



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

<p><i>Case Number:</i> I18-FEMA-SID-06980 <i>Case Title:</i> William "Brock" Long Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator, EX-02</p> <p><i>Report Status:</i> Final <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> 18 U.S.C. § 641 – Theft of Public Money, Property, or Records; 18 U.S.C. § 287 – Making or Presenting a False Claim; 18 U.S.C. § 1519 – Destruction of Records in Federal Investigations; 18 U.S.C. § 1001 – False Statements; 31 U.S.C. § 1344 – Passenger Carrier Use; 31 U.S.C. § 1349 – Adverse Personnel Actions; 41 C.F.R. Part 102-5, Home-to-Work Transportation; 5 C.F.R. § 2635 – Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, Subpart G – Misuse of Position; DHS Directive 112-05, Home-to-Work Transportation Programs; DHS Management Directive 11015, Emergency Signaling Devices in DHS Vehicles</p>	<p>(b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(A)</p> <p>(b) (7)(A) (b) (7)(A)</p>
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SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated based upon receipt of a complaint that William “Brock” Long, Administrator, FEMA, Washington, DC, while not on official business, was a passenger in a U.S. Government vehicle (GOV) involved in an accident in North Carolina. The complainant further alleged that FEMA personnel attempted to hide Long’s presence when the accident occurred by intentionally omitting him from the traffic accident report.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), found evidence that Long used GOVs and FEMA personnel for home to work (HTW) transportation that he was not authorized. The unauthorized use of resources occurred in both Washington, DC where Long has an apartment and in Hickory, NC where his family resides. Additional instances of unauthorized HTW support occurred when Long and his family were transported to and from Hickory, NC to Charlotte, NC for a trip to Hawaii. While in Hawaii and not on official business, Keith Lafoucade, Emergency Management Specialist, FEMA, Office of the Administrator Emergency Support Team (OAEST), Washington, DC provided transportation to Long and his family in a vehicle rented by the U.S. Government. Lafoucade was on temporary duty to Hawaii to provide communications support to Long. The DHS OIG found that Long’s unauthorized use of HTW transportation resulted in the following approximate costs to the U.S. Government: \$94,000 in salary costs; \$55,000 in travel expenditures; and approximately \$2,000 in GOV operations and maintenance related costs.

(b) (7)(A)



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(b) (7)(A)



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DETAILS

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation on November 27, 2017, based upon a complaint that William “Brock” Long, Administrator, FEMA, Washington, DC, while not on official business, was a passenger in a U.S. Government vehicle (GOV) involved in an accident in North Carolina. The complainant further alleged that FEMA personnel attempted to hide Long’s presence when the accident occurred by intentionally omitting him from the traffic accident report. (Exhibit 1)

[Agent’s Note: The Office of the Administrator Emergency Support Team (OAEST), National Continuity Programs (NCP), FEMA, provide Long with (b) (7)(E) and transportation support both within and outside the National Capital Region. OAEST operates a fleet of four Chevrolet Suburbans equipped with a variety of telecommunications equipment. (b) (7)(E)

Each vehicle bears DHS license plates, and is recognizable by visible roof mounted antennae, and equipped with emergency lights and sirens. Members of the OAEST are: Keith Lafoucade, Emergency Management Specialist GS-15; Douglas Slade, Telecommunications Specialist (TS), GS-13, Washington, DC; John Williams, TS, GS-12, Glynco, GA; Bruce Patton, TS, Glynco, GA; Joseph Short, Security Specialist, GS-13, Washington, DC; and Brian Jones, Security Specialist, GS-13, Washington, DC. During the course of the investigation, the DHS OIG determined that while reporting to Lafoucade in Washington, DC, both Patton and Williams were assigned to, and stationed in Glynco, GA at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).]

Allegation 1: William Long received home-to-work (HTW) transportation that he was not authorized.

