

# Towards a successful outcome of the first global stocktake of the Paris Agreement

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### **Abstract**

The first global stocktake (GST1) of collective progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement will conclude at COP28. How the final stage of GST1 is organised, who is involved and how the final outputs are structured can influence the success of the process. This paper explores how to organise the final component of GST1 and how to design related outputs to be impactful. This paper sets out how to build broad, high-level momentum behind GST1 by structuring activities in 2023 and beyond into four phases of: i) awareness building; ii) socialisation; iii) decision-making; and iv) follow-up. This paper highlights the importance of technical outputs that are fit for purpose and identifies potential options for structuring technical outputs from GST1 to target different actors, including negotiators, policy makers, practitioners, and a broader audience beyond the UNFCCC process. The paper also sets out how to design a package of political outputs from GST1 to include different mutually supportive elements, including negotiated, consultative, and non-negotiated elements, which could play distinct roles and engage different actors. The paper underlines the importance of efforts to monitor how GST1 outputs are taken forward by different actors after COP28. This follow-up could build on existing provisions and establish new processes where needed, to help assess the success of the GST1 exercise and inform subsequent GST cycles.

JEL classifications: Q54, Q56, Q58, F53

Keywords: Climate change, Paris Agreement, Global stocktake, Outputs, Outcomes, NDCs, UNFCCC

### Résumé

Le premier bilan mondial des progrès collectifs accomplis vers les buts de l'Accord de Paris se conclura à l'occasion de la COP28. La manière dont l'étape finale du bilan mondial est organisée, qui est impliqué et comment les livrables finaux sont structurés peuvent influencer le succès du processus. Le présent document examine la façon d'organiser la dernière phase du bilan mondial et la conception des livrables correspondants pour qu'ils aient un fort impact. Le document décrit les moyens de créer une dynamique large et de haut niveau derrière le premier bilan mondial en structurant les activités menées en 2023 et au-delà en quatre phases: 1) sensibilisation; 2) réflexion; 3) prise de décision et 4) suivi. Il souligne l'importance de résultats techniques adaptés à l'objectif et identifie des options potentielles pour structurer les résultats techniques du premier bilan mondial de façon à cibler différents acteurs, dont les négociateurs, les décideurs, les spécialistes et un plus large public extérieur au processus de la CCNUCC. Le document explique comment concevoir un ensemble de résultats politiques du premier bilan mondial pour inclure différents éléments se renforçant mutuellement, y compris des éléments négociés, consultatifs et non négociés, qui pourraient jouer différents rôles et mobiliser différents acteurs. Le document souligne également l'importance des efforts visant à contrôler la manière dont les résultats du premier bilan mondial sont pris en compte par les différents acteurs après la COP28. Pour assurer ce suivi, il serait possible de s'appuyer sur les dispositions existantes et établir de nouveaux processus, le cas échéant, afin d'aider à évaluer la réussite du premier bilan mondial et d'apporter des éclairages pour les cycles suivants.

Classification JEL: Q54, Q56, Q58, F53

Mots-clés: Changement climatique, Accord de Paris, Bilan mondial, Livrables, Résultats, CDN, CCNUCC

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## **List of Acronyms**

AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
BTR	Biennial Transparency Report
CCXG	Climate Change Expert Group
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreemen
СО	Consideration of outputs component
СОР	Conference of the Parties
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
EIG	Environmental Integrity Group
ETF	Enhanced Transparency Framework
FMCP	Facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress
GCAP	Global Climate Action Portal
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GST	Global Stocktake
HAC	High Ambition Coalition
HLC	High-Level Committee
HoD	Heads of Delegation
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IDCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

JCG	Joint Contact Group
KCI	Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures
LMDC	Like-Minded Developing Countries
LTS	Long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MWP	Mitigation Work Programme
NAZCA	Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action
NCQG	New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NPS	Non-Party Stakeholder
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PCCB	Paris Committee on Capacity-building
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
TD	Technical Dialogue
TD SYR	Technical Dialogue Factual Synthesis Report
TEC	Technology Executive Committee
TEP	Technical Examination Process
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General

## **Executive summary**

The global stocktake (GST) is a periodic process to assess overall progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement. The aim of this stocktaking exercise is to inform national actions and enhance international co-operation for climate action. The first GST (GST1) was launched at the 26<sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties (COP26) in Glasgow in November 2021 and will conclude at COP28 in Dubai in December 2023.

The GST is structured around three components - 'information collection and preparation', 'technical assessment' and 'consideration of outputs'. This paper explores how to organise the final component of GST1 – the 'consideration of outputs' component (CO) - to build broad and high-level momentum for GST1 leading up to COP28 and beyond. This paper also explores potential options for structuring the final outputs of GST1 to be most useful to different actors. Unpacking these issues and understanding options for designing the final phase of GST1 will be critical for its success.

Translating the findings from the technical assessment phase of the GST into strong political signals that can drive action on the ground is not straightforward. Clear, transparent linkages between technical findings and final GST1 outputs will play an important role in generating ownership and facilitating follow-up. Who is involved, how active their engagement has been throughout the GST1 process and how cross-cutting issues such as equity are operationalised in final GST1 outputs will be other factors affecting follow-up. This goes beyond the CO of GST1 at COP28 to an "implementation arc" in 2024-2025 where GST1 outputs are taken forward and could culminate in the submission of updated NDCs informed by GST1 by COP30. It will also be important to establish follow-up processes to monitor take-up of GST1 outputs to assess the success of the exercise and to help inform subsequent GST cycles.

#### Designing the consideration of outputs of GST1 to inform subsequent action

Various activities can be carried out during the CO of GST1. These activities could be structured into four phases:

- Awareness building phase (March-September 2023): Prior to the release of the factual synthesis
  report of the technical dialogues (TD SYR), GST-related discussions at events within the UNFCCC
  process and beyond, could bring GST1 to the attention of key stakeholders and start to build
  political momentum ahead of final deliberations at COP28.
- Socialisation phase (September–November 2023): Between the release of the TD SYR and COP28, activities could focus on disseminating the findings of the technical assessment and exploring possible elements of a final package of GST1 outputs to be adopted at COP28.
- Decision-making phase (November-December 2023): At COP28, activities will include final decisions on GST1 and could involve key players including the high-level committee (HLC), political leaders, ministers, Heads of Delegations, and non-Party stakeholders (NPS).
- Follow-up phase (January 2024-December 2025): This phase could focus on the implementation of GST1 outputs and could culminate with the adoption of updated NDCs "informed" by GST1 by COP30 in December 2025.

#### Structuring impactful technical outputs from GST1

To be impactful and fit for purpose, technical outputs need to be focused and structured in a well-organised, accessible format. A package of technical outputs targeting different actors could include:

- A short, focused TD SYR that sets out the key messages from the technical assessment of GST1.
- Technical annexes appended to the TD SYR that set out challenges and opportunities in key sectors, systems, and the adaptation policy cycle. Technical annexes could also map the current landscape of enablers within the UNFCCC and beyond, gaps and opportunities. To increase accessibility, certain information could be presented in the form of a searchable database.
- Summary key cards that present the main findings from the technical assessment in a clear, visual format. Such a format could facilitate communication of GST1 findings to a broader audience and support awareness raising activities at different levels.

#### Structuring impactful political outputs from GST1

A package of political outputs with mutually supportive elements could be designed to play different roles and engage different actors. This package could include negotiated, consultative, and non-negotiated elements:

- A CMA decision, prepared by the joint contact group (JCG), could set out high-level political messages and the overall direction of travel. The decision could for example: urge Parties to implement GST1 findings when preparing their NDCs; set out recommendations to strengthen parts of the UNFCCC system; establish follow-up processes building on current reporting provisions and set up new systems where needed to improve accountability.
- A political declaration(s), co-ordinated by the HLC, could be put forward for signature by all Parties (e.g. at Heads of State level) or a group of Parties (e.g. High Ambition Coalition, voluntary coalition of first movers on the GST). This could provide a strong political signal of intent among signatories to achieve the GST1 outcome, provide resources to enable implementation, and set out a roadmap for doing so. The political declaration(s) could build on parallel initiatives (e.g. UNSG's Climate Solidarity Pact, Breakthrough Agendas) and could be co-ordinated with different actors (e.g. UN High-Level Climate Champions, international organisations).
- A CMA cover decision, co-ordinated by the COP28 Presidency, could highlight overarching political messages from GST1, set out linkages and establish feedback loops between the GST1 and relevant processes. The cover decision could also invite actors within and outside the UNFCCC process to align their practices and policies to support implementation of GST1 recommendations.
- Initiatives and partnerships, co-ordinated by the COP28 Presidency with the UN High-Level Climate Champions, could provide streams of operational action to take forward GST1 recommendations in key areas. This could build on existing initiatives and new initiatives where gaps exist. A system of reporting and review of international co-operation initiatives could be established building on work by the UNFCCC secretariat and the Marrakech Partnership.

GST1 marks a key milestone in the UNFCCC process which, if designed correctly, could help to drive needed transformations on the ground. GST1 provides an important opportunity for Parties and the international community to course correct so that collective efforts are in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement. By doing so, the GST1 can provide a positive signal that the multilateral climate process can deliver an adequate, solutions-focused response to the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report. We cannot afford to let this opportunity pass by given the climate impacts already being felt and the rapidly closing window to act to keep the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement within reach.

## Introduction

The global stocktake (GST) is a periodic process, established under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, to assess collective progress towards the long-term goals of the Agreement. The aim of this stocktaking exercise is to inform Parties in updating and enhancing their national actions and support, as well as to enhance international co-operation for climate action. The first GST (GST1) was launched at COP26 and will conclude at COP28 in December 2023. At COP27, Parties recognised the need to start preparing for the final phase of GST1 - the 'consideration of outputs' component (CO) - and agreed a process of intersessional work in the lead up to COP28.

