REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

NO-ONE LEFT BEHIND?

Refugees and internally displaced persons in development planning

No-one left behind?

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Keywords: Refugees, internally displaced persons, fragility, forced displacement, inclusion, development co-operation, development effectiveness, development planning, HDP Nexus, migration

JEL classifications: F35; H41; H50; H87; O20; P41

Abstract/Résumé

This paper provides a factual baseline of the extent to which refugees and internally displaced persons are included in development planning, specifically in the national development plans and sector plans of low- and middle-income countries; in the international development co-operation strategies of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members and participants; and in the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks of the UN development system at country level. It contributes to measuring progress towards commitments – under the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the UN Action Agenda on Internal Displacement – to treat forced displacement also as a development issue. Finally, it formulates policy recommendations to further improve the inclusion of the forcibly displaced in development planning.

Ce papier évalue la prise en compte des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées à l'intérieur de leur propre pays dans la planification du développement national, en particulier dans les plans de développement nationaux et sectoriels des pays à revenu faible et intermédiaire ; les stratégies de coopération internationale des membres et des participants du Comité d'aide au développement (CAD) ; et les cadres de coopération pour le développement durable du système des Nations unies. Il mesure le respect des engagements pris dans le cadre du Pacte mondial sur les réfugiés (PMR) et du programme d'action des Nations unies sur les déplacements internes pour traiter les déplacements forcés comme une question de développement. Enfin, il formule des recommandations pour améliorer la prise en compte des personnes déplacées de force dans la planification du développement national.

Foreword

Finding sustainable solutions for the world's refugees and internally displaced persons remain a top priority for both the displaced and their hosts. For the vast majority of those forced to flee, however, the "protracted" nature of displacement makes it hard to find effective solutions.

The Global Compact on Refugees and the UN Action Agenda on Internal Displacement recognise that international support to displacement-affected countries needs to go beyond short-term humanitarian aid. They also recognise that forced displacement needs to be firmly anchored in development co-operation efforts. Solutions such as local integration, voluntary return in safety and dignity, or re-settlement to another country require substantive long-term development and peace support. A short-term vision risks falling short.

To unlock the potential of development co-operation to better include the forcibly displaced, we must look at the underlying strategy, planning and negotiation processes in displacement affected low- and middle-income countries (LICs and MICs), and in donor countries.

To that end, this paper presents the first-ever baseline analysis on the state of inclusion of refugees and internally-displaced persons in development planning, exploring why and how support for inclusion can be further strengthened. It forms part of a series of papers on addressing forced displacement with a long-term perspective across all dimensions of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, issued jointly by the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) and the OECD Development Centre (DEV). It is a deliverable of the forced displacement workstream of the OECD Development Assistance Committee's International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), and of the joint DCD-DEV workplan on forced displacement.

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Executive summary

Inclusive development planning constitutes an important, if insufficient, pathway to facilitate the socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced in societies. Recognising the forcibly displaced as potential contributors to the development of the economy, fiscal system, and national services requires political will, as well as support and finance from development partners for LICs and MICs. It also requires overcoming specific practical barriers, such as access to documentation.

To what extent, therefore, are refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) explicitly included in development planning? This paper gathers fresh evidence, analysing national development plans and sector plans of the most displacement-affected low- and middle-income countries (LICs and MICs with more than 100 000 refugees and IDPs combined – 58 countries), UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs), and the high-level development co-operation strategies of 30 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members and three DAC participants.

The number of forcibly displaced persons, including refugees and IDPs, has been in constant rise over the last two decades. At the same time, forced displacement has become protracted, as durable solutions such as return in safety and dignity, are drying up. Only six million forcibly displaced returned to their areas of origin in 2022, while over 110 million people remained in displacement by the end of the year, the highest number in history (UNHCR, 2023). Over 70% of all forcibly displaced live in LICs and MICs.

In this context, the socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced – access to national systems and the economy on par with non-displaced nationals – constitutes a pragmatic holding pattern and rational economic choice. If implemented well, inclusion approaches reduce the economic cost of forced displacement over time, offering an exit from dependency on humanitarian aid. They also prepare the displaced for durable solutions, including return in safety and dignity.

Data and analysis on the socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced and related development co-operation support for LICs and MICs indicates that:

- There are important differences between IDPs and refugees, yet both face inclusion challenges
- The socio-economic inclusion of refugees and IDPs works in favour of the development ambitions of displacement-affected LICs and MICs
- Development effectiveness principles, such as ownership and leaving no-one behind, make the inclusion of the forcibly displaced a requirement for planners; through mutual benefits for the displaced and hosts, inclusion can improve the effectiveness of development finance
- Inclusion approaches are not feasible in all contexts and by themselves, and remain one tool alongside humanitarian aid.

Inclusion of the forcibly displaced in development planning: Baseline findings

National development plans of displacement-affected LICs and MICs include refugees and IDPs the least (28% do so). Some 46.8 million refugees and IDPs, who are not explicitly included, face a higher

risk of being left behind in development, and continuously dependent on humanitarian aid. This is followed by global donor development co-operation strategies, where the majority (52%) explicitly include the displaced. UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs) or UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) which preceded the UNSDCFs and others display the highest rate of explicit inclusion (76%). The commitment of leaving no-one-behind is most prioritised in UN development planning. The total number of forcibly displaced people in a country, alongside the intensity of fragility, is a strong predictor of inclusion in development planning.

There is a significant mismatch between LIC and MIC national development plans, and donors' high-level development co-operation strategies, in terms of inclusion. While donors appear to promote inclusion mostly in social protection, LICs and MICs rarely feature this sector. LICs and MICs focus inclusion around health and education, more so than donors do. The inclusion of refugees and IDPs does not systematically feature in the policy dialogue between donors and their partner countries. This also raises questions on how far development effectiveness principles have been applied in this space.

Policy recommendations

1. **Policy dialogue on inclusion:** Both LICs and MICs affected by forced displacement, and their international development partners, need to ensure that dialogue on socio-economic inclusion-oriented policies systematically forms part of regular development planning and co-operation. Development partners should also encourage inclusion policies through predictable, multi-year development finance for inclusive national services.

2. **Engagement of sector leaders, civil society and the private sector:** There are existing pathways for the inclusion of refugees and IDPs in development efforts, especially in specific sectors such as education and health, and in civil society, including faith-based and displaced-led organisations, and companies from a labour market perspective. Leaders in these spaces have the ability to influence development planning and contribute to making a positive case for inclusion.

3. **Ownership, accountability and monitoring:** Government ownership for the inclusion of refugees and IDPs should be strengthened at country level. Refugees and IDPs themselves should be empowered to become a constituency with a voice in development planning. The displaced should be included and dis-aggregated in national statistics and household surveys.

   At global level, data-based monitoring of inclusion in development planning, programming and implementation, should continue over time, and dis-aggregated by displacement status. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) monitoring framework tracks the inclusion of the displaced in national development strategies. Displacement affected countries, development partners, along with all stakeholders, are encouraged to actively engage in the GPEDC monitoring process at country level, feeding into global analysis.

4. **Refugee and IDP response planning – inclusion feasibility assessment:** When designing country level strategies for refugee and internal displacement situations, the feasibility of the inclusion of the forcibly displaced in national systems, labour markets, and related development planning should be systematically assessed at country and sub-national levels.

5. **Evidence on socio-economic inclusion of the displaced:** For inclusion commitments to be effectively implemented and resourced, decision makers need to be convinced that inclusion serves the mutual interests of the displaced and the hosts. All stakeholders should undertake more contextualised research and evaluation of the impact of effective inclusion cases on the displaced and host communities, and disseminate the findings.

1 Planning for inclusion has become imperative

The number of forcibly displaced persons, including refugees and IDPs (conflict and disaster displaced), has been in constant rise over the last two decades. At the same time, forced displacement situations have become protracted, as durable solutions of resettlement and return are drying up. Only six million forcibly displaced returned to their areas of origin in 2022, while over 110 million people remained in displacement by the end of the year, the highest number in history (UNHCR, 2023).

Momentum towards sustainable long-term responses to forced displacement, such as socio-economic inclusion of forcibly displaced persons, has gained traction at the global level. Recent policy frameworks have firmly placed the response to forced displacement across the spectrum of the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus, a concept that refers to the interdependence of humanitarian, development and peace interventions. It highlights the need for actors to work together to effectively address complex challenges. In addition, two overarching global agendas act as a common compass for coordinated responses. The 2018 Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) urges for more developmental responses to refugee situations and a broader approach involving all parts of government at the national and sub-national levels. More recently, the 2022 UN Action Agenda on Internal Displacement (AAID) has solicited the global community to address internal displacement, more specifically, as also more than a humanitarian issue, and to recognise it as a priority for development, peace and climate action.

"Socio-economic inclusion" of the forcibly displaced

"Socio-economic inclusion" of the forcibly displaced – refugees and IDPs – refers to ensuring access to national systems on par with non-displaced nationals. This means access to essential social services such as health and education, but also access to registration and documentation services, justice, social protection, financial services, electricity, and communications services, among others. The economic aspect of inclusion refers to access to the formal labour market and wider economic opportunities, for which freedom of movement is an important pre-requisite.

This section outlines why socio-economic inclusion constitutes a pragmatic approach, is beneficial for displacement affected countries, and for the displaced themselves. It argues that development co-operation, alongside humanitarian aid, has an important role in facilitating socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced, and that development effectiveness can only be achieved with an inclusive approach.

1.1. Socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced is pragmatic

In the absence of durable solutions – such as voluntary return in safety and dignity, or settlement elsewhere – socio-economic inclusion constitutes a pragmatic holding pattern. It also prepares the displaced for future

durable solutions. In the medium to long-term, it can reduce cost of the response to the forced displacement situation by enabling the displaced to contribute their agency, skills and abilities to the host society. It leads to better outcomes for the well-being and protection of the displaced. Inclusion enables the displaced to become economically productive, thereby contributing to private sector development and domestic resource mobilisation. Through socio-economic inclusion, the displaced are better positioned to build social networks and wealth, making them more resilient and less dependent on public support and host community resources. There are important differences between refugees and IDPs, yet both face exclusion challenges (Box 1).

Socio-economic inclusion contributes to private sector development and domestic resource mobilisation in displacement affected countries. Research on Syrian refugee entrepreneurship in Türkiye found that many refugee entrepreneurs deliberately remained secluded in the informal sector to keep their costs low, as operating informally relieves entrepreneurs from tax and social security costs (Atasu-Topcuoglu, 2019). Inclusion improves participation of forced migrants in the formal economy increases domestic revenue and also decreases unfair competition from informal or grey market entrepreneurs. The latter point is compelling especially since such competition can antagonise host country entrepreneurs and even translate into violence such was the case that left 400 people dead in xenophobic violence against Somali traders in South Africa in 2007 (UNHCR, 2007).

Another example how inclusion contributes to strengthening the social cohesion between the displaced and hosting communities are standards in social service provision. By applying the same standards for service provision to both the displaced and non-displaced, resentment by the local population against the displaced can be mitigated. Host countries also tend to improve service delivery to host communities in the sub-national area when adopting inclusion approaches (OECD, 2022). The added attention and support that comes from an influx of displaced people can be used to unlock system challenges.

