



Department of Homeland Security

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL



SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

OCTOBER 1, 2018 – MARCH 31, 2019

Inspector General's Message

The Honorable Kevin K. McAleenan
Acting Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Secretary:


I am pleased to present our 33rd semiannual report (SAR), which summarizes the work and accomplishments of our office during the first half of fiscal year 2019.

The audits, inspections, and investigations we conducted during this reporting period should continue to help improve treatment and care of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainees at detention facilities, secure the election infrastructure, and strengthen the Federal Protective Service's management of overtime. Our work should also help the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to better safeguard Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and Sensitive PII (SPII) of disaster survivors, as well as enhance FEMA's oversight of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. Finally, U.S. Customs and Border Protection ultimately canceled a multi-million dollar hiring contract with Accenture in which we identified serious performance issues.

The Department and its components have worked with us to correct hundreds of issues and improve the economy and efficiency of programs and operations. Based on the Department's actions this period, we closed 151 recommendations issued in this and prior periods. As a result of a lapse in appropriations during this SAR period, we had to significantly scale back our operations, ceasing a large percentage of ongoing work and furloughing the vast majority of our employees. However, our work this reporting period still resulted in improved overall effectiveness and a more secure homeland as well as improved management and oversight of programs and operations to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

This year marks the 41st anniversary of the *Inspector General Act of 1978* and the creation of the original 12 Offices of Inspector General. Our office was created in 2003. Every 6 months we provide the Congress with a report detailing our independent oversight of the Department. In the years to come, we look forward to continuing our efforts to provide independent and effective oversight of the Department and working with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on important issues that cut across our Government.

Sincerely,



John V. Kelly
Acting Inspector General

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Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments


October 1, 2018 – March 31, 2019

During this reporting period, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed audits, inspections, and investigations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department’s programs and operations.

Reports Issued to DHS

We issued 37 reports, including 3 management alerts and 4 reports on Disaster Relief Fund spending (appendix 5), as well as 348 investigative reports, while continuing to strengthen our transparency and internal oversight.

Our reports provide the DHS Secretary and Congress with an objective assessment of issues the Department faces. The reports also offer specific recommendations to correct deficiencies and improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS’ programs.



Dollar Impact

Our audits resulted in questioned costs of \$36,131,751 of which \$2,432,871 did not have supporting documentation. The Department recovered or deobligated \$243,254,908 as a result of audits. (See appendix 6.) We issued three reports identifying \$688,380,334 in funds put to better use. Additionally, we reported \$14,222,628 in recoveries, fines, and restitution from investigations.

Type of Impact	Amount
Questioned Costs	\$36,131,751
Funds to be Put to Better Use	\$688,380,334
Management Agreement that Funds be Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$294,380,334
Funds Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$243,254,908
Recoveries from Investigations (<i>Not from Fines and Restitution</i>)	\$10,619,441
Fines from Investigations	\$425,679
Restitution from Investigations	\$3,177,508

Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

Investigations


We initiated 431 investigations and closed 396 investigations. Our investigations resulted in 49 arrests, 45 indictments, 37 convictions, and 12 personnel actions. We have included, in accordance with the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*, information regarding the number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

Type of Investigation*	Number
Open Investigations as of 9/30/2018	1,228
Investigations Initiated	431
Investigations Closed	396
Open Investigations as of 3/31/19	1,263
Investigative Reports Issued	348
Investigations Referred for Federal Prosecution	19
Investigations Accepted for Federal Prosecution	20
Investigations Declined for Federal Prosecution	2
Total number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution	9
Total number of indictments and criminal information during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities	17

*All data was obtained from the Enforcement Data System, which is the Office of Investigations' case management system.

Note: Investigations accepted or declined may have been received in a prior reporting period.

Investigations resulted in



Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

Complaints

The OIG Hotline is a resource for Federal employees and the public to report allegations of employee corruption, civil rights and civil liberties abuses, program fraud and financial crimes, and miscellaneous criminal and non-criminal activity associated with waste, abuse, or fraud affecting the programs and operations of the Department.

Complaints	Number
Total Hotline Complaints Received	11,930
Complaints Referred (to programs or other agencies)	13,113
Complaints Closed	13,877

*Complaints referred and closed included complaints received in prior period.

Whistleblower Protection Unit

The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU) reviews and investigates allegations of whistleblower retaliation made by DHS employees, including members of the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), as well as by employees of DHS contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and subgrantees. The WPU primarily conducts non-discretionary investigations pursuant to the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 U.S.C. § 1034; *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information, Presidential Policy Directive 19*; *Security Clearances and Classified Information*, 50 U.S.C. § 3341; and the *Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractors and Grantees*, 41 U.S.C. § 4712. Additionally, in certain instances, WPU conducts whistleblower retaliation investigations under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, and the *Whistleblower Protection Act*, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9).

Activity During Current SAR Period

During this semiannual report period, WPU received 138 complaints alleging whistleblower retaliation. Entering the period, WPU had 46 pending complaints to resolve. WPU declined to open an investigation for 165 complaints during the intake process, with 19 complaints currently pending WPU review.

Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

WPU Intake Complaints	Number
Pending Complaints Entering this Period	46
Complaints Received by WPU During Period	138
Total Complaints Reviewed by WPU during Period	184
Complaints Declined During Intake Process ¹	165
Complaints Converted to Investigation	0
Total Complaints Pending at End of Period	19

Investigations

WPU closed two whistleblower retaliation investigations during the SAR period with reports of investigation. One report of investigation substantiated the allegations of whistleblower retaliation.

Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations	Number
Investigations Pending at Beginning of Period	42
Investigations Opened During Period	0
Investigations Closed During Period	2
Investigations Pending at End of Period	40

During this reporting period, the WPU continued to handle time-intensive special projects at the request of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Integrity Committee.

Substantiated Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations

W17-USCG-WPU-16018

OIG's investigation substantiated allegations that a Lieutenant Commander in the Coast Guard was retaliated against for making discrimination and harassment

¹ Complaints are most often declined during the intake process because they fail to allege a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, are the subject of an open inquiry being conducted by another office or agency, or allege whistleblower retaliation generally handled by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.

Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

complaints against her supervisors. OIG determined that her complaints were a contributing factor in the numerical performance marks in her Officer Evaluation Report. OIG made four recommendations for corrective action: (1) that the Lieutenant Commander's Officer Evaluation Report be corrected; (2) that commanders be required to document in writing the reasons for their findings and outcomes in response to bullying and harassment complaints; (3) that supervisors receive supplemental training on the Coast Guard's discrimination, harassment, and bullying policies; and (4) that the *United States Coast Guard Civil Rights Manual* be modified to clarify how military members can file whistleblower retaliation complaints. Under the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, the DHS Secretary's response to these recommendations was due in January 2019, but as of the end of this SAR period, OIG has not received a response. The full report of investigation with appropriate redactions can be found on the OIG website:

<https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2018/WRROI-W17-USCG-WPU-16018.pdf>.

I16-CBP-DET-17715

During a previous reporting period, OIG closed case I16-CBP-DET-17715, concerning a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officer who was denied a training opportunity in retaliation for a protected disclosure. In response to our report of investigation, CBP provided special training to the responsible management official involved on how to properly handle similar situations in the future. CBP has informed us that it has also proposed disciplinary action against the responsible management official in response to his conduct. We expect the CBP deciding official to issue a decision concerning the proposed disciplinary action during the next SAR period.

Whistleblower Protection Coordinator

Education, Outreach and Coordination by WPC

The second component of the DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Program is the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator (WPC). The WPC is a department-level resource for educating and advising DHS employees about whistleblower protection rights and remedies. The WPC operates independent of WPU, but collaborates frequently with WPU.

At the end of the last reporting period, the prior Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman for DHS OIG retired. In October 2018, the Acting Inspector General for DHS OIG selected and designated a new WPC to fulfill the statutorily required duties of this position.

Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

During this reporting period, the new WPC provided PowerPoint presentations and lectures at 10 DHS Headquarters New Employee Orientation classes, educating approximately 269 attendees on whistleblower protection issues. The WPC provided similar PowerPoint presentations and lectures at 11 DHS Headquarters New Contractor classes, educating almost 1,000 contractor, subcontractor, and grantee attendees on their statutory whistleblower rights and protections under 41 U.S.C. § 4712. These presentations also addressed the particular whistleblower protections that apply to security clearance matters under Presidential Policy Directive 19 and 50 U.S.C. § 3341.

