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Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?
Discusses the role of the Soviet Union in bringing about World War II, and suggests that Stalin was preparing the invasion of Germany when Hitler attacked
364 pages, Hardcover
First published August 28, 1990
About the author
Viktor Suvorov
81 books170 followersFormer Soviet-Union army officer fled in 1978 to England. Where he worked as a teacher and a adviser for news agencies.
Author of a number of bestsellers about the history of the World War II, the Soviet Army special operations troops and military intelligence, and the Red Army.
He is one of the historians who believes that Hitler started the war against Russia to prevent Stalin attacking Germany first.
See also Виктор Суворов and Wiktor Suworow
Author of a number of bestsellers about the history of the World War II, the Soviet Army special operations troops and military intelligence, and the Red Army.
He is one of the historians who believes that Hitler started the war against Russia to prevent Stalin attacking Germany first.
See also Виктор Суворов and Wiktor Suworow
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 61 reviews
June 5, 2015
If Hitler had delayed the invasion of the Soviet Union by two weeks, Europe would today be speaking Russian and look much like East Germany prior to unification. That is the conclusion one draws from Suvorov's book.
Anyone with an interest in the history of the Second World War knows the general narrative of the German invasion of Russia June 22, 1941. Hitler fooled Stalin into signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, bribing him with the secret protocols dividing up Eastern Europe. This allowed Hitler to fight on one front only without having to watch his back and would deal with Russia later. The Germans were so successful in overrunning Western Europe, North Africa, Norway and the Balkans, that Hitler decided to risk invading the Soviet Union. Destruction of the USSR was his overriding goal all along - starving 1/3 of all Slavs, enslaving 1/3 and driving 1/3 behind the Urals.
The Red Army was massed along the border with Germany and munitions, aircraft, tanks etc were also there. The Red Army was badly led, Stalin having killed off all the experienced officers in the 1937-38 purges, and did not have time to prepare defenses. Stalin was convinced Hitler would not attack and disregarded warnings of the pending German invasion, from among other sources Churchill and Sorge, as spy in teh German Embassy in Japan who gave the exact date of the invasion.
The Red Army was caught totally unprepared by the German attack and collapsed in utter confusion, though they fought bravely. It took several weeks for the Soviet Army to get organized and begin to provide any kind of solid defense. They were not helped by Stalin who insisted that there should be no retreat and no territory lost.
Originally scheduled for April, Barbarossa was delayed until late June while the Germans bailed out Mussolini in the Balkans and reinforced the Romanian oilfields. Hitler was convinced that the war with the Soviet Union would be over in 4 months. However, even though in the first few weeks and months of the war, the Nazi's captured over 4 million Red Army soldiers and destroyed or captured thousands of aircraft and tanks, and millions of tonnes of munitions, they were caught by winter at the gates of Moscow.
This is the accepted story from German sources and official Soviet sources. For some reason, no one questioned the official Soviet sources and no one asked the obvious question, "What the hell were the Russians doing between Sept 1939 and June 1941 and more importantly, what were they thinking?"
We know the Soviet Union supplied food and raw materials to the Germans. We know in September 1939 they invaded and annexed eastern Poland, fought the Winter War with Finland, then in 1940 invaded and annexed the Baltics as per the agreement with Germany. They also invaded and annexed Bessarabia which was not in the agreement and which was too close for comfort to the Ploiesti oilfields, Germany's only oil supply.
It is Suvorov's belief that it was Stalin who fooled Hitler into facing west and that Hitler was finished the moment he turned his back on the USSR. Stalin's logic goes back to the very beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Socialism was not supposed to be limited to one country, it was to be world wide. After Russia, the country most ready for revolution was Germany immediately after the Great War. But by 1920, when the Russian civil war ended, it was too late. The Red Army was beaten back at Warsaw in 1922 and the border established to 1939.
Stalin realized that WWII was essential to the spread of Socialism; for the Capitalist Europe (Germany, France and Britain), to destroy themselves. That is why the USSR began helping Germany rearm, contrary to the Treaty of Versailles, long before Hitler came on the scene. It is also why Stalin encouraged the rise of Hitler, because he recognized his usefulness to the Socialist cause. Stalin referred to Hitler as the "Icebreaker" who would open the way for a Socialist conquest of Europe.
So when Zhukov signaled Stalin in August that the Red Army was in position to annihilate the Japanese Army North at Khalkhin-Gol on the Mongolian-Manchurian border and ensure Russia did not have to fight on two fronts, Molotov signed the infamous agreement with Molotov.
Suvorov was a Russian Military Intelligence Officer until his defection to Britain with his family in 1978. As such he had access to documents that other historians did not or that they did not understand the significance of. Suvorov describes in well documented detail what the Red Army was doing and what they were thinking. He lists which officers commanded which armies, division, battalions, where and when they were stationed, what their training and equipment was. He asks many questions to which he then applies his knowledge of military strategy and tactics to work out possible answers.
IF the Soviet Union was determined to stay neutral and stay out of the war and their only concern was to defend themselves against German aggression then WHY did they:
Move their border up against Germany, rather than leaving a buffer?
Abandon and destroy the Stalin-Line of defensive fortresses stretching from north to south, which at least would have provided a fall back line of defense?
Train a million paratroopers and establish a marine landing invasion force stationed on the Danube?
Train and organize a First Echelon army of millions and secretly move it up against the Border with Germany and Romania?
Train and organize a Second Echelon army and secretly begin moving it towards the German border?
Build roads and railroads towards the German border and use them to move troops and to stockpile millions of tonnes of fuel, munitions etc within 50 km of the border?
Build airstrips within 40 to 50 km of the border and part aircraft wingtip to wingtip?
Train pilots not in air to air combat but in air to ground bombing and strafing?
Spend months of detailed planning but have no defense plans?
These are activities of an OFFENSIVE Army, not a defensive army. In other words Stalin was NOT waiting for Hitler, he was going to attack. Suvorov calculated the date of July 6, 1941. Sunday morning was a favoured Soviet attack time. And according to the railway schedule the Second Echelon armies would begin arriving at the front July 10, which meant they could actually be unloaded on the other side of the border on German territory. On July 6, the disasters which happened to the Red Army would have happened to the German army.
By May and early June 1941 the actions of both armies on both sides of the border were mirror images of each other. Both sides were well aware of the build up of the other side. Why didn't Stalin believe the warnings? He had no reason to trust Churchill whose very survival depended on opening of an Eastern Front. Nor did he trust Sorge who had been "recalled to Moscow" months previous but refused, knowing what was waiting for him when he got there.
Stalin did trust his own intelligence officers who were certain an attack would not be launched even if Hitler were foolish enough to want to fight on two fronts. They were monitoring two critical items which they knew Germany MUST have before an attack on the USSR. Winter clothing and winter lubricants. Hitler's hubris sunk Stalin.
Suvorov's claims have been disputed as revisionist. The mythology of the Great Patriotic War is that Russia did not want to fight but were invaded without cause by the German aggressor. Most of the documentation needed to prove Suvorov's version has of course been destroyed, in particular the detailed plans which every commander along the front had in a red envelope in a safe which was to be opened on command from Moscow. But there are enough clues left to indicate that Hitler attacked to preempt what he knew was coming and that it was just in time.
Until I find a specific detailed rebuttal, I am inclined to go with Suvorov.
Anyone with an interest in the history of the Second World War knows the general narrative of the German invasion of Russia June 22, 1941. Hitler fooled Stalin into signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, bribing him with the secret protocols dividing up Eastern Europe. This allowed Hitler to fight on one front only without having to watch his back and would deal with Russia later. The Germans were so successful in overrunning Western Europe, North Africa, Norway and the Balkans, that Hitler decided to risk invading the Soviet Union. Destruction of the USSR was his overriding goal all along - starving 1/3 of all Slavs, enslaving 1/3 and driving 1/3 behind the Urals.
