

SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE
IN XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

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ABSTRACT

SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE IN XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

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This thesis addresses China's security and surveillance practices in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), in the context of the "security" concept of Foucault, with particular focus on security and surveillance practices after Chen Quanguo was appointed as Communist Party Secretary of XUAR in 2016. Besides it presents an overview of the transformation of China's governing practices. For this purpose, the thesis pays particular attention to the consequences of the state transformation after 1978.

Keywords: Xinjiang, China, Security, Surveillance, Foucault

ÖZ

SİNCAN UYGUR ÖZERK BÖLGESİ'NDE GÜVENLİK VE GÖZETİM

Güngör, Gülperi

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez, Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'nde Çin'in güvenlik ve gözetim uygulamalarını, Foucault'nun “güvenlik” kavramı bağlamında, özellikle 2016 yılında Chen Quanguo'nun Komünist Parti Sekreteri olarak atanması sonrası gerçekleştirilen güvenlik ve gözetim uygulamalarına odaklanarak ele almaktadır. Ayrıca Çin'in yönetim uygulamalarının dönüşümü hakkında genel bir bakış sunmaktadır. Bu amaçla bu tez 1978 sonrası Çin'de gerçekleşen devlet dönüşümünün sonuçlarına dikkat çekmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uygur, Çin, Güvenlik, Gözetim, Foucault

To My Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CPC	Communist Party of China
GMD	Guomindang
GWD	Great Western Development
IJOP	Integrated Joint Operations Platform
MFA	Minister of Foreign Affairs
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
SCS	Social Credit System
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
STPNLC	Sinkiang Turkic People's National Liberation Committee
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
U.S	United States
XPCC	Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
XUAR	Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), along with the Tibet Autonomous Region, is one of China's politically sensitive regions. In recent years, especially after Chen Quanguo was appointed as a Communist Party Secretary of XUAR in 2016, an unprecedented level of security and surveillance practices have begun to be implemented in the region.

This thesis seeks to answer the question of whether surveillance and security policies in XUAR are the result of the changing governmentality in China. In order to find an answer to this question, security measures, control bureaucracy and surveillance in XUAR will be addressed in the context of the “governmentality” and “security” concepts of Michel Foucault. How the “war on terror” discourse provides for management of population will be discussed, pointing out the role of “risk-oriented” profiling technologies in the management. The contribution of this thesis to the literature is to examine the security practices and surveillance in XUAR, in the context of disciplinary power and security dispositifs, which Foucault addressed in his lectures in 1978 at College de France.

The reason for addressing this issue in this theoretical framework is to draw attention to the fact that security and surveillance institutions in XUAR were built in line with the changing governmentality after the reform and opening up in China. The aim is to focus on the fact that rationality of power that monitors the circulation, determines the factors that prevent the functioning of the market for security reasons in China.

In the theoretical framework, how disciplinary power developed in Europe, then in the 18th century the emergence of security dispositifs that calculate the factors affecting the population will be discussed. Drawing on Foucault's concept of governmentality, attention will be drawn to the rationality of governing that has become dominant throughout the world. Later, as a result of the events such as increasing immigration, global warming, and terror after the 1970s, the expansion of preventive measures in the management approach throughout the world will be addressed, and the development of this techniques in China's policies will be pointed out.

As historical background, the history of the region before the conquest by the Qing Empire will be briefly mentioned. Later how the management practices of the Qing Empire in the region changed throughout history will be discussed. The effects of Britain and Russia on the policies of Qing Empire will be addressed in the context of British support for the Yaqub Beg Emirate and Russia's intervention in northern Xinjiang. Later, the policies of local governors during the Guomindang period, the modern ideologies that spread in this period, the uprisings in the region, and the influence of the Soviet Union on the policies of governors will be addressed. Then, developing events and the policies implemented in XUAR during the administration of the People's Republic of China will be discussed. Finally, the first period of the PRC in the region, the Mao period, and the policies of the post-1978, reform and opening up, China's changing policies towards minorities after the collapse of Soviet Union will be compared.

In Chapter 4, firstly, it will be noted that decentralization has increased in the PRC since 1978 and that authority has become fragmented. It will be pointed out that the development programs supported by the Chinese government to ensure stability in the XUAR are not national policies, and it will be mentioned that Uyghurs and other minorities could not benefit from the development policies equally.

Later, it will be mentioned that the unrest derived from the uneven economic situation in the region and the rising circulation of people and flow of information have been associated with terrorism and religious extremism by the Chinese authorities since 2001. It will be asserted that this adapted rhetoric as well as increasing surveillance and security measures after 2016 are the risk-oriented preventive practices and security dispositifs pointed out by Foucault.

Hereafter, the Social Credit System, in which the financial system and the behavior of citizens are credited will be linked to the governmentality adopted after China's transition to the market economy in 1978. It will be shown that this system has a function of identifying factors that hinders the operation of the market, monitoring, and controlling the circulation. Then, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform built along these lines will be addressed.

Grid Management will be linked to the changing function of neighborhood committees after 1978. It will be shown that digitalization in management within the framework of the grid system has the function of providing coordination mechanisms in the fragmented authority, monitoring and managing the population. It will be asserted that this system is a security dispositif.

The concept of re-education originating from the modernization of China's prisons will be discussed. Then, it will be revealed that the detention of people - alleged to pose a risk - in re-education centers is a profiling technology where people are subjected to a special regime. Finally, the surveillance function of officers' home visits in XUAR will be demonstrated. All of these practices will be discussed in the context of the governmentality of "war on terror," Foucault's concept of "security," and risk-oriented profiling techniques which are pointed out in the theoretical framework.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Disciplinary Power

In his book “Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison” published in 1975, Foucault addresses the history of prison or history of surveillance and punishment, focusing on how the penal system changed and a new kind of power, influenced by Enlightenment ideas, emerged in the 18th century.

At the end of the 18th century, torture in the penal system was reduced and replaced by more specialized practices centered on discipline and supervision, the target in punishment became the soul of the convict instead of his body.¹ Foucault first compares public executions in 1757 and prison rules in 1837. The public punishment of the body has become a private punishment of the soul. We can call it effective punishment instead of terrifying punishment. Russia, in 1769; Prussia in 1780; Pennsylvania and Tuscany in 1786; Austria in 1788; France in 1791, 1808, and 1810 developed a modern legal system, and a new age for penal justice started.² The confession of crime in public was abolished for the first time in France in 1791, after a short return, it was abolished again in 1830; the pillory was abolished in 1789. As for Britain, the date of the abolition of the pillory was 1837.³

¹ Michel Foucault, (1995), **Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison**, Vintage Books, New York, p. 16.

² Ibid, p. 7.

³ Ibid, p. 8.

In the classical period, the punishment was related to body and death. Death was common and normal due to epidemics and wars.⁴ Torture was legal. Public executions represented the power of the sovereign, because even the slightest violation was a kind of uprising against the authority of the sovereign.⁵

Under the influence of the Enlightenment, in Europe in the 18th century, the principles of the rule of law, rationalism, freedom, and humanism provided the reason for legal reform. With the emergence of individual fundamental rights in modernity, punishment has become a form of suspension of these rights, correction and disciplining the person, and expelling evil.⁶ In fact, punishment techniques still work on the body: prison, forced labor, penal servitude, residence ban, deportation.⁷ But the relationship between punishment and body is not the same as for torture. The body is an instrument here.⁸

The aforementioned “soul of the convict” has no divine meaning.⁹ The soul is the result and instrument of political anatomy.¹⁰ Here we see the new economy of the mechanisms of power. With the approach of human sciences, the scientific-juridical complex in prison analyzes who is abnormal – or normal. In the new laws, if the perpetrator is insane, the crime itself disappears. It is also admitted that perpetrators can be both insane and guilty; the more insane they are, the less guilty they are.¹¹ In this scientific-juridical aspect of disciplinary power, what should be

⁴ Ibid, p. 55.

⁵ Michel Foucault, (2003b), **Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France, 1974-1975**, Picador, New York, p. 81-82.

⁶ M. Foucault, (1995), p. 11.

⁷ Ibid, p. 11.

⁸ Ibid, p. 11.

⁹ Ibid, p. 29.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 30.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 20.

underlined is when the power does not belong to the sovereign, crime is now committed against society, and now many instruments of the bureaucracy (judges, juries, psychiatrists, etc.) evaluate this crime.

In modernity, through various institutions, disciplinary power is applied not only to those who are punished but to other detainees, the ones nurtured and rehabilitated, madmen, children, schools, colonized peoples, that is, the ones who are on a production vehicle and controlled.¹² The disciplinary power is functioning continuously.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the understanding of discipline itself also changed. Criminal individuals were transformed into docile bodies, to be “subjected, used, transformed, improved.”¹³ So with confinement in areas like a military barrack, the birth of the prison took place. With the control of activities, timetables were organized in the prisons.¹⁴ According to Foucault, as a result of the Industrial Revolution, the architectural structure developed with an understanding of the organized structure of production. Organized space and time occurred not only in prison but in many institutions like schools, hospitals,¹⁵ and the military.¹⁶ Disciplinary power institutions and practices make the body first obedient, docile, and then functionally transformed and realized to be productive.¹⁷ Efficiency is the keyword here. This disciplinary power in these institutions had 3 basic principles as the means of correct training: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination.¹⁸

¹² Ibid, p. 29.

¹³ Ibid, p. 136.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 121.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 149.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 150.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 136.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 170.

As an example of hierarchical observation, Foucault addresses Jeremy Bentham's panopticon design. The design includes a courtyard and a tower in the middle of a ring-shaped building. There is also a supervisor in the central tower. While the supervisor can see everything, those who are enclosed cannot see the supervisor.¹⁹ Thus, an institution that is under constant surveillance is built. Panopticon is "a principle of a new political anatomy" that derives from disciplinary relations.²⁰ Prisoners do not know whether they are being monitored or not. This system is applied in factories, schools, etc. While scientific confirmation of accuracy, the normal is separated from the abnormal, and normalization takes place by disciplining techniques. To determine whether a behavior is good or evil, a distinction is made with a scoring system. Finally, according to observation and normalizing judgment, it is classified and qualified.

Consequently, the sovereign power, which operates with prohibitions and penalties, uses the central power of the state through sanctions, thus ensures obedience to the laws. In exercising terror, there is the purpose of making the sovereign visible.²¹ However, with the techniques of surveillance, control, separation, spatial regulation, calculation, classification, and rationalization developed in the 17th century, the means of adapting individual bodies to a certain norm was created. What is visible is not the sovereign, anymore, but is the ones that are subjected. By these means, observed ones will become subjects that internalize norms and reproduce power.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 200.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 208.

²¹ Ibid, p. 49.

2.2 Security, Territory, Population

In 1978, in his classes in College de France, Foucault discussed another kind of power, which can be considered as a consequence of the understanding of liberalism, which he did not address in “The Birth of the Prison”. In his lectures called “Security, Territory, Population” he examines the aspects of the security mechanisms of regulatory power different from disciplinary power. He then explains the concept of governmentality at the macro level. Looking at the history of security technologies, Foucault asks the question of whether there is a security society today.

Foucault proposes three different types of power in these lessons. It should be emphasized that none of these models of power, according to Foucault, will abolish the previous model of power after it has emerged, strengthened, and become dominant.²² On the contrary, it takes the previous techniques and adapts to itself, the tactics and strategies of the previous models when appropriate.²³

As previously mentioned about disciplinary power, this power has a uniformizing role. It manages the body and behaviors. Normal and abnormal are detected according to a predetermined norm (for example mental illness). For this purpose, it establishes hierarchies, makes measurements, tries to correct. Security mechanisms, unlike the disciplinary power, perform processes such as predicting possible social phenomena, calculating their probabilities, and directing them in one direction or another. In order to better explain the three different technologies of power, Foucault addresses the issue through the following examples: punishment, fight against epidemics, and city designs.

²² Michel Foucault, (2009), **Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977 – 1978**, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 7.

²³ Ibid, p. 8.

He starts with the example of the punishment of theft first. Sovereign power makes laws and prohibits something and punishes those who violate the ban. Disciplinary power, too, punishes the one who breaks the law, on the other hand, it aims to transform the individual who commits a crime with rules and norms by enculturating the criminal with a number of institutions through techniques such as correction, moralization, and forced labor. At the present time, although these two techniques continue, besides, there are practices of calculating the average frequency of committing the crime, making statistics, calculating the cost of suppression, and determining the factors that will reduce or increase rates.²⁴

Foucault gives examples of techniques for combating epidemics, that have changed throughout history. Until the end of the Middle Ages, lepers were taken out of the city and isolated. It derived its legitimacy from the laws and also from religion and rituals. It was an exclusion practice.²⁵ However, in the fight against the plague in the 16th and 17th centuries, people infected with the plague were quarantined. Regions and cities struck by plague were surrounded. The difference from the previous example is, that authorities, and doctors told people “what to do”- not “what not to do”- they told when they could leave, what they must eat. As for smallpox, the vaccine is a method to fight against it. Although disciplinary techniques are still used, age, mortality, vaccine risks, and mortality despite inoculation are calculated here.²⁶

About the design of cities, Foucault, firstly, reminds us of the old walled cities isolated from the other areas as a symbol of sovereign power.²⁷ He also states that sovereignty is symbolized by a empowered capital city, citing the example of

²⁴ Ibid, p. 4.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 9.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 10.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 12.

Alexandre La Maitre's project in the 17th century.²⁸ As for the disciplinary power, it organizes the hierarchical and functional distribution of the elements in the space.²⁹ The city involves constructed artificial multiplicities here.³⁰ In the case of urbanization in the 18th century, in line with the commercial developments, the increase in population and commercial demand, the function of the city as a driver of circulation gained importance. This required monitoring of the circulation of people and goods.³¹ The movement of, "*all floating populations like beggars, vagrants, delinquents, criminals, thieves, murderers etc.*"³² or – a more recent issue on the agenda - the refugees in the cities have now become important for security monitoring. So security practices, here, are actually the techniques thought to eliminate the problems of freedom of movement.³³ The issue of refugees and border security, which is widely debated today, or detention of Uyghur students who have studied abroad in order to keep them away from extremist tendencies, can be evaluated in this context.

The difference between security and disciplinary power is that it works on the management of the population instead of power over the body. Here, the population is "*all of the individuals who are biologically connected to the materiality in which they live.*"³⁴ The concept of population as a source of the dynamic of power emerged in the middle of the 18th century.³⁵ Previously, people were seen as the subject of the sovereign. In the 17th century, during the

²⁸ Ibid, p. 15.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 20.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 17.

³¹ Ibid, p. 18.

³² Ibid, p. 18.

³³ Şükran Gölbaşı, (2015), "Güvenlik, Toprak, Nüfus", **Mülkiye Dergisi**, 39(2), p. 330.

³⁴ Foucault (2009), p. 21.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 68.

period of mercantilism, the population became the principle of power dynamics.³⁶ Here, the population is an element of the power of the states as a labor force for agriculture and industry. The population is a production force³⁷ however it is still a subject whose management is determined by laws and prohibitions.³⁸ As for the physiocrats in the 18th century, they considered the population as processes to be managed, a technical-political object of an administration.³⁹ Through calculations and analysis, economists wanted to have an impact on things that played an active role in the population. They developed the management devices by identifying the variables (climate, environment, trade etc.)⁴⁰ that were able to transform the population. This approach of physiocrats paved the way for mass intervention in the population through the collection of some demographic data. At this point, the population is no longer considered a legal subject. In other words, “the population is a risk pool.”⁴¹

Sovereign power is applied within the boundaries of territory, disciplinary power on individuals, security is applied to the entire population. Gambetti, who addresses this distinction in Foucault’s thought, points out that the characteristic of security is to allow a part of the population to disappear according to the risks that can change at any time, instead of organizing and protecting life. The understanding of balancing one power with another requires the disqualification of a certain part of the population.⁴² Gambetti states that there is no normalization in

³⁶ Ibid, p. 68.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 68.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 69.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 70.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 70.

⁴¹ Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, (2008), “Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century: An Introduction”, **Review of International Studies**, 34(2), April, p. 267.

⁴² Zeynep Gambetti, (2008), “Foucault’da Disiplin Toplumu - Güvenlik Toplumu Ayrımı”, **Mesele**, 20, August, p. 46.

security as in disciplinary society, abnormalities can be intentionally fueled⁴³ and she points to David Harvey's description of neoliberalism as creative destruction. Harvey highlights the redistributive role of neoliberalism with this description. He refers to the fact that unemployment has been deliberately fueled to create a pool of low-wage surplus labor.⁴⁴

There should not be a limitation for the functioning of the market, but there should be monitoring and regulation of the factors that may disrupt the functioning of the market when planning security. Here, the threat to the functionalized security can vary depending on the conjuncture.⁴⁵ Restriction of freedoms for security occurs according to this conjuncture.

While discipline sets limits, security -which selects the population as the target and whose information form the economy and politics, creates the reality. The power here makes reality go its way and can activate the elements of reality against each other.⁴⁶ This type of power works within the relations of people with space, territory, and economy. Security mechanisms tend to expand continuously through “dispositifs.”

2.3 Dispositif

The French word “dispositif” is translated as “device” or “apparatus.” In Foucault's theory, dispositif is a term used to refer to the functioning of power through the system of relations between various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and information structures.⁴⁷

⁴³ Ibid p. 45.

⁴⁴ David Harvey, (2006), “Neo-Liberalism As Creative Destruction”, **Geogr. Ann.**, 88 B (2), p 154.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p 155.

⁴⁶ Gölbaşı, (2015), p. 332.

Agamben defines the dispositif as “*everything which has capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings.*” In addition to “*prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, judicial measures*” according to him, “*the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones also can be dispositif. Even language itself is a kind of dispositif.*”⁴⁸

The function of the dispositifs is fundamentally strategic, they respond to certain needs.⁴⁹ They have the function of developing or preventing, balancing and using power relations in a certain direction.⁵⁰ Through their elements, dispositifs impose truths on the people and make them obedient and docile.

Foucault emphasizes the emergence of dispositifs within the context of power-knowledge relations. In the relationship between power and knowledge, dispositif emerges from the strategic aim of the power, but it also depends on the limits of the knowledge in this paradigm.⁵¹ In other words, dispositifs are strategies that both support a certain type of knowledge are affected by these types of knowledge. Dispositif is a more general form of episteme.⁵² While the episteme is particularly discursive dispositif, the elements of dispositif in general form have a much more heterogeneous structure: both discursive and non-discursive.⁵³

⁴⁷ Michel Foucault, (1980) , **Power/Knowledge, Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977**, Pantheon Books, Newyork, p. 194.

⁴⁸ Giorgio Agamben,(2009) "What is an Apparatus?", **What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 14.

⁴⁹ Foucault (1980), p. 195.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 196.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 196.

⁵² Ibid, p. 197.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 197.

Foucault had interpreted Bentham's Panopticon design as a symbol of modern disciplinary power. Zygmunt Bauman states that the panopticon type disciplinary power continues but is much stronger now in "*Liquid Surveillance*"⁵⁴ According to Bauman and Lyon, intensive surveillance is now applied with profiling technologies to marginalized groups such as immigrants, and terrorist suspects.⁵⁵ In this surveillance called "ban-opticon", referring Didier Bigo, it is determined who will be subject to this security regime by creating categories.⁵⁶ Technological tools such as databases, discourses of exclusion, architecture, and control bureaucracy are the dispositifs of this.⁵⁷ For security purposes, people in excluded categories are subject to the state of exception, state of emergency, and an uncertain temporal regime.⁵⁸

2.4 Governmentality

In his lectures at the College de France, from February 1, 1978, Foucault shifted his focus from the previously mentioned security to the government and governmentality. When we talk about governmentality which Foucault also calls "the art of government",⁵⁹ we should first mention that Foucault uses the concept of government, here, in a narrow sense and he addresses it as "exercising political sovereignty."⁶⁰ Likewise, he uses "governmentality" in a narrow sense, and this

⁵⁴ Zygmunt Bauman & David Lyon, (2013), **Liquid Surveillance: A Conversation**, Polity Press, Cambridge, p. 51.

⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 55.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 56.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 56.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 59.

⁵⁹ Michel Foucault, (2009), p. 79.

⁶⁰ Michel Foucault, (2008), **The Birth of Biopolitics, Lectures At The Collège De France, 1978-79**, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, p. 2.

concept does not refer to the actual practices in management, but it refers to the way of thinking in these practices.⁶¹

Foucault, who uses the concept of governmentality in three different dimensions, primarily refers to the institutions, thoughts, calculations, and tactics, etc. that target the population and provide power through security dispositifs.⁶² This concept also refers to the understanding of a type of power that is becoming increasingly dominant in the West,⁶³ although it does not eliminate other types of powers totally. Another point that he emphasizes with this concept is that the state has become “governmentalized” since the 15th and 16th centuries with the techniques of “the administrative state.”⁶⁴

Foucault gives Machiavelli’s “Prince” as an example. The emphasis in this work is sovereign power's aim to protect the territorial integrity of Italy.⁶⁵ However, Foucault mentions that the understanding of governmentality based on territory changed in the 17th-18th centuries and that the governmentality became the governing of things. For example, his lectures compare Russia with extensive lands and the Netherlands with smaller lands. Population, wealth, trade, and its navy made the Netherlands an important country. These elements refer to the governing of the things.⁶⁶ He refers to the text of Guillaume de La Perriere and mentions that “the things” are directed to the proper purpose.⁶⁷ The government made use of statistical information for this administration.

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 2.

⁶² Michel Foucault, (2009), p. 108.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 108.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 109.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 65.

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 97.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 98.

As the population gained importance in the administration, the intervention of the state in the lives of the people increased. However, this is no longer only through obedience, but with the understanding that began to develop in the 18th century and gained weight in neoliberalism through the subjectivization of individuals. This subjectivization is only possible by assuming people's own management according to the determined norm.⁶⁸ Lorey calls this point "normalized free subjects" and states that people are free but within certain norms, thus contributing to the reproduction of existing power.⁶⁹ However, this freedom brings the construction of "a danger against the normal, a threat".⁷⁰

2.5 Governmentality of "War on Terror" and "Precautionary Risk" as a New Dispositif

In order to speak of the concept of security, there must be an identified risk or threat. Risk and threat can change over time; this is socially constructed. In the Cold War, for example, in the nuclear race, there was certainty on both sides about where the risk came from. In fact, behavioralists in International Relations have tried to calculate the risks with the scientific methods used in natural sciences.

With the oil shocks erupted in the 1970s, followed by global warming, immigration, overpopulation, terrorism, organized crime, etc. the range of threats has increased, and significant changes have occurred in threat and risk perceptions. Now the threat after 9/11 comes from terrorism, an enemy that is difficult to identify. After the terrorist attacks on the twin towers, with the state of emergency, a war-like situation arose, offices and markets were closed, but it was not clear who was responsible. After the attack, some authors argued that after the Cold War

⁶⁸ Isabell Lorey, (2016), "Governmentality and Self-Precarization, On The Normalization Of Cultural Producers", European Institute For Progressive Cultural Policies, January. <https://eipcp.net/transversal/1106/lorey/en.html> Retrieved: 18.11.2019

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

we were in a Gray War. “*In this battle, everyone can be killed or rewarded as soldiers now.*”⁷¹

Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster describe the war on terror as the new form of governmentality.⁷² Precautionary risk, which is a new dispositif form, appears as new rationality and technology.⁷³ Aradau and Munster compare two types of risk. In the first type of risk, calculation of representations determined through statistics takes place. The aim is to reduce threats by monitoring and calculating.⁷⁴ What if threats cannot be calculated precisely? Here, the authors refer to Ulrich Bech's concept of “infinity of risk”, saying that catastrophes and uncertain situations can not be calculated.⁷⁵ But they return to Foucault and state that in these uncalculable situations, a new type of security rationality emerged.⁷⁶

A new kind of risk, precautionary risk as a dispositif is applied to what is uncertain. This situation is different from prudentialism because there is no calculation of frequency.⁷⁷ Precautionary risk targets an entire population as a potential threat; surveillance of everyone is required.⁷⁸ ;The decision of “who is a threat or not” is decided not by judicial institutions but by administration.⁷⁹ Indefinite detention, in which individuals -mostly the ones who are considered as a

⁷¹ David Won Drehle, (2001), “World War, Cold War Won. Now, the Gray War”, the Washington Post, September. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/09/12/world-war-cold-war-won-now-the-gray-war/52a2b151-cb90-4a53-9092-d7e999069654/> Retrieved: 06.08.2019

⁷² Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, (2007), “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future”, **European Journal of International Relations**, 13(1), p. 91.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 91.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 92.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 101.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 101.

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 107.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 104.

⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 106.

threat to national security, terror suspects, and refugees- are imprisoned without trial, is becoming widespread throughout the world.