With regard to coordination efforts, the WPC attended and participated in two CIGIE Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman/Coordinator working group meetings and one Intelligence Community IG working group meeting during this reporting period. The WPC is also working closely with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) to complete the OSC re-certification process for 2019. Additionally, the WPC is coordinating with OSC and other agency IGs to identify best practices regarding alternative dispute resolutions (ADR) in connection with evaluating whether DHS OIG can and should implement some form of ADR to assist in resolving whistleblower retaliation complaints more efficiently.

Office of Inspector General and Department of Homeland Security Profiles

The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* officially established DHS, with the primary mission of protecting the American homeland. The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* also established an OIG in the Department by amendment to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*. By this action, Congress and the Administration ensured independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations of DHS' programs and operations.

The President appoints and the Senate confirms the Inspector General, who reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Congress. The *Inspector General Act* ensures OIG's independence. This independence enhances our ability to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as to provide objective and credible reports to the Secretary and Congress on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS programs and operations.


OIG Offices	DHS Component and Offices
Executive Office Office of Audits (OA) Office of Counsel Office of External Affairs Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations (SRE) Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight (IQO) Office of Investigations (INV) Office of Management (OM)	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Management Directorate (MGMT) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CISO) Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE) Office of Public Affairs (OPA) Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY) Privacy Office Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) United States Secret Service (Secret Service)

Summary of Significant Office of Inspector General Activities

Since 2003, our work has inspired significant Department and congressional action to correct deficiencies identified in our audit, inspection, and investigative reports. We issued more than 10,594 recommendations to improve the economy, effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity of the Department's programs and operations. As of March 31, 2019, the Department took action to address all but 575 of those recommendations. Congress has also taken notice of our work and called on us to testify 154 times since our office was created.

During this reporting period, we issued 37 new reports and 181 unique recommendations to the Department; we closed 151 recommendations, issued in this and prior periods, because of the Department's actions. Congress also recognized our work by calling on us to testify about our efforts to improve the Department.

OIG Activity October 1, 2018 – March 31, 2019



We have highlighted a number of audits and inspections that we conducted during the reporting period in the following eight focus areas:

- Acquisitions
- Disaster-related Activities
- Financial Management
- Immigration
- Information Technology Cybersecurity
- Law Enforcement
- Terrorism
- Investigations

ACQUISITIONS

During this SAR period, we identified serious performance issues with CBP's contract with Accenture. In other contracts, instead of holding facilities accountable through financial penalties, ICE issued waivers to facilities with deficient conditions, seeking to exempt them from complying with certain standards. We also noted that DHS' ability to make informed decisions about components' assessments of capability needs is hindered by inconsistent analyst reviews.



What We Found

1 Management Alert - CBP Needs to Address Serious Performance Issues on the Accenture Hiring Contract (OIG-19-13)

In its first year, CBP's contract with Accenture took longer to deploy and delivered less capability than promised. Accenture is nowhere near satisfying its 7,500-person hiring goal over the next 5 years. Further, CBP has used significant staffing and resources to help Accenture do the job for which it was contracted. As such, we are concerned that CBP may have paid Accenture for services and tools not provided. CBP risks wasting millions of taxpayer dollars on a contract that is not meeting its proposed performance expectations.

2 ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards (OIG-19-18)

ICE employed a multilayered system to manage and oversee detention contracts. However, ICE did not adequately hold detention facility contractors accountable for not meeting performance standards. ICE failed to consistently include its quality assurance surveillance plan (QASP) in facility contracts. The QASP provides tools for ensuring facilities meet performance standards. Only 28 out of 106 contracts we reviewed contained the QASP.

3 DHS Needs to Improve the Process for Identifying Acquisition Planning Capability Needs (OIG-19-19)

DHS does not hold components accountable for failing to follow guidance and has not provided adequate direction on implementing the guidance. As a result, the Department cannot be assured that capability needs are properly identified.

DHS Response

CBP concurred with all four recommendations and initially reported it would complete a contract assessment analysis to review and take appropriate actions as warranted. CBP also reported it would coordinate with the appropriate entities related to deploying EyeDetect. In December 2018, CBP issued Accenture a partial Stop Work Order directing Accenture to stop and immediately cease work on all activities involved in the hiring of applicants. In April 2019, CBP terminated its \$297 million contract with Accenture.

ICE officials concurred with all five recommendations and proposed steps to update processes and guidance regarding contracting tools used to hold detention facility contractors accountable for failing to meet performance standards. ICE has already begun providing additional training to all contracting officer's representatives responsible for detention contracts.

The Department concurred with our four recommendations and described corrective actions taken, including updating the Joint Requirements Integration and Management Systems manual.



Moving Forward

CBP must hold contractors accountable, mitigate risk, and devise a strategy to ensure results without additional costs to the Government. We will closely monitor all actions ICE takes in response to our recommendations to improve contract oversight and compliance of ICE detention facility contractors. Implementation of our recommendations will ensure the Department has consistent information on which to base acquisition decisions.

DISASTER-RELATED ACTIVITIES

During this SAR period, we issued four disaster-related reports, including audits of grant funds. We questioned \$9.1 million awarded to the Ascension Parish School Board in Louisiana. We also questioned \$22.3 million awarded to the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation in Montana. After a false missile alert in Hawaii, we determined that FEMA has limited responsibility for the sending and canceling of state and local alerts.



What We Found

- 1 FEMA Should Disallow \$9.1 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Ascension Parish School Board, Louisiana (OIG-19-05)**

The Board did not follow all Federal procurement regulations in awarding \$25.6 million in disaster-related contracts, resulting in \$9.1 million in ineligible costs. There were also issues with direct administrative costs related to a Recovery Program and Grants Management services contract.
- 2 FEMA Should Disallow \$22.3 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation, Montana (OIG-19-06)**

The Tribe did not account for and expend all FEMA public assistance grant funds according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. The Tribe failed to manage a \$32.4 million grant from FEMA according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines. As a result, FEMA has no assurance that expenditures the Tribe claimed and plans to claim are valid, allowable, or eligible.
- 3 FEMA's Oversight of the Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS) (OIG-19-08)**

FEMA maintains IPAWS as a messaging platform. State and local alerting authorities must obtain commercially available emergency-alert software to generate messages, which pass through IPAWS for authentication and delivery. We found that FEMA does not require that this software perform functions critical to the alert process and does not require that software vendors provide training on alerting authorities. FEMA only recommends that software vendors include these capabilities as "best practices."

DHS Response

FEMA concurred with the three recommendations to better oversee Louisiana to ensure it fulfills its grantee responsibilities, to ensure the Board complies with Federal procurement regulations for awarding disaster contracts to prevent potential improper spending, and to disallow \$8,149,417 as ineligible contract costs, unless FEMA grants an exemption for all or part of the costs.

FEMA officials agreed with our findings and recommendations. FEMA will continue to monitor payments, consistently communicate with the Tribe, and continue to support grant management activities.

FEMA concurred with the recommendations. The FEMA IPAWS Program Management Office agreed to incorporate the functional requirements of the 2015 and 2018 vendor letters in an updated version of the memorandum of agreement with FEMA, which state, local, tribal, and territorial alerting authorities must enter into to leverage IPAWS services for sending alerts and warnings to the public.

➔ Moving Forward

FEMA will develop new programs to assist and monitor grant recipients, and provide assistance and guidance for ensuring compliance with all Federal regulations. FEMA will proactively monitor the Tribe's activities for all open projects to ensure compliance with all Federal grant requirements. FEMA will exercise appropriate oversight of IPAWS.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Our reports on financial management focused on the Department's financial statements and internal controls over financial reporting; CBP's revenue collection process to determine to what extent CBP's process enforces Customs laws; and whether Federal Protective Service's inspector positions were classified correctly for purposes of earning overtime under the *Fair Labor Standards Act*.



What We Found

1 **Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2018 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting (OIG-19-04)**

The independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP (KPMG) issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on DHS' consolidated financial statements. KPMG noted that the financial statements presented fairly, in all material respects, DHS' financial position as of September 30, 2018. KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS' internal control over financial reporting of its financial statements as of September 30, 2018. The report identifies the six significant deficiencies in internal control, two of which are considered material weaknesses, and four instances in which DHS did not comply with laws and regulations.