The DHS OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FEMA, Washington, DC, who stated that between September and November 2017, the FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), a cell activated at FEMA Headquarters for emergency management, was activated in response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and Tropical Storm Nate. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated during this activation, he learned the FEMA OAEST was providing HTW transportation support to Long in the Washington, DC area. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated when he discussed this with OAEST personnel he was told OAEST had provided the same support to the prior FEMA Administrator, William Fugate, who retired in January 2017. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated he also discussed the HTW issue with FEMA Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) and was informed that Long was not authorized HTW support. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated he informed Long in October that this support was not authorized.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated FEMA OCC researched HTW authorization and determined Long could obtain temporary authorization when the NRCC was activated, but would need approval from the DHS Secretary and Long would incur a tax liability as this type of support would be considered a fringe

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benefit. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he briefed Long concerning the research and Long told him he would use the Metro in Washington, DC as he could not afford the additional tax burden.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that on October 27, 2017, (b) (6), (b) (6), Washington, DC, informed him that Long was involved in a traffic accident while traveling from Charlotte-Douglas International Airport (CLT), Charlotte, NC, to Long's residence in Hickory, NC. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had assumed the practice of OAEST personnel transporting Long had ceased and was not aware of any authority that would allow OAEST vehicles to transport Long from CLT to his residence in Hickory, NC. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated it was his understanding that Long traveled to Hickory, NC most weekends to spend time with his family, but he assumed he used his personal vehicle. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was aware that due to communications requirements, an OAEST vehicle equipped with a telecommunications suite would be present when Long was in Hickory, NC, but he was unaware the vehicle was being used to transport Long. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he again discussed the issue with FEMA OCC. (b)(5) - AC Priv (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he and (b) (6), (b) (6), Washington, DC, informed (b) (6) that Long was not authorized HTW transportation support. (Exhibits 2-5)

The DHS OIG interviewed a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who stated he/she periodically heard rumors regarding Long's use of OAEST vehicles and drivers to transport him to and from his residence in Washington, DC during FEMA's response to the 2017 hurricanes during September - November 2017. The (b) (6) stated (b) (6) sought guidance from FEMA OCC who opined that Long was not authorized HTW transportation. The (b) (6) stated (b) (6) was not aware Long was also receiving HTW support while in North Carolina until Long was involved in the accident in October 2017. (Exhibit 6)

The DHS OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7) who stated he was aware of the attempts to obtain HTW authorization for Long. He stated that during the NRCC activation OAEST personnel were providing HTW transportation for Long despite a lack of authorization to do so. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated he could not recall who informed him that Long was using HTW transportation, but he provided guidance that it was not authorized. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated he had several conversations with senior FEMA personnel, including (b) (6), (b) (7) informing all of them that Long was not authorized HTW support. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated FEMA OCC worked with the DHS Office of General Counsel (OGC) to draft a memorandum requesting HTW authorization for Long when the NRCC was activated at the highest level, as (b) (6), (b) (7) felt the activation fit the stated statutory exception for temporary HTW authorization. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated both FEMA OCC and DHS OGC attorneys concurred with the scope of the request and felt the DHS Secretary would approve it. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated the draft memorandum was sent to the FEMA Office of the Administrator (OA), but he was not informed of any action taken. (Exhibit 3)

[Agent's Note: The temporary nature of the HTW transportation outlined in the draft memorandum described by (b) (6), (b) (7) was based on the statutory exception in Title 31 United States Code (USC)

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Section 1344, Passenger Carrier Use. If the authorization was approved by the DHS Secretary, Long could be provided HTW transportation for a period of 15 days during a period of national emergency, with extensions up to 90 days.]

