 509th Composite Group which would drop the atomic bombs. Colonel Paul Tibbets commanded the Group, which had practiced dropping atomic bomb lookalikes filled with high explosives to simulate the attacks. General Marshall gave the order verbally to drop the bomb to General Spaatz, but he demanded it in writing. On July 26 the Potsdam Declaration was issued demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan. On July 27 in Potsdam, Stimson signed the order for the bombs and sent it to Spaatz. Spaatz folded it up and kept it in his wallet. In August Spaatz gave the order to Tibbets and on August 6th the bomb was dropped. 70,000 died at once with another 70,000 to follow from radiation and fallout. Photos showed that four-square miles of the city had been eviscerated. Stimson presented the reports and photos to Truman who now understood there were only a few scattered military targets and that the civilian death toll would be extensive. Recognizing the moral implications of the civilian deaths, Truman toned down the radio address he planned to give the nation. Similarly concerned, General Marshall told General Arnold and General Groves not to gloat over the Hiroshima attack. Groves said his thoughts were about the American soldiers who died on the Bataan Death March. Arnold replied “It’s just the way I feel.”
On August 9th Russia invaded Manchuria. Learning of Russia’s entry into the war, Togo realized Japan must surrender. The Big Six met that day at 11am, but still only Togo called for surrender. Togo suspected some of the others were afraid to express their true feelings, out of fear of the hardliners or appearing to be weak or disloyal. At 1pm the meeting was interrupted with news of the bomb attack on Nagasaki. Still Togo was alone in wanting to surrender. Togo went to emperor Hirohito and told him they were deadlocked and the emperor would have to decide. Another meeting later that day which included the full cabinet produced more votes for surrender. Togo, now joined by the Prime Minister, went to the emperor who said he would call an unprecedented imperial conference. He met with the Big Six at 11:55pm. They remain deadlocked. At 2am Hirohito announced he had made a sacred decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration with one exception, that Japan be allowed to keep its emperor.
The bomb dropped on Nagasaki on August 9th was off target hitting an industrial area instead of the city center. The bomb was twice as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb, but it killed half as many people since it missed the center. The original target, Kokura, had been abandoned due to clouds, which also interfered with targeting Nagasaki. The crew had to drop the bomb. The B-29 bomber couldn’t land still carrying the five-ton bomb. Low on fuel it barely made it to Okinawa. Truman learned about the second bombing only after it happened. The Army was in control. Truman subsequently issued an order that no more atom bombs were to be dropped without his specific permission. On August 10th Japan broadcast its agreement to unconditional surrender with the exception that it retain its emperor. Stimson, Byrnes and military advisors met with Truman on how to respond. Stimson wanted to allow the exception. Byrnes wasn’t so sure, but ended up devising an acceptance allowing the emperor to stay but specifying that all terms will be set by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur. The response was received in Japan at 1am August 12th. Meanwhile Groves notified Spaatz the third bomb would be ready on August 17.
In Tokyo the military was still resistant and hardliners were frantically trying to engineer a coup to prevent surrender. The Big Six remained deadlocked with only Togo calling for accepting the new terms. On August 14th American bombers dropped leaflets over Japan including the imperial palace. The leaflets told the Japanese of the American response to the emperor’s offer to surrender, that Japan could choose to end the war now. When Hirohito read one, he knew he must act quickly before a coup was organized. He ordered a meeting of the Big Six immediately where he proclaimed another sacred decision to accept the new terms. In a dramatic session the holdouts acquiesced. On August 15th at noon Hirohito addressed the nation announcing the surrender of Japan.
November 6, 2023
"Road to Surrender" is, in my opinion, popular history at its best. Fine books have been written about the Manhattan Project and the construction of the first nuclear weapons. In “Road to Surrender,” Evan Thomas takes a different tack. Focusing on three men, he sheds light the days and hours that led up to the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, how decisions were made about whether and where to use the devices, the heated internal disagreements in both the US and Japan that surrounded the events, discussions about international reactions, and the moral questions the use of such weapons evoked. It's an extraordinary story, and Evans tells it in a manner that is both accessible and exciting (which is to say that I found it difficult to put down).
The three men Evans looks at are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito’s Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender.
Evans’ telling of the story is masterful. Even though the events he describes happened nearly 80 years ago and we know the outcome, the book is suspenseful, not least because the story is told in the present tense as if it were a novel. Drama and tension exist everywhere in the book -- in the halls of power in DC, on military bases in the Pacific, in the Japanese Imperial Palace. Secretary Stimson, for one -- by summer 1945 an old man with a weak heart, a holdover from old school diplomacy -- is at odds with individuals at the State Department who are trying to nudge him aside and limit his influence on the President. Military officials keep him in the dark: he learns of the extent of the firebombing of Dresden not from the Army but from coverage in the New York Times. Arguments rage about whether to tell Stalin about the bomb and perhaps even share the technology with him to reduce international anxiety and thus the risk of another war. Of course, as the Americans later discover, Stalin is already well aware of the bomb. Soviet scientists are developing their own nuclear device based on material secreted out of American labs by spies.
Then there are the more intimate personal struggles. Evans quotes from Stimson’s diary entries to reveal a man struggling with moral questions about the devastation of modern war and worrying whether the human ingenuity that led to the creation of the bomb will be matched by wisdom about whether to use it. General Spaatz likewise has qualms about how many civilians will be killed by the new bombs. Maj. Charles Sweeney, pilot of the plane that will be carrying what will turn out to be the Nagasaki bomb, finds himself with an impossible dilemma: As a good Catholic he is obliged to go to confession but he can’t confess because what he would confess is top secret.
Some of the most enthralling material in the book — all of it new to me — has to do with what was going on in Japan that summer. On one hand, there was growing awareness among some (like Togo) that the war was lost and a way must be found to end the fighting. On the other hand, however, a very powerful cadre within the Japanese military refused to countenance surrender, and they were willing to resort to assassination and even a coup to make sure it didn’t happen. In fact, as I learned, the coup they had planned was actually set in motion: they would remove peace-seekers like Togo, declare martial law, and sequester the Emperor himself under the guise of protecting him. As they saw it, the Japanese military was still strong and determined to fight on. If Americans invaded, they said, the Japanese people themselves — “twenty million,” a Vice Admiral exclaims, “a hundred million!” says another (ichioku gyokusai a common patriotic slogan read: “death in battle of the hundred million” ) including the elderly, women, and children — would fight American invaders with every weapon they could find. Evans writes:
The Japanese do not have to “win” the Decisive Battle. They just have to make the cost of victory unbearable to the Americans. It is called shukkettsu, “the bleeding strategy.” Facing waves of suicide planes and the task of burning Japanese soldiers out of caves while battling women and children with pitchforks, America — already showing signs of war weariness — could be reasonably expected to back off from unconditional surrender and offer good terms.