The first GST is important given the state of the climate system, the gap between current efforts and the goals of the Paris Agreement, and the rapidly closing window to act, as highlighted in numerous reports from within the UNFCCC processes and beyond. The urgent need for scaled-up action to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement was reiterated in the Glasgow Climate Pact ((UNFCCC, 2021[1]) and in the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (UNFCCC, 2022<sub>[2]</sub>). Thus, the first GST represents both a key milestone of the Paris Agreement and a test of multilateral co-operation on climate change (Government of Canada, 2022[3]) (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 2023[4]). At the same time, the GST provides a significant opportunity for Parties and the international community to course correct so that collective efforts are in line with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.

The design of the final component of GST1 and related outputs will be critical for ensuring the process can successfully inform subsequent national processes to enhance climate actions, strengthen international co-operation, and influence efforts by non-Party stakeholders (NPS). This paper explores how to organise the CO of GST1 and how to structure the final outputs to be most useful. Unpacking these issues and understanding different potential options could inform preparations for the final component of GST1 and help to ensure the GST can meet its intended outcome.

This paper is structured as follows: Section 2. provides a brief background to the GST process, including the scope and purpose of the CO, and key issues in the transition from the technical assessment to the CO. Section 3. explores potential options for the design of the CO of GST1, the role of different actors and key political moments that could help build broad and high-level momentum for GST1 in the lead up to COP28 and beyond. Section 4. sets out potential options for structuring the technical and political outputs of GST1 to be most useful for informing national actions and enhancing international co-operation in the coming years. Finally, Section 5. provides a synthesis of key findings and conclusions.

## Context and overview

#### 2.1. Overview of key provisions of the GST

The Paris Agreement, in its Article 14.1, established the GST to "assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of [the] Agreement and its long-term goals" (UNFCCC, 2016<sub>[5]</sub>). The intended outcome, set out in Article 14.31, is to "inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing international co-operation for climate action". Detailed provisions and modalities of the GST are set out in Decision 19/CMA.1 (UNFCCC, 2018[6]) and subsequent documents by the co-facilitators of the technical dialogues (Co-facilitators of TD1, 2022<sub>[7]</sub>), (Co-facilitators of TD1, 2022<sub>[8]</sub>), (Co-facilitators of TD1, 2023[9]) and Chairs of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) (SBI and SBSTA Chairs, 2021[10]) (SBI and SBSTA Chairs, 2022[11]).

The GST exercise is to be repeated every five years, taking into account lessons learned. The provision for learning-by-doing (UNFCCC, 2018[6]) provides an opportunity for continuous improvement in the process (i.e. how different components are carried out) as well as in the approaches and methodologies applied over time (i.e. for addressing the GST mandate on adaptation as data availability improves) (Jeudy-Hugo, Errendal and Kotani, 2022[12]). Key concepts in the GST process, as defined in this paper, are set out in Box 2.1. Note, in this paper, all references to Articles are from the Paris Agreement unless indicated otherwise and all references to Paragraphs are from the Decision 19/CMA.1 unless indicated otherwise.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> All references to Articles are from the Paris Agreement unless indicated otherwise.

#### Box 2.1. Defining GST concepts used in this paper

Component: Refers to the three stages of the GST set out in Decision 19/CMA.1 (UNFCCC, 2018<sub>[6]</sub>):

- Information collection and preparation: Component that gathers, compiles, and synthesises information from various sources and types of inputs to prepare for the technical assessment.
- Technical assessment: Component that assesses collective progress towards the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement and identifies opportunities for enhanced action and support.
- Consideration of outputs: Component that discusses the findings from the technical assessment to achieve the intended outcome of the GST.

Inputs: Refers to various sources and types of information used to inform the GST process (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]). Initial sources of input for the GST are identified in the Paris Agreement and include information provided under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (UNFCCC, 2016<sub>[5]</sub>). Further non-exhaustive lists of sources and types of input are identified in Decision 19/CMA.1 and include reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (UNFCCC, 2018[6]). At COP26, Parties agreed further sources and types of information to inform GST1 (UNFCCC, 2021[14]).

Outputs: Refers to different elements to be produced by the GST process (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]). GST outputs "should summarise opportunities and challenges for enhancing action and support in the light of equity and the best available science, as well as lessons learned and good practices" (UNFCCC, 2018[6]).

Outcomes: Refers to the overall effects and changes in behaviour that result from work undertaken throughout the GST process. Outcomes can include intangible effects, e.g. raising awareness, and tangible effects, e.g. Parties' enhancing their NDCs informed by the GST.

Political moments: Refers to political events and processes within the UNFCCC process and beyond that could be used to build/maintain momentum and attention on the GST. This could for example include annual ministerial roundtables, discussions under the G7 and G20, high-level summit convened by the UN Secretary General (UNSG), etc.


Source: Authors based on listed sources.

The GST process is structured around three components. A brief overview of efforts under each component of GST1 as of 12 May 2023 is set out below:

- Information collection and preparation: A range of inputs have been gathered and are available online through the GST information portal (UNFCCC, 2022[15]). As of 12 May 2023, specific submissions to the GST portal have been made by groups of Parties (12), Parties (14), and NPS (231), as well as synthesis reports by the UNFCCC secretariat (7), UNFCCC constituted bodies, forums, and other institutional arrangements (9).
- Technical assessment: Two technical dialogues (TD) have been conducted, with a third and final TD (TD1.3) to be held in June 2023. A mix of formats, including plenaries, roundtables, and world café stations, have been used to encourage interactive, substantive exchanges between Parties, NPS, and experts. The focus of discussions at the first TD (TD1.1) was on "what" the main issues/challenges/gaps are in each area, discussions at the second TD (TD1.2) started to reflect on "how to" address the identified gaps in each area, and discussions at the third TD (TD1.3) will turn to the "what is next" (Co-facilitators of TD1, 2023[16]). Discussions during the TDs have been broadly welcomed for their innovative approach and opportunity for informal, constructive, and inclusive discussions (Co-facilitators of TD1, 2022[17]).

Consideration of outputs: At COP27, Parties recognised the need to start preparing for the CO and agreed intersessional work in the lead up to COP28 - see Figure 2.1. This includes a call for submissions on the approach to the CO, a hybrid consultation in April 2023 on preparations for the CO, an invitation to the high-level committee (HLC) to provide an update on their planning at SB58, and an in-person workshop in October 2023 to develop elements for the CO (UNFCCC, 2022[18]).

Figure 2.1. Key mandated milestones in the CO of GST1



Source: Authors.

#### 2.2. Understanding the CO of the GST

As set out in Decision 19/CMA.1, the focus of the CO is to discuss "the implications of the findings of the technical assessment with a view to achieving the outcomes of the global stocktake" (para. 3(a))<sup>2</sup> (UNFCCC, 2018[6]). Discussions during the CO could thus explore what the findings of the technical assessment imply for updating national actions and enhancing international co-operation in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement. The format of the CO includes high-level events where "the findings of the technical assessment will be presented, and their implications discussed and considered by Parties" (para. 33) (UNFCCC, 2018[6]). These high-level events are to be chaired by a high-level committee (HLC) comprising of the Presidencies of the Conference of Parties (COP), the SBI and SBSTA Chairs.

In terms of "who" is involved in the CO, paragraph 33 of Decision 19/CMA.1 only refers to Parties explicitly. However, the overall GST process is to be conducted with the participation of NPS, as set out in paragraph 10 of Decision 19/CMA.1 (UNFCCC, 2018<sub>[6]</sub>). In addition, the High-Level Climate Champions are to facilitate the engagement of NPS in the GST process (UNFCCC, 2021[1]). NPS have played an important role in the GST1 process to date, providing numerous inputs to the GST portal and actively engaging in the technical dialogues. NPS will also have an important role in implementing GST outputs. Continued engagement of NPS in the CO could help to strengthen ownership and facilitate subsequent follow-up from GST1 (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]).

In terms of the focus/content of the outputs from the CO, as set out in Decision 19/CMA.1, GST outputs are not meant to be country-specific nor policy prescriptive, and are to:

identify opportunities and challenges in enhancing action and support

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> All references to Paragraphs are from the Decision 19/CMA.1 unless indicated otherwise.


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- identify possible measures, good practices, international co-operation and related good practices
- summarise key political messages, including recommendations for strengthening action and enhancing support
- referenced in a decision adopted by the Conference of Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) and/or a declaration (UNFCCC, 2018<sub>[6]</sub>).

#### 2.3. Key issues in the transition from the technical to the political phase of GST1

The CO (sometimes referred to as the political phase of the GST) is a culmination of the two preceding components of the GST – see Figure 2.2. It is important that the CO builds on and complements the preceding two components (European Union, 2023[19]). This final phase of the GST cycle is one of the most important as it is where findings from discussions at the technical level can be used to inform actions at the political level. Subsequent take-up of GST1 recommendations by relevant actors in the 2024-2025 period will determine the success of the overall exercise.

Figure 2.2. Overview of GST process and intended outcome



Source: Authors.

There are different ways of measuring the success of GST1 and this may go beyond the two-year timeline of GST1. A successful GST1 process could be assessed based on its consistency with principles set out in the Paris Agreement and Decision 19/CMA.1 of being a comprehensive, facilitative, and inclusive exercise, which considers equity and the best available science. The success of the process could also be assessed in terms of its outcome and whether subsequent NDCs have been "informed" by GST1 and whether international co-operation has been strengthened following GST1. This goes beyond the conclusion of the CO of GST1 at COP28 to an "implementation arc" in 2024-2025 where final GST outputs are taken forward by different actors. This period covers the implementation of GST1 outputs and could culminate with the submission of updated NDCs "informed" by GST1 in December 2025. At the same time, "our measure of success for this, the very first cycle of the GST, must be realistic and achievable" (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 2023[4]).