The Red Army was massed along the border with Germany and munitions, aircraft, tanks etc were also there. The Red Army was badly led, Stalin having killed off all the experienced officers in the 1937-38 purges, and did not have time to prepare defenses. Stalin was convinced Hitler would not attack and disregarded warnings of the pending German invasion, from among other sources Churchill and Sorge, as spy in teh German Embassy in Japan who gave the exact date of the invasion.
The Red Army was caught totally unprepared by the German attack and collapsed in utter confusion, though they fought bravely. It took several weeks for the Soviet Army to get organized and begin to provide any kind of solid defense. They were not helped by Stalin who insisted that there should be no retreat and no territory lost.
Originally scheduled for April, Barbarossa was delayed until late June while the Germans bailed out Mussolini in the Balkans and reinforced the Romanian oilfields. Hitler was convinced that the war with the Soviet Union would be over in 4 months. However, even though in the first few weeks and months of the war, the Nazi's captured over 4 million Red Army soldiers and destroyed or captured thousands of aircraft and tanks, and millions of tonnes of munitions, they were caught by winter at the gates of Moscow.
This is the accepted story from German sources and official Soviet sources. For some reason, no one questioned the official Soviet sources and no one asked the obvious question, "What the hell were the Russians doing between Sept 1939 and June 1941 and more importantly, what were they thinking?"
We know the Soviet Union supplied food and raw materials to the Germans. We know in September 1939 they invaded and annexed eastern Poland, fought the Winter War with Finland, then in 1940 invaded and annexed the Baltics as per the agreement with Germany. They also invaded and annexed Bessarabia which was not in the agreement and which was too close for comfort to the Ploiesti oilfields, Germany's only oil supply.
It is Suvorov's belief that it was Stalin who fooled Hitler into facing west and that Hitler was finished the moment he turned his back on the USSR. Stalin's logic goes back to the very beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Socialism was not supposed to be limited to one country, it was to be world wide. After Russia, the country most ready for revolution was Germany immediately after the Great War. But by 1920, when the Russian civil war ended, it was too late. The Red Army was beaten back at Warsaw in 1922 and the border established to 1939.
Stalin realized that WWII was essential to the spread of Socialism; for the Capitalist Europe (Germany, France and Britain), to destroy themselves. That is why the USSR began helping Germany rearm, contrary to the Treaty of Versailles, long before Hitler came on the scene. It is also why Stalin encouraged the rise of Hitler, because he recognized his usefulness to the Socialist cause. Stalin referred to Hitler as the "Icebreaker" who would open the way for a Socialist conquest of Europe.
So when Zhukov signaled Stalin in August that the Red Army was in position to annihilate the Japanese Army North at Khalkhin-Gol on the Mongolian-Manchurian border and ensure Russia did not have to fight on two fronts, Molotov signed the infamous agreement with Molotov.
Suvorov was a Russian Military Intelligence Officer until his defection to Britain with his family in 1978. As such he had access to documents that other historians did not or that they did not understand the significance of. Suvorov describes in well documented detail what the Red Army was doing and what they were thinking. He lists which officers commanded which armies, division, battalions, where and when they were stationed, what their training and equipment was. He asks many questions to which he then applies his knowledge of military strategy and tactics to work out possible answers.
IF the Soviet Union was determined to stay neutral and stay out of the war and their only concern was to defend themselves against German aggression then WHY did they:
Move their border up against Germany, rather than leaving a buffer?
Abandon and destroy the Stalin-Line of defensive fortresses stretching from north to south, which at least would have provided a fall back line of defense?
Train a million paratroopers and establish a marine landing invasion force stationed on the Danube?
Train and organize a First Echelon army of millions and secretly move it up against the Border with Germany and Romania?
Train and organize a Second Echelon army and secretly begin moving it towards the German border?
Build roads and railroads towards the German border and use them to move troops and to stockpile millions of tonnes of fuel, munitions etc within 50 km of the border?
Build airstrips within 40 to 50 km of the border and part aircraft wingtip to wingtip?
Train pilots not in air to air combat but in air to ground bombing and strafing?
Spend months of detailed planning but have no defense plans?
These are activities of an OFFENSIVE Army, not a defensive army. In other words Stalin was NOT waiting for Hitler, he was going to attack. Suvorov calculated the date of July 6, 1941. Sunday morning was a favoured Soviet attack time. And according to the railway schedule the Second Echelon armies would begin arriving at the front July 10, which meant they could actually be unloaded on the other side of the border on German territory. On July 6, the disasters which happened to the Red Army would have happened to the German army.
By May and early June 1941 the actions of both armies on both sides of the border were mirror images of each other. Both sides were well aware of the build up of the other side. Why didn't Stalin believe the warnings? He had no reason to trust Churchill whose very survival depended on opening of an Eastern Front. Nor did he trust Sorge who had been "recalled to Moscow" months previous but refused, knowing what was waiting for him when he got there.
Stalin did trust his own intelligence officers who were certain an attack would not be launched even if Hitler were foolish enough to want to fight on two fronts. They were monitoring two critical items which they knew Germany MUST have before an attack on the USSR. Winter clothing and winter lubricants. Hitler's hubris sunk Stalin.
Suvorov's claims have been disputed as revisionist. The mythology of the Great Patriotic War is that Russia did not want to fight but were invaded without cause by the German aggressor. Most of the documentation needed to prove Suvorov's version has of course been destroyed, in particular the detailed plans which every commander along the front had in a red envelope in a safe which was to be opened on command from Moscow. But there are enough clues left to indicate that Hitler attacked to preempt what he knew was coming and that it was just in time.
Until I find a specific detailed rebuttal, I am inclined to go with Suvorov.
December 21, 2007
It realy made me to rethink the WW2.
August 9, 2018
Must read book on World War II
The author clearly and logically details how Stalin had prepared for a war of aggression against Germany and all of non-Soviet Europe. That Stalin had set the date of July 7th for the attack, but that Hitler had thwarted this attack, by launching a pre-emotive strike against Stalin on June 22nd.
The author clearly and logically details how Stalin had prepared for a war of aggression against Germany and all of non-Soviet Europe. That Stalin had set the date of July 7th for the attack, but that Hitler had thwarted this attack, by launching a pre-emotive strike against Stalin on June 22nd.
July 30, 2021
Stalin was planning to invade Europe to spread Comunism, something that has been hidden from us, so as to make Germany the eternal guilty party.Also hidden or rarely spoken about was the horrors people endured and the millions who lost their lives because of this madman and his henchmen.
May 6, 2019
Stalin iba a invadir a Alemania
Suvorov describe porque stalin estaba listo para invadir a Alemania y Hitler le arruinó sus planes. Súper recomendado esta lectura para aquellos que quieran abrir sus ojos de tantas mentiras del sistema.
Suvorov describe porque stalin estaba listo para invadir a Alemania y Hitler le arruinó sus planes. Súper recomendado esta lectura para aquellos que quieran abrir sus ojos de tantas mentiras del sistema.
October 28, 2022
Чудесна книга, която помага да разберем какво опитва да постигне Путин в Украйна в момента. И хвърля много светлина върху подготовката к участието на СССР във Втората сверовна война - според Суворов всъщност Сталин се е готвел да нападне Хитлер малко преди германците да изненадат руските войски… И заради нулевата си подготовка за защитна война, първоначално търпят много поражения - целият ресурс всъщност е бил хвърлян в продължение на години за подготовка за изненадващи атакуващи действия
March 13, 2009
Book presnting Viktor Suvorov's theory on who started World War 2. Was it just for Nazi interests of getting Lebensraum? Or communistist officials of USSR also planned getting Europe for themselves?
