Levitsky and Ziblatt examine the ways in which our democracies die. They provide some historical examples, from Europe and Latin American, but their mLevitsky and Ziblatt examine the ways in which our democracies die. They provide some historical examples, from Europe and Latin American, but their main focus is the US. There are plenty of bad examples in the American history to illustrate their points.
They offer four key indicators of authoritarian behavior: rejection of democratic rules of the game; denial of the legitimacy of political opponents; toleration of encouragement of violence; readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents and the media. By answering some key questions, we can see if our own political leaders have some authoritarian tendencies or not. These key indicators could have been used for some statistical work or for some scientific method, but the authors don’t go too much into them. The whole book is more of an extended essay.
They are concerned about Trump and the state of the US democracy. A strong democracy does not only rely on the Constitution and the rules of the game, but on some guardrails and unwritten norms and understandings. In the US, these guardrails were strong enough to curtail the rise of populists (Trump was not the first one), to stop attacks on the democratic institutions (like court packing or ruling by decree). The political parties had a mutual understanding to respect and tolerate each other. They recognised the other party as legitimate and even though they did not have the majority all the time, they respected the right to exist of the other. The guardrails were strong enough.
However, in recent decades, from the 90s onward, these guardrails lost in strength. American democracy started to erode. More and more direct attacks on each other began a process of polarization in the American society. The supporters of one party see the other as an enemy. No reconciliation is possible. The GOP moved to the extreme right. The unwritten rules were broken more and more often. In 2016, a 150-year tradition of not opposing a sitting president to appoint a Supreme Judge was broken by the Republicans. Since then, the Republicans stopped speaking against their own, even if they saw that a demagogue was threatening their democracy.
Unfortunately, the book was written in 2017, after just one year of Trump presidency. The conclusion, up to that point, was that the rest of the US institutions managed to contain, to some extent, the chaotic presidency, however the damage to democracy was big and very hard to repair. For the rest of the world, the conclusion is that the American democracy is far from perfect and is just as fragile as the others. The American constitution is very lax, and unwritten norms and precedents were very powerful up to recent times. This changes now. We see norm-breaking at an unprecedented scale. Another conclusion is that we don’t often see the erosion of democracy. When we do, it may be too late.
Because there is no single moment – no coup, declaration of martial law, or suspension of the constitution – in which the regime obviously “crosses the line” into dictatorship, nothing may set off society’s alarm bells. Those who denounce government abuse may be dismissed as exaggerating or crying wolf. Democracy’s erosion is, for many, almost imperceptible.
By capturing the referees, buying off or enfeebling opponents, and rewriting the rules of the game, elected leaders can establish a decisive – and permanent – advantage over their opponents. Because these measures are carried out piecemeal and with the appearance of legality, the drift into authoritarianism doesn’t always set off alarm bells. Citizens are often slow to realize that their democracy is being dismantled – even as it happens before their eyes. One of the greatest ironies of how democracies die is that the very defense of democracy is often used as a pretext for its subversion.
Got this after watching Oppenheimer, with its numerous moral dilemmas in the latter part of the movie, and after re-reading Walzer’s essay about the AGot this after watching Oppenheimer, with its numerous moral dilemmas in the latter part of the movie, and after re-reading Walzer’s essay about the Allied strategic bombing campaign in WWII (World War II: Why Was This War Different?). But only started reading after Sinclair McKay’s The Fire and the Darkness: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945 left me unsatisfied. I needed more in-depth analysis of all the moral considerations in a case like this. Unfortunately, this book barely touches on this particular subject and does not expand much the point in his essay (point being that Nazism was an existential threat, so strategic bombing was justifiable, especially considering that it was the only way the British could fight back; it was wrong though to continue it and to change its objectives to indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets).
Waltzer takes war and all its gruesome aspects and puts them through a theoretical grinder. All the reasons we have for waging war and all the rules we have in war – jus ad bellum/jus in bello – are analysed by Waltzer. He takes examples as starting points and as ways to illustrate his arguments. This approach makes it easier to understand particular cases but weakens the argument. You can’t make general conclusions based on one example. In war, every situation is different, even if you strip it down to the very basics.
Waltzer essentially tells us that in every situation of war you have to see if your decision is morally justifiable. Every decision must check some criteria. As much as I agree with him in the ways that he sees war and the rules states/combatants must adhere to, I still think that it is hard, and next to impossible, to consider all the necessary things when you are being shot at, when you have to follow orders, when events swallow you whole or when you are in a state of constant stress/fear/exhaustion/adrenaline etc. He takes these particularities and argues against/for them separately, but in war these never come alone.
In retrospect, we can examine every decision as much as we want. We do have rules for waging war and we can easily see – most of the times – when a war is just. We can see what was morally acceptable or morally wrong. We have the luxury of time and comfort. But in war, those who fight will argue that they do not have the same luxuries and we should be more lenient in passing judgment.
This was a challenging, time-consuming read. Waltzer’s writing, although it seems friendly enough, is actually difficult to follow. It is worth it though, if not in its entirety, at least the chapters/aspects of war one is more interested in....more
This one is so good and well-written that it is hard to summarize.
Paul Mason fights fascism. He is a Marxist, but he is not afraid to criticize the lThis one is so good and well-written that it is hard to summarize.
Paul Mason fights fascism. He is a Marxist, but he is not afraid to criticize the left and what it has historically done wrong in the fight with fascism (for the main battle of the 1930s was between fascism and Marxist ideologies).
So, what we thought is a thing of the past is not back in our lives: fascism. Instead of fighting it, we are hoping it will go away. People look at fascism now like they did after WW2, as a failed movement. They try today to analyse it using the same frameworks they did 50-60-70 years ago. But fascism now is very much different because the world we live in has changed. We have technology, the internet, rights, freedoms, an economic model that is dying, divided societies. Paul Mason is trying to tell us what to do. But before he does that, he tells us how to recognise fascism and how it came to be in the interwar period.