As part of the CO, it will be important to reflect how to measure/account for the impact of GST1. For example, whether GST1 outcomes have been taken into account in the preparation of subsequent NDCs could be assessed based on information provided by Parties in line with Decision 4/CMA.1 (UNFCCC, 2019[20]) and/or through potential new follow-up processes for NPS (see discussion in Section 4. ). These findings can provide a marker against which to assess the success of the GST1 exercise (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]) and could help to inform/improve subsequent GST cycles.

Translating the findings from the technical assessment into strong political signals that can drive action across different sectors and systems, countries, governance levels, and stakeholders is not straightforward. A key issue is how to ensure the CO of GST1 captures the findings of the technical assessment to provide strong political messages and recommendations that can be carried forward by different actors. There needs to be a clear, seamless transition from what has been discussed in the technical assessment to the political deliberations to ensure ownership and facilitate follow-up (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]). Who is involved in the CO and how active their engagement has been throughout the GST1 process is another important factor affecting follow-up. Other issues relate to how to generate political momentum; how to strengthen communication and awareness beyond the UNFCCC; and how to engage enabling factors (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]).

How cross-cutting issues of equity and best available science are operationalised in final GST1 outputs will be another key factor for ensuring buy-in. Operationalising equity considerations in final GST1 outputs could help overcome resistance and support widespread follow-up on needed transformations (iGST Equity Working Group, 2022[21]). How to do this in practice, especially when it comes to operationalising equity in outputs formulated at the collective level, is however not straightforward. Different approaches could be considered. For example, equity could be framed as a way to enable/facilitate enhanced ambition and operationalised through targeted support to assist countries in implementing GST1 recommendations as provided for in Decision 19/CMA.1. For example, GST1 outputs could establish a targeted institutional strengthening and capacity building programme to support implementation of GST1 outputs at the national level (Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), 2022<sub>[22]</sub>). Other approaches to equity in GST1 outputs could be to promote inclusive engagement of relevant stakeholders and support for just transitions in implementing GST1 recommendations (Government of Norway, 2022<sub>[23]</sub>). Early engagement and candid discussions among Parties on how to operationalise equity in GST1 outputs could help to move the discussion forward ahead of final deliberations at COP28.

# **3.** Organisation and design options for the CO

This section explores how to organise and design the CO of the GST. It is based on the provisions of Decision 19/CMA.1 which mandates various roles and deliverables for the CO of the GST. These are supplemented by governance roles and deliverables relevant to outputs expected from this phase of the GST. These roles and deliverables are summarised in Box 3.1. and further developed in sections below.

#### Box 3.1. Overview of roles and functions of the CO of the GST

#### Mandated roles and functions as set out in Decision 19/CMA.1

- 1. Review and socialise the findings of the technical assessment (paras. 18 and 33)
- 2. Assess the implications of the findings of the technical assessment vis-à-vis the goals of the Paris Agreement (para. 3(c))
- 3. Provide guidance that will:
  - a. inform subsequent NDCs (para. 3(c));
  - b. address opportunities and challenges identified by the technical assessment (para. 13 and para. 34(a));
  - c. strengthen international cooperation (para. 14); and
  - d. contribute to the implementation of its outcome (para. 18).

#### Additional governance roles and functions which could be considered

- 1. Establish ownership of GST outcomes at the political level.
- 2. Increase commitment to implementation by Parties and NPS.
- 3. Provide an overall signalling function for the Paris Agreement.

Source: Authors based on (UNFCCC, 2018[6]).

This section unpacks each role and deliverable of the CO of the GST to identify options for delivering them. It then brings the options together in a consolidated package for the organisation and design of the CO of GST1. It identifies different types of activities that could be considered; roles and responsibilities of different actors including both Parties and NPS; key political moments that could help build broad and high-level momentum for GST1 in the lead up to COP28/CMA5 and beyond; and a timeline for implementing the CO of GST1.

#### 3.1. Mandated roles and functions of the CO

#### 3.1.1. Building awareness around the findings of the technical assessment

A broad consideration of the findings of the technical assessment will help to build awareness and support the elaboration of specific outputs by the high-level committee (HLC) and the joint contact group (JCG).

Paras. 18 and 33 of Decision 19/CMA.1 envisage a broad consideration of the findings of the technical assessment and refer to "related events within and outside the UNFCCC" contributing to this exercise (UNFCCC, 2018[6]). The findings of the technical assessment could be considered in events that are already scheduled within the UNFCCC process. For example, a potential dedicated session devoted to the factual synthesis report of the technical dialogues (hereafter the TD SYR) could be organised at the COP28 pre-COP.

The findings of the technical assessment could also be considered at further events organised within the UNFCCC process. These events could be arranged to include a specific focus on the GST, for example, a special webinar presentation could be made to Heads of Delegations (HoDs) following the expected release of the TD SYR in September 2023. A Special Event on the GST could be organised around the start of COP28 to present the TD SYR to Parties and NPS to set the tone for subsequent political discussions. A focused presentation of the TD SYR could also be organised at the start of the Ministerial segment of COP28 to share key findings with Ministers. Some meetings could perform multiple functions - awareness, socialisation and decision-making - depending on when they take place and who participates in them.

Emerging findings of GST1 could also be picked up in relevant international level activities outside the UNFCCC process to start building political momentum ahead of final deliberations at COP28. As some of these activities would take place before the TD SYR is discussed by Parties in the UNFCCC process, there would not be formal presentations of the TD SYR at these activities. However, invited keynote speakers, such as the UNSG, the UNFCCC Executive Secretary, or the COP President, could make references to the main findings emerging from the technical assessment phase of GST1. Relevant activities outside the UNFCCC process include international fora already scheduled to discuss climate change for example: the high-level Japan-Brazil Informal Meeting of Ministers and HoDs; the Copenhagen Ministerial; the Petersberg Climate Dialogue; the G7 Ministers' Meeting on Climate, Energy and Environment; the Climate Ambition Summit by the UNSG. It could also include other meetings where climate change has been discussed in the past, for example: the G7 Summit; the G20 Summit; the Spring and Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the IMF; among others. GST focused events could also be organised during Regional Climate Weeks in collaboration with the High-Level Climate Champions.

Although some of these activities will take place before the release of the TD SYR, they could be an opportunity to begin early, high-level awareness raising of the importance of the GST. It would be useful for Parties to begin sharing initial views on key findings emerging from the technical assessment in preparation for the CO (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 2023<sub>[4]</sub>). This will help build political momentum and pave the ground for the adoption of substantive GST1 outputs at COP28 by starting to identify issues that need to be resolved and possible options at an early stage. As of May 2023, informal exchanges on expectations for GST1 have begun at some high-level events, including the G7 Ministerial Meeting; the Major Economies Forum; the Copenhagen Ministerial and the Petersberg Dialogue. Such activities could draw on the findings emerging from the technical assessment as set out in the summary reports from TD1.1 and TD1.2. Relevant regional activities, such as the African Union Assembly, ASEAN Summit, etc., could also be encouraged to address the GST, however it will be challenging for the HLC to work at all levels. It will be important that the HLC remains focused on the international level while encouraging action and inputs from national and regional levels.

Key actors in this awareness building phase include the HLC, the UNSG, HoDs, G7 and G20 Ministers, the UNFCCC Executive Secretary, participants at pre-COP and at the intersessional workshop. The COP Presidencies working in collaboration with the UNFCCC Secretariat and the UNSG Office could take the lead in coordinating inputs to activities outside the UNFCCC process. The actors and their roles are set out in Table 3.1 and a timeline of indicative awareness building activities set out in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. Potential awareness building activities in 2023 and mandated activities under GST1




Table 3.1.Indicative awareness building activities

Activities in 2023	Key actors	Role
Japan-Brazil Informal Meeting (March)	HoDs	Awareness building and discuss possible options
Copenhagen Ministerial Meeting (March)	Ministers, HoDs	Awareness building and discuss possible options
Spring meetings of the World Bank and the IMF (April)	Finance Ministers, Heads of State	Awareness building and discuss possible options
G7 Ministers' Meeting on Climate, Energy and Environment (April) and G7 Summit (May)	Ministers, Heads of State	Awareness building and discuss possible options
Petersberg Climate Dialogue (May)	Ministers	Awareness building and discuss possible options
Regional Climate Weeks (ACW 4-8 September; MENACW 9-12 October; LACCW 23-27 October; APCW date tbc)	NPS	Awareness building and discuss possible options
JCG discussions at 58th SB Meetings (June)	Negotiators	Discuss possible options and potential structure of a package of GST1 outputs
HLC event at 58th SB Meetings (June)	All Parties, representatives of NPS constituencies	Raise awareness of high-level process
Summit on new Global Financing Pact (June)	Heads of international financial institutions, heads of multilateral development banks, Finance Ministers	Awareness building and discuss possible options
Special webinar presentation of TD SYR (September)	HoDs	Receive and discuss TD SYR
G20 Summit (September)	Ministers, Heads of State	Discuss possible outputs
UNSG Climate Ambition Summit (September)	Ministers, UNSG	Discuss possible outputs
Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the IMF (October)	Finance Ministers, Heads of State	Discuss possible outputs
Discussion at pre-COP, with a dedicated session devoted to TD SR and possible outputs	Ministers	Identify implications and possible outputs
GST Special Event at COP28	All Parties	Receive and discuss TD SR
Presentation to Ministers during Ministerial segment of COP28	Ministers	Receive and discuss TD SR and possible outputs

Notes: ACW: Africa Climate Week; MENACW: Middle East and North Africa Climate Week; LACCW: Latin America and Caribbean Climate Week; APCW: Asia-Pacific Climate Week.

#### 3.1.2. Assessing the implications of the findings of the technical assessment

The CO of the GST is mandated to discuss the implications of the findings of the technical assessment component with a view to achieving the outcome of the GST (UNFCCC, 2018[6]). Decision 19/CMA.1 also speaks to providing guidance for: informing subsequent NDCs; addressing other key challenges identified by the TD SYR; and strengthening international co-operation. These three elements are part of the decision-making phase of the GST where political recommendations are to be developed.

Activities in this phase could include discussions at the intersessional workshop in October; pre-COP; deliberations in the JCG; discussions during ministerial activities at CMA, including Ministerial Round Tables; and final decision-making by the HLC. For example, the intersessional workshop in October could begin to explore the potential content/substance of a draft CMA decision and other GST1 related outputs to be put forward at COP28 (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 2023[4]) (European Union, 2023[19]). GST-related discussions could also be held during mandated events in parallel processes, e.g. MWP, new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance, global goal on adaptation (GGA), to reflect on the technical findings from GST1 and how this relates to respective discussions in each area.

This phase will require participation at the highest levels including negotiators in the JCG, HoDs, ministerial representatives, NPS, and the HLC. It could also benefit from inputs by the UNSG. The actors, their possible roles and timelines for the various activities are set out in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Indicative activities to assess implications of the findings of the technical assessment

Activities	Key Actors	Role	Timeline
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		Discuss implications of findings of the technical assessment and start preparations on substance of draft CMA decision	October 2023
Discussion at pre-COP	Ministers, HLC	Discuss implications of findings of the technical assessment and develop solution-oriented recommendations to be adopted by CMA	October 2023
JCG deliberations at COP28	Negotiators	Identify implications of findings of the technical assessment and develop solution-oriented recommendations to be adopted by CMA	November –
CMA activities including ministerial roundtables at COP28	Ministers, HoDs and NPS	Agree on implications of findings of the technical assessment and develop solution-oriented recommendations to be adopted by CMA	December 2023
HLC decision-making at COP28	HLC members, HoDs and NPS	Agree on implications of findings of the technical assessment, refine and finalise solution-oriented recommendations to be adopted by CMA	

Source: Authors.

#### 3.2. Further governance roles and functions of the CO

#### 3.2.1. Ensuring political ownership of GST outcomes

Ownership of GST outputs by national political leadership will contribute significantly to the achievement of the GST outcome (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022<sub>[13]</sub>). The GST process is mandated to ensure there is transparency at every level (para. 10 and 11 of Decision 19/CMA.1) and equity in the process, so each Party can participate fully in the deliberations and development of final decisions. Activities that can deliver such transparency and inclusivity will be very important in this respect. The socialisation and awareness building activities discussed earlier can also play a decisive role in this regard. Transparent and equitable guidelines for organisation of Regional Climate Weeks and for participation in activities like pre-COP, the October intersessional workshop, HoDs Meetings, and the HLC processes at the COP can help to generate an atmosphere of trust and ownership.

Clear, transparent linkages between the findings of the TD SYR and the final outputs from the CO will also play an important role in generating acceptance and ownership of these outcomes. Furthermore, it will be important to have early discussions on how to operationalise equity in the final outputs of the GST1, for example with discussions at the October workshop and pre-COP among others. An early discussion on how to operationalise equity in the final outputs of GST1 will help to map out the main issues and identify potential options to address these ahead of final deliberations at COP28.

Key actors and gatekeepers in this respect will be the HLC who will need to ensure that the technical and participatory elements of the process are transparent and inclusive (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022<sub>[13]</sub>). The actors, their roles and timelines for various activities are set out in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3. Indicative activities to generate political ownership of GST outcomes

Activities	Key Actors	Role	Timeline
Hybrid meeting to "consider Party submissions on the CO of GST1" as requested at CMA4	All Parties, HLC	Opportunity for Parties to contribute to the design of the CO and thus have a sense of ownership of the process	April 2023
HLC event at 58th SB Meetings	All Parties, representatives of NPS constituencies	Awareness raising of high-level process and planning	June 2023
Presentation to HoDs	HODs	Receive and discuss TD SYR	September 2023
Regional Climate Weeks	NPS, Ministerial Representatives	Discuss emerging findings from technical assessment / TD SYR	September - December 2023
Discussion at pre-COP	Ministers, HLC	Agree on implications of findings of technical assessment, discuss cross-cutting issues including how to operationalise equity, and explore solution-oriented recommendations to be adopted by CMA	October 2023
October workshop	Negotiators, HoDs	Receive and discuss TD SYR, discuss cross-cutting issues including how to operationalise equity in final outputs	October 2023
Inclusive processes at COP28/CMA5	Ministers, HoDs, NPS	Agree on implications of findings of technical assessment and develop solution-oriented recommendations to be adopted by CMA	November – December 2023

Source: Authors.

#### 3.2.2. Increasing commitment to implementation at different levels

Implementation of the GST outcome cannot be taken for granted. Parties can agree decisions and still fail to implement them. For example, independent reviews of the Talanoa Dialogue identified this as one of the shortcomings of that process where the final decision "lacked concrete outputs beyond reports and summaries and left a limited imprint" (Rajamani, Oberthür and Guilanpour, 2022<sub>[24]</sub>), "merely took note of the outcome, inputs and outputs" (Beuermann, Obergassel and Wang-Helmreich, 2020<sub>[25]</sub>) and did not translate the findings of the Talanoa Dialogue into specific recommendations or guidance for Parties.

To avoid repeating the experience with the Talanoa Dialogue, it will be important for specific incentives to be built into the final package of GST1 outputs which can encourage implementation and follow-up. Socialisation activities (see discussion above) can help to build ownership. Furthermore, the final package of GST1 outputs could create specific incentives for follow-up and systems for reporting on progress. Some examples are set out below and elaborated further in section 4.:

 Targeted support for capacity building to assist countries with implementation of the GST1 recommendations at the national level (as provided for in para. 12 of Decision 19/CMA.1).

- Specific requirements to monitor implementation of GST1 outcomes, e.g. (a) provisions that Parties indicate how GST1 recommendations have been used to "inform" the development of their NDCs to be submitted in 2025, (b) a requirement for an updated report by the UNFCCC Secretariat on progress with implementation of GST1 recommendations as part of their annual NDC Synthesis Report, (c) a Special Event in the second quarter of 2025 by the UNSG where Parties that have updated their NDCs in line with GST1 recommendations are recognised.
- Establish a process for regular reporting on progress by Parties and NPS under relevant voluntary international co-operation initiatives.
- Recognise links with the Action Agenda and Presidency initiatives to enable and drive action in different sectors and areas (see discussion in Section 4.).

Key actors in this phase include the HLC, the UNSG, Ministers, the High-Level Climate Champions, and constituency leaders of NPS. The main actors, their roles and timelines of various activities are set out in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4. Indicative activities for increasing commitment to implementation

Activities	Key Actors	Role	Timeline
Transparent and inclusive HLC socialisation activities	HLC, Ministers, Negotiators, NPS constituency leadership	Agree on implications of findings of technical assessment and develop solution-oriented recommendations to be adopted by CMA	September– November 2023
HoDs meetings	HoDs	Agree on implications of findings of technical assessment and develop solution-oriented recommendations to be adopted by the CMA	September – November 2023
Meetings of High-Level Climate Champions and constituency leaders of NPS	Representatives of NPS	Agree on implications of findings of technical assessment and develop solution-oriented recommendations to be included in CMA decision	September – November 2023
Transparent and inclusive HLC activities at COP/CMA	HLC, Ministers, Negotiators, NPS constituency leadership	Agree on implications of findings of technical assessment and develop/refine solution-oriented recommendations to be adopted by the CMA	November 2023

Source: Authors.

#### 3.2.3. Provide an overall signalling function

Global agreements like the Paris Agreement provide guidance as "...they signal the resolve of governments across the world to take far-reaching action on climate change" (Beuermann, Obergassel and Wang-Helmreich, 2020<sub>[25]</sub>) In this regard, stocktaking processes perform "...a guidance and signal function related to the success in achieving the objectives of the regime" (Beuermann, Obergassel and Wang-Helmreich, 2020<sub>[25]</sub>). The GST can perform a signalling function through the content of its outputs, including the TD SYR, and final outputs agreed at CMA5.

The focus, clarity, and format of the final package of outputs could help to improve the signalling function of GST1 (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]). The overarching TD SYR will set out the main messages from the technical assessment component. The HLC, Ministers, negotiators, and NPS constituency leadership will discuss the implications of the findings from the technical assessment and develop recommendations for strengthening action and enhancing support. These outputs could lay the groundwork for subsequent follow-up at different levels. How these final outputs are structured will play an important role in determining the extent to which they inform subsequent national processes and efforts by NPS (see discussion in Section 4.).

#### 3.3. Overview of different phases and responsibilities in the CO

Based on the foregoing analysis, the CO can be designed as four phases of work: i) awareness building phase; ii) socialisation phase; iii) decision-making phase; and iv) follow-up phase – spread over 2023 and beyond. Key characteristics of each phase are set out in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5. Key characteristics of each phase in the CO

	Awareness building	Socialisation	Decision-making	Follow-up
	(March – Sept. 2023)	(Sept. – Nov. 2023)	(Nov. – Dec. 2023)	(Dec 2023 – Dec 2025)
Objective(s)	To begin building awareness around GST1 and discuss possible options and structure of package of outputs  To pave way for rapid consideration of TD SYR and lay the groundwork for adoption of substantive GST1 outputs at COP28	To discuss and disseminate the findings of the TD SYR  To begin exploring possible outputs with partners	To consider outcomes of parallel processes due to conclude at COP28 and how GST1 could provide guidance to processes continuing after COP28  To make final decisions on GST1 outputs	To encourage Parties to use GST1 recommendations to inform their NDCs to be submitted in 2025
Key actors	HLC Political leaders High-level officials in multilateral institutions	HLC Political leaders and Ministers HoDs NPS (High-Level Climate Champions)	HLC Political leaders and Ministers HoDs NPS JCG	UNSG HLC Political leaders NPS Troika of current/incoming Presidencies of COP28, COP29, COP30 Individual Parties
Key actions	HLC to provide updates on GST1, including expectations for GST1 outcome, at high- level meetings such as G7, Petersberg Dialogue, Copenhagen Ministerial etc.	Update on TD SYR  Discuss implications of technical findings  Identify and discuss possible solutions, e.g. at UNSG Climate Ambition Summit, Regional Climate Weeks, pre-COP, October intersessional workshop	JCG Deliberations HLC ministerial activities	Incorporation of GST1 recommendations in NDCs to be submitted in 2025  Presentation at UNSG Special Event of NDCs informed by GST1  Annual assessment of progress on GST recommendations in NDC Synthesis Report
Results	Political leaders begin internal consideration of possible enhanced climate action	Relevant players aware of content of TD SYR  Identification of possible final GST1 outputs	Final GST outputs – Decision, Political Declaration(s), Cover decision, Initiatives, Follow- up activities	Ambitious new/updated NDCs informed by GST1  Strengthened international co-operation for climate action

Source: Authors.

#### 3.3.1. Roles of Joint Contact Group (JCG) and High-Level Committee (HLC)

The design of the decision-making phase could pay particular attention to the respective roles of the HLC and the JCG at COP28. The analysis in this section shows that both have a role to play in the decision-making phase with potential overlap between their respective roles which will need to be managed. Decision 19/CMA.1, para 33 gives the HLC a mandate to chair the high-level events "where the findings of the technical assessment will be presented and their implications discussed", while the JCG has been mandated to assist the CMA in conducting the GST (UNFCCC, 2018<sub>[6]</sub>). One option could be to use the JCG to conduct the technical review of the TD SYR and develop outputs and recommendations thereon.

The HLC could then be used for the political discussions, outputs, and final decision-making on GST1. The interplay between these two tracks will have to be carefully managed by the HLC.

The analysis in this paper indicates that the HLC could provide leadership in a variety of events on GST1 throughout 2023. In addition to this, it will also have to design a transparent and inclusive programme of activities to arrive at a final decision on GST1 at COP28. Given the decision-making nature of the HLC mandate, this programme will be focused primarily on Ministers, HoDs, and the leadership of NPS constituencies. These activities could be designed to encourage constructive engagement among participants and create an environment that engenders trust, increases understanding and identifies solutions. Potential elements of a HLC programme at COP28 could include the following:

- Day 1 High-level presentation of TD SYR to Ministers, HoDs and NPS constituencies followed by Q&A.
- Day 2 High-level roundtables on each of the thematic areas of the GST Adaptation, Mitigation, Means of Implementation and Support, as well as Consequences and impacts of response measures; and Efforts to avert, minimise and address loss and damage as appropriate. These Roundtables could meet in two three-hour sessions, the first to identify the critical issues to be addressed based on the TD SYR and the second to consider solutions and final GST'1 outputs.
- Day 3 A ministerial Plenary (in the morning) could be held for reports from the high-level roundtables and provide an opportunity for Ministers to hear what has been proposed in all the roundtables. A ministerial Plenary (in the afternoon/evening) could be held to consider a first draft of GST1 outputs based on discussions in the roundtables.
- Day 4 Ministerial caucuses with HLC Chairs as needed to address specific concerns and negotiate compromises.

In addition to these structured activities, it may be necessary for the HLC and the COP28 Presidency to conduct outreach to specific Parties or Groups of Parties in the lead up to COP28. Targeted outreach activities could potentially be coordinated/amplified by working with others such as the UNSG in the lead up to Climate Ambition Summit in September. This type of coordinated outreach has been successful in the past including in the lead up to COP21 in Paris in 2015 and in the lead up to COP26 in Glasgow in 2021 (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]). Such outreach activities could be used to (a) develop a better understanding of the key priorities of Parties/Groups; (b) resolve concerns held by Parties/Groups; and (c) to test possible options for outputs from GST1 in advance of officially tabling them.

## Structuring impactful outputs from GST1

This section explores how to structure the final outputs of GST1 to be fit for purpose for informing national actions and enhancing international co-operation as intended in the Paris Agreement. It explores potential options and formats for designing the technical and political outputs of GST1 to be most impactful The technical outputs focus on the findings from the technical discussions while political outputs are concerned with the "implications of the findings of the technical assessment with a view to achieving the outcomes of the global stocktake" (UNFCCC, 2018[6]).

As highlighted in previous CCXG analysis (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]), it is important that the technical and political phases of the GST are kept separate to ensure the integrity of the findings from the technical assessment. At the same time, the two phases need to be carefully sequenced so the political component of GST1 effectively captures the findings coming out of the technical discussions and translates this into strong political recommendations which can be carried forward by different actors.

When thinking about how to structure the final outputs of the GST1, it is important to consider what is needed to reach the intended outcome of the process. As discussed in previous CCXG analysis, (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]), the translation of recommendations formulated at the collective level into subsequent processes at national/sub-national/local levels depends on various enabling factors. Enablers include external factors such as global political advocacy efforts and geo-political considerations, as well as domestic factors such as the level of national political commitment, institutional set-up, capacities, follow-up processes, as well as communication and education activities. The CO could explore such enabling factors as part of a discussion on how to facilitate achievement of the GST outcome and final GST1 outputs could be designed to engage with these enabling factors.

#### 4.1. Potential options for structuring the technical outputs of GST1

The outputs from the technical assessment component of the GST, as set out in Decision 19/CMA.1, include summary reports from the technical dialogues and an overarching factual synthesis report (UNFCCC, 2018[6]). How can these technical outputs be designed to be fit for purpose to inform national actions and enhance international co-operation? The importance of identifying, actionable solutions and good practices is recognised by several actors (Co-facilitators of TD1, 2022[17]). However, it is currently unclear what specific, actionable solutions would look like in a process conducted at a collective level where outputs are not meant to be country-specific nor policy prescriptive. Given the focus of the GST on the collective level but its intention to inform actions at the national level, the "process needs to provide a reflection on available opportunities, as well as specific policies and actions to unlock them" (Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES) and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), 2022[26]).

#### 4.1.1. Potential elements of a package of technical outputs from GST1

To be impactful and fit for purpose, it is important that technical outputs from GST1 are carefully designed to be focused, dynamic and structured in a well-organised and accessible format. A consolidated package of technical outputs could be developed, targeting different actors, and comprising of the factual synthesis report supported by detailed technical annexes and summary key cards. An overview of each of these potential elements is set out in Figure 4.1 and elaborated below.

Figure 4.1. Overview of a potential package of technical outputs from GST1

	Factual synthesis report	Technical annexes	Summary key cards
Target	Negotiators and decision makers	Policy makers and practitioners	Broad audience
Scope	Key messages     Main gaps, challenges, high impact opportunities, lessons learned and good practices     Enablers and potential options targeting different actors	<ul> <li>Specific challenges and opportunities within and across sectors, systems and the adaptation policy cycle</li> <li>Specific enablers and means of implementation</li> <li>Current guidance, tools, initiatives and mechanisms within the UNFCCC and beyond, gaps and opportunities</li> <li>Searchable database of scalable options, high impact solutions and good practices</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Visual summary of key findings in each area</li> <li>Challenges and gaps</li> <li>Opportunities and solutions</li> <li>Good practices, tools and guidance</li> <li>Enablers for action</li> </ul>

Source: Authors.

The factual synthesis report (TD SYR) could be a short, focused document that sets out the overall key findings from the technical assessment to enable discussions in a balanced manner across the thematic and cross-cutting areas in the CO. The TD SYR could target negotiators and decision makers and be structured in such a way that "findings are the most politically applicable" (European Union, 2023[19]). The findings from the technical assessment could be organised around a limited number of key messages similar to the synthesis report of the structured expert dialogue on the second periodic review (Cofacilitators of the structured expert dialogue, 2022[27]). The TD SYR could be structured around key messages that synthesise collective progress, main gaps and challenges (relating to knowledge, policy and implementation); high-impact opportunities for enhancing action and support and how to unlock these; lessons learned and good practices in line with Decision 19/CMA.1 (UNFCCC, 2018<sub>[6]</sub>). The TD SYR could also reiterate the importance of adding a long-term perspective to near-term action and map out key enablers and options for consideration targeting different actors. A similar approach was used in the Synthesis Report of the Preparatory Phase of the Talanoa Dialogue which set out recommendations and policy options targeting national/sub-national governments, private sector, finance, civil society, multilateral, regional and bilateral organisations etc. (COP23 and COP24 Presidencies, 2018<sub>[28]</sub>).

Technical annexes could be appended to the TD SYR to provide a breakdown of potential pathways and transformations to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement (see for example: (Obergassel et al., 2019[29]); (Rajamani, Oberthür and Guilanpour, 2022[24]); (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]); (Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), 2022[30]) (European Union (EU), 2022[31])). The technical annexes could target policymakers and practitioners and set out specific challenges and opportunities within and across key sectors and systems (i.e., energy, transport, industry, agriculture, land-use, water, waste, urban and health) and along the adaptation policy cycle (i.e., assessment of climate impacts, vulnerability, and risks; planning; implementation; monitoring, evaluation and learning). The technical annexes could provide a practical toolkit for enhancing NDCs and identify a scalable menu of options or high-impact solutions that could be implemented at different levels considering different capacities and circumstances. Technical annexes could also include a mapping of available guidance, tools, initiatives, and mechanisms within the UNFCCC system and beyond that could enable/support the transformation in each sector and system. This mapping could identify the main gaps/barriers in the current landscape of enablers and opportunities to bridge current gaps (e.g. through partnerships/collaborations to accelerate development and deployment of technologies) (Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), 2022[32]); (African Group, 2022[33]).

It is important to consider how the technical annexes, could be organised/presented in a way that is accessible and most useful for identifying opportunities to enhance ambition and action (Government of the United States, 2022[34]). In previous processes under the UNFCCC, lengthy lists of good practices have been developed for example in the Talanoa Dialogue (UNFCCC, 2018<sub>[35]</sub>) and the Technical Examination Process (TEP) (UNFCCC Secretariat, 2015[36]). Such static formats are not accessible and may have limited effect in informing/inspiring subsequent action by different actors. The co-facilitators of the TDs have recognised the importance of making the information submitted to GST1 accessible and usable (Cofacilitators of TD1, 2023[16]). A comprehensive, searchable online database of good practices could be developed as part of the technical annexes. The database could draw on submissions to the GST portal and summaries of the TDs and be structured in different ways, e.g. by sector, system, or stage of the adaptation policy cycle; by region or geographic area; by type of policy option; by available supportive tools, databases, and guidance, etc. Such a database could be developed drawing lessons from existing platforms such as the European Climate Adaptation Platform (Climate-ADAPT) database (European Commission and the European Environment Agency, n.d.[37]) among others. In future GST cycles, new data management and artificial intelligence tools could be explored to identify new ways to present information collected through the GST process in a way that could be most useful to different actors.

Building on the TD SYR and technical annexes, summary key cards could be developed to present the detailed findings from the technical assessment in a more visual and accessible way. Key cards could be developed for each area of the GST, for example, there could be up to seven key cards developed to cover mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity support, as well as loss and damage, and response measures as appropriate. Presenting the technical results in a key card format (see potential template in Figure 4.2) could facilitate communication of the findings of GST1 to a broader audience beyond the UNFCCC process. Summary key cards could be a useful tool in activities to strengthen communication and awareness raising around the importance of GST1 to get buy-in and mobilise support at different levels. Summary key cards could also provide a useful synthetic tool to support political deliberations in the CO of GST1.

Figure 4.2. Potential template for key cards synthesising technical findings in each area

#### **Challenges and gaps**

- What are key challenges faced?
- What are priority gaps?

#### **Opportunities and solutions**

- What are available opportunities?
- What are potential solutions to bridge gaps?

#### Good practices, tools and guidance

- What are examples of good practices?
- What are key initiatives/partnerships?
- What are available tools, guidance and mechanisms?

#### **Enablers for action**

- How to align key enablers within UNFCCC process and beyond to be fit for purpose?
- · How to mobilise needed means of implementation and support?

Source: Authors.

Structuring the final package of technical outputs as set out above could provide a useful, operational dimension to be picked up in subsequent discussions in the CO of GST1. By identifying specific gaps, barriers and enablers, technical outputs could facilitate a focus during the CO on how to fill identified gaps, e.g. by strengthening existing tools and mechanisms within the UNFCCC system. Such technical outputs could also be useful for informing subsequent work, e.g. by the research and scientific community, constituted bodies, forums, and other institutional arrangements.

To inform the formulation of technical outputs structured along the lines outlined above, discussions in TD1.3 could focus on enablers, linking discussions on mitigation and adaptation with means of implementation and support (African Group, 2022[33]). Upcoming discussions in TD1.3 are expected to focus on "what is next" (Co-facilitators of TD1, 2023[16]) and could for example:

- Explore specific enablers to support the necessary transformations on the ground and overcome identified challenges in key sectors, systems and across the adaptation policy cycle. This could improve understanding of specific enablers to deliver/implement needed transformations on the ground, the role and responsibilities of different actors, the current landscape of enablers, the main gaps/challenges faced, and opportunities to strengthen enablers.
- Unpack the role of the constituted bodies and the UNFCCC secretariat in supporting enablers in different sectors, systems and across the adaptation policy cycle, current gaps, challenges, and barriers. This could help increase understanding of whether the current system is fit for purpose and how it could be reformed/aligned to support the needed transformations on the ground.
- Deeper consideration of cross-cutting issues including equity and just transition as an enabler for enhanced ambition of action and how this can be facilitated/supported by the international system. This could include consideration of just transition issues beyond energy (e.g. food, transport), support needs, current arrangements (e.g. Forum on Response Measures and the Katowice Committee of Experts on Impacts of the implementation of response measures (KCI)) and how they could be aligned to support needed transformations to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.

#### 4.2. Potential options for structuring the political outputs of GST1

In thinking about how to structure the final outputs from GST1 to be most impactful, it is useful to think about the type of political signals that are needed, who could deliver these, what actors need to be reached and how to best reach them. The outputs of the final component of the GST (hereafter referred to as political outputs) are to identify opportunities, challenges, good practices, key political messages, including recommendations, and be referenced in a decision and/or declaration (UNFCCC, 2018<sub>[6]</sub>). Different types of outputs could be developed, serving different roles and targeting different actors.

#### 4.2.1. Potential elements of a package of political outputs from GST1

A negotiated output commands greater legitimacy and could play an important signalling role, it also has certain drawbacks and could be complemented by consultative and/or non-negotiated outputs to have greater impact. A negotiated output (e.g. draft decision) is challenging to agree given the need for consensus among all Parties and could be complemented by consultative (e.g. political declaration) and/or non-negotiated outputs (e.g. Presidency initiatives) which could provide more detailed guidance to help drive action on the ground. A package of political outputs comprising negotiated, consultative, and non-negotiated elements could be developed, with mutually supportive elements designed to play different roles and engaging different actors. An overview of these elements is set out in Figure 4.3 and elaborated below.

Figure 4.3. Overview of a potential package of political outputs from GST1

	Negotiated outputs	Consultative outputs		Non-negotiated outputs
	CMA decision	Political declaration(s)	CMA cover decision	Presidency initiatives
Role	Overall direction of travel	Political commitment(s) and roadmap	High-level political messages and feedback loops	Tools to enable and drive action
Scope	Urge Parties to implement technical findings when preparing their NDCs     Endorse relevant initiatives and enabling processes     Recommendations to strengthen existing UNFCCC mechanisms to operationalise GST1 outcome     Establish follow-up processes to assess progress on GST1     Initiate process to identify lessons for future GSTs	Commit to align 2025 NDCs with LTS and 1.5°C pathways  Commit to present updated NDCs at UNSG Special Event  Commit to provide enhanced support for implementation of GST1 findings  Commit to report back on progress at COP29	Reiterate urgency of action and need for a whole-of-society approach  Recognise enabling processes, partnerships and initiatives to implement GST1  Recognise linkages and establish feedback loops between GST1 and parallel processes  Invite partners, institutions and operating entities within UNFCCC and beyond to support implementation of GST1 findings and align broader practices and policies	Consolidate and/or strengthen existing initiatives, pacts and coalitions in key sectors and systems  Launch new initiatives where gaps exist  Set up regular reporting and review processes of voluntary initiatives

Source: Authors.

A draft CMA decision on the GST, prepared by the JCG, could play an important signalling role, setting out clear, high-level political messages in response to GST1. The draft decision could provide a renewed political signal of Parties' commitment to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement (Moosmann et al., 2023<sub>[38]</sub>) and help set the overall direction of travel for the coming years in response to the IPCC AR6. The draft decision could cover different issues, for example:

- Recognise the best available science, highlight collective progress, gaps and the need for urgent, enhanced action and a whole-of-society approach to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.
- Urge (Encourage/Invite) Parties to implement the findings from the technical assessment, set out in the TD SYR and related technical annexes, when preparing their NDCs to be submitted in 2025.
- Recognise the outcomes of parallel processes due to conclude at COP28, noting their consideration during deliberations on GST1 outputs, e.g. as inputs to the Ministerial Round Tables.
- Endorse relevant initiatives and enabling processes to facilitate implementation of GST1 recommendations in key sectors, systems and across the adaptation policy cycle.
- Recommendations to strengthen existing parts of the UNFCCC system to strengthen existing UNFCCC practices and processes, including the work of relevant bodies providing financial, technical, and capacity building support, to align with implementing GST1 outcomes. For example, the decision could establish a dedicated window in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to provide targeted support to developing countries in their NDC preparations. The decision could invite the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB) to set up a targeted institutional strengthening and capacity building programme to implement GST1 recommendations (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]).
- Request further technical work to be undertaken by relevant bodies, e.g. Adaptation Committee, Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), or the research community, to fill identified gaps in the technical assessment and inform the next GST.
- Establish follow-up processes to assess progress on GST1 and facilitate implementation. This could build on existing reporting mechanisms/provisions under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF). For example, Parties could be invited to indicate how subsequent NDCs have been "informed" by the outcomes of GST1 in line with Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement and guidance in Decision 4/CMA.1 to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs (UNFCCC, 2019[20]). Technical expert reviews of BTRs could consider if Parties have provided information on how GST1 recommendations have been considered in their updated NDCs. Faciliative, multilateral consideration of progress (FMCP) workshops could include consideration of information on how Parties' NDCs were informed by GST1, to provide an opportunity for peer exchange and mutual learning including on potential challenges/barriers faced.
- The UNFCCC Secretariat could be invited to prepare an update on progress with the take-up of GST1 recommendations as part of their annual NDC Synthesis Report in 2024 and in 2025.
- Establish new reporting systems where needed to improve the accountability of climate action by different actors. For example, the UNFCCC secretariat (together with the UN High-Level Climate Champions) could be invited to prepare an annual report (as an appendix to the annual synthesis report of NDCs or as a separate report) on progress under voluntary co-operation initiatives between Parties and NPS. This could build on the work of the secretariat through the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) platform, the UNFCCC Global Climate Action Portal (GCAP) and recommendations of the UN High-Level Expert Group on the net zero emissions commitments of non-state entities (High-Level Expert Group on the Net Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities, 2022[39]). A new accountability system for NPS and voluntary international co-operation initiatives would need to be developed over time and could include support to strengthen current reporting frameworks as well as penalties / compliance incentives, e.g. not being able to participate in the Race to Zero or Race to Resilience campaigns until reporting requirements are met (Climate Chance and World Benchmarking Alliance, 2023[40]).
- The draft decision could also request relevant constituted bodies, forums, and other institutional arrangements to include in their annual reports to the COP specific actions taken in response to GST1 recommendations. Similar requests to the Technology Executive Committee (TEC)/Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and the Adaptation Committee were included in the

- decision on the assessment of the TEP (UNFCCC, 2018<sub>[41]</sub>) and helped inform subsequent work of the Adaptation Committee and the TEC (UNFCCC, 2020<sub>[42]</sub>).
- Invite the UNFCCC secretariat to prepare a report on lessons learned from GST1 to be made available at COP29. The findings of this report could be used to inform preparations for GST2 and subsequent GST cycles (Jeudy-Hugo and Charles, 2022[13]).

Draft political declaration(s) could be coordinated by the HLC (with other actors such as the UN High-Level Climate Champions and international organisations for specific sectoral commitments), to provide a signal of political commitment and a roadmap for implementing GST1 outcomes. The political declaration(s) could be put forward for signature by Parties (at the Heads of State or Minister level) to provide a strong political commitment and signal on achieving the intended outcome of the GST1. Similar declarations have been adopted in the past by a sub-set of Parties. For example, the "Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration" put forward by the Polish COP24 Presidency for signature at the Leaders' Summit was signed by over 50 Parties (COP24 Presidency, 2018[43]), the "Glasgow Just Transition Declaration" was signed by more than 30 Parties (COP26 Presidency, 2021[44]) and the "Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use" was signed by 145 Parties (COP26 Presidency, 2021[45]).

A signed political declaration on GST1 could provide a strong collective statement of intent by signatory Parties to implement the intended outcome of GST1. Signatory Parties, or a group of Parties (such as the High Ambition Coalition (HAC) or a voluntary coalition of first movers on the GST), could sign the declaration to show they are going to do what is necessary to achieve the GST1 outcome, provide resources to enable implementation, and a commitment to regularly report on progress. This could help to convey a message of hope/inspiration coming out of the GST process in response to the findings of the IPCC AR6. The political declaration(s) could build on parallel initiatives, e.g. the UNSG's proposal for a Climate Solidarity Pact and/or adopt models that have been used in the past such as the Glasgow Breakthroughs. Political declaration(s) could cover different issues, for example:

- A commitment by signatory Parties to align their NDCs to be submitted in 2025 with long-term strategies (LTS) that are consistent with pathways to reach 1.5°C.
- A commitment by signatory Parties to present their updated NDCs at the Special Event organised by the UNSG (as provided for in Decision 19/CMA.1, para. 17).
- A commitment to provide enhanced support, including through financial resources, technology transfer and capacity-building, to enable the implementation of GST1 recommendations.
- A commitment by signatory Parties to report on progress towards implementing the declaration at COP29.
- Sectoral commitments that bring together different sub-sets of countries (together with non-Party stakeholders) and set out strong political commitments in key sectors. This could for example build on calls in the Glasgow Climate Pact and Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan (e.g. on phasing down unabated coal power, phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies etc.) with accompanying commitments to report on progress at subsequent COPs.

A CMA cover decision, coordinated by the COP28 Presidency, could highlight overarching political messages from GST1, set out linkages and establish feedback loops with relevant processes and institutions within the UNFCCC and beyond, and drive collaboration across and between Parties and NPS. A cover decision text could cover different issues, for example:

- Reiterate the urgency of action and the need for a whole-of-society approach.
- Recognise linkages and establish feedback loops between GST1 findings and parallel processes
  within the UNFCCC. For processes due to be finalised at COP28 (e.g. Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh
  work programme on the GGA, work of the Transitional Committee on the operationalisation of new
  funding arrangements for L&D), the draft cover text could include a reference to these processes
  noting the outcomes have been incorporated/reflected in final GST1 outputs (e.g. through

consideration at relevant Ministerial Round Tables). The draft cover decision could also invite processes continuing after the conclusion of GST1 (e.g. mitigation work programme, the NCQG, just transition work programme, Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on Article 2.1c) to consider the findings of GST1 in their future work and final deliberations/conclusions. Outcomes of some parallel processes, e.g. on the GGA, could also be useful in guiding future GSTs (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 2023[4]).

- Recognise enabling processes, partnerships, and initiatives to facilitate implementation of GST1 outcomes beyond the UNFCCC such as just transition partnerships for energy and for food, initiatives launched by COP Presidencies, G7 and G20 initiatives on climate change, efforts to reform the IFIs and MDBs, etc.
- Invite multilateral development partners, international financial institutions, and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to support implementation of GST1 findings and align their broader practices and policies to be fit for the purpose for implementing the goals of the Paris Agreement. The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan included a similar invitation to provide support for implementing the Early Warnings for All Initiative and calls for reforming multilateral development bank practices and priorities ((UNFCCC, 2022[2]).
- Welcome the leadership of the COP Presidency and the High-level Climate Champions, and collaboration between Parties and NPS to drive action in support of GST1 recommendations in key sectors and systems, highlight main commitments made, and urge accelerated implementation and enhanced international collaboration to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.

Streams of operational action through new/strengthened initiatives and partnerships could be coordinated by the COP28 Presidency together with the High-Level Climate Champions, to help implement GST1 recommendations in key sectors and systems. Similar to Priority Actions agreed at COP27 under the Breakthrough Agenda (UNFCCC, n.d.[46]), actions to be delivered before COP29 could be identified, including how each action will be taken forward, coordinating initiatives and collaborating governments. Relevant initiatives and partnerships could be highlighted in the cover decision text to raise their profile and garner further support. These streams of action could build on initiatives launched at COP26 and COP27 (e.g. on methane, deforestation, agriculture, technology, adaptation, etc.), the Breakthrough Agenda (e.g. in power, road transport, steel, hydrogen, and agriculture) as well as launch new initiatives where gaps remain (e.g. food systems). Such initiatives could help to enhance international co-operation and facilitate/enable greater ambition at the national level. These efforts would be voluntary initiatives between Parties and NPS and could gradually be expanded to include a wider geographic coverage. To enhance accountability and transparency, regular reporting and review processes could be set up, building on the work of the UNFCCC secretariat through the NAZCA platform.


## **Conclusions**

The global stocktake (GST) is an important milestone in the Paris Agreement's ratchet mechanism. It provides an opportunity to periodically take stock of efforts to respond to the threat of climate change with the intention of informing national actions and enhancing international co-operation for climate action. The first GST (GST1) was launched at COP26 and will conclude at COP28 in December 2023. As of May 2023, the GST1 has focused on gathering inputs ('information collection and preparation' component) and technical discussions ('technical assessment' component). Preparations for the final phase of GST1 - the 'consideration of outputs' component (CO) - have also begun. How the final phase of GST1 is organised and who will be involved in the discussions can influence the success of the process.

Translating the findings from the GST1's technical assessment into strong political signals that can drive action by different actors on the ground is far from straightforward. The design of the GST process and related outputs can strengthen ownership and build political momentum to support subsequent action. Clear, transparent linkages between the findings from the technical assessment and the final outputs agreed at COP28 will play an important role in generating ownership of the result and can facilitate followup. Who is involved, which Parties and which groups of stakeholders, and how active their engagement has been throughout the GST1 process is another important factor that can affect ownership and subsequent take-up. How cross-cutting issues of equity and best available science are operationalised in final GST1 outputs will be another key factor for ensuring buy-in. How to do this in practice, especially when it comes to operationalising equity in GST outputs formulated at the collective level, is not easy and would benefit from early engagement and discussion with relevant actors.

Activities during the CO could be designed as four phases of work spread over 2023 and beyond. These four phases could include: i) awareness building; ii) socialisation; iii) decision-making; and iv) follow-up see Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1. Overview of four phases of the CO of GST1



Source: Authors.

The awareness building phase will raise awareness of the GST1 prior to the release of the factual synthesis report of the technical dialogues (TD SYR), building political momentum and laying the groundwork for the adoption of substantive outputs on GST1 at COP28. The socialisation phase will focus on disseminating and discussing the findings of the technical assessment component and exploring possible outputs from GST1. The decision-making phase will take place at COP28 and will focus on developing and agreeing the final GST1 outputs. The follow-up phase will take place after COP28 and will focus on implementation of GST1 outputs and outcomes, culminating in the presentation of NDCs that have been informed by the

GST in 2025. An overview of the different phases, objectives, key actors involved, and results is set out in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Overview of different phases in the CO of GST1

Phase	Period	Objective(s)	Key actors	Key actions	Results
Awareness building	March – September 2023	To begin building awareness around GST1 and discuss potential options and structure of final package of GST1 outputs  To pave the way for a rapid consideration of the TD SYR and lay the groundwork for adopting	High-level committee (HLC)  Political leaders  High-level officials in multilateral institutions	HLC to provide updates on GST1 including expectations for GST1 outputs at Copenhagen Ministerial, G7, G20, Petersberg Climate Dialogue etc.	Political leaders begin internal consideration of possible enhanced climate actions
Socialisation	September – November 2023	substantive GST1 outputs at COP28  To discuss and disseminate the findings of the TD SYR  To begin exploring possible GST1 outputs with partners	HLC Political leaders and Ministers Heads of Delegations NPS (High-Level Climate Champions)	Update on TD SYR  Identify and discuss possible solutions to challenges at UNSG Climate Ambition Summit, Regional Climate Weeks, pre-COP, Intersessional workshop	Relevant players aware of content of TD SYR Identification of possible final GST1 outputs
Decision- making	November – December 2023 at COP28	To consider outcomes of parallel processes due to conclude at COP28 and how GST1 could provide guidance to processes continuing after COP28  To make final decisions on GST1 outputs	HLC Political leaders and Ministers Heads of Delegations Joint Contact Group (JCG)	JCG deliberations  HLC ministerial     activities	Final package of GST1 outputs – Decision, Political Declaration(s), Cover decision, Presidency Initiatives, Follow-up activities
Follow-up	December 2023 – December 2025	To encourage Parties to use GST1 recommendations to inform their NDCs to be submitted in 2025	NPS UNSG HLC Political leaders NPS Troika of current/incoming Presidencies of COP28, COP29, COP30 Individual Parties to inform their NDCs	Presentation of NDCs to be submitted in 2025 informed by GST1 at UNSG Special Event  Annual assessment of progress on implementing GST1 recommendations in NDC Synthesis Report  Incorporation of GST1 recommendations in NDCs to be submitted in 2025	Ambitious new/updated NDCs informed by GST1 Strengthened international co- operation for climate action following GST1

Notes:

HLC: High-level committee JCG: Joint contact group

UNSG: United Nations Secretary General NDC: Nationally determined contribution

TD SYR: Factual synthesis report of technical dialogue

Source: Authors.

Who will be involved in the final stage of the GST1 can also influence its success. Different actors could play a role in the four phases of activities in the CO of GST1. For example, during the awareness building phase, the COP Presidencies working in collaboration with the UNFCCC secretariat and the office of the UNSG could take a lead in coordinating inputs on GST1 to activities outside the UNFCCC process. In the decision-making phase, the JCG, comprised of negotiators, could for example lead the technical review of the TD SYR and develop outputs and recommendations thereon. The HLC, comprised of the SB Chairs and COP Presidencies, could lead the political discussions, outputs, and the final decision-making on GST1 at COP28, including designing a transparent and inclusive programme of activities to arrive at a final package of outputs on GST1 at CMA5.

In addition to structured activities on the GST1 at COP28, the HLC and the COP28 Presidency could conduct outreach to specific Parties or Groups of Parties in the lead up to COP28. Such outreach could be used to (a) develop a better understanding of key priorities of different Parties/Groups; (b) resolve concerns held by Parties and Groups; and (c) test possible options for outputs from GST1 in advance of officially tabling them at COP28. Similar outreach activities have been successful in building political momentum for more ambitious climate action, for example in the lead up to COP21 and COP26. This political momentum could be carried forward in the follow-up phase through collaboration between the troika of current/incoming Presidencies of COP28, COP29, COP30, and could culminate with the submission of updated NDCs "informed" by GST1 in December 2025.

As discussed in previous CCXG analysis<sup>3</sup>, the take-up of recommendations formulated at the collective level in subsequent processes at national/sub-national/local levels is neither automatic nor easy. The translation of collective outputs into national processes depends on various enabling factors such as global political advocacy efforts and geo-political considerations, as well as domestic factors such as institutional set-up, capacities, follow-up processes, and communication activities. The ownership of GST1 outputs will contribute significantly to the achievement of the intended outcome of the process. The CO of GST1 could be designed to ensure transparency and equity so all Parties can participate fully in the deliberations and development of final decisions. Transparent and equitable guidelines for participation in activities, like the intersessional workshop in October and HLC processes at COP28, could help generate an atmosphere of trust, strengthen a sense of ownership in the final GST1 outputs and support follow-up.

To be impactful and fit for purpose, it is important that technical outputs from GST1 are carefully designed to be focused, dynamic and structured in a well-organised and accessible format. A package of technical outputs with different elements could be developed comprising of the TD SYR supported by detailed technical annexes and summary key cards – see Table 5.2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Jeudy-Hugo, S. and L. Charles (2022), "Translating outputs to outcomes under the global stocktake of the Paris Agreement", OECD/IEA Climate Change Expert Group Papers, No. 2022/01, OECD Publishing, Paris, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1787/e06c61f0-en">https://doi.org/10.1787/e06c61f0-en</a>

Table 5.2. Overview of potential package of technical outputs from GST1

Element	Description			
Factual synthesis report of the technical dialogues	<ul> <li>Overall key messages across thematic and cross-cutting areas of GST1</li> <li>Summarise main gaps, challenges, high impact opportunities, lessons learned and good practices</li> <li>Set out key enablers and potential options targeting different actors</li> </ul>			
Technical annexes	<ul> <li>Specific challenges and opportunities for transformations within and across sectors, systems, and across adaptation policy cycle</li> <li>Specific enablers and means of implementation</li> <li>Current guidance, tools, initiatives, and mechanisms with the UNFCCC and beyond to enable/support needed transformations, gaps/barriers in current landscape of enablers, opportunities for enhancing/strengthening enablers</li> <li>Searchable database of scalable options, high impact solutions, good practices</li> </ul>			
Summary key cards	<ul> <li>Visual summary of key findings in each area (e.g. one page each for mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity support, as well as loss and damage, and response measures as appropriate)</li> <li>Challenges and gaps</li> <li>Opportunities and solutions</li> <li>Good practices, tools and guidance</li> <li>Enablers for action</li> </ul>			

Source: Authors.

Structuring the final package of the GST1's technical outputs as outlined in Table 5.2 provides a useful, operational dimension that could be picked up in subsequent discussions in the CO. Such technical outputs could also be useful for informing subsequent work, including by the research and scientific community, relevant constituted bodies, forums, and other institutional arrangements. To inform such a package of technical outputs, it would be helpful if the third technical dialogue (TD 1.3) focuses on specific enablers. For example, discussions in TD 1.3 could focus on the current landscape of enablers, including the role of constituted bodies and the UNFCCC secretariat, the main gaps/challenges, and how they could be overcome. Discussions could include deeper consideration of equity and just transition as an enabler for enhanced ambition, current arrangements and how they could be aligned to support needed transformations, while considering different national circumstances and contexts.

To structure the political outputs of GST1 to be most impactful, it is useful to think about the type of political signals that are needed, who could deliver these, what actors need to be reached and how best to reach them. While a negotiated output commands greater legitimacy, it also requires consensus among all Parties and could be complemented by consultative and non-negotiated outputs to have greater impact. A package of political outputs comprising negotiated, consultative, and non-negotiated elements could be developed, with mutually supportive elements designed to play different roles and engaging different actors. Potential elements of a package of political outputs from GST1 are set out in Table 5.3. These different elements are non-exclusive and could be designed to be mutually supportive.

Table 5.3. Overview of potential package of political outputs from GST1

	Element	Co-ordinated by	Role	Description
Negotiated outputs	CMA decision	Joint contact group	Signal overall direction of travel	Urge Parties to implement GST1 recommendations when preparing NDCs     Endorse relevant initiatives and enabling processes     Recommendations to strengthen existing parts of UNFCCC system to operationalise GST recommendations     Establish follow-up processes, building on existing provisions (e.g. invite Parties to indicate how NDCs have been informed by GST1; invite UNFCCC Secretariat to prepare update on take-up of GST1 as part of annual NDC Synthesis Report) or new reporting systems where needed     Initiate process to identify lessons for future GSTs
Consultative outputs	Political declaration(s)	High-level committee	Political commitment(s) to implement GST1 recommendations and provide a roadmap for doing so	<ul> <li>Signed by Parties and/or a group of Parties (e.g. High Ambition Coalition (HAC), voluntary coalition of first movers on GST1)</li> <li>Commit to align NDCs submitted in 2025 with LTS consistent with pathways to 1.5°C</li> <li>Commit to present updated NDCs at UNSG Special Event</li> <li>Commit to provide enhanced support to implement GST1 recommendations</li> <li>Commit to report back on progress at COP29</li> <li>Could build on parallel initiatives (e.g. UNSG Climate Solidarity Pact, Breakthrough Agendas), structured in different ways (e.g. by sector) and coordinated with different actors (e.g. UN High-Level Climate Champions, international organisations)</li> </ul>
	CMA cover decision	COP28 Presidency	High-level political messages and feedback loops	<ul> <li>Reiterate overarching messages of GST1</li> <li>Recognise enabling processes, partnerships, and initiatives to facilitate GST1 outcome and urge accelerated implementation</li> <li>Recognise linkages and establish feedback loops between GST1 and parallel processes</li> <li>Invite partners, institutions and operating entities within and beyond UNFCCC to support implementation of GST1 recommendations, and align broader practices and policies to be fit for the purpose</li> </ul>
Non-negotiated	Presidency initiatives	COP28 Presidency (with High-Level Climate Champions)	Tools to enable and drive action	Consolidate and/or strengthen existing initiatives, partnerships and coalitions in key sectors and systems     Launch new initiatives in areas where gaps exist     Set up regular reporting and review processes of voluntary international co-operation initiatives, building on on-going work of UNFCCC secretariat and the Marrakech Partnership

Source: Authors.

An important part of the final package of outputs will be establishing follow-up processes to monitor implementation and provide a marker against which to assess the success of the GST1 exercise and help to inform subsequent GST cycles. This follow-up could build on existing provisions or establish new processes where needed, for example:

- Parties could indicate how GST1 outcomes have been used to "inform" the development of their NDCs to be submitted in 2025 in line with Article 4.9 of the Paris Agreement.
- Technical expert reviews of BTRs could consider if Parties have provided information on how GST1 recommendations have been considered in their updated NDCs.

- Faciliative, multilateral consideration of progress (FMCP) workshops could consider information on how Parties' NDCs were informed by GST1, to provide an opportunity for peer exchange and mutual learning, including on potential challenges/barriers faced by Parties.
- The UNFCCC Secretariat could provide an update on progress with the take-up of GST1 recommendations as part of their annual NDC Synthesis Report in 2024 and in 2025. At the Special Event in the second quarter of 2025 by the UNSG, Parties that have updated their NDCs in line with GST1 recommendations could be recognised.
- Follow-up could also involve establishing new accountability/follow-up processes for reporting on progress under relevant international co-operation initiatives. Such accountability systems can help to ensure the GST1 is more than a box ticking exercise and encourage enhanced action. The findings from these reporting processes can also help to inform/improve subsequent GST cycles as part of its learning-by-doing approach.

GST1 provides an opportunity for Parties and the international community to course correct, to align current systems, structures, and mechanisms to be fit for purpose, and to strengthen collaboration and partnerships within and beyond the UNFCCC process to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. Achieving this outcome is however not straightforward and depends on several factors and enabling conditions. One key issue is how to ensure the final phase of GST1 captures and fully engages with the findings of the technical assessment to provide strong, clear political messages and recommendations that can be carried forward by different actors. How the final phase of GST1 is organised, who will be involved in the discussions and how the final outputs are structured are important factors that can influence the success of the process in supporting the goals of the Paris Agreement.

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