When an entire population is targeted, “*burden of proof is no longer on the state*” but “*on the people,*” who have to prove that they are not a threat.⁸⁰ “*Potentially dangerous is a priori responsible*”, say Aradau and Munster.⁸¹ When disciplinary techniques can not be applied due to incalculability, the aim of the new form of rationality is governing the ungovernable.⁸² Obviously, these technologies have not been successful in prevention, but according to the authors, that failure is part of this new governmentality, and it shows there is a requirement for more knowledge and technology and allows power to expand.⁸³ In this expanding power structure, with the cutting edge technologies (such as biometrics, and using DNA to track people), tools of surveillance have increased. That surveillance has two objectives: to provide maximum efficiency from the population and to determine the uncertain.⁸⁴

In the 18th century, with the increase in the circulation of people, we mentioned that the monitoring and circulation of “people and goods” took place. Ayse Ceyhan emphasizes that today, the precautionary risk is attributed to “bad circulation” in the regulation of population movements and risk prevention measures.⁸⁵ While in the 18th century, these were delinquents, vagrants, beggars, also an ethnic group or immigrants can be considered as bad circulation now, and they can be the target.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 106.

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 106.

⁸² Ibid, p. 107.

⁸³ Ibid, p. 108.

⁸⁴ Ayse Ceylan, (2012), “Surveillance as Biopower” in Kirstie Ball, Kevin D. Haggerty and David Lyon (eds.), **Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies**, Routledge, New York, p. 38.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 41.

2.6. Governmentality in China

This thesis addresses surveillance and security practices, which started with Chen Quanguo after appointed as Communist Party Secretary of XUAR. It will be explained that discipline techniques and security dispositifs were used together in these practices. However, there may be questions such as how these practices in China might be linked to the disciplining techniques that emerged with the effect of the Enlightenment in Europe or how security dispositifs, which are expressed as tools used by especially neoliberal governments can be used in the analysis of practices in China, as well as what has been the effect of neoliberalism is in China.

With the reforms in the last years of the Qing Empire, a modernization process took place motivated by getting rid of unequal treaties and extraterritoriality, which were, and still are seen as national humiliation by China.⁸⁶ In order to be a part of the global system, with new domestic laws harmonized with the international legal regime,⁸⁷ China adopted the Western governing technologies that discipline the body.⁸⁸ Practices and institutions were developed in which time and space were arranged in this context. It should be emphasized that the adaptation took place without completely removing old indigenous systems. For example, the modern police system was adopted and developed in China, while the indigenous system of local security groups continued.⁸⁹ It will be discussed in Chapter 4 that similar adaptation processes took place in the modernization of the prison system, and the technologies of disciplinary power were developed.

⁸⁶ Klaus Mühlhahn, (2009), **Criminal Justice in China: A History**, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, p. 70.

⁸⁷ Tong Lam, (2010), "Policing the Imperial Nation: Sovereignty, International Law, and the Civilizing Mission in Late Qing China", **Comparative Studies in Society and History**, 52(4), October, p. 896.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 899.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 899.

After 1978, the governmental techniques developed in China reached a new dimension, due to the state transformation which accompanied China's transition to market socialism. There are many studies on changing governmentality in China in the literature. For example, Greenhalgh and Winckler discuss population policies and the one-child policy in China, arguing that China has evolved from Leninist methods to neoliberal governmentality involving the regulation of citizens and population.⁹⁰ In another example, Haidan Chen's article addresses the weaknesses in government regulation of private firms in the cord blood banking industry in China.⁹¹

Jeffreys and Sigley argue that China's policies can be analyzed from the perspective of governmentality for the following reasons: Firstly, the authors say that with the reform and opening up, the transition to market socialism, hybrid socialist-neoliberal rationality was formed in China instead of the mass line policies of the Mao era.⁹² The development of the understanding of self-management and the active participation of citizens are the signs of this rationality. Jie Yang, for example, discusses how post-1978 lay-offs and the privatization of SOEs changed the function of the "dang'an" files in which employees' information was kept, that citizens started to use these files to find jobs in talent centers and people transformed into the entrepreneurial subjects.⁹³ We will discuss this as it relates to the development of the Social Credit System in Chapter 4.

Another point emphasized by Jeffreys and Sigley is that liberalism should not be perceived as limited government alone and that another dimension of liberalism is

⁹⁰ Susan Greenhalgh And Edwin A. Winckler, (2005), **Governing China's Population From Leninist To Neoliberal Biopolitics**, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.

⁹¹ Haidan Chen, (2011), "Cord-Blood Banking in China: Public and Private Tensions", **East Asian Science, Technology and Society**, 5(3).

⁹² Elaine Jeffreys, (2009), **China's Governmentalities, Governing Change, Changing Government**, Routledge, London and Newyork, p. 2.

⁹³ Jie Yang, (2011), "The Politics of the Dang'an: Spectralization, Spatialization, and Neoliberal Governmentality in China", **Anthropological Quarterly**, 84(2), Spring.

the construction of autonomous individual.⁹⁴ In the Foucauldian perspective, this is expressed as the formation of normalized free individuals. Moreover, the intervention of the state in liberalism is not completely rejected, it demonstrates governmentality in which the intervention is carried out by means of security dispositifs. In order to demonstrate the development processes in this direction in China, we will address the degrees of weighting given to the term "responsible individual" in China under the titles of Social Credit System and Grid Management.

Another sign of developing governmentality in China is that modernization policies have been based on economic growth.⁹⁵ However, the benefits of this economic growth are not shared equally by all segments of society. Furthermore, the processes of collaboration, coordination, negotiation, and social networking, which Jeffreys and Sigley pointed out as neoliberal strategies⁹⁶ have been seen in China, since non-traditional policy entrepreneurs have emerged, and their effects are increasing. Authority has been fragmented between different institutions of the state, and between these institutions or between the state and private companies, these cooperation and negotiation processes are taking place. To support this claim, Chapter 4, section 1 will address fragmented authority in China and its effects in XUAR.

Consequently, it is seen that, despite the ideological differences, China has adopted the techniques of governmentality of the West and, in this respect, has been carrying out "a unique mix of rationalities and technologies."⁹⁷ At this point, it will be discussed that disciplinary power techniques and security dispositifs are applied together in China's policies in XUAR. As mentioned earlier, in the

⁹⁴ Jeffreys, (2009), p. 5.

⁹⁵ H.H.Karrar, (2018) "Resistance to State-orchestrated Modernization in Xinjiang: The Genesis of Unrest in the Multiethnic Frontier", **China Information**, 32(2), p. 9.

⁹⁶ Jeffreys, (2009), p. 12.

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 13.

relationship of sovereign power, disciplinary power, and security, there is no progressive succession by eliminating each other. One can be more dominant and outshine the other, but it doesn't completely eliminate the other. As Foucault pointed out in 1976, power compositions dominated by more than one type of power have been seen throughout history: By generalizing bio-power⁹⁸, the Nazi regime established an extraordinary dictatorship with extended discipline techniques and sovereign power techniques, abusing the sovereign right to kill.⁹⁹

We see that the regulatory power, which intervenes through security dispositifs, applies discipline techniques to the “*unmanageable parts of the society*.”¹⁰⁰ In this context, we will address, the subordination of the entire population of XUAR to the surveillance and security regime, which has increased in recent years, especially after the appointment of Chen Quanguo as Party Secretary. We will examine the practices of the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, Grid Management, home visits under the program of “Becoming Family” and detention in re-education centers in the context of changing governmentality in China.

2.7. Conclusion:

In this chapter, we first examined the emergence of disciplinary power in Europe, which Foucault addressed in his book “Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison” and the implementation of the means of correct training in the institutions in line with the rationality of disciplinary power. Then, we covered the issue of “security” that Foucault discussed in his lectures at the College de France in 1978 and concluded that unlike disciplinary power, an understanding of power that targets the population, monitors the circulation of people and goods, determines

⁹⁸ In the concept of bio-power, Foucault refers to the fact that knowledge about people's bodies becomes the subject of economic and political problems at the point where population management emerges as the source of power.

⁹⁹ Michel Foucault, (2003a), **Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976**, Picador, Newyork, p. 260.

¹⁰⁰ Bauman, Lyon, (2013), p. 52.

risks, and calculates the cost of managing factors has developed. We mentioned that this rationality emerged predominantly in liberal understanding and strengthened in neoliberalism. We emphasized that this power intervenes through security dispositifs, which are discursive and non-discursive governing apparatuses.

Foucault discussed this rationality at the macro level within the framework of the concept of governmentality. From this point of view, we have stated that governmentality that intervenes through security dispositifs is dominant in the world today. However, since the 1970s, the threats to the security and risk perception have changed. When issues such as global warming, overpopulation, and terrorism became concerns, the understanding of “precautionary risk” has emerged as a dispositif in the management. Surveillance has increased with group profiling methods and digital technology tools being used to identify potential threats in uncertain situations.

We mentioned that in China, institutions involving governing techniques of disciplinary power emerged in the early 20th century, in the process of modernization of institutions. However, after reform and opening up in 1978, a new governmentality developed in China. Population regulations, the emergence of non-traditional actors in policymaking, the replacement of mass line politics with the understanding of the autonomous individual, and the transformation of individuals into entrepreneurial subjects are all signs of the new governmentality in China. Within this theoretical framework, we will address in Chapter 4 that surveillance and security measures implemented in XUAR emerged as a result of this evolving governmentality.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 Region Until 17th Century




Figure 1.1. Map by Larry Hargrave and Avram G. Primack¹⁰¹

Xinjiang means "New Frontier," a name given to the region during the Qing Empire. European writers in the 19th century began to call this region Chinese Turkestan, differentiating it from Russian Turkestan.¹⁰² In 1955, Xinjiang Province was renamed as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The capital and the largest city of XUAR is Urumqi. The population of XUAR was 22.1 million in 2017.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ S. Frederick Starr (ed.), (2004), **Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland**, M.E. Sharpe, London, England, Armonk, NY, p. 265.

¹⁰² James A. Millward, (2007), **Eurasian Crossroads**, Columbia University Press, Newyork, p. ix.

Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is located in the west of China. XUAR has borders with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Within China, it has borders with Gansu and Qinghai provinces and the Tibet Autonomous Region. In XUAR, the north of the Tianshan mountains is historically called Dzungaria and the south is called the Tarim Basin. These two regions (Dzungaria and the Tarim Basin) were not an integrated political unit until the 18th century.¹⁰⁴

Archeological evidences show, since prehistoric times herders and farmers have lived in the region.¹⁰⁵ The Saka was one of the first emerging states in the early history of the region.¹⁰⁶ According to Millward, in the history of the region, there is a pattern of control of the Tarim basin by outside powers: by nomads in the north of the Tian Shan or by a China-based power.¹⁰⁷ At the beginning of the Han Dynasty (206 BC-AD 220), the region was dominated by the Xiongnu.¹⁰⁸ After 60 BCE¹⁰⁹ the Han State partly settled in the Tarim Basin.¹¹⁰ Likewise, during the Tang Dynasty, the Chinese state was influential only in some parts of the region.¹¹¹ Starting from 8th century, there was a period in which an independent Tibet governed the southern Tarim Basin.¹¹² From the 6th century the Western Khanate

¹⁰³ “Xinjiang Territory Profile”, BBC News, October 2018.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16860974> Retrieved: 01.12. 2019

¹⁰⁴ Millward, (2007), p. 4.

¹⁰⁵ Starr, (2004), p. 33.

¹⁰⁶ Millward, (2007), p. 13.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid p. 88.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p.19

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 22.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 24.

¹¹¹ Starr, (2004), p. 38.

¹¹² Millward, (2007), p. 37.

of Kok-Turk started to rule the western Tarim Basin.¹¹³ Between the 8th and 9th centuries, rule of Uyghur Khanate appeared in the region¹¹⁴ and between the 9th and 13th centuries Qocho Uyghur State ruled.¹¹⁵ This was followed by a period of rule by the Uyghur state in the north, Karakhanid in the west, and Tangut in the south of the region.¹¹⁶ After the 12th century, the area was part of the Qara Khitai Empire.¹¹⁷ Chinese historians consider to be a Sinicised dynasty known as the Western Liao but other nationalities dispute this. Later, the dominance of Chagatai Khanate in the region and the ruling of Mongol Chagatai Khans took place.¹¹⁸ When this ruling weakened, actors such as Sufi Hodjas and Mongol Oirats played an important role in the history of the region.¹¹⁹

3.2 Dzungar Khanate and Qing Conquest of the Region

Before the Qing Empire named the region Xinjiang in 1884, it consisted of two separate regions: the northern part of the Tianshan mountains, the Dzungaria and the south, the Tarim basin. Islamization of the Tarim basin took place between the 14th and 17th centuries.¹²⁰ When the Chagatai Khanate was founded in the 17th century, the Tarim basin became completely Muslim.¹²¹ During the 16th century, Islamization also progressed to other parts of the region.¹²²

¹¹³ Ibid, p. 31.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 45, 46.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, p. 47.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p. 51.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 57.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p. 62.

¹¹⁹ Starr, (2004), p. 47.

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 44

¹²¹ Ibid, p. 44.

¹²² Millward (2007), p. 79.

Sufism was important in the spread of Islam in the region. There was competition between the descendants of Makhdumzade Khodja, two branches of Naqshibandi tariqats (sects): Ishaqi and Afaqi.¹²³ During the Seidiyah State of Chagatai origin, the leader of the Afaqis met with the Buddhist leader the Dalai Lama, said that he was the legitimate ruler of the region and asked for support against Ismail Khan.¹²⁴

Dzungar Khan Galdan was educated in Tibet and he was confirmed by Dalai Lama to be the head of the Mongol Oirat tribes.¹²⁵ In 1678, the Dalai Lama wrote to Dzungar Khan on behalf of Afaq Hodja; this was an opportunity for Galdan. Galdan took the Tarim and Turpan area.¹²⁶ Galdan made Afaq Khodja, ruler in the region in exchange for annual payment.¹²⁷ According to Millward, this is a pattern that took place at different times throughout the history of the region - the local rulers paid overlords to the north.¹²⁸

However, according to Perdue and Millward, the current modern situation of Asia began to take shape in the 16th century. Three great powers emerged as empires during this period.¹²⁹ The Russians advanced to Siberia.¹³⁰ Meanwhile, Nurhachi had founded the Qing-Manchu state. Another great power in Asia was the Mongol Dzungar state. While the Manchus took Beijing, the Russians reached the

¹²³ Coşkun Kumru, (2017), Tezkire-İ Hâcegân'a Göre Doğu Türkistan'da Hocalar Dönemi, **Ulakbilge**, 5(14), p. 1252.

¹²⁴ Millward, (2007), p. 87.

¹²⁵ Peter Perdue, (2005), **China Marches West**, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, p.104.

¹²⁶ Starr, (2004), p. 50.

¹²⁷ Millward, (2007), p.88.

¹²⁸ Ibid, p. 88.

¹²⁹ Starr, (2004), p. 48, 49.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 49.

Pacific¹³¹ and the Dzungars established a confederation in the time of Batur. Galdan consolidated this confederation.¹³²

Connection with Tibet provided the Dzungars with legitimacy and growth.¹³³ Dzungar Khan, Galdan aimed to expand to Eastern Mongolia and to establish the political unity of the Mongolian groups.¹³⁴ However, the Qing Empire opposed the Dzungars to keep the northern borders safe. In fact, the Qing borders had expanded as much as the previous Ming empire, so it can be thought that there should have been no security concerns¹³⁵ However, the reasons for security concerns were changing in the 16th century. The expansion of the influence of Russia in the present Mongolia and North East Manchuria in the late 16th and early 17th centuries was a concern for the Qing.¹³⁶ There was the possibility that the Khalkas in Mongolia could cooperate with the Russians or the Dzungars against the Qing.¹³⁷ Besides, if the Dzungars who had close ties to Tibet, dominated Tibet and the Buddhist Church, they would pose a threat to the Qing in Central Asia and Mongolia.¹³⁸

Being against the Dzungar's expansion, the Qing first signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk with Russia in 1689.¹³⁹ According to Perdue, the benefits for Russia

¹³¹ Ibid, p. 49.

¹³² Ibid, p. 50.

¹³³ Millward, (2007), p. 90.

¹³⁴ Michael Edmund Clarke, (2004), In The Eye Of Power: China And Xinjiang From The Qing Conquest To The 'New Great Game' For Central Asia, 1759-2004, Thesis (PhD Doctorate), Griffith University, Brisbane, p. 31.

¹³⁵ Perdue, (2005), p. 138.

¹³⁶ Clarke, (2004), p. 30

¹³⁷ Ibid, p. 30, 31.

¹³⁸ Ibid, p. 33.

¹³⁹ Perdue, (2005), p. 161.

were trade¹⁴⁰ whereas China's goals were to deter the Russians from supporting the Dzungars.¹⁴¹ Perdue also emphasizes that as a result of the events that occurred after this date, Central Asia's division into two (between China and Russia) began to take place: Refugees, deserters etc took place as subjects of either Russia or China, and identities were shaped in this direction.¹⁴²

As a result of the efforts of the Dzungars to expand to the east, the Qing - Dzungar rivalry continued for a long time. During this period, the Qing invaded Hami in Xinjiang in 1696 to push back the Dzungars.¹⁴³ While the Dzungars could not expand to the east in this term, in 1717, Dzungar Khan Tsewang Rabtán did take Tibet.¹⁴⁴ However, sending a bigger force, the Qing recaptured the Tibet later and appointed a new Dalai Lama. Thus, the Chinese protectorate started in Tibet.¹⁴⁵

When the Dzungar Khan died, the Qing Emperor supported Amursana in the succession rivalry.¹⁴⁶ However after Amursana took the lead in Ili, Qing Emperor Qianlong's plan was to divide the Dzungars between 4 Oirat tribes and appoint a different Khan to each.¹⁴⁷ When Amursana took the lead, he opposed the plan of the Qing emperor.¹⁴⁸ In response, in 1756 the Qing sent a military force to Ili and won the battle.¹⁴⁹ But Qianlong wanted to solve the Dzungar issue completely.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 161.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p. 138.

¹⁴² Ibid, p. 161.

¹⁴³ Clarke, (2004), p. 32.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 36.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 36.

¹⁴⁶ Starr, (2004), p. 53.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 53.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 54.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 54.

This solution resulted in complete destruction.¹⁵⁰ One million people died in the subsequent war in battle or, as a result of the massacres, and smallpox.¹⁵¹ There were also those who fled to Russia and Kazakhstan.¹⁵²

In the meantime, the Qing Empire had wanted to support Burhanaddin and Khoja Jahan from the Naqshbandi sect and set them up as clients.¹⁵³ Khoja Jahan objected. He wanted to establish an independent rule¹⁵⁴ and fought against the Qing. Hodjas fled to the west when the Qing took over Yarkand and Kashgar.¹⁵⁵

Consequently, the Mongol danger has been instrumental in the development of China's dominance in Tibet and Xinjiang, the two politically sensitive regions of China. After taking Altishar and Zhungaria, the Qing Empire reached Muslim Central Asia.¹⁵⁶

3.3. Region Under The Qing Rule

When the Qing conquered Altishahr and Zungharia, these two regions were ruled under a single military governor.¹⁵⁷ Later this united region was named Xinjiang, that means new frontier. In this and the following sections, we will address the governance of the Qing empire in the region with an emphasis on the effects of international conditions and changing minority policies.

¹⁵⁰ Millward, (2007), p. 95.

¹⁵¹ Starr, (2004), p. 54.

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 54.

¹⁵³ Millward, (2007), p. 96.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 96.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 96.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 96.

¹⁵⁷ James A. Millward (1998), **Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864**, Stanford University Press Stanford, California, p. 32.

In the first period of the Qing rule, the South of the region (Altishahr) was ruled through Muslim local elites while the Qing established military bases in the North (Dzungaria).¹⁵⁸ However, according to Perdue and Millward, this does not mean that the local governors are vassals. Here, a special administrative structure was created.¹⁵⁹

In this period, there were no restraints on the Islamic legal system and education of the local Muslims.¹⁶⁰ “Beg System” was applied in the South.¹⁶¹ While Beg had been the title of nobility¹⁶² in the Uyghurs before, now it became the title of an official who could be promoted and appointed by the Qing rulers. Loyalty to the Qing became an important criterion in the selection of the Beks.¹⁶³ The local governors loyal to the Qing in Turfan and Hami cities were given the title of “Wang,” and Wangs ruled their areas with some autonomy.¹⁶⁴

Military garrisons were placed in the region, mostly in the North.¹⁶⁵ The tuntian (state farm) model was established to provide food and income to the army in these areas where agricultural activities were carried out in the conquered lands in the North. This model later transformed into the Xinjiang Production and Constructions Corps or Bingtuan model in the 20th Century.¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁸ Starr, (2004), p. 57.

¹⁵⁹ Millward, (2007), p. 99.

¹⁶⁰ Millward, (2007), p. 97.

¹⁶¹ Clarke, (2004), p. 47.

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 48.

¹⁶³ Li Sheng (ed.), (2005), **Xinjiang of China, Its Past and Present**, Xinjiang People’s Publishing House, Xinjiang, China, p. 99.

¹⁶⁴ Millward, (2007), p. 100.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 99.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 104

The Han Chinese were not allowed to settle permanently in the Altishahr region.¹⁶⁷ Only a small group of Han Chinese merchants were present there. In this period, the policy of “segregation of the region from China proper” and “segregation of Altishahr from the North” was applied to preserve the stability of administration.¹⁶⁸

Qing emperor Qianlong appointed the Jesuit missionary Michel Benoit to map out the western regions in 1769.¹⁶⁹ The resulting Qianlong Atlas was a modern atlas with European techniques, trigonometric surveys, and European geographic knowledge.¹⁷⁰ Therewithal, *New Gazetteer of Altishahr and Zhungaria* were published. In the new gazetteer, besides places and their history in the region, the Chinese names used for these place names during the Han, Tang Dynasties and previous dynasties were written.¹⁷¹ Thus, the modern maps and gazetteer provided the basis for the legitimization of the historical connection of the Qing Empire with the region. In addition, these modern maps hold importance in the context of knowledge-power relationships. As Millward pointed out, it can be said that the mapping of the region and the creation of gazetteer reflects a kind of understanding as we see in modern power. As Harvey states, “Cartographers create a spatial panopticon.”¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ Clarke, (2004), p. 50.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 60.

¹⁶⁹ James A. Millward, (1999), "Coming onto the Map: 'Western Regions' Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of Chinese Empire in Xinjiang," **Late Imperial China**, 20(2), p. 70.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 72.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p77.

¹⁷² Wen Lin, (2005), “Tracing The Map in The Age of Web 2.0.”, **Cartopgraphica**, 50(1), p. 41.

3.4 1864 Rebellions and The Emirate of Yaqub Beg

In the early 1860s, the Qing Empire was shaken by two major internal revolutions, the Taiping Rebellion and the Nian Rebellion and the country's economy was deteriorating.¹⁷³ Besides, fights broke out between Muslim Chinese (called either Hui or Tungans) and Han Chinese in Shanxi Province which turned into rebellion.¹⁷⁴

To keep rebellion from spreading to the west, the Qing administration ordered suspicious Tungans to be executed.¹⁷⁵ Thereupon, rumors spread that the Qing administration would carry out a massacre in the west and the rebellions spread to Xinjiang.¹⁷⁶ The Uyghurs were also involved in the rebellion initiated by the Tungans.¹⁷⁷

In the Tarim Basin, the Qing rule collapsed, as a result of the rebellions. Rebel groups in different cities held different administrative areas.¹⁷⁸ Khoqand ruler Alim Quli saw this situation in the region as an opportunity and sent Naqshibandi Makdumzada Khoja's descendant Buzurgu to Kashgar to fight together with the commander Yaqub Beg.¹⁷⁹ Yaqub Beg conquered Kashgar and the cities located in the southeast of Xinjiang. With that, he established his dominance on all south Xinjiang.¹⁸⁰ The Dzungaria region in the north was (until the intervention of the Russians in 1871) ruled by Taranchis (the name used to identify Turkic Muslims

¹⁷³ Millward, (2007), p. 116.

¹⁷⁴ Hodong Kim, ed. (2004), **Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877**, California University Press, Stanford, p. 5.

¹⁷⁵ Kim, (2004), p. 7.

¹⁷⁶ Millward, (2007), p. 117.

¹⁷⁷ Kim, (2004), p. 8.

¹⁷⁸ Millward, (2007), p. 118.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 118.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 120.

who migrated from the Tarim Basin to Dzungaria region in the North, sharing the same origin with Uyghurs.)¹⁸¹

Yaqub Beg established an emirate in the Tarim Basin in the South, that continued until 1877. The important note for the Yaqub Beg period is his diplomatic success. The Russians feared that the influence of the state of Yaqub Beg could spread to Muslims who lived in the territories of Russia. In fact in 1871, Russian forces invaded the İli, thinking that Yaqub Beg would form an alliance with the İli Sultanate in the north of Xinjiang.¹⁸² Russia stated that they supported the Qing authority in Xinjiang, but this occupation was a temporary condition to protect property and citizens of Russia until the Qing controlled the area, again.¹⁸³

That did not happen in the short term and a commercial agreement was signed in 1872 between Yaqub Beg and the Russians.¹⁸⁴ Yaqub Beg employed international recognition for his government by developing relations with Britain.¹⁸⁵ Britain recognized Yaqub Beg's government and in so doing kept India borders safe against Russian territorial ambitions.¹⁸⁶ With the support of Britain, Yaqub Beg also developed relations with the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸⁷ The Ottoman Empire gave Yaqub Beg the title of the "Emir" and provided him military support.¹⁸⁸ The support coming from the Ottoman reached Kashgar through India.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸¹ Ibid, p. 118.

¹⁸² Clarke, (2004), 76.

¹⁸³ Ibid, p. 77.

¹⁸⁴ Millward, (2007), p. 123.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 123.

¹⁸⁶ Clarke, (2004), p. 77

¹⁸⁷ İklil Kurban, (1995), **Doğu Türkistan İçin Savaş**, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, p. 84.

¹⁸⁸ Clarke, (2004), p. 77.

¹⁸⁹ Kurban, (1995), p. 84.

This period is important in the context of the influence of Britain and Russia, the major powers in Asia, on the policies of the region. Yaqub Beg's success was to achieve recognition from these countries. However, in Uyghurs' later attempts to form a state, they could not find international support for the reasons we will explain.

3.5 The Qing Reconquest of Xinjiang

After the Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1874, a great debate erupted in the Qing administration to decide whether to focus on maritime defense against the threat from Western countries and Japan or frontier defense.¹⁹⁰ This period also corresponded to the competition between Britain, the Qing Empire, and Russia called “The Great Game” era in Central Asia and South Asia in the 19th century.¹⁹¹ Commander Zuo Zongtang was in favor of the capture of Xinjiang for frontier defense, was able to find support for this at Court and carried out military operations in the region.¹⁹²

Yaqub Beg was ready to negotiate with the Qing with the mediation of Britain, and he would accept suzerainty.¹⁹³ Meanwhile Qing troops were advancing in the region in 1877, but the negotiation could not progress with the sudden death of Yaqub Beg.¹⁹⁴ The Qing then conquered the south of the region in a short period of time.¹⁹⁵

After the Qing’s reconquest of the south, Xinjiang’s provincialization was on the agenda, yet Ili was not taken from the Russians until the Treaty of Saint Petersburg

¹⁹⁰ Millward, (2007), p. 126.

¹⁹¹ Clarke, (2004), p. 27.

¹⁹² Millward, (2007), p.126.

¹⁹³ Ibid, p. 129.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 129.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 130

was signed in 1881 with Russia.¹⁹⁶ According to the treaty, Russia agreed to retreat from the places they occupied. A new border was established. The Qing government paid 9.000.000 metal rubles in return for Russian occupation costs and claims for compensation.¹⁹⁷ Customs-free trade rights were given to Russian traders in Xinjiang.¹⁹⁸ It was also decided to increase the number of Russian consulates in the region.¹⁹⁹ In 1884, the region - Zhungaria in the north and Tarim Basin (or Altishahr) in the south together-were renamed as Xin-jiang (new frontier) as a province of the Qing Empire.²⁰⁰ Urumqi became the capital.²⁰¹

The Provincialisation of Xinjiang and the previous policy of “Segregation of Xinjiang from China Proper” were discontinued. Until the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1911, Han Chinese immigration to the region was encouraged, but this was limited. As Millward put it, the real Han Chinese immigration to the region didn’t start until 1949.²⁰²

After the Provincialisation, the previous special administrative system was discontinued, and the Beg system dropped.²⁰³ The Uyghurs were employed under the title of Beg again, but serving the Qing officers who did not speak the language of the region, but unlike the old administration, the Beg title no longer referred to its previous administrative position.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 132.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 135.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 135.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 135.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 137.

²⁰¹ Ibid, p. 131.

²⁰² Ibid, p. 151.

²⁰³ Ibid, p. 140.

²⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 140.

Zuo Zongtang proposed the opening of Chinese-style schools in the region, and Confucian schools that provided education in Chinese opened.²⁰⁵ Starting in 1907, modern type schools were opened throughout the Qing state.²⁰⁶ In addition, local madrasa-type religious schools and local “maktap” schools continued.²⁰⁷

Millward describes the Qing policy in the region after 1878 as more assimilative and sinicizing than previous policies and states that the authority in the region was predominantly Han Chinese for the first time²⁰⁸. However, in 1911, the Qing Empire was brought down by the Xinhai revolution.

3.6 Warlords Period (1912-1944)

3.6.1 Yang Zengxin

According to Millward, the Qing Empire’s second conquest of the region in 1878 was “the last imperial campaign of a dying empire.”²⁰⁹ After the collapse of the empire, the new government, headed by Yuan Shikai in Beijing, appointed Yang Zengxin as the Governor of Xinjiang.²¹⁰

Martial reforms such as state officials having their own soldiers were carried out during the resistance to the Taping uprising. This caused a personal communications network to gain importance.²¹¹ Even though the region was under

²⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 142.

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 143.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 147.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 148.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, , p. 124.

²¹⁰ Ibid, p. 168.

²¹¹ Richard J Smith, Kwang-Ching Liu, (2002), in “The Military Challenge: The North-West and the Coast” in Fairbank, John King; Liu, Kwang-Ching (eds.), **The Cambridge History of China: Late Ch'ing, Vol 11, 1800-1911, Part 2**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney, p. 203.

the rule of the Nationalist Chinese Government, the central government could not rule the region in the latter part of the period, because of the wars with Japan and later with the Communists. In this era, governor generals were the region's main rulers. This was the reason that this era was named the Warlords Period. This period, which we will discuss in this section, is important for understanding the effects of Soviets and ideologies such as Jadidism on China's policies in the management of the region.

After the collapse of the Qing State, the first of the governor generals was Yang Zengxin who reinforced his power by appointing his family and close associates to different positions close to him in a structure of family hierarchy identified by Lattimore.²¹² During Yang's time, while Muslims were able to be civil servants as "Begs," they did not serve in the upper echelons.²¹³

This was the period when the ideologies of Jadidism, Nationalism, and Communism were starting to spread in the region²¹⁴, but all were considered dangerous by the government of Xinjiang. Uyghurs were prohibited from teaching in their own language, opening schools, publishing papers, or establishing printing press.²¹⁵ However, books and papers from Turkey, West Turkistan (A part of today's Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, a big part of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan and a part of Afghanistan), Idel-Ural, North Caucasus and the Crimean Peninsula still reached and influenced a group in the region.²¹⁶

Being aware of the local and ethnic interests, Zengxin gave privileges to some groups such as people descended from Begs in the Qing era and migrant chiefs to a

²¹² Owen Lattimore, (1950), **Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia**, Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, p. 53.

²¹³ M. Ali Taşçı, (1985), **Esir Doğu Türkistan İçin, İsa Yusuf Alptekin'in Mücadele Hatıraları**, Doğu Türkistan Neşriyat Merkezi, İstanbul, p. 21.

²¹⁴ Millward, (2007), p. 179.

²¹⁵ Taşçı, (1985), p. 173.

²¹⁶ Ibid, p. 173.

certain degree as a balancer in order to establish control.²¹⁷ He followed balancing politics, such as using clerical conservatives against Jadidists.²¹⁸ Politics of isolation of the region were followed at this time with publications from China and Soviet regions banned.²¹⁹

In this era, the region's commercial relations with the Soviets were maintained through the local authority. Ever since the Treaty of Saint Petersburg in 1881 there were Russian commercial interests in the region.²²⁰ Yang signed temporary trade agreements with the Soviets without the approval of the central government.²²¹ In 1928 Xinjiang's Soviet trade was 10 times more than trade with the other regions of China.²²²

3.6.2 Jin Shuren

Local governor Jin Shuren served after Yang Zengxin was assassinated in 1928 in an attempted coup intended to bring Xinjiang closer into line with the Nationalist Government. After Yang was assassinated by Fan Yaonan (Nationalist Government appointee) Internal Affairs Deputy of the State Government Jin Shuren called Yang Zengxin's supporters and invaded state government office. After Jin became new governor general, he pursued the strict policies applied during Yang era however Jin's abilities were more limited in comparison,²²³ and he could not apply a balanced policy like Yang.²²⁴ Jin doubled military and police forces,

²¹⁷ Millward, (2007), p. 182.

²¹⁸ Ibid, p. 183.

²¹⁹ Ibid, p. 184.

²²⁰ Ibid, p. 186.

²²¹ Ibid, p. 186.

²²² Ibid, p. 186.

²²³ Li Sheng, (2005), p. 119.

²²⁴ Millward, (2007), p. 189.

increased taxes, and monopolized gold and jade mines as well as some other industries to consolidate his power.²²⁵

Jin also privileged Chinese Han over Turkic groups, and this caused ethnic conflicts between Uyghurs and Chinese. He settled Chinese people who fled from Gansu because of war and hunger and kept them exempt from taxes for three years.²²⁶ He forbade Muslims undertaking the Haj.²²⁷ Perhaps his most significant action was to end the khanate status of Hami.²²⁸ As a result of Jin's ruling, an uprising broke out in Hami (Kumul) in 1931 and the rebellion spread throughout Xinjiang.

The title of Wang (prince) was given by the Qing as a privilege to Begs in Hami and Turpan in Turkic groups.²²⁹ In Hami (Kumul) the Prince Shah Maqsud was almost ruling independently, the public were paying their taxes to the Wang.²³⁰ Jin Shuren abolished the title of Wang after Shah Maqsud's death. He divided Kumul into 3 different government units,²³¹ and settled people from Gansu.²³² As a result of all these policies the uprising broke out in Hami. Khoja Niyaz Haji became the Commander of the uprising, and he cooperated with Yulbars Khan (the former Chancellor of Maqsut Shah).²³³ Jin's attempt to appoint a Chinese officer to govern the Kyrgyz people in the region caused them to join the uprising too.²³⁴

²²⁵ Andrew D. W Forbes , (1986), **Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 40.

²²⁶ Ibid, p. 46.

²²⁷ Ibid, p. 42.

²²⁸ Millward, (2007), p. 191.

²²⁹ Ibid, p. 190.

²³⁰ Forbes, (1986), p. 44.

²³¹ Ibid, p. 45.

²³² Ibid, p. 46.

²³³ Ibid, p. 49.

²³⁴ Ibid, p. 51.

Starting in 1931, this uprising got more serious with the inclusion of Tungan (Chinese Muslim) general Ma Zhongying, who was a relative of the general ruler of Gansu Province.²³⁵ (Located to the east of Xinjiang.)

When the uprising in Kumul spread to Turfan, respectable merchants who had established schools in the region, the Maksut and Muhiti brothers, supporting Hoca Niyaz, also got involved in the rebellion.²³⁶ At this point, it is also important to talk about the Jadidism movement with which the Maksut and Muhiti brothers were involved. Jadidism was a social-political and intellectual movement that emerged in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, especially among Muslim people of Turkic origin.²³⁷ One of the leading names of the movement was Ismail Gaspirali from Crimea. He created and applied a syllabus in accordance with the new way of schooling called the New Method (Usul ul-Jadid).²³⁸ Gaspirali gave lectures aimed at forming and improving the unity of Turks. This movement spread among Uyghurs and people engaged in higher education in countries such as Turkey, Egypt, India, Iran, and Afghanistan.²³⁹ They returned to their countries and began to pioneer this movement.²⁴⁰

At this point, Millward explains that many different groups joined the war with different motivations. Tungsans (Chinese Muslims) and Uyghurs fought together against Jin rule, and even some Chinese join in the rebellions.²⁴¹ The uprising

²³⁵ Ibid, p. 52.

²³⁶ İlkel Kurban, (1992), *Şarki Türkistan Cumhuriyeti (1944-1949)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, p. 12, 13.

²³⁷ Varis Abdurrahman, (2001), “Doğu Türkistan’daki Ceditçilik Hareketi ve Ahmet Kemal İlkel”, *Türk Yurdu*, 170, October, p. 51.

²³⁸ Ibid, p. 51.

²³⁹ Ibid, p. 51.

²⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 51.

²⁴¹ Millward (2007), p. 195.

expanded to South Xinjiang however, the formerly cooperating groups then turned against each other.²⁴²

When Ma Zhongying and Khoja Niyaz Haji approached Urumqi together, Jin Shuren signed a secret agreement with the Soviet Union, under which the Soviets directed the Manchurian Salvation Army (The Chinese who had fled as refugees to the Soviet Union during the Japanese Invasion of Northeast China from 1931 onwards) to put down the rebellion.²⁴³ In return for this and military-economic aid from the Soviets, an agreement granting trade concessions to the Soviets was signed.²⁴⁴

The Soviet support here had different motivations. According to Millward, aside from trade concessions, there were rumors of the Japanese supporting Pan Turkists and Islamists, or Ma Zhongying.²⁴⁵ The other reason was that the Soviets did not want an independent Turkic state in Central Asia.²⁴⁶

The uprising spread to the South as a result of the increase in paper currency, taxes not guaranteed by the government, and Jin's strict policies.²⁴⁷ Workers revolted in gold mines of Karakas in Hoten. According to Forbes, the reason for this revolt was inflation, severe working conditions, and the fact that Jin Shuren put a lot of counterfeit paper currency in the market²⁴⁸ But this rebellion by the workers did not have a pro-Soviet or communist discourse.²⁴⁹ However, this movement in the south was also overshadowed by Mehmet Emin Buğra and Sabit Damolla, who

²⁴² Ibid, p. 195.

²⁴³ Ibid, p. 196.

²⁴⁴ Forbes, (1986), p. 98.

²⁴⁵ Millward, (2007), p. 199.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 199.

²⁴⁷ Forbes, (1986), p. 70.

²⁴⁸ Ibid, p.74.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, p.74.

were the leaders of the Revolution Committee established in Hoten. Bugra and Damolla declared that the Emirate was established in Hoten.²⁵⁰

The situation in Kashgar developed differently from the North. The cooperation of the Uyghurs with Tungans (Chinese Muslims) was difficult here. Because in the South, local government officials and soldiers were mainly Muslim Chinese, the Tungans and the Uyghurs who looked at each other with suspicion.²⁵¹ Another factor was that, since the last years of the Yang administration, Kashgar was considered a British zone of influence.²⁵² The Russian embassy of Tsarist Russia in Kashgar was closed in Yang's term.²⁵³ The British were trying to prevent Soviet influence in the south, and Yang supported Britain as the Soviets strengthened in the north, in order to establish balance with Britain.²⁵⁴

The Young Kashgar Party was established in Kashgar.²⁵⁵ This group called themselves "Kashgar Affairs Office of Khonten Government", and later declared the Islamic Republic of East Turkestan.²⁵⁶

Meanwhile, there was a government coup in Xinjiang in 1933, and as a result, general Sheng Shicai took over as the new governor-general (Duban).²⁵⁷ After taking office, Sheng Shicai contacted Gagarin Appresof (Consul General in Urumqi) in 1933 for help from the Soviets.²⁵⁸ In January 1934, Soviet troops

²⁵⁰ Millward, (2007), p. 197.

²⁵¹ Forbes, (1986), p. 67.

²⁵² Ibid, p. 63.

²⁵³ Ibid, p 63.

²⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 63.

²⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 144.

²⁵⁶ Millward, (2007), p. 198.

²⁵⁷ Taşçı, (1985), p. 219.

²⁵⁸ Millward, (2007), p. 199.

advanced through Gulya and Tarbagatay, and they defeated Tungan forces.²⁵⁹ Sheng Shicai planned to reach an agreement with Khoja Niyaz Haji, through the Soviets,²⁶⁰ but that was delayed as the East Turkestan Republic was founded in Kashgar in the south.

3.6.3 Sheng Shicai and the Establishment of East Turkestan Republic

On 12 November 1933, the Republic of East Turkestan (ETR) was declared in Kashgar. The government of East Turkestan, established here, announced Khoja Niyaz Haji as president of the state in order to persuade him not to agree with Sheng Shicai.²⁶¹

One of the main principles of the East Turkestan State was to develop good relations with Britain,²⁶² however when meetings were conducted for the recognition of the state, no successful results were achieved. Britain was contacted through representatives sent to India.²⁶³ Thomson Glover was also contacted in Kashgar.²⁶⁴ At first, Glover, known for his anti-Soviet stance, was interested in the demands of Sabit Damolla and Khoja Niyaz Haji. However, the British government stated that China was considered the legitimate government of the region.²⁶⁵ It can be said that Britain did not think of the ETR as strong enough to balance the Soviet Union and therefore did not intervene against China. Also, in the meeting between Uyghur representatives and Turkey, their demands for

²⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 199.

²⁶⁰ Mehmet Emin Buğra, (1952), *Doğu Türkistan, Tarihi, Coğrafi ve Şimdiki Durumu*, Güven Basımevi, İstanbul, p. 37.

²⁶¹ Ibid, p. 38.

²⁶² Forbes, (1986), p. 114.

²⁶³ Ibid, p. 115.

²⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 115.

²⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 115.

recognition and aid were not met by Turkey either.²⁶⁶ The cause of the refusal of Turkey can be interpreted as Turkey's unwillingness to make a move against the Soviet Union. Although, during meetings with the government of Muhammad Zahir Shah in Afghanistan, a decision was received later.²⁶⁷

During these diplomatic efforts by ETR representatives, Sheng Shicai was attacking the positions of the revolutionaries in the north of Xinjiang, with the support of the Soviets.²⁶⁸ Later, the Soviets negotiated with President Khoja Niyaz Haji and isolated the Hoten Emir who was active in the Kashgar Government.²⁶⁹ Under the agreement of Sheng Shicai and the Soviet Union, with the help of the Soviet military, technicians and doctors were sent to Xinjiang.²⁷⁰ During this period, some Xingiang citizens also went to Moscow for education.²⁷¹ The Soviets contributed 7.5 million rubles for Xinjiang's development.²⁷² The Soviets, on the other hand, obtained concessions to the mineral and oil deposits.²⁷³ Soviet People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs forces were trained against possible Japanese invasion near Hami.²⁷⁴

Sheng recognized 14 ethnic categories in Xinjiang in line with the Soviet nationality policy: Uyghur, Han, Hui, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Mongol, Manchu, Xibe

²⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 115.

²⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 116.

²⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 120.

²⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 121.

²⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 137.

²⁷¹ Ibid, p. 137.

²⁷² Millward, (2007), p. 206, 207.

²⁷³ Ibid, p. 207.

²⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 207.

(Sibe), Solon, Tatar, Uzbek, Tajik, Taranchi, and Guihua (Russians)²⁷⁵ Mehmet Emin Buğra (one of the leaders of the uprising in Hoten) criticized this policy for not using the word “Turk.”²⁷⁶

In this progressive period of Sheng’s governorship, equality of Minzus (ethnic groups) was emphasized.²⁷⁷ It was stated that the rights of Wangs (princes) would be protected, and non-Han Chinese would be included in the government.²⁷⁸ It was stated that languages other than Chinese would be used in education and publishing. However, these have been propaganda publications.²⁷⁹

By 1939, Xinjiang had become a Soviet satellite.²⁸⁰ In 1940, with the agreement of Tin Mines, extensive privileges were granted to the Soviets,²⁸¹ and the influence of the Soviets in Xinjiang reached its highest point.

But when Germany invaded the Soviet Union War in May 1941, the policy in the region changed completely.²⁸² As of 1942, Sheng broke off trade with the Soviets, embarking on a clean-up movement against pro-Soviet Turkic Muslims and Chinese communists.²⁸³ Sheng Shicai had collaborated with the Chinese communists alongside the Soviets, but later executed the communists, including Mao Zedung's brother, Mao Zemin. Instead, Sheng negotiated with the

²⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 208.

²⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 209.

²⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 209.

²⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 209.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 209.

²⁸⁰ Forbes, (1986), p. 144.

²⁸¹ Ibid, p. 148.

²⁸² Millward, (2007), p. 211.

²⁸³ Ibid, p. 211.

Guomindang.²⁸⁴ When the Japanese attacked on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the US entered the war, and began to supply weapons to the Guomindang, which strengthened the hand of the Chinese nationalist government, then based in Chongqing, to intervene in Xinjiang.²⁸⁵ In 1943, with the invitation of Chongqing, a US embassy was opened in Urumqi.²⁸⁶

In 1943, GMD (Guomindang) forces entered Xinjiang.²⁸⁷ Taking control of Xinjiang, the Chinese government removed Sheng from command and head of the local government.²⁸⁸ After the appointment of Wu Zhongshin, Xinjiang was directly linked to the rule of the Nationalist Chinese Government.²⁸⁹

3.6.4 Wu Zhongxin, GMD Rule and the Establishment of Second Eastern Turkistan Republic

After Wu Zhongxing was appointed as chairman of Xinjiang, the control of the GMD administration in the region began to strengthen.²⁹⁰ However, minority rights were reversed in Wu's term since Wu made speeches that rejected national identities in the region, claiming that language differences are due to geography,²⁹¹ and Han Chinese migration was supported for the integration of the region.²⁹²

²⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 211.

²⁸⁵ Forbes, (1986), p. 158.

²⁸⁶ Millward, (2007), p. 211.

²⁸⁷ Forbes, (1986), p. 140.

²⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 161.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 163.

²⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 163.

²⁹¹ Kurban, (2002), p. 35.

²⁹² Millward, (2007), p. 212.

Between the years 1942-1943, 4000 Han Chinese from Henan and in 1944, 7000 people were settled in Xinjiang as part of a Development Project.²⁹³ Because of the policy of settling immigrants on the land cultivated by Uyghur farmers in Kumul in Jin Shuren's era had caused an uprising, the GMD decided to settle the immigrants on somewhere different, grassland, where Kazakhs live.²⁹⁴

In the time of Wu administration, inflation and taxes increased since the deterioration of trade relations with the Soviets affected the economy badly.²⁹⁵ Moreover, by using the Chinese Government currency which was worth less than the region's previous locally issued currency, inflation rose to 1200% in 1944.²⁹⁶ All these events led to the escalation of tension and caused another uprising.

The leader of the Kazakh uprising Osman Batur revolted to keep Chinese troops, officials and settlers out of the Altai region. After Altai was seized under Osman Batur's leadership, there was no attempt to establish a state.²⁹⁷

However, when the uprising of Kazakhs spread to Ili in 1944, it showed different characteristics. Ili was a region in which Russia had enjoyed influence since the 19th century.²⁹⁸ As mentioned, during the era of Yaqub Beg, Russia had occupied Ili for the reason of border security. In the Sheng era, Soviet Military Troops were placed in Ili.²⁹⁹

To escape from Sheng's purge against the communists, the ones trained by the Soviets fled to Soviet Central Asia, and in 1943 the Sinkiang Turkic People's National Liberation Committee (STPNLC) was established in Almaty as an

²⁹³ Ibid, p. 212

²⁹⁴ Forbes, (1986), p. 169.

²⁹⁵ Forbes, (1986), p. 165.

²⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 167.

²⁹⁷ Forbes, (1986), p. 172.

²⁹⁸ Kurban, (1992), p. 18.

²⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 23.

opposition movement against Sheng Shicai and later the Guomintang.³⁰⁰ When the uprising in Ili progressed, according to historian N.N Mingulov, the coordination of the uprising and process leading to forming a state were carried out by STPNLC.³⁰¹

The rebels in Ili had seized most of the city, and on November 15th, 1944 they proclaimed the Republic of East Turkistan (ETR).³⁰² In the declared Ghulja (İli) Declaration, in 1945, equality of nationalities, religious freedom, economic development and establishment of good relations with the Soviet Union were emphasized.³⁰³ The proclaimed government created the state structure by introducing a tax system, printing money, and constituting an army.³⁰⁴

Early clashes between the ETR army with the Guomintang troops went in favor of the ETR.³⁰⁵ Wu Zhongxin and Guomintang executives accused the Soviet Union of supporting the revolutionaries. The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a protest note to the Soviet envoy, claiming that there were Soviet planes on the side of the ETR army.³⁰⁶ The Chinese government also responded by removing Wu Zhongxin from his post and appointed Zhang Zhizhong, who was famous for his diplomatic successes.³⁰⁷ Zhang went to the Soviet Consulate General in Urumqi on September 13, 1945, and stated: "If a ceasefire was not implemented as soon as possible, China would make an international affair of the matter."³⁰⁸ The Soviets affirmed

³⁰⁰ Forbes, (1986), p. 173.

³⁰¹ Ibid, p. 174.

³⁰² Ibid, p. 176.

³⁰³ Ibid, p. 183.

³⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 185.

³⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 189.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 189

³⁰⁷ Taşçı, (1985), p. 443.