November 21, 2014
Excellent study, lefts one with a complete different view on WWII history
April 1, 2023
Great book, I recommend it VERY MUCH.
It’s a very thorough and intelligent analysis of various aspects that look bewildering in any other interpretation of the events but make perfect sense if you agree with the key idea of Виктор Суворов: that the USSR was actively preparing an aggressive war against Germany (with the ultimate purpose of the conquest of the whole Europe) and intended to strike first somewhere in the middle of 1941.
I should say that I was somewhat skeptical about Виктор Суворов after “Аквариум” (which is a half-autobiography, half-romanticized hymn to the Soviet “special forces”). However, “Ледокол” convinced me that “Аквариум” was just not the best choice for the first acquaintance with the author, and they are overall very different books in their importance and stylistically. I consider “Ледокол” a must-read for everybody who is interested in WW2 and the history of the USSR in general. It not only gives answers to a lot of questions you might have and plenty of material to think about and investigate deeper, but it is also a surprisingly very well-written book (again, contrary to “Аквариум” that sometimes seems on the verge of graphomania but, I think, mostly just reflects the lack of experience in a new author who wanted to tell his unique story to the world as impressively as possible).
“Ледокол” tells us about a whole series of facts and patterns that all gradually make a very logical picture of the active preparations of the USSR for the military aggression against Nazi Germany (while Germany was “busy” with its own aggressive war with all the democratic Europe). This aggressive war should have been conducted under the label of “liberation,” of course, and not called by the Soviets “a war” at all. Similarly to “liberation campaigns” (“освободительные походы”) of the Red Army in Poland, Finland, Baltic countries, Afghanistan, etc. You know, similarly to the current “special operation” in Ukraine.
Виктор Суворов does not conjure the idea from thin air, just because he “believes” that the USSR could have been such an aggressor (although we know perfectly that yes, the USSR was exactly such an aggressor and it dreamed about conquering Europe and transforming it into one large “Soviet Union”). No, he analyzed millions of documents that show to any “military literate” person that there were indeed very active preparations for such a war — an aggressive war, an imminent war, an unprecedentedly large-scale war, and all this was definitely NOT a preparation to possible defense against looming Germany’s aggression. From the military point of view, preparations for aggression against another country (on its territory) and preparations for defense against another country’s aggression (on your territory) are very different complexes of measures. They require different weapons, different lines of defense, different compositions and arrangements of army units, different engineering, construction, mining works, etc., etc. All this looks obvious even for the general public if you start to talk about some particular specifics. Виктор Суворов is doing exactly this: very consistently and gradually, he shows how these, and these, and these things are literally SCREAMING to our faces that the USSR planned to start an aggressive war very soon, and would have definitely done it if Germany had not stricken first (Виктор Суворов believes, by the way, that Germany wouldn’t do it, at least so soon, if Germany had not observed these preparations to the aggression towards it; Hitler just knew that his only chance was to cut it down when Stalin did not expect it and when the USSR was the most vulnerable immediately before its own attack — Hitler was just forced to strike first at this moment and stun the USSR with surprise causing the necessity to carry out “defensive” actions instead of “assaulting,” which is disastrous for a country that had no plans to defend itself on its own territory; Виктор Суворов claims that the choice of the end of June 1941 for Germany’s attack was made because Stalin most probably planned his attack on July).
The book is not only VERY convincing (to the point that you start to think in terms “these things are so obvious, I am sure that I already KNEW all this, just could not formulate them for myself comprehensively…”), but it also explains a lot of very problematic issues that no other “theory” can explain. For example, the whole picture of the disastrous first months of the war for the USSR, which was literally crushed by the German assault. No historian who “does not believe” that the USSR planned an aggressive war can explain it. Yes, Nazi Germany was a strong and high-tech aggressor, but the USSR was also a very powerful and militarily highly advanced state, and it concentrated a lot of troops and weapons near its Western borders, and it had one of the most well-developed intelligence/espionage networks in Europe. Of course, they knew what was going on. Of course, they were preparing for something. Of course, they were not naive fools who just never intended to participate in the war. However, most historians still try to follow this faulty logic: that Stalin was a fool who thought that Hitler was his “friend,” and the Soviet army was just too weak compared to Germans, or incorrectly positioned, or poorly motivated — whatever. This just does not make any sense to anybody who knows the history and Soviet ambitions about its place in the world. However, Виктор Суворов’s idea makes perfect sense: they were preparing an aggressive war themselves and saw it as the most probable (=only) scenario for the nearest future, and this means that their ability to defend their own territory was weakened day by day. They did not need such engineering constructions, such weapons, such roads, such army structure that were necessary for successful defense if they intended to be the aggressors themselves and “conquer” other countries. They would have never concentrated so many troops, and planes, and unprotected warehouses with all kinds of ammunition near the border if they had anticipated being attacked from this direction. All this eventually resulted in the most disastrous defeat of the Soviet army during the first months of Germany’s assault. Even if the Soviets had never made any preparations for war at all, the disaster would not have been so devastating compared to what they got after preparing for the aggressive war themselves. And it would have never been a disaster at all if they had indeed prepared for defense.
There are many, many very interesting arguments like this in the book, and each claim is very well substantiated — first of all, from the point of view of a professional military man. More than anything, the whole mass of all these facts and statements is fascinating and makes a very solid base for contemplations.
One of the most amazing characteristics of this book is that it was created in the 1980s based on publicly available information, mostly open Soviet publications and “censorship-approved” memoirs of Soviet officers. Not archives, not stolen state secrets, not confidential interviews. The author just analyzed the available-for-everyone facts and explained what he can see from them as a professional officer himself. Many of these facts look innocent enough until you gather them together and show how unidirectional they actually are and what an interesting pattern they reveal for somebody who understands what was going on.
Still, this book was published first in Germany and in the UK, and its Russian translation was not possible until 1992 (the peak of “freedom” in Russia). After this, it has been a permanent object of hate from Russians )).
*
I should say that after this book I now consider Виктор Суворов a perfect “marker” of historical adequacy. I mean: if somebody starts the discussion with words like “Виктор Суворов writes shit, and all this is anti-historical, and his fantasies do not cost a penny, etc.,” you can just stop discussing with this person anything )). We can criticize some of Суворов’s points or interpretations, of course, or maybe some inaccurately collected details, but no normal person who knows history cannot NOT agree with him in general. Some of his statements can be considered “speculations,” for sure (like the particular date of the planned Soviet assault, for example), although I believe that they are very well-grounded and totally justified “speculations.” However, 90% of this book is a very clear and very factual demonstration of real historical events and processes that any adequate person may interpret only similarly to what the author did himself. Contrary to “Аквариум” (where he often talks about “secret” things that nobody can reasonably confirm or discredit), “Ледокол” is a collection of well-known and publicly available information gathered from the sources approved even by the USSR itself, and the author gives the respective references to every quote or fact discussed.