Through an alignment of shared interests between the forced displacement response and sector planning in the displacement affected country, inclusion can have tangible safety, security, and health benefits. For example, infectious diseases by their very nature cannot be addressed without explicit attention to movement of people. When it comes to education, inclusion is about education as a fundamental right, ensuring displaced people become employable, and about ensuring community security. Using an inclusion approach in responding to health crises such as COVID-19 (World Bank, 2021) can lead to improvements in social registries (thus enabling access to local services) and statistical systems.

Box 1. There are important differences between refugees and internally displaced persons, yet both face inclusion challenges

IDPs have not left their country, therefore protection, basic services, and solutions remain the responsibility of their own government, as for all citizens of the country. This also means that IDPs do not hold a specific legal status with specific rights or limitations attached to it. They in principle enjoy full citizen rights of the country, therefore are legally entitled to "inclusion". Individual registration and documentation are not consistently practised in internal displacement situations. Many IDPs may not have national identification documents, due to lack of issuance, loss, expiry, or their choice not to register out of fear.

Refugees on the other hand are not citizens of the host country but are protected under international and national laws. Once recognised, refugees enjoy a specific legal status in the host country. It is the responsibility of the host government to protect them. Individual registration, and issuance of specific refugee status related documentation, is considered standard practice, although implementation may lag or faces challenges due to circumstance. Refugees fleeing across borders start as non-citizens in

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the host country, similar to migrants. Their rights to access the formal labour market and services need to be regulated by specific policies or legal provisions.

The movement of conflict or disaster IDPs to different areas of their country poses similar short-term supply and demand issues like for refugee influxes, especially on local communities' infrastructure and municipalities budgets. While legally there should not be a difference between IDPs and other citizens of the country, the reality is that IDPs may constitute a "humanitarian caseload" in the new hosting area. In certain contexts, they may be deliberately marginalised, due to conflict and social cohesion dynamics. Since they may not be registered in the hosting local area, they are not included in planning for regular local social services, or these services are overwhelmed. Depending on national legislation, they can be deprived of their political rights to vote in a different municipality than their own. They may face difficulties to obtain documentation outside their origin municipality. In short, while the principle of "inclusion" of IDPs as citizens in their own country goes without question, in practice both refugees and IDPs may face significant barriers to inclusion in society, national services, the formal labour market, and development planning.

1.1.1. Limitations of socio-economic inclusion approaches

Inclusion approaches premise that national and municipal social service systems and economies have the capacity to take displaced populations on board, including refugees, and IDPs in sub-national areas to which they have been displaced. In many LICs and MICs, the reality is that systems already struggle to meet the demand of non-displaced citizens, and unemployment (in the formal sector) remains high. Social protection systems for example may be nascent in many LIC and MIC host countries (OECD, 2022b), and are not designed to be highly flexible and responsive to significant population changes. Therefore, national systems may not be immediately suited to take newly displaced populations on board, especially in the often remote or under-privileged where the displaced live. Furthermore, 64% of all forcibly displaced live in fragile states (OECD, 2022b). The low institutional capacity and often weak economy characteristic of many fragile states leads to the forcibly displaced caught in a "capability trap", whereby they can neither achieve socio-economic inclusion nor other solutions to end displacement (OECD, 2022f).

In terms of political will, it is a reality that in some displaced affected countries, socio-economic inclusion-oriented policies are not yet supported. Underlying deep fears include that inclusion would assign a degree of permanency to displacement, or would discourage the displaced from returning home. Similar to migrants, the displaced may be perceived as competition over scarce resources, including jobs. Resentment and negative public perception of displaced people is easily mobilised for political gain. Guarding against opportunism that creates value in disenfranchising and excluding displaced people is a constant concern.

Another dilemma relates to costs: reaching the furthest behind is both difficult and expensive. Going the last mile requires getting staff to work in remote, challenging and sometimes dangerous places; the long-term engagement to understand and address systemic exclusion; and the depth and multidimensional nature of poverty. Delivering public services like health or education is likely to carry a higher unit cost for the furthest behind than for others – appearing to be a less efficient use of resources. Finally, the communication and literature is thin on inclusion success stories meaning that knowhow and best practices are as rare as success stories.

Inclusion approaches are one element in a wider toolbox of responses to forced displacement across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. They are not always appropriate or feasible, nor an end in themselves. The impact and feasibility of inclusion approaches on the protection and well-being of refugees and IDPs, and on attaining durable solutions, remains to be evaluated and monitored in most contexts. Humanitarian aid will continue to be required over time in most situations, even where inclusion approaches are feasible or promising.

1.2. Development planning matters for the inclusion agenda

Inclusion of the forcibly displaced in development planning is necessary, and not sufficient, for improving access to the formal economy and services by forcibly displaced people. It is insufficient in so far that legal frameworks need to be conducive, practical barriers to inclusion still need to be overcome, and planning needs to be translated into firm implementable commitments. Development planning however constitutes a pathway to inclusion, when donor, host country and UN policy emphasise inclusion, they create accountability and commitment. By pursuing inclusion as a fundamental change in narrative, refugees and IDPs can shift from being viewed as a humanitarian burden to being part of an equation that delivers on the SDGs, by contributing to host country social, economic and political ambitions. Inclusion enables displaced populations to be better identified in terms of the associated investment opportunities for both displacement affected countries and their development partners.

National development plans of LICs and MICs, their sector plans, the international co-operation strategies of bilateral development finance providers, and country-level UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs) stand out as key development planning instruments. They set the priorities and scope for the programming and implementation of development co-operation. These developmental plans are the backbones through which resources and development support are mobilised.

The underlying theory of change is that development co-operation constitutes a negotiated handshake between LICs and MICs and their bilateral and multi-lateral development partners. All partners need to remain assured that they pursue common objectives. When displacement affected countries explicitly include the displaced in their national development and sector plans, this can leverage development finance towards inclusive development programmes. By explicitly including forced displacement in their long-term development co-operation strategies, development partners send a trust-building signal that inclusion of the forcibly displaced is considered among the priorities of development finance, and displacement affected countries are not left to their own devices. If inclusion in development planning instruments is pursued consistently and forms part of development co-operation dialogue, it can leverage sustainable policy change towards socio-economic inclusion of refugees and IDPs.

1.2.1. The role of national development plans is fundamental

The national development plans of displacement affected LICs and MICs are fundamental to inclusion as they manifest ownership, and provide a framework for how a country aims to grow and develop over time. National development plans typically outline the goals and priorities of a particular country and are translated into sectoral strategies and eventually policies to achieve those goals. In turn, these strategies and policies are the basis for medium-term or developmental financial planning and resource allocation.

While national development planning had waned for many years, starting in the early 1970s, it has increasingly carved itself a new role within a growing paradigm of country ownership – more closely with electoral cycles and nationally determined priorities (Chimhowu, et al., 2019). Countries increasingly use the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a means for alliance building with constituencies and development partners in development planning. The number of countries with a national development plan has more than doubled – from 62 to 134 – between 2006 and 2018, and 80% of the global population lived in a country with a national development plan in 2019 (Chimhowu, et al., 2019).

Four main reasons explain the return of national development plans globally:

1. Countries are incentivised to develop national development plans because such plans are to access financing and lending from multilateral banks, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (World Bank, 2022a)
2. There is a need to demonstrate a national response to the SDGs, and identify as part of a global community

3. Countries have also needed to take back influence and redirect global commitments towards domestic political priorities

4. Development planning provides a narrative that protects countries from risks to sovereignty, in the light of rapid globalisation.

1.2.2. Inclusive planning means better development effectiveness

Development effectiveness principles affirm the 2030 Agenda's pledge to "leave no one behind" (LNOB), recognising that development co-operation must do so to be effective. LNOB constitutes an important entry point for the inclusion of refugees and IDPs, and their host communities, in development planning. Displaced populations will remain siloed in humanitarian responses, until development policy and planning are aligned with commitments to inclusion. National development plans will remain incomplete, and possibly in-effective, without acknowledging the reality of protracted displacement. In some countries, the displaced can constitute up to a quarter of population on a country's territory.

Using a development approach to invest in displaced populations is also a sound resource allocation decision. Investing in public services and infrastructure for displaced people directly benefits host communities and their governments (World Bank, 2017). In difference to parallel humanitarian aid, inclusion is about the government systems in displacement affected countries, a development effectiveness commitment under the "ownership" principle of *Effective Development Cooperation*.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) is the custodian of the development effectiveness principles – *Country ownership*, *Focus on results*, *Inclusive partnerships*, *Transparency and accountability* – since the Busan Agreement in 2011. It monitors how effectively governments have established a conducive environment to lead national development efforts, enabling the full participation of the whole of society. It also monitors how development partners deliver their support in a way that is focused on country-owned development priorities, drawing on existing country systems and capacities.

In a significant step, the new GPEDC monitoring exercise (GPEDC, 2023) will gather various data points related to the inclusion of IDPs, stateless people, asylum seekers and refugees in development planning:

- whether national development strategies define development priorities for IDPs, stateless people, asylum-seekers, and refugees (A1.3)
- whether national development strategies establish targets and result indicators disaggregated by migration status (incl. IDPs, asylum seekers and refugees, stateless individuals) (A1.4)
- whether countries have systems in place to track and publicly report allocations for IDPs, stateless people, asylum-seekers and refugees (A.4.2).
- Similarly, it tracks whether development partners have incorporated development priorities related to IDPs, stateless people, asylum-seekers, and refugees into their partner country strategies. (B.1.6).

The GPEDC monitoring exercise also supports evidence-based *dialogue* between donors and their partners on several LNOB aspects, including forcibly displaced populations, relevant for the effectiveness agenda:

- Consultation: degree in which a diversity of actors is being consulted in the preparation of national development strategies and donors' country-level strategies to help bring in the perspectives of the vulnerable and marginalised.
- Targets and results: degree in which partner countries' national development strategies and development partners' country-level strategies include development priorities for vulnerable and marginalised groups of the population and whether national development strategies include

disaggregated targets and results indicators and whether development partners use distributional analysis to define targets and results indicators.

- Data and statistics: degree in which data-based assessments inform national development plans and development partners' country-level strategies, as well as whether disaggregated data and statistics are available – from the national statistical systems or other sources – to monitor progress on targets and results indicators for the vulnerable and marginalised.

Development finance and inclusion of the forcibly displaced

Large amounts of domestic and international development finance resources are invested in forced displacement contexts. 'Basic needs' of internally displaced persons cost affected countries, host communities, and donors almost USD 22 billion in 2021 alone (IDMC, 2022). In Somalia, the cost is a quarter of GDP, in Syria it is a sixth of GDP (IDMC, 2022). The "heavy lifting" is done disproportionately by displacement affected LICs and MICs, host communities and their taxpayers.

Inclusion promises a better return, and also a pathway to sustainability. The OECD refugee financing survey found that in 2018-19, 32 bilateral donors gave USD 24.2 billion of ODA for refugee situations in LICs and MICs, over 70% of this in humanitarian aid modality. Unless displacement affected LICs and MICs, and their development partners, make policy and planning work for sustainable approaches to displacement, responses are entirely dependent on recurring humanitarian operations.