2 **CBP Did Not Maximize Its Revenue Collection Efforts for Delinquent Debt Owed from Importers (OIG-19-11)**

CBP did not fully enforce Customs laws over its revenue collection process. CBP failed to ensure the timely collection, write-off, and processing of delinquent debt from importers during fiscal years 2014–2016. Instead, CBP settled for collecting funds from importer surety bonds, which yielded less than 1 percent of the more than \$189 million owed from importers. CBP did not exhaust all administrative efforts in its collection duties.

3 **The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively (OIG-19-15)**

Although FPS inspectors were properly classified as non-exempt, inspectors' excessive use of overtime raised concerns. Eleven of the 19 inspectors reviewed frequently worked multiple 17- to 21-hour shifts with no days off in between. This extensive overtime allowed seven inspectors to earn more than the most senior executives in the Federal Government, with three earning more than the Vice President of the United States earns. FPS' increasing use of overtime contributed to a projected budget shortfall for FY 2018, potentially putting the FPS mission at risk.

DHS Response

The Department concurred with the independent auditors' conclusions and indicated that management will continue to implement corrective actions to improve financial management and internal control.

CBP concurred with the recommendations and described corrective actions it is taking and plans to take. CBP Office of Trade's development of an initial risk-based bonding methodology is in the final stages. CBP's Office of Finance finalized data elements on viability analysis worksheets to ensure standardized documentation of its collection efforts. Additionally, CBP's policy and procedures document will address the entire debt collection process managed within the Office of Finance's Revenue Division.

NPPD concurred with the recommendations and explained that the FPS Overtime Pay Directive provides detailed guidance for monitoring and tracking overtime. FPS will also review payroll data from May 2015 through September 2017 to determine if similar overtime usage patterns exist for FLSA non-exempt FPS inspectors.



Moving Forward

DHS must continue remediation efforts and stay focused to maintain its clean opinion on its financial statements and obtain a clean opinion on its internal control over financial reporting. CBP needs to track debt properly to ensure the processing of delinquent debt; otherwise, outstanding cumulative debt will continue to increase. FPS needs to develop more detailed overtime guidance and communicate it to the workforce more effectively.

IMMIGRATION

During this SAR period, we assessed CBP's air coordination efforts for supporting the Rio Grande Valley Sector. We completed unannounced inspections of correctional facilities and found a number of violations. We also noted factors beyond ICE's control that delayed the timely repatriation of detained aliens.



What We Found

1 **CBP Should Improve Its Air Coordination of the Rio Grande Valley Sector (OIG-19-02)**

In December 2017, U.S. Border Patrol began a joint operations center to coordinate with CBP's Air and Marine Operations (AMO). AMO routinely flies at night to support Border Patrol in the Rio Grande Valley sector. Coast Guard flight hours represent less than 1 percent of those supporting Border Patrol missions over land. Those efforts should improve the effectiveness of air support in the Rio Grande Valley sector and enhance unity of effort among CBP components.

2 **Issues Requiring Action at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey (OIG-19-20)**

During our July 2018 unannounced inspection in the Essex County Correctional Facility, we found a number of violations related to unreported security incidents, food safety, and facility conditions. We recommended that ICE conduct an immediate, full review of the facility, as well as Essex County Department of Corrections' management of the facility, to ensure compliance with ICE's 2011 *Performance-Based National Detention Standards*.

3 **ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens (OIG-19-28)**

We reviewed cases involving 3,053 aliens not removed within 90 days of receiving final orders. We found the most significant factors delaying repatriation were external and beyond ICE's control. Internally, we found that ICE struggles with inadequate staffing, heavy caseloads, and frequent officer rotations. We made five recommendations to improve ICE's removal operations staffing, flight reservation system, and metrics related to visa sanctions.

DHS Response

CBP concurred with our recommendation. CBP will create a joint working group of AMO and Border Patrol to continue to implement the operations center. CBP will also establish performance metrics and evaluate whether the operations center improves air coordination in the Rio Grande Valley Sector.

ICE concurred with our recommendation and initiated an immediate follow-up review process. ICE took action to address unreported security incidents, food safety issues, and facility conditions. ICE issued the facility another Contract Discrepancy Report, agreed to return to the facility for re-review within 6 months, and stated that the agency will schedule quarterly meetings with respective stakeholders.

ICE concurred with our recommendations and proposed steps to develop: a staffing model that assigns sufficient officers to manage post-order custody cases; training for all Enforcement and Removal Operations staff; a web-based flight management and tracking system; and written documentation of recommendations and justifications for imposing, retaining, and lifting visa sanctions.



Moving Forward

CBP should improve its air coordination to respond to the highest priority Border Patrol requests. ICE must ensure all correctional facilities comply with detention standards to establish an environment that protects the safety, rights, and health of detainees. ICE Air needs to enhance technology for efficient repatriation.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CYBERSECURITY

Prompted by suspicious cyber activities on election systems, we evaluated the effectiveness of the Department's efforts to coordinate with states on securing the Nation's election infrastructure. We issued a management alert that focused on FEMA's release of PII and SPII. We also evaluated DHS' enterprise-wide security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems.



What We Found

- 1 Progress Made, But Additional Efforts Are Needed to Secure the Election Infrastructure (OIG-19-24)**

Despite Federal requirements, DHS has not completed plans and strategies critical to identifying emerging threats and mitigation activities, and to establishing metrics to gauge progress in securing the election infrastructure. Senior leadership turnover and a lack of guidance and administrative staff have hindered DHS' ability to accomplish such planning. Also, staff shortages, a lengthy security clearance process, and state and local officials' historic mistrust of Federal government assistance restrict DHS' efforts to provide the services and assessments needed to secure the election infrastructure.
- 2 Management Alert – FEMA Did Not Safeguard Disaster Survivors' Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (OIG-19-32)**

During an ongoing audit of FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Program, we issued a management alert after finding that the agency had violated the *Privacy Act of 1974* by improperly releasing to contractors the PII and SPII of 2.3 million survivors of hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the California wildfires.
- 3 (U) Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2018 (OIG-19-34)**

For FY 2018, we determined that DHS' information security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems was effective as the Department achieved "Level 4 – Managed and Measurable" in three of five cybersecurity functions, based on current reporting instructions for intelligence systems. However, we identified deficiencies in DHS' overall patch management process and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's weakness remediation and security awareness training.

DHS Response

DHS, through its newly established Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, agreed to: prioritize hiring of administrative and operational staff; enhance development of situation analysis and assessment summary reports on threats, vulnerabilities, best practices, and security tips to election infrastructure stakeholders; identify strategies to increase outreach to state and local officials; enhance and expand governance structures for sharing and tailoring information to assist stakeholders; and collaborate across the Intelligence Community to improve the sharing of classified information.

FEMA agreed to assess the extent of this privacy incident and implement a process to protect survivors more effectively in the future. FEMA also agreed to implement controls to ensure that it only sends required data elements on registered disaster survivors to contractors.

DHS concurred with all three of our recommendations to address the intelligence system deficiencies identified. One recommendation was closed the other two were resolved.



Moving Forward

Additional staff could enhance DHS' ability to provide technical assistance and outreach to state and local election officials during elections. FEMA must take corrective action to protect current and future disaster survivors from identity theft and fraud. DHS also should improve its patch management process.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

We investigated allegations that a whistleblower was retaliated against for, among other things, communicating with Members of Congress regarding discrimination and retaliation against the whistleblower. We also conducted a review of ICE OPR's Investigations Division.



What We Found

- 1 Management Alert - Coast Guard Investigative Service Search and Seizure of DHS OIG and Congressional Communications (OIG-19-03)**

We conveyed profound concern regarding a search warrant executed by the Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) against a DHS whistleblower. The warrant specifically sought “communications with DHS OIG and congressional aid[e]s” regarding the whistleblower’s claims of discrimination. We requested immediate action to resolve the potentially retaliatory situation and ensure that all DHS components with investigative authority exercise that authority with due respect for the rights of whistleblowers.
- 2 Oversight Review of the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigations Division (OIG-19-14)**

In most cases, ICE through its Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) Investigations Division maintained equipment records and complied with vehicle and availability pay requirements. Offices were also accurate in accounting for all firearms. However, we noted deficiencies in compliance with evidence inventory requirements, and observed inaccuracies in ammunition records. We also found a systemic absence of training on certain firearms, untimely investigative reports, and uneven supervisory review.