In this light, it is especially funny now to see how Russians hate Виктор Суворов. His books and his name overall are traditionally showered by all the possible shit, and it is not even considered appropriate to mention his works in any “decent” historical discussion. Now I know why )). Because he proves easily and clearly through many, many, many well-known facts the most obvious things Russian “historians” try to deny for dozens of years: that the USSR was an aggressor and one of the main instigators of World War Two. Russians have written tons of books and articles about “вранье Виктора Суворова (Резуна)” (somehow they like to mention his real surname, probably believing that it sounds more disgusting) but, as I understand, nobody managed to show convincingly that “Ледокол” (or any other of his books in the series) is indeed a lie, or falsification, or manipulation, etc. They managed to make his name “scandalous,” though, so people who do not understand history much are usually under impression that Виктор Суворов should better be avoided, because too many people are “criticizing” him ))). I can claim with certainty that it’s a powerful and well-organized reputation fouling campaign, and you know perfectly that Russia and especially Russian “historians” love to do this with facts they don’t like about their history (well, they actually LIKE them, but they understand that it is a bad thing to be proud of them publicly, so they mostly just deny them).
(Should I also add that Виктор Суворов is still “sentenced to death in absentia” in modern Russia? I am sure they would love “to get” him for this…)
Lastly, I wanted to underline that I really liked how this book is written: exceptionally well-structured (every chapter tells you all the details about some specific aspect, and all the chapters consistently give you more and more information about the things you would never even thought were important) and presented in an intelligent and very interesting way, not overwhelming you but streamlining everything you already knew yourself about the same events.
So I can only recommend it, especially today, when Russia uses its status of a “victim of an assault” during World War Two as a powerful leverage for a new aggressive war and mobilization of its population “to defend our innocent and peaceful nation” and “to liberate our compatriots.” The war against Ukraine is just another war in the chain of aggressive wars Moscow waged against its neighbors for hundreds of years. The war against Ukraine is a possible beginning of a war against Europe and the whole “community of democracies” Moscow always wanted to start, and was the closest to it in 1941. If you don’t know these basic things about history, maybe then “Ледокол” would look like “a fantasy” to you. Otherwise, just read it.
*
This book is part of a series:
1. “Ледокол” — about the preparation of the USSR to its aggression against Germany.
2. “День „М“ — some additional information about the preparation and the actual beginning of the war inside the USSR via mobilization of the population into a huge army.
3. “Последняя республика” — about the ideological background of the Soviet aggression against Europe. This book is also part of a separate cycle: “Последняя республика” + “Святое дело” + “Разгром”.
4. “Очищение” — about Stalin’s “purge” of the Soviet Army before World War Two (which, Виктор Суворов believes, was not “a folly” but a very intentional operation conducted to strengthen the military and make it much more prepared for the aggressive war).
5. “Самоубийство” — about the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR (which, Виктор Суворов believes, was mostly provoked by the fast preparations of the USSR for their attack, and therefore, was a desperate, “suicidal” attempt to strike first).
As I understand, they all have a similar structure and are subordinated to the common idea but may be read separately (although preferably in this order). I intend to read all of them, one by one.
It’s a very thorough and intelligent analysis of various aspects that look bewildering in any other interpretation of the events but make perfect sense if you agree with the key idea of Виктор Суворов: that the USSR was actively preparing an aggressive war against Germany (with the ultimate purpose of the conquest of the whole Europe) and intended to strike first somewhere in the middle of 1941.
I should say that I was somewhat skeptical about Виктор Суворов after “Аквариум” (which is a half-autobiography, half-romanticized hymn to the Soviet “special forces”). However, “Ледокол” convinced me that “Аквариум” was just not the best choice for the first acquaintance with the author, and they are overall very different books in their importance and stylistically. I consider “Ледокол” a must-read for everybody who is interested in WW2 and the history of the USSR in general. It not only gives answers to a lot of questions you might have and plenty of material to think about and investigate deeper, but it is also a surprisingly very well-written book (again, contrary to “Аквариум” that sometimes seems on the verge of graphomania but, I think, mostly just reflects the lack of experience in a new author who wanted to tell his unique story to the world as impressively as possible).
“Ледокол” tells us about a whole series of facts and patterns that all gradually make a very logical picture of the active preparations of the USSR for the military aggression against Nazi Germany (while Germany was “busy” with its own aggressive war with all the democratic Europe). This aggressive war should have been conducted under the label of “liberation,” of course, and not called by the Soviets “a war” at all. Similarly to “liberation campaigns” (“освободительные походы”) of the Red Army in Poland, Finland, Baltic countries, Afghanistan, etc. You know, similarly to the current “special operation” in Ukraine.
Виктор Суворов does not conjure the idea from thin air, just because he “believes” that the USSR could have been such an aggressor (although we know perfectly that yes, the USSR was exactly such an aggressor and it dreamed about conquering Europe and transforming it into one large “Soviet Union”). No, he analyzed millions of documents that show to any “military literate” person that there were indeed very active preparations for such a war — an aggressive war, an imminent war, an unprecedentedly large-scale war, and all this was definitely NOT a preparation to possible defense against looming Germany’s aggression. From the military point of view, preparations for aggression against another country (on its territory) and preparations for defense against another country’s aggression (on your territory) are very different complexes of measures. They require different weapons, different lines of defense, different compositions and arrangements of army units, different engineering, construction, mining works, etc., etc. All this looks obvious even for the general public if you start to talk about some particular specifics. Виктор Суворов is doing exactly this: very consistently and gradually, he shows how these, and these, and these things are literally SCREAMING to our faces that the USSR planned to start an aggressive war very soon, and would have definitely done it if Germany had not stricken first (Виктор Суворов believes, by the way, that Germany wouldn’t do it, at least so soon, if Germany had not observed these preparations to the aggression towards it; Hitler just knew that his only chance was to cut it down when Stalin did not expect it and when the USSR was the most vulnerable immediately before its own attack — Hitler was just forced to strike first at this moment and stun the USSR with surprise causing the necessity to carry out “defensive” actions instead of “assaulting,” which is disastrous for a country that had no plans to defend itself on its own territory; Виктор Суворов claims that the choice of the end of June 1941 for Germany’s attack was made because Stalin most probably planned his attack on July).
The book is not only VERY convincing (to the point that you start to think in terms “these things are so obvious, I am sure that I already KNEW all this, just could not formulate them for myself comprehensively…”), but it also explains a lot of very problematic issues that no other “theory” can explain. For example, the whole picture of the disastrous first months of the war for the USSR, which was literally crushed by the German assault. No historian who “does not believe” that the USSR planned an aggressive war can explain it. Yes, Nazi Germany was a strong and high-tech aggressor, but the USSR was also a very powerful and militarily highly advanced state, and it concentrated a lot of troops and weapons near its Western borders, and it had one of the most well-developed intelligence/espionage networks in Europe. Of course, they knew what was going on. Of course, they were preparing for something. Of course, they were not naive fools who just never intended to participate in the war. However, most historians still try to follow this faulty logic: that Stalin was a fool who thought that Hitler was his “friend,” and the Soviet army was just too weak compared to Germans, or incorrectly positioned, or poorly motivated — whatever. This just does not make any sense to anybody who knows the history and Soviet ambitions about its place in the world. However, Виктор Суворов’s idea makes perfect sense: they were preparing an aggressive war themselves and saw it as the most probable (=only) scenario for the nearest future, and this means that their ability to defend their own territory was weakened day by day. They did not need such engineering constructions, such weapons, such roads, such army structure that were necessary for successful defense if they intended to be the aggressors themselves and “conquer” other countries. They would have never concentrated so many troops, and planes, and unprotected warehouses with all kinds of ammunition near the border if they had anticipated being attacked from this direction. All this eventually resulted in the most disastrous defeat of the Soviet army during the first months of Germany’s assault. Even if the Soviets had never made any preparations for war at all, the disaster would not have been so devastating compared to what they got after preparing for the aggressive war themselves. And it would have never been a disaster at all if they had indeed prepared for defense.