Nor were they entirely wrong in believing this. Americans were indeed tired of the war. The prospect of having to invade the Japanese homeland was demoralizing to both civilian and soldier. The war could go on for a long time. As Evans puts it, any number of "false or unlucky moves" along the way could have completely undermined the attempt to end the war. The Emperor might have been removed from the discussion. The coup might have succeeded. As far as the Japanese military was concerned, one member of the cadre pronounced, "A hundred atom bombs could be dropped on a hundred cities and Japan would still not surrender." (Members of the cadre minimized the devastation caused by the bombs, saying that white clothing would protect people from radiation and that the damage to the soil beneath the blasted ground was limited to one or two inches. The Emperor must be told of this! they said. The fact that the Emperor was entirely fed up with these men and wanted the fighting to end immediately was of no importance to them.)
We read too of the arguments back in the States about what cities to target, how many bombs should be dropped, whether there were even enough cities of military significance left in Japan that hadn’t already been devastated, whether civilian officials should be told the truth about "precision bombing" and civilian casualties. We read how badly US military intelligence had underestimated Japanese strength in the summer of 1945 (they projected, for example, that Kyushu would have around 350,000 Japanese defenders, against more than 700,000 American invaders; in fact, Japanese forces in Kyushu numbered more than 900,000). How communication was so bad that President Truman wasn’t aware the strike on Nagasaki was taking place until after it happened. How technicians had accidentally set two switches on the Nagasaki bomb in the wrong positions, Setting off alarms on the plane as it flew toward Japan, how the Mayday call the pilot sent out in case he had to ditch the plane was unheard because officials at the Titian airbase believed the operation had been aborted. About General Leslie Groves testifying before Congress that radiation poisoning was “a very pleasant way to die” (in fact, it can be agonizing). It's a compelling story, one that causes the reader to reconsider his/her understanding of the events.
Evans ends his book by taking a sober look at the ongoing controversies about whether the bombs should have been dropped on the cities in the first place. Were decisions made with military strategy and geopolitics in mind or out of an understandable hunger for revenge? It’s a convincing argument in my opinion, but I’m not certain it will change many minds.
In all, “Road to Surrender” is a splendid work of history. I have little doubt it will be a bestseller when it is released in June of this year.
My thanks to Random House and Edelweis for providing an advance digital copy of the book in return for an honest review.
The three men Evans looks at are Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, who had overall responsibility for decisions about the atom bomb; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific, who supervised the planes that dropped the bombs; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, the only one in Emperor Hirohito’s Supreme War Council who believed even before the bombs were dropped that Japan should surrender.
Evans’ telling of the story is masterful. Even though the events he describes happened nearly 80 years ago and we know the outcome, the book is suspenseful, not least because the story is told in the present tense as if it were a novel. Drama and tension exist everywhere in the book -- in the halls of power in DC, on military bases in the Pacific, in the Japanese Imperial Palace. Secretary Stimson, for one -- by summer 1945 an old man with a weak heart, a holdover from old school diplomacy -- is at odds with individuals at the State Department who are trying to nudge him aside and limit his influence on the President. Military officials keep him in the dark: he learns of the extent of the firebombing of Dresden not from the Army but from coverage in the New York Times. Arguments rage about whether to tell Stalin about the bomb and perhaps even share the technology with him to reduce international anxiety and thus the risk of another war. Of course, as the Americans later discover, Stalin is already well aware of the bomb. Soviet scientists are developing their own nuclear device based on material secreted out of American labs by spies.
Then there are the more intimate personal struggles. Evans quotes from Stimson’s diary entries to reveal a man struggling with moral questions about the devastation of modern war and worrying whether the human ingenuity that led to the creation of the bomb will be matched by wisdom about whether to use it. General Spaatz likewise has qualms about how many civilians will be killed by the new bombs. Maj. Charles Sweeney, pilot of the plane that will be carrying what will turn out to be the Nagasaki bomb, finds himself with an impossible dilemma: As a good Catholic he is obliged to go to confession but he can’t confess because what he would confess is top secret.
Some of the most enthralling material in the book — all of it new to me — has to do with what was going on in Japan that summer. On one hand, there was growing awareness among some (like Togo) that the war was lost and a way must be found to end the fighting. On the other hand, however, a very powerful cadre within the Japanese military refused to countenance surrender, and they were willing to resort to assassination and even a coup to make sure it didn’t happen. In fact, as I learned, the coup they had planned was actually set in motion: they would remove peace-seekers like Togo, declare martial law, and sequester the Emperor himself under the guise of protecting him. As they saw it, the Japanese military was still strong and determined to fight on. If Americans invaded, they said, the Japanese people themselves — “twenty million,” a Vice Admiral exclaims, “a hundred million!” says another (ichioku gyokusai a common patriotic slogan read: “death in battle of the hundred million” ) including the elderly, women, and children — would fight American invaders with every weapon they could find. Evans writes:
The Japanese do not have to “win” the Decisive Battle. They just have to make the cost of victory unbearable to the Americans. It is called shukkettsu, “the bleeding strategy.” Facing waves of suicide planes and the task of burning Japanese soldiers out of caves while battling women and children with pitchforks, America — already showing signs of war weariness — could be reasonably expected to back off from unconditional surrender and offer good terms.
Nor were they entirely wrong in believing this. Americans were indeed tired of the war. The prospect of having to invade the Japanese homeland was demoralizing to both civilian and soldier. The war could go on for a long time. As Evans puts it, any number of "false or unlucky moves" along the way could have completely undermined the attempt to end the war. The Emperor might have been removed from the discussion. The coup might have succeeded. As far as the Japanese military was concerned, one member of the cadre pronounced, "A hundred atom bombs could be dropped on a hundred cities and Japan would still not surrender." (Members of the cadre minimized the devastation caused by the bombs, saying that white clothing would protect people from radiation and that the damage to the soil beneath the blasted ground was limited to one or two inches. The Emperor must be told of this! they said. The fact that the Emperor was entirely fed up with these men and wanted the fighting to end immediately was of no importance to them.)
We read too of the arguments back in the States about what cities to target, how many bombs should be dropped, whether there were even enough cities of military significance left in Japan that hadn’t already been devastated, whether civilian officials should be told the truth about "precision bombing" and civilian casualties. We read how badly US military intelligence had underestimated Japanese strength in the summer of 1945 (they projected, for example, that Kyushu would have around 350,000 Japanese defenders, against more than 700,000 American invaders; in fact, Japanese forces in Kyushu numbered more than 900,000). How communication was so bad that President Truman wasn’t aware the strike on Nagasaki was taking place until after it happened. How technicians had accidentally set two switches on the Nagasaki bomb in the wrong positions, Setting off alarms on the plane as it flew toward Japan, how the Mayday call the pilot sent out in case he had to ditch the plane was unheard because officials at the Titian airbase believed the operation had been aborted. About General Leslie Groves testifying before Congress that radiation poisoning was “a very pleasant way to die” (in fact, it can be agonizing). It's a compelling story, one that causes the reader to reconsider his/her understanding of the events.
Evans ends his book by taking a sober look at the ongoing controversies about whether the bombs should have been dropped on the cities in the first place. Were decisions made with military strategy and geopolitics in mind or out of an understandable hunger for revenge? It’s a convincing argument in my opinion, but I’m not certain it will change many minds.
In all, “Road to Surrender” is a splendid work of history. I have little doubt it will be a bestseller when it is released in June of this year.
My thanks to Random House and Edelweis for providing an advance digital copy of the book in return for an honest review.
March 10, 2023
Immersing myself in history, I run into a lot of people who complain there are too many World War II books. Road to Surrender by Evan Thomas is proof that we are nowhere close to over-saturation. Following three major players at the end of the war in the Pacific, Thomas eviscerates those who oversimplify the question, "Should we have dropped the atomic bombs on Japan?"
Thomas focuses on Henry Stimson, the U.S. Secretary of War, U.S. General "Tooey" Spaatz, and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo. Each of them get their own spotlight although Stimson and Togo seem to have stronger narratives. Thomas writes so well it feels almost like a novel and the facts he lays out make it clear just how tangled the last days of World War II were. There are some new facts here unless you are a true scholar of the time and the pertinent facts are laid out for all to see.
This is a fantastic book and everyone should read it. Even those who don't like history will find this riveting.
(This book was provided as an advance copy by Netgalley and Random House Publishing.)
Thomas focuses on Henry Stimson, the U.S. Secretary of War, U.S. General "Tooey" Spaatz, and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo. Each of them get their own spotlight although Stimson and Togo seem to have stronger narratives. Thomas writes so well it feels almost like a novel and the facts he lays out make it clear just how tangled the last days of World War II were. There are some new facts here unless you are a true scholar of the time and the pertinent facts are laid out for all to see.
This is a fantastic book and everyone should read it. Even those who don't like history will find this riveting.
(This book was provided as an advance copy by Netgalley and Random House Publishing.)
April 5, 2023
A good book: easy to read, clear in its goal, successful in the presentation of solid evidence in support of that goal.
The goal is: to refute the contention, in wide circulation especially since the 1995 publication of The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb by Gar Alperovitz, “that, by August 1945, Japan was ready to surrender, and that America’s real motivation in dropping the A-bomb was to intimidate Russia in the earliest days of the Cold War” (Road to Surrender, Kindle location 88).
“The facts are otherwise,” Thomas replies (also location 88).
I think that Thomas’s book is very convincing in its thesis, but I don’t think the people who believe otherwise are going to be convinced by this book, or, indeed, by any book.
I don’t speak Japanese but I love words. Here are some interesting Japanese words, as interpreted by the author:
– haragei: “A man gifted at haragei, the stomach “art” or “game”, can disguise his gut feeling with words, while signaling, by inference or with the barest winks and nods, sometimes invisibly, his true intentions” (location 1001).
– giri: “a heavy sense of obligation” (location 1013).
– gekokujo: “the overpowering of seniors by their juniors” (used, in the book, concerning political matters, location 1032).
I love to read popular history, but I wish there were some sort of labelling law that books of this type had to have a box, sort of like the box on food with nutritional information, that stated clearly what new (that is, previously unpublished) information appears in the book you are reading. In the case of this book, the new information appears to be diaries and papers of the three people (Henry Stimson, US Secretary of War; Gen. Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo) referred to in the book’s subtitle. Of these, the author only uses “unpublished” to characterize Togo’s dairy entries. For the other two, the author says, some family members gave him diaries and letters, but it’s not clear whether Thomas is the first scholar ever to be given that access.
In many books, interesting information is hidden in the footnotes. Here’s an example from this book: Footnote 31, appearing after the epilogue of this book, reads in part: “The Japanese military knew from its own failed attempt to build an atomic bomb that even a single bomb required a fantastic and time-consuming effort. After grudgingly conceding that Hiroshima had been destroyed by an atomic bomb, some Japanese military leaders argued that the Americans could not possible build more. Nagasaki showed them otherwise” (location 3172). Since people who might admit that one atomic bomb was necessary often feel that the second one was unnecessary, I would have loved to have had more information on this point, that is, which Japanese leaders argued that there was only one atomic bomb in existance, when did they argue it, what was the reaction?
The above are quibbles. This book was a fascinating read.
I received a free electronic advance copy of this book for review from Penguin Random House via Netgalley.
The goal is: to refute the contention, in wide circulation especially since the 1995 publication of The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb by Gar Alperovitz, “that, by August 1945, Japan was ready to surrender, and that America’s real motivation in dropping the A-bomb was to intimidate Russia in the earliest days of the Cold War” (Road to Surrender, Kindle location 88).
“The facts are otherwise,” Thomas replies (also location 88).
I think that Thomas’s book is very convincing in its thesis, but I don’t think the people who believe otherwise are going to be convinced by this book, or, indeed, by any book.
I don’t speak Japanese but I love words. Here are some interesting Japanese words, as interpreted by the author:
– haragei: “A man gifted at haragei, the stomach “art” or “game”, can disguise his gut feeling with words, while signaling, by inference or with the barest winks and nods, sometimes invisibly, his true intentions” (location 1001).
– giri: “a heavy sense of obligation” (location 1013).
– gekokujo: “the overpowering of seniors by their juniors” (used, in the book, concerning political matters, location 1032).
I love to read popular history, but I wish there were some sort of labelling law that books of this type had to have a box, sort of like the box on food with nutritional information, that stated clearly what new (that is, previously unpublished) information appears in the book you are reading. In the case of this book, the new information appears to be diaries and papers of the three people (Henry Stimson, US Secretary of War; Gen. Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, head of strategic bombing in the Pacific; and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo) referred to in the book’s subtitle. Of these, the author only uses “unpublished” to characterize Togo’s dairy entries. For the other two, the author says, some family members gave him diaries and letters, but it’s not clear whether Thomas is the first scholar ever to be given that access.
In many books, interesting information is hidden in the footnotes. Here’s an example from this book: Footnote 31, appearing after the epilogue of this book, reads in part: “The Japanese military knew from its own failed attempt to build an atomic bomb that even a single bomb required a fantastic and time-consuming effort. After grudgingly conceding that Hiroshima had been destroyed by an atomic bomb, some Japanese military leaders argued that the Americans could not possible build more. Nagasaki showed them otherwise” (location 3172). Since people who might admit that one atomic bomb was necessary often feel that the second one was unnecessary, I would have loved to have had more information on this point, that is, which Japanese leaders argued that there was only one atomic bomb in existance, when did they argue it, what was the reaction?
The above are quibbles. This book was a fascinating read.
I received a free electronic advance copy of this book for review from Penguin Random House via Netgalley.
December 2, 2023
This was a riveting read, impeccably researched and with a tightly focused narrative. The actual bombing of Hiroshima only warrants two pages. If you have read a lot of history on Japan in WW2, you might think this is covered ground but there is a lot of fresh material. It's almost as if the author intentionally filled in the gaps and left the other historic books to stand on their own.
This book focuses on the key Japanese and American decision makers during those final months as American leaders agonized over how to get Japan to surrender. They eventually succeeded by dropping the two A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and unleashing the nuclear era on the world. Readers will learn in detail how intransigent many of the Japanese military leaders were, even defying the emperor and launching failed coups in the waning hours before surrender. The emperor himself decided to go on the radio, with no advance warning, to thwart the insurrectionists and tell the people directly that Japan had surrendered.
Rather than destroying Tokyo with a planned A-bomb, the U.S. gave time for Japan to make a decision and the Air Force dropped millions of leaflets on Tokyo. These leaflets told the citizens who had been kept in the dark about surrender discussions that peace terms had been offered and that they could keep their Emperor. One of the Japanese war ministers who was against surrender realized when he read a dropped leaflet that fell on the palace grounds that the war was now effectively over.
In fact the U.S. had plans to use nine atomic bombs alone just to soften up the battlefields as breaches for their invasion of southern Japan. They intended to wait just 48 hours before sending the ground troops onward through the desolated battle zones. That our U.S. generals in the Pacific did not know of nuclear fallout and radiation hazards is pretty extraordinary.
Japan's Foreign minister Toko and U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson play the largest roles in the book. This is my favorite type of history. Rather than another tome on Harry Truman or Robert Oppenheimer, it was great to see one that went deep and covered new ground.
Kudos. Those who believe that the war with Japan could have ended without dropping atomic bombs or simply as a warning and demonstration to Japan in an unpopulated area might be disappointed with the conclusions in the book on that point. They might be heartened to know however the degree of agonizing by most of the principal players (except Leslie Groves) in the U.S. and the vast range of parallel strategies that the U.S. earnestly pursued.
5 stars easy.
This book focuses on the key Japanese and American decision makers during those final months as American leaders agonized over how to get Japan to surrender. They eventually succeeded by dropping the two A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and unleashing the nuclear era on the world. Readers will learn in detail how intransigent many of the Japanese military leaders were, even defying the emperor and launching failed coups in the waning hours before surrender. The emperor himself decided to go on the radio, with no advance warning, to thwart the insurrectionists and tell the people directly that Japan had surrendered.
Rather than destroying Tokyo with a planned A-bomb, the U.S. gave time for Japan to make a decision and the Air Force dropped millions of leaflets on Tokyo. These leaflets told the citizens who had been kept in the dark about surrender discussions that peace terms had been offered and that they could keep their Emperor. One of the Japanese war ministers who was against surrender realized when he read a dropped leaflet that fell on the palace grounds that the war was now effectively over.
In fact the U.S. had plans to use nine atomic bombs alone just to soften up the battlefields as breaches for their invasion of southern Japan. They intended to wait just 48 hours before sending the ground troops onward through the desolated battle zones. That our U.S. generals in the Pacific did not know of nuclear fallout and radiation hazards is pretty extraordinary.
Japan's Foreign minister Toko and U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson play the largest roles in the book. This is my favorite type of history. Rather than another tome on Harry Truman or Robert Oppenheimer, it was great to see one that went deep and covered new ground.
Kudos. Those who believe that the war with Japan could have ended without dropping atomic bombs or simply as a warning and demonstration to Japan in an unpopulated area might be disappointed with the conclusions in the book on that point. They might be heartened to know however the degree of agonizing by most of the principal players (except Leslie Groves) in the U.S. and the vast range of parallel strategies that the U.S. earnestly pursued.
5 stars easy.
July 29, 2024
_______________________________________________
I am tired and sick of war. Its glory is all moonshine. It is only those who have neither fired a shot nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded who cry aloud for blood, for vengeance, for desolation. War is hell. --William Tecumseh Sherman
The war in the Pacific seems to be nearing an end, but
If you are interested in WWII beyond the events on the battlefields, this is a book you should read.
Note: In the Epilogue the author builds the case that bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may have saved millions of Japanese lives in the long term and millions more lives of Asians who were caught in the brutal occupation of their lands. You be the judge.
I am tired and sick of war. Its glory is all moonshine. It is only those who have neither fired a shot nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded who cry aloud for blood, for vengeance, for desolation. War is hell. --William Tecumseh Sherman
The war in the Pacific seems to be nearing an end, but
>President Roosevelt had previously declared that the U.S. would never accept anything less than Japan’s unconditional surrender.
>Few Japanese officials will accept surrender except under the condition that the Emperor be retained.
>The powerful radical groups in Japan’s army and navy vow to never surrender, to fight to the last man (and last woman and child if necessary).
>The U.S. forces are preparing for an invasion of Japan, but it is estimated that such an invasion could initially cost 500,000 or more American lives.
>The atomic bombs are ready to be deployed, but some U.S. officials oppose using them on civilian populations. Others want to burn every Japanese city to the ground.
>Even after the A-bombs are deployed, secret organizations of Japanese military officers threaten to assassinate officials who advocate surrendering.
If you are interested in WWII beyond the events on the battlefields, this is a book you should read.
Note: In the Epilogue the author builds the case that bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki may have saved millions of Japanese lives in the long term and millions more lives of Asians who were caught in the brutal occupation of their lands. You be the judge.
April 18, 2023
An eye-opening account of the end of WWII through three men involved in decision making: the American Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, ailing and pressuring for limiting civilian casualties; Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz in charge of bombing in the Pacific; and Japan’s Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, pressing surrender to a War Council determined to accept massive causalities over defeat.
At the heart of the book is the decision by the United States to employ the Atom bomb. Those involved came to second guess their support and decisions, but the author argues that it did save lives.
Henry Stimson is the center of the story. He had a long political career and was well respected when President Roosevelt appointed him Secretary of War. Although in failing health and disturbed by the horrible civilian casualties in Europe, he was dedicated to his work, pressuring the U.S.to not follow the British carpet bombing that killed civilians, and urging the banning of submarines in war. His moral vision is admirable. With Roosevelt’s death, Truman sidelines Stimson.
We are given an understanding of what was happening in Japan, how the military’s power overshadowed Emperor Hirohito, a coup brewing if he surrendered. Russia entering the war would allow them to take over more territory in China and, they hoped, Japan. The U.S. wanted to end the war and stop the Russian advance.
Choosing targets for the atom bombs–ocean, small island, military target or city–was complicated. And when Japan did not immediately accept the terms of surrender, the U.S. was preparing a third and even a fourth bomb.
Deeply researched, the book brings to life history and the men who made history.
Thanks to the publisher for a free ebook.
At the heart of the book is the decision by the United States to employ the Atom bomb. Those involved came to second guess their support and decisions, but the author argues that it did save lives.
Henry Stimson is the center of the story. He had a long political career and was well respected when President Roosevelt appointed him Secretary of War. Although in failing health and disturbed by the horrible civilian casualties in Europe, he was dedicated to his work, pressuring the U.S.to not follow the British carpet bombing that killed civilians, and urging the banning of submarines in war. His moral vision is admirable. With Roosevelt’s death, Truman sidelines Stimson.
We are given an understanding of what was happening in Japan, how the military’s power overshadowed Emperor Hirohito, a coup brewing if he surrendered. Russia entering the war would allow them to take over more territory in China and, they hoped, Japan. The U.S. wanted to end the war and stop the Russian advance.