The World Bank responded to these dynamics by calling for a development approach to supporting refugees, the internally displaced, and their hosts (World Bank, 2017). The World Bank recognised that the solution in that so long unless development programming adopts an inclusion approach, it will continue incentivising siloed policy making. The World Bank translated this into development programming with the 2017-2020 IDA18 regional sub-window for refugees and host communities that provides USD 2 billion of dedicated funding to help low-income countries hosting large numbers of refugees (World Bank 2022).

In another example, the European Union has invested over EUR 16 billion since 2015 in implementing the *Joint Valetta Action Plan*. The financing was provided with the primary objective of mainstreaming migration in development co-operation through integrating "migration in development and poverty eradication strategies and programmes, in particular in the areas such as labour market/employment, private sector development, education, health, social protection and security" (EU 2015: 2).

Limitations of inclusion in development planning instruments

Structured international development planning processes are not effective in all contexts, nor for all international development co-operation, nor is development planning alone sufficient. In contexts where capacity for development planning is weak or ineffective, trying to include the forcibly displaced will have little impact. It will also not work when the dialogue between displacement affected countries and development partners is "constrained", due to fundamental differences on governance or human rights values, or due to non-recognition of the authorities by the international community (coup or transition situations for example). Furthermore, inclusion in development co-operation planning instruments does not necessarily mean that the displaced are actually included in national services and the economy. If planning remains lip service and does not result in firm implementable commitments, it has little impact on the actual situation of the displaced and host communities.

1.3. The extent of inclusion of refugees and IDPs in development planning is unknown

On the one hand, the primarily *low- and middle-income* nature of most displacement affected countries means that inclusion is mainly a *development* challenge – one that must be tackled by affected countries themselves. On the other, development co-operation support towards addressing the socio-economic inclusion of forcibly displaced is seen as a pragmatic and mutually beneficial way of protecting and assisting refugees and IDPs and achieving positive outcomes for host communities and host countries at the same time. Development plans and donor development co-operation strategies are therefore central to paving the way towards more inclusion.

Yet, there is a dearth of data for measuring the actual extent to which forced displacement has been made a development challenge in long-term planning. This paper contributes to filling this knowledge gap. What is the extent to which refugee and IDP inclusion is prioritised or explicitly included in development planning? One way to assess this is to establish the extent of explicit reference to refugees and IDPs in displacement affected LICs and MICs' costed national development plans, their sector development plans, donor development co-operation strategies, and UN cooperation frameworks.

2 Evidence on inclusion of refugees and IDPs in development planning

Baseline analysis key findings

- **National development plans of displacement affected LICs and MICs include refugees and IDPs the least (only 28% do so), an important area for policy change.** Some 46.8 million refugees and IDPs, who are not explicitly included, face a higher risk of being left behind in development, and continuously dependent on humanitarian aid. This is followed by global donor development co-operation strategies, where the majority (52%) explicitly include the displaced. UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs, including UNDAFs and other UN cooperation frameworks in countries where UNSDCFs have not yet been established) show the highest rate of explicit inclusion (76%). This is an indication that advocacy within UN country teams had impact, and leave-no-one-behind (LNOB) thinking is most present in UN agency development planning.

- **There is a significant mismatch between LIC and MIC national development plans, and donor's high-level development co-operation strategies, when it comes to inclusion.** While donors appear to promote inclusion mostly in the social protection sector, LICs and MICs, by contrast, rarely feature this sector. LICs and MICs focus inclusion around health and education, while donors do not. Inclusion of refugees and IDPs appears to not systematically feature in policy dialogue between donors and their partner countries. This also raises questions in how far development effectiveness principles have been applied in this development policy area. Policy dialogues in the context of the GPEDC development effectiveness monitoring exercise could be an opportunity to discuss and address this.

- **The scale of the forcibly displaced population in a country constitutes the strongest predictor of inclusion in development planning**, as visible in LIC and MIC national development plans and UNSDCFs. The baseline analysis also identified fragility as a predictor, whereby development planning instruments in contexts exposed to more extreme fragility are more likely to reference forced displacement.

2.1. Methodology

This project compiled a novel dataset of development planning documents, and applied a word-search methodology. The specific objective was to establish a baseline on the inclusion of refugees and IDPs in the four different sets of development strategies (Table 1).

1. **Displacement affected LICs and MICs' national development plans:** The scope was set to include countries with at least 100 000 refugees and IDPs combined on their territory, meaning the most severely displacement affected countries. This gave us a total of 58 LICs and MICs. The most

recent plans were selected for the analysis. In cases in which plans had expired, only those that were still relevant no later than 2020 were analysed for the 58 LICs and MICs within the scope. A total of 54 national development plans were available for review.

2. **Sector development plans:** Sector development plans were analysed for the same 58 LICs and MICs within scope, in three sectors: health, education and technical and vocational education and training (TVET). This yielded a total of 47 health plans, 47 education plans and 28 TVET plans, which gave us a combined total of 132 sectoral plans.

3. **High-level donor development co-operation strategies:** High-level (global) donor strategies were analysed for 30[1] members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), as well as three DAC participants[2] that have a stand-alone development co-operation strategy in place, yielding 33 donor strategies in total.

4. **UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs):** UNSDCFs, including their predecessor UNDAFs and other situation specific co-operation frameworks in countries where UNSDCFs were not yet established, were reviewed for 54 LICs and MICs within scope. They constitute planning frameworks for the contributions to sustainable development by UN agencies, funds and programmes in the country, under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator. Based on UN Common Country Analysis, they support host countries with their development, and set the agenda for policy dialogue with host country governments.

Overall, the forcibly displaced population in the 58 countries within scope totals 87.3 million refugees and IDPs, or 80% of the global forcibly displaced population as of December 2021.

Table 1. Documents analysed for inclusion of the forcibly displaced

Development planning document type	Number of development planning documents within scope and available
Displacement affected LIC and MIC development plans	54 (for four countries, no plan available)
LIC and MIC sector development plans: health, education, technical and vocational education and training (TVET)	47 health plans 47 education plans 28 TVET plans
High-level donor development cooperation strategies	33
UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (including UNDAFs and other situation specific frameworks in countries where UNSDCFs were not yet established)	54 (for four countries, no UN cooperation frameworks available)
Total development planning documents considered	**263**

Sources: Document database established by the OECD; national development and sector plans, donor development co-operation strategies: government public websites; UNSDCFs: UN public website

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[1] The baseline analysis for this specific project, including the establishment of the document database, started before Lithuania joined the DAC in November 2022, therefore Lithuania's development co-operation strategy did not form part of this analysis.

[2] These seven countries are: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kuwait, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Of these seven, strategies for Bulgaria, Romania and the UAE were analysed.

<u>Within scope</u>: For the purpose of this policy paper, LIC and MIC national and sectoral development plans, donor development co-operation strategies, and UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks are classified as development planning documents. This allows analysing the inclusion of forcibly displaced in broader development efforts.

<u>Outside scope</u>: Humanitarian, emergency plans, strategies or appeals that target response and protection of specific population groups were not included. They bear low impact on development related policy reform, policy making, and the development trajectory of a country. Stand-alone refugee and IDP specific policies, strategies, plans and special instruments were also not considered for the baseline analysis, since inclusion in wider development plans is the objective of the analysis. Finally, for capacity reasons, the project team could not consider donor development co-operation strategies at country or regional level. It is recognised that inclusion could feature prominently in them, yet does not feature in this baseline analysis. At the same time, the assumption is that reference to inclusion of forcibly displaced in high level donor strategies is desirable, since it will trickle down into country and regional strategies.

All displacement affected LIC and MIC national development plans and strategies are referred to as *development plans* throughout the paper, and all high-level donor development co-operation strategies, plans, policies are referred to as a *donor development co-operation strategies*. Various types of UN system-wide development plans at country level are referred to as UN cooperation frameworks.

2.1.1. Inclusion baseline analysis criteria

The baseline focuses on identifying explicit reference to inclusion of IDPs and refugees in each set of development plans, drawing from desk analysis and documents available online. The objective was to categorise the prevalence of inclusion according to three levels: (1) inclusion mainstreamed, (2) significant mention of inclusion and (3) no significant mention of inclusion (Table 2).

Table 2. Baseline analysis: Definition of tiers for prevalence of inclusion

Inclusion mainstreamed	An inclusion approach is adopted as a core tenant and mainstreamed throughout planned activities.
Significant mention of inclusion	Inclusion is significantly referenced in relation to refugees and displaced populations and specifically linked to planning developmental type activities.
No significant mention of inclusion	No significant reference to refugees and displaced populations specifically in relation to planning developmental type activities. This category includes plans and strategies that refer to refugees and internally displaced persons in international commitments, national context or risk sections but does not include such populations in planning developmental type activities.

Word searches were used to identify the prevalence of inclusion in development documents. Eleven words were used for the search: "refuge", "refugee", "displaced", "forced", "forcibly", "forcibly" (sic),[3] "IDP", "migrant", "migrate", "migrating" and "migration". In countries where the plans were not in English, the plans were machine translated into English and then word searches conducted in English. To guard against machine translation problems, the specific words were then translated back into the language of the plans and searched in the original text to identify any potential mistranslations. The number of actual references of inclusion in the particular plan, strategy or framework is recorded in the database.

Each document was coded according to the number of references to refugees, IDPs, and host community. The text was analysed to ascertain whether forcibly displaced persons are referred to primarily as 'problems to solve' or in a similar tone to other host country communities. The country and organisational-level findings of this study act as a benchmark and reference but not a judgement on performance.[4]

Inclusion was also coded according to how it relates to development planning. The codes or sections used to analyse inclusion this relation include the (a) national context, (b) development financing, (c) health, (d) education, (e) jobs/private sector development, (f) safety and security, (g) social protection, (h) domestic revenue mobilisation and (i) whether there are any specific indicators referring to forced displacement.

2.2. Inclusion in national development plans of displacement affected LICs and MICs

Key findings: LIC and MIC national development plans

National development plans

- **Only 28% of LIC and MIC development plans, in 15 countries, reference inclusion of refugees and IDPs.** Combined, these countries were home to 40.5 million refugees and IDPs in mid-2022.

- **No displacement affected country mainstreams inclusion, and 74% do not reference inclusion in a significant manner. The potential impact of this low rate of explicit inclusion is that 46.8 million displaced – those living in countries where they are not acknowledged as a constituency in development planning – risk being left behind in development efforts, or in certain policy areas.**

- Inclusion is mostly associated with planning on health, safety and security and education.

- Host countries do not appear to leverage the domestic revenue (tax) potential of inclusion.

- Fragile states are more likely to make the inclusion of refugees and IDPs a priority in their national development planning.

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[3] Common spelling error.

[4] The scope of this study did not include for extensive consultations with international development partners, host country governments and donor officials. This method of working does not mean the work of officials striving to mainstream inclusion in development planning processes has gone unnoticed. Participating in and collating evidence to persuade policy makers and planners to mainstream forcibly displaced people into developmental approaches is highly contextual. Tangible change takes time. In this regard, case studies on Colombia, Kenya and Sweden were produced for this study to illustrate the nuances and complexities that explain how inclusion can be a top developmental policy priority while not explicitly referenced in development plans.