There are many, many very interesting arguments like this in the book, and each claim is very well substantiated — first of all, from the point of view of a professional military man. More than anything, the whole mass of all these facts and statements is fascinating and makes a very solid base for contemplations.
One of the most amazing characteristics of this book is that it was created in the 1980s based on publicly available information, mostly open Soviet publications and “censorship-approved” memoirs of Soviet officers. Not archives, not stolen state secrets, not confidential interviews. The author just analyzed the available-for-everyone facts and explained what he can see from them as a professional officer himself. Many of these facts look innocent enough until you gather them together and show how unidirectional they actually are and what an interesting pattern they reveal for somebody who understands what was going on.
Still, this book was published first in Germany and in the UK, and its Russian translation was not possible until 1992 (the peak of “freedom” in Russia). After this, it has been a permanent object of hate from Russians )).
*
I should say that after this book I now consider Виктор Суворов a perfect “marker” of historical adequacy. I mean: if somebody starts the discussion with words like “Виктор Суворов writes shit, and all this is anti-historical, and his fantasies do not cost a penny, etc.,” you can just stop discussing with this person anything )). We can criticize some of Суворов’s points or interpretations, of course, or maybe some inaccurately collected details, but no normal person who knows history cannot NOT agree with him in general. Some of his statements can be considered “speculations,” for sure (like the particular date of the planned Soviet assault, for example), although I believe that they are very well-grounded and totally justified “speculations.” However, 90% of this book is a very clear and very factual demonstration of real historical events and processes that any adequate person may interpret only similarly to what the author did himself. Contrary to “Аквариум” (where he often talks about “secret” things that nobody can reasonably confirm or discredit), “Ледокол” is a collection of well-known and publicly available information gathered from the sources approved even by the USSR itself, and the author gives the respective references to every quote or fact discussed.
In this light, it is especially funny now to see how Russians hate Виктор Суворов. His books and his name overall are traditionally showered by all the possible shit, and it is not even considered appropriate to mention his works in any “decent” historical discussion. Now I know why )). Because he proves easily and clearly through many, many, many well-known facts the most obvious things Russian “historians” try to deny for dozens of years: that the USSR was an aggressor and one of the main instigators of World War Two. Russians have written tons of books and articles about “вранье Виктора Суворова (Резуна)” (somehow they like to mention his real surname, probably believing that it sounds more disgusting) but, as I understand, nobody managed to show convincingly that “Ледокол” (or any other of his books in the series) is indeed a lie, or falsification, or manipulation, etc. They managed to make his name “scandalous,” though, so people who do not understand history much are usually under impression that Виктор Суворов should better be avoided, because too many people are “criticizing” him ))). I can claim with certainty that it’s a powerful and well-organized reputation fouling campaign, and you know perfectly that Russia and especially Russian “historians” love to do this with facts they don’t like about their history (well, they actually LIKE them, but they understand that it is a bad thing to be proud of them publicly, so they mostly just deny them).
(Should I also add that Виктор Суворов is still “sentenced to death in absentia” in modern Russia? I am sure they would love “to get” him for this…)
Lastly, I wanted to underline that I really liked how this book is written: exceptionally well-structured (every chapter tells you all the details about some specific aspect, and all the chapters consistently give you more and more information about the things you would never even thought were important) and presented in an intelligent and very interesting way, not overwhelming you but streamlining everything you already knew yourself about the same events.
So I can only recommend it, especially today, when Russia uses its status of a “victim of an assault” during World War Two as a powerful leverage for a new aggressive war and mobilization of its population “to defend our innocent and peaceful nation” and “to liberate our compatriots.” The war against Ukraine is just another war in the chain of aggressive wars Moscow waged against its neighbors for hundreds of years. The war against Ukraine is a possible beginning of a war against Europe and the whole “community of democracies” Moscow always wanted to start, and was the closest to it in 1941. If you don’t know these basic things about history, maybe then “Ледокол” would look like “a fantasy” to you. Otherwise, just read it.
*
This book is part of a series:
1. “Ледокол” — about the preparation of the USSR to its aggression against Germany.
2. “День „М“ — some additional information about the preparation and the actual beginning of the war inside the USSR via mobilization of the population into a huge army.
3. “Последняя республика” — about the ideological background of the Soviet aggression against Europe. This book is also part of a separate cycle: “Последняя республика” + “Святое дело” + “Разгром”.
4. “Очищение” — about Stalin’s “purge” of the Soviet Army before World War Two (which, Виктор Суворов believes, was not “a folly” but a very intentional operation conducted to strengthen the military and make it much more prepared for the aggressive war).
5. “Самоубийство” — about the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR (which, Виктор Суворов believes, was mostly provoked by the fast preparations of the USSR for their attack, and therefore, was a desperate, “suicidal” attempt to strike first).
As I understand, they all have a similar structure and are subordinated to the common idea but may be read separately (although preferably in this order). I intend to read all of them, one by one.
March 13, 2013
It seems I had some wrong expectations. Based on general opinion about author, I've expected some very juicy historical facts for pure entertainment. Unfortunately (at least for me), Suvorov has focused on just one thesis - that Stalin was aiming for WW the 2nd even more than Hitler did and all his actions that seems ridiculous (sometimes) were caused by that. Why is it a problem for me? Well, first 10% of the book is quite interesting, next 10% still kept me involved, but after that it gets more and more dull - Suvorov tries to collect all the evidence based on historical reports and statements, but it's damn hard to find any entertainment in that. Don't misunderstand me - his speculations seem quite realistic (convincing), but after 25% of the book I haven't find anything new - all the conclusions and clarifications looked exactly the same ("That was an offensive unit, so why was it transfered to XYZ").
So, in the end I'm a bit disappointed, but it's more about my wrong expectations that the book itself (it's just a historical elaboration, not something I was looking for).
So, in the end I'm a bit disappointed, but it's more about my wrong expectations that the book itself (it's just a historical elaboration, not something I was looking for).
April 29, 2024
Suvorov is a famous Russian army defector who wrote several controversial revisionist history books. In Icebreaker, his most famous book, he explains his main theory: that in 1941 the USSR was getting ready to attack Nazi Germany and the German attack in June beat the Soviets to the punch.
This theory explains why the Soviet army performed so poorly at the start of the war as it was caught in offensive positions instead of being in defensive positions.
There is a fair few arguments that he brings to the table such as:
- the USSR dismantled all the extensive defensive works from the border with Germany
- huge amounts of troops, material and ammo was being moved from the Russian Far East to the Western border just before the German attack
- officers were given orders and plans for potential attacks on Germany, Poland and Romania
- Stalin gave a secret speech just before the German attack talking about an aggressive war against Germany
There is a whole heap of circumstantial evidence that take together could be interpreted as being proof of this theory. But there's no actual direct solid evidence. Most military historians dispute this theory which was actually first iterated by Nazi generals at the Nuremberg trials.
The book is definitely worth reading for an alternative perspective but it lacks the academic rigour to back up this controversial theory.
This theory explains why the Soviet army performed so poorly at the start of the war as it was caught in offensive positions instead of being in defensive positions.
There is a fair few arguments that he brings to the table such as:
- the USSR dismantled all the extensive defensive works from the border with Germany
- huge amounts of troops, material and ammo was being moved from the Russian Far East to the Western border just before the German attack
- officers were given orders and plans for potential attacks on Germany, Poland and Romania
- Stalin gave a secret speech just before the German attack talking about an aggressive war against Germany
There is a whole heap of circumstantial evidence that take together could be interpreted as being proof of this theory. But there's no actual direct solid evidence. Most military historians dispute this theory which was actually first iterated by Nazi generals at the Nuremberg trials.