Choosing targets for the atom bombs–ocean, small island, military target or city–was complicated. And when Japan did not immediately accept the terms of surrender, the U.S. was preparing a third and even a fourth bomb.
Deeply researched, the book brings to life history and the men who made history.
Thanks to the publisher for a free ebook.
September 26, 2023
Another really excellent history book, thoroughly researched and yet easily digestible for a popular audience. This is part of the "Jacob is fascinated with all things nuclear" series and I've been interested in the question of "Was dropping the bombs the right call?" for a long time. This book does a great job of laying out all of the factors that went into that "brutal calculus," as I heard the author describe it in a Fresh Air interview. It reminded me once again that decision making in war time is particularly difficult and there is basically never a clear correct choice, morally or strategically. More often the question is, "Which outcome is least bad?" Many times, these decisions have to be made flying semi-blind, as it is not always clear what the other side is thinking and even if they told you, could you trust them? Fascinating.
February 7, 2024
Excellent story on the account of the end of WWII through three men involved in decision making: American Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, Gen. Spaatz and Japan’s Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo. Very well written and laid out, it kept me engaged the entire time. You learn about the personal struggles these men went through on how to bring about the end of the war. It’s easy now to look back and say, what we did was probably not the best way to go about it. But at the time the only thought was to save American lives and end the war.
However, what surprised me was how some care very little about civilian casualties. True, some, cannot be avoided, but to continue to bomb cities just weaken the moral of the enemy? You decide.
In addition, was it necessary to drop two atomic bombs on Japan? Could we have went through instead with a blockade and starved out the Japanese? The author makes a good case on why dropping the bombs was necessary.
For anyone interested in WWII or history in general, this is an eye-opening book sure to keep your interest even though we all know how it ended.
However, what surprised me was how some care very little about civilian casualties. True, some, cannot be avoided, but to continue to bomb cities just weaken the moral of the enemy? You decide.
In addition, was it necessary to drop two atomic bombs on Japan? Could we have went through instead with a blockade and starved out the Japanese? The author makes a good case on why dropping the bombs was necessary.
For anyone interested in WWII or history in general, this is an eye-opening book sure to keep your interest even though we all know how it ended.
February 15, 2023
Mr. Thomas has added a well-written addition to the historical record. Many tens of thousands of books on the Second World War have been written and sold, but there is still a paucity of works in English that use Japanese primary source material and that is where "Road to Surrender" shines. Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo has only a now-out-of-print book dealing primarily with his experiences during the preceding years of the Second World War. Mr. Thomas uses Foreign Minister Togo's writings extensively juxtaposed with the American decision-makers
of the time concerning the decision to use the Atomic Bomb on Japan.
of the time concerning the decision to use the Atomic Bomb on Japan.
October 25, 2023
I read this one based on the review of a friend on goodreads. I was hesitant as I feel like the market is saturated with WWII books. However, I really enjoyed the perspective of this one. It follows the top military and political heads in the US and Japan regarding the circumstances of the atomic bombs. It really squashes recent criticism regarding the use of the bombs and lays bare the stark reality of the mindset of the Japanese military. Deeply rooted cultural beliefs related to honor in death, including sacrificing women and children helps put things in perspective. Military fanatics in Japan would even dream of national suicide as a beautiful thing (like falling cherry blossoms). It's truly chilling. Aside from the obvious understanding that the Japanese were willing to sacrifice millions more lives during WWII, they were hoarding food for their army and starving their citizens. US leaders were not numb to the awful prospect of dropping the atomic bombs, and much of their thought processes are explored. It's interesting to reflect on the mindset of a different culture.
July 30, 2023
4.5 stars rounded up
This is a must read. To be given an inside view of both the American and Japanese points of view in the summer of 1945 was truly astonishing.
This is a must read. To be given an inside view of both the American and Japanese points of view in the summer of 1945 was truly astonishing.
January 16, 2024
I put this book on my "Get At Library" list thanks to a good review in the Wall Street Journal. The reviewer, Michael Auslin, was right: it is really good. It's accessibly written; the author, Evan Thomas, was once a journalist at Time and Newsweek, and he knows how to tell a punchy story. But he's also a meticulous researcher, and it shows in the text, bibliography, and endnotes.
The "three men" of the subtitle: Henry Stimson, US Secretary of War under FDR and Truman; Shigenori Tōgō, Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, commander of the US Pacific air forces. There are, of course, many supporting characters; Thomas gets inside the heads of nearly everyone involved.
Thomas ably defends his major thesis: there was a good-faith argument that inflicting massive civilian casualties on Japan was necessary to avoid an even more massive bloodbath (on both sides) that would have resulted from an American invasion. He notes the intransigence of Japan's hardliners about surrender that continued even after the A-bombs were dropped. And even the eventual surrender was a near thing; there was an attempted coup against the pro-surrender forces. And there was a lot of seppuku.
Stimson, in particular, was tormented by the use of the A-bomb against Japanese cities. (He absolutely banned its use against Kyoto, a city he had previously visited, and charmed by its beauty.)
On the Japanese side, the focus on Tōgō is interesting too. He was kind of an oddball, marrying a German lady he'd met while on a diplomatic assignment there. Thomas makes clear that his advocacy of surrender was perilous: officials insufficiently gung-ho for war were often murdered.
Interesting fact: while the new B-29 bombers could fly at 30,000 feet, their ground speed on the way to Japan was greatly reduced thanks to the jet stream. (Thomas claims that the jet stream was a "never-before-observed meteorological phenomenon"; Wikipedia disagrees.) This caused a strategy shift from high-altitude daytime "precision" bombing (which was beset by other problems) to nighttime lower-altitude incendiary bombing, causing firestorms and massive civilian death. This, after the British bombing of Dresden was widely deplored.
Further interesting fact: Stimson called for the abolition of submarines as a weapon of war as Hoover's Secretary of State in 1930; too sneaky! And (as noted) he was morally torn about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But in 1966, the USS Henry L. Stimson ballistic missile submarine was commisioned, carrying 16 Polaris/Poseidon/Trident missles, with warheads that made the bombs dropped on Japan look like relative firecrackers.
January 5, 2024
Very, very good.
He looks at the decision to drop the bombs through the eyes of Sec of War Stimpson, Gen Carl Spaatz - head of strategic bombing, based in Guam and finally the Japanese Foreign Minister Togo who was desperate to find a way to end the war.
Some things I took away from the book
This is a 4+ star read
He looks at the decision to drop the bombs through the eyes of Sec of War Stimpson, Gen Carl Spaatz - head of strategic bombing, based in Guam and finally the Japanese Foreign Minister Togo who was desperate to find a way to end the war.
Some things I took away from the book
This is a 4+ star read
April 18, 2024
4/12/24: page 101 -- Harry Truman described as a judge of Jefferson County, Missouri -- damn, one of cardinal sins of modern publishing -- errors not caught by editors that mar the book's overall credibility! Truman was a county judge (an executive-branch position, not judicial) in JACKSON County on the western edge of Missouri (including Kansas City). Jefferson County is on the eastern edge of Missouri (St. Louis area). So, if the book contains this easily caught error, how much else is wrong!?!