The DHS OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Washington, DC who stated he was tasked by (b) (6) to prepare a memorandum for HTW authorization for Long under the compelling operational or declared emergency exception in Title 31 USC Section 1344. (b) (6) explained the justification used for the HTW authorization was the need for Long to have access to (b) (6), (b) (7)(E) that allowed him to be in constant communication with senior government officials, to include the President of the United States (POTUS). (b) (6) stated he felt that despite the DHS OGC concurrence with the request, the possibility of Long incurring additional tax liabilities was the impetus behind the request not being submitted to the DHS Secretary for consideration and approval. (Exhibit 7)

The DHS OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7) who stated he felt HTW authorization for Long was essential for him to accomplish his mission as directed by the White House. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated Long, by the nature of his position, is required to have communications available to include (b) (7)(E) in the event POTUS wished to speak with him. (b) (6), (b) (7) admitted, to his knowledge, Long has not spoken with POTUS from the OAEST vehicles since being confirmed as the FEMA Administrator on June 23, 2017. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated the only guidance he received from OCC regarding transportation for Long was that the OAEST vehicles “cannot touch driveways” (of Long’s residences), which he felt was a joke. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated the OAEST are unable to perform their mission if the drivers cannot take Long to and from his residence. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated despite the guidance he received from OCC, Long has been driven to his residence on numerous occasions. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated the OAEST drivers also provide transportation for Long to and from CLT and his residence in Hickory, NC. (b) (6), (b) (7) admitted he instructed OAEST personnel to transport Long to his residence if he was tired or in the middle of a phone call. He stated he directed the OAEST to use their judgement, while taking Long’s safety and the national security mission into consideration. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated that when an attempt was made to obtain authorization for HTW transportation for Long, he was informed that the cost of the vehicles, drivers’ salaries, and gas for the vehicles would be considered a fringe benefit that would become taxable income for Long. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated he felt that was “ridiculous” and “absurd.” (b) (6), (b) (7) stated when he informed Long of the additional tax burden he would incur if HTW was authorized, Long told him he could not afford that. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated that in his opinion, Long being denied HTW authorization was “stupid” and “offensive.” (b) (6), (b) (7) stated the OAEST personnel are not authorized to take the OAEST vehicles to their personal residences, but that he feels that they should be authorized to do so in the event they have to provide immediate support. (b) (6), (b) (7) admitted there had been occasions OAEST personnel were instructed to take those vehicles to their personal residences in the event of an early morning mission or an emergency. (Exhibit 8)

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The DHS OIG reviewed the official email of Lafoucade regarding the issue of HTW support for Long. One email chain, dated October 20, 2017, titled “F1 Home to Work Support” was sent from Lafoucade to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and requested confirmation that Long should not be picked up and dropped off at his residence any longer. A subsequent email response from (b) (6), former (b) (6) Washington, DC, advised Lafoucade that HTW support for Long was to cease. Lafoucade acknowledged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) guidance and forwarded the email chain to the OAEST drivers to include Patton, Williams, Slade, Short, and Jones. On October 23, 2017, Lafoucade and Slade, with a courtesy copy to the other drivers, discussed guidance regarding HTW transportation requirements for Long in an email chain entitled “Transportation Guidance.” In the email, Lafoucade stated he asked (b) (6) about HTW authorization for Long, but had not yet received a response. Lafoucade directed that the drivers be prepared in the event Long wished transportation support. On October 27, 2017, Lafoucade emailed (b) (6) and various FEMA senior staff that Long was involved in a traffic accident while in Charlotte, NC. (Exhibit 9)

The DHS OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Washington, DC, who stated shortly after he was employed by FEMA, he was informed that the use of government vehicles to transport him to and from his residence was unauthorized. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated his understanding of the guidance was that it was not open for debate; that it was clear and unequivocal. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he could not recall who provided this guidance, but was certain it came from the Continuity Support Division (CSD) of the NCP. He stated within the first two or so weeks of his being at FEMA, he recalled a conversation regarding if he and Long could receive HTW support if either he or Long had an early morning meeting as the first engagement of the day, or a late day meeting as the last engagement of the day. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he was told the practice was allowable, but within the first few weeks of his tenure at FEMA this position was overruled by FEMA OCC. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he had been driven to and from his residence on a few occasions, but ceased the practice immediately when FEMA OCC became involved. (Exhibit 10)