The book is definitely worth reading for an alternative perspective but it lacks the academic rigour to back up this controversial theory.
October 13, 2023
საინტერესო წიგნია, ევროპაში გაქცეული რუსი აგენტის დაწერილი. უმარავი საინტერესო ფაქტით და სრულიად სხვანაირი ხედვით მეორე მსოფლიო ომის დასაწყისზე, უფრო კი იმ მიზეზებზე, რომელთა გამოც ამ ომმა ასეთი ფორმა მიიღო!
რატომ გახსნა ნაცისტურმა გერმანიამ მეორე ფრონტი საბჭოთა კავშირთან, როდესაც ზუსტად იცოდა რა მოუტანა ორ ფრონტზე ბრძოლამ პირველ მსოფლიო ომში, რატომ შეიჭრა ასე ღრმად გერმანული არმია კომუნისტურ იმპერიაში და რატო "არ დახვდა მზად" ამ შემოჭრას საბჭოთა ჯარი. რატომ მოშა��ა სტალინმა ქვეყნის სიღრმეში სარტყლეად გვალებული თავდაცვის თითქმის გადაულახავი ზღუდეები, რატომ გაიყო გერმანიასთან პოლონეთი და რა იყო მოლოტოვ-რიბენტროპის ზავის დაფარული მიზანი!
სუვოროვის ხედვა განსხვავებული და ლოგიკურია და მიუხედავად იმისა, რომ ალაგ-ალაგ მაინც გამიჩნდა ეჭვი, ფაქტები რომლებიც მოჰყავს ფიქრის და ჩვენს გონებაში ისტორიული სახელმძღვანელოებიდან, ფილმებიდან და რომ��ნებიდან ჩაბეჭდილი სურათის ხელახლა გადახედვის საბაბს ნამდვილად იძლევა.
რატომ გახსნა ნაცისტურმა გერმანიამ მეორე ფრონტი საბჭოთა კავშირთან, როდესაც ზუსტად იცოდა რა მოუტანა ორ ფრონტზე ბრძოლამ პირველ მსოფლიო ომში, რატომ შეიჭრა ასე ღრმად გერმანული არმია კომუნისტურ იმპერიაში და რატო "არ დახვდა მზად" ამ შემოჭრას საბჭოთა ჯარი. რატომ მოშა��ა სტალინმა ქვეყნის სიღრმეში სარტყლეად გვალებული თავდაცვის თითქმის გადაულახავი ზღუდეები, რატომ გაიყო გერმანიასთან პოლონეთი და რა იყო მოლოტოვ-რიბენტროპის ზავის დაფარული მიზანი!
სუვოროვის ხედვა განსხვავებული და ლოგიკურია და მიუხედავად იმისა, რომ ალაგ-ალაგ მაინც გამიჩნდა ეჭვი, ფაქტები რომლებიც მოჰყავს ფიქრის და ჩვენს გონებაში ისტორიული სახელმძღვანელოებიდან, ფილმებიდან და რომ��ნებიდან ჩაბეჭდილი სურათის ხელახლა გადახედვის საბაბს ნამდვილად იძლევა.
March 3, 2021
Немного о превентивности)0)0
April 30, 2020
По-моему, обязательно для прочтения.
June 29, 2016
Grāmatu ieteica kāds poļu kolēģis pirms 2 gadiem. Internetā atradu oriģinālversiju krievu valodā un sāku lasīt. Toreiz lasīšanas process kaut kā nevedās, bet pēc latviešu valodas versijas iegūšanas īpašumā beidzot grāmatai pieķēros pamatīgāk. Likās , ka būs pagrūti lasīt dokumentālu darbu ar daudzām atsaucēm. Man par pārsteigumu darbs pat lasās ļoti ātri.
Suvorova apjomigais darbs man salika pa pareiziem plauktiņiem daudzus vēstures jautājumus: Molotova - Ribentropa pakts, Latvijas okupācija, masveidīgās izsūtīšanas utt. Varbūt autors kā skolotājs vienu un to pašu faktu pārfrāzē vairākas reizes, bet iespējams tas vēlreiz norāda uz būtiskajiem momentiem vēstures līkločos.
Katrā gadījumā pēc grāmatas izlasīšanas vēlreiz jāpārdomā par mazu valstu likteņiem lielo pasaules grandu interesū ceļā. Diezgan pārliecinoši var novilkt paralēles ar mūsdienu notikumiem pie lielā kaimiņa.
Tiem , kam slinkums lasīt grāmatu, vai kā prologs grāmatai iesaku noskatīties paša autora anotāciju grāmatai videoversijā vienkāršā angļu valodā ar izteiktu krievu akcentu : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SbBnR...
Suvorova apjomigais darbs man salika pa pareiziem plauktiņiem daudzus vēstures jautājumus: Molotova - Ribentropa pakts, Latvijas okupācija, masveidīgās izsūtīšanas utt. Varbūt autors kā skolotājs vienu un to pašu faktu pārfrāzē vairākas reizes, bet iespējams tas vēlreiz norāda uz būtiskajiem momentiem vēstures līkločos.
Katrā gadījumā pēc grāmatas izlasīšanas vēlreiz jāpārdomā par mazu valstu likteņiem lielo pasaules grandu interesū ceļā. Diezgan pārliecinoši var novilkt paralēles ar mūsdienu notikumiem pie lielā kaimiņa.
Tiem , kam slinkums lasīt grāmatu, vai kā prologs grāmatai iesaku noskatīties paša autora anotāciju grāmatai videoversijā vienkāršā angļu valodā ar izteiktu krievu akcentu : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SbBnR...
Read
November 22, 2016Kārtējā grāmatiņa par 2 kaimiņu puikām H. un S., kuri ar savām brigadēm kariņu uzspēlēja arī manā pagalmā un kurus pēcāk par neganti izmīdītajām ģeorģīņu un pujeņu dobēm un izbiedētajiem kaķēniem sabāra nerimstoši piktā kaimiņu tante Nirnberga, visā notikušajā jandāliņā vainojot mazo delveri H., kaut gan grāmatiņā autors detalizēti ar neskaitāmām atsaucēm, faktiem un secinājumiem pierāda, ka jestro tingeltangeli jau gadiem rūpīgi perināja zellis S., kas, sasolot gardas bonbongas, veikli pagrūda puišeli H. un viņa rokaspuišus zem tantes Nirnbergas un citu tanšu kaimiņmāju logos jaudīgajām lornetēm.
February 22, 2012
This book is one that makes you think. It is an alternative history of WWII in which Suvorov makes the case that Stalin propped up Hitler in order to use him to get the war started. This was part of Stalin's plan to take over Europe. Things went horribly wrong when Germany attacked Russia only weeks before Russia was set to attack Germany.
April 7, 2013
Логічне й послідовне доведення неймовірного факту, що Другу Світову війну розпочав СРСР.
Книга містить в собі величезну кількість фактів і доказів, всі вони взяті з відкритих джерел.
Не знаю, може автор нас і водить за носа. Але якщо і так, то я знімаю перед ним капелюха — це в нього виходить майстерно!
Книгу потрібно прочитати всім, хто цікавиться історією
Книга містить в собі величезну кількість фактів і доказів, всі вони взяті з відкритих джерел.
Не знаю, може автор нас і водить за носа. Але якщо і так, то я знімаю перед ним капелюха — це в нього виходить майстерно!
Книгу потрібно прочитати всім, хто цікавиться історією
March 23, 2017
An interesting point of view on WW2's history. It lacks in terms of scientific objectivity and sometimes author gives desired for a fact, but still this book provides very interesting reading. The real truth may be between this theory and the one, which we used to consider an official version.
July 20, 2018
Невероятна книга - брутално опровергава ширещите се в обществото лъжи за невинността на СССР и "нечовешки агресивната" Германия. Необходимо е тази книга да бъде цитирана често, за да се освежава паметта на населението както в България, така и в Европа.
June 17, 2020
Хорошая книга. Под конец автора несёт на волне любви к народу, но всё равно очень хорошо. Особенно учитывая как горит жопа у всех ватников, прочитавших это.
Рекомендую "Воспоминания о войне" Никулина для дополнения картины великой войны и победы.
Рекомендую "Воспоминания о войне" Никулина для дополнения картины великой войны и победы.
April 9, 2015
Fascinating
Must read for any WWII students. Totally changed my perspective regarding the Eastern front and why Germany would unleash Operation Barbarosa.
Must read for any WWII students. Totally changed my perspective regarding the Eastern front and why Germany would unleash Operation Barbarosa.
May 28, 2023
Am fost de mic pasionat de istorie – am constatat, de foarte mult timp, că istoria este cea mai mincinoasă știință: este, în majoritatea cazurilor, scrisă numai de învingători, păcătuiește frecvent prin omisiuni, este folosită de politic pentru manipulare (vezi ”1984” de George Orwell)... și orice domeniu îngust atins de istorie are aceleași caracteristici, fie că vorbim de istoria religiilor, a artelor, a științelor, a literaturii, a umanității chiar! Prin urmare: merită să căutăm, cu perseverență, ”adevărul istoric”? Eu cred că acesta, pur și simplu, nu există – sau nu (mai) poate fi aflat cu precizie... Mai degrabă, orice încercare de reinterpretare a unor ipoteze mainstream trebuie salutată și acceptată cu entuziasm, fiindcă nu face altceva decât să completeze (!) direcțiile POSIBILE prin care evoluția ne-a adus unde suntem azi și să ne avertizeze, poate, asupra unor viitoruri alternative... Sigur, poate e mai comod să le etichetăm drept ”teoria conspirației” și să rămânem credincioși unor cutume...
Aș putea face două-trei comparații cu această încercare de a rescrie istoria începutului celei mai mari conflagrații mondiale: ipoteza paleoastronautică (ajunge să fac trimitere la Erich von Daniken?), respectiv începuturile creștinismului (vezi Joseph Atwill, ”Caesar’s Messiah”)... Personal, nu mă interesează dacă autorul a indicat cu precizie și sinceritate toate acele surse la care face trimitere – tabloul pe care-l construiește mi se pare POSIBIL, ba chiar PROBABIL; adică, este CREDIBIL, măcar parțial! Anumite aspecte privind ”nebunia lui Hitler” ori ”naivitatea lui Stalin”, pe care nu le-am putut niciodată digera din cronicile mainstream, pe mine m-au mulțumit – deci, a căuta argumente contra autorului sau a unor detalii mi se pare inutil. Recomand lectura...
Aș putea face două-trei comparații cu această încercare de a rescrie istoria începutului celei mai mari conflagrații mondiale: ipoteza paleoastronautică (ajunge să fac trimitere la Erich von Daniken?), respectiv începuturile creștinismului (vezi Joseph Atwill, ”Caesar’s Messiah”)... Personal, nu mă interesează dacă autorul a indicat cu precizie și sinceritate toate acele surse la care face trimitere – tabloul pe care-l construiește mi se pare POSIBIL, ba chiar PROBABIL; adică, este CREDIBIL, măcar parțial! Anumite aspecte privind ”nebunia lui Hitler” ori ”naivitatea lui Stalin”, pe care nu le-am putut niciodată digera din cronicile mainstream, pe mine m-au mulțumit – deci, a căuta argumente contra autorului sau a unor detalii mi se pare inutil. Recomand lectura...
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November 28, 2019Protams, Suvorova neatkārtojamais stils (pilnībā baudāms tikai oriģinālvalodā). Neatkarīgi no tā, vai argumenti balstās faktos vai pievilkti aiz matiem, tie pasniegti ārkārtīgi pārliecinošā spēkā.
Bet paskatīsimies, ko tas maina mūsu priekšstatos.
Padomju oficiālā historiogrāfija mācīja, ka Staļins gatavojās (nodevīgi, protams) uzbrukt Hitleram 1942. gadā. Drukātie teksti izpildīti dubultdomas stilā, piejaucot miermīlīgo politiku, bet arī tajos 1942 kā uzbrukuma laiks nepārprotams. Suvorovs tikai atvirza Staļina plānus par vienu gadu.
Vai tas maina Hitlera vērtējumu? Ja Hitlers zinātu par Staļina plāniem, tad - jā, preventīvs uzbrukums būtu līdzvērtīgs aizsardzībai. Bet vācu papīri zināmi, ieskaitot Hitlera pusdiengalda sarunas. Hitlers nesaskatīja taktisku draudu no Staļina, tikai stratēģisku nākotnē.
Vai uzbrukums, ja Staļins paspētu pirmais, mainītu Staļina vērtējumu? Nu, vēsturi raksta anglosakši. Un vēsture teiktu: svēts vīrs Staļins, uzbruka neģēlim.
Piemērs - Staļina uzbrukums Japānai 1945, nodevīgi laužot neuzbrukšanas līgumu. Neviens te nesaskata neko peļamu. Ja A-bumba nāktu gatava drusku vēlāk, Staļinam sauktu - Aleluja!
Ak jā, vēl Suvorova apgalvojums, ka nedēļu agrāk sākts uzbrukums ietu bez apstājas līdz Lamanšam. Nu, tā ir muļķīga fantāzija. Pat 1940/41 Jaungada nakts karaspēle izgāzās.
Tātad - Suvorova teorija ir interesanta un izpētes cienīga. Bet neko būtisku vēstures vērtējumā nemaina.
Bet paskatīsimies, ko tas maina mūsu priekšstatos.
Padomju oficiālā historiogrāfija mācīja, ka Staļins gatavojās (nodevīgi, protams) uzbrukt Hitleram 1942. gadā. Drukātie teksti izpildīti dubultdomas stilā, piejaucot miermīlīgo politiku, bet arī tajos 1942 kā uzbrukuma laiks nepārprotams. Suvorovs tikai atvirza Staļina plānus par vienu gadu.
Vai tas maina Hitlera vērtējumu? Ja Hitlers zinātu par Staļina plāniem, tad - jā, preventīvs uzbrukums būtu līdzvērtīgs aizsardzībai. Bet vācu papīri zināmi, ieskaitot Hitlera pusdiengalda sarunas. Hitlers nesaskatīja taktisku draudu no Staļina, tikai stratēģisku nākotnē.
Vai uzbrukums, ja Staļins paspētu pirmais, mainītu Staļina vērtējumu? Nu, vēsturi raksta anglosakši. Un vēsture teiktu: svēts vīrs Staļins, uzbruka neģēlim.
Piemērs - Staļina uzbrukums Japānai 1945, nodevīgi laužot neuzbrukšanas līgumu. Neviens te nesaskata neko peļamu. Ja A-bumba nāktu gatava drusku vēlāk, Staļinam sauktu - Aleluja!
Ak jā, vēl Suvorova apgalvojums, ka nedēļu agrāk sākts uzbrukums ietu bez apstājas līdz Lamanšam. Nu, tā ir muļķīga fantāzija. Pat 1940/41 Jaungada nakts karaspēle izgāzās.