4/16/24: Finished, and worth four stars (just unfortunate that egregious error noted above kindled suspicions of other errors sneaking in).
Evan Thomas was the co-author of one of my favorite books, The Wise Men, and for the most part this book is strong throughout -- well written, broadly sourced, with conclusions and inferences based on the evidence. A critic might say he relies too much on the memoirs of the three principal characters, but I would disagree -- the author uses those memoirs as the main threads, but weaves in plenty of supporting material from other primary sources and secondary sources.
One particular fact (or set of facts) of which I was unaware: the propensity of Japanese mid-level military officers to conduct coups or assassinations of higher-ranking officers and politicians, which consequently made the leadership in 1945 wary of appearing too ready to ask for peace. It was a delicate balancing act and the threat of more atomic bombings played a major role in the Emperor's ultimate willingness to give his opinion . . . a break with tradition!
A book club discussion coming up . . . should be good!
Afterwards: it was. But no controversy. Everyone thought the book well done and well worth reading.
4/16/24: Finished, and worth four stars (just unfortunate that egregious error noted above kindled suspicions of other errors sneaking in).
Evan Thomas was the co-author of one of my favorite books, The Wise Men, and for the most part this book is strong throughout -- well written, broadly sourced, with conclusions and inferences based on the evidence. A critic might say he relies too much on the memoirs of the three principal characters, but I would disagree -- the author uses those memoirs as the main threads, but weaves in plenty of supporting material from other primary sources and secondary sources.
One particular fact (or set of facts) of which I was unaware: the propensity of Japanese mid-level military officers to conduct coups or assassinations of higher-ranking officers and politicians, which consequently made the leadership in 1945 wary of appearing too ready to ask for peace. It was a delicate balancing act and the threat of more atomic bombings played a major role in the Emperor's ultimate willingness to give his opinion . . . a break with tradition!
A book club discussion coming up . . . should be good!
Afterwards: it was. But no controversy. Everyone thought the book well done and well worth reading.
July 9, 2023
Excellent history lesson and a serious look at the fanatical world of the Japanese military on the subject of surrender, which is they didn’t want to do it, and were willing to sacrifice their civilians (throwing around numbers like 20 million dead which didn’t even register as a big effing deal.)
While this book is mainly in the head of secretary of war Stimson, it does touch on other American leaders and players on the road to the nuclear bomb. I mainly was interested to hear about Oppenheimer and that operation since a movie is coming out and I was undecided if I really want to see it. I think I might.
This will for sure teach you some history and in an interesting format.
While this book is mainly in the head of secretary of war Stimson, it does touch on other American leaders and players on the road to the nuclear bomb. I mainly was interested to hear about Oppenheimer and that operation since a movie is coming out and I was undecided if I really want to see it. I think I might.
This will for sure teach you some history and in an interesting format.
August 16, 2023
Excellent. A fascinating portrait of three key players at the end of WW2 and their responses to the US’s use of the atomic bomb. A much-needed, nuanced exploration of one of the most controversial moments in US history, pushing back against the simplistic critiques of many revisionist pundits today.
January 28, 2024
In a gripping and dramatic tale, we understand the burden and pressure of key decision makers in an intriguing, thrilling, and well researched look into the end of WWII in the Pacific. Thomas re-creates key moments in the US decision to deploy one of the deadliest weapons created and Japan's decision to surrender.
May 13, 2024
Worth the read to get a unique perspective on the lead up to dropping the Atomic bomb. I enjoyed this history, and it makes me more sympathetic to the US decision to drop the bomb.
December 9, 2023
Road to Surrender feels very much like watching a History channel special on the end of World War II. Thomas skillfully braids together the three narratives of the book, and the sections about Henry Stimson are particularly intriguing; however, I found myself continuously frustrated not only by the style — why write a history book set 80 years ago in present tense? — but also its focus.
Time and again, I couldn't help but feel Thomas failed to investigate the more pertinent questions brought up by the subject matter at hand. I am less interested in Truman's realization that thousands of civilians died in Hiroshima than I am with how the President of the United States could authorize the use of the atomic bomb without taking the time to learn that Hiroshima was not truly a military target.
In his defense, Thomas does a nice job breaking down the system of imperial rule in Japan, which is by no means straightforward or intuitive to American readers. Yet he also touches on the question of whether the A-bomb was necessary only to circumnavigate a clear answer. He reports that the bomb saved thousands of G.I. lives from a catastrophic invasion, only to later suggest that the invasion was on the brink of being called off. Which is it? What evidence is there to support this theory? Why not explore those questions in more detail? Perhaps this is intentional, but it feels more like being strung along.
It's a fairly short book, so it wouldn't be lost time for intrigued readers. But I imagine there are books that address much of the subject matter in a more serious, inquisitive fashion.
Time and again, I couldn't help but feel Thomas failed to investigate the more pertinent questions brought up by the subject matter at hand. I am less interested in Truman's realization that thousands of civilians died in Hiroshima than I am with how the President of the United States could authorize the use of the atomic bomb without taking the time to learn that Hiroshima was not truly a military target.
In his defense, Thomas does a nice job breaking down the system of imperial rule in Japan, which is by no means straightforward or intuitive to American readers. Yet he also touches on the question of whether the A-bomb was necessary only to circumnavigate a clear answer. He reports that the bomb saved thousands of G.I. lives from a catastrophic invasion, only to later suggest that the invasion was on the brink of being called off. Which is it? What evidence is there to support this theory? Why not explore those questions in more detail? Perhaps this is intentional, but it feels more like being strung along.
It's a fairly short book, so it wouldn't be lost time for intrigued readers. But I imagine there are books that address much of the subject matter in a more serious, inquisitive fashion.
August 9, 2023
Went into this after reading (the superior) “American Prometheus.” The author doesn’t try to sugar coat history, really laying it into the Japanese fanaticism during the time period.
There is a ton of information from the Japanese front on this one—a welcome respite from the United States-minded history lessons of WW2 nonfiction in the past.
There is a ton of information from the Japanese front on this one—a welcome respite from the United States-minded history lessons of WW2 nonfiction in the past.
December 1, 2023
The Story of One of the World’s Weightiest Decisions Taken in the Fog of War
Was it necessary to drop two atomic bombs on Japan, killing tens of thousands of civilians, to end the war? Could the U.S. have dropped a “demonstration” bomb that would have convinced the Japanese leadership to surrender? Or perhaps the effective submarine cordon around Japan would have ended resistance as the Japanese people began to starve in large numbers?
Author Evan Thomas makes a convincing case that dropping the atomic bombs was necessary.
Emperor Hirohito’s Supreme War Council was unable to accept that Japan had lost the war and many harbored notions of universal suicide of the Japanese nation. Moreover, had they decided to begin negotiations with the Americans, the six members of this Council were likely to be replaced, by assassination if necessary. Powerful hardliners in the military would not countenance surrender.
Thomas builds his analysis around three individuals swept up in the moral dilemma.
Most prominent is Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War and the senior administration official who from the earliest days was involved the decision to develop the atomic bomb. Stimson had to wrestle with the moral decision about how to use the bomb once it had been successfully tested in July, 1945.
The air force general who approved the firebombing of Japanese cities and subsequently the dropping of the atomic bombs was Carl “Toohey” Spaatz.
The U.S. Air Force still clung to the notion that precision bombing could destroy the enemy’s capability to fight while avoiding most civilian deaths. The problem was that “precision bombing,” using bombs dropped by gravity, was never precise. And as the war in Europe continued, the Americans joined the British in area bombing in Hamburg (40,000 deaths), Berlin (50,000 deaths), and very controversially Dresden (25,000 deaths). Stimson toured Germany after surrender and was appalled by what he saw in Berlin and Dresden.
As the war proceeded, area bombing had become more acceptable in the European theater of war despite civilian loss of life. As the U.S. sought to force Japanese surrender through air power, “targeted” bombing was not producing desired results. This was due to the inaccuracy of bombing technology of the time exacerbated by the powerful high altitude jet stream over Japan which scattered bombs. Finally Japanese industrial production was more difficult to destroy because it was more dispersed than in Germany.
All this convinced Spaatz to allow General Curtis LeMay to abandon high altitude bombing in favor a a new firebomb (napalm) dropped at low altitude at night on civilian areas where most housing was made of wood and paper. Firebombing Tokyo the night of March 9-10, 1945 is estimated to have killed 100,000. The technique was unleashed on most other Japanese cities, leading to estimates of the death of hundreds of thousands more.
Clearly, the experience of years of war had made civilian death no longer “unacceptable.”
Still, as Thomas writes, Stimson was greatly bothered by such death and wrestled with the decision about the atomic bomb. Indeed Robert Oppenheimer remembered that Stimson felt the war had brought about complacency and indifference to mass bombing in Europe and Japan. A footnote: In the 1920s Stimson and his wife had visited Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan and a cultural treasure much visited today. The Secretary of War demanded that Kyoto be taken off the atomic bomb target list.
While the question of whether it was necessary to drop the bombs can be debated, Thomas has made the best case this reader has seen that the Japanese might not have surrendered but for the atomic bomb.
The author does this through the person of Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, one of the six members of the Supreme War Council and the only one who pressed for surrender, even after the dropping of the atomic bombs.
Japanese cities were already being destroyed by firebombing and a submarine cordon was already leading to starvation. But the Supreme Council could not bring themselves to admit defeat. Having broken the Japanese diplomatic code, the Americans had seen the exchange between Togo and Japanese Ambassador Sato in Moscow. It was clear that the Japanese militarists were not serious about finding acceptable terms of surrender and there was great mistrust given the Japanese duplicity around Pearl Harbor.
Thomas argues that it was the dropping of atomic bombs that broke the impasse at the Supreme Council.The fact that the Emperor’s surrender broadcast mentioned that “the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb” makes the case that the Japanese needed a dramatic development to finally accept the surrender terms.
We now know what the Americans didn’t know then. As Thomas writes, “The Japanese do not have to ‘win’ the Decisive Battle. They just have to make the cost of victory unbearable to the Americans.” The Americans underestimated Japanese strength on Kyushu where the U.S. was to land in November. The militarists believed that 100 million Japanese people would choose death over surrender (a popular slogan). And if the Emperor were sidelined, as the militarists wanted, who could have negotiated the surrender then?
This is an excellent book which deals with the morality of war generally and the atomic bomb specifically. It also deals with the fact that momentous decisions must be taken in the fog of war. In that instance, it is a sobering lesson as European war rages in the Ukraine and Asian war is a risk over Taiwan.
Was it necessary to drop two atomic bombs on Japan, killing tens of thousands of civilians, to end the war? Could the U.S. have dropped a “demonstration” bomb that would have convinced the Japanese leadership to surrender? Or perhaps the effective submarine cordon around Japan would have ended resistance as the Japanese people began to starve in large numbers?
Author Evan Thomas makes a convincing case that dropping the atomic bombs was necessary.
Emperor Hirohito’s Supreme War Council was unable to accept that Japan had lost the war and many harbored notions of universal suicide of the Japanese nation. Moreover, had they decided to begin negotiations with the Americans, the six members of this Council were likely to be replaced, by assassination if necessary. Powerful hardliners in the military would not countenance surrender.
Thomas builds his analysis around three individuals swept up in the moral dilemma.
Most prominent is Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War and the senior administration official who from the earliest days was involved the decision to develop the atomic bomb. Stimson had to wrestle with the moral decision about how to use the bomb once it had been successfully tested in July, 1945.
The air force general who approved the firebombing of Japanese cities and subsequently the dropping of the atomic bombs was Carl “Toohey” Spaatz.
The U.S. Air Force still clung to the notion that precision bombing could destroy the enemy’s capability to fight while avoiding most civilian deaths. The problem was that “precision bombing,” using bombs dropped by gravity, was never precise. And as the war in Europe continued, the Americans joined the British in area bombing in Hamburg (40,000 deaths), Berlin (50,000 deaths), and very controversially Dresden (25,000 deaths). Stimson toured Germany after surrender and was appalled by what he saw in Berlin and Dresden.
As the war proceeded, area bombing had become more acceptable in the European theater of war despite civilian loss of life. As the U.S. sought to force Japanese surrender through air power, “targeted” bombing was not producing desired results. This was due to the inaccuracy of bombing technology of the time exacerbated by the powerful high altitude jet stream over Japan which scattered bombs. Finally Japanese industrial production was more difficult to destroy because it was more dispersed than in Germany.
All this convinced Spaatz to allow General Curtis LeMay to abandon high altitude bombing in favor a a new firebomb (napalm) dropped at low altitude at night on civilian areas where most housing was made of wood and paper. Firebombing Tokyo the night of March 9-10, 1945 is estimated to have killed 100,000. The technique was unleashed on most other Japanese cities, leading to estimates of the death of hundreds of thousands more.
Clearly, the experience of years of war had made civilian death no longer “unacceptable.”
Still, as Thomas writes, Stimson was greatly bothered by such death and wrestled with the decision about the atomic bomb. Indeed Robert Oppenheimer remembered that Stimson felt the war had brought about complacency and indifference to mass bombing in Europe and Japan. A footnote: In the 1920s Stimson and his wife had visited Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan and a cultural treasure much visited today. The Secretary of War demanded that Kyoto be taken off the atomic bomb target list.
While the question of whether it was necessary to drop the bombs can be debated, Thomas has made the best case this reader has seen that the Japanese might not have surrendered but for the atomic bomb.
The author does this through the person of Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, one of the six members of the Supreme War Council and the only one who pressed for surrender, even after the dropping of the atomic bombs.
Japanese cities were already being destroyed by firebombing and a submarine cordon was already leading to starvation. But the Supreme Council could not bring themselves to admit defeat. Having broken the Japanese diplomatic code, the Americans had seen the exchange between Togo and Japanese Ambassador Sato in Moscow. It was clear that the Japanese militarists were not serious about finding acceptable terms of surrender and there was great mistrust given the Japanese duplicity around Pearl Harbor.
Thomas argues that it was the dropping of atomic bombs that broke the impasse at the Supreme Council.The fact that the Emperor’s surrender broadcast mentioned that “the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb” makes the case that the Japanese needed a dramatic development to finally accept the surrender terms.
We now know what the Americans didn’t know then. As Thomas writes, “The Japanese do not have to ‘win’ the Decisive Battle. They just have to make the cost of victory unbearable to the Americans.” The Americans underestimated Japanese strength on Kyushu where the U.S. was to land in November. The militarists believed that 100 million Japanese people would choose death over surrender (a popular slogan). And if the Emperor were sidelined, as the militarists wanted, who could have negotiated the surrender then?
This is an excellent book which deals with the morality of war generally and the atomic bomb specifically. It also deals with the fact that momentous decisions must be taken in the fog of war. In that instance, it is a sobering lesson as European war rages in the Ukraine and Asian war is a risk over Taiwan.
June 9, 2023
Thank you to NetGalley, Evan Thomas, and Random House Publishing Group/Random House for providing this ARC in exchange for an honest review.
April 23, 2023
I received an advance reading copy (arc) of this book from the publisher and NetGalley.com in return for a fair review. Author Evan Thomas did an incredible job researching and writing about the agonizing decision to drop an atomic bomb on Japan with the intent of finally ending World War II (WWII) once and for all. Thomas focuses on three men--U. S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson who was responsible for decisions about the use of the A-Bomb, General Carl 'Tooey' Spatz who supervised the bombing missions, and the Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, who firmly believed that Japan should surrender in order to avoid future bloodshed on both sides. I have read several books about WWII and the use of the A-Bomb, but this is the first time, I learned about the Japanese response. Foreign Minister Togo was one of the first to realize the futility in Japan's refusal to surrender. A land invasion was scheduled to start and in order to avoid the unimaginable casualties on both sides, the decision to drop the bomb was made, but not before giving Japan the opportunity to surrender. Togo urged his peers to adhere to the Allies' demands. He even convinced Emperor Hirohito to give in, but the Emperor himself was a figurehead and the men under him made all of the important decisions. The majority refused to surrender. The soldiers themselves refused because they felt shame in the act and their insistence on fighting led to an attempted coup. Thomas drew on diaries from all three men to reconstruct that terrible time, which gives us an up close and personal view of what was happening before, during, and after the bombs were dropped. For anyone interested in WWII or history in general, this is an eye-opening book sure to keep your interest even though we all know what the end result was.
September 20, 2023
“Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End if World War II “ by Evan Thomas, is a compelling historical account of the decision made at the highest levels of the United States military, and the United States Government, to drop the atomic bombs in Japan. The end game, of course, was the surrender of the Empire of Japan after a costly world war.
The narrative that is expertly woven together by Thomas is vivid and spellbinding. One can sense the angst experienced by the story’s primary characters: Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, the Army’s air force commander, Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo. There are other major players involved, but Thomas primarily conveys this historical account through the eyes of these three men, and the result is spectacular!
Much has been written about most aspects of WWII, but to date such an account as presented by Thomas has been lacking. I highly commend this book to you. Happy reading!
The narrative that is expertly woven together by Thomas is vivid and spellbinding. One can sense the angst experienced by the story’s primary characters: Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, the Army’s air force commander, Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo. There are other major players involved, but Thomas primarily conveys this historical account through the eyes of these three men, and the result is spectacular!
Much has been written about most aspects of WWII, but to date such an account as presented by Thomas has been lacking. I highly commend this book to you. Happy reading!
April 21, 2023
So many books are published about WWII, and I keep promising myself I'm going to read about something else. But here I am. The description of the American side of this story is pretty standard stuff, but told mostly through the eyes of Secretary of War Henry Stimson. The logistics and decisions behind the dropping of the atom bomb are already very well described in The Making of the Atomic Bomb by Richard Rhodes, and likely in countless other books that I have not read. But this book really shines when describing the Japanese side of the events through the eyes of Japanese Foreign Minister Togo. The Japanese leaders weren't just making life or death decisions for their country; saying the wrong thing was very likely to get them killed by the hard-core militarists.
Evan Thomas uses the present tense to describe the ongoing events, which lends considerable power to his core argument - the dropping of two atom bombs on Japan was necessary and likely saved lives. Understanding the weighty decisions that were made requires one to be fully transported into the shoes of those responsible. Thomas's arguments are further enhanced by putting us in the room with the Big Six (the Supreme War Council of Japan) to show how resistant Japan was to surrender even after the two bombs were dropped.
With all that has been written about these events, I set the bar pretty high for World War II books. A new World War II book should feel like it was necessary (see Half American by Matthew F. Delmont for a necessary WWII book). I don't think that Road to Surrender quite makes that bar, but it's a good read. Those who know little about these events will likely find it to be a superb read.
Thanks to Net Galley and Penguin Random House for providing an egalley.
Evan Thomas uses the present tense to describe the ongoing events, which lends considerable power to his core argument - the dropping of two atom bombs on Japan was necessary and likely saved lives. Understanding the weighty decisions that were made requires one to be fully transported into the shoes of those responsible. Thomas's arguments are further enhanced by putting us in the room with the Big Six (the Supreme War Council of Japan) to show how resistant Japan was to surrender even after the two bombs were dropped.
With all that has been written about these events, I set the bar pretty high for World War II books. A new World War II book should feel like it was necessary (see Half American by Matthew F. Delmont for a necessary WWII book). I don't think that Road to Surrender quite makes that bar, but it's a good read. Those who know little about these events will likely find it to be a superb read.
Thanks to Net Galley and Penguin Random House for providing an egalley.
August 26, 2024
This book documents the last few months of WW2 through the eyes of US Secretary of War Henry Stimson, US General Carl Spaatz and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo. The author does an excellent job of revealing the tough behind the scenes decisions that were made by the US to drop the 2 atomic bombs on Japan. Meanwhile, the chaotic situation within the fractured Japanese leadership is also discussed. Highly recommended for those who wonder if the use of atomic weapons was necessary to end the war.
May 25, 2023
One of the most debated topics in the United States (and around the world) concerns the making and subsequent dropping of the first atomic bombs. These bombs, and the threat of others being dropped on Japan, ended WW2. The questions are many and have been asked by historians, religious figures, survivors, soldiers, scientists, and politicians, among others.
THIS REVIEW IS STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION. CHECK BACK.
THIS REVIEW IS STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION. CHECK BACK.
January 20, 2024
This is a fascinating examination of the final weeks of World War II, focused on three men at the center of decision-making: US secretary of war Stimson, general in charge of the bombing of Japan Spaatz and the Japanese foreign minister Togo. From our perspective almost 80 years later, the course of the surrender is a given, a done deed. This riveting account helps us see that many other paths were considered and available on both sides, and could have led to very different outcomes.
September 16, 2023
Loved the book. Very insightful and I really appreciated the perspective and narrative tone through historical detail. I finished from the second bomb to the end of the book on 16 Sep 23 during my own trip to Nagasaki.
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