DHS Response

DHS reviewed details of the investigation provided by Coast Guard and concluded that no reprisal took place in this matter. DHS further noted its compliance with various legal requirements meant to protect whistleblowers, and stated CGIS will require its agents to coordinate with DHS OIG concerning any investigation in which DHS OIG communications will be sought. However, we do not consider DHS’ actions, characterizations, or explanations sufficient to address our concerns and recommendations. Therefore, both of our recommendations in this management alert remain open and unresolved.

ICE concurred with 10 of 12 recommendations to improve the agency’s operational management and compliance with applicable standards. ICE’s non-concurrence pertained to ensuring that all agents located in offices with shoulder-fired firearms complete required annual familiarization training (which ICE deemed not always feasible); and agents comply with ICE OPR’s *Investigative Guidebook* requirements on thoroughness (a requirement that ICE OPR officials believe is already satisfied by a rigorous review process that includes the ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor).

➔ Moving Forward

CGIS will require its agents to coordinate with DHS OIG concerning any investigation in which they seek an employee’s communications with DHS OIG. We will work with ICE OPR to resolve and close recommendations, which will ensure its investigative activities comply with applicable standards.

TERRORISM

Deficiencies in CBP's supervision, guidance, and equipment management, combined with a lack of performance measures, limited Office of Field Operations' (OFO) ability to detect and deter illegal activities related to terrorism. DHS did not promptly fulfill its first requirement mandated by Public Law 114-278.



What We Found

- 1 CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry (OIG-19-10)**

Because of inadequate supervision to ensure CBP's OFO officers properly documented searches, OFO could not maintain accurate quantitative data or identify and address performance problems related to these searches. OFO officers also did not consistently disconnect electronic devices, specifically cell phones, from networks before searching them because headquarters provided inconsistent guidance to ports of entry on disabling data connections on electronic devices. OFO also did not adequately manage technology to effectively support search operations and ensure the security of data.
- 2 DHS' and TSA's Compliance with Public Law 114-278, Transportation Security Card Program Assessment (OIG-19-16)**

DHS did not promptly fulfill its first requirement mandated by Public Law 114-278, delaying the award for a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of the Transportation Security Card Program by more than a year. TSA partially complied with two and fully complied with four of the six requirements mandated in the public law. For the two partially complied items, TSA did not identify best practices for quality assurance at every stage of the security threat assessment in its comprehensive risk analysis, or provide sufficient documentation or clearly state how it would address all recommended additional internal controls identified in the risk analysis.
- 3 (U) Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas (OIG-19-21)**

We identified vulnerabilities with various airport access control points and with associated access control procedures. Details related to the testing results presented in our report are classified or designated Sensitive Security Information.

DHS Response

CBP concurred with our five recommendations to improve its oversight of searches of electronic devices at ports of entry. OFO Tactical Operations Division's (TOD) is developing a process to conduct annual Field Office reviews at ports of entry. TOD will also work with OFO's Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation to enhance and update the current self-inspection worksheet to ensure proper documentation of officer actions when conducting searches of electronic devices, as well as adequate and prompt supervisory reviews.

DHS Science and Technology Directorate and TSA did not provide formal comments, as this report contained no recommendations.

TSA management concurred with all six of our recommendations, which, when implemented, should help TSA and airports better safeguard secure airport



Moving Forward

We will monitor CBP's development of performance measures based on positive enforcement actions resulting from advanced searches. We will oversee DHS' and TSA's progress in implementing actions required in Public Law 114-278. In addition, we will monitor TSA's progress in implementing our recommendations related to safeguarding secure airport areas.

INVESTIGATIONS

Our Reports of Investigation disclosed that several groups or individuals defrauded FEMA, including business partners and a former police officer and spouse, and a Government contractor defrauded the Small Business Administration (SBA) as well as a Border Patrol Agent and his sister assisted trafficking organization to smuggle narcotics into the United States.



What We Found

- 1 Business Partners Defrauded FEMA**
We investigated two business partners for defrauding FEMA disaster assistance programs and individual disaster survivors following Hurricane Sandy.
- 2 Police Officer and Spouse Defrauded FEMA**
We investigated a former police officer and spouse for fraudulently applying for and receiving \$187,000 in disaster-related relief benefits.
- 3 Government Contractor Misrepresented Itself to Defraud SBA**
We investigated a government contractor who misrepresented itself as a small business in order to obtain U.S. Government small business set-aside contracts, when in fact it was an affiliate of a larger foreign company.
- 4 Border Protection Specialist Submits False Reports**
We investigated a Customs and Border Protection Agricultural Specialist for falsely submitting 16 ship inspection reports between 2015 and 2017.
- 5 Border Patrol Agent Trafficking Drugs**
We investigated a Border Patrol Agent, with the Intelligence Unit, his sister (civilian), and another civilian for assisting a drug trafficking organization smuggle narcotics into the U.S. We conducted three undercover operations in which the BP Agent provided real time scouting information and ensured that the marijuana load vehicle was not stopped by law enforcement officers during the smuggling activities. The civilian was one of the scouts assisting the BP Agent in the smuggling operation.

Action Taken

A Federal judge sentenced the first individual to 7 years' imprisonment and the second individual to 5 years of probation. Together they were ordered to pay \$1,454,646 in restitution. We conducted this investigation jointly with the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice.

The former police officer was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment, forfeiture of employment as a police officer, and ordered to pay \$86,599 in restitution. The spouse was sentenced to 3 years of probation and 50 hours of community service, and ordered to pay \$86,599 in restitution. We conducted this investigation jointly with the New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice, Financial & Computer Crimes Bureau, the U.S. Housing and Urban Development OIG, and SBA OIG.

Although the contractor did not admit to liability, it agreed to settle with the U.S., and to pay \$310,015 in fines and \$589,985 in restitutions. This investigation was conducted jointly with SBA OIG.

A Federal judge sentenced the former employee to 90 days home detention, 3 years of probation, 200 hours of community service, and a \$500 fine.

The BP Agent was previously sentenced to 90 months incarceration. His sister was previously sentenced to 3 years' probation and the civilian was sentenced to 3 years supervised release. This investigation was conducted by the Southwest Border Corruption Task Force, which included the OIG, ICE OPR, CBP OPR, and the Federal Bureau of Investigations.

This section reports on each OIG investigation involving substantiated allegations of misconduct by a senior Government employee that we closed during the reporting period. This report is provided in accordance with requirements of the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*. Appendix 9 provides a detailed description of all other OIG investigations involving senior Government employees that we closed during the reporting period and did not disclose to the public.



We Investigated...

A DHS official (SES) for collecting illegal drug proceeds on behalf of an incarcerated drug trafficker. The official resigned 2 weeks after arrest. A Federal judge sentenced the former DHS official to 2 months' imprisonment, followed by 12 months of home detention, and was ordered to pay a fine of \$10,000 after the former official pleaded guilty to one count of racketeering.

A CBP official (SES) for engaging in misconduct during a detail assignment and failing to take leave while performing work as a military reservist. We did not substantiate the misconduct allegation, but substantiated that the official failed to take military leave while performing duties as a military reservist and therefore received payment from CBP and the military reserves. We referred this matter to the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) on July 11, 2018, and it was declined for prosecution on the same date.

A CBP manager (GS-15) for conflict of interest for having a close personal relationship with a contract employee who worked under a contract the manager supervised. We found that the manager did not clearly disclose the relationship with the contract employee, failed to recuse themselves, and did not list this relationship on financial disclosure forms as required. We found no evidence that the manager benefited financially from this relationship. We referred this matter to the USAO on September 7, 2017. The USAO declined prosecution on November 30, 2017, in favor of administrative action.

A CBP manager (GS-15) for nepotism and prohibited personnel practices. We determined the manager had a conflict of interest by directly supervising a relative. Both employees are now retired. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

An NPPD official (SES) for misusing a government-owned vehicle on several occasions. We identified at least one instance in which the official misused a government vehicle. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

Congressional Testimony and Briefings



The Acting Inspector General testified before Congress once during this period.

- March 6, 2019 – U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security at a hearing entitled, *DHS Office of Inspector General*.

Testimony prepared for this hearing may be accessed on our website at www.oig.dhs.gov.

We briefed congressional Members and their staffs frequently throughout the reporting period. Our office conducted more than 20 briefings for congressional committee staff on the results of our work, including on the following OIG reports:

- *Special Review – Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues Under the Zero Tolerance Policy* (OIG-18-84);
- *Results of Unannounced Inspections of Conditions for Unaccompanied Alien Children in CBP Custody* (OIG-18-87);
- *Management Alert – Coast Guard Investigative Service Search and Seizure of DHS OIG and Congressional Communications* (OIG-19-03); and
- *Management Alert – CBP Needs to Address Serious Performance Issues on the Accenture Hiring Contract* (OIG-19-13).