How to we recognise fascism? The fascist mythology nowadays, according to Mason, is spread through five key narratives: the great replacement theory (which wraps together racism, anti-feminism and hostility to the left: the left is promoting immigration and feminism, immigration leads to ‘genocide’ of the white race, feminists contribute to it by refusing to have children); liberalism is the enemy (this includes disdain to liberal democracy which promotes rights, immigration, which makes it hard to expel the ‘invaders’, meaning that democracy is bad and must be replaced); ‘cultural Marxist’ is destroying the West because it promotes free speech, homosexuality, immigration, women’s rights and so on; spread these ideas in the networks populated by people angry with their own lives, easily manipulated and converted; and wait for Day X, a catastrophe that will purify society and traditional gender roles (this day will come after multiple crises that will trigger a decisive phase: a civil war, an insurrection etc).
Why is this mythology spreading? Because society now faces multiple crises, which interact in unexpected ways. We have an economic model that no longer works, evaporating support for democracy, a crisis of technological control, meaning that some states and businesses are using information networks to suppress the truth and deter rational thinking, we have a post-Covid world and, looming above it all, a coming climate catastrophe.
People can’t understand the world they live in anymore. Before 2008, people could buy a house, pay their mortgage in three years, have a decent wage and a nice life. They had a predictable, secure life. Now, the same things are almost unaffordable. They have no one to blame, because those who control aspects of their lives are unreachable; they can’t protest their corporation, can’t yell at some multi-billion company for increasing their rent, can’t stop using Google or Facebook when they spread lies, so they take out their anger on groups that are reachable: women, minorities, immigrants. They feel that these groups, who are now becoming free, are the reason for the decline in their living standards. For Mason, fascism now is a fear of freedom driven by a glimpse of freedom, by which he means that fascists fear the freedom of others. But they also fear their own freedom, showing that most fascists would welcome a strongman leader or an authoritarian regime.
From the dawn of capitalism to the mid-1980s, workers’ lives were dominated by a single economic relationship – that with their boss. Today there are multiple relationships of exploitation which overlap and collide. As a result, it has become much harder to identify who is exploiting us. The top 0.1 per cent in every country are part of a globalized, super-rich stratum whose wealth is based primarily on rent-seeking and finance – and most of our lives do not bring us into any form of contact with them.
Instead it has become easier to identify somebody lower down the ladder as responsible for your own poverty and powerlessness: the buy-to-let landlord, the staff at the benefits office, the call centre worker at your bank; the person in the queue at the doctor’s surgery who speaks a foreign language; the security guard at the supermarket telling you to wear a face mask.
The answer to what we should do to stop the spread of fascism is simple: we should act and not stay idle. It won’t go away just by hoping it would. Fascists are active, vocal, so we should be too. We should take it to the streets and to the internet to show that we disagree, that we are not complacent. Online, we should fight the anonymous disinformation, hate speech and calls for crime and genocide. In the streets, if necessary, we should literally fight the fascists.
We live in atomized societies. We have different interests, principles, values. It is hard for large numbers of people to coagulate around a common goal but we should try. We should also pressure our politicians to do so. In the 1930s, different parties could not find common ground to cooperate. They were too stuck in their ways and their ideologies. But against fascism, cooperation is worthy, because if we/they fail to come together, we can lose everything.
The book is more detailed than that. The chapters on history, on the rise of Mussolini and Hitler, are very clear and well-structured. From there, it is easier to come to the present and understand the similarities, and, more importantly, the differences between then and now.
I hope this gets translated in my country and becomes mandatory reading....more
Krastev and Holmes look at how political regimes or, better yet, political leaders imitate each other. What caught my interest was their view on the pKrastev and Holmes look at how political regimes or, better yet, political leaders imitate each other. What caught my interest was their view on the political transition in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. They look at Poland and Hungary, because they make the clearest dissenting note with the rest of Europe. I was particularly interested in this. I see the domino effect of illiberalism and of the far-right extremism. I already resigned myself to it. But I still try to understand it. I know that all the populism and demagogy, all the pompous speeches, the persecution complex are just a cover for the corruption and the need for more and more power. I was hoping there are more subtle explanations.
About Hungary and Poland: In the cases of Orban and Kaczynski, the authors argue that underneath the surface, there are deep insecurities. Eastern European countries were very hopeful after the fall of communism. They thought that the switch to democracy, to liberalism, to market economy and the rule of law will be immediate, not a long process. They were seeing themselves as part of the West. But the transition proved to be a road too long. They became frustrated. The West did not understand the East. They did not understand that corruption, for example, was part of eastern societies simply because they did not know anything else.
The never-ending transition made the East go into imitation. They started emulating and imitating what was easy. They adopted the institutions, not their spirit, the laws, but not the principles. It all became form without substance. With time, leaders grew tired of being told what to do to become western. They were seeing the western leaders, bureaucrats and consultants as being smug and arrogant. These eastern political leaders started to look for their independence. With different crises coming to Europe, they were looking for their own solutions, because from their point of view the West was failing. It did not have what it takes to do what needs to be done.
Let’s take the immigration crisis, for example. Orban looked at it as an opportunity to save the Hungarian society. With falling birth-rates, Hungary, a small nation, risks to disappear. He started channelling the frustration with the West to erect himself as a saviour, not only of Hungary, but of Europe itself. He will do, he thinks, what the West is afraid to do.
“When Orban and Kaczynski attacked Western liberalism, they did so while claiming the mantle of Europeanness for themselves, describing Central Europe not only as the true Europe but as Europe’s last line of defence. Fanon would have never said anything of the kind about Frances former colonies in Africa. the PiS government frequently cites the heroic role of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under Jan III Sobieski in lifting the Muslim invasion of Europe. Both Orban and Kaczynski, in fact, present themselves to their publics as what Carl Schmitt called `forestallers`: heroic resisters against a looming Islamic takeover of Europe. The illiberal democrats of Central and Eastern Europe are now prepared, they say, to take up the historic anti-Muslim mission so recklessly abandoned by Western Europeans. […] This is why Central and East Europeans, to the perplexity of some, declare themselves adamantly pro-European even as they also claim to be violently anti-EU.”