Tātad - Suvorova teorija ir interesanta un izpētes cienīga. Bet neko būtisku vēstures vērtējumā nemaina.
April 16, 2021
Cînd l-am întîlnit prima dată pe Victor Suvorov, era deja obsedat de această carte, debita în şir cifre şi fapte, pur şi simplu nu mai putea vorbi despre nimic altceva, dar nu s-a hotărît să pună toate acestea pe hîrtie încă mulţi ani: ori pentru că nu credea pînă la capăt în propriile concluzii, ori pentru că se temea să-şi pervertească ideea, neavînd speranţa că va fi ascultat. Încă nu erau scrise Acvarium, nici Speţnaz, care i-au adus faimă mondială; abia îi ieşise prima cărticică, culegerea de texte cu subiect militar Povestirile Eliberatorului. La drept vorbind, datorită acestei cărţulii ne-am întîlnit. S-a întîmplat că redacţia Times din Londra mi-a trimis-o pentru recenzare, iar eu aproape că am fost singurul care am elogiat-o în presă.
E caraghios să amintesc acum, dar în acele vremuri anticomunismul, ba şi simpla raportare negativă faţă de Uniunea Sovietică erau în ochii intelectualităţii occidentale ceva de genul unei boli ruşinoase, iar un scriitor al moravurilor socialismului învechit în rele nu putea năzui la o recenzie măcar, darmite la recunoaşterea talentului său. Doar puţini dintre noi reuşeau pa atunci să facă o breşă în zidul tăcerii.
E caraghios să amintesc acum, dar în acele vremuri anticomunismul, ba şi simpla raportare negativă faţă de Uniunea Sovietică erau în ochii intelectualităţii occidentale ceva de genul unei boli ruşinoase, iar un scriitor al moravurilor socialismului învechit în rele nu putea năzui la o recenzie măcar, darmite la recunoaşterea talentului său. Doar puţini dintre noi reuşeau pa atunci să facă o breşă în zidul tăcerii.
July 15, 2021
This book by a former Russian Intelligence agent is a deep dive into Russian and European WW2 history, politics and military, but it is straightforward in a sense: the central (and only?) argument the author defends is that Hitler's apparently misguided invasion of Russia (breaching the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact) was less of a military blunder and more of an inevitable situation in which he was subtly check-mated by Stalin.
Every minute detail Suvorov goes through, from military vehicle's preferred terrain to communist propaganda analysis and little details about minor political figures, serves to build this argument, like a prosecutor building his case, bit by bit.
I have to say, it's overall compelling evidence. It's all presented in a detached and matter-of-fact manner, but the author never shies from his conclusions. I must say it does start to drag after the mid part, and it's too technical at times (I admit I sped through some chapters), but I'm glad I read it. History and Truth share a fascinating relationship to say the least!
Every minute detail Suvorov goes through, from military vehicle's preferred terrain to communist propaganda analysis and little details about minor political figures, serves to build this argument, like a prosecutor building his case, bit by bit.
I have to say, it's overall compelling evidence. It's all presented in a detached and matter-of-fact manner, but the author never shies from his conclusions. I must say it does start to drag after the mid part, and it's too technical at times (I admit I sped through some chapters), but I'm glad I read it. History and Truth share a fascinating relationship to say the least!
April 2, 2024
Разбирам защо тази книга е толкова зле приета и на запад и на изток - просто тя своего рода потвърждава някои от хитлеристките опорки, а за това на места вкарват в затвора.
Книгата наистина недвусмислено доказва, че СССР са имали планове да ударят Германия в гръб, но определно не мисля, че успява да докаже, че поначало Германия е започнала войната по съветска инициатива. С известна съвестска помощ - да, но дотам.
Нещо, което ми е наистина трудно да повярвам е колко безкрайно по-мощен от Германия е представен Съветският Съюз. Тук умишлено използвам думата "вярвам" защото нямам достатъчни познания - нито военни, нито исторически - за да имам иформирано мнение.
От литературна гледна точка тази книга определено не е особено интересно четиво тъй като над две трети от нея представляват изреждане на доказателства за планирания удар на Съветите в немски гръб, които в голямата си част звучат като преповтаряне на едно и също.
Книгата наистина недвусмислено доказва, че СССР са имали планове да ударят Германия в гръб, но определно не мисля, че успява да докаже, че поначало Германия е започнала войната по съветска инициатива. С известна съвестска помощ - да, но дотам.
Нещо, което ми е наистина трудно да повярвам е колко безкрайно по-мощен от Германия е представен Съветският Съюз. Тук умишлено използвам думата "вярвам" защото нямам достатъчни познания - нито военни, нито исторически - за да имам иформирано мнение.
От литературна гледна точка тази книга определено не е особено интересно четиво тъй като над две трети от нея представляват изреждане на доказателства за планирания удар на Съветите в немски гръб, които в голямата си част звучат като преповтаряне на едно и също.
January 5, 2024
This book provides evidence that USSR was planning to invade Germany (and the rest of Europe, by the way) in the start of July 1941 but Hitler broke the plan by attacking them on the 22nd June. This explain the quick and huge german wins as the soviets were not prepare to defend but to attack.
All had been planned following the sovietic dogma of expanding communism world wide: They armed Hitler in the 30s to fight the rest of Europe, they granted peace to invade Poland and start WWII, so when all parties would exhausted, the USSR could liberate Europe of imperialist capitalism, starting with the Roumanian oil fields.
Hitler saw it coming too late and had to launch Barbarosa unprepared and overoptimistic.
Great read, with maybe too much detail on proving the points. Most of it could be better located in appendix.
All had been planned following the sovietic dogma of expanding communism world wide: They armed Hitler in the 30s to fight the rest of Europe, they granted peace to invade Poland and start WWII, so when all parties would exhausted, the USSR could liberate Europe of imperialist capitalism, starting with the Roumanian oil fields.
Hitler saw it coming too late and had to launch Barbarosa unprepared and overoptimistic.
Great read, with maybe too much detail on proving the points. Most of it could be better located in appendix.
August 31, 2020
Возникло ощущение что читаю FakeNews. Звучит как рассуждение автора о причинах и следствиях. Однако большинство информации больше похоже на мнение. Думаю если говорить о альтернативной версии истории есть некоторые мысли которые имеет смысл пытаться исследовать. К примеру размышления о Троцком и причинах его убийства. Заинтриговало сравнение социализма СССР и Германии и их вождей. Однако это и одна из причин по которой общее впечатление остаётся, что послушал современного «пропагандиста». Возможно это из-за современного способа пода��ать информацию, когда подвергаешь сомнению информацию из любых источников. Это моя первая книга по тематике (альтернативная история) и возможно впечатления негативные именно по этому.
May 14, 2022
Пропагандисты окружили эту книгу завесой из спойлеров и это работало на меня, не хотелось читать зная основную суть, но детали переворачивают все. Читается как захватывающий детектив. Основной посыл думаю все знают, но интересней наблюдать как вскрывается работа пропаганды мертвой империи, которая до сих пор влияет на умы и скрывает неудобную правду. Книга выполняет основную задачу - объясняет причины необычайности этой войны, которая всегда преследовала меня с самого детства и конечно все узнать невозможно, но это детектив в длинною в жизнь.
Читать всем любителям истории, войны, для подавление своего врожденного стокгольмского синдрома. Единственное, под конец драйв выдыхается, автор просто накидывает доказательства, но это утомляет и сбивает темп.
Читать всем любителям истории, войны, для подавление своего врожденного стокгольмского синдрома. Единственное, под конец драйв выдыхается, автор просто накидывает доказательства, но это утомляет и сбивает темп.
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