We also met with congressional staff to discuss Member requests for OIG reviews of DHS programs and operations.



OIG In The News

Washington Post, *CNN*, *CBS News*, *AP News*, and *NBC News* — among other news outlets — took notice of our audit and inspection work from October 1, 2018 – March 31, 2019.

Nooses, rotting teeth and neglect: Inspectors find dismal conditions at California immigration jail

Washington Post
October 2, 2018

'Serious' issues with \$297 million CBP hiring contract, internal watchdog says

CNN
December 10, 2018

Federal K-9 handlers earned more than Vice President Mike Pence last year

CBS News
December 18, 2018

Report: ICE doesn't always hold contractors accountable

AP News
February 1, 2019

Homeland Security IG says half of money spent on air marshals is wasted

CNN
February 12, 2019

Inspector general says FEMA put 2.3M hurricane, wildfire survivors at risk of identity theft

NBC News
March 23, 2019

Other Office of Inspector General Activities

OVERSIGHT OF *SINGLE AUDIT ACT*, AS AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 104-156



The *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, requires that inspectors general take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal auditors complies with Government Auditing Standards (GAS). The Office of Management and Budget requires entities such as state and local governments, universities, and nonprofit organizations that spend \$750,000 or more in Federal funds in a year to obtain an audit, referred to as a “single audit.” Non-Federal auditors perform these single audits. Our role is to take the appropriate steps to ensure the non-Federal auditors perform their single audit work in compliance with GAS. During this reporting period, we completed 33 desk reviews of Single Audit reports issued by independent public accountant organizations.

33
Desk
Reviews
Completed

0
Quality Control
Reviews
Completed

Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings



Reports and Recommendations with Questioned Costs, Unsupported Costs

Carryover from last period

10 reports with 30 recommendations

- Questioned Costs \$99,545,563
- Unsupported Costs \$262,446

Issued this period

6 reports with 10 recommendations

- Questioned Costs \$36,131,751
- Unsupported Costs \$2,432,871




**16 Reports with
40 Recommendations**

**135,677,314 Questioned Costs
2,695,317 Unsupported Costs**



Current Status on Reports and Recommendations with Questioned Costs (QC) and Unsupported Costs (UC)



Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings (Continued)



Reports and Recommendations with Funds to be Put to Better Use (FPTBU)

Carryover from last period

5 reports with 20 recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use

- Funds Put to Better Use \$2,022,607,736

Issued this period


3 reports with 2 recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use*

- Funds Put to Better Use \$688,380,334

* OIG-19-13 had FPTBU that were not specific to a recommendation.




**8 Reports with
22 Recommendations**




**FPTBU
\$2,710,988,070**

Current Status on Reports and Recommendations with FPTBU




Appendix 2 Compliance – Resolution of Reports and Recommendations


MANAGEMENT DECISION IS PENDING



CURRENT REPORT INVENTORY



ACTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS



Note: This appendix excludes investigative reports.

Appendix 3

Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec. No.	DHS Comp	No. Over 6 Months
1	12/16/2011	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	3, 4	FEMA	2
2	5/4/2015	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
3	6/19/2015	OIG-15-107	<i>New York's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010-12</i>	3	FEMA	1
4	5/10/2016	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program</i>	5	TSA	1
5	8/4/2017	OIG-17-99-MA	<i>Management Alert – CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants</i>	1	CBP	1
6	9/14/2017	OIG-17-103-MA	<i>Management Alert – Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
7	10/24/2017	OIG-18-04	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i>	2, 3, 4	TSA	3
8	11/16/2017	OIG-18-18	<i>Management Alert – CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509</i>	3	CBP	1
9	1/5/2018	OIG-18-36	<i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (REDACTED)</i>	2	ICE	1
10	4/26/2018	OIG-18-62	<i>Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority, California, Provided FEMA Incorrect Information for Its \$33 Million Project</i>	1, 2	FEMA	2
11	9/19/2018	OIG-18-77	<i>Lack of Planning Hinders Effective Oversight and Management of ICE's Expanding 287(g) Program</i>	3	ICE	1
					Total	15

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
1	OIG-10-11	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2009 Financial Statements and Internal Control Over Financial Reporting</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCG
2	OIG-11-16	<i>Customs and Border Protection's Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at Land Ports of Entry</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
3	OIG-11-92	<i>Efficacy of Customs and Border Protection's Bonding Process</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
4	OIG-12-07	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2011 Integrated Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	5	\$0	\$0	FEMA, USCG
5	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
6	OIG-12-132	<i>CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
7	OIG-13-20	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS FY 2012 Consolidated Financial Statements and Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting</i>	16	\$0	\$0	FEMA, ICE, OCIO-OCFO, USCG

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
8	OIG-13-80	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Enforcement and Removal Operations' Contract Funding and Payment Processes</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
9	OIG-13-104	<i>Technical Security Evaluation of DHS Activities at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
10	OIG-13-119	<i>CBP's and USCG's Controls Over Exports Related to Foreign Military Sales</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
11	OIG-14-18	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2013 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	10	\$0	\$0	MGMT, ICE, USSS, USCG, DHS
12	OIG-14-32	<i>Ensuring the Integrity of CBP's Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
13	OIG-14-105	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
14	OIG-14-132	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
15	OIG-14-142	<i>(U) Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
16	OIG-14-150-D	<i>FEMA and the State of Louisiana Need to Accelerate the Funding of \$812 Million in Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Funds and Develop a Plan to Close Approved Projects</i>	1	\$0	\$812,238,776	FEMA
17	OIG-14-153	<i>Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
18	OIG-15-06-D	<i>FEMA Needs To Track Performance Data and Develop Policies, Procedures, and Performance Measures for Long Term Recovery Offices</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
19	OIG-15-08	<i>Ohio's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012</i>	1	\$3,559,067	\$0	FEMA
20	OIG-15-10	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	31	\$0	\$0	USCG, FEMA, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, DHS