The authors also explain the conflict along generational lines. Parents, who lived in communism, don’t understand their children. Because the children adopted without any consideration the Western way of life and thinking. The parents, seeing that they cannot program their children with their own values, they began demanding from the state to do it for them. Sounds a little weird, but this does explain why these leaders, the likes of Orban and Kaczynski, the far-right in other countries, have so much traction among the older population.
About the USA: Orban and other illiberals think they are winning. When they look at Trump (the book was written during his presidency), they see how he is imitating them. This is the supreme blow they can give to the West. Now, not Eastern Europe is looking to the West, but the West is seeing the East as a model. (This is true about Western European countries as well, where right-wing populist parties are winning).
Trump and his electorate have similar fears as Orban or Polish PiS. They are afraid that the whites will no longer be the majority. The latino population is growing. There is a lot of positive discrimination towards the minorities and the blacks. The whites are tired of being always at fault for everything. They hate political correctness. They feel they are left behind. The liberals/democrats look at them as second-hand citizens. They are poorly educated, without college degrees, workers and farmers, whilst the democrats promote nice-looking college degree-holders. So, naturally, they like that someone is paying attention to them. They feel seen, after a very long time.
Trump is using this anger and frustration. Yes, he does not have a clear overview of what he is trying to accomplish, but he has intuition. By making America great again Trump wants the USA to look inwards, not outwards. He is tired of constant American attempts to export their way of life. He thinks this weakens his country. Other powers prosper because they do not care about ideology, but about making money and growing their economy. He wants to get rid of all the rules that are constraining American power in the world.
Yes, he lies, but he does so to show that he does not care, that rules do not apply to the powerful. He wants the same for the USA.
About Russia: After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian politicians did not want to become like the West. They only pretended to do so. Up until around 2010 Putin was still keeping the appearances. But he grew tired of it. He saw no more point in it. He wants to show now that he can get away with anything.
Elections in Russia are not a pretence, an appearance at emulating democracy. Nobody believes they can bring out change. They do have different goals. Elections are a way of bringing together all the people of Russia, a very vast country, deeply divided along different lines. Elections mean unity. They are also a way of testing leaders from the regions, their loyalty and their power. If they don’t cope, they are replaced. During elections Putin identifies his possible adversaries so he can get rid of them.
“Unlike the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation cannot hope to defeat the West. What it does hope to do is to bring the West to the point of breaking into pieces, just as happened to the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union itself in 1989-91. That the result will be a stable world in which Russia’s interests will be protected is impossible to imagine.”
About China: China simply does not care about ideology, about regimes, democracy, communism or anything else. Chinese leaders only want to do business. Your country can be liberal, illiberal, far-right, far-left, it makes no difference, as long as you are friendly to China and its interests. China does not imitate and it doesn’t want anyone to imitate it. It only cares about money flowing.
All in all, instructive reading, although a bit difficult/challenging at times....more
Asta nu e neapărat o istorie a BOR. Este, mai degrabă, o sinteză a cercetărilor despre BOR. În baza acestor cercetări, se scrie și se citește și istorAsta nu e neapărat o istorie a BOR. Este, mai degrabă, o sinteză a cercetărilor despre BOR. În baza acestor cercetări, se scrie și se citește și istoria din ultimul secol a Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, dar cu lacunele existente în ceea ce ține cercetarea anumitor perioade. Autorul își face un obiectiv din a repeta, de câte ori e posibil și necesar, că în cercetarea istorică despre BOR există goluri mari. Unele perioade au fost cercetate mai bine, altele aproape deloc. Motivele sunt multe: cercetarea anumitor perioade servește BOR, deci a încurajat-o; alte perioade sunt rușinoase pentru BOR, deci a limitat orice fel de demers de cercetare în privința lor; pentru unele perioade există material de cercetat: biografii, presă, studii ale vremii; pentru altele nu există încă surse: BOR a închis accesul la propriile arhive, deși ar fi trebuit să le predea la Arhivele Naționale, unele dosare de la Securitate nu sunt disponibile sau au fost distruse; cel mai important însă e că BOR, prin influența pe care o are, asupra publicului și asupra statului, descurajează orice încercare de a face lumină asupra acestor perioade – istoricii care se încumetă sunt pur și simplu ostracizați, iar BOR contraatacă și prin studii, în note apologetice, din partea istoricilor de casă.
Cartea e bine scrisă, ușor de parcurs și de deslușit, odată ce te obișnuiești cu termenii specifici bisericii. Așa cum atenționează și autorul, se observă dezechilibrul dintre perioade: despre unele perioade și personaje se știu multe și astfel ele ocupă mai multe pagini din economia cărții, iar despre altele nu se cunoaște mai nimic, paginile fiind acoperite mai degrabă cu listarea tuturor lucrurilor neștiute. Prin perioada postdecembristă parcă Schmitt trece prea repede, demonstrând că scopul lui nu a fost cercetarea propriu-zisă, ci sinteza și scrierea unei cărți pentru mase, a unui bestseller chiar (garantat de subiectul controversat prin potențialul de polarizare a publicului).
Curiozitatea mea a fost simplă. Nu am nimic cu religia, înțelegându-i utilitatea pentru cine o adoptă și pentru societate în general, dar nu-mi place absolut deloc, chiar detest BOR. Nu e nevoie de o autoritate centrală coruptă pentru spiritualitatea proprie, individuală. Citind, am înțeles că BOR a fost la fel de la începuturile ei. Clerul superior a dat mereu dovadă de adaptabilitate la schimbările politice și, aparent paradoxal, dar, de fapt, normal pentru el, de profundă incapacitate de reformă și adaptabilitate la timpuri și la schimbările din societate. De politic și de stat, BOR a depins mereu pentru a obține avantaje, în special materiale, și influență. În schimb, BOR a susținut regimurile, indiferent de ideologie, fie complet – declarativ și activ –, fie doar cu jumătate de glas. Când statul proaspăt comunist a desființat Biserica Greco-Catolică, BOR a cules toată prada, fără scrupule și fără rușine. În 89, BOR îi cânta osanale lui Ceaușescu, doar ca în iarna lui 1990 să devină profund anticomunistă și anticeaușistă. Flexibilitatea în poziții este incredibilă. An după an, guvernarea după guvernare, BOR o demonstrează. Cartea conține numeroase exemple.