The DHS OIG conducted surveillance operations during the course of this investigation. The following information is provided concerning those operations:

December 5, 2017 – Long was observed being picked up by an OAEST vehicle from the Reagan National Airport (DCA) and transported to his residence at (b) (6) Washington, DC. (Exhibit 11)

December 19, 2017 – Long was observed being picked up by an OAEST vehicle from DCA and transported to FEMA Headquarters. DHS OIG determined Long was in Hickory, NC from December 15, 2017 to December 19, 2017. (Exhibits 12 and 35)

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January 16, 2018 – Long was observed being transported from his residence in Hickory, NC to CLT in a government rented vehicle. (Exhibit 13)

February 2, 2018 – Long was observed being transported in an OAEST vehicle from the Nebraska Avenue Complex to his Washington, DC residence. (Exhibit 15)

March 13, 2018 – Long was observed being transported from DCA to his Washington, DC residence in an OAEST vehicle. (Exhibit 16)

March 25, 2018 – Long and his family, to include his spouse and two children, were observed being transported in an OAEST vehicle from their residence in Hickory, NC to CLT for a flight to Hawaii. (Exhibits 17 and 18)

April 3, 2018 – Upon return from Hawaii, Long and his family were observed being picked up at CLT by OAEST personnel in a government rented vehicle and transported to their residence in Hickory, NC. (Exhibit 19)

The DHS OIG reviewed the travel records of drivers assigned to the OAEST that consisted of travel authorizations, travel vouchers, flight itineraries, hotel receipts, and other related documents provided for claims of reimbursement related to official travel; Long's official travel records; itineraries (trip sheets) prepared by FEMA Headquarters for Long that documented planned travel arrangements; and vehicle logs regarding the OAEST vehicles. OAEST personnel typically rented Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) for transportation support in locations where OAEST vehicles were not available. These vehicles did not contain the communications packages present within the OAEST vehicles, but information received from drivers and Long indicated the (b) (7)(E)

Further, the drivers indicated Long has never used (b) (7)(E). Due to Long's frequent travel to North Carolina, one OAEST vehicle was prepositioned at the FBI office in Charlotte, NC. (Exhibits 4, 20-34)

Long's travel records indicated that he often combined multiple-day stopovers to Charlotte, NC, and during these stopovers was transported in a OAEST vehicle to his residence in Hickory, NC. For example, from Wednesday July 12, 2017 until Saturday July 15, 2017, Long was on official business in Boston, MA and Providence, RI. While at these locations, Lafoucade provided transportation in a rented SUV. On Saturday July 15, 2017, Long flew to Charlotte, NC, where he was met and transported by Williams to his Hickory, NC residence. The travel records of Williams indicated he was on official travel in Charlotte, NC from Wednesday, July 12, 2017 until Monday

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July 17, 2017. On Monday July 17, 2017, Long was driven to CLT by Williams where he flew to Atlanta, GA and then Denton, TX. While in Atlanta, GA, Long was transported by Slade, and while in Texas he was transported by Lafoucade. Upon his return to Washington, DC on Tuesday, July 18, 2017, OAEST provided transportation for Long to his residence. The travel records of Long and the OAEST drivers disclosed there were several instances of this type indicating that Long was being provided with OAEST transportation for official and non-official reasons. (Exhibits 20-24, 27, 33, 34)

(b) (7)(A)

Additionally, all OAEST drivers were provided with a memorandum from FEMA Headquarters that authorized them to rent toll transponders, SUVs, and exceed the typical GSA per diem rates. (Exhibits 20-24, 27, 33, 34)

Lafoucade, Slade, Williams, and Jones took at least 25 separate trips to North Carolina (either Hickory, Charlotte, or Gastonia - all within a 50 mile radius of Long's residence), that did not coincide with any of Long's official travel. A large majority of those trips included weekends. In the timeframe reviewed by the DHS OIG, Long took at least nine official trips that either began or ended in Charlotte, NC or had a two-day stopover at that location. These stopovers often spanned the length of the weekend and resulted in an additional 15 TDY trips by OAEST personnel to North Carolina to provide Long transportation during these stopovers. (Exhibits 20-24, 27, 33-36)

The review of Lafoucade's travel records indicated he was on official travel in Oahu, HI, from March 22, 2018, to April 3, 2018, and that his duties were (b) (7)(E) and Transportation Support." The travel records indicated he rented a Chevrolet Suburban on March 22, 2018, which he returned on April 2, 2018, having driven a total 429 miles. (Exhibits 37 and 38)

The DHS OIG interviewed all personnel assigned to the FEMA OAEST that were tasked with providing (b) (7)(E) and transportation support to Long. All admitted to providing Long HTW transportation in Washington, DC and Hickory, NC. The drivers indicated when they were providing support in North Carolina they were on TDY status at the time and the majority of these missions were on weekends. The drivers indicated that typically they would transport Long from CLT to his residence on a Friday and then spend the weekend in a hotel until Long required transportation back to CLT on either Sunday evening or Monday morning. All of the drivers were provided either overtime or compensatory time during these missions despite spending the weekend in a hotel room. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6) admitted they drove Long to or from Washington, DC and his residence in Hickory, NC, on several occasions. (b) (6), (b) (7) stated he was directed by Lafoucade on November 4, 2017 to pick Long up at the Atlanta-Hartsfield International Airport (ATL) and drive him to a funeral home in McRae, GA, for (b) (6). (b) (6), (b) (7) who is assigned as part of the FEMA contingent to FLETC, Glynco, GA, drove a FLETC vehicle from Glynco, GA to the FBI office in Charlotte, NC, where he picked up the

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prepositioned OAEST vehicle. He then picked up Long at ATL and transported him to McRae, GA. (b) (6), stated he followed Long and his spouse who drove their personal vehicle to Hickory, NC. (b) (6), remained in North Carolina until November 12, 2017, when he transported Long from his residence to CLT for a flight to DCA. (Exhibits 4, 25, 26, 28-32, 39)

(b) (6) stated all FEMA drivers supporting Long were issued the memorandum allowing them to rent large SUVs to transport several FEMA employees at one time, but he admitted that the large SUVs were rented to transport Long because it is commensurate to his status as Administrator. (Exhibits 4, 32)

All of the drivers assigned to the National Capital Region admitted to taking OAEST vehicles to their personal residences on occasion. The drivers stated this was typically in the event of an early morning commitment where they could go directly to Long's Washington, DC residence rather than having to stop at FEMA Headquarters to retrieve an OAEST vehicle. This HTW use for the drivers was authorized by (b) (6) (Exhibits 4, 25, 26, 28-32)

(b) (6), (b) stated he did not arrange for an OAEST vehicle to transport Long and his family from Hickory, NC to CLT for the trip to Hawaii and suggested he was concerned when he found out this type of support had been provided. (b) (6), (b) stated he was already in Hawaii to support Long when this occurred. (b) (6), (b) stated while Long and his family were in Hawaii, he provided them with transportation around the island in a large SUV he had rented. (b) (6), (b) stated he provided this transportation support to Long and his family in Hawaii during both the official portion of the trip and during the family vacation. During the vacation portion of the trip, (b) (6), (b) stated he transported the family to a Dole plantation and a volcano. (b) (6), (b) stated the official portion of the trip to Hawaii did not require Long's spouse or his children to accompany him. (b) (6), (b) stated during the Hawaii trip, Long told him he would consult with an ethics attorney to determine if OAEST transportation support for his family was authorized while on vacation. (Exhibits 4, 32)

[Agent's Note: The DHS OIG review of Long's official travel records revealed an official schedule from March 25, 2018, to March 29, 2018. Long began his personal schedule on March 30, 2018, and departed Hawaii on April 2, 2018. The overall dates of his trip there were from March 25, 2018, to April 3, 2018.]

(b) (6), (b) stated on one occasion he transported Long and his spouse from their Hickory, NC residence to a local school where he picked up their children and then drove back to the residence. (b) (6), (b) stated he could not remember the school's location, but Long provided him with turn-by-turn directions. (b) (6), (b) stated he also could not recall the circumstances surrounding picking the children up at their school, but he believed it was because one of Long's children had a sporting event. (b) (6), (b) stated he was not coerced into providing transportation for the family, but felt he could not tell Long that his spouse could not ride in the vehicle with him. (b) (6), (b) stated he

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believed other OAEST drivers had probably provided transportation for Long and his family in OAEST vehicles. (Exhibits 4, 32)

(b) (6) stated he had been to Hickory, NC on numerous occasions to transport Long and admitted to transporting Long and his family in an OAEST vehicle from Hickory, NC to CLT on March 25, 2018, for their flight to Hawaii. (b) (6) stated prior to Long's family getting into the vehicle he was not aware he would be taking them all to the airport. (b) (6) stated he did not discuss the transportation of non-government individuals with Long as he recognized Long as an authority figure and complied with the requirement to proceed to CLT. (b) (6) stated on April 3, 2018, he returned to CLT, and transported Long and his family to their Hickory, NC residence in a large SUV he had rented while on TDY. In addition, (b) (6) stated on March 22, 2018, he transported Long in the OAEST vehicle from Washington, DC to Hot Springs, VA for an official event. On March 23, 2018, (b) (6) stated he drove Long from Hot Springs, VA, to Hickory, NC, but shortly prior to their arrival at Long's residence, Long instructed (b) (6) to deviate a few blocks from his residence to pick one of his sons up from a neighbor's residence. He stated he picked the son up then transported both to Long's residence. (Exhibits 4, 29)

The DHS OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Washington, DC, who stated on April 17, 2018, Long asked him if he and his family's use of a government rented vehicle in Hawaii was appropriate and added that he "wanted to make it right." Long explained to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he was required to have access to various communications equipment while in Hawaii. Long told him that as the U.S. Government rented vehicle containing the communications equipment would be required to follow Long, his spouse, and two children, around the island while they were sightseeing, Long chose for them to be transported in that vehicle rather than renting a vehicle for their own use. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Long told him since a FEMA employee with the communication equipment was required to be present wherever he was, that he did not feel the government would incur any additional costs if his family rode in the government vehicle rented by the FEMA employee accompanying him to Hawaii. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated that as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), he told Long that the arrangement made it appear he used the trappings of his office and misused his government position. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he told Long that the best course of action for Long would be to reimburse the U.S. Government for the expense of that vehicle. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated Long informed him that his expenses in Hawaii had already been reimbursed by the U.S. Government. As a result, arrangements were made for Long to write a personal check to the U.S. Department of the Treasury. (Exhibit 40)

The DHS OIG interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Washington, DC, who stated when Long returned from Hawaii, he approached her and instructed her to generate a memorandum in reference to partial payment for a U.S. Government rental vehicle he and his family had used there. She stated the purpose of the memorandum was to document that he was paying for the time he used the U.S. Government rented vehicle for his personal use. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she coordinated with the FEMA Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) to facilitate the

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repayment that was determined to be \$309.24. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated FEMA OCFO determined Long should generate a personal check that would be deposited in the U.S. Department of Treasury's FEMA lockbox. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she prepared the memorandum with approval of its content by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) prior to forwarding it and the check to the U.S. Department of Treasury. (Exhibit 41)

The DHS OIG interviewed Long who stated he was aware that the FEMA OCC did not feel that it was appropriate for him to have HTW transportation both in Washington, DC, and in Hickory, NC. Long stated he feels that FEMA OCC was applying "general government rules" to the use of those vehicles. Long stated he feels the use of the vehicles was required for execution of his duties pursuant to Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 40, which Long termed as a "Top Secret program." Long stated without the use of the OAEST vehicles and OAEST drivers, he is unable to execute his duties under PPD 40, but admitted there was no specific policy that required the vehicles to support him to fulfill requirements under PPD 40. When asked about the vehicle characteristics, Long stated he could not describe the vehicles because of their Sensitive Compartmentalized Information (SCI) characteristics. Long stated he believed his duties as specified within PPD 40 were justification for him to be provided a vehicle (b) (7)(E) and driver.

Long was shown the October 20, 2017 email between FEMA senior staff and (b) (6) that indicated HTW transportation for Long should cease upon the deactivation of the NRCC. Long stated while the NRCC was activated in 2017, he worked 16 hour days and was driven to and from his Washington, DC residence that was less than a mile away from FEMA Headquarters.

Long stated he recalled seeing a draft memorandum from FEMA to DHS requesting HTW transportation authorization on a temporary basis, for a 15 day period, during NRCC activation, but when he was informed that the cost of the HTW transportation would be a taxable benefit, he told his staff not to submit the request. Long stated he could not recall the amount of taxable income, but stated it was either \$12,000 or \$34,000. Long stated he did not feel he should pay for support that was required for him to perform his duties under PPD 40. Long later denied he told his staff not to submit the request for a HTW exception, but also stated he "is going broke and in the hole every month." Long stated when in Hickory, NC, he used the OAEST vehicles for transportation to and from official speaking engagements. Long initially stated he did not use the OAEST vehicles for personal use, but later admitted that on March 25, 2018, an OAEST vehicle provided him and his wife and two children transportation from his Hickory, NC, residence to CLT for a flight to Hawaii. Long stated between the dates of March 26-29, 2018, he had official business in Hawaii, but remained there on vacation with his family until they returned to North Carolina on April 3, 2018. Long stated that during the time he was on vacation in Hawaii with his family, they were driven around the island of Oahu for sightseeing in a U.S. Government rented vehicle operated by Lafoucade, who was in Hawaii on a temporary duty assignment to support him. Long stated that upon their return from Hawaii, they were met by an OAEST driver who transported him and his family from CLT back to their residence in Hickory, NC. Long stated after he returned from Hawaii, he coordinated with FEMA OCC to determine if his family being transported in a vehicle

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rented by the U.S. Government while on vacation was appropriate. Long stated FEMA OCC opined it was not appropriate so he provided a personal check for \$309 made payable to the U.S. Department of Treasury to the FEMA OCFO that he felt would cover the cost of using the vehicle for personal use.

Long stated on another occasion, Lafoucade drove him and his spouse in an OAEST vehicle from his residence in Hickory, NC, to his children's school. Long stated his children were picked up at the school and the entire family was transported back to their residence. Long stated he did not ask for this support from Lafoucade, but recalled that Lafoucade had offered to drive them.

Long stated he has been provided transportation in both Washington, DC and Hickory, NC since he was confirmed as the FEMA Administrator. He stated he assumed his senior staff was working on obtaining clarity regarding the HTW policy, but as of yet have been unable to determine if he was authorized HTW transportation. Long stated that he and (b) (6) have asked DHS for clarification regarding the policies.

Long stated there have also been instances he was driven in an OAEST vehicle to or from Washington, DC, to his residence in Hickory, NC. He stated that on those occasions, OAEST was replacing the OAEST vehicle prepositioned at the FBI office in Charlotte, NC, with an OAEST vehicle from Washington, DC and he would ride with them. Long could not recall how many times this occurred, but estimated it was on four or five occasions. Long stated that one of these instances was while the NRCC was activated and he had not seen his family in over a month. Long stated he never asked the drivers to do anything unethical. (Exhibits 42 and 43)

The DHS OIG found that Long's unauthorized use of HTW transportation resulted in costs for the U.S. Government of approximately \$89,000 in salary costs associated with transporting him outside of the NCR as well as approximately \$55,000 in additional travel expenditures. Approximately \$4,800 in salary costs were associated with transportation in the NCR. Approximately \$2,000 in FEMA vehicle operations and maintenance related costs resulted in that transportation. (Exhibits 35, 36, 45)

(b) (7)(A)



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(b) (7)(A)



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(b) (7)(A)



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(b) (7)(A)



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(b) (7)(A)



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(b) (7)(A)



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EXHIBITS

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
1	Memorandum of Activity - Receipt of Complaint - November 27, 2017
2	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - May 7, 2018
3	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - May 7, 2018
4	Memorandum of Activity - Records Receipt – Transcriptions of Interviews – May 16, 2018
5	Memorandum of Activity - Other – Receipt of Statement (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - May 24, 2018
6	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of Source of Information
7	Memorandum of Activity - Telephone Contact-Interview of (b) (6) - December 11, 2017
8	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - May 7, 2018
9	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review-Emails (b) (6) - January 29, 2018
10	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
11	Memorandum of Activity - Investigative Activity-Surveillance - December 27, 2017
12	Memorandum of Activity - Investigative Activity-Surveillance - January 10, 2018
13	Memorandum of Activity - Investigative Activity-Surveillance - March 13, 2018
14	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Subpoena Return (b) (6) (b) (6) - March 15, 2018
15	Memorandum of Activity - Investigative Activity-Surveillance - March 15, 2018
16	Memorandum of Activity - Investigative Activity-Surveillance - April 3, 2018
17	Memorandum of Activity - Investigative Activity-Surveillance - April 3, 2018
18	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review-Surveillance footage - May 7, 2018
19	Memorandum of Activity - Investigative Activity-Surveillance - April 18, 2018
20	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Travel Records (b) (6) (b) (6) - December 27, 2017

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21	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Travel Records (b) (6) - January 25, 2018
22	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Travel Records (b) (6) - January 25, 2018
23	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Travel Records (b) (6) - January 25, 2018
24	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Travel Records (b) (6) - January 25, 2018
25	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of [REDACTED] - March 15, 2018
26	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - April 27, 2018
27	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Additional Travel Records (b) (6) - April 3, 2018
28	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review-Transcript Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - April 3, 2018
29	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - May 7, 2018
30	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - May 7, 2018
31	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - May 7, 2018
32	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - May 24, 2018
33	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Additional Review of Travel Records (b) (6) - May 17, 2018
34	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Travel Records (b) (6) - September 6, 2018
35	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - OAEST Travel Support Analysis - September 10, 2018
36	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - OAEST NCR Support Analysis - September 10, 2018
37	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Subpoena Return (Long) - March 19, 2018
38	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Travel Records (William Long) - April 27, 2018
39	Memorandum of Activity - Digital Forensics Report - April 18, 2018
40	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) - July 10, 2018

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41	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - July 10, 2018
42	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of William Long - May 24, 2018
43	Memorandum of Activity - Other - Records Receipt - Transcription of Interview (Long) - September 10, 2018
44	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - September 6, 2018
45	Memorandum of Activity - Records Receipt - Time and Attendance Records – September 10, 2018
46	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review-Complaint Documents – December 27, 2017
47	Memorandum of Activity - Telephone Contact-Interview of Complainant - December 28, 2017
48	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - February 8, 2018
49	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review-Police Report - January 10, 2018
50	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - February 8, 2018
51	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review- (b) (6) 911 call - February 8, 2018
52	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Travel Itineraries (Long) - May 17, 2018
53	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Email Review (Long and (b) (6) – December 27, 2017
54	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - March 23, 2018
55	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - March 23, 2018
56	Memorandum of Activity - Personal Interview of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - February 20, 2018
57	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Review of FLETC Access Records – May 24, 2018
58	Memorandum of Activity - Digital Forensics Report - May 2, 2018
59	Memorandum of Activity - Digital Forensics Report - September 6, 2018
60	Memorandum of Activity - Records Review - Personal Cellular Telephone Activity (Long) - September 10, 2018

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