³⁰⁸ Forbes, (1986), p. 190.

that they could act as a mediator in negotiations between the ETR and the Chinese government.³⁰⁹ With the mediation of the Soviets, a ceasefire was declared in September 1945.

In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, in the discussions about the independence of Outer Mongolia, China stipulated that the Soviets should not support the revolution in Xinjiang.³¹⁰ Stalin stated that both Yan'an and Xinjiang must obey the leadership of Chiang Kai Shek, the USSR could issue a statement on this issue, and it could ensure the prevention of arms smuggling from the USSR to Xinjiang.³¹¹ When the USSR's war with Japan ended, the Treaty of Amity and Alliance was signed between USSR and China. Article 5 of this agreement emphasized that the USSR had no intention to interfere in the internal affairs of China.³¹²

It is thought that Soviets support for cease-fire between China and the ETR is because Soviets had little influence over the far-flung revolutionaries and Soviets' concerns that the US might intervene.³¹³ As a result of the truce, the Coalition Government negotiations between China and ETR lasted for eight months, and the agreement was signed in June 1946.³¹⁴

3.6.5 Coalition Government Period

After the agreement between the ETR and China, Zhang Zhizhong was appointed head of the newly formed Coalition Government. According to the agreement, it was decided 15 ministers to be locally elected, 10 ministers to be appointed by the

³⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 190

³¹⁰ Sheng, (2005), p. 156.

³¹¹ Ibid, p. 156

³¹² Ibid, p. 156.

³¹³ Forbes, (1986), p. 193.

³¹⁴ İsa Yusuf Alptekin, (1981), **Doğu Türkistan Davası**, Marifet Yayınları, İstanbul, p. 183.

central government, to the Provincial Commission.³¹⁵ Fourteen non-Han people and eleven Han Chinese served in Provincial Commission. Chinese, Uyghur, and Kazakh languages were accepted as the official languages.³¹⁶ Education in the mother-tongue and the development of culture and art were guaranteed.³¹⁷ The local army in Ili - not exceeding 12.000- was accepted.³¹⁸ The appointment of local people as civil servants to police departments and branches were also accepted. In the civil service, it was decided to hire 70 percent Non-Han, 30 percent Han Chinese people.³¹⁹

Zhang made moderate efforts to engage with the local ethnic communities during his administration. However, Zhang, who could not find support from both the Ili group and the Guomintang, resigned in 1947.³²⁰ As a result of the unrest, the Chinese government and Zhang decided that a local Muslim should be in the administration of the provincial government. It was thought that it would be appropriate to bring Mesut Sabri Baykuzu to the Presidency and Isa Yusuf Alptekin to be the General Secretary.³²¹ Mesut Sabri Baykuzu and Isa Yusuf Alptekin were Turkish nationalists and known for being anti-Soviet.

However, the Ili group in parliament was opposed to them. First, 25 members of the parliament, then representatives of the Kashgar region, opposing the administration, left Urumqi and moved to Gulca (Ili).³²² Although they did not use the name of the Republic of East Turkestan there, they established a tax system

³¹⁵ Forbes, (1986), p. 192.

³¹⁶ Milward, (2007), p. 219.

³¹⁷ Ibid, p. 219.

³¹⁸ Forbes, (1986), p. 193.

³¹⁹ Milward, (2007), p. 219

³²⁰ Ibid, p. 222

³²¹ Taşçı, (1985), p. 480

³²² Forbes, (1986), p.211

and an education system. Even though the coalition was disbanded, Mesut Sabri Baykuzu continued his activities in other regions for a while.³²³

During these years, as the Chinese Civil War continued, the Communist Party was moving towards Beijing. Chiang Kai Shek was looking for reconciliation with the Soviets³²⁴. In January 1949, Mesud Sabri Baykuzu and Isa Yusuf Alptekin were discharged from their posts. Burhan Shahidi, who was born in Kazan-Tatarstan and was thought to be moderate and acceptable to both the Ili group and the Chinese government, was brought in as Chairman of the Government.³²⁵

3.7 People's Republic of China

In January 1949, the Communist Party of China (CPC) troops took Beijing. In September 1949, Guomindang soldiers in Xinjiang surrendered to the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Burhan Shahidi broke ties with the Guomindang administration and became a member of the Chinese Communist Party.³²⁶ In order to preserve the autonomy in the northwest, the Ili Group had chosen the option of meeting with Chinese Communists³²⁷ However, the delegation that went to Beijing with Ahmadjan Qasimi and most of the other former leaders of the ETR lost their lives in a suspected plane crash. Meanwhile others resisted. Isa Yusuf Alptekin and Muhammad Emin Bughra fled to Turkey in 1949. Yulbars Han fled to Taiwan. Masud Sabri was arrested in 1951 and died in jail.³²⁸ Osman Batur did not accept

³²³ Millward, (2007) ,p. 223.

³²⁴ Forbes, (1986), p. 219.

³²⁵ Linda Benson (1990). *The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge To Chinese Authority In Xinjiang, 1944-1949*, Armonk, N.Y:M. E. Sharpe, Inc., p. 63.

³²⁶ Forbes, (1986), p. 220.

³²⁷ Ibid, p. 221.

³²⁸ Ibid, p. 247.

the new administration and waged a guerrilla war. He was arrested by the PLA in 1951 and executed for counter-revolutionary action.³²⁹

In order to integrate the Ili National Army, units were sent to 3 regions far away from Xinjiang, and placed under the command to the of troops of the People's Army of China.³³⁰ Burhan Shahidi was appointed as the provincial chairman of the Chinese Communist Party in the region, and Saypidin Azizi became his deputy. Wang Zhen and Wang Enmao, the First Field Army Group of People's Liberation Army (PLA) generals, provided the consolidation of the party's power in the region.³³¹

After 1950, land reform was implemented in the region. Compared to other parts of China, land reform was implemented here in a slow process.³³² Some Uyghur farmers welcomed land reform, but there was more resistance to collectivization movement in nomadic areas, and not all nomad groups were included in the collectivization.³³³ Therefore, some nomadic groups were incentivized to adopt a settled life.³³⁴

The Ili region was included as one of 5 autonomous prefecture and other local government units in the administration. Finally, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established in October 1955.

The nationalities policy was implemented as had been in Sheng Shicai era, and the presence of 13 minorities in the region was accepted. (Uyghur, Han, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Hui, Mongol, Manchu, Xibe, Tajik, Tatar, Russian, Uzbek, Daur). A federalist administration was not founded, as in the Soviet Union. The presence of

³²⁹ Ibid, p. 225.

³³⁰ Ibid, p. 226.

³³¹ Karrar, (2018), p. 18.

³³² Starr, (2004), p. 88.

³³³ Millward (2007), p. 241

³³⁴ Ibid, p. 242

55 national minorities in all of China was accepted. Equal rights to all minorities were emphasized³³⁵. Since the Uyghurs were the majority in the region, it was named as Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The military farm system that had been in the region since the Qing Empire was reorganized in 1953-54. Unlike the Tuntian model of the Qing era, this system was not only deployed in the north. Divisions were created in the entire region³³⁶. It was named as Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) (Bingtuan in Chinese). The XPCC, which was established for military purposes, border security and agricultural and industrial development, worked until 1975, when it was dissolved due to the Cultural Revolution. However, it was re-established in 1981³³⁷. Han migration was encouraged to work in the XPCC from the 50s to the 70s. While, in 1954, 200.000 people were working in the XPCC, in 1966 there were 600.000 XPCC people.³³⁸ The XPCC was not only linked to the local authority in Xinjiang, but also directly to Beijing³³⁹. As Millward pointed out, the region was tied to the Central Government more than ever.³⁴⁰

In 1956, The Hundred Flowers Campaign started with the statement “Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend” initiated by the discourse of Ma Zedung. It was emphasized that Government should be open to criticism by the public that progress would be made, and socialism would settle. However, the pendulum quickly swung in the opposite direction after the Anti Rightist Movement, which started in 1957, many intellectuals, officials, students,

³³⁵ Ibid, p. 243

³³⁶ Ibid, p. 253

³³⁷ Yajun Bao, (2018), “The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps: An Insider’s Perspective”, Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper Series, January, p. 3.

<https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2018-05/BSG-WP-2018-023.pdf> Retrieved: 01.09.2019

³³⁸ Millward, (2007),p. 253

³³⁹ Ibid, p. 252

³⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 246

and artists were arrested. In Xinjiang, those who had Soviet ties or former ties with the Ili group were arrested and sent to labor camps³⁴¹. Mao's policies began to get tougher during the period in which Chinese-Soviet relations began to deteriorate³⁴² and Soviet books were confiscated³⁴³. In 1962, the Soviet Consulates in Xinjiang were closed.³⁴⁴

In addition to deteriorating relations between China and the Soviets, China's economy also deteriorated. The Great Leap Forward campaign across China, which was initiated between 1958 and 1962 for rapid industrialization and collectivization, compounded rapidly growing population, decades of growing soil exhaustion and erosion and a rationing system biased in favour of the cities to produce widespread famine. For this reason, in 1962, a mass exodus of 60,000 people from North Xinjiang to the Soviet Union took place, called the Yi-Ta (Yili-Tacheng) incident³⁴⁵. There were a few Hans besides Kazakhs and Uyghurs in this exodus³⁴⁶. The Chinese Government was concerned that this exodus could have an impact on other parts of the region as well, and that it could create events that could cause riots by opposition groups³⁴⁷. It was thought that the Soviets had involvement in Yi-Ta Incident, that the Soviets issued passports to support the

³⁴¹ Ibid, p. 258

³⁴² Donald H. McMillen (1984). Xinjiang and Wang Enmao: New Directions in Power, Policy and Integration?, **The China Quarterly**, 99, September, p. 570.

³⁴³ Millward, (2007), p. 256.

³⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 257.

³⁴⁵ Charles Kraus, (2019), "Laying Blame for Flight and Fight: Sino-Soviet Relations and the "Yi-Ta" Incident in Xinjiang, 1962", **The China Quarterly**, 238, June, p. 1.

³⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 13.

³⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 7

exodus.³⁴⁸ Consequently, the need to strengthen the border and improve the economy in the region was discussed.³⁴⁹

Later, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps built military farms on the Sino-Soviet border. Border security was further strengthened with the migration of Han from other parts of China to military farms.³⁵⁰

The Cultural Revolution, launched by Mao Zedong throughout China from 1966-76, also had an impact in Xinjiang. Due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the inspiration of reforms initiated by Krushchev in the USSR after Stalin's death, there was opposition to Mao's leadership. The Cultural Revolution was initiated by Mao in order to eliminate the revisionists, the bourgeois elements, and to end the bureaucratic communism. During the Cultural Revolution, there was an attack against all kinds of works and institutions representing the old society and old habits. Mao encouraged young people to participate in the Red Guards organizations. For propaganda purposes, the Red Guards were expanded, and after this, they went out of control. However, Red Guards were protected from the legal consequences of their actions and against all attacks by opposing elements. During this period, there were also clashes between different Red Guards groups.

In Xinjiang, there were attacks from the Red Guards against Wang Enmao's leadership. Thereupon, Wang formed a rival group of Red Guards³⁵¹. Conflicts also took place in the Xinjiang Production Construction Corps (Bingtuan). Then, the Fourth Field Army³⁵² took over the XPCC and Xinjiang's administrative and economic organs³⁵³. During this period, the insecurity in the region occurred,

³⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 9

³⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 8

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 13

³⁵¹ Millward, (2007), p. 267.

³⁵² Starr, (2004), p. 96

³⁵³ Millward, (2007), p. 268.

meant that the economy deteriorated. The number of Bingtuan employees decreased. In 1975, the XPCC (Bingtuan) was dissolved by the Central Government³⁵⁴. However, during this period, Mao supported urban youths to go to the countryside. Thus, Han Chinese migration to the region took place.³⁵⁵

In the period of the Cultural Revolution, the non-Han staff were purged.³⁵⁶ During this period, restrictions were imposed on Uyghur culture (such as the prohibition of ritual celebrations) and Islam. There were attacks to the culture and Islam (destroying mosques, burning Qur'an) where Red Guards were responsible.³⁵⁷

When Mao Zedung died in 1976, the Maoist faction, popularly known as the Gang of Four was purged. Hua Yaobang became the general secretary after Hua Guofeng's service between 1976-1981 in China. Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping served as Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission from 1982-87. During this period, Mao's policies, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were criticized, and economic reform was adopted by transitioning to the socialist market economy with the discourse of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. Thus, a new era was started in PRC history.

3.8. From Reform and Opening-Up to Today

Beginning with reform and opening up, the policies used in Xinjiang during the Mao period were also criticized, and a more moderate approach was adopted with a discourse of toleration towards cultural and religious differences. The dominance of Han cadre in Xinjiang was criticized.³⁵⁸ A more moderate

³⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 270.

³⁵⁵ Clarke, (2007), p. 296.

³⁵⁶ Starr, (2004), p. 97.

³⁵⁷ June Teufel Dreyer, (1994), "The PLA and regionalism in Xinjiang", **The Pacific Review**, 7(1), p44.

³⁵⁸ Millward(2007), p. 277.

approach was expressed towards Islam, and new mosques were opened during this period.³⁵⁹ The Xinjiang Islamic Association was reestablished.³⁶⁰ Publishing in local languages was promoted.³⁶¹

With the reform and opening up, firstly, China has prioritized development in coastal areas with its export-oriented development strategy. Thus, a more developed environment for participation in the international economy was created.³⁶² However, over time, an economic gap has emerged between the more developed coastal provinces in eastern China and the western provinces. Even when Hu Yaobang visited Tibet in 1980, he saw this economic poverty and stressed the importance of reform in minority areas.³⁶³ The necessity of economic stabilization for the region has been emphasized from 1978 to the present.

In 1981, Wang Enmao became First Party Secretary. He was the commander of the People's Liberation Army in 1950 when the CPC took Xinjiang.³⁶⁴ As mentioned, during the Cultural Revolution, there was opposition to him, especially from the Red Guards. With Wang Enmao's return, as Karrar stated, Wang Enmao and another 1950s PLA commander, Wang Zhen emphasized the 1950s state - building memories, with martial undertones.³⁶⁵ After the reform and opening up, the emphasis was placed on the policies espoused pre-1966 and the unity of “minzu”s while those who caused trouble were seen as “bad elements and counter-revolutionaries.”³⁶⁶

³⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 278.

³⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 277

³⁶¹ Ibid, p. 278

³⁶² Dali L. Yang (1991), “China Adjusts to the World Economy: The Political Economy of China's Coastal Development Strategy”, *Pacific Affairs*, 64(1), Spring, p. 42.

³⁶³ Millward, (2007), p. 278.

³⁶⁴ Karrar, (2018), p. 18.

³⁶⁵ Ibid, p.16.

³⁶⁶ McMillen, (1984), p. 583

From the 1980s onwards, modernization was linked to economic growth, emphasizing the necessity of development for the socialist state.³⁶⁷ In 1981, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) was reestablished. Lands and assets were returned to XPCC,³⁶⁸ and it was expanded. What was new was that after reform the XPCC became part of the hybrid enterprise and bureaucracy system.³⁶⁹ It was allowed to build hotels, and restaurants in XPCC's state farms.³⁷⁰ It was encouraged to recruit Han peasants in to work in the XPCC from other regions.³⁷¹ In 1983, 2.26 million XPCC residents accounted for 16% of Xinjiang's population and 42% the Han population.³⁷² Besides, urbanization in the region has increased over time, and there have been migrants from other parts of China for new business opportunities in urban areas in Xinjiang. With the newly discovered oil fields in the region, oil fields and transportation infrastructures were developed.³⁷³ For the development of the region, agriculture, pastoral commodity industries, petrochemicals, and mineral industries were defined as pillar industries for the development of the region.³⁷⁴

For development in the region, trade relations of Xinjiang were also developed. The establishment of Xinjiang Import-Export Trading Company and Xinjiangintor

³⁶⁷ Karrar, (2018), p. 10.

³⁶⁸ Bao, (2018), p. 3.

³⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 7.

³⁷⁰ Karrar, (2018), p. .13

³⁷¹ Bao, (2018), p. 4.

³⁷² Ibid, p. 4.

³⁷³ "PetroChina Tarim Oilfield Company's Annual Crude Oil Output Exceeds 5 million Tons", PetroChina Company Limited, December 2012.
<http://www.petrochina.com.cn/ptr/xwxx/201404/1b7cad2f6d8d43efb7314512c1757e4d.shtml>
Retrieved: 28.08.2019

³⁷⁴ Michael E. Clarke, (2011), **Xinjiang and China's Rise in Central Asia, 1949-2009: A History**, London, Routledge, p. 106.

with the Soviets and the reopening of Soviet consulates took place.³⁷⁵ After the independence of former Soviet countries in 1989-1991, China turned this to its advantage. Border trade rose rapidly. As of 1992, the Urumqi Border Region Economic and Trade Fair was organized. This has become the largest fair in western China.³⁷⁶ As we will discuss below, other regions have also benefited from trade with Central Asian states. Xinjiang's importance grew both in terms of integration with other regions of China and expansion into Central Asia.

However, while trade opportunities with Central Asia provide economic advantages to China, with the outward expansion of China, the circulation of Uyghurs and other ethnic groups in the region increased and the flow of information increased. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the rise of the Taliban raised concerns about the revival of Islam in the region, and with the independence of the Central Asian States, reassessing of the identities of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang raised concerns for China.³⁷⁷

In 1990 the closure of Quranic schools by the Chinese government caused protests. The same year, protests against Han migration started in the township of Baren near Kashgar, which transformed to an armed conflict. It is claimed that the leader of the organisation of the East Turkistan Islamic Party which was founded in 1989, is behind this incident. Following this, large scale arrests took place. In 1991, 1992 and 1993 a series of bombings happened. In this term, the Chinese authorities associated this incidents with separatist elements.³⁷⁸

After that, reevaluation of gradualist policies towards Xinjiang which began with the reform and opening up, especially control of the religious and cultural practices of the ethnic minorities took place. The emphasis on economic development for

³⁷⁵ Clarke, (2004), p. 340-341

³⁷⁶ Mingjiang Li, (2016), "From Look-West to Act-West: Xinjiang's Role in China-Central Asian Relations", **Journal of Contemporary China**, 25(100), p. 518.

³⁷⁷ Clarke, (2004), p. 362

³⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 391.

the national unity after 1990 continued. However, in 1991, as Wang Lequan stated, managing and guiding religion were also expressed as another requirement for national unity.³⁷⁹ In this direction, the air of freedom in the early period of opening up began to change with restrictions on religious organizations and non-religious community gatherings and the training of religious personnel.³⁸⁰ Authorities have consistently correlated religious activities outside the party's control with ethnic separatism.³⁸¹

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Xinjiang's minority circulation increased in Central Asia, but China, transformed new developments into an advantage to develop trade relations with Central Asia and to cooperate with states in the region against the separatism in Xinjiang. For example: in 1991, Kazakhstan and China declared each other the most favored nation. Investment in Xinjiang increased for foreign trade-oriented development.³⁸² Road transport was developed between Central Asian states and China.³⁸³ In 1992 and 1993, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in joint meetings discussed border security issues.³⁸⁴ In 1993, the Tajik president and the Chinese president made joint statement emphasizing the sovereignty of each other and mutual cooperation on security issues.³⁸⁵ In 1994, Li Peng launched a tour of the Central Asian states. However, Uyghur political organizations in Central Asian states protested before Li's

³⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch And Human Rights In China, (2015)“The Repressive Framework Of Religious Regulation in Xinjiang”, p.1
<https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/CRF.2.2005/2.2005-RS-Xinjiang.pdf>

Retrieved: 01.07.2019

³⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 2.

³⁸¹ Ibid, p. 1

³⁸² Clarke, (2004), p. 380.

³⁸³ Ibid, p.382.

³⁸⁴ Ibid, p.389

³⁸⁵ Ibid, p.389

visits.³⁸⁶ Nevertheless, China's commercial agreements with Central Asian states provided support from Central Asian states about China's domestic policy on separatism.³⁸⁷

In 1991, the relatively liberal gradualist approach had begun to change. In 1994-95 there were a series of demonstrations after the ban on “mashrap”³⁸⁸ (an old tradition where people gather at home and perform traditional music and listen to the conversations of religious scholars.)³⁸⁹ Unrest in the region increased at the beginning of 1996.

In 1996, a strike hard period began in Xinjiang domestic policy. Also in 1996, the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust was signed by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan in Shanghai. This is often referred to as the Shanghai Five and showed that, in foreign relations, security-oriented breakthroughs were increased.

In 1996, at the Central Politburo Committee Meeting, illegal religious activities and ethnic separatism were expressed as the two greatest threats to Xinjiang's stability.³⁹⁰ With the strike hard campaign that followed in Xinjiang, thousands of people associated with separatist activities and violent incidents in Xinjiang were arrested, and executed.³⁹¹ Regulations were introduced for the control of Islamic books, periodicals and audio-visual products.³⁹² Books and publications that were

³⁸⁶ Ibid, p.391.

³⁸⁷ Ibid, p.393.

³⁸⁸ Millward, (2007), p. 330.

³⁸⁹ Taşçı, (1985), p. 44.

³⁹⁰ Justin V. Hastings (2011), “Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest Source”, **The China Quarterly**, 208, p. 903.

³⁹¹ Ibid, p. 893.

³⁹² Michael Dillon, (2004), **Xinjiang – China’s Muslim Far Northwest**, Routledge, NY, London, p. 85.

considered as promoting national separation were confiscated.³⁹³ Some village organizations were reported to host illegal religious forces. Against it, it was stated that Han cadres who will work in Bingtuan (XPCC) must be trained, and cadres and technical personal from other regions were sent to work in Xinjiang.³⁹⁴ Restrictions were introduced for traveling abroad. At this stage, Wang Lequan, the CCP Secretary of Xinjiang, in his speech about separatism and illegal religious forces, accused hostile international forces of conspiring against China but reiterated that the country would remain unified and strong.³⁹⁵

This period coincided with Russia's war against Islamic fundamentalism and separatism in Chechnya, and civil war in Tajikistan.³⁹⁶ As for Afghanistan, in 1996, Kabul was captured by the Taliban, which increased the concerns of Russia and China about Islamic fundamentalism in the region.³⁹⁷ In 1998, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was founded. All these incidents underlined the growing importance of the Shanghai Five after 1996.³⁹⁸ In 2001, after the participation of Uzbekistan, the Shanghai Five became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which has focused on security of frontiers, circulations, cooperation mechanisms for energy, and other areas.

After China's bilateral relations with the Central Asian states in the '90s, the cooperation mechanisms under the SCO increased the influence of China in the region.³⁹⁹ As a result of China's Great Western Development Strategy, announced in 1999, the growing economic interdependence between China and Central Asian states reinforced the growth of Chinese influence in Central Asia.

³⁹³ Ibid, p. 87

³⁹⁴ Millward, (2007), p. 342.

³⁹⁵ Dillon, (2004), p. 87.

³⁹⁶ Clarke, (2004), p. 440.

³⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 447.

³⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 468.

³⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 476.

According to Clarke, after September 11, 2001, when the USA launched its “war on terror” and the coalition war in Afghanistan, the impact of the SCO narrowed, as the Central Asian states in the SCO began to develop new cooperation mechanisms. China did not take a position against the USA's policies regarding the war on terror in the region.⁴⁰⁰ However, China used “war on terror” discourse in domestic policy after this period.

After 2001, China persuaded the United Nations and the US to recognize the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) officially as a terrorist organisation. Prior to the UN's recognition of this organisation as terrorist, the United States issued a document linking ETIM to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.⁴⁰¹ According to Sean Roberts, it is surprising that this previously little known group was blamed for the violence in the 1990s. A rhetorical shift in Chinese domestic policy took place. While in the 90s, illegal religious organizations were associated with separatism, the emphasis on terrorism and extremism replaced it with the Global War on Terror.⁴⁰²

As Roberts explained, as the repression on minorities increases in the region, unrest and violence increase too, and this leads to more repression by the state in a vicious circle.⁴⁰³ If we ask why stricter policies are applied for security when the insecure situation occurs in this way, we need to address the state transformation and fragmented authority in China, which began with reform and opening up. As mentioned above, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, circulation and information of ethnic minorities increased. The developmentalist approach for state commitment was approached, but an uneven economic development took place in the region. In Chapter 4, we will discuss this situation as a reason for the unrest in the XUAR.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 481.

⁴⁰¹Sean R. Roberts, (2018), The Biopolitics of China’s “War on Terror” and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs, *Critical Asian Studies*, 50(2), p. 1.

⁴⁰² Roberts, (2018), p. 7.

⁴⁰³ Roberts, (2018), p. 5.

3.9. Conclusion

As the history surveyed in this chapter shows, after the Qing Empire conquered the Tarim Basin and the Dzungaria, during the first period of rule, the Qing Empire governed this region through local Muslims. In order to maintain stability, the Han Chinese people were forbidden to settle in the region. In this term, the creation of modern maps and gazetteer of the region, the search for Chinese names for the places in Xinjiang to emphasize the historical connection of the region to China are considered as the first indicators of modern power.

The emergence of Britain as an actor in Asia, Britain's support to the Yaqub Beg Emirate established in the region, and Russia's intervention in the north of the region raised the concerns of western border security for the Qing and the region was re- conquered by the Qing Empire. After that, The Qing Empire's management in the region became more assimilating than the first period, the local people of the region were excluded from the administration, and Han Chinese migration was supported.

As in the Qing Empire, during the Guomindang and PRC administration, policies towards the people of the region changed, affected by international conditions in Asia or by China's domestic political developments. In this respect, we addressed the events that occurred in the region during the Guomindang administration. We explained the reasons and characteristics of uprisings as a result of local administrators' restrictive policies on minority rights and the effect of modern ideologies such as Jadidism which spread in the region. We also talked about the effects of the Soviet Union on these uprisings and on the policies of Guomindang and the local authorities.

The turning points in the change of approaches to minority politics during the PRC are respectively, the Cultural Revolution, the 1978 reform and opening up, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the increased US influence as an actor in Asia after 2001. In the first period of PRC administration in the region, a moderate approach towards the minorities was taken, but this changed during the Cultural

Revolution and attacks on all kinds of approaches and traditions that were considered bourgeois elements or revisionist took place. Following the reform and opening up, authorities returned to moderate approaches and discourses on minority rights. Besides, the importance of economic development in the region for stability was emphasized. However, after the Soviet Union collapsed, China started to impose restrictions on the rights of minorities in the region because the independence of the Central Asian states led to a reassessment of the identities of Uyghur and other minorities. As of 1996, the strike hard period began, and these restrictions increased. China has also turned new conditions in Central Asia into an advantage by establishing cooperation mechanisms with Central Asian countries. After 2001, the increasing influence of the US as an actor in the region narrowed the effectiveness of China's cooperation mechanisms with the Central Asian countries.

However, after 9/11, China adopted the discourse of “war on terror” in XUAR, associating the unrest in the region with terrorism and religious extremism. Since this point, surveillance and security measures in XUAR have increased. In Chapter 4, we will address the security and surveillance practices that were created in line with this adapted discourse, emphasizing the impact of post-1978 state transformation on the understanding of the management policies.

CHAPTER 4

SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE

4.1 Fragmented Authority and Uneven Development

In this section, we will focus on the fragmented state of authority in China to pay attention to the local processes of governmentality that led to the formation of security-oriented power and to emphasize that the digitalized governing has been a response to the need for coordination among institutions. In the XUAR, where local mechanisms are strong and gaining importance with Great Western Development and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the marginalization of minorities due to uneven development in the region will be discussed in this section. We will explain in the following sections the marginalization of these groups, which are considered risky and how these groups are being subjected to a special regime through the war on terror discourse.

As we mentioned above, with the reform and opening up, priority was given to development in China's coastal provinces, which focused primarily on foreign trade, but the economic gap between these regions and the less developed west occurred. In the late 90s, in order to integrate the western regions into China and to create new trade opportunities with the countries in the west, China's Western Development program, including six provinces in the west and five autonomous regions (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan) was introduced.

According to Min Ye, the increase in US-China rivalry in the South China Sea also had an impact on China's focus on development-oriented policies in the western

regions, as an alternative to confrontation.⁴⁰⁴ China's Great Western Development (GWD) campaign, aims to develop trade and investment and its accompanying infrastructure in the western regions. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) announced by Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in 2013 is considered as an extended version of it.⁴⁰⁵

However, Jones and Zeng state that the Western development campaign is far from a central grand program detailed by the leaders. As authors say, although leaders make statements that turn into a slogan, in practice, local institutions and actors interpret this in their own way. Sometimes they ignore central guidelines.⁴⁰⁶

Jones and Zeng base this situation on the state transformation after China's reform and opening up in 1978. After 1978 in the Chinese state, fragmentation and decentralization of authority took place. Thus different public, private, and hybrid actors emerged as policy entrepreneurs.⁴⁰⁷ As an example of the fragmentation of authority in the state, authors cite that in foreign policymaking in China, China's Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has been bypassed by other institutions of the state. (Minister of Defence and Public Security in security, Ministry of Commerce in foreign trade, aid, investment, Ministry of Finance and People's Bank of China in financial and monetary matters National Development and Reform Commission on overseas investment, State Owned Enterprises in autonomous overseas investments often involve serious diplomatic repercussions)⁴⁰⁸. Also, a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) could establish cooperation mechanisms to improve

⁴⁰⁴ Min Ye, (2019), "Fragmentation and Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road in China", **Journal of Contemporary China**, p. 8.

⁴⁰⁵ Lee Jones, Jinghan Zeng (2019), "Understanding China's 'Belt And Road Initiative: Beyond 'Grand Strategy' To A State Transformation Analysis", **Third World Quarterly**, p. 6.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 5.

⁴⁰⁷ Andrew Mertha (2009). "Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0": Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process", **The China Quarterly**, 200, December, p. 996.

⁴⁰⁸ Jones, Zeng, (2019),p. 2.

China's relations with a foreign country, but the MFA has no sway over these institutions.⁴⁰⁹

Another issue is the strengthening and internationalization of the local actors of the state as a developing tendency with globalization. In China in the 1980s decentralization was considerably strengthened. Such that provinces can make transboundary agreements with foreign countries.⁴¹⁰

As for the cause of decentralization, Jones says that in the post-1978 transformation of the state, the state's primary social base has changed from the peasantry and urban working class to an emergent "cadre-capitalist" class.⁴¹¹ In this case, although SOEs are profit-seeking entities, they are seen as China's state actors. The central government plays a regulatory role, says Jones.⁴¹²

In this regulating state model, new actors can influence the process of policymaking through lobbying activities. They can propose their own agenda for economic support. Jones addresses these processes in 3 categories: they influence, ignore, or interpret the central guidelines.

Jones and Zeng state that local agendas are decisive in Great Western Development, too. Taking Yunnan province as an example, we see, it was the largest winner of the central government fund (averaging US \$ 79.4bn of central government funding by 2015), which was used by local state-linked construction companies in transboundary infrastructure-building projects. These projects were organized by local politico - business initiatives. Lobbying by Yunnan province and a SOE (China National Petroleum Company), oil and gas pipelines linking Yunnan to Myanmar's west coast, were completed in 2013. However, in the case of Yunnan, we see the issue of ignoring the directives given by the central

⁴⁰⁹ Min Ye, (2019), p. 3.

⁴¹⁰ Lee Jones, (2019), "Theorizing Foreign and Security Policy in an Era of State Transformation: A New Framework and Case Study of China", *Journal of Global Security Studies*,4(4), p. 8.

⁴¹¹ Ibid, p. 8.

⁴¹² Ibid, p. 2.

government. Many regulations have been violated by these local actors and the ban on economic relations with Myanmar's rebel groups has been violated. This situation caused a crisis in the relations between Myanmar and China.⁴¹³ Min Ye says Xi Jinping's authority stems from a stronger use of this fragmented mechanism. Although Xi concentrated his power, interpretation and improvisation of the policies (the BRI – for example) can be realized to suit their own functional needs by local actors.⁴¹⁴

If we ask where Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is located in the fragmented characteristic of this western development: as we discussed above, with the independence of Soviet countries and the opening of borders, border trade rose rapidly. Local coordination mechanisms with neighboring countries were established.⁴¹⁵ The increase in cross border trade also led to the emergence of security-related concerns. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), thus, was founded for the security of frontiers, circulations, cooperation mechanisms for energy, and other areas.

Xinjiang began to play an important role in China's look West policy.⁴¹⁶ Under the strategy of developing resources in the West, annual oil production, which was 7 million tons in Xinjiang in 1990, exceeded 20 million tons in 2002.⁴¹⁷ It is also part of China's policy of attaining 85% energy self sufficiency.

2 billion yuan of financial assistance was offered to Xinjiang as part of the province's socio-economic development program. The provincial government and enterprises created 2000 investment projects. In 2011, 108.7 billion yuan worth of investment was made. Under the 12th Five-year plan, SOEs were expected to

⁴¹³ Jones, Zeng, (2019), p.7.

⁴¹⁴ Min Ye, (2019), p. 4.

⁴¹⁵ Mingjiang Li, (2016), p. 520.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid, p. 519.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid, p. 519.

invest 1.5 trillion yuan.⁴¹⁸ Other provinces aside from Xinjiang also made attempts to improve trade with the western states through Xinjiang. For example, with the agreement between Sichuan province and Xinjiang, the railway transportation project from Xinjiang to Central Asia, West Asia, and South Asia was realized.⁴¹⁹ Therefore, Minjiang Li says that with the cooperation of local actors, a double opening up takes place, which connects Xinjiang to both foreign countries and the other provinces of China.⁴²⁰

Double opening aims at the integration of Xinjiang into China. However, it is often ignored that these development policies did not create equal distribution in the region, and these policies sharpened divisions.⁴²¹

According to Alessandra Cappalletti's research, despite the urbanization and development of northern Xinjiang, the South of Xinjiang has remained mostly rural. Despite the increase in urbanization (while the urban population was 870.000 in 1955, it became 8.45 million in 2008), currently, 60.5% of the total population lives in the countryside.⁴²² South Xinjiang is home to 35% of the region's population but urbanization has been mostly seen in the northern regions. Where it has occurred most of the urban population consists of Han Chinese whereas 80-90% of Uyghurs live in rural areas. 1/5 of Uyghurs live in the north.⁴²³

Cappalletti states that urban expansion in the north is driven by institutional and social (such as education and health) reasons as well as geographical reasons. When urbanisation developed in the north of the XUAR, immigration to the region

⁴¹⁸ Ibid, p. 523.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid, p. 526.

⁴²⁰ Ibid p. 517.

⁴²¹ Karrar, (2018), p.22.

⁴²² Alessandra Cappalletti, (2015), "Developing the Land and the People: Social Development Issues in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1999–2009)", *East Asia*, 32(2), p. 142.

⁴²³ Ibid. 145.

was supported. Migration through the XPCC (Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps) has been the major vehicle of migration since 1949.⁴²⁴

Han population is gaining the main benefits of the urbanisation⁴²⁵ The migration of Uyghurs to the urban areas is also increasing. But, they mostly work in underpaid jobs in construction and restaurant sectors.⁴²⁶ Besides, many of the high paid jobs which are in the oil and petro- chemical industries recruit from a small number of exclusive universities. Access to these requires very high GaoKao (university entrance exam) scores. Until 2017, ethnic minorities were given additional points to encourage Chinese education of minorities. However the arrest and possible death sentence given to prominent Uyghur academic Tashpolat Tiyip, recently, do nothing to encourage ethnic minority students from Xinjiang to try to enter the university sytem, thus condemning them to remain in low skilled, low paid jobs.

So very few of the Uyghur middle class can catch new opportunities in cities. But conditions for migrant workers who work in underpaid jobs are worsening because estate prices have risen in cities.

It has been said that the increase in the living standards would spread to the whole region through a “trickle down” effect, but now the southern region remains mostly rural, and 80% of the South consists of Uyghurs.⁴²⁷ In uneven development, the Uyghurs do not believe that there are mechanisms in which to advance; nor do not have strong political representation. The number of trained bourgeois Uyghurs is very few.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁴ Ibid, 144.

⁴²⁵ Ibid, p. 146.

⁴²⁶ Ibid, p. 147.

⁴²⁷ Ibid, p. 166.

⁴²⁸ Ibid, p. 147.

Cappelletti shows that an implementation of the development program was the reason for the riots in Xinjiang in 2009. Referring to Abduresit Jelil Qarluq's research, she says that forced transfers from Xinjiang to the southern regions of China were the catalyst. The plan was aiming to transfer surplus rural labor to cities, thus according to Cappelletti, considering these people as cheap labor, “the floating population” caused the riots.⁴²⁹ She refers then, to the “internal colonialism” concept of Hechter and says that seeing these events as an ethnic issue actually conceals the class struggle.⁴³⁰

The line of government rhetoric argues there should be more modernization and development for the stabilization of the region, but this has brought little benefit to many Uyghurs, and this does not create a situation that allows them to integrate. Tension in the region has been being discussed through the discourse of terrorism. Harmonious society has been shown as the main goal, but this economic situation shows otherwise. After 1996 with strike hard campaign, illegal religious activities, and separatism triggered by foreign forces and after 9/11, terrorism and religious extremism have been pointed out as the reasons for instability in the region and the real causes have been suppressed.

4.2 Governing Through Risk and Social Credit System

Chen Quanguo was appointed as Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in August 2016. Previously, he worked as party secretary in Tibet Autonomous Region from 2011 to 2016. Since he was appointed, an aggressive system of security and surveillance practices have been implemented in XUAR. Re-education camps are the most extreme example of these practices. These policies were first put into practice in Tibet when Chen was Party Secretary there. With the discourse of securitization and better management, these extraordinary measures were legitimized. He was appointed to XUAR for his

⁴²⁹ Ibid, p. 142.

⁴³⁰ Ibid, p. 167.

“achievements” in stabilizing Tibet.⁴³¹ During his term of office, surveillance and security practices focused on risk prevention have increased in the XUAR. In this section, we will address the Social Credit System to discuss the development of governmentality with profiling technologies in these practices, linking this development with China’s transformation after 1978.

The Social Credit System (SCS), includes a commercial credit rating system, and also credits the social behavior of the citizens. Thus it serves to regulate business and citizen behaviors. SCS, which is currently being evaluated in pilot projects, is planned to be implemented throughout China by the end of 2020.⁴³² Within the scope of SCS, financial data of companies, organizations, and individuals are collected. SCS also includes travel information or social media data.⁴³³

Government authorities state that social credit targets honesty in government affairs, commercial integrity, societal integrity and judicial credibility.⁴³⁴

When we look at the development process of SCS, we see that China needed to establish a national credit system in the financial sector after the transition to the socialist market economy. According to Samanta Hoffman, considering international credit institutions as a potential threat, China attaches importance to SCS as an alternative credit system within the scope of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).⁴³⁵ We also see that BRI is an improved version of the Great Western

⁴³¹ Sophie Richardson, (2017), “China Poised to Repeat Tibet Mistakes”, Human Rights Watch, January. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/20/china-poised-repeat-tibet-mistakes> Retrieved: 20.11.2019

⁴³² Fan Liang, Vishnupriya Das, Nadiya Kostyuk, and Muzammil M. Hussain, (2018), “Constructing a Data-Driven Society: China’s Social Credit System as a State Surveillance Infrastructure”, **Policy & Internet**, 10(4), p. 416.

⁴³³ Liang et al, (2018), p. 416.

⁴³⁴ “Trust And Consequences: China’s Evolving Social Credit System”, South China Morning Post Youtube Channel, February 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkILO6D2m_I Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴³⁵ Samantha Hoffman, (2018), “Social Credit”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June. <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/social-credit> Retrieved: 25.08.2019

Development Project, and China needed a national financial credit system from the 90s onwards. First, in 2006, the People's Bank of China established the national database of corporate and retail credit information systems. In addition to financial credit information, the database also includes debt information related to tax debt, unpaid fees, social security and housing guarantee fund fees, telecommunications expenditures, and administrative penalties and court affairs.⁴³⁶ In 2007, within the framework of the Ministerial Joint Meeting, it was decided to take action⁴³⁷ for such purposes as analyzing the debt problems of non-financial enterprises and proposing solutions; reducing enterprise leverage⁴³⁸. In this process, some autonomous regions and municipalities have taken initiatives for the Social Credit System with local laws and regulations.⁴³⁹ Credit investigation firms also participated in this process.⁴⁴⁰

In 2011, steps were taken to expand SCS in line with the plan of crediting social activities, government, and judicial affairs.⁴⁴¹ Finally, in 2014, the State Council issued a plan under the name “Planning Outline For The Construction of a Social Credit System.” This notice, which states that the credit system is an essential part of the socialist market economy system, calls on local authorities, ministries, and commissions to establish a full-scale SCS to be completed by 2020. It emphasizes

⁴³⁶ Yu Sinian, (2016) “我国社会信用体系建设的进程探究”
<http://yuandiancredit.com/h-nd-2591.html> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴³⁷ Liang et al, (2018), p. 427

⁴³⁸ “Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting System to Reduce Enterprise Leverage”, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, October, 2016.
http://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2016/10/26/content_281475475632140.htm
Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴³⁹ Yu Sinian, (2016), “我国社会信用体系建设的进程探究”
<http://yuandiancredit.com/h-nd-2591.html> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴⁴⁰ Liang et al, (2018), p. 424.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid, p. 425.

commercial and social sincerity, and judicial credibility.⁴⁴² Accordingly, some of the areas where SCS is planned to be implemented are set out: production, finance, taxation, pricing, the logistics sector and checking credits with product bar codes. Also the implementation of SCS in government procurement, in the area of tendering and bidding, crediting trustworthy cities in e-commerce, crediting enterprises, SCS in the area of traffic and transportation. Establishing a credit system for intermediary services bodies, and their employees, crediting exhibition organizing bodies and SCS in the area of advertising. Credit construction in the area of social security, establishing verifying mechanisms in areas such as aid, social security and charity. In education, crediting teachers and students, or crediting academic researchers and the implementation of SCS in hiring. Credits for sports clubs, crediting social organisations to guide them to be open, SCS for natural persons, crediting online behavior and so on. The State Council called on institutions to establish reward and punishment mechanisms in the SCS system.⁴⁴³

Following this call of the State Council, local authorities have created pilot projects and several companies, including technology companies, have created joint projects with the government or have created private projects. For example, as Maurtvedt discussed, in the Honest Shanghai Project, the government and the private sector acted together, people can now see their scoring via a smart phone app, based on criteria such as whether they paid their bills on time. In another example of public private collaboration, the private software company Zhangxin Fangsheng attempted to collect more data and conducted checks from social media.⁴⁴⁴ Alibaba's Sesame Credit project carries out evaluation by watching shopping with Alipay. Playing too many computer games, for example, decreasing

⁴⁴² "Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)", China Copyright and Media, June 2014. <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Martin Maurtvedt, (2017), "The Chinese Social Credit System Surveillance and Social Manipulation: A Solution to "Moral Decay?", Master's Thesis, p. 23.

one's credit, being friends with a person who has low social credit also a reason for low credit, and the site provides advantages to high-credit people.⁴⁴⁵

Banks take into account the SCS. Besides, in some applications that seem to be games, crediting behaviors in private life becomes important in hiring. Also, mechanisms such as a ban on air tickets are applied to people with low scores.⁴⁴⁶

People with high scores are marked as trustworthy, or those with very low scores are included in the blacklist. It is undeniable that creating certain norms and the categorization according to these norms by the authorities, control the behavior of the person and the discipline. However, this system also creates an expanding power structure through technology and new dispositifs. Surveillance and profiling are beginning to encompass the whole society and expansion in the various areas is creating a security society because there is now a shift of understanding from the management of the subject to the management of factors. These factors mark the person as reliable or unreliable, and a governmentality that we call “governing through risk” emerges.

Some authors see SCS as the version of the “Dang’an” (personal dossiers) system launched during the Mao era. Dang’an is an archive of the personal information of workers such as education and work history, family history, political activities, gains, and mistakes.⁴⁴⁷ Linking the origin of the SCS system to this may lead us to ignore the logic of SCS's governmentality. As a matter of fact, the function of the Dang’an system itself has been transformed after the transition to the socialist market economy. As State-Owned Enterprises were privatized and restructured in

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 24.

⁴⁴⁶ “Simina Mistreanu, (2019), “Fears About China’s Social-Credit System Are Probably Overblown, But It Will Still Be Chilling”, the Washington Post, March.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/08/fears-about-chinas-social-credit-system-are-probably-overblown-it-will-still-be-chilling/>
Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴⁴⁷ Jie Yang, (2011), “The Politics of the Dang'an: Spectralization, Spatialization, and Neoliberal Governmentality in China”, *Anthropological Quarterly*, 84(2), Spring, p. 508.

the 1980s, as Jie Yang discussed, the layoffs took place, and the workers took part in re-employment projects, but then, for workers who want to find a job in the market, "dang'an" has become a representation of their talents.⁴⁴⁸ Yang state that these individuals started to express themselves as self-enterprising subjects.⁴⁴⁹ Credit rating in SCS also have become important for being able to work in both the public and private sector.

Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize the dimension of "individual responsibility" in the SCS system in the context of bringing the person forward or backward in market conditions. Individuals who have internalized the official understanding of "normality" will make rational choices, they will act for their own benefit. Thus, one's self-management and the dispositifs of power are intertwined here.

At present, a large number of people in China who think that SCS will make them stand out from other people support SCS. G. Kostka, who surveyed public opinion about SCS, found that this system was supported by many people.⁴⁵⁰ She shows that the people who a have high income level supports the system more and the people in the cities support SCS more than the rural people.⁴⁵¹ The researcher state that educated, urban people who have high-income would be expected to have a more liberal understanding, and they would have been opposed to SCS with the suspicion of authoritarian control, but as research reveals, these people acknowledge that they would benefit from this system.⁴⁵² Also, in the surveys of

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 530.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 509.

⁴⁵⁰ Genia Kostka, (2019), "China's Social Credit Systems And Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels Of Approval", *New Media & Society*, 21(7), p. 1573.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid, p. 1577.

⁴⁵² Ibid, p. 1579.

Martin Maartvedt, we see that while the supporters were the majority, the student, who has ethnic minority background, has not positive view about this system.⁴⁵³

Here, we come to the point that Robert Castel points out as “dual society.” Castel addressing governmentality of risk, based on Foucault's concept of power, mentions that disciplinary power eliminates the undesirable one or integrates him/her with corrective practices.⁴⁵⁴ However, here, there is the issue of controlling and profiling the flow of population, based on factors in order to prevent danger before it occurs. (This is what Chinese authorities call the principle of sincerity.) When talking about “dual society” what Castel means, making people live their destiny according to their capacities in this competitive environment and marginalization of some people. (Unofficial economy, for example.)⁴⁵⁵ In this competitive environment of the SCS system, there is a situation of marginalization of people who are profiled as untrustworthy, the people who do not comply with the norms. In other words, people who are unprofitable pay the cost of this system. Ban on air tickets in SCS, potentially means that SCS can be used to control the circulation of people. In XUAR where nearly all Muslims will have low scores due to participation in cultural and religious practices the government disapproves of, it could amount to locking them inside Xinjiang.

In XUAR, in the security practices that have a similar mentality of SCS, people are already categorized as trustworthy, average, or untrustworthy within the framework of the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP). The Xinjiang Bureau of Public Security established the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) as a preventive security practice in 2016. Through this system, people are

⁴⁵³ Maartvedt, (2017), p. 35.

⁴⁵⁴ Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller (editors), (1991), **The Foucault Effect, Studies In Governmentality**, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 294.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 294.

supervised by various means including checkpoints, telephone apps,⁴⁵⁶ and facial recognition cameras.⁴⁵⁷ According to a report by Human Rights Watch, 20 categories have been created to determine whether people are trustworthy.⁴⁵⁸ Some of the behaviors that would put the person in the categorization of suspicious include having traveled to one of 26 countries such as Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Turkey.⁴⁵⁹ countries that have a majority of Muslim citizens, and this list shows the suspicion that traveling to these countries may lead XUAR citizens to extremism. In addition, people's phones and social media accounts are examined, and - depending on the content they share- whether "the person is reliable or not" is judged.⁴⁶⁰ Thus, suspects are reported and subjected to "education of anti-extremism" in the "re-education centers," as we will explain below.

Consequently, these practices provide power with ban-opticon type surveillance, which we mentioned in the theoretical framework rather than panoptic model surveillance, because people who have not yet engaged in a terrorist or extremist activity are included in the risky category, on the basis of factors. This is a power that operates through the inclusion of individuals categorized as untrustworthy under the special regime and the provision of incentives in the form of self interest to be in the good category assigning personal responsibility to citizens for their behavior.

As mentioned in the previous section, the fact that the majority of Uyghurs in the XUAR live in rural areas, as well as their different cultures, religion, and their

⁴⁵⁶ Kieren McCarthy, (2017), "China Crams Spyware On Phones In Muslim-Majority Province", The Register, July. https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/24/china_installing_mobile_spyware/ Retrieved: 06.06.2019

⁴⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch, (2018), "Eradicating Ideological Viruses, China's Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims", September. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs#> Retrieved: 01.07.2019

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 75.

connections with Central Asian countries are the reasons that leave them behind in this competitive system. With the profiling system, which can be seen as a security dispositif, everyone is under surveillance. The tension in the region, which is caused by social problems, is no longer considered as an ideological problem but addressed through the discourse of “war on terror and extremism” by the authorities. Thus, for security reasons, there is a power that seeps more and more into the elements of people's lives. The understanding of the responsibility of the people for security leads to the marginalization of these people. Islamophobia which has emerged worldwide also makes this exclusion legitimate.⁴⁶¹ There is a ban on veils and burqas in China as well as in Europe. It is also forbidden to have abnormal beards and Islamic names for children in China.⁴⁶² We can say, China, to resist any foreign interference in its domestic politics and security has calculated that they can get away with repression in XUAR because the West and the Russians share Islamophobia and are not likely to do anything significant to help the Uyghurs in terms of thwarting China's other ambitions. However, if anti-Chinese elements in the US Congress succeed in linking events in Hong Kong to the persecution of the Uyghurs, then that calculation might change.

In the next section, we will address the “Grid management” system implemented in XUAR as a surveillance practice that supports these profiling practices. This system provides data for profiling and makes people more subject to surveillance.

⁴⁶¹David Brophy, (2018), “China's Uyghur Repression”, Jacobin, May.
<https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/05/xinjiang-uyghur-china-repression-surveillance-islamophobia>
Retrieved: 01.03.2019

⁴⁶² Sophie Richardson, (2017), “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang” Human Rights Watch, April.
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/24/china-bans-many-muslim-baby-names-xinjiang>
Retrieved: 01.03.2019

4.3 Grid Management

When we talk about the concept of “grid management”, one of the first things that comes to mind is the concept of the “power grid”⁴⁶³ which means briefly “power distribution networks that provide electricity” and “smart grid” refers to a new generation network that provides electricity distribution, which is more reliable and durable, saves energy and is equipped with information and communication networks. Grid is a concept widely used in internet technologies. Gridding technology is also used in industries such as agriculture, transportation, meteorology, etc. As for the concept of “Grid management” in China, that we will address, it means the division of urban areas into a number of grids in electronic maps and public service delivery and management of government assets through modern information technology and community grid management organizations by assigning controllers to each grid. In other words, it is the integration of internet technology and social management services.

Grid management in China first started in 2004 as an urban management innovation project in Dongcheng District, Beijing, in order to quickly solve problems such as environmental improvement and infrastructure maintenance. Dongcheng District was divided into 1652 squares.⁴⁶⁴ The city assets on each grid were divided into sections of different categories and levels were numbered.⁴⁶⁵ Through 3S technology (RS, GIS, GPS) key information about these assets was

⁴⁶³ Shu-Wang Zhang, Can Guo and Jeff Wang, (2017), “The Improvement of Grid Management in Rural Community from the View of Social Governance-Based on the Investigation of Menglian”, **International Conference on Advanced Education and Management Science**, p. 158.

⁴⁶⁴ Ping Du, Shiyang Yu, Daoling Yang (editors), (2019), **The Development of E-governance in China, Improving Cybersecurity and Promoting Informatization as Means for Modernizing State Governance**, Springer, Singapore, p. 208.

⁴⁶⁵ Gil-Garcia, J. Ramon, (2013), **E-Government Success around the World: Cases, Empirical Studies, and Practical Recommendations: Cases, Empirical Studies, and Practical Recommendations**, IGI Global, p. 154.

recorded electronically.⁴⁶⁶ Supervisors were assigned to each square. In this way, it was aimed to convey the events and problems to the public officials instantly via mobile devices provided to supervisors.⁴⁶⁷ Also, records of the events which had occurred before in each grid were archived electronically.⁴⁶⁸ The system operates through the stages of information gathering and case detection by supervisors, sending tasks through mobile devices, task processing of the relevant public unit, and feedback of the transaction.⁴⁶⁹ In this way, the grid system provides information about various components and events in each grid, such as lost manhole covers, damage to public facilities, garbage dumping, unlicensed travellers etc.⁴⁷⁰

In 2005, grid management began to be implemented throughout Beijing. In the same year, the Ministry of Construction implemented it in 51 cities and districts.⁴⁷¹ Some of these cities are Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, and Wuhan.⁴⁷² Expanding to different cities with more pilot projects, the system also started to be implemented in different areas of services, including fire safety, floating population management, cultural market regulation, economic operations, and monitoring...⁴⁷³

⁴⁶⁶ Wu Qiang, (2014), "Urban Grid Management and Police State in China: A Brief Overview", China Change, August. <https://chinachange.org/2013/08/08/the-urban-grid-management-and-police-state-in-china-a-brief-overview/> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴⁶⁷ Wu Qiang, (2015), "Gridding, Mass Line and Social Management Innovation, A Comparative Study of Gridding Management in China from an Anthropological-Political Perspective", **The China Nonprofit Preview**, 7(1), p. 121.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 121.

⁴⁶⁹ Wang Wei, Zhang Wei, "互联网+"驱动下的城市网格化管理展望"
<http://www.gongyisixiang.org/chuangxin/news-id/7783/> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴⁷⁰ Yan Yaojun, (2006), 城市网格化管理的特点及启示, 《城市问题》年第 2 期, p. 76.

⁴⁷¹ Wu Qiang, (2015), p. 111.

⁴⁷² Ping Du, Shiyang Yu, Daoling Yang (editors), (2019), p. 146.

⁴⁷³ Ibid, p. 213

Ping Du et al. state that in the system of grid management, there was a shift of management understanding, and “community resident services” gradually took the role of “government employees” in public services.⁴⁷⁴ However, some authors state that management techniques similar to Grid management have actually been implemented in China before, and grid management is a digital version of them. They base this practice on China's residential committees system and even baojia, which began in the 11th century. However, it should be noted that grid management differs in quality from these systems:

The Baojia system, which started to be implemented in China in the 11th century, is the supervision of 10 families (jia) by a leader, and ten of these jia units are supervised by one person(bao). In this way, it is aimed to provide convenience in tax collection and supervision of individuals. In the 1930s, the Guomindang also implemented the system.⁴⁷⁵ In the period of the People's Republic of China, residents' committees were created as a grassroot organization by 1952.⁴⁷⁶ This management form, called neighborhood committees also, has the role of monitoring people under the household registration system (Hukou).⁴⁷⁷ In the work unit (danwei), where education and health services, accommodation and work were carried out in one unit, residents' committees acted as an intermediary for the provision of control, besides committees had a role in political education.⁴⁷⁸

After the economic reform in 1978, as Choate pointed out, residents' committees did not function well,⁴⁷⁹ because the household system became ineffective with

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 147.

⁴⁷⁵ Qian Gang, (2018), “China Under The Grid”, China Media Project, December.
<https://chinamediaproject.org/2018/12/07/china-under-the-grid/> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴⁷⁶ Allen C. Choate, (1998), “Local Governance In China -Part II, An Assessment Of Urban Residents Committees And Municipal Community Development”, **The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series**, Working Paper No. 10., p .8.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 8

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 9

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 10

the increasing mobility. Talented people, the ones who were no longer willing to work in work units (danwei), the ones who want to work in their chosen places, or illegal migrants increased.⁴⁸⁰ Fast urbanization and redundancies paved the way to it.⁴⁸¹

In 1985-86, an attempt to strengthen the Residents' Committees started.⁴⁸² After destabilization emerged with the economic reform, steps were taken to rebuild the legitimacy and order in the relations between the citizen and the local authority. For example, the village committees became elected by residents.⁴⁸³ Residents' committees were also supported for monitoring and controlling increasing internal migration.⁴⁸⁴ After economic reform, the role of the committees as a service provider was supported.⁴⁸⁵ Yanwei Chai mentions that the production-oriented approach in the danwei system has disappeared and a daily-life based mentality which emphasizes public service delivery has emerged.⁴⁸⁶ Xiaoyuan Wan says that the order-oriented discourse of the Maoist era continued, but Western-based concepts and institutions such as public participation, participation of NGOs, private sector, and individuals were also included.⁴⁸⁷ In this respect, the involvement of more social actors reveals the aspect of changing governmentality.⁴⁸⁸

⁴⁸⁰Lisa M. Hoffman, (2014), "The Urban, Politics And Subject Formation", **International Journal of Urban and Regional Research**, 38(5), p. 1581.

⁴⁸¹ Choate, (1998), p. 6.

⁴⁸² Ibid, p. 10.

⁴⁸³ Ibid, p. 11.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 11.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 11.

⁴⁸⁶ Yanwei Chai, (2014), "From Socialist Danwei to New Danwei: A Daily-Life-Based Framework For Sustainable Development in Urban China", **Asian Geographer**, 31(2), p. 183.

⁴⁸⁷ Xiaoyuan Wan, (2015), "Changing Governmentalities Of Neighborhood Governance in China: A Genealogical Exploration", **Critical Policy Studies**, 9(4), p. 469.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 468.

As Wu Qiang discusses, grid management involves more complex processes than the “mass line “ of the Mao era, which earlier practices are based on.⁴⁸⁹ There are even differences between the different grassroot-based projects implemented in China today. For example, the gridding model is different from the pacifying model in which the retired leaders mediate.⁴⁹⁰ Qiang emphasizes that: while previous practices as a bureaucratic model utilize the masses, grid management is a dispositif that is heterogenous, and serves to certain needs.⁴⁹¹ It provides surveillance and control.⁴⁹² In this direction, - revealing different points – we will explain that the grid management functions as a security dispositif in the XUAR.

So, although there are similarities between grid management and previous systems, grid management differs from previous models with the inclusion of new actors and functional differences. The digitalization of services also provides easier control and surveillance. In this system, also surveillance is strengthened with technologies like face identification⁴⁹³ that encompasses whole components in the cities.⁴⁹⁴

Godsmith and Eggers discuss the increasing digitalization of public sector services around the world and explain this through examples, such as the USA developing networked applications to fight against terrorism.⁴⁹⁵ The authors state that this

⁴⁸⁹ Wu Qiang, (2015), p. 134.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 126.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid, p. 131.

⁴⁹² Ibid, p. 134.

⁴⁹³ Zhou Wang, (2018), “Is China’s Grassroots Social Order Project Running Out of Money?”, Sixth Tone, June.
<https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1002393/is-chinas-grassroots-social-order-project-running-out-of-money%3F> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴⁹⁴ Ping Du, Shiyang Yu, Daoling Yang (editors), (2019), p. 211.

⁴⁹⁵ Stephen Goldsmith William D. Eggers, (2004), **Governing By Network, The New Shape of the Public Sector**, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., p. 18.

digitalization is due to the effects of 4 factors.⁴⁹⁶ These factors are: involvement of more private firms and non-profit organizations in the public service with partnerships and contracts, more joint operations in services by different government agencies and the necessity of coordination among these institutions, the role of technology in facilitating communications and operations, as a reflection of the diversity in the private sector and, finally, demands by citizens for more options from the state.⁴⁹⁷ We see the role of these four factors also in China's integration of technology and social management services with the grid management.

As discussed in Chapter 4 section 1, one result of increasing decentralization and fragmentation of authority, has been that many actors, different institutions of the state, and SOEs now play a role in the policy-making processes. Grid management functions as a mediating role between these institutions. Digitalization of management and tools such as rapid solutions with mobile phones serve this purpose. Within the framework of these coordination mechanisms, grid management aims to manage the consequences of dissolving production-oriented communities and the increasing mobility of the population. In line with the changing governmentality of the state, its function is also changing, and a profitable management is preferred. Indeed, the community volunteers who work instead of the government employees are receiving low wages.⁴⁹⁸ Besides, the grid management system which started in rural areas in 2008,⁴⁹⁹ according to

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 9.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 9.

⁴⁹⁸ Zhou Wang, (2018), "Is China's Grassroots Social Order Project Running Out of Money?", Sixth Tone, June.
<https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1002393/is-chinas-grassroots-social-order-project-running-out-of-money%3F> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁴⁹⁹ Shu-Wang Zhang, Can Guo And Jeff Wang, (2017), p. 158.

Yongshun Cai, acts as a result of the reluctance or inadequacy of local governments to resolve civil disputes as a result of agricultural tax reform.⁵⁰⁰

For example, in 2008, in the Dai-Lahu-Va Autonomous County of Menglian in Yunnan province, where the majority of the Dai ethnic group live, rubber farmers started protests because a rubber company had exploited their rights which turned into clashes with the police.⁵⁰¹ As a result of these events, when the local government became ineffective in the region, it was decided to implement grid management in the county. As Zhang and others have addressed, after these events, the county was divided into grids, teams (1960 teams and 1810 service teams) that are responsible for each grid, were formed.⁵⁰² Coming just after the Arab Spring in 2011, Hu Jintao's call for the need for “scientific social management” revealed the security dimension of grid management⁵⁰³

The information gathered by grid management, which also serves as a notification system, provides data to justify intervention and attempted transformation of the population. This system as an expanding dispositif in public service areas, is also expanding its effect with its security discourse. As a matter of fact, Grid Management had been applied to persecute Falun Gong followers.⁵⁰⁴

Again, in Tibet, in one of the politically sensitive regions, we see the security function of this system. Chen Quanguo, before his appointment as party secretary at XUAR in 2016, worked as party secretary in Tibet Autonomous Region from 2011 to 2016. During this period, a grid management system was implemented in

⁵⁰⁰ Yongshun Cai, Cai, Yongshun, (2018), “Grid Management and Social Control in China”, Asia Dialogue, April. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/04/27/grid-management-and-social-control-in-china> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁵⁰¹ “Rubber Plant Growers' Unrest Under Investigation”, China Daily, July 2008. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/21/content_6861860.htm Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁵⁰² Shu-wang Zhang, Can Guo and Jeff Wang, (2017), p. 159.

⁵⁰³ Wu Qiang, (2015), p. 112.

⁵⁰⁴ Ouyang Fei, (2019), “From Skynet to Grid Management: How Modern Technologies Are Abused in the Persecution of Falun Gong”, Falun Dafa - Minghui, October. <http://en.minghui.org/html/articles/2019/10/4/180178.html> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

Tibet and police check points with intervals of 300-500 meters were created.⁵⁰⁵ The security practices were strengthened with CCTV and face recognition cameras.⁵⁰⁶ Blocking some media resources and applications was another surveillance method.⁵⁰⁷ Preventive practices in Tibet reached such a level that in 2012 around 8000 people who attended the religious ceremony the Kalachakra in India were detained for “re-education ”when they returned.⁵⁰⁸

In 2007, the process of building the Grid management system was started in the XUAR, but in 2008 protests erupted with the death of Uyghur businessman Mutallip Hajim in custody, and unrest erupted in the region. Since 2010, the surveillance applications supported by technological surveillance practices such as the eagle eye cameras have been tightened.⁵⁰⁹ When knife and bomb attacks took place in Kunming railway station and Urumqi in 2014, terrorist organizations and extremism were blamed for these attacks although exactly which groups were responsible remains unclear.⁵¹⁰

Thus preventive practices were initiated and the tracking of warning signs of extremism was initiated, as described in the previous section. After Chen Quanguo became party secretary in the XUAR in 2016, he increased security measures still further. Drawing on his experience in Tibet, convenience police stations were

⁵⁰⁵ “The Origin of the ‘Xinjiang Model’ in Tibet under Chen Quanguo: Securitizing Ethnicity and Accelerating Assimilation”, International Campaign for Tibet, December 2018. <https://savetibet.org/the-origin-of-the-xinjiang-model-in-tibet-under-chen-quanguo-securitizing-ethnicity-and-accelerating-assimilation/> Retrieved: 06.03.2019

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ “Lockdown in Lhasa At Tibetan New Year; Unprecedented Detentions Of Hundreds Of Tibetans After Dalai Lama Teaching in Exile”, International Campaign for Tibet, February, 2012. <https://savetibet.org/lockdown-in-lhasa-at-tibetan-new-year-unprecedented-detentions-of-hundreds-of-tibetans-after-dalai-lama-teaching-in-exile> Retrieved: 06.03.2019

⁵⁰⁹ Wu Qiang, (2015), p. 111.

⁵¹⁰ Jérôme Doyon, (2019), “Counter-Extremism In Xinjiang: Understanding China’s Community-Focused Counter-Terrorism Tactics”, War on the Rocks, January. <https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/counter-extremism-in-xinjiang-understanding-chinas-community-focused-counter-terrorism-tactics/> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

established.⁵¹¹ Zenz and Leibold's research also shows how much police-related jobs have increased after 2016.⁵¹² Within the grid system, supervisors even monitor and report who has entered and exited the neighborhood.⁵¹³ Controlling citizens phones at checkpoints and installing spy applications on the phones by government officials were the other security practices.⁵¹⁴ Communication applications except Sino Weibo (a social media platform similar to Twitter but heavily censored using search engine optimisation and keyword monitoring techniques) and WeChat were banned.⁵¹⁵ and installing the other applications was forbidden. Communications and discussions are being tracked via Sina Weibo. Also, car drivers have been forced to install a navigation program, which is thought to be for tracking people.⁵¹⁶ Those who are considered to have suspicious behaviors and those placed in the risky category are detained in re-education centers, as we will address in the next section.

⁵¹¹ Adrian Zenz, James Leibold, (2017), Zenz, Adrian, Leibold, James, (2017), "Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang", **China Brief**, No. 17, Issue 12, p. 17. <https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁵¹² Ibid, p. 20.

⁵¹³ Zhou Wang, (2018), "Is China's Grassroots Social Order Project Running Out of Money?", Sixth Tone, June. <https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1002393/is-chinas-grassroots-social-order-project-running-out-of-money%3F> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁵¹⁴ Kiereen McCarthy, (2017), "China Crams Spyware On Phones In Muslim-Majority Province", The Register, July. https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/07/24/china_installing_mobile_spyware/ Retrieved: 06.06.2019

⁵¹⁵ James A. Millward, (2018), "What It's Like to Live in a Surveillance State", The New York Times, February. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/opinion/sunday/china-surveillance-state-ughurs.html> Retrieved: 01.07.2019

⁵¹⁶ Edward Wong, (2017), "Western China Region Aims to Track People by Requiring Car Navigation Retrieved", the New York Times, February. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/world/asia/china-xinjiang-gps-vehicles.html?module=inline> Retrieved: 03.04.2019

4.4 Re-education Centers

The re-education centers in XUAR are one of the most radical example of security and surveillance practices yet seen in China. By officials, it was stated that these centers were established with the aim of deradicalisation and they were professional education schools designed to improve language and vocational skills and help members of the ethnic minorities into employment.

China at first called the camps vocational education training centers.⁵¹⁷ But after the legalisation of these centers within Xinjiang law, it is has been shown that they not only aim to achieve anti-extremist ideological education, and psychological and behavioral correction but involve indefinite mass internment of up to a million people without charge or trial and subjecting them to processes of indoctrination.⁵¹⁸ Sophie Richardson, China director for Human Rights Watch argues that there is no legal basis for these mass detentions without due process of law.⁵¹⁹

In August 2018, in the session of The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in China national report, Gay McDougall asked about the detention and disappearance of Uyghur students returning from abroad.⁵²⁰ Laura Stone, US Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs stated in April 2018, that mass detention centres in China were disturbing picture.⁵²¹ In July 2019, 22 countries including “Australia, Austria,

⁵¹⁷ “China Denies Having 'Concentration Camps,' Tells US to 'Stop Interfering'” Retrieved: 01.06.2019 <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/06/asia/china-us-xinjiang-concentration-camps-intl/index.html>

⁵¹⁸China Legalizes Xinjiang 'Re-education Camps' After Denying They Exist, Retrieved: 01.06.2019 <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/10/asia/xinjiang-china-reeducation-camps-intl/index.html>

⁵¹⁹ Nick Cumming-Bruce, (2018), “U.N. Panel Confronts China Over Reports That It Holds a Million Uighurs in Camps”, the New York Times, August. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-un-uighurs.html> Retrieved: 01.06.2019

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Philip Wen, (2018), “Tens of Thousands Detained in China's Xinjiang, U.S. Diplomat Says”, Reuters, April. <https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN1HP16E> Retrieved: 01.09.2019

Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK” wrote a letter to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights calling China to end the detentions.⁵²²

Human Rights Watch published a report⁵²³ based on interviews with 58 former residents of Xinjiang, including 5 former detainees and 38 relatives of detainees. The report showed foreign ties was one of the reasons people were detained. According to the report people with connections to an official list of “26 sensitive countries,”(including Kazakhstan, Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia) pose a risk. As mentioned above, cultural and religious symbols like abnormal beards or religious names make the person “suspicious” and allegedly prone to separatism. Alternatively, the data obtained as a result of tracking people can be the reason for the detention in the camps. As Zenz stated, between 2017 and 2018, 10% of the Xinjiang population was detained at re-education centers.⁵²⁴

When international reactions to these centers increased, China opened some of the re-education camps to the international media. John Sudworth from BBC News visited one of them. According to Sudworth's report, satellite imagery shows that before the arrival of journalists, structures such as the watchtower, which make this place look like a prison, are being removed and sports complexes are being built. Journalists can only visit some camps determined by Chinese officials. As Sudworth’s report shows, Chinese officials wanted to picture a colorful image while showing people dancing, and painting inside the center. However there were

⁵²² Human Rights Watch
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190708_joint_statement_xinjiang.pdf
Retrieved:01.06.2019

⁵²³ Human Rights Watch, (2018), “Eradicating Ideological Viruses, China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims”, September. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs#> Retrieved: 01.07.2019

⁵²⁴ Adrian Zenz, (2018), “Thoroughly Reforming Them Towards a Healthy Heart Attitude: China’s Political Re-education Campaign in Xinjiang”, **Central Asian Survey**, 38(1), p. 1.

always government officials in the background watching every conversation.⁵²⁵ In these centers, within the scope of training, activities such as studying laws on restrictions, writing personal statements and reflections, and patriotic singing are carried out.⁵²⁶

The origin of the re-education practice lies in the modernization of China's institutions and the prison system in the early 20th century. Before the legal reforms and modernization, in China, foreign merchants were exempted from Chinese law. After the Opium War with Britain, extraterritorial privileges were expanded.⁵²⁷ Unequal agreements with Western countries during the time of the Qing Empire, and extraterritorial interference were seen as national humiliation⁵²⁸ and when the Republic of China was established, China adopted modernization in institutions and legal systems for international recognition and to adapt to the global system.⁵²⁹

According to Mülhahn, while China's institutions were modernized, western institutions were not replicated but were modified.⁵³⁰ While modern prison institutions were being built, the place and time arrangements we saw in the west started to be implemented in the same way, and in addition to this, in connection with the Confucian theory, the importance of moral improvement and education in prisons was emphasized. In this way, it was stated that the crime was a disease, and prisons would provide education and transformation and would play a hospital

⁵²⁵ “Inside China's 'Thought Transformation' Camps”, BBC News, June, 2019.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-48667221/inside-china-s-thought-transformation-camps> Retrieved: 01.07.2019

⁵²⁶ Zenz, (2018), p. 12.

⁵²⁷ Klaus Mühlhahn (2009), *Criminal Justice in China: A History*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, p. 68.

⁵²⁸ Ibid, p. 70.

⁵²⁹ Ibid, p. 67.

⁵³⁰ Ibid, p. 74.

role.⁵³¹ According to Mülhahn, Confucius' theory does not fit at this point because of Confucius' distrust of law,⁵³² but his idea of reintegrating people into society through education was instrumentalized in the process of modernization. The intellectuals of Republican China also emphasized intellectual education instead of ethical or religious instruction within the framework of rehabilitation programs in prisons.⁵³³ Thus, among the other types of training, texts on important political leaders and national events were studied in prisons to encourage commitment to the state.⁵³⁴

We also see the re-education practice in the 1930s, where the political opponents of the Guomintang were detained in mass internment camps.⁵³⁵ In these prison camps, inmates were called “people in self-cultivation” or “convalescents.”⁵³⁶ Practices such as Confucian moral thinking and examinations through individual discussions, self-cultivation reports were implemented to persuade them to correct their thinking.⁵³⁷ Those who refused were executed. At the time of the Guomintang administration, Soviet corrective labor practices in the prisons were also cited as a model by intellectuals.⁵³⁸ In the 1950s, in the framework of reform through labor in prisons, there were prisons which were almost like factory camps.⁵³⁹

⁵³¹ Ibid, p. 80.

⁵³² Ibid, p. 75.

⁵³³ Ibid, p. 79.

⁵³⁴ Ibid, p. 93.

⁵³⁵ Klaus Mülhahn (2010), “The Concentration Camp in Global Historical Perspective”, **History Compass**, 8(6), p. 551

⁵³⁶ Ibid, p. 553.

⁵³⁷ Ibid, p. 553.

⁵³⁸ Mülhahn (2009), p. 79.

⁵³⁹ Zenz, (2018), p. 3

Now in XUAR, minorities are arrested, without being criminal or prisoners of war, only because they represent a risk, with the discourse that this practice aims at de-radicalization. In this case, they are exempt from the protection of fundamental rights.

As we mentioned in the theoretical framework, in the relationship between security, disciplinary power, and sovereign power, the existence of one does not completely eliminate the other. The Nazi regime established an extraordinary system where the power combinations were used together. In this context, the detentions in re-education centers can be seen as the combination of the disciplinary power practices which emerged in the modernization of China's prisons and the using of precautionary risk as a *dispositif*.

As Çelebi puts it, nowadays, worldwide, in the places where migration strains the frontiers of states or where incidents (e.g. civil war) have led to a revision of nation-state borders, there are arrests where the rights of citizens are lost, the state of exception gains continuity and camps emerge.⁵⁴⁰ As a matter of fact, China bases its legitimacy on this global trend. As Brophy points out, the PRC authorities emphasize that counter-extremism practices are in line with international norms. Chinese Central Television broadcasts propagandas that de-radicalization centers have been implemented in France and Britain.⁵⁴¹

Globalization is pushing the boundaries of the nation state with increasing information flow and increasing circulation of people. We have mentioned that the modern understanding of power sees the population as a production force. Security practices bring a sense of risk that externalizes “bad elements” that are thought to disrupt the existing production system. In uneven development in Xinjiang, Uyghurs have little space to represent themselves in local institutions and in the

⁵⁴⁰ Aykut Çelebi (1999), “Modernin Yasası Olarak Kamp: Şiddet ve Politika Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme”, *Kültür Ve İletişim*, 2(1), Kış/Winter, p. 73

⁵⁴¹ David Brophy, (2019), “Good And Bad Muslims In Xinjiang”, *Made in China Journal*, 4(2), Apr–Jun, p. 45.

hybrid enterprise and bureaucracy system, sometimes referred to as “state capitalism”. They are externalized both because of their opposition to GWD practices such as Han migration, and also because they are perceived as a threat to the GWD.

The security mechanisms in Xinjiang are also supported by international companies abroad, and these mechanisms are exported to other countries. According to the Financial Times⁵⁴² in December 2018, people in the camps were sent to work in textile factories, and they were not allowed to leave. In these centers, they work at very low wages. The New York Times has also investigated China’s detention camps and revealed that Badger Sportswear, a company based in North Carolina, received a container of polyester knitted T-shirts from a company that uses forced labor in Xinjiang.⁵⁴³ The Associated Press, reported that U.S colleges and sports teams bought these products.⁵⁴⁴ Furthermore, regarding the connection of the camps with international actors, a private security firm, Frontier Services Group (FSG), run by Blackwater's founder Erik Prince, announced that they will open a training center in Xinjiang. The FSG has previously trained private anti-terrorism personnel in China.⁵⁴⁵

⁵⁴² Emily Feng, (2018), “Forced Labour Being Used in China’s ‘Re-Education’ Camps”, Financial Times, December. https://www.ft.com/content/eb2239aa-fc4f-11e8-aebf-99e208d3e521?fbclid=IwAR37Cbwx1a6ukCgBvlpp2OJ60dzJkXdkmpVtY0XV7oMiWZJGyscHN9Ei_Ug Retrieved: 20.08.2019

⁵⁴³ Chirs Buckley; Austin Ramzy, (2018), “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor”, The New York Times, December. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-camps-uihurs.html> Retrieved: 20.08.2019

⁵⁴⁴ Dake Kang; Martha Mendoza; Yanan Wang, (2018), “US Sportswear Traced To Factory in China’s Internment Camps” Associated Press News, December. https://apnews.com/99016849cddb4b99a048b863b52c28cb?utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter&utm_campaign=SocialFlow Retrieved: 20.08.2019

⁵⁴⁵ Roche, Gerald, (2019), “Transnational Carceral Capitalism in Xinjiang and Beyond”, Made in China Journal, February. <https://madeinchinajournal.com/2019/02/12/transnational-carceral-capitalism-xinjiang/> Retrieved: 20.08.2019

Chinese companies have also been marketing security and surveillance technologies used in Xinjiang to other countries. An example of this is the agreement between Venezuela and the Chinese company ZTE for data-gathering smart cards and databases.⁵⁴⁶ Darren Byler, expresses the situation in XUAR as terror capitalism, referring to the security-industrial complex that is now driving much of the economy in the region.⁵⁴⁷ Such connections make it less likely that recipient countries will vote to condemn China's behaviour at the UN or support any sanctions that may be imposed.

4.5 Home Visits

Another recently expanded surveillance practice in XUAR is home visits by government officials, party members, and SOE cadres.⁵⁴⁸ First, in 2014, under the program "Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Bring Together the Hearts of the People", 200,000 party members visited homes in XUAR⁵⁴⁹, expressing the aim of listening to the voice of the people and solving the difficulties of the lives of the people.⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch, (2018), "China: Children Caught in Xinjiang Crackdown", October. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/16/china-children-caught-xinjiang-crackdown> Retrieved: 20.08.2019

⁵⁴⁷ "Terror Capitalism in Xinjiang", China Digital Times, November 2018. <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/11/darren-byler-terror-capitalism-and-digital> Retrieved: 05.01.2018

⁵⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch, (2018), "Eradicating Ideological Viruses, China's Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims", September. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs#> Retrieved: 01.07.2019

⁵⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, (2018), "China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region", October. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁵⁵⁰ People's Daily Online <http://xj.people.com.cn/GB/188750/361873/> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

In 2016, under the program of “Becoming Family”, 110.000 officials visited the rural areas of XUAR.⁵⁵¹ In 2017, this campaign was expanded, and more than 1 million officials spent a week at a time in the homes of the Uyghur and Kazakh families.⁵⁵² In 2018, this converted to regularly visits every two months.⁵⁵³

According to the manuals provided by the government, the officials visiting houses are responsible for monitoring what people are watching on television, religious practices at home, and identifying suspicious situations.⁵⁵⁴ Also, during these visits, the purpose of teaching Chinese culture and indoctrination of Uyghurs in the villages is driven home.⁵⁵⁵ According to interviews conducted by anthropologist Daren Byler, officials who are mostly from urban areas see their visits in XUAR as a civilizing mission.⁵⁵⁶

Byler also notes that these visits were different from sending the workers and students through the “sent down” program, in the Maoist period, because at that time, workers and students were sent to learn from the public.⁵⁵⁷ Now, in order to teach and detect suspicious situations, surveillance is carried out. Especially if one

⁵⁵¹ Human Rights Watch, (2018), “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region”, October. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁵⁵² Ibid.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁴ Darren Byler, (2018a), “Violent Paternalism: On the Banality of Uyghur Unfreedom”, **The Asia-Pacific Journal**, 16(24), 4, p. 5.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 11.

⁵⁵⁶ Darren Byler, (2018b), “China’s Government Has Ordered a Million Citizens to Occupy Uighur Homes, Here’s What They Think They’re Doing”, ChinaFile, October. http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/postcard/million-citizens-occupy-uighur-homes-xinjiang?fbclid=IwAR0vs2pcfgJeez53VI8QsnjWtL2NxPyCqw2sTZTbM6unEwPK-B7y_cIFl6M Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁵⁵⁷ Byler, (2018a), p. 4.

of the family members is detained in a re-education center, these families are visited.⁵⁵⁸

Apparently, in these practices, it is not possible for individuals to claim the right to privacy or travel. As we mentioned in the theoretical framework, in the disciplinary power that emerges with modernity, there is recognition of such fundamental rights. However, in XUAR, in governing through security dispositifs, the people considered as risky are subject to special treatment. Thus, those in the excluded category are experiencing a state of exception and state of emergency and it is not clear when it will end.

4.6 Conclusion

After the reform and opening up in 1978, as a consequence of the state transformation, authority gained a fragmented character in China, because, decentralization has increased and local institutions and actors have interpreted central guidelines according to their own agendas in the implementation of projects such as Great Western Development and Belt and Road Initiative. An emergent cadre-capitalist class has also emerged as a decisive actor in the policy processes. Therefore, while the economic development of XUAR was originally aimed at achieving stability and integration, the positive impacts of development policies on the Uyghurs and other minorities in the XUAR have been relatively low. Uyghurs and other minorities have always had little representation in this process. While urbanization in XUAR increased, Han Chinese immigration to cities increased, also. However, most of the Uyghurs and other minorities have remained resident in rural areas. Because of this uneven situation, at the time when circulation and flow of information increased in Central Asia, the Uyghurs reassessed their identities.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 4

However, under the influence of 9/11, China has adopted a new discourse in the region, and the authorities have linked unrest in the region with religious extremism and terrorism. At this point, increasing surveillance and security measures after 2016 should be seen as security dispositifs built on these discourses. Hu Jintao's emphasis on the need for scientific management after the Arab Spring in 2011 is an indication of this.

The monitoring of the population and categorization of people as risky or reliable aims to control the increased circulation and flow of information. In this way, it is legitimated to marginalize the minorities in the XUAR with security dispositifs and to subject them to a particular regime. In this chapter, first, we discussed the categorization of the people as trustworthy or unreliable in the Social Credit System and Integrated Joint Operations Platform. Then we addressed the practices of creating a digital surveillance system with Grid Management and intensifying surveillance with officials' home visits in XUAR as security dispositifs. We addressed the detention of people considered as risky in re-education centers as a practice in which fundamental rights and freedoms are suspended, and individuals are subject to a special regime. Consequently, all these practices, that intensified after the appointment of Chen Quanguo as party secretary in XUAR in 2016, are the result of governmentality using profiling technologies that monitor circulation, identify factors that hinder market functioning and create preventive practices.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

As discussed in the theoretical framework, in the 18th century, with the legal reforms in Europe, torture was abolished in prisons and within the normalization methods, practices aiming to transform the soul of convict began to be implemented. These practices, which Foucault presents as indicators of the disciplinary power, have been developed not only in prisons but also in schools and hospitals. Surveillance has increased, and correct training according to the norms determined by the scientifico-juridical complex has developed. The arrangement of time and place in institutions was realized in order to ensure that individuals comply with certain norms.

Later, as a result of increasing urbanization, circulation of people, goods and capital in Europe, physiocrats took the understanding of power to another dimension with security dispositifs. While the disciplinary power continues, the practices that target the population operate through calculating the factors and risks that influence the population and determine the cost of the practices. This rationalization of power, which regulates but intervenes with security dispositifs, is associated with the liberal philosophy during this period. It was mentioned that in neoliberalism, these security dispositifs perform the calculation of the factors that hinder the functioning of the market in the security context and intervene at this point. Foucault - via the concept of governmentality – shows that these methods developed by physiocrats have replaced the understanding of power based on territory, this understanding of government gained weight in the West, and the state was governmentalized

In this thesis, it has been shown that in China, with the reforms in the modernization process in the last years of the Qing Empire, disciplinary power was improved in the institutions and discourses. After reform and opening up in 1978, governmentality targeting the population was developed. It has been asserted that today, indigenous practices, disciplinary techniques, institutions and discourses are used together with security dispositifs in China. It has also been emphasized that economic growth-oriented policies, population regulations, increasing private sector-state cooperation, and replacement of mass line politics by autonomous individual construction were indicators of this changing governmentality. The security and surveillance practices which increased after 2016 in XUAR have been examined through the concept of security dispositifs which Foucault addressed in his lectures in 1978, and it has been demonstrated that these practices were developed under the influence of internationally emerging discourses and governmentality.

As pointed out in the historical background, China's governing techniques in the Xinjiang region have been influenced by international developments throughout history. As Millward explained, after the conquest of the region by the Qing Empire, the creation of the modern maps and gazetteer of the region through the European missionaries had the function of emphasizing the historical connection between the region and China in the context of the Foucauldian “knowledge-power” relation. As a result of the developing events with the emergence of Britain and Russia as powers in Central Asia, the Qing Empire adopted more restrictive policies towards minorities in the region at the end of the 19th century. In the Guomindang era, the influence of the USSR in the region, the uprisings and revolutions that emerged as a result of modern ideologies spread among the minorities played a decisive role in the government's attitude towards minorities.

Again, the XUAR policy of the PRC administration in the 1990s was influenced by the international conditions in the region after the independence of the Central Asian states, with the development of trade and security relations with these

countries. The integration of the region was sought, with the developmentalist approach, by establishing trade relations with Central Asian states. Also, China established cooperation mechanisms with these countries to ensure the security of the region. However, as a result of the US involvement in the region as an actor after 2001, the impact of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was observed to shrink but consequently, China adopted the discourse of war on terror in the region. We explained that increasing security measures after 2016, the practices of profiling technologies, grid management, re-education centers and home visits are the result of this changing discourse, and the governmentality developed after the state transformation in 1978.

In this context, the Social Credit System, which regulates finance and citizen behaviors in China, is the result of China's transition to the market economy in 1978 because China, from the 1990s onwards, needed a national credit system for the financial sector. Later, with this credit system, technologies for monitoring and profiling of citizen behaviors outside the financial sector were also developed. In addition, as a result of the emergence of layoffs and new job opportunities after 1978, the circulation of people increased and documents containing the personal information of the workers (dang'an files) have become profiles representing the people for new job applications. The Social Credit System which places people in a reliable - unreliable category according to certain factors, has also emerged as a profiling technology as a result of this increasing circulation.

Foucault mentioned that security dispositifs emerged as a result of the increasing circulation of people and goods in Europe in the 18th century. In this respect, the Social Credit System and monitoring people who go to the countries listed as sensitive and the discourse that these people pose a risk for security should be seen as a security dispositif. Since, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the circulation of Uyghurs and other minorities of XUAR in Central Asia has increased, and the flow of information rose with globalization. Developmentalist policies in the region have been implemented to ensure the minorities' loyalty to

the state, however, in the process in which different actors and a hybrid of enterprise and bureaucracy emerged, the positive effects of development-oriented policies on the Uyghurs and other minorities were relatively minor. Because of minorities' unequal conditions, their different languages, and the fact that the majority of them continue to live in rural areas, they could not find opportunities to represent themselves fully. Besides, they were opposed to practical aspects of policies of Great Western Development, such as Han migration. In this respect, while minorities generally are considered a threat to the functioning of the market, Uyghurs are declared as “bad circulation” as a result of increased circulation of people and information, so the practice of profiling people was created as a security dispositif.

We have shown that the grid management system, in which digital records of city assets and events on each grid and intensive surveillance by supervisors takes place, was created as a consequence of the loss of functionality of the household system as a result of the increasing circulation of people. In this respect, we emphasize that the surveillance by the supervisors in grid management is a security dispositif since it serves certain needs and control purposes. We have also identified officials' 1-week home visits in XUAR as another surveillance practice.

Another point is that Foucault's emphasis on the calculation of risks and the factors affecting the population is seen in these practices. As a preventive security practice, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, even though people have not yet committed a crime, is profiling those who pose a risk through pre determined norms. In grid management, it was mentioned that surveillance increased through digital tools and supervisors. Consequently, this system has a function of monitoring the factors. It was also emphasized that risky people have been determined through the monitoring of factors in the home visits: such as monitoring what people watch on TV. It was mentioned that surveillance took place also with phone applications such as Sina Weibo. All of these are practices developed with the understanding of power that sees the population as a risk pool.

Group profiles have been created with the aim of governing the uncalculable situations, which Aradau and Munster have stated as the dispositif of “precautionary risk”.

Our analysis shows that detentions in re-education centers are linked to the concept of re-education developed in the modernization process of prisons in China in the early 20th century, and this has been applied as a method of disciplinary power. However, the re-education centers are practices of detention of people who are neither convicted criminals nor prisoners of war, targeting a specific group. This practice is a security dispositif and aims to govern the unmanageable. Along with other security and surveillance practices, re-education centers put the Uyghurs and other minorities in the XUAR into a marginalized category and subject them to a particular regime. This marginalization- what Bigo refers to as ban-opticon - is formed by creating risk categories, security discourses and institutions that determine who will be subjected to a particular regime.

China, with the war on terror discourse, identifying risk factors with profiling technologies has created practices which combine her own indigenous systems, disciplining mechanisms, and new security dispositifs in XUAR. Consequently, practices that divide people into suspicious or safe categories in XUAR, practices that provide monitoring and surveillance with grid management, re-education centers for fighting extremism and the home visits of officials are the results of this mixed governmentality. People considered risky for security reasons are subject to a special regime, and they are in a state of emergency, a state of exception in which fundamental rights are suspended. For further research it would be helpful to consider the policies in the region not solely in the context of authoritarianism, to consider the fragmented authority in XUAR, and to pay attention to the changing governmentality in the region.

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APPENDICES

A: TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez Çin'in Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'ndeki güvenlik ve gözetim uygulamalarını ele almakta ve özellikle Chen Quanguo'nun 2016'da Komünist Parti Sekreteri olarak atanması sonrasında gerçekleşen uygulamalara odaklanmaktadır. Bu uygulamalar, 1978 sonrası Çin'de gerçekleşen devlet dönüşümünün sonuçlarına dikkat çekilerek, Michel Foucault'un güvenlik ve yönetimsellik kavramları bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Sosyal Kredi Sistemi, grid yönetim sistemi, yeniden eğitim kampları ve memurların bölgedeki ev ziyaretleri incelenmektedir. Tarihsel arka planı ele aldığımız bölümde ise, Çin'in bölgedeki yönetim pratiklerinin ve azınlık politikalarının tarih içerisinde dönüşümü ele alınmaktadır.

Teorik çerçeve bölümünde belirtildiği üzere, Michel Foucault 1975 yılında yayınlanan Hapishanenin Doğuşu adlı eserinde, 18. yüzyılda Avrupa'da ortaya çıkan yeni bir iktidar türünü (disiplin iktidarı) işaret ederek, gözetim ve ceza tarihini ele almıştır. 18. yüzyılın sonunda ceza sistemindeki işkence kaldırılmış, yerine disiplin ve denetim merkezli daha uzmanlaşmış uygulamalar getirilmiştir. Bununla kişiyi terbiye etme ve itaatkar kılma hedefi güdülmektedir. Aydınlanmanın etkisi altında, Avrupa'da gelişen hukukun üstünlüğü, rasyonalizm, özgürlük ve hümanizm ilkeleri bu yasal reformların temelini oluşturmaktadır.

Modernite ile gelişen disiplin iktidarı, mekan ve zamanı organize ederek sadece hapishanelerde değil, hastaneler ve okullar gibi kurumlarda hiyerarşik gözetim, normalleştirici yaptırım ve sınav aracılığı ile işlemektedir. Disiplin iktidarının kurumları ve uygulamaları kişileri önce itaatkar, uysal, sonra işlevsel olarak dönüştürülmüş ve üretken hale getirmektedir.

Foucault 1978’de College de France’daki derslerinde ise, disiplin iktidarından farklı, güvenlik odaklı başka bir iktidarı ele almakta ve bugün bir güvenlik toplumunda yaşayıp yaşamadığımız sormaktadır. Disiplinde normalleştirme rolü vardır. Bu amaçla hiyerarşiler kurar, ölçümler yapar, düzeltmeye çalışır. Güvenlik ise, disiplin iktidarının aksine, olası sosyal olayları tahmin etme, olasılıklarını hesaplama ve bunları bir yöne yönlendirme gibi süreçleri gerçekleştirir. Foucault güvenliğin söylemsel olan veya olmayan her türlü araçlarını, kurumlarını, yapılarını dispoşitif (güvenlik düzenekleri) olarak ifade etmiştir.

Liberal düşüncenin etkisi ile ortaya çıkmış ve neoliberalizm ile birlikte günümüzde ağırlık kazanmış güvenlik dispoşitifleri nüfus yönetimini hedefler. Piyasanın işleyişine etki eden faktörler belirlenir, riskler hesaplanır. Güvenlik algısı konjonktüre göre değişebilir. Bu noktada disiplin iktidarından farklı olarak normalleştirme uygulamaları yerine, anormallikler söylemler ve pratikler ile bilerek kısıktırılabilir.

18. yüzyılda Avrupa’da şehirleşme, nüfus ve ticari talep artışı insanların ve malların dolaşımının izlenmesini gerektirmiştir. Güvenlik dispoşitifleri, dolaşıma dair sorunları ortadan kaldırma amacı güden tekniklerdir. Bugün yaygın olarak tartışılan göçmenler ve sınır güvenliği sorunu ya da dini aşırılık eğilimlerinden uzaklaştırmak için yurtdışında eğitim gören Uygur öğrencilerinin yeniden eğitim kamplarında tutuklanması güvenlik dispoşitifleri olarak görülebilir.

Foucault, yine College de France’daki derslerinde, aynı yıl, odağını devlete ve makro düzeye kaydırarak, “yönetim sanatı” olarak da adlandırdığı yönetimsellik kavramını ayrıca ele almaktadır. Yönetimsellik, nüfusu hedef alan, güvenlik dispoşitifleri ile iktidar sağlayan kurumlar, düşünceler, hesaplamalar ve taktiklerdir. Bu kavram aynı zamanda Batı’da giderek daha baskın hale gelen bir tür iktidarı anlatmaktadır.

Bentham'ın mimari tasarımı panoptikon, disiplin iktidarının hiyerarşik gözetiminin sembolü olarak görülmüştü. Zygmunt Bauman, panoptikon tipi disiplin gücünün devam ettiğini, ancak bunun artık çok daha güçlü olduğunu belirtiyor.⁵⁵⁹ Bauman ve Lyon'a göre, göçmenler ve terör şüphelileri gibi marjinal gruplara profil çıkarma teknolojileri ile yoğun gözetim uygulanmaktadır. Didier Bigo'nun “ban-optikon” olarak adlandırdığı bu gözetimde, kategoriler oluşturulmakta ve güvenlik rejimine kimlerin maruz kalacağı belirlenmekte.⁵⁶⁰ Veri tabanları, dışlayıcı söylemler, mimari yapılar ve kontrol bürokrasisi bu yapının araçlarıdır.⁵⁶¹ Güvenlik nedeniyle, dışlanan kategorilerdeki kişiler istisna haline, olağanüstü hal durumuna ve belirsiz bir geçici rejime tabi kılınmaktadır.⁵⁶²

Güvenlikten bahsettiğimizde ortada bir tehdit veya riskin olması gerekmektedir. Soğuk Savaşta her iki blok için de belirli olan tehdit algısı 70'ler sonrasında değişmeye başlamıştır. Petrol krizi, küresel ısınma, artan göç, artan nüfus yoğunluğu, terörizm gibi konuların gündemde ağırlık kazanması ile belirsiz bir risk algısı ortaya çıkmıştır.

Aradu ve Munster bu noktada ihtiyati risk kavramının yeni bir dispozitif olarak ortaya çıktığından bahsetmektedir.⁵⁶³ Böylece potansiyel tehditlerin, gözetim ve hesaplamalar ile azaltılması hedeflenmektedir. Yazarlar Ulrich Beck'in riskin sonsuzluğu kavramına atıfta bulunarak belirsiz durumların hesaplanmadığını ancak bu belirsiz durumlarda güvenlik dispozitiflerinin ortaya çıktığını ifade etmektedirler.⁵⁶⁴ Böylece nüfusu hedef alan gözetim artmaktadır. Göçmenler, terör

⁵⁵⁹ Zygmunt Bauman & David Lyon, (2013, p. 51.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 56.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid, p. 56.

⁵⁶² Ibid, p. 59

⁵⁶³ Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, (2007), p. 91.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 101.

şüphelileri gibi milli güvenliğe tehdit olarak algılananlar istisna durumuna, olağanüstü hal rejimine tabi kılınmaktadır.

Bu tezde ortaya koyduğumuz üzere Avrupa'da gelişen disiplin iktidarı uygulamaları ve güvenlik dispoitifleri Çin'de de görülmektedir. Çin 20. yüzyılın başında, batılı ülkelerle yapılan eşitsiz anlaşmalardan kurtulmak ve uluslararası sistemin bir parçası olmak için kurumlarında modernleşme sürecine gitmiştir ve yerli yönetim uygulamalarını tamamen ortadan kaldırmadan, disiplin iktidarının araçları olan kurumları ve söylemleri adapte etmiştir. 1978 sonrasında ise Çin'in piyasa sosyalizmine geçişi ile birlikte gerçekleşen devlet dönüşümü nedeniyle Çin'de yönetimsellik yeni bir boyuta ulaşmıştır. Nüfus düzenlemeleri, Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri'nin özelleştirilmesi, Mao döneminin kitle çizgisi politikası yerine, kişinin öz yönetimi anlayışının gelişmesi⁵⁶⁵ Çin'de gelişen neoliberal yönetimselliğin işaretleridir. İdeolojik farklılıklara rağmen, Çin'in Batı'nın yönetim tekniklerini benimsediği görülmektedir. Bu tez bu bağlamda Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'nde 2016 sonrası artan güvenlik ve gözetim pratiklerinde, Çin'de 1978 sonrası gelişen yönetimselliğin sonucu olarak, disiplin gücü tekniklerinin ve güvenlik dispoitiflerinin birlikte uygulandığını ortaya koymaktadır.

Tarihsel arka plana ele alındığı üzere, Çin'in Sincan bölgesindeki yönetim teknikleri tarih boyunca uluslararası gelişmelerden etkilenmiştir. Bölgenin Mançu (Qing) İmparatorluğu tarafından fethinden sonra, Avrupalı misyonerler aracılığıyla modern haritalarının oluşturulması ve bölgenin tarihteki Çince yer adlarının araştırılması, Foucault'nun teorisi bağlamında bir bilgi-iktidar ilişkisi oluşturmaktadır ve bu bölge ile Çin arasındaki tarihi bağlantıyı vurgulama işlevine sahiptir.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁵ Elaine Jeffreys, (2009), p. 2.

⁵⁶⁶ James A. Millward, (1999), p. 72.

Ayrıca, İngiltere'nin 19. yüzyıl sounda Asya'da bir aktör olarak ortaya çıkması, İngiltere'nin bölgede kurulan Yaqub Beg Emirliği'ne desteği ve Rusya'nın bölgenin kuzeyine müdahalesi, Qing için batı sınır güvenliği endişelerini artırmıştır Bu nedenle, Qing İmparatorluğu Tarım Havzası ve Cungarya'yı (şimdiki Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi sınırları içerisindeki alanlar) fethettikten sonraki ilk yönetim döneminde bu bölgeyi yerel Müslümanlar aracılığıyla yönetirken ve istikrarı korumak için Han Çinlileri'nin bölgeye yerleşmesi yasaklarken, 19. yy sonrası bölgeyi ikinci kez aldıktan sonra, ilk döneme göre daha asimilasyonist politikalar gütmüştür. Bölgenin yerel halkı yönetimden dışlanmış ve bölgeye Han Çinlisi göçü desteklenmiştir.

Qing İmparatorluğu'nda olduğu gibi, Guomintang ve Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti yönetimi sırasında da bölge halkına yönelik politikalar, Asya'daki uluslararası koşullardan veya Çin'in iç politik gelişmelerinden etkilenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Guomintang yönetimi sırasında bölgede meydana gelen olayları ele aldık. Yerel yöneticilerin azınlık hakları üzerindeki kısıtlayıcı politikalarının bir sonucu olarak ayaklanmaların nedenlerini, özelliklerini ve bölgede yayılan Ceditçilik gibi modern ideolojilerin etkisini açıkladık. Ayrıca, Sovyetler Birliği'nin bu ayaklanmalar ve Guomintang yönetimi ile yerel yöneticilerin politikaları üzerindeki etkilerini ele aldık.

Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin yönetiminde ise azınlık siyasetine yaklaşımların değişimindeki dönüm noktaları sırasıyla Kültür Devrimi, 1978 reformu, Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılması ve 2001'den sonra ABD'nin Asya'da bir aktör olarak artan etkisi olmuştur. Bölgede Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin yönetiminin ilk döneminde azınlıklara karşı ılımlı bir yaklaşım benimsenmiştir, fakat bu Kültür Devrimi sırasında değişmiştir, burjuva unsurlar veya revizyonist olarak kabul edilen her türlü yaklaşım ve geleneklere yönelik saldırılar gerçekleşmiştir. 1978 reformu ardından yetkililer, azınlık hakları konusunda ılımlı yaklaşımlara ve söylemlere geri döndüler. Ayrıca bölgedeki ekonomik kalkınmanın istikrar için önemi vurgulanmıştır. Ancak, Sovyetler Birliği dağıldıktan sonra Çin, bölgedeki

azınlıkların haklarına kısıtlamalar getirmeye başladı çünkü Orta Asya ülkelerinin bağımsızlığı, bölgedeki Uygur ve diğer azınlıkların Çin'e bağılıklarını yeniden değerlendirilmesine yol açmıştır.

1990'larda Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti yönetiminin Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi politikası, Orta Asya devletlerinin bağımsızlığından sonra, bu ülkelerle ticaret ve güvenlik ilişkilerinin gelişmesiyle, bölgedeki uluslararası koşullardan etkilenmiştir. Bölgenin entegrasyonu kalkınmacı yaklaşımla, Orta Asya devletleri ile ticari ilişkiler kurarak sağlanmaya çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca Çin, bölgenin güvenliğini sağlamak için bu ülkelerle işbirliği mekanizmaları kurmuştur. Bununla birlikte, 11 Eylül'den sonra ABD'nin bir aktör olarak Asya'da ağırlığını arttırmasının sonucu olarak, Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü'nün etkisinin azaldığı gözlemlendi, ancak sonuç olarak Çin, ABD'ye karşı bu konuda cephe almadı. Çin, kendisi de, 2001 sonrası bölgede terör üzerine savaş söylemini benimsedi. 2016 sonrası artan güvenlik önlemleri, profil oluşturma teknolojileri, grid yönetimi, yeniden eğitim merkezleri ve ev ziyaretleri uygulamalarının bu değişen söylemin sonucu olarak ortaya çıktığını ifade ettik. Bu söylemin 1978 sonrası bölgede artan ekonomik eşitsizlikten kaynaklanan huzursuzlukları göz ardı ettiğini iddia ettik.

Sosyalist market ekonomisine geçişi sonrası Çin'de, dış ticarete odaklı bir ekonomi politikası ile kıyı bölgelerinde kalkınmaya önem verilmiştir. Ancak bu kıyı bölgeleri ile daha az gelişmiş batı bölgeleri arasındaki ekonomik farklılıklar artınca, batı bölgelerinin de kalkınması gerekliliği üzerine harekete geçildi. 90'larda başlatılan Çin'in Büyük Batı Kalkınma Kampanyası, ticaret ve yatırım ile batı bölgelerindeki altyapıyı geliştirmeyi amaçlamaktaydı. Xi Jiping tarafından 2013 yılında Kazakistan'da ilan edilen Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi bunun genişletilmiş bir versiyonu olarak kabul edilmektedir.

Bununla birlikte, Batı Kalkınma Kampanyası merkezi bir büyük program olmaktan uzaktadır. Jong ve Zeng'in belirttiği üzere, liderler bir slogan haline gelen açıklamalar yapsalar da, pratikte yerel kurumlar ve aktörler bunu kendi

çıkarlarına göre yorumlamakta ve bazen merkezi yönergeleri görmezden gelmektedir.⁵⁶⁷ Örneğin merkez hükümet tarafından Myanmar'ın isyancı gruplarıyla ekonomik ilişkiler yasağı getirilmesine rağmen, Çin'in Yunnan Eyaleti yönetimi Yunnan'ı Myanmar'ın batı kıyısına bağlayan petrol ve gaz boru hatları projesini 2013 yılında tamamlamıştır. Bu durum Myanmar ve Çin arasındaki ilişkilerde bir krize neden olmuştur.⁵⁶⁸

Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi, 90'lı yıllardan itibaren Çin'in Batı kalkınmasında önemli bir rol oynamaya başlamıştır. Batı'da kaynak geliştirme stratejisi kapsamında, oluşturulan yatırım projeleri Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi üzerinden Orta Asya ile bağlantı kurmak ve bölgenin Çin'e entegrasyonunu sağlamak hedefini gütmekteydi. Ancak bu projelerin yukarıda bahsettiğimiz üzere merkezi planlı bir program olmamasından ötürü kalkınma bölgede tüm kesimlere eşit olarak yansımamıştır.

Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'nin kuzeyinin kentleşmesine ve gelişmesine rağmen, güneyi çoğunlukla kırsal olarak kalmıştır. Kentsel nüfusun çoğu Han Çinlilerinden oluşurken, Uygurların % 80-90'ı kırsal alanlarda yaşamaktadır. Sincan'ın kuzeyinde kentleşme geliştiğinde bölgeye göç desteklendi. Bingtuan askeri çiftlikleri 1949'dan beri en büyük göç aracı olmuştur. Han nüfusu kentleşmeden yararlanırken, Uygurlar'ın kentsel alanlara göçü de artmaktadır. Ancak, Uygurlar burada çoğunlukla inşaat ve restoran sektörlerinde düşük ücretli işlerde çalışmaktadırlar.⁵⁶⁹ Ayrıca, bölgedeki petro-kimya endüstrilerindeki yüksek ücretli işlerin birçoğu az sayıda özel üniversiteden işe alınmaktadır. Bunlara erişim için çok yüksek GaoKao (üniversite giriş sınavı) puanları gerekir. 2017 yılına kadar, etnik azınlıklara Çince yüksek eğitimini teşvik etmek için ek puanlar verildi. Ancak son zamanlarda önde gelen Uygur akademisyen Tashpolat Tiyp'in ve

⁵⁶⁷ Lee Jones, Jinghan Zeng (2019), p. 6.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 7.

⁵⁶⁹ Alessandra Cappelletti, (2015), p. 147.

muhafif entelektüellerin tutuklanması Sincan'daki etnik azınlık öğrencilerinin üniversite sistemine girmeye teşvikini baltalamakta, böylece düşük vasıflı, düşük ücretli işlerde kalmaya mahkum etmekte.

Bu eşitsiz gelişmede Uygurlar ilerleyecek mekanizmalar bulamamaktadır ve güçlü bir siyasi temsile sahip değiller. Hükümet, bölgenin istikrarı için daha fazla modernleşme ve kalkınma olması gerektiğini savunmakta, ancak bunun Uygurlara faydası görece az olmuştur ve bu onların entegre olmalarına izin veren bir durum yaratmamıştır. Tüm bu eşitsiz koşullar sebebiyle ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşü ile Uygurlar'ın Asya'da artan dolaşımı, küreselleşme ile bilgi akışının artması sonucu Uygurlar Çin'e aidiyetlerini sorgulamakta ve kimliklerini vurgulamaktadırlar. Ancak Çin otoriteleri bu ekonomik koşulları göz ardı etmektedir.

90'lı yılların başında itibaren dini ve kültürel pratiklerin kontrolü ile başlayan azınlıklara yönelik baskı, 1996 sonrası gittikçe yoğunlaşmıştır. 1996 yılında, Merkezi Politbüro Komitesi Toplantısında yasadışı dini faaliyetler ve etnik ayrılıkçılık, Sincan'ın istikrarı için en büyük iki tehdit olarak ifade edildi. Ayrılıkçı faaliyetler ve Sincan'daki şiddet olayları ile ilişkilendirilen binlerce kişi tutuklandı ve idam edildi. Ayrılıkçılığı teşvik ettiği düşünülen kitap ve yayınlara el konuldu. Buna karşı Bingtuan'da çalışacak olan Han Çinlisi kadrolarının eğitilmesi gerektiği belirtildi ve diğer bölgelerden kadrolar ve teknik personel Sincan'da çalışmaya gönderildi.

11 Eylül sonrasında ise Çin, Sincan Uygur Özerk bölgesi'ndeki huzursuzlukları terörizm ve dini ekstremizm ile ilişkilendirmeye başladı. Terörle savaş söylemiyle bölgede uygulanan baskı, gerilimi tırmandırmıştır ve daha fazla huzursuzluğa sebep olmaktadır. Baskı şiddet olaylarına sebebiyet vermiştir ve bu daha fazla baskının oluşmasına yol açmıştır. Bu noktada, teorik çerçeveden yola çıkarak, Sincan'da terörle savaş söylemi ile uygulanan güvenlik uygulamalarının

güvensizliği körükleyerek genişleyen bir iktidar mekanizması yarattığı ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Chen Quanguo, Ağustos 2016'da Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi Komünist Parti Sekreteri olarak atandı. Daha önce, 2011-2016 yılları arasında Tibet Özerk Bölgesi'nde parti sekreteri olarak görev yaptı. Atandığından bu yana, gözetim ve güvenlik uygulamaları artmış, yeniden eğitim kampları bu uygulamaların en uç örneklerinden biri olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu politikalar ilk olarak Chen, Tibet'te Parti Sekreteri iken uygulamaya konuldu. Bu tezde, Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'nde önleyici güvenlik uygulamalarının Çin genelinde gelişen Sosyal Kredi Sistemi ile bağlantısını ortaya koyduk.

Çin'deki finans ve vatandaş davranışlarını düzenleyen Sosyal Kredi Sistemi, Çin'in 1978 yılında piyasa ekonomisine geçişinin bir sonucudur, çünkü 90'lı yıllardan itibaren Çin finans sektörü için ulusal bir kredi sistemine ihtiyaç duymuştur. Daha sonra bu kredi sistemi ile finansal sektör dışındaki vatandaş davranışlarının izlenmesi ve profilleri çıkarılması için teknolojiler de geliştirildi.

Bazı yazarlar Sosyal Kredi Sistemi'ni Mao döneminde başlatılan “Dang’an” (kişisel dosyalar) sisteminin versiyonu olarak görmektedir. Dang’an, işçilerin eğitim ve çalışma tarihi, aile tarihi, siyasi faaliyetleri, kazanımları ve yanlışları gibi kişisel bilgilerinin bulunduğu bir arşivdir.⁵⁷⁰ Sosyal Kredi Sistemi'nin kökenini buna bağlamak, bu sistemdeki yönetimselliği göz ardı etmemize neden olabilir. Nitekim piyasa ekonomisine geçişten sonra Dang’an sisteminin kendisinin de işlevi değişti. Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri 1980'lerde özelleştirildi ve yeniden yapılandırıldığında, Jie Yang'ın ele aldığı üzere, işten çıkarmalar gerçekleşti ve işçiler yeniden istihdam projelerine katıldılar, ancak daha sonra piyasada bir iş bulmak isteyen işçiler için Dang'an kişilerin yeteneklerinin bir temsili haline

⁵⁷⁰ Jie Yang, (2011), p. 508.

gelmiştir.⁵⁷¹ Yang, bu kişilerin kendilerini girişimci özneler olarak ifade etmeye başladığını belirtiyor.⁵⁷²

Şu an pilot projelerle yürütülmekte olan Sosyal Kredi Sistemi kişilerin davranışlarını puanlamakta ve riskli grupları kategorize etmektedir. Çin'deki kamuoyu araştırmaları göstermektedir ki, Sosyal Kredi Sistemi'nin kendilerini diğer insanlardan öne çıkacağını düşünen çok sayıda insan bu sistemi desteklemekte. Yüksek gelir düzeyine sahip kişilerin Sosyal Kredi Sistemi'ni daha fazla desteklediği ve bu sistemi, şehirlerde yaşayanların kırsal kesimdekilerden daha fazla desteklediği görülmektedir.⁵⁷³ Bu rekabet ortamında Sosyal Kredi Sistemi kapsamındaki normlara uymayan insanların marjinalleşmesi durumu ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'nde, bu sisteme benzer bir zihniyetteki güvenlik uygulamalarından, Entegre Ortak Operasyonlar Platformu (IJOP) çerçevesinde kişiler güvenilir veya güveniliriz olarak sınıflandırılmaktadır. Sincan Kamu Güvenliği Bürosu, 2016 yılında önleyici güvenlik uygulaması olarak Entegre Ortak Operasyonlar Platformu'nu kurdu. Bu sistem sayesinde insanlar kontrol noktaları, telefon uygulamaları ve yüz tanıma kameraları da dahil olmak üzere çeşitli yollarla denetleniyor. İnsan Hakları İzleme Örgütü'nün bir raporuna göre, insanların güvenilir olup olmadığını belirlemek için 20 kategori oluşturuldu. Kişiyi şüpheli kategorisine sokacak davranışlardan bazıları, Kazakistan, Malezya ve Türkiye gibi ülkelerin (Müslüman vatandaşların çoğunluğuna sahip ülkeler) dahil olduğu listedeki, 26 ülkeden birine, seyahat etmeyi içermekte.⁵⁷⁴ Çin otoriteleri, bu ülkelere seyahat eden vatandaşların dini aşırılığa sürüklenebileceğini iddia ediyor.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid, p. 530.

⁵⁷² Ibid, p. 509.

⁵⁷³ Genia Kostka,, p. 1577.

⁵⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch, (2018), "Eradicating Ideological Viruses, China's Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims", September. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs#> Retrieved: 01.07.2019

Buna ek olarak, insanların telefonları ve sosyal medya hesapları da incelenmekte ve "paylaştıkları içeriğe bağlı olarak", "kişinin güvenilir olup olmadığı" değerlendirilmekte.

Foucault, 18. yüzyılda Avrupa'da artan insan ve mal dolaşımının bir sonucu olarak güvenlik dispozitiflerinin ortaya çıktığını belirtmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Sosyal Kredi Sistemi ve hassas olarak listelenen ülkelere gidenlerin izlenmesi, bu kişilerin güvenlik için risk oluşturdukları söylemi bir güvenlik dispozitifini olarak görülmelidir. Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşünden sonra, Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'nde Uygurlar'ın ve diğer azınlıklarının Orta Asya'daki dolaşımını arttı ve küreselleşme ile bilgi akışı arttı. Bölgedeki kalkınmacı politikalar, azınlıkların devlete sadakatini sağlamak için uygulanmıştır, ancak kalkınma odaklı politikaların Uygurlar ve diğer azınlıklar üzerindeki olumlu etkileri nispeten azdır. Azınlıkların eşit olmayan koşulları, farklı dilleri ve çoğunluğunun kırsal alanlarda yaşamaya devam etmeleri nedeniyle, kendilerini tam olarak temsil etme fırsatı bulamamışlardır. Ayrıca, Han göçü gibi Büyük Batı Kalkınma politikalarının pratiklerine de karşıydılar. Bu bağlamda, azınlıklar piyasanın işleyişi için bir tehdit olarak görülmekte. Uygurlar, kişilerin ve bilginin dolaşımının arttığı bu süreçte, "kötü dolaşım" olarak ilan edildi, bu nedenle kişilerin profilleri çıkarılması uygulaması bir güvenlik dispozitifini olarak yaratıldı.

Bir başka nokta, Foucault'nun güvenlik dispozitiflerinde risklerin hesaplandığına vurgu yapması ve nüfusu etkileyen faktörlerin hesaplanmasının bu uygulamalarda görülmesidir. Önleyici bir güvenlik uygulaması olarak, Entegre Ortak Operasyonlar Platformu, insanlar henüz bir suç işlememiş olsalar bile, önceden belirlenmiş normlar yoluyla riskli grupları belirlemektedir.

Artan dolaşımın bir sonucu olarak, hane halkı kayıt (hukou) sisteminin işlevselliğini kaybettiği, bunun sonucu olarak her bir grid üzerindeki şehir varlıklarının ve olayların dijital kayıtlarının tutulduğu ve denetçiler tarafından yoğun gözetimin grid sistemi aracılığı ile gerçekleştirildiği gösterildi. Bu bağlamda,

grid sistemindeki denetçilerin gözetiminin, belirli ihtiyaçlara ve kontrol amaçlarına hizmet ettiği için bir güvenlik dispozitifini olduğunu vurgulanmıştır.

4.bölümde ele alındığı üzere, Çin’de birçok aktörün, devletin farklı kurumlarının ve Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri’ nin politika oluşturma süreçlerinde rol oynadığı görülmektedir. Yönetimin dijitalleştirilmesi ve cep telefonları ile hızlı çözümler gibi araçlar ile grid yönetimi bu kurumlar arasında iletişim rolü oynamaktadır. Ayrıca, Yongshun Cai’ye göre, 2008 yılında kırsal alanlarda başlayan grid yönetim sistemi, yerel yönetimlerin tarımsal vergi reformu sonucunda sivil uyuşmazlıkların çözümünde isteksizliği veya yetersizliği sonucu inşa edilmiştir.⁵⁷⁵ Örneğin, 2008 yılında, Dai etnik grubunun çoğunluğunun yaşadığı Yunnan eyaletindeki Menglian’ın Dai-Lahu-Va Özerk Bölgesi’nde, kauçuk çiftçilerinin protestoları polisle çatışmalara dönüşünce yerel yönetim bölgede etkisiz hale geldi, ilçede grid yönetiminin uygulanmasına karar verildi.⁵⁷⁶ Bu olaylardan sonra, bölge şebekelere bölünmüş, her bir şebekeden sorumlu ekipler oluşturulmuştur. 2011’de Arap Baharı’ndan sonra gelen Hu Jintao’nun “bilimsel sosyal yönetim” ihtiyacına yönelik çağrısı da, şebeke yönetiminin güvenlik boyutunu ortaya koymaktadır.⁵⁷⁷

Grid yönetimi tarafından toplanan bilgiler, müdahaleyi haklı çıkarmak ve nüfusun kontrolü için veri sağlar. Nitekim, Grid yönetimi, Falun Gong takipçilerine müdahale etmek için de uygulanmıştır. 2007 yılında Grid yönetim sisteminin oluşturulması süreci Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi’nde başlatılmış, ancak 2008’de Uygur işadamı Mutallip Hajim’in gözaltında ölmesiyle protestolar patlak vermiş ve bölgede huzursuzluklar patlak vermiştir. 2010 yılından bu yana, teknolojik gözetim uygulamalarıyla desteklenen güvenlik uygulamaları sıkılaştırılmıştır. 2014 yılında Kunming tren istasyonunda ve Urumçi’de bıçaklama ve bomba saldırıları

⁵⁷⁵ Yongshun Cai, Cai, Yongshun, (2018), “Grid Management and Social Control in China”, Asia Dialogue, April. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/04/27/grid-management-and-social-control-in-china> Retrieved: 14.11.2019

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ Wu Qiang, (2015), p. 112.

gerçekleştğinde, tam olarak hangi grupların sorumlu olduğu belli olmamasına rağmen dini ekstremist gruplar bu suçlardan sorumlu tutuldu. Böylece önleyici uygulamalar başlatılmış ve aşırılıkçılığın uyarı işaretlerinin izlenmesi başlatılmıştır. Chen Quanguo 2016 yılında Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'nde parti sekreteri olduktan sonra güvenlik önlemlerini daha da artmıştır.

Analizimiz, yeniden eğitim merkezlerindeki tutuklamaların, 20. yüzyılın başlarında Çin'deki hapishanelerin modernleşme sürecinde geliştirilen yeniden eğitim kavramı ile bağlantılı olduğunu ve bunun bir disiplin gücü yöntemi olarak uygulandığını göstermektedir. Bununla birlikte, yeniden eğitim merkezleri, suçlu ya da savaş esiri olmayan kişileri hedef alan uygulamalardır. Bu yüzden, bu uygulama bir güvenlik dispozitifidir. Diğer güvenlik ve gözetim uygulamalarının yanı sıra, yeniden eğitim merkezleri Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi'ndeki Uygurları ve diğer azınlıkları marjinalize etmekte ve onları belirli bir rejime tabi tutmaktadır. Bigo'nun ban-opticon olarak adlandırdığı bu marjinalleştirme, belirli bir rejime kimin maruz kalacağını belirleyen risk kategorileri, güvenlik söylemleri ve kurumlar yaratarak oluşur.

Dünya çapında göçün, devletlerin sınırlarını zorladığı durumlarda vatandaşların haklarının kaybolduğu tutuklamalar olduğunu, istisna durumunun süreklilik kazandığını ve kampların ortaya çıktığını görmekteyiz. Nitekim Çin meşruiyetini bu küresel eğilime dayandırıyor. Brophy'nin belirttiği gibi, Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti yetkilileri dini aşırılık ile mücadele uygulamalarının, uluslararası normlara uygun olduğunu vurgulamaktadır.⁵⁷⁸

Ayrıca, memurların bölgedeki ev ziyaretlerinde, kişilerin evde televizyonda ne izledikleri gibi faktörlerin izlendiğini ve bu şekilde kişilerin takibini yapıldığının, riskli grupların belirlendiğini anlattık. Bütün bunlar, nüfusu bir risk havuzu olarak gören iktidar anlayışı ile geliştirilen uygulamalardır.

⁵⁷⁸ David Brophy, (2019), p. 45.

Sonuç olarak, bu uygulamalar panoptik model gözetiminden ziyade teorik çerçevede bahsettiğimiz ban-opticon tipi gözetim ile iktidar sağlamaktadır, çünkü henüz bir terörist veya aşırılık yanlısı faaliyette bulunmayan insanlar riskli kategoriye dahil edilmiştir. Terör ile savaş söylemi ile Çin, risk faktörlerini profil çıkarma teknolojileriyle tanımlayarak, kendi yerli sistemlerini, disiplin mekanizmalarını ve yeni güvenlik dispoitfilerini birleştiren uygulamalar yaratmıştır. Güvenlik nedeniyle riskli olduğu düşünülen insanlar özel bir rejime tabidir ve temel hallerin askıya alındığı bir olağanüstü hal durumundadır.

Nüfusun izlenmesi ve insanların riskli veya güvenilir olarak sınıflandırılması, artan dolaşım ve bilgi akışını kontrol etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Chen Quanguo'nun 2016 yılında Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi Parti Sekreteri olarak atanmasından sonra yoğunlaşan tüm bu güvenlik ve gözetim uygulamaları, dolaşımı izleyen, piyasanın işleyişini engelleyen faktörleri belirleyen ve önleyici uygulamalar olarak profil çıkarma teknolojilerini kullanan bir yönetimselliğin sonucudur.

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