Incapacitatea de adaptare la timpuri și la schimbările din societate este o altă caracteristică a BOR, care, bănuiesc și sper, va duce la o diminuare a influenței sale. De-a lungul existenței, BOR a fost antieuropeană și antioccidentală. Membrii clerului superior și foarte mulți ai celui inferior au fost și fasciști, și legionari, și comuniști convinși, și, acum, putiniști. În continuare și cu mai mult succes decât înainte, BOR își vinde influența partidelor politice și obține concesii și putere incredibile.
În titlu apare o întrebare. Răspunsul e (cred) că BOR a fost, de-a lungul timpului, și biserică de stat și biserică în stat. De multe ori concomitent. De stat pentru că s-a aliniat cu regimurile, cu ideologiile dominante și și-a vândut influența pentru a mobiliza electorat și sprijin politic. În stat (înțelegând aici un fel de structură paralelă, independentă, nu neapărat pe o treaptă mai jos, din contră) pentru că are o putere foarte mare și își permite să facă foarte multe și să manipuleze politicul. Acum acest lucru este cel mai vizibil.
Nu are rost să mai intru în detalii. Frustrările mele să rămână doar ale mele. Atâta timp cât BOR se bucură de o asemenea susținere, prin bani de la stat, fiind de facto biserica oficială a statului laic, știu că nu vom scăpa prea curând de ea și nu vom vedea în Biserică o instituție în pas cu timpurile, cu schimbările, care să fie un model de toleranță și de influență pozitivă în societate, fără falși idoli și fără scopul de a ține oamenii în întuneric pentru foloase proprii.
Cartea are 400 de pagini. Par suficiente pentru o privire de ansamblu și pentru câteva concluzii mai puțin nuanțate. Aceste pagini sunt și foarte interesante. Nefiind deloc inițiat în domeniu, am descoperit multe lucruri curioase.
Schmitt încurajează istoricii tineri să cerceteze BOR, în special acolo unde există mari lacune. Îmi place că istoricii străini sunt capabili să scrie mai detașat și mai obiectiv despre istoria noastră decât românii. Uneori întunericul cel mai mare e la piciorul lămpii.
Am ajuns la volum ăsta după o recomandare, cu promisiunea că în ultimul capitol voi găsi un fel de rezumat al istoriei recente a României. După ce m-aAm ajuns la volum ăsta după o recomandare, cu promisiunea că în ultimul capitol voi găsi un fel de rezumat al istoriei recente a României. După ce m-am uitat peste cuprins, am fost atras și de capitolul al III-lea, penultimul, intitulat „P.C.R. (Pile, Cunoștințe și Relații) în postcomunism”. Volumul, însă, nu a fost ce m-am așteptat să fie. Include patru studii sociologice, științifice, iar eu nu aveam chef să citesc așa ceva. Nu că nu aș putea și nu o fac atunci când am nevoie și starea necesară, ci pentru că aș fi vrut acum ceva mai ușor, dar am primit ceva foarte greoi. Studiile sunt interesante și concluziile pertinente (unele date chiar m-au surprins), dar foarte academice. Primul e un studiu de caz despre colectivizare în două sate, în baza unor interviuri. Al doilea e un studiu despre politica de cadre a PCR, în comparație cu alte țări socialiste, în baza unor statistici. Al treilea e despre legăturile sociale în comunism (pilele și relațiile) și cum s-au păstrat și dezvoltat acestea după 1989. Și ultimul studiu e despre capitalismul postcomunist. A doua parte a acestui ultim studiu e un pic mai accesibilă și interesantă față de restul paginilor.
Nu e o carte rea și poate voi reveni la ea, dar pentru acum nu a fost ce trebuie. ...more
Kaplan tries to explain why the South China Sea is a brewing cauldron of future conflict. This sea is as important to the bordering countries, especiaKaplan tries to explain why the South China Sea is a brewing cauldron of future conflict. This sea is as important to the bordering countries, especially China, as the European hinterland was to European powers a century ago. Only that a naval conflict would be somewhat different, because it requires different capabilities.
There is not much analysis in this book. Kaplan’s style is more akin to journalistic reporting than to academic research. He travels and he sees things and from a few interactions (we don’t know if there are five or fifty) with local decision-makers or experts he draws conclusions. He may have a trained eye, a sharp mind or good intuition, but ultimately, I feel that he is somewhat superficial. The first two chapters more or less summarize the basis of the book and its conclusion. Here Kaplan puts forward the most of the analytical part. So, if a naval war breaks out in the South China Sea, there would be no humanitarian element to it, it would be just (because of normal) business. This means that we, in the West, won’t care much about it. It would be military confrontation for a few rocks in the middle of the sea, for resources, and we won’t care about it (unless, of course, it gets in the way of our way of life, SCS being extremely important for world trade). The USA may not have the capacity or the home support to intervene (no humanitarian imperative), because the US military and navy are already overstretched and underfunded (for its ambitions). This is extremely problematic because the US acts like a balancing power in this region. But, if the US defines the region as essential to its foreign and domestic policy and gets more entangled here, it may be more harmful to peace than China, a challenger in the region. Another argument why there would be no humanitarian case is that China may act detestable at home, but it is responsible abroad and she will pursue its goals because it feels like it has the right to: China wants to dominate the region as US dominates the West.
In the second chapter, Kaplan tells us that capitalism prosperity naturally leads to military acquisitions because countries want to protect their commercial lanes. According to him, we don’t pay enough attention to the military build-ups in the SCS, which are immense.
The rest of the chapters are focused on the countries in the region. Kaplan is a travel blogger, a journalist, an expert, a historian, everything at once in these chapters. They are a little bit useful, in the sense that you get a feel of the place (through Kaplans eyes only, of course) and how these countries are thinking regarding Chinese claims in the SCS and how they deal with them or with the US.
This is not a waste of time, but don’t expect anything ground-breaking. It was written 10 years ago, so, of course, much of the statistics can’t stand anymore and we miss info on military acquisitions for the past decade (military acquisitions being very important to the author and his arguments).
Am tot observat tendința unor autori de a-și scoate în volum articolele/editorialele/interviurile publicate anterior online. Acesta este un astfel de Am tot observat tendința unor autori de a-și scoate în volum articolele/editorialele/interviurile publicate anterior online. Acesta este un astfel de volum. Am observat abia după ce l-am cumpărat, luându-l instinctiv de pe raft. Nu neg că Armand Goșu este un analist bun pe Rusia și comentariile pe care le-a făcut de-a lungul timpului par/păreau relevante și corecte, dar parcă îmi doream un text original.
Totuși, lectura nu a fost o pierdere de timp. Cine i-a cules și aranjat textele a făcut-o bine. Chiar dacă unele remarci se mai repetă, felul în care sunt alese și ordonate oferă o imagine destul de bună asupra ambițiilor imperialiste ale lui Putin și asupra felului în care Rusia/Putin vede lumea și relațiile cu vecinii. Sunt contextualizate relațiile bilaterale cu fostele republici sovietice și sunt detaliate modalitățile prin care Putin a pus mâna pe Rusia (mai mult printr-un fel de studii de caz, cazuri particulare care țin de relația cu un personaj sau altul, dar capitol după capitol, începi să înțelegi un modus operandi).
Chiar dacă nu mi-a spus multe lucruri noi, volumul nu e o pierdere de timp totală, pentru cineva mai puțin versat în istoria recentă a Rusiei și a politicii ei externe, cred că ar putea fi o introducere chiar bună.
Pe scurt: o carte foarte bună, mai ales pentru cei care nu citesc de obicei așa ceva.
Părerea mai lungă e puțin mai nuanțată. Graham Allison vorbește îPe scurt: o carte foarte bună, mai ales pentru cei care nu citesc de obicei așa ceva.
Părerea mai lungă e puțin mai nuanțată. Graham Allison vorbește într-adevăr despre o problemă tot mai vizibilă pentru SUA (și respectiv pentru noi, ca parte a „lumii libere”) la care acestea au băgat capul în nisip până acum: China este din ce în ce mai puternică și, dacă istoria ne-o spune bine, va căuta să schimbe status quo-ul, iar acest lucru, tot istoria ne-o spune, se va petrece, foarte posibil, prin război.
Autorul a identificat 16 cazuri istorice în care o putere emergentă și una dominantă au avut de împărțit ceva (statutul de putere dominantă pe undeva) și în 12 din aceste cazuri s-a ajuns la război, doar în patru găsind o formulă de acomodare. Exemplele lui Allison par să fie dezbrăcate până la piele de orice particularități și variabile. Rămân doar puterea dominantă, cea emergentă și rezultatul. Este o alegere metodologică pentru a întări argumentul. Mi se pare o abordare greșită. Fiecare caz are particularitățile lui, relevante pentru analiză. Uneori puterea dominantă a atacat, alteori a făcut-o cea emergentă. În unele cazuri nu putem vorbi despre o singură putere dominantă și astfel nu prea mai putem vorbi nici despre o capcană a lui Tucidide. Cele mai multe exemple vin din spațiul european, dintr-o epocă în care războiul era cea dintâi modalitate de a rezolva o dispută sau de a stopa o putere emergentă, o epocă a imperiilor și regatelor în care războiul era aproape un hobby pentru conducători și în care războiul nu era total. În unele cazuri, capcana lui Tucidide pare doar o haină diferită pentru dilema securității. Nu toate au produs schimbări ecouri și schimbări sistemice majore.
Aproape toate exemplele (cu excepția unuia care implică Imperiul Otoman și două cu Japonia) se referă la confruntări între puteri europene sau occidentale. Acest lucru compromite argumentul lui Allison, mai ales că tot el vorbește, pe larg, despre diferențele culturale între China și SUA la toate nivelurile de interpretare, precum concepțiile asupra timpului, locului în lume sau a valorilor fundamentale.
Dacă iei aceste concluzii din urma unor conflicte europene, din timpuri mult diferite, în care nu s-au confruntat civilizații diferite și în care mizele erau mult mai mici, vezi că ele nu pot fi aplicate peste relația China-SUA. Ar fi mai multe de comentat pentru că din moment ce începi să diseci fiecare argument, fiecare sugestie (sunt multe, dar par toate doar concluzii cu puțină relevanță pentru China și SUA) și fiecare scenariu, găsești multe puncte slabe.
Totuși, cartea este foarte bună pentru că dă de gândit. Dacă luăm exemplele istorice doar ca exemple din care putem învăța câte ceva, nu ca previziuni despre cum se vor întâmpla lucrurile, nu ca statistici care ne condamnă, într-adevăr pare că ne îndreptăm spre ape tulburi despre care liderii politici nu par să știe cum să le navigheze. Abordările chineze (pe termen lung) și cele americane (în care fiecare eveniment este fără precedent) pot duce la neînțelegeri grave și la accidente devastatoare. Lipsa de viziune, mai ales la americani, va crea multă confuzie. Optimistul din mine spune că aceste două mari puteri vor găsi modalități pentru a-și împărți lumea, fiecare cu sfera proprie de influență și cu o cooperare acceptabilă în comerț. Altfel, ar avea mult mai multe de pierdut decât de câștigat și anume acest calcul domină agenda politică a acestor state. Să sperăm la ce e mai bine, deși, indiferent ce se întâmplă, vom trăi probabil un viitor chinezificat. E timpul să ne obișnuim cu această idee.
Cartea este foarte bine scrisă. Se citește dintr-o răsuflare. Recomand. ...more
I don’t usually read books about Russia because I don’t need to actually, I have lived my life in its shadow, so there is little I have to discover abI don’t usually read books about Russia because I don’t need to actually, I have lived my life in its shadow, so there is little I have to discover about it. This one came recommended. It is impressive how an author so young, in his early twenties at the time the book was published, and so foreign, could understand Russia so well. The book is well-structured and well-researched, it is topical, but also chronological. It is ambitious, but it delivers what it promises. I would consider it more of an opinion book than a rigorously researched scientific one, but regardless as to how Judah comes to his conclusions, they are correct (as far as I can judge). He is very good at reading the mood inside Russia. He says he has travelled far and wide and has come in contact with thousands of Russians. It shows. Be they a thousand or a hundred Russians, he manages to understand what they think and what they want, ultimately reading between the lines, from what is not said at times, rather from they are comfortable saying.
I will not go into much detail, because Russia is both complicated and simple really. There is an authoritarian regime, with a president/dictator/tsar, a court and a clientele – a plutocracy perhaps –, detached from the people, their wants and needs, reliant on natural resources and the high prices of oil and gas. Although it keeps the illusion of democracy, with many gradually opening their eyes thanks to the internet and capitalism, it has the tools of silencing the voices of dissent. The more people try to speak, the tighter the grip gets. It seems as Russians are doomed to make the same mistakes, to live through the same cycles of history.
Judah analyses Putin’s rise to power up until 2012, when he came back after an intermezzo, and argues that, slow but steady, Russians are falling out of love with him. He does not say when their dissatisfaction will start boiling – he is very cautious in this regard, as time moves slower in Russia due to a number of factors. 10 years after the book was published, with a full-on illegal and unjustified war against Ukraine, the grip on power, on the resources and on the people seems strong still.
For those who want to understand how modern Russia came to be, how many Russias are inside its vastness, how every-day Russians live and think, this book is the right one. I will forgive Judah’s long metaphors and the descriptions of all the cafes he’s had conversations in (not at all times relevant) and will put them down to his young age....more
Cum s-o spun elegant? Cartea asta este despre prea multe și despre nimic în același timp. Scrisă cu pandemia în gând, în timpul pandemiei (la începutuCum s-o spun elegant? Cartea asta este despre prea multe și despre nimic în același timp. Scrisă cu pandemia în gând, în timpul pandemiei (la începutul ei, dacă judec după momentul în care mă aflu, în primăvara-vara 2020), despre pandemie, își ratează mult ținta. În general, sunt de părerea că o carte despre un eveniment trebuie scrisă după ce evenimentul se stinge. Autorul a anticipat critica asta (pe care o numește „oțioasă”), care probabil i-a venit din multe părți, și se apără spunând că „cine poate spune când se încheie o pandemie?” și că „nu e niciodată prea devreme să începem să învățăm din greșeli”. Apărarea asta nu ține atunci când te avânți în previziuni despre efectele evenimentului care sunt deja demontate când iese cartea de sub tipar.
Autorul încearcă să înainteze un fel de teorie, o struțo-cămilă. Conform lui, 1. dezastrele sunt imprevizibile; 2. nu există o separare clară între dezastre naturale și cele provocate de om (război sau pandemie, efectele dezastrelor depind mai mult de factorul politic, decât de proveniența lor, pentru că dacă la nivel politic și administrativ un dezastru – inundație, furtună, tsunami, pandemie sau război – ar fi gestionat cum trebuie, nu ar mai fi dezastru); 3. erorile nu se fac la vârf, ci undeva pe la mijloc (intră, într-o oarecare măsură, în contradicție cu punctul 2), de funcționari și experți de nivel mediu; 4. contagiunea nu se datorează doar agenților patogeni, ci și contagiunii mentale, adică știrilor false și acțiunii ostile a unor actori pe rețelele sociale. O altă idee pe care o înaintează este că suntem mai vulnerabili la dezastre precum pandemia covid din cauza rețelelor în care trăim. Mă rog, într-un fel globalizarea e de vină pentru pandemie. Nu o spune direct, dar se înțelege.
Problema este că, chiar dacă a înaintat ideile de la punctele 2 și 4, autorul absolvă aproape în totalitate liderii politici de responsabilitate în privința efectelor pandemiei. Se axează cel mai mult pe SUA și UK, spunând că Trump și Boris Johnson au făcut greșeli, dar nu au fost chiar atât de grave. Îmi este greu să înțeleg punctul acesta de vedere. Când definești un dezastru prin felul în care acționează oamenii cu putere de decizie și mai spui că știrile false, manipularea, conspirațiile au un efect foarte mare în răspândirea unei pandemii, nu poți să spui că Trump, președintele țării, cu zeci de milioane de adepți fideli, dar adresându-se întregii populații, nu e responsabil de felul în care a fost gestionată pandemia știind ce tâmpenii a propagat în spațiul public și ce eforturi a făcut pentru a minimiza efectele pandemiei. Nu poți da vina doar pe birocrație, când toată lumea primea și aștepta indicații de la administrația prezidențială.
În fine, pandemia covid face obiectul a doar 1/3, poate 2/5 din carte. Restul cărții este plină de informații, într-o ordine aproape lipsită de logică (există multe capitole, dar nu reușesc să-mi dau seama acum dacă a tratat fiecare un subiect distinct), despre războaie, dezastre, pandemii, boli, vaccinuri, tehnologii și avertismente despre cum urmează lucruri rele, cum ar fi o confruntare rece (care deja a început) cu China. Ciorba lui Niall Ferguson are de toate.
I was hoping for this to restore my faith in democracy, to tell me that people are not complete imbeciles and that, unbeknownst to them, they are guidI was hoping for this to restore my faith in democracy, to tell me that people are not complete imbeciles and that, unbeknownst to them, they are guided by something resembling an invisible hand and that all is (will be) well in the end. It wasn’t that. It begins like that, telling the reader that crowds and groups have more wisdom than the total sum of its members and that good decisions do indeed come out, with the condition that these crowds are diverse and representative to society. The examples are good in illustrating the point. But it then goes deeper into how the markets work, how people trade in stocks and stuff like this. I got bored and all those pages were just narrowly touching the main point. It did not make me more hopeful or optimistic about the democratic process, it did not restore my faith in humanity, in society’s ability to arrive at good conclusions and decisions. Even if a group of uninformed people can, without any prior knowledge, guess the weight of an ox or the location of a sunken submarine (guess these as a group, not individually), I doubt this wisdom can go further to complex issues like politics, government, science and so on. It is easy to average what people think about the number of marbles in a jar, harder when it comes to rights, health, the way their country should be governed. Starts well and then derails. ...more
This one was a very interesting take on the nature of war. Freedman provides a history of war by going through what people used to think about the futThis one was a very interesting take on the nature of war. Freedman provides a history of war by going through what people used to think about the future of war and warfare. He takes on popular culture, science-fiction, strategical analysis, academia etc. It seems that everyone, everywhere, misses the point when predicting how the next war will look. They tend to focus on some parts and ignore others. When looking at the next war, be it for strategic planning or fiction, somehow they are always stuck in the past, unable to see that the future might look different (even with all the necessary data available). They confidently bet on something, only for the reality to strike back with something else. Over and over again. We are nothing if not creatures of habit! (When we imagine future wars, not when we wage them).
This is not a comprehensive history of the Cold War, nor is it concise enough for a wide audience. It has the advantage, though, of being able to piecThis is not a comprehensive history of the Cold War, nor is it concise enough for a wide audience. It has the advantage, though, of being able to piece together a lot of moving parts. Being intended to a younger, unsuspecting audience, I got the feeling it oversimplifies some events and exaggerates the importance of others (like Reagan’s role in ending the CW). The fact that Gaddis is American should not be overlooked. He is biased from the start. There are some things he has to cover, because if he didn’t it would look overly suspicions, but he minimizes their effects and moral ambiguity.
The subject is kind of alluring, but the book ultimately underwhelming.
The point is that fascism does not have a narrow definition, it can encompass mThe subject is kind of alluring, but the book ultimately underwhelming.
The point is that fascism does not have a narrow definition, it can encompass many things, and so it does in this book. There are many chapters describing different forms of fascism across the globe and that is basically it. There is no solution. The disaster is coming, you should not let it come, but if it does, don’t look at this to tell you what to do....more
Gaddis has to go from A to B. Instead of going straight from A to B, he chooses more complicated paths. A→F→D→C→A→E→B. This is detrimental to his ideaGaddis has to go from A to B. Instead of going straight from A to B, he chooses more complicated paths. A→F→D→C→A→E→B. This is detrimental to his ideas. I could not understand what that grand strategy is. If I took his fox and hedgehog metaphor, then the book is full of fox-like things, but the big thing, the one characteristic to the hedgehog, is missing. There is no discernible explanation for the grand strategy. The book is abundant with historical examples and that’s it.
I also disliked Gaddis' inclination for the dramatic. The final phrases always try to achieve some dramatic effect. ...more
While history is interesting and fascinating it is also complicated. In six short, well-written, and occasionally complicated lectures, Carr explains While history is interesting and fascinating it is also complicated. In six short, well-written, and occasionally complicated lectures, Carr explains that history is not merely a list of facts, but the interpretation of these facts and the meaning the historian attributes to them. History is analysis, not a grocery list.
He, of course, makes some other points by exploring the role of history in society and its importance for the present and the future, its ability to predict, its place between the sciences, the relevance of accidents and so on.
An account of all the instances when the U.S. and the West could have intervened somewhere to stop genocide and it did not. It’s heartbreaking to readAn account of all the instances when the U.S. and the West could have intervened somewhere to stop genocide and it did not. It’s heartbreaking to read. I can’t even begin to imagine the frustration of low-level analysts engaged in early-warning, and then again, in gathering intelligence while these abysmal acts were taking place, when their reports where simply disregarded. All in the name of the “national interest”. I won’t ever try to imagine the pain and the suffering of the victims, of those killed, of those forced to watch while their families were butchered, of those hoping that the Americans (and the rest of the Westerners) will come and save them. They never will, or if they do, it will be too late.
How can you regard yourself as a beacon of hope, as a leader of the free world, when all you care about is your political capital, your influence, your “turf”? Is that really more important than millions of lives?
“Never again” is really “over and over again”.
The author is trying to make sense of it all, but she does a better job than necessary. You read and read, every instance when someone could have done something and deliberately chose not to, and you get furious, cast down, hopeless.
Emotions set aside; the book is very informative, well-written and well-organized. I have read some of the criticism it received, regarding its softness in condemning US policy-makers for choosing to stay on the sidelines. I have also read the criticism regarding the argument for the superiority of liberal interventionism. I guess there will always be two sides to a story, but it’s hard not to argue for interventionism when thousands die every day for no reason and you read about it in your morning newspaper and see mass graves on the evening news.
“When you suffer like we have suffered, you simply cannot imagine that nobody will come along to stop the pain. Every day you would wake up and tell yourself ‘somebody will come, something is going to happen.’ If you stop hoping for rescue, you stop hoping. And hope is all that can keep you alive.”
“Don’t, don’t, don’t live under this dream that the West is going to come in and sort this problem out. Don’t dream dreams.”
“A U.S. officer was wondering precisely how many Rwandans had died. Dallaire was puzzled and asked why he wanted to know. ‘We are doing our calculations back here,’ the U.S. officer said, ‘and one American casualty is worth about 85,000 Rwandans dead.”
“Favoring humanitarian intervention had never been a great career move.”...more
Interesantă concepţie şi lucrare. Îmi dau seama că ideile astea, de la 1925, au ajuns până acum şi la mine, fără să trec pe la sursă. Sincronismul, imInteresantă concepţie şi lucrare. Îmi dau seama că ideile astea, de la 1925, au ajuns până acum şi la mine, fără să trec pe la sursă. Sincronismul, imitaţia, spiritul veacului, evoluţia de la formă la fond - sunt idei aparent banale, dar erau scandaloase la vremea aceea. Acum mi se par aproape axiome. După 1989 poporul român a reînceput aceleaşi procese. Mi se pare normal. Chiar şi acum ele explică foarte bine evoluţia politică, ideologică, economică, psihologică, socială etc.
First off, I have to say that the title is misleading. I’ve had two friends disappointed to find out, upon opening this book, that it only focuses on First off, I have to say that the title is misleading. I’ve had two friends disappointed to find out, upon opening this book, that it only focuses on three countries. When I first learned about this book, I had hoped that it includes chapters on the whole Eastern bloc. It’s not the case. Anne Applebaum mentions in the introduction that her choice of the three countries (East Germany, Poland and Hungary) is part because they were so different (p. xxxv), and part because of the logistical difficulties (p. xxxviii). I can perfectly understand the latter, although she has had help from two research assistants based in Hungary and Germany, but I cannot accept the former, mostly because of her writing style. In virtually every chapter she tries to draw parallels between these three countries, focusing more on what brings them closer rather on what drives them away. Maybe the geographical proximity played a more important role? (This does not explain why Czechoslovakia, literally situated between these three countries, was not part of the wider research.) Or maybe her own ties to these countries? Even if you consider Yugoslavia to be a special case, it is hard to believe that Romania and Bulgaria don’t deserve to be researched and written about, especially since, at least Romania, had some different experience at the beginning of the communist era. And also, what about Albania, repeatedly ignored by history books about communism and treated merely as an afterthought? My second problem with the title is the phrase “the crushing of”. It is hard for me to imagine any more “crushing” in Eastern Europe after WWII. What the soviets did cannot objectively be called crushing, they merely tried to keep Eastern Europe crushed by rebuilding it in URSS’ image.
I have had this book on my reading list for a long time. I remember attending a lecture at CEU where Anne Applebaum took the audience (unwittingly) through her arguments that lie at the core of “Iron Curtain” (here is the lecture, also included here verbatim). I remember feeling a little patronized (as a member of the audience) by her condescending attitude. Re-watching now the lecture I feel like I was wrong, or maybe the Q&A part played a bigger role in my impression. Nevertheless, I set upon, a few days after the lecture, reading Gulag: A History, and after that, Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine, 1921-1933 (both topics of bigger interest to me at the time). Only now I decided again to try “Iron Curtain”, which I repeatedly postponed, mainly because of my disappointment to learn that my country is almost entirely ignored.
After reading I feel that a lot of criticism Applebaum gets for this book is unwarranted. People want an objective history book but they don’t realize that that is not possible. Every history book is written either by victors, by losers, by victims, by people with personal tragedy, with personal connection. It is influenced by the ideas of the time, by ideology, by personal convictions. Even the decision to study history and to write a history book has personal motivations and prejudice from the start. That is why critical thinking always has to be employed when reading a history book. A minimal research into the author’s personal background and convictions is also important. At least Applebaum is honest on what she tries to do and what to say. Her language is a language that she assumes, she knows she is guilty for it but it is the one that she believes best conveys her points.
At the same time, much of this criticism tends to come from people who have no direct experience with communism. They expect a certain degree of political correctness, or at least some balanced debate about communism. For someone that lived under the iron curtain or with the ghosts of communism ever-present in society, the public and private sphere (like myself), a discussion about the good things under communism is not possible, neither wanted. The bad things outweigh the good ones. I may personally be aware of some good things, I may even entertain the argument sometimes, but I cannot just ignore the methods used by the regime. The good things under communism are almost unintended consequences of the oppression, the human condition and the will to live deserving more credit for them than the regime. It is no wonder to me that Applebaum makes judgment(al) calls about the people and communism in general, for those who experienced communism know them to be true. At times I even felt that she tries to fight these urges by balancing some of her conclusions and arguments about some persons she uses as examples.
The intended audience for this type of book should also be considered. This is not a popular-science-type-of-book, but it’s also not a scientific-research-book in the true sense of the definition either. It is not a book for the academia and for the scientific community, and neither for the common uneducated reader. It is intended for an educated, smart audience that wants to learn more about a subject unfamiliar to them. It is for those that have not lived behind the iron curtain (although, truth be told, Applebaum in the final page of the epilogue argues that “before a nation can be rebuild, its citizens need to understand how it was destroyed in the first place” – presumably the purpose of the book). At least that’s what I feel. She uses familiar, accessible language, but also scientific methods. Her book is well researched, deriving her sources not only from archives and scientific books, but also from memoirs, journals, interviews, popular culture incl. film, music and arts. The discovery of future reading lists is guaranteed when browsing the bibliography.
I am not the biggest Anne Applebaum fan, but I find her writing style appealing. Of course, this book is not perfect, but it gave me useful insight. I can’t say I was unfamiliar with the histories of these countries before, and even so, I learned a lot and the level of detail in the book is commendable.
What struck me the most, from reading small excerpts of documents, reports, official letters, was the language invented within the language. Those apparatchiks were always speaking in codes, never saying what they really wanted, but always understanding what was meant. It is surreal.
It just so happens that I have finished the book on the 64th anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. How fitting! The 1956 revolution is the one to conclude the book and the time period the author has chosen.
“One winter day, I stupidly wrote in the text of the script, ‘There is cold atmospheric front approaching us from Russia.’ The broadcaster read it aloud… in the morning they phone me: ‘Go and see the director.’ I went to see the director, and was ushered in right away. ‘Zalewski,’ he told me, ‘I thought you were more intelligent. From now on, remember that only warm, good things come from the East.’ It didn’t seem funny at the time…” (Andrzej Zalewski, former Polish radio employee, p. 186)
“The definition of socialism: an incessant struggle against difficulties which would not exist in any other system.” (Hungarian joke of the 1950s, p. 238)
“ ‘Who built the White Sea Canal?’ ‘Those who told political jokes.’ ‘And who built the Volga-Don Canal?’ ‘Those who listened.’ ” (p. 451)
For the quotes I used my copy of the book, Allen Lane/Penguin Books Ltd, 2012....more
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