The Big Short Quotes
![The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine](https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1446581171l/26889576._SY75_.jpg)
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The Big Short Quotes
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“banks—the biggest of which was the $13.9 billion AIG owed to Goldman Sachs. When you added in the $8.4 billion in cash AIG had already forked over to Goldman in collateral, you saw that Goldman had transferred more than $20 billion in subprime mortgage bond risk into the insurance company, which was in one way or another being covered by the U.S. taxpayer. That fact alone was enough to make everyone wonder at once how much more of this stuff was out there, and who owned it.”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“how Wall Street investment banks somehow had conned the rating agencies into blessing piles of crappy loans; how this had enabled the lending of trillions of dollars to ordinary Americans; how the ordinary Americans had happily complied and told the lies they needed to tell to obtain the loans; how the machinery that turned the loans into supposedly riskless securities was so complicated that investors had ceased to evaluate risks; how the problem had grown so big that the end was bound to be cataclysmic and have big social and political consequences.”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“In early October 2008, after the U.S. government had stepped in to say it would, in effect, absorb all the losses in the financial system and prevent any big Wall Street firm from failing, Burry had started to buy stocks with enthusiasm, for the first time in years.”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“best definition of “investing” is “gambling with the odds in your favor.” The people on the short side of the subprime mortgage market had gambled with the odds in their favor. The people on the other side—the entire financial system, essentially—had gambled with the odds against them.”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“cause of the financial crisis was “simple. Greed on both sides—greed of investors and the greed of the bankers.” I thought it was more complicated. Greed on Wall Street was a given—almost an obligation. The problem was the system of incentives that channeled the greed. The line between gambling and investing is artificial and thin.”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“the Wall Street firm became a black box. The shareholders who financed the risk taking had no real understanding of what the risk takers were doing, and, as the risk taking grew ever more complex, their understanding diminished.”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“the unwillingness of the U.S. government to allow the bankers to fail was less a solution than a symptom of a still deeply dysfunctional financial system.”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“The problem wasn’t that the banks were, in and of themselves, critical to the success of the U.S. economy. The problem, he felt certain, was that some gargantuan, unknown dollar amount of credit default swaps had been bought and sold on every one of them. “There’s no limit to the risk in the market,” he said. “A bank with a market capitalization of one billion dollars might have one trillion dollars’ worth of credit default swaps outstanding. No one knows how many there are! And no one knows where they are!” The failure of, say, Citigroup might be economically tolerable. It would trigger losses to Citigroup’s shareholders, bondholders, and employees—but the sums involved were known to all. Citigroup’s failure, however, would also trigger the payoff of a massive bet of unknown dimensions: from people who had sold credit default swaps on Citigroup to those who had bought them.”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“The main effect of turning a partnership into a corporation was to transfer the financial risk to the shareholders. “When things go wrong it’s their problem,”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“Goldman Sachs itself—and so Goldman was in the position of selling bonds to its customers created by its own traders, so they might bet against them. Secondly, there was a crude, messy, slow, but acceptable substitute for Mike Burry’s credit default swaps: the actual cash bonds. According to a former Goldman derivatives trader, Goldman would buy the triple-A tranche of some CDO, pair it off with the credit default swaps AIG sold Goldman that insured the tranche (at a cost well below the yield on the tranche), declare the entire package risk-free, and hold it off its balance sheet. Of course, the whole thing wasn’t risk-free: If AIG went bust, the insurance was worthless, and Goldman could lose everything. Today Goldman Sachs is, to put it mildly, unhelpful when asked to explain exactly what it did, and this lack of transparency extends to its own shareholders. “If a team of forensic accountants went over Goldman’s books, they’d be shocked at just how good Goldman is at hiding things,”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“Goldman Sachs did not leave the house before it began to burn; it was merely the first to dash through the exit—and then it closed the door behind it.”