- In the nine host countries that significantly reference IDPs, seven also significantly reference refugees. Only Colombia and Nigeria significantly reference IDPs without also referencing refugees.
- No LIC or MIC development plan included clear, comprehensive costing of services and support forcibly displaced populations.

Sector development plans

- **There is markedly higher rate of explicit inclusion in LIC and MIC sector development plans, indicating that advocacy efforts at sector level were more successful:**
  - o 56% of education plans make significant reference to displaced populations whilst 38% mainstreaming inclusion;
  - o 40% of health plans make significant reference to displaced populations whilst 32% mainstreaming inclusion;
  - o 39% (11) of LIC and MIC technical and vocational education and training plans make significant reference to displaced populations whilst 21% (six) mainstreaming inclusion.
- There is evidence of "silos" and fragmentation demonstrated by the lack of correlation between significant reference in LIC and MIC national development and sector plans.
- 11 of 28 LIC and MIC technical and vocational education and training plans significantly reference forcibly displaced people with six of these plans doing so in a manner that is consistent with mainstreaming inclusion.

2.2.1 Inclusion in LIC and MIC national development plans

None of the development plans within scope mainstream inclusion in its planning. However, 15 of the 58 plans included significant references to refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) in relation to planning developmental type activities. The remaining 43 plans did not make significant references to refugees or internally displaced persons in relation to planning (Table 3).

Table 3. Prevalence of inclusion of refugees and IDPs in LIC and MIC national development plans

Host country	Tone/Theme of reference to forced displacement	Significantly refers to refugees?	Significantly refers to IDPs?	Forcibly displaced hosted (refugees and IDPs)	Displaced as % of total in-country population
Syria	Reintegration, rebuilding, state building	✓		7 259 947	41.5%
Colombia	Return, reintegration		✓	7 109 308	14.0%
Dem. Republic of Congo	Most vulnerable			6 066 366	6.8%
Afghanistan	Reintegration, rebuilding, state building	✓		5 771 008	14.8%
Türkiye				5 175 621	6.1%
Ethiopia				4 992 047	4.3%
Yemen				4 401 635	14.8%
Sudan				4 391 059	10.0%
Nigeria	Most vulnerable		✓	3 414 228	16.6%
Jordan		✓		3 094 809	30.3%
Somalia	Reintegration, rebuilding, state building	✓	✓	2 997 562	18.9%
West Bank and Gaza Strip		✓	✓	2 411 919	50.2%
South Sudan	Return, reintegration, state building			2 233 597	20.0%
Pakistan				1 677 822	0.8%
Burkina Faso				1 614 399	7.7%
Uganda	Return, security risk	✓		1 599 294	3.5%
Iraq	State building	✓		1 498 110	3.7%
Cameroon	Return, humanitarian			1 402 054	5.3%
Peru				1 394 125	4.2%
Bangladesh				1 387 819	0.8%
Lebanon				1 337 308	19.6%
China	External security problem			1 246 859	0.1%
Chad	Return, humanitarian	✓		976 430	5.9%
Mozambique				902 541	2.9%
Ukraine	Return, state building	✓		859 113	1.9%
Iran				811 820	1.0%
Philippines				809 889	0.7%
Kenya	Settlement of landless IDPs, repatriation			784 369	1.5%
India				753 654	0.1%
Central African Republic	Return, reintegration, state building	✓	✓	728 023	15.1%
Mexico	Foreign affairs			673 046	0.5%
Azerbaijan				656 549	6.5%
Myanmar	Role in peace process			650 450	1.2%
Ecuador	Equal rights			568 341	3.2%
Niger				530 703	2.2%
Chile				513 884	2.7%
Brazil	Reintegration, rebuilding, state building			483 888	0.2%
Mali		✓	✓	400 948	2.0%
Egypt				342 178	0.3%
Georgia				336 192	9.1%
Côte d'Ivoire	Inclusion, most vulnerable, indigenous			301 705	1.1%
Guatemala	Foreign affairs, demographics			268 264	1.6%
South Africa				250 763	0.4%
Honduras	Target to reduce no. of 'internal refugees'			247 363	2.5%
Indonesia	Housing displaced by earthquake			241 241	0.1%
Haiti	Target to reduce no. of refugees			236 343	2.1%
United Rep. of Tanzania				234 870	0.4%
Libya				200 338	2.9%
Burundi				199 196	1.7%
Malaysia	Inclusion, legal status, human rights			188 441	0.6%
Costa Rica		✓		184 497	3.6%
Argentina				179 698	0.4%
Thailand				145 301	0.2%
Panama				142 172	3.3%
Rwanda	Displaced by disaster			122 988	0.9%
Dominican Rep.				116 804	1.1%
Congo				111 608	0.1%
Mauritania	Clear donor driven			105 311	2.3%
Algeria	Development			103 474	0.2%

Note: Colour coding - light green: significant mention of inclusion; white: no significant mention of inclusion; "forcibly displaced" include: Refugees, asylum seekers, Venezuelans displaced abroad, refugees under UNRWA mandate, conflict and disaster IDPs, as of Dec. 2021
Source: Baseline analysis; displacement data: UNHCR and IDMC 2022.

The size of the forcibly displaced population in the hosting country appears to be a bigger predictor of inclusion than its proportion in relation to the host country's overall population. The host country's level of fragility is also strongly correlated with inclusion. Countries classified as extremely fragile are more likely to reference displaced populations. This is likely related to a higher level of participation of humanitarian actors in development planning in fragile contexts than in more stable and higher income hose countries.

Refugees are more likely to be significantly referenced in host country development plans than internally displaced people are. Nigeria and Colombia are the only two countries in which IDPs are significantly referenced without also referencing refugees.

Amongst the 15 host countries that significantly reference inclusion in their national development plans (Table 4), such references are mostly associated with developmental planning on health and safety and security (14 cases), followed by education (twelve cases). Calls for more spending, development finance and inclusion in the local job market feature in two out of three plans. Inclusion is associated with domestic resource mobilisation in only two host country development plans.

In six plans, forcibly displaced populations were referred to with numbers, implying the possibility to include forcibly displaced persons in performance targets and related monitoring indicators. However, forcibly displaced populations are not systematically disaggregated for monitoring and evaluation in any host country development plans.

Seven of the 15 national plans refer to refugees and IDPs in a manner that could be associated with opportunity, that is typically related to reintegration, return and state building. Eight of the 15 countries describe forcibly displaced people primarily as a challenge, for instance calling for repatriation of refugees to their country of origin, or a placing displacement as a security risk.

Table 4. National development plans with significant reference: Where does forced displacement feature?

Host country	Context	Health	Dev. Financing	Social Protection	Indicators	Education	Domestic revenue mobilization	Jobs / Private sector development	Safety / security
Syria									
Colombia									
Afghanistan									
Nigeria									
Jordan									
Somalia									
West Bank and Gaza Strip									
South Sudan									
Uganda									
Iraq									
Chad									
Ukraine									
Central African Republic									
Mali									
Costa Rica									
# of references	15	11	10	14	10	12	2	10	14

Note: Colour coding - dark green: inclusion mainstreamed; light green: significant mention of inclusion; white: no significant mention of inclusion
Source: Baseline analysis.

None of the national development plans included clear, comprehensive costing of forcibly displaced populations. There is little evidence in the national development plans that refugees and IDPs are included in countries socio-economic data. Specific information on nature of displacement did not appear prominently in any national development plans.

Business and/or investment plans are not associated with inclusion in host country plans. In the case of refugees, burden sharing is more likely to appear when talking about transferring burden to the international community or to the country of origin. What appear to be more fertile pathways for inclusion are recognising

that health, education, anti-poverty, and human rights advocates share a sense of ownership of the inclusion agenda. Planners do not appear to acknowledge the domestic resource mobilisation potentials through regularising refugees in the local economy so that they pay taxes.

2.2.2 Inclusion in sector development plans (health, education, TVET)

While references to the inclusion of forcibly displaced persons is much more significant, and even mainstreamed, in sector plans than it is in national development plans, there is little cross-referencing of such issues across plans within the same country. Significant references to inclusion range from 57% (education), 40% (health) to 39% (TVET).

National education plans: Education plans display a higher reference to inclusion of forcibly displaced persons than national development plans. Of the 47 education sector plans analysed for references to inclusion in host countries, 27 significantly reference forcibly displaced people (57%) (Table 4). Moreover, 18 plans do so in a consistently mainstreamed fashion (38%). Such reference does not necessarily stem from a significant reference in the national development plan, and sectoral plans often seem to be done in a silo from national development plans. Of the 27 countries that significantly reference inclusion, only nine countries also significantly reference inclusion of forcibly displaced persons in the education sections of their national development plans. An example of this is Ethiopia, where the country has developed a specific refugee education inclusion strategy, but without referring to the strategy nor to inclusion in a significant way in the national development plan, nor the education sector plan. In addition, there are several cases in which inclusion of forcibly displaced persons is mainstreamed in education sector plans, but without significant reference in national development plans. This includes the cases of Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Honduras, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, The Philippines, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen.

National health plans: National health plans significantly reference forcibly displaced persons in 19 of 47 countries (40%), with 15 of such plans doing so in a mainstreamed way (32%). Of the 19 countries, only nine also significantly reference inclusion in the health sections of their national development plans. In addition, of the 15 countries that mainstream inclusion in their health sector plans, six do not have significant reference to forcibly displaced persons in the health sections of their national development plans. Cameroon's health plan ties forced displacement and inclusion to reducing risks of epidemic outbreaks.

National technical and vocational education and training (TVET) plans: In 11 of 28 national TVET plans, references to the inclusion of forcibly displaced persons is significant (39%) (Table 6), with six of such plans doing so in a mainstreamed (21%). There is little cross-referencing across plans. Of the 11 countries where inclusion is significant in TVET plans, only three countries also significantly reference forcibly displaced persons in the jobs or private sector development sections of their national development plans.

Box 2. Colombia case study: Displacement is firmly anchored in development planning

As of February 2023, some 6.8 million Colombians were internally displaced. In addition, the country hosted some 2.5 million refugees and migrants from Venezuela, bringing the total displaced and migrant population in Colombia to 9.3 million people. The country's National Development Plan 2018-2022 places strong emphasis on IDPs as especially important to recovery, reintegration, and development planning. The Plan includes significant emphasis on IDPs in relation to investments in health, social protection, education, jobs, and private sector development, as well as safety and security.

The concerns of IDPs are not only seen as vital to national reconciliation, but they also form part of the constituencies to which law and policy makers are answerable. The Colombian Congress allocates 21 of its 188 seats to "5 members of the *Comunes* (formerly FARC) [and] 16 members elected from Special Transitional Peace Constituencies (CITREP)". These constitutionally guaranteed representatives are part and parcel of Colombia's political settlement.

Colombia's long history of conflict related forced displacement is still fresh in the public memory and discussed in a way that invokes a debt needing to be repaid to populations affected. When talking about inclusion of forcibly displaced people in development planning, key informants explained that victims' groups, activist networks, and peace champions still set the agenda and define a developmental narrative that strongly emphasises solidarity. These factors provide a strong incentive that high-level planning agendas are responsive to the needs of displaced populations.

The process for the development of the new national development plan was launched with *the Diálogos Regionales Vinculantes*, held between September and December 2022. This consultative dialogue gave voice to communities and regions on their priorities for the government during its four-year term. This phase was participatory and consultative, with representatives from the central government visiting regions to hold public events and listen to the perspectives of local communities.

Colombia's long experience with the displacement of its own population can be seen as a conduit for the inclusion of refugees and migrants from Venezuela, albeit not referenced in the national development plan. The narrative of solidarity contributes to mobilising support for inclusion. In July 2022, Colombia's National Council for Economic and Social Policy (CONEP), part of the National Planning Department, issued the "Strategy for the attention of migration from Venezuela" (CONEP 4100). The strategy makes a strong case for the social, economic and cultural integration of refugees and migrants to be supported by national institutions. It specifically recommends the implementation of strategies that increase the supply of services and make them accessible for migrants and hosting communities.

Source: Key informant interviews; literature and policy review.

2.3. Inclusion in donor development co-operation strategies

Key findings: Donor development co-operation strategies

- **52% of DAC members and participants (17 of 33 countries) make inclusion a significant aspect of their global strategies.**
- No donor mainstreams inclusion across their entire development co-operation strategy.
- Social protection, safety and security are most associated with references to inclusion of refugees and IDPs. Health and education appear less often.
- All donor strategies that reference IDPs also significantly reference refugees.

2.3.1. More than half of donor countries reference inclusion

No donor country mainstreams inclusion across its entire strategy. However, more than half of DAC members and participants significantly refer to inclusion in their development co-operation strategies (17 of 33 countries, 52%), and Denmark and the Netherlands make inclusion a major priority. Conversely, 16 of the 33 donors (48%) have no significant reference to forcibly displaced populations. IDPs are not referenced as often as refugees, as only eight donor strategies reference IDPs (24%). On the other hand, all donors that reference IDPs also reference refugees (Table 6).

Table 5. Development co-operation strategies of DAC members and participants with significant reference: Where does forced displacement feature?

Development finance provider	Context	Dev. financing	Health	Education	Jobs / private sector development	Safety	Social protection	Domestic revenue mobilisation	Indicators
Austria	🟩			🟩		🟩	🟩		
Czech Republic	🟩	🟩							
Denmark	🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩		🟩
EU Institutions	🟩	🟩							
Finland						🟩			
Germany		🟩		🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	
Iceland	🟩	🟩		🟩			🟩	🟩	🟩
Ireland	🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩		🟩
Italy	🟩	🟩					🟩		🟩
Japan	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩		
Luxembourg	🟩	🟩					🟩		
Netherlands	🟩	🟩		🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩		🟩
Poland				🟩					
Slovak Republic	🟩		🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩	🟩		
Switzerland	🟩		🟩			🟩			
UAE	🟩		🟩		🟩	🟩	🟩		
USA			🟩		🟩	🟩			
# of references	13	9	6	9	7	10	11	2	5

Source: Baseline analysis.

Amongst the 17 donor countries that reference inclusion (Table 5), social protection is the most referenced sector (eleven out of 17 donors, 65%). Other important references include safety and security, which is linked to inclusion in ten out of 17 strategies (59%), education and development financing are referred to

in just over half of strategies (nine out of 17 donors, 53%). Health, on the other hand, ranks in only six of 17 donor plans (35%).

Human rights and anti-discrimination advocates in Canada, Spain and the US (like in host countries Ecuador, and Costa Rica) have made inclusion a pillar of the anti-discrimination and human rights agenda. These donors make excluding forced migrants from their development finance an act of discrimination.

Specifically, the US (USAID 2022a:12) opens the window to making inclusion a feature in its' two flagship global programmes on agriculture/livelihoods and on health (Feed the Future and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)). Equally important is that the US emphasises a working politically approach that could be capitalised on to strengthen the influence of "reformers and activists" (USAID 2022a:7-8) at country level. Commitments like this make it possible to mobilise donor support for inclusion in policy dialogue on national development planning.

Other examples relate to Germany and Austria both of whom are committed to inclusion of forcibly displaced populations in education programming. For example, this already features in Germany's co-funded EU Team Europe Initiative on Technical Vocational Education and Training in Kenya.

Table 6. Inclusion of forced displacement in high-level donor development co-operation strategies

Development finance provider	Significantly refers to refugees?	Significantly refers to IDPs?	ODA % of GNI	ODA million US$	In-donor refugee costs, % of ODA by provider
Australia			0.22%	3,444	0.0%
Austria	✓		0.31%	1,460	2.1%
Belgium			0.46%	2,571	5.2%
Bulgaria			0.12%	67	6.6%
Canada			0.32%	6,271	10.1%
Czech Republic	✓	✓	0.13%	362	1.5%
Denmark	✓	✓	0.70%	2,874	2.0%
EU Institutions	✓	✓	n/a	19,027	0.0%
Finland	✓		0.47%	1,436	4.1%
France			0.52%	15,448	7.9%
Germany	✓	✓	0.74%	32,232	8.2%
Greece			0.12%	264	30.4%
Hungary			0.29%	455	0.6%
Iceland	✓		0.28%	105	5.4%
Ireland	✓	✓	0.31%	1,169	3.2%
Italy	✓	✓	0.28%	6,017	3.8%
Japan	✓		0.34%	17,619	0.0%
Korea			0.16%	2,855	0.0%
Luxembourg	✓		0.99%	539	0.0%
Netherlands	✓		0.52%	5,288	10.6%
New Zealand			0.28%	681	1.2%
Norway			0.93%	4,673	1.0%
Poland	✓		0.15%	952	0.7%
Portugal			0.18%	450	2.2%
Romania			0.12%	327	0.1%
Slovak Republic	✓		0.13%	151	0.6%
Slovenia			0.19%	115	2.3%
Spain			0.25%	3,542	5.5%
Sweden			0.92%	5,927	2.5%
Switzerland	✓	✓	0.51%	3,923	8.2%
UAE	✓		0.40%	1,500	
UK			0.50%	16,000	5.0%
USA	✓	✓	0.18%	42,311	3.6%

Note: ODA data for the year 2021
Source: Baseline analysis; OECD Creditor Reporting System.

Box 3. Sweden case study: Migration and refugees is among the thematic priorities for development co-operation

Sweden's de-facto inclusion of migration and refugees in development co-operation policy, planning and practice illustrates that these high-level development co-operation strategies need to be seen in the context of other policy tools. The absence of explicit reference to the inclusion of refugees and IDPs in Sweden's global periodic development co-operation strategy does not pre-empt inclusion from actually being implemented in specific regional or country strategies. This may also be the case for other donor countries.

Sweden's "Strategy for Sweden's Global Development Cooperation in Sustainable Social Development 2018-2022" does not make specific reference to the inclusion of refugees and IDPs. Yet, thematic policy direction, as well as contextual regional and country strategies have set migration and forced displacement as one of the priorities.

The 2016 "Policy framework for Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance", which has shaped programming decisions to date, puts migration and development (GoS 2016, section 5.6) as one of eight thematic priorities for development programming and financing. It sets out the long-term policy direction that "Sweden will contribute to improving the capacity of countries of destination to manage migration in a way that safeguards the rights of refugees and migrants and promotes the countries' development."

Furthermore, country or regional development strategies are developed based on inputs from Sida and other actors in partner countries and the region, who consult with civil society and government in the country and regions concerned. These consultations are critical for mainstreaming forced displacement. Reasons for mainstreaming may also be motivated by political interest or preference of a certain approach. Mainstreaming can be a result both of top-down and bottom-up interest. Due to these factors, Sweden has prioritised mainstreaming inclusion of forced displacement into a number of geographic, regional, and related strategies.

The rapid growth of forced displacement as a developmental challenge is still nascent in policy making. As a contrast, gender, climate change and democratic governance took generations to be transformed into essential requirements in planning for effective development co-operation. This is reflected, for example, in the prevalence of gender considerations in all planned activities, the appointment of gender officers to projects and programmes, the monitoring of gender specific indicators and even the roll out of gender-based budgeting in Swedish co-operation. In comparison with gender, forced displacement as a mainstreaming priority is still in a nascent state.

Sweden's government elected in 2022 recognises the importance of migration and forced displacement both in terms of its role on the international stage and in terms of its mandate from the electorate. The wording in the new budget bill called for effective measures to reduce the root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration. As new instructions are given to revise strategies and/or make new appropriations, different dynamics will present and there may be opportunities to mainstream forced displacement further.

Source: Key informant interviews; policy analysis.

2.4. Inclusion in UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks

Key findings: UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks

- 76% of UNSDCFs make significant reference to inclusion. 15% of UNSDCFs have mainstreamed inclusion.
- Inclusion in UNSDCFs is primarily associated with social protection, access to jobs and private sector development, followed by health, and safety and security.
- UNSDCFs do not significantly emphasise the value of inclusion to domestic revenue mobilisation (taxation).
- 47% of UNSDCFs significantly reference IDPs. Of these 27 countries, 7 only mention IDPs and do not reference refugees (Colombia, South Sudan, Mozambique, India, Georgia, Honduras and Libya).

Eight of the 58 LICs and MICs which have a UN cooperation framework in place display signs of mainstreaming inclusion (Table 7). Of the remaining 50 countries, 34 make significant references to refugees and/or IDPs. 12 UN cooperation frameworks do not provide evidence of significant reference to inclusion.

Cameroon, Chad, Mauritania, Mexico, Rwanda, Syria, Uganda, and Ukraine benefit from UN cooperation frameworks that have successfully mainstreamed inclusion in development planning. In most of these countries, inclusion is referenced mainly to refugee populations. The notable exceptions are UN cooperation frameworks in Cameroon, Chad and Ukraine, that explicitly focus on IDPs as well. Cameroon makes inclusion particularly prevalent in its performance objectives. Mexico links inclusion to the wider migration agenda. The UN cooperation framework in Rwanda describes inclusion as part of a new paradigm in which refugees are graduated from displaced people with rights into consumers and net contributors to the local economy.

The larger the population of forcibly displaced people in real terms or as a portion of host country population is correlated with inclusion. Nigeria (3.4 million displaced), Pakistan (1.7 million displaced), Burkina Faso (1.6 million displaced), China (1.2 million displaced) stand out as countries in which the UN opted not to emphasise inclusion in co-operation frameworks despite these countries hosting over a million displaced people.

The UN cooperation framework in Ethiopia stands out as an atypical case in which there is significant reference to the humanitarian-development nexus, that does not translate into inclusion being mainstreamed. Another example pertains to Mozambique which does not mainstream inclusion but includes a statement saying that the potential contribution of displaced persons and refugees to the achievement of the SDGs is not yet explored, thus implying inclusion is on the agenda just not yet articulated in the UN's development planning in country.

Inclusion is mostly associated in UN cooperation frameworks respectively with social protection and jobs or private sector development (36 of 51 frameworks), then health, safety, and security (35 of 51 frameworks). In 34 of 51 UN cooperation frameworks, inclusion is connected to calling for spending on development investments or developmental type services. Education is referenced in 32 of the 51 frameworks.

Table 7. Prevalence of inclusion in UN cooperation frameworks in displacement affected LICs and MICs

Host Country	Tone/theme of reference to forced displacement	Significantly refers to refugees?	Significantly refers to IDPs?	Forcibly displaced hosted (IDPs and Refugees)	Displaced as % of total in-country population
Syria	Refugees Abroad, State Building			7 259 947	41.5%
Colombia	Refers to Regional Plan on Migration (Venezuelan)			7 109 308	14.0%
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Approximating Full Inclusion; including DRM			6 066 366	6.8%
Afghanistan	Legal Conventions			5 771 008	14.8%
Türkiye	Service Delivery			5 175 621	6.1%
Ethiopia	Transboundary and Combatting Violent Extremism			4 992 047	4.3%
Yemen	UNDAF from 2011	N/A	N/A	4 401 635	14.8%
Sudan	Legal Conventions			4 391 059	10.0%
Nigeria				3 414 228	16.6%
Jordan	Legal Conventions			3 094 809	30.3%
Somalia	Legal Conventions			2 997 562	18.9%
West Bank and Gaza Strip				2 411 919	50.2%
South Sudan	High reference to humanitarian acces			2 233 597	20.0%
Pakistan	Service Delivery			1 677 822	0.8%
Burkina Faso				1 614 399	7.7%
Uganda				1 599 294	3.5%
Iraq				1 498 110	3.7%
Cameroon				1 402 054	5.3%
Peru	Inclusion as human rights / anti-discrimination			1 394 125	4.2%
Bangladesh	Most Vulnerable			1 387 819	0.8%
Lebanon	Tensions with Host Communities			1 337 308	19.6%
China	Link to Migrants' access to service			1 246 859	0.1%
Chad				976 430	5.9%
Mozambique	"Contribution of displaced persons and refugees to SDGs is not explored"			902 541	2.9%
Ukraine	Unfolding Crisis			859 113	1.9%
Iran				811 820	1.0%
Philippines	Leave no-one behind			809 889	0.7%
Kenya	Linked to vulnerable ASAL Populations and name assylum seekers			784 369	1.5%
India	Most vulnerable, LNOB			753 654	0.1%
CAR	Reconciliation and Reintegration			728 023	15.1%
Mexico	Transversal: Gender Equality and Migrants and Refugees			673 046	0.5%
Azerbaijan	Service Delivery			656 549	6.5%
Myanmar	No developmental strategy - humanitarian response	N/A	N/A	650 450	1.2%
Ecuador	Link to trafficking, impact on host communities			568 341	3.2%
Niger				530 703	2.2%
Brazil	Inclusion - local integration / decentralized to municipal			483 888	0.2%
Mali	Reconciliation			400 948	2.0%
Egypt				342 178	0.3%
Georgia	Focus mainly on displaced			336 192	9.1%
Cote d'Ivoire				301 705	1.1%
Guatemala	Inclsuion, Anti-discrimination; strengthening voice and governances,			268 264	1.6%
South Africa	No plan	N/A	N/A	250 763	0.4%
Honduras	Volence driving displacement			247 363	2.5%
Indonesia	Refugees as vulnerable - covid & legal reform			241 241	0.1%
Haiti	No developmental strategy - humanitarian response	N/A	N/A	236 343	2.1%
United Rep. of Tanzania	High profile standalone priority			234 870	0.4%
Libya	Reintegration, Rebuilding, State Building			200 338	2.9%
Burundi	Durable Solutions / Access to services, land, jobs / 54% of whom are hosted by host families,			199 196	1.7%
Malaysia				188 441	0.6%
Costa Rica	Anti-discrimination; strengthening voice and governances,			184 497	3.6%
Argentina	Anti-discrimination; strengthening voice and governances, Venezuelans			179 698	0.4%
Thailand				145 301	0.2%
Panama				142 172	3.3%
Rwanda	Full inclusion			122 988	0.9%
Dominican Rep				116 804	1.1%
Congo	Peaceful cohabitation between displaced persons (refugees, returnees, IDPs) and host populations			111 608	0.1%
Mauritania	High level of inclusion			105 311	2.3%
Algeria				103 474	0.2%

Note: Colour coding - dark green: inclusion mainstreamed; light green: significant mention of inclusion; white: no significant mention of inclusion; "forcibly displaced" include: Refugees, asylum seekers, Venezuelans displaced abroad, refugees under UNRWA mandate, conflict IDPs, disaster IDPs, as of end 2021; for Yemen, the UNSDCF 2022-24 is also available, but was not considered in the analysis.
Source: Baseline analysis; displacement data: UNHCR and IDMC 2022.

3 Advocacy towards inclusion of refugees and IDPs remains important

3.1. Inclusion of refugees and IDPs in development planning is nascent

Inclusion of refugees and IDPs in mainstream development planning processes is at a nascent state, compared to other inclusion policy areas. Over the course of development planning history, there have been many attempts at inclusion, aimed of various groups, including women, persons with disabilities and those affected by HIV+. Given the rising trend of forced displacement, inclusion in development planning is less of a luxury, and more of a necessity in ensuring that public planning responds to the needs of all parts of society.

Inclusion of forcibly displaced competes with other humanitarian and developmental priorities for attention. Unless inclusion remains consistently on the agenda, it will be lagging behind better organised advocates' priorities. A long history of forced displacement mainly as a *humanitarian* concern, means considerable work is to be done in demonstrating changing political incentives to favour inclusion in *development*.

3.2. Mapping pathways, influential actors, and engaging them

In order to achieve effective advocacy, mapping pathways and influential actors outside the humanitarian forced displacement space remains important. At country level, the entry point is to look at the inclusion of refugees and IDPs from the perspective of priorities for mainstream development planning, and the related political economy of planning processes. Recognising constituencies and groups that already invest in the inclusion agenda is vital to changing the narrative from being focused on sharing burden to sharing interests. Shared interest means the inclusion agenda is about acknowledging the over 100 million forcibly displaced people in plans and resource allocations. It is in the interests of government planners to do so, because they are primarily accountable to their domestic constituencies.

Pathways exist and could be capitalised on to better reflect on the benefits of inclusion. The baseline analysis findings indicate the importance of inclusion for policy makers outside the refugee/forced displacement/humanitarian space. Getting displaced children into school, for example, is an education priority. Ensuring access to health care for displaced people is a health sector policy priority, because it helps manage communicable diseases, and for health workers to deliver on their professional commitments. The analysis of development plans in South America and strategies by Canada and the United States demonstrate that inclusion is a priority for anti-discrimination and human rights policy makers. In Kenya, inclusion is a priority for policy makers pushing development for arid and semi-arid communities. And in many other countries inclusion is a priority for policy makers working on safety and security, domestic revenue mobilisation, and good governance of labour and business markets.

Box 4. Kenya case study: The incentives for inclusion of refugees are strongest at local level, less at national level

As of December 2022, Kenya hosted more than 573 000 refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons, mainly of Somali and South Sudanese nationality (UNHCR, 2023), who primarily reside in camp settings. The hosting context is characterised by repeated tense discussions on closing camps and returning refugees to their countries of origin.

In 2021, Kenya signed into law important commitments to "allow nearly half a million refugees living in Kenya an opportunity to integrate into the economy, have better access to education, work." However, the implementation of these commitments has shown limited progress in practice. For example, refugee schools are still primarily financed and run by UNHCR, and not directly through Kenya's Ministry of Education.

Due to the legacy of managing camps and building relations with local authorities, incentives for achieving inclusion are more favourable at local and regional levels. The town of Garissa, for example, is economically dependent on a population of more than a quarter million refugees in Dadaab. In this local context, refugee advocates are major resource providers and UNHCR has convening authority at the camp level. As a result, refugee-related issues have been included in the County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs) for Garissa and Turkana as part of the two area-based development plans.

At national level, incentives are less prevalent for translating inclusion commitments, policies, planning, and programming into practice. The ruling party's 68-page manifesto does not refer to refugees or forcibly displaced persons. Neither refugees nor other displaced people appear to be the subject of Parliament's joint and standing committees. In November 2022, the Principal Secretary for the Kenyan State Department for Planning presented key highlights of the upcoming national development plan, with no mention of refugees.

Development partners create positive incentives through the budget support type modalities for line ministries for other advocacy priorities. Refugees, on the other hand, fall under the mandate of Kenya's State Department for Immigration and Citizen Services. The Ministry of Interior and National Administration has less incentives for dialogue with international development partners, given that development finance in the form of budget support is mostly directed towards line ministries.

Kenya's gender sector working group, covering a less controversial topic than refugees, stands out for its comparative success at advocating for inclusion along gender lines in government policy as well as for attracting the support development partners. It influences sector and national development planning such as through incubating the revised 2023 education gender sector policy.

"Gender inclusion" is a key item and has come to constitute the narrative on equality and equity. "Refugee inclusion" on the other hand falls under "special needs", with refugees seen as a consideration equivalent to other niches. This approach siloes refugee inclusion, rather than mainstreaming it in education policy. This is echoed in the 2021 *Kenya Global Partnership for Education Compact* in which refugees are discussed almost exclusively in the context of camps, alongside displaced people in relation to special needs education.

Further analysis of what Government and development partner political priorities are in Kenya could inform entry points for accelerating the inclusion of refugees in national services. This could leverage existing dialogue between the donor community and government departments, many of which have so far not been supported to mainstream inclusion of refugees in their sector plans.

Source: Key informant interviews; policy and literature review.

There is potential for common cause with politically influential constituencies such as educators, health professionals, demographers, and security actors. This is particularly observable in several education sector plans such as DRC's, which explicitly commits to covering education costs for displaced people. Politically influential institutions and local advocates have an interest in making inclusion a reality, and thereby influence the agenda. Host country teachers and health care workers, for example, typically see displaced populations as equal citizens needing equivalent support. Teachers and nurses are highly influential political constituencies that host country governments typically rely on to get elected. Faith based organisations are highly influential political actors. Faith leaders hold regular dialogue with heads of state. Faith-based institutions thus have access to putting inclusion of refugees and IDPs on the agenda in a way that many development partners do not.

As the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for refugees and migrants from Venezuela demonstrates, there are opportunities for approaches without dividing efforts for economic migrants and forced displacement. In their policies, Guatemala, Haiti, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, and the Philippines emphasise the need to improve rights and protections for their own citizens as economic migrants. These countries have shared interests in protecting migrants, reducing exploitation and associated policy commitments that would benefit economic migrants and forcibly displaced populations alike. However, none of their national development plans significantly refer to inclusion.

3.3. Timing advocacy with planning cycles

A significant opportunity to advocate for more inclusion is when development strategies or plans come to an end, need to be revised, redrafted and tabled in parliament: 24 displacement LICs and MICs will revise their national development plans over the coming years; 14 DAC members and participants will revise their development co-operation strategies over 2024-25; UN cooperation frameworks in 24 displacement affected LICs and MICs will be revised by the end of 2023 (Table 8). Given the long-term nature of development plans, advocacy outside these planning cycles will have lower impact.

Table 8. Opportunities for dialogue on inclusion: Revision years of development plans

The table indicates the year in which the development plan is due to be revised, and during which related planning processes will take place.

2023	2024	2025
Displacement affected LIC and MIC national development plans		
Brazil	Jordan	Ethiopia
Burundi	Somalia	Yemen
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	South Sudan	Nigeria
Guatemala	Uganda	Pakistan
Mali	Bangladesh	Cameroon
Syria	Ukraine	China
Türkiye	Mexico	Mozambique
West Bank and Gaza Strip	Myanmar	Côte d'Ivoire
	Egypt	Haiti
	South Africa	United Rep. of Tanzania
	Indonesia	Malaysia
	Rwanda	Panama
	Mauritania	Dominican Republic.

Donor development cooperation strategies

Canada	Bulgaria	France
Iceland	Czech Republic	Germany
Italy	EU	Greece
Romania	Switzerland	Hungary
Slovak Republic		Korea
UK		USA

UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks

Afghanistan	Republic of Congo	Argentina
Burundi	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Azerbaijan
Colombia	Iraq	China
Rwanda	Mali	Côte d'Ivoire
Ukraine	Syria	Ethiopia
		Georgia
		Guatemala
		Indonesia
		Lebanon
		Libya
		Mexico
		Somalia
		Türkiye
		Uganda

Source: Baseline analysis.

4 Policy recommendations

Five policy recommendations are proposed:

1: Policy dialogue on inclusion between displacement affected LICs and MICs and development partners

International development partners, and LICs and MICs affected by forced displacement, should ensure that dialogue on inclusion-oriented policies always forms part of development planning and co-operation. For LICs and MICs this means making the case, including costing refugees and IDPs, in national development plans, aid architectures, and policies related to development. For international development partners, this means linking existing broader development co-operation programmes, and projects, to policy dialogue on inclusion of the displaced. The *Refugee Policy Review Framework* of the World Bank IDA Refugee and Host Community Sub-Window is a good example in this regard. Development partners should also incentivise inclusion through predictable multi-year development finance for inclusive national services.

2: Engagement of sector leaders, civil society and the private sector in inclusive development planning

Development partners should continue to recognise the importance of leaders in sectors for shaping the inclusion agenda, from health, education, social protection, safety and security, good governance, human rights and domestic resource mobilisation. LIC and MIC displacement-affected countries, their development partners, including those in the UN system, should engage in dialogue with influential actors in civil society (vocational groups, humanitarian and human rights actors, faith-based organisations, political parties) and the private sector (interest to address labour market gaps), who have shared interests in the inclusion of the forcibly displaced, and the ability to influence development planning.

3: Ownership, accountability and monitoring

At the country level, government ownership and accountability for the inclusion of refugees and IDPs should be strengthened, through inclusive processes and policies which result in a clear understanding how inclusion is contextualised and integrated with existing government, social and market systems, and development planning. The displaced should be included and dis-aggregated in national statistics and household surveys. Refugees and IDPs themselves should be enabled to become a constituency with a voice in development planning. UNHCR, in partnership with UN country teams and development partners, is well positioned to support governments in this regard.

Displacement affected countries, development partners, along with all stakeholders, are encouraged to actively engage in the GPEDC monitoring process at country level. This includes contributing to data collection and participating in the multistakeholder action dialogues. This will allow the GPEDC monitoring

to generate useful data on the inclusion of IDPs, stateless, refugees and asylum seekers in national development strategies, results frameworks and budgets, and in development partner country strategies. The new GPEDC monitoring action dialogues offers a platform for evidence-based dialogue to discuss the monitoring findings and their implications, including for the shared commitment to leave no-one behind.

At the global level, data-based monitoring of inclusion in economies, national social services, and development planning, such as the baseline analysis in this report, should continue over time. The aggregated results of the GPEDC monitoring exercise will form an important component of this, as well as UNHCR's findings from country-level monitoring, in partnership with the UNHCR-World Bank Joint Data Centre, the UN Development Coordination Office (DCO), and the UN Sustainable Development Group.

4: Refugee and IDP response planning: Inclusion feasibility assessment

When designing country level response strategies for refugee and internal displacement situations, the feasibility of the inclusion of forcibly displaced in national systems, labour markets, and related development planning should be systematically assessed at country and sub-national levels. Feasibility assessments should not only assess the capacity of social service systems and labour markets in displacement affected regions of the country, the legal and policy framework, but also the political will required to make inclusion a reality, including at sub-national level. Such feasibility assessments can inform development planning and related resource allocation, and/or humanitarian response planning where inclusion is not feasible. Such assessments also help avoid unsustainable system dependencies, and help plan for an eventual exit of international support systems.

Feasibility assessments are also ideally included in annual reporting and monitoring at country level, for example in the context of monitoring UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks. Alternatively, donors like the EU could consider including such an assessment in their civil society road map processes, or in reporting on human rights.

5: Compelling evidence on inclusion of the displaced in national services and the economy

For inclusion of the displaced to graduate from a commitment to a policy decision that is implemented and resourced, it must tell a compelling story, leading policy makers to conclude that inclusion is the right thing to do.

All stakeholders should undertake more contextualised research and evaluation in this area. The impact of inclusion on the displaced and host communities should be monitored. This benefits from being coupled with deliberate communication efforts to disseminate findings. Inclusion is relevant across different aspects of policy making, including: Climate change adaptation; key sectors such as health, early childhood development, education, social protection, rule of law, safety and security; domestic resource mobilisation; key economic and labour market sectors; fragility; and human rights.

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Annex A. Low- and middle-income country national development plans considered

Country	Influence Year	Name of Plan/Strategy	Displaced Actual	% of Host
Afghanistan	2026	Afghanistan National Development Strategy	5 771 008	14.82%
Algeria	2022	Establishment of Algeria's National Vision [2013 to] 2030 [NOT CLEAR IF PROJECT DOCUMENT OR STRATEGY]	103 474	0.24%
Argentina		*No plan available*	179 698	0.40%
Azerbaijan	2026	Socio-economic Development Strategy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 2022—2026	656 549	6.49%
Bangladesh	2024	8th Five Year Plan	1 387 819	0.84%
Brazil	2023	Estrategia Federal De Desenvolvimento Para O Brasil 2020-2031	483 888	0.23%
Burkina Faso	2022	National Economic and Social Development Plan 2016-2020	1 614 399	7.72%
Burundi	2023	Burundi National Development plan 2018-2023	199 196	1.68%
Cameroon	2025	National Development Strategy 2030	1 402 054	5.28%
Central African Republic	2022	National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan	728 023	15.07%
Chad	2022	National Development Plan 2017-2021	976 430	5.94%
China	2025	China's National Plan on Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development	1 246 859	0.09%
Colombia	2022	National Development Plan 2018-2022	7 109 308	13.97%
Congo	2022	National Plan of Development 2018-2022	111 608	0.12%
Costa Rica	2022	National Plan of Development 2018-2022	184 497	3.62%
Côte d'Ivoire	2025	PND 2021-2025 (Synthetic Summary)	301 705	1.14%
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	2023	National Strategic Development Plan 2019-2023	6 066 366	6.77%
Dominican Rep.	2025	National Strategy for Development 2030	116 804	1.08%
Ecuador	2022	National Development Plan 2017-2021	568 341	3.22%
Egypt	2024	Vision 2030	342 178	0.34%
Ethiopia	2025	Ten Years Development Plan 2021-2030	4 992 047	4.34%
Georgia		*No plan - decentralisation and 10-year plans for infrastructure and economy*	336 192	9.05%
Guatemala	2023	National Development Plan 2014-2032	268 264	1.59%
Haiti	2025	Strategic Development Plan 2030	236 343	2.07%
Honduras	2022	Strategic Plan OF GOVERNMENT 2018 - 2022	247 363	2.50%
India	N/A	N/A	753 654	0.05%
Indonesia	2024	National Medium-Term Development Plan for 20220-2024	241 241	0.09%
Iran	2022	6th Five Year Development Plan	811 820	0.97%
Iraq	2022	National Development Plan 2018-2022	1 498 110	3.72%
Jordan	2024	Jordan 2025	3 094 809	30.34%

Kenya	2022	Third Medium Term Plan 2018-2022	784 369	1.46%
Lebanon	N/A	N/A	1 337 308	19.59%
Libya	2029	2030 Vision	200 338	2.92%
Malaysia	2025	Twelfth Malaysia Plan	188 441	0.58%
Mali	2023	Strategic Framework for Economic Recovery and Development 2019-2023	400 948	1.98%
Mauritania	2024	Economic Development Document 2016-2030	105 311	2.26%
Mexico	2024	National Development Plan 2019-2024	673 046	0.52%
Mozambique	2025	National Development Strategy 2015-2035	902 541	2.89%
Myanmar	2024	Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018-2030	650 450	1.20%
Niger	2022	Economic and Social Development Plan 2017-2021	530 703	2.19%
Nigeria	2025	National Development Plan 2021-2025	3 414 228	16.57%
Pakistan	2025	Vision 2025	1 677 822	0.76%
West Bank and Gaza Strip	2023	National Development Plan 2021-2023	2 411 919	50.22%
Panama	2025	Aligning national development with National Strategic Plan with State Vision Panama 2030	142 172	3.29%
Peru	2022	Plan Peru 2011-2021	1 394 125	4.23%
Philippines	2022	Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022	809 889	0.74%
Rwanda	2024	7 Years Government Programme	122 988	0.95%
Somalia	2024	SOMALIA NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2020 to 2024	2 997 562	18.86%
South Africa	2024	National Development Plan 2030	250 763	0.42%
South Sudan	2024	Revised National Development Strategy	2 233 597	19.96%
Sudan	2030	The Twenty-Five--Year National Strategy	4 391 059	10.01%
Syria	2023	The National Development Program for Post-War Syria, Syria Strategic Plan 2030	7 259 947	41.49%
Thailand	2022	Twelfth National Economic and Social Development Plan 2017-2021	145 301	0.21%
Türkiye	2023	11th Development Plan	5 175 621	6.14%
Uganda	2024	National Development Plan III	1 599 294	3.50%
Ukraine	2024	Ukraine National Recovery Plan 2022-2026	859 113	1.95%
United Rep. of Tanzania	2025	Tanzania National Development Plan 2021/2-2025/6	234 870	0.39%
Yemen	2025	Yemen's Strategic Vision 2025	4 401 635	14.76%

Annex B. Low- and middle-income country sector development plans considered

Country	Health sector development plans
Afghanistan	Islamic Republic of Afghanistan National Health Promotion Strategy 2014-2020
Algeria	National Multisectoral Strategic Plan for the Integrated Control of Non-Communicable 2015-2019
Argentina	2010 Health Sector Policy
Azerbaijan	National Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases 2015-2020
Bangladesh	N/A- Health Policy 2011
Brazil	Institutional Strategic Planning of the Ministry of Health for the years 2020 – 2023
Burundi	National Health Plan 2016-2025
Cameroon	Health Sector Strategy 2016-2027
Central African Republic	Strategic Plan 2018-2022
Chad	Multi-Sector Plan on Non-Communicable Diseases
China	Health China 2030
Colombia	Ten-year Public Health Plan 2012-2021
Costa Rica	National Health Plan 2016-2020
Côte d'Ivoire	National Adolescence and Youth Health Policy 2016
Ecuador	Ecuador Road to Universal Health
Ethiopia	Health Sector Transformation Plan 2020-2025
Georgia	Healthcare State Programme
Guatemala	Program to Strengthen the Institutional Health Services 2022
Honduras	National Health Plan 2014-2018
India	National Multisectoral Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable Diseases 2017-2022
Iraq	National Health Policy
Jordan	The National Strategy for Health Sector in Jordan 2015- 2019
Kenya	Health Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2023
Lebanon	Strategic Health plan 2016-2020
Malaysia	National Policy for Quality in Healthcare 2022-2026
Mali	Ten-Year Health and Social Development Plan 2014-2023
Mauritania	National Health Policy Plan 2012-2020
Mexico	Specific Action Program 2013-2018
Mozambique	Health Sector Strategic Plan 2014-2019
Myanmar	National Health Plan 2017-2021
Niger	Health Development Plan 2017-2021
Nigeria	National Health Policy 2016
Pakistan	National Health Vision 2016-2025

Panama	National Health Policy 2016 -2025
Peru	National Health Plan 2007-2021
Philippines	National Objectives for Health 2011-2016
Rwanda	Forth Health Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2024
Somalia	Health Sector Strategic Plan 2017-2021
South Africa	Strategic Plan 2020-1 to 2024-4
South Sudan	National Health Policy 2016-2026
Sudan	25 Year Strategic Plan for Health 2003-2027
Thailand	National Strategic Plan for Public Health 2017-2036
Türkiye	Health Strategic Plan 2019-2023
Uganda	Ministry of Health Strategic Plan 2020-1-2024-5
Ukraine	National Health Reform Strategy for Ukraine 2015-2020
United Rep. of Tanzania	Health Sector Strategic Plan 2021-2026
West Bank and Gaza	Health Sector Strategic Plan 2021-2025

Country	Education sector development plans
Afghanistan	Afghanistan Ministry of Education Annual Operational Plan 2021
Argentina	Plan de Finalización de Estudios Primarios y Secundarios 2020
Bangladesh	Education Sector Plan (ESP) for Bangladesh 2020/21 – 2024/25
Brazil	Brazil National Education Plan 2014-2021
Burkina Faso	Education and Training Sector Plan (PSEF) 2017-2030
Burundi	Transitional Education Plan 2018-2020
Cameroon	Cameroon Education and Training Sector Plan 2013-2020
Central African Republic	Education Sector Plan 2020-2029
Chad	Interim Plan for Education 2018-2020
China	Medium and Long Term Education Reform and Development Plan for 2010-2020
Colombia	Colombia, the best educated in 2025: Strategic lines of the educational policy of the Ministry of National Education
Congo	Education Sector Strategy 2015-2025
Costa Rica	2015-2018 Education Sector
Côte d'Ivoire	2015-2020 Education Sector Plan
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	2016-2025 Education and Training Sector Plan
Dominican Rep.	Strategic Plan of Ministry of Education 2017-2020
Ecuador	Ten-Year Education Plan 2008-2018
Egypt	Education Strategic Education Plan 2014-2030
Ethiopia	Ethiopia Education Development Roadmap 2018-2030
Georgia	Unified Strategy of Education and Science 2017-2021
Guatemala	Strategic Education Plan 2016-2020
Haiti	Ten-Year Education and Training Plan 2020-2029
Honduras	Strategic Plan for the Education Sector 2018-2030
India	National Education Policy 2020
Indonesia	Strategic Plan Ministry of Education and Culture 2015-2019
Jordan	Education Strategic Plan 2018-2022

Kenya	National Education Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2022
Lebanon	Lebanon Race 2 2017-2021
Malaysia	Malaysia Education Blueprint 2013-2025
Mali	Ten-year Second Generation Education and Vocational Training Development Plan 2019-2028
Mauritania	Three-Year Action Plan for Education Sector 2019-2021
Mexico	Education Sector Plan 2020-2024
Myanmar	National Education Strategic Plan 2016-2021
Niger	Education and Training Sector Transition Plan 2020-2022
Nigeria	Education for Change 2018-2022
Pakistan	National Education Policy Framework
Peru	Multiannual Sectoral Strategic Plan for Education 2016-2021
Philippines	Basic Education Development Plan 2030
Rwanda	Education Sector Plan 2018-9 - 2023-4
Somalia	Education Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2020
South Africa	Basic Education Strategic Plan 2020-2024
South Sudan	General Education Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2023
Sudan	General Education Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2023
Thailand	National Education Plan 2017-2036
Türkiye	Education Vision 2023
Uganda	Planning, Budgeting and Implementation Guidelines for Local Government for the Education and Sports Sector 2021-2022
United Rep. of Tanzania	Education Sector Development Plan 2016-7 - 2020-1
West Bank and Gaza	Palestine Education Sector Strategic Plan 2017-2022
Yemen	Yemen Transitional Education Plan 2019-20 to 2021-22

Country	Technical and vocational education and training (TVET) sector development plans
Afghanistan	National Technical and Vocational Education and Training Strategy (NTVETS) for Afghanistan 2013-2018
Costa Rica	2020 National Plan on Higher Education
Côte d'Ivoire	2015-2020 Education Sector Plan
Georgia	Vocational Education and Training Development Strategy for 2013-2020
Haiti	Ten-Year Education and Training Plan 2020-2029
Jordan	Jordan National TVET Strategy 2014-2020
Kenya	National Education Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2022
Lebanon	Strategic TVET Framework 2018-2022
Malaysia	Malaysia Education Blueprint 2013-2025
Mali	Ten-year Second Generation Education and Vocational Training Development Plan 2019-2028
Mauritania	Three-Year Action Plan for Education Sector 2019-2021
Mexico	Education Sector Plan 2020-2024
Mozambique	Strategic Plan for Technical Professional Education 2018-2024
Myanmar	National Education Strategic Plan 2016-2021
Niger	Education and Training Sector Transition Plan 2020-2022
Nigeria	National TVET Policy and Strategy on Open, Distance, Flexible and e-Learning

Pakistan	Technical Vocational Education and Training Policy
Philippines	National Technical Education and Skills Development Plan 2018-2022
Rwanda	N/A TVET from 2008
Somalia	Education Sector Strategic Plan 2018-2020
South Africa	Revised Higher Education Strategic Plan 2020-2025
South Sudan	2015 Policy for Alternative Education
Sudan	Sudan TVET Policy
Thailand	National Education Plan 2017-2036
Uganda	TVET Policy 2019
United Rep. of Tanzania	Technical Vocational Education and Training Development Programme 2013-4 - 2017-8
West Bank and Gaza	Palestine TVET Strategy

Annex C. Donor development co-operation strategies considered (DAC members and three DAC participants)

Country/DAC Donor	Next Influence Year	Document
Australia	2022	Partnerships for Recovery (Interim): 2020-2022
Austria	2022	Three Year Programme 2019-2021
Belgium	2029	Strategy Position 2030
Bulgaria	2024	Priorities of the Bulgarian Development Policy
Canada	2023	Cooperation Canada Strategic Plan 2018-2023
Czech Republic	2024	Development Cooperation Strategy 2018-2030
Denmark	2029	Denmark's Strategy for Development Cooperation
EU	2024	NDICI Regulation
Finland	2027	Report on Development Policy Across Parliamentary Terms
France	2025	LAW no 2021-1031 of August 4, 2021, on programming on inclusive development and the fight against global inequalities
Germany	2025	BMZ Development Policy 2030
Greece	2025	Strategic Plan 2022-2025
Hungary	2025	International Development Cooperation Strategy 2020-2025
Iceland	2023	Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Policy for International Development Cooperation for 2019-2023
Ireland	2029	A Better World
Italy	2023	Three-Year Programming and Policy Planning Document 2021-2023
Japan	2026	5th Medium Term Plan 2022-2026
Korea	2025	Mid-Term Sectoral Strategy 2021-2025
Luxembourg	2029	General Development Cooperation Strategy
Netherlands	2022	Investing in Global Prospects
New Zealand	2022	Strategic Plan 2015-2019 - not updated
Norway	2029	Norad's Strategy Towards 2030
Poland	2029	The Multiannual Programme for Development Cooperation for 2021–2030 Solidarity for Development
Portugal	2022	Strategic Concept for Portuguese Development Cooperation 2014-2020 - not updated
Romania (DAC Participant)	2023	Multiannual Strategic Program on the International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance for the Period 2020-2023
Slovak Republic	2023	Medium Term Strategy for Development Cooperation 2019-2023
Slovenia	2029	Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia until 2030
Spain	2022	Master Plan for Spanish Development Cooperation, for the period 2018-2021

Sweden	2022	Strategy for Sweden's Global Development Cooperation in Sustainable Social Development 2018-2022
Switzerland	2024	International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2024
UAE	2021	UAE Policy for Foreign Assistance 2017-2021
UK	2023	The UK Government's Strategy for International Development
USAID	2025	Policy Framework (for public comment)

Annex D. United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks (UNSDCFs, or similar) considered

Country	Next Influence Year	Document type
Afghanistan	2023	Transitional Engagement Framework
Algeria	2027	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Argentina	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Azerbaijan	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Bangladesh	2026	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Brazil	2021	UNDAF
Burkina Faso	2022	UNDAF
Burundi	2023	UNDAF
Cameroon	2026	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
CAR	2027	UNDAF+ Results Framework 2023-2027
Chad	2022	UNDAF 2017-2021
China	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Colombia	2023	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Congo	2024	UNDAF Annual Review 2020
Costa Rica	2027	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Cote d'Ivoire	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	2024	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Dominican Rep	2022	UNDAF
Ecuador	2026	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Egypt	2022	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Ethiopia	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Georgia	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Guatemala	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Haiti		n/a – humanitarian
Honduras	2022	UNDAF
India	2022	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Indonesia	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Iran	2021	UNDAF
Iraq	2024	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Jordan	2022	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework

Kenya	2026	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Lebanon	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Libya	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Malaysia		n/a
Mali	2024	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Mauritania	2022	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Mexico	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Mozambique	2026	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Myanmar		n/a humanitarian
Niger	2027	Roadmap Development of the Cooperation Framework Plan in Niger
Nigeria	2022	Sustainable Development Partnership Framework
Pakistan	2022	UNDAF
Panama	2022	UNDAF
Peru	2026	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Philippines	2022	Partnership Framework for Sustainable Development
Rwanda	2023	UN Development Assistance Plan
Somalia	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
South Africa		N/A
South Sudan	2022	UN Cooperation Framework
Sudan	2022	UNDAF 2018-2021
Syria	2024	UN Strategic Framework
Thailand	2022	UN Partnerships Framework
Türkiye	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Uganda	2025	Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
Ukraine	2023	UN Transitional Framework
United Rep. of Tanzania	2022	UN Development Assistance Plan
West Bank and Gaza Strip	2022	UNDAF 2018-2022
Yemen		UNDAF 2011 (note: the Yemen UNSDCF 2022-24 is also available, but was not considered in the analysis)