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
21	OIG-15-18	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at John F. Kennedy International Airport-Sensitive Security Information</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP, ICE
22	OIG-15-29	<i>Security Enhancements Needed to the TSA PreCheck™ Initiative</i>	4	\$0	\$0	TSA
23	OIG-15-38	<i>Science and Technology Directorate Needs to Improve Its Contract Management Procedures</i>	1	\$0	\$0	S&T
24	OIG-15-45	<i>Allegations of Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck Improperly (OSC File No. DI-14-3679)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
25	OIG-15-80	<i>DHS Should Do More to Reduce Travel Reservation Costs</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
26	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
27	OIG-15-88	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at San Francisco International Airport</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
28	OIG-15-94	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2014 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
29	OIG-15-107	<i>New York's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010–12</i>	8	\$67,360,082	\$0	FEMA
30	OIG-15-108-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the Department of Homeland Security National Protection and Programs Directorate Internal Affairs Division</i>	1	\$0	\$0	NPPD
31	OIG-15-112	<i>Follow-up to Management Alert – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Facility, San Pedro, California</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
32	OIG-15-128-D	<i>FEMA's Process for Selecting Joint Field Offices Needs Improvement</i>	1	\$0	\$1,553,000	FEMA
33	OIG-15-140	<i>DHS Can Strengthen Its Cyber Mission Coordination Efforts</i>	3	\$0	\$0	PLCY, ICE
34	OIG-16-02	<i>The FPS Vehicle Fleet Is Not Managed Effectively</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
35	OIG-16-06	<i>Fiscal Year 2015 Financial and Internal Controls Audit</i>	15	\$0	\$0	USCG, CFO, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, DHS, FEMA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
36	OIG-16-10	<i>FEMA Faces Challenges in Managing Information Technology</i>	4	\$0	\$0	FEMA
37	OIG-16-20	<i>U.S. Secret Service Needs to Upgrade Its Radio Systems</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USSS
38	OIG-16-37	<i>Conditions at CBP's Forward Operating Bases along the Southwest Border</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
39	OIG-16-47	<i>FEMA Does Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Its National Flood Insurance Write Your Own Program</i>	4	\$0	\$0	FEMA
40	OIG-16-51	<i>CBP Needs to Better Plan Its Implementation of the DHS Prison Rape Elimination Act Regulations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
41	OIG-16-54	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
42	OIG-16-75	<i>CBP Needs Better Data to Justify Its Criminal Investigator Staffing</i>	5	\$0	\$0	CBP
43	OIG-16-78-D	<i>Colorado Should Provide the City of Evans More Assistance in Managing FEMA Grant Funds</i>	1	\$2,218,535	\$0	FEMA
44	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program</i>	11	\$0	\$0	TSA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
45	OIG-16-88	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2015 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
46	OIG-16-91	<i>TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA, OGC
47	OIG-16-98	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - SAFER Grants</i>	1	\$18,443,447	\$0	FEMA
48	OIG-16-100	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program – AFG</i>	1	\$7,124,893	\$0	FEMA
49	OIG-16-115-D	<i>FEMA Should Suspend All Grant Payments on the \$29.9 Million Coastal Retrofit Program Until Mississippi Can Properly Account for Federal Funds</i>	4	\$0	\$26,899,836	FEMA
50	OIG-16-123	<i>CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility's Privacy Policies and Practices</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
51	OIG-16-126-D	<i>FEMA Can Do More to Improve Public Assistance Grantees' and Subgrantees' Compliance with Federal Procurement Rules</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
52	OIG-16-127-D	<i>FEMA Can Enhance Readiness with Management of Its Disaster Incident Workforce</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
53	OIG-16-134	<i>TSA Needs a Crosscutting Risk-Based Security Strategy</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
54	OIG-16-138	<i>DHS' Progress in Implementing the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
55	OIG-16-139-D	<i>FEMA Acquisition of a Joint Field Office for DR-4223 in Austin, Texas</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
56	OIG-17-01	<i>USSS Faces Challenges Protecting Sensitive Case Management Systems and Data</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USSS
57	OIG-17-03	<i>AMO and Coast Guard Maritime Missions Are Not Duplicative, But Could Improve with Better Coordination</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT, USCG, CBP, ICE
58	OIG-17-04	<i>TSA Could Improve Its Oversight of Airport Controls over Access Media Badges</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
59	OIG-17-09	<i>DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
60	OIG-17-10	<i>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel</i>	4	\$0	\$0	USSS
61	OIG-17-12	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	\$0	\$0	USCG, CFO, FEMA, CBP, USSS, NPPD
62	OIG-17-14	<i>Summary Report on Audits of Security Controls for TSA Information Technology Systems at Airports</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
63	OIG-17-22	<i>DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
64	OIG-17-24	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2016</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
65	OIG-17-25-D	<i>The Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority in Victorville, California, Did Not Properly Manage \$32 Million in FEMA Grant Funds</i>	3	\$23,785,177	\$0	FEMA
66	OIG-17-36	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CBP

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
67	OIG-17-38-D	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
68	OIG-17-42	<i>H-2 Petition Fee Structure is Inequitable and Contributes to Processing Errors</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCIS
69	OIG-17-43-MA	<i>Management Alert on Issues Requiring Immediate Action at the Theo Lacy Facility in Orange, California</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
70	OIG-17-49	<i>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information</i>	6	\$0	\$0	CRCL, OGC, I&A, PRIV, SEC, DSEC, COS
71	OIG-17-51	<i>ICE Deportation Operations</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE
72	OIG-17-56	<i>DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays Is Hindered by Insufficient Technology</i>	5	\$0	\$0	MGMT, ICE
73	OIG-17-59	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2016 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
74	OIG-17-74-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the US Coast Guard Investigative Service</i>	18	\$0	\$0	USCG
75	OIG-17-91	<i>PALMS Does Not Address Department Needs</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
76	OIG-17-99-MA	<i>Management Alert – CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
77	OIG-17-101	<i>Improvements Needed to Promote DHS Progress toward Accomplishing Enterprise-wide Data Goals</i>	2	\$0	\$0	I&A, MGMT
78	OIG-17-103-MA	<i>Management Alert – Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns</i>	2	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
79	OIG-17-110	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Management of Its Flood Mapping Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
80	OIG-17-112	<i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i>	7	\$0	\$0	TSA
81	OIG-17-114	<i>CBP's IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully Support Border Security Operations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
82	OIG-17-115-MA	<i>Management Alert – Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
83	OIG-17-117-D	<i>Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York</i>	2	\$808,159	\$0	FEMA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
84	OIG-17-119	<i>ICE Field Offices Need to Improve Compliance with Oversight Requirements for Segregation of Detainees with Mental Health Conditions</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
85	OIG-18-01	<i>Hazard Mitigation Grant Funds Awarded to MEMA for the Mississippi Coastal Retrofit Program</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA
86	OIG-18-03	<i>USCIS Needs a Better Approach to Verify H-1B Visa Participants</i>	3	\$0	\$0	USCIS
87	OIG-18-04	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i>	3	\$0	\$0	TSA
88	OIG-18-05	<i>DHS' Controls Over Firearms and Other Sensitive Assets</i>	3	\$0	\$0	MGMT
89	OIG-18-07	<i>DHS Needs a More Unified Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Administration</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
90	OIG-18-08	<i>FEMA and California Need to Assist CalRecycle, a California State Agency, to Improve Its Accounting of \$230 Million in Disaster Costs</i>	3	\$107,002,492	\$65,397,921	FEMA
91	OIG-18-10	<i>Biennial Report of DHS' Implementation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015</i>	1	\$0	\$0	NPPD

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
92	OIG-18-15	<i>Coast Guard IT Investments Risk Failure Without Required Oversight</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCG
93	OIG-18-16	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	42	\$0	\$0	DHS, USCG, USSS, CBP, FEMA
94	OIG-18-17	<i>Napa State Hospital, California, Should Improve the Management of Its \$6.7 Million FEMA Grant</i>	2	\$4,788,492	\$0	FEMA
95	OIG-18-18	<i>Management Alert – CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP
96	OIG-18-20	<i>Office of Health Affairs Has Not Implemented An Effective Privacy Management Program</i>	4	\$0	\$0	OHA
97	OIG-18-27	<i>TSA's Adjudication Resources Are Inadequate to Meet TSA PreCheck Enrollment Goals</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
98	OIG-18-32	<i>Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Detention Facilities</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
99	OIG-18-34	<i>DHS' Implementation of the DATA Act</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
100	OIG-18-36	<i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (Redacted)</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE
101	OIG-18-38	<i>Unsupported Payments Made to Policyholders Who Participated in the Hurricane Sandy Claims Review Process</i>	7	\$0	\$0	FEMA
102	OIG-18-51	<i>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement</i>	2	\$0	\$0	DHS
103	OIG-18-53	<i>Immigration and Customs Enforcement Did Not Follow Federal Procurement Guidelines When Contracting for Detention Services</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
104	OIG-18-56	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2017</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
105	OIG-18-57	<i>Fiscal Year 2016 Audit of the DHS Bankcard Program Indicates Moderate Risk Remains</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
106	OIG-18-58	<i>USCIS Has Unclear Website Information and Unrealistic Time Goals for Adjudicating Green Card Applications</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS
107	OIG-18-62	<i>Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority, California, Provided FEMA Incorrect Information for Its \$33 Million Project</i>	3	\$24,843,002	\$4,527,346	FEMA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
108	OIG-18-63	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$20.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Diamondhead Water and Sewer District, Mississippi</i>	5	\$20,391,686	\$0	FEMA
109	OIG-18-65	<i>Special Report – Certain Findings Relating to the OIG's Investigation of Allegations Involving FLETC Senior Officials</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
110	OIG-18-66	<i>Sandy Recovery Improvement Act Review</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
111	OIG-18-67	<i>ICE's Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or Systemic Improvements</i>	5	\$0	\$0	ICE
112	OIG-18-70	<i>FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-Based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission - Sensitive Security Information</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
113	OIG-18-71	<i>FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Premium Pay Cap</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA
114	OIG-18-72	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2017 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CFO

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
115	OIG-18-73	<i>DHS' Non-disclosure Forms and Settlement Agreements Do Not Always Include the Required Statement from the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012</i>	3	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
116	OIG-18-76	<i>Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers</i>	6	\$0	\$0	CBP, ICE
117	OIG-18-77	<i>Lack of Planning Hinders Effective Oversight and Management of ICE's Expanding 287(g) Program</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE
118	OIG-18-78	<i>USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement</i>	8	\$0	\$0	USCIS
119	OIG-18-79	<i>CBP Has Not Ensured Safeguards for Data Collected Using Unmanned Aircraft Systems</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP
120	OIG-18-80	<i>Progress Made, but CBP Faces Challenges Implementing a Biometric Capability to Track Air Passengers Departures Nationwide</i>	5	\$0	\$0	CBP
121	OIG-18-81	<i>DHS Support Components Do Not Have Sufficient Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct</i>	6	\$0	\$0	MGMT

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
122	OIG-18-83	<i>CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport</i>	8	\$0	\$0	CBP
123	OIG-18-85	<i>Management Alert – Observations of FEMA's Debris Monitoring Efforts for Hurricane Irma</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA
124	OIG-18-86	<i>Management Alert – Issues Requiring Action at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in Adelanto, California</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
125	OIG-18-88	<i>Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program</i>	4	\$0	\$0	S&T, USCG
126	OIG-18-89	<i>(U) S&T Has Taken Steps to Address Insider Threats, But Management Challenges Remain</i>	4	\$0	\$0	DHS
Total			453	\$280,325,032	\$910,616,879	

Report Number Abbreviations:

A report number ending with “D” is a grant audit.

A report number ending with “MA” is a Management Alert. These reports identify conditions that pose an immediate and serious threat.

A report number ending with “IQO” is a report issued by the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight.

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
1	11/09/18	OIG-19-01	<i>Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
2	10/18/18	OIG-19-02	<i>CBP Should Improve Its Air Coordination of the Rio Grande Valley Sector</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
3	10/29/18	OIG-19-03	<i>Management Alert – Coast Guard Investigative Service Search and Seizure of DHS OIG and Congressional Communications</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
4	11/15/18	OIG-19-04	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2018 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
5	11/16/18	OIG-19-05	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$9.1 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Ascension Parish School Board, Louisiana</i>	\$8,149,417	\$0	\$51,380,334
6	11/28/18	OIG-19-06	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$22.3 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation, Montana</i>	\$22,318,110	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
7	11/20/18	OIG-19-07	<i>DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
8	11/19/18	OIG-19-08	<i>FEMA's Oversight of the Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
9	11/29/18	OIG-19-09	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$413,074 of Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, for a May 2010 Flood</i>	\$371,766	\$362,296	\$0
10	12/3/18	OIG-19-10	<i>CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
11	12/4/18	OIG-19-11	<i>CBP Did Not Maximize its Revenue Collection Efforts for Delinquent Debt Owed from Importers</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
12	12/4/18	OIG-19-12	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$3,061,819 in Grant Funds Awarded to Jackson County, Florida</i>	\$2,296,365	\$301,807	\$0
13	12/6/18	OIG-19-13	<i>Management Alert – CBP Needs to Address Serious Performance Issues on the Accenture Hiring Contract</i>	\$0	\$0	\$243,000,000

Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
14	12/6/18	OIG-19-14	<i>Oversight Review of the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigations Division</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
15	12/11/18	OIG-19-15	<i>The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively</i>	\$1,768,768	\$1,768,768	\$0
16	12/14/18	OIG-19-16	<i>DHS' and TSA's Compliance with Public Law 114-278, Transportation Security Card Program Assessment</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
17	12/19/18	OIG-19-17	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security is Questionable</i>	\$0	\$0	\$394,000,000
18	1/29/19	OIG-19-18	<i>ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
19	1/30/19	OIG-19-19	<i>DHS Needs to Improve the Process for Identifying Acquisition Planning Capability Needs</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
20	2/13/19	OIG-19-20	<i>Issues Requiring Action at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
21	2/13/19	OIG-19-21	<i>(U) Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
22	2/21/19	OIG-19-22	<i>United States Coast Guard's Reporting of Uniform Code of Military Justice Violations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
23	2/28/19	OIG-19-23	<i>Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
24	2/28/19	OIG-19-24	<i>Progress Made, But Additional Efforts Are Needed to Secure the Election Infrastructure</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
25	3/7/19	OIG-19-25	<i>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
26	3/8/19	OIG-19-26	<i>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
27	3/8/19	OIG-19-27	<i>Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
28	3/11/19	OIG-19-28	<i>ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
29	3/8/19	OIG-19-29	<i>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
30	3/8/19	OIG-19-30	<i>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
31	3/13/19	OIG-19-31	<i>Oregon's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015</i>	\$1,227,325	\$0	\$0
32	3/15/19	OIG-19-32	<i>Management Alert – FEMA Did Not Safeguard Disaster Survivors' Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
33	3/18/19	OIG-19-33	<i>Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2018 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
34	3/21/19	OIG-19-34	<i>(U) Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2018</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
35	3/28/19	OIG-19-35	<i>TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
36	3/29/19	OIG-19-36	<i>Missouri's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded during Fiscal Years 2012 through 2015</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
37	3/29/19	OIG-19-37	<i>Additional Controls Needed to Better Manage FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
			Total	\$36,131,751	\$2,432,871	\$688,380,334

Notes and Explanations:

(a) DHS OIG reports the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of costs it questions. The Total Questioned Costs column includes the Federal share of all ineligible and unsupported costs reported.

(b) The Unsupported Costs column is a subset of Total Questioned Costs and is shown separately as required by the *Inspector General Act*.

(c) The Funds to be Put to Better Use column only includes the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of our cumulative reported findings or recommendations.

Appendix 6

Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	OIG Recommended Recovery (Federal Share)	Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow)	Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed)	Amount DHS Recovered/Deobligated
1	11/16/18	OIG-19-05	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$9.1 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Ascension Parish School</i>	\$8,149,417	\$254,908	\$8,000,000	\$254,908
2	11/16/18	OIG-19-05	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$9.1 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Ascension Parish School Board, Louisiana</i>	\$51,380,334	\$0	\$57,089,260	\$0
3	12/6/18	OIG-19-13	<i>Management Alert – CBP Needs to Address Serious Performance Issues on the Accenture Hiring Contract</i>	\$243,000,000	\$243,000,000	\$0	\$243,000,000
	AUDIT REPORT TOTAL			\$302,529,751	\$243,254,908	\$65,089,260	\$243,254,908
	INV Recoveries (d)	10/2018-3/2019					\$10,619,441
			Totals	\$302,529,751	\$243,254,908	\$65,089,260	\$253,874,349

Notes and Explanations: (d) Recoveries, other than administrative cost savings, which resulted from investigative efforts.

Appendix 7

Contract Audit Reports



The ***National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008*** requires that we list all contract audit reports issued during the reporting period containing significant audit findings; briefly describe the significant audit findings in the report; and specify the amounts of costs identified in the report as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed. This act defines significant audit findings as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs in excess of \$10 million or other findings that the Inspector General determines to be significant. It defines contracts as a contract, an order placed under a task or delivery order contract, or a subcontract.

We did not process contract audit reports meeting the criteria of the *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008* during this reporting period.

Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs	Disallowed Costs
N/A	N/A	N/A

Appendix 8

Peer Review Results



Section 5(a) (14) – (16) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, requires OIGs to include in their semiannual reports certain information pertaining to peer reviews of or conducted by or of an OIG during and prior to the current reporting period.

Peer Review Conducted of DHS OIG Audit Operations

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) OIG completed a peer review of DHS OIG Audit operations on August 27, 2018, for the FY ending September 30, 2017. While we have made progress towards completing the corrective actions to address the recommendations, more time is needed to implement the actions.

#	Recommendation	Status
1	Identify the root cause for the departures identified from <i>Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards</i> (GAGAS) in audit planning, assessment of evidence, supervision, indexing, and reporting disclosures for the sampled Emergency Management Oversight (EMO) assignment, as well as the other seven terminated assignments.	Estimated completion: June 30, 2019
2	Update its policies and procedures as necessary to address the deficiencies.	Estimated completion: May 30, 2019
3	Verify that changes to the DHS OIG system of quality control, and the integration of the EMO into the Office of Audit, resolves the deficiencies in the areas of audit planning, assessment of evidence, supervision, indexing and reporting disclosures.	Estimated completion: June 28, 2019
4	Schedule an off-cycle peer review with the CIGIE to verify that changes to the DHS OIG system of quality control provides reasonable assurance of conformance with GAGAS.	Estimated completion: March 2020

Outstanding Recommendations from Previous Peer Reviews of Audit Operations

DHS OIG does not have any outstanding recommendations from any previous peer reviews conducted of or by DHS OIG other than listed above.

Appendix 8

Peer Review Results (Continued)



Investigative Operations

The Office of Investigations was not subject to a peer review during the reporting period. Our investigative operations received a peer review rating of “compliant” in September 2016, as a result of a review completed by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. The review noted three “best practices” and two observations, but did not result in any recommendations.

We did not conduct a peer review of another Federal Inspector’s General investigative operations during the period.

Appendix 9

Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

	Affected Agency	Allegation
1	CBP	We investigated a CBP official (SES) and a CBP manager (GS-15) for conflicts of interest and procurement irregularities, and potentially for personal gain. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
2	CBP	We investigated a CBP manager (GS-15) for engaging in criminal conduct. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
3	CBP	We investigated a CBP manager (GS-15) for inappropriately providing mandatory training waivers to several subordinates. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
4	CBP	We investigated a CBP manager (GS-15) for supervising a CBP official (SES). We determined that while a GS-15 could supervise an SES for a 240-day period, this period had expired, whereupon the CBP official (SES) was placed under the supervision of another executive. We also investigated the CBP official (SES) for engaging in prohibited personnel practices and a second CBP official (SES) for favoring a particular organizational component and misleading agency leadership. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
5	CBP	We investigated a CBP manager (GS-15) for receiving preferential treatment during the pre-employment polygraph process. We found that the manager may have received preferential treatment, but was unaware of this fact.
6	DHS	We investigated a DHS OIG manager (GS-15) for entering a secure area and making inappropriate comments to security officials. We found that the manager inadvertently entered a secure area, but did not substantiate that the manager made inappropriate comments. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.
7	FEMA	We investigated a FEMA manager (GS-15) for engaging in prohibited personnel practices. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
8	FEMA	We investigated two FEMA officials (SESs) for harassing an employee, creating a disruptive work environment, and verbally attacking employees in front of their peers. The second official also allegedly violated the FEMA telework policy and misappropriated another employee's government laptop computer. We found no evidence that the first official engaged in harassment or created a hostile work environment. However, we found that the first official was aware of the complaints regarding the reportedly unprofessional and inappropriate behavior of the second, subordinate official, but failed to make any inquiries or take any action to address them. We substantiated allegations that the second official violated the telework policy and inappropriately borrowed another employee's computer. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.
9	FEMA	We investigated a FEMA official (SES) for engaging in official travel for personal reasons. We found that this allegation was unsubstantiated.

Appendix 9

Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public (Continued)

	Affected Agency	Allegation
10	FEMA	We investigated a FEMA official (SES) for instituting a performance appraisal system that violated existing policies and that the official's transfer to another location violated policy. We found that the performance appraisal system instituted was inconsistent with FEMA and federal policies and that the official's implementation of this policy and behavior reportedly fostered a hostile work environment. We found the allegation that the official's transfer to another location violated policy unsubstantiated.
11	FEMA	We investigated a FEMA official (SES) for engaging in mismanagement by failing to take appropriate action regarding an occupational health hazard. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
12	FEMA	We investigated a FEMA official (SES) for engaging in prohibited personnel practices. A subordinate employee claimed retaliation for reporting fraud, waste, and abuse within the agency. We found that this allegation was unsubstantiated.
13	ICE	We investigated an ICE manager (GS-15) for violating the Federal Acquisition Regulations, colluding with an ICE contractor by providing sealed bid information to the contractor, and permitting the contractor to overbill ICE for work performed. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
14	ICE	We investigated a former ICE official (SES) for accepting payments from Mexican Cartel members in exchange of U.S. Immigration documents. We found that this allegation was unsubstantiated.
15	ICE	We investigated an ICE official and two managers (GS-15) for circumventing bidding rules associated with an ICE contract award. We also investigated one of the managers for travel fraud. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
16	ICE	We investigated an ICE official (SES) for permitting colleagues who were friends to accompany the SES on official trips abroad for recreational purposes. We found this allegation unsubstantiated.
17	NPPD	We investigated a National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) official (SES) for engaging in government travel abuse and enabling another NPPD (SES) to engage in the same. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
18	USCIS	We investigated a USCIS manager (GS-15) for engaging in prohibited personnel practices. We found the allegations were unsubstantiated.

Appendix 9

Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public (Continued)

	Affected Agency	Allegation
19	USCIS	We investigated three USCIS managers (GS-15) for influencing a contract award based upon a personal relationship with an employee of the company. It was alleged the first manager had a personal and financial relationship with the employee, whose employer received double payments for invoices submitted during the contract; the second manager left USCIS to work for the contractor and was later improperly rehired by USCIS; and the first and third managers engaged in prohibited and discriminatory personnel practices. We found no evidence of procurement irregularities, but found that the first manager had lent the contract employee money before the manager became a Federal employee. We found that the second manager left USCIS and inquired about returning, but was never rehired. We found that the personnel misconduct allegations concerning the first and third managers were unsubstantiated, but are under review by another agency.
	Total: 19	

Appendix 10

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADR	alternative dispute resolution
AMO	Air and Marine Operations
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CGIS	Coast Guard Investigative Service
CIGIE	Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CISA	Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
CISO	Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman
COS	Chief of Staff
CRCL	Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
DSEC	Deputy Secretary
EMO	Office of Emergency Management Oversight
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FAMS	Federal Air Marshal Service
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
FPS	Federal Protective Service
FPTBU	Funds to be Put to Better Use
GAGAS	Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
GAS	Government Auditing Standards
I&A	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
INV	Office of Investigations
IPAWS	Integrated Public Alert & Warning System
IQO	Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight
IT	information technology
JFK	John F. Kennedy International Airport
MGMT	Directorate for Management
NPPD	National Protection and Programs Directorate
OA	Office of Audits
OCFO	Office of the Chief Financial Officer
OCIO	Office of the Chief Information Officer
OFO	Office of Field Operations
OGC	Office of General Counsel
OHA	Office of Health Affairs
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OLA	Office of Legislative Affairs
OM	Office of Management
OPA	Office of Public Affairs
OPS	Office of Operations Coordination
OPCEN	operations center
OPE	Office of Partnership and Engagement
OPR	Office of Professional Responsibility
OSC	U.S. Office of Special Counsel
PALMS	Performance and Learning Management System
PLCY	Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PRIV	Privacy Office
QASP	quality assurance surveillance plan
QC	Questioned Costs

Appendix 10

Acronyms and Abbreviations (Continued)

S&T	Science and Technology Directorate
SAFER	Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response
SAR	semiannual report
SBA	Small Business Administration
SEC	Secretary
SES	Senior Executive Service
SPII	Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information
SRE	Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations
TOD	Tactical Operations Division
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
(U)	Unclassified
UC	Unsupported Costs
USAO	U.S. Attorney's Office
U.S.C.	United States Code
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
WPA	Whistleblower Protection Act
WPC	Whistleblower Protection Coordinator
WPU	Whistleblower Protection Unit

Appendix 11

OIG Contacts and Locations



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Jennifer Costello	Deputy Inspector General
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Sondra McCauley	Assistant Inspector General/Audits
Karen Ouzts	Counsel to the Inspector General (<i>Acting</i>)
Erica Paulson	Assistant Inspector General/External Affairs
Thomas Salmon	Assistant Inspector General/Integrity and Quality Oversight
Michele Kennedy	Assistant Inspector General/Investigations
Louise McGlathery	Assistant Inspector General/Management
Diana Shaw	Assistant Inspector General/Special Reviews and Evaluations

Appendix 12

Index to Reporting Requirements

The specific reporting requirements described in the *Inspector General Act*, including Section 989C of the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010*, are listed below with a reference to the pages on which they appear.

Requirement:	Pages
Matters Referred to Federal Prosecutorial Authorities	4
Report of Whistleblower Retaliation	5
Recommendations with Significant Problems	Nothing to Report
Summary of Significant OIG Activities	10 – 18
Review of Legislation and Regulations	Nothing to Report
Reports with Questioned Costs	23
Reports Recommending that Funds Be Put to Better Use	24
Summary of Reports in which No Management Decision Was Made	25
Prior Recommendations Not Yet Implemented	26 – 43
List of Audit Reports	44– 49
Peer Review Results	52
Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees Not Disclosed to the Public	54 – 56
Management Decision Disagreements	Nothing to Report
Revised Management Decisions	Nothing to Report
Summary of Instances Where Information Was Refused	Nothing to Report
Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	Nothing to Report
No Establishment Comment Received Within 60 Days of Report Issuance	Nothing to Report
Inspection, Evaluation, or Audit Closed and Not Publicly Disclosed	Nothing to Report