― The Big Short
― The Big Short
“I also immediately internalized the idea that no school could teach someone how to be a great investor. If it were true, it’d be the most popular school in the world, with an impossibly high tuition. So it must not be true.” Investing”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“Back in 1995, Munger had given a talk at Harvard Business School called “The Psychology of Human Misjudgment.” If you wanted to predict how people would behave, Munger said, you only had to look at their incentives. FedEx couldn’t get its night shift to finish on time; they tried everything to speed it up but nothing worked—until they stopped paying night shift workers by the hour and started to pay them by the shift. Xerox created a new, better machine only to have it sell less well than the inferior older ones—until they figured out the salesmen got a bigger commission for selling the older one. “Well, you can say, ‘Everybody knows that,’” said Munger. “I think I’ve been in the top five percent of my age cohort all my life in understanding the power of incentives, and all my life I’ve underestimated it. And never a year passes but I get some surprise that pushes my limit a little farther.” Munger’s”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“One of the oldest adages in investing is that if you’re reading about it in the paper, it’s too late,” he”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“But the more we looked at what a CDO really was, the more we were like, Holy shit, that’s just fucking crazy. That’s fraud. Maybe you can’t prove it in a court of law. But it’s fraud.” It”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“Liquidity. When an executive said his bank had plenty of liquidity it always meant that it didn’t. At”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“The moment Salomon Brothers demonstrated the potential gains to be had from turning an investment bank into a public corporation and leveraging its balance sheet with exotic risks, the psychological foundations of Wall Street shifted, from trust to blind faith.”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“In the two decades after I left, I waited for the end of Wall Street as I had known it. The outrageous bonuses, the endless parade of rogue traders, the scandal that sank Drexel Burnham, the scandal that destroyed John Gutfreund and finished off Salomon Brothers, the crisis following the collapse of my old boss John Meriwether’s Long-Term Capital Management, the Internet bubble: Over and over again, the financial system was, in some narrow way, discredited. Yet the big Wall Street banks at the center of it just kept on growing, along with the sums of money that they doled out to twenty-six-year-olds to perform tasks of no obvious social utility. The rebellion by American youth against the money culture never happened. Why bother to overturn your parents’ world when you can buy it and sell off the pieces?”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“There's a difference between an old-fashioned financial panic and what had happened on Wall Street in 2008. In an old-fashioned panic, perception creates its own reality: Someone shouts "Fire!" in a crowded theater and the audience crushes each other to death in its rush for the exits. On Wall Street in 2008 the reality finally overwhelmed perceptions: A crowded theater burned down with a lot of people still in their seats.”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“Looking for bad bonds inside a CDO was like fishing for crap in a Port-O-Let: The question wasn’t whether you’d catch some but how quickly you’d be satisfied you’d caught enough.
”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“Subprime borrowers tended to be one broken refrigerator away from default. Few,”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“default swaps on subprime mortgage bonds. Only a triple-A-rated corporation could assume such risk, no money down, and no questions asked. Burry was right about this, too, but it would be three years before he knew it. The party on the other side of his bet against subprime mortgage bonds was the triple-A-rated insurance company AIG—American International Group, Inc. Or, rather, a unit of AIG called AIG FP. AIG Financial Products was created”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“first. In a financial system that was rapidly generating complicated risks, AIG FP became a huge swallower of those risks. In the early days it must have seemed as if it was being paid to insure events extremely unlikely to occur, as it was. Its success bred imitators: Zurich Re FP, Swiss Re FP, Credit Suisse FP, Gen Re FP. (“Re” stands for Reinsurance.) All of these places were central to what happened in the last two decades; without them, the new risks being created would have had no place to hide and would have remained in full view of bank regulators. All of these places, when the crisis came, would be washed away by the general nausea felt in the presence of complicated financial risks, but there was a moment when their existence seemed cartographically necessary to the financial world. AIG FP was the model for them all.”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“Aldinger, collected his $100 million, Eisman was on his way to becoming the financial market’s first socialist. “When you’re a conservative Republican, you never think people are making money by ripping other people off,” he said. His mind was now fully”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“raising chickens. It was almost as hard for Eisman to imagine himself raising chickens as it was for people who knew him, but he’d agreed. “The idea of it was so unbelievably unappealing to him,” says his wife, “that he started to work harder.” Eisman traveled all over Europe and the United States searching for people willing to invest with him and found exactly one: an insurance company, which staked him to $50 million. It wasn’t enough to create a sustainable equity fund, but it was a start. Instead of money, Eisman”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“March 2008 the stock market had finally grasped what every mortgage bond salesman had long known: Someone had lost at least $240 billion. But who? Morgan Stanley still owned $13 billion or so in CDOs, courtesy of Howie Hubler. The idiots in Germany owned some, Wing Chau and CDO managers like him owned some”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“It's not easy to stand apart from mass hysteria - to believe that most of what's in the financial news is wrong, to believe that most important financial people are either lying or deluded - without being insane.”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“When you’re a conservative Republican, you never think people are making money by ripping other people off,” he said. His mind was now fully open to the possibility. “I now realized there was an entire industry, called consumer finance, that basically existed to rip people off.” Denied”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“There are a lot of really crappy bonds in these CDOs,’” said Charlie. They didn’t realize yet that the bonds inside their CDOs were actually credit default swaps on the bonds, and so their CDOs weren’t ordinary CDOs but synthetic CDOs, or that the bonds on which the swaps were based had been handpicked by Mike Burry and Steve Eisman and others betting against the market. In many ways, they were still innocents.”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
“Burry did not think investing could be reduced to a formula or learned from any one role model. The more he studied Buffett, the less he thought Buffett could be copied; indeed, the lesson of Buffett was: To succeed in a spectacular fashion you had to be spectacularly unusual. “If you are going to be a great investor, you have to fit the style to who you are,” Burry said. “At one point I recognized”
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
― The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine