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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE

TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUSTIN, TEXAS

IN THE MATTER OF THE REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMPEACHMENT HOUSE SIMPLE RESOLUTION NO. 161 - JUDGE O. P. CARRILLO

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VOLUME I

BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, August 4, 1975, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., the above entitled matter came on for hearing before the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATE OF TEXAS, the HONORABLE BILL CLAYTON, Speaker, presiding, and the following proceedings were reported by Hickman Reporting Service, 504 Travis Building, 205 West 9th, Austin, Texas 78701.



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## **PROCEEDINGS**

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SPEAKER CLAYTON: Pursuant to the provisions of House Simple Resolution 221, 64th Legislature, Regular Session, and under the authority of Article 15, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Texas and Article 5962, Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, I hereby call the House of Representatives to order to consider the matters of impeachment.

The Clerk will call the roll of members.

(The Clerk called the roll.)

A quorum is present. The House and Gallery will rise for the invocation to be given by Dr. Ralph Smith, pastor of the Hyde Park Baptist Church here of Austin.

(The invocation was given.)

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The Chair will now hear excuse of absent members.

(Absence excuses were recognized.)

Members, if I might have your attention, as I noted to you a moment ago, the proceedings of this Special Session are being broadcast live. The Chair has a few brief comments that he would like to make to this body prior to getting into the business of the session, so if I might have your attention.

MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker-1 Mr. Moreno, I'11 2 SPEAKER CLAYTON: 3 recognize you for a motion as soon as we get into that particular portion. 4 MR. MORENO: This will not be a motion, 5 Mr. Speaker. It's a parliamentary inquiry, and I think 6 it's a very important inquiry. 7 SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, 8 9 Mr. Moreno. MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker, would you please 10 rephrase to this House under what authority we are con-11 vened today, please. 12 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Yes, sir. I'd be 13 delighted to. 14 Pursuant to the provisions of House Simple 15 Resolution 221 of the 64th Legislature, Regular Session, 16 and under the authority of Article 15, Section 1 of the 17 Constitution of the State of Texas and Article 5962, 18 Revised Civil Statutes of the State. 19 MR. MORENO: All right. Mr. Speaker, 20 then what happened to House Simple Resolution No. 161 21 and 167? 22 SPEAKER CLAYTON: House Resolution 161 23 will be the resolution laid out for consideration before 24

this body, Mr. Moreno.

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1 MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker, I move a point 2 of order that we are improperly convened in view of the 3 fact that House Simple Resolution was the resolution 4 that commenced this impeachment proceedings, and now the 5 Chair has announced that we are meeting here pursuant 6 to H.S.R. 221. 7 SPEAKER CLAYTON: 221. Mr. Moreno, was 8 a resolution passed in the latter days of the session 9 that set out the procedure by which we would come back 10 into session when the Committee under House Simole 11 Resolution 161 filed its report. 12 The point of order is respectfully overruled. 13 MR. GARCIA: Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 14 Speaker. 15 SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, Mr. Garcia. 16 MR. GARCIA: I understand that this House 17 is being convened under Article 5962 relating to impeach-18 ment? 19 20 SPEAKER CLAYTON: That's correct, Mr. 21 Garcia. MR. GARCIA: The inquiry I have, Mr. 22 Speaker, is because of the fact that this House con-23 cluded its legislative business, and we are being 24 25 summoned back specifically to consider articles of

impeachment. On page 356 of the Black Statutes it provides the manner in which the House may be convened for the purpose of impeachment. That is, one, by proclamation of the Governor; number two, by proclamation of the Speaker, which proclamation shall be made only when petitioned in writing by not less than fifty members of the House; and the third manner is by proclamation in writing signed by a majority of the members of the House.

There is also a provision that relates to the notices being published in at least three daily news-papers.

I would like to determine what mechanics were followed by the House in calling us into session for impeachment.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Bring your point forward,
Mr. Garcia.

Mr. Garcia raises a point of order that the proper procedures were not performed in calling the session for the impeachment purposes.

Under Article 5962 it sets out two purposes by which a session may be called, or three purposes, three ways. These are ways that a session may be called when we are not convened. The first part of that article speaks to additional methods by which the House may call

itself back into session to consider impeachment proceedings, and pursuant to an Attorney General's ruling when the Honorable Ralph Yarborough was Assistant Attorney General of the State of Texas, and according to history the precedent in the Ferguson case, the point of order is respectfully overruled.

MR. SALEM: Mr. Speaker.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: For what purpose?

MR. SALEM: Mr. Speaker, this is a very important mission that we've undertaken here today, and I'd like to call for strict enforcement of the rules, and those individuals that are not entitled to the privilege of the floor that they be removed.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Salem, strict enforcement will be granted, and the Sergeant at Arms has been instructed and enforcement will be carried out.

MR. SALEM: Mr. Speaker, it hasn't been thus far. There are members of the committee who have not been authorized to be on this floor simply because they're members—or working for the committee. I feel that they ought to be removed from the floor also.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Okay. We'll take that up in just a few minutes, Mr. Salem.

At this time the Sergeant will remove any unauthorized personnel on the floor.

MR. SALEM: Now I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, Mr. Salem.

MR. SALEM: Mr. Speaker, on this booklet that was sent out by the Committee on Impeachment, on page 17 it says:

"Resolution: Impeachment action is initiated in the House of Representatives by the filing of a simple resolution calling for the impeachment of a public official. This was done in the instant case when Representative Terry Canales filed H.S.R. No. 161 with the Chief Clerk."

Now, my question is this: All I have to do, or any member of the Legislature has to do, to bring articles of impeachment or ask that an individual be impeached is just to file a House Simple Resolution with the Chief Clerk?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: No, sir, that is not correct, Mr. Salem. That resolution has to be passed by this body.

MR. SALEM: Well then, Mr. Speaker, the resolution calling for the impeachment of Judge O. P. Carrillo was not passed by this body. It was 161, and

it was referred -- The Speaker has the prerogative of 1 2 referring it to any committee he wants to. The House 3 chose by another resolution to send it to a Select 4 Impeachment Committee. Is this not correct? 5 6 SPEAKER CLAYTON: That is correct, Mr. 7 Salem. MR. SALEM: Then when did the resolution 8 9 pass? 10 SPEAKER CLAYTON: The resolution has not 11 passed, Mr. Salem. That is what we will have under consideration here today. 12 13 MR. SALEM: That's what I'm asking, Mr. 14 Speaker. All I have to do to bring impeachment pro-15 ceedings against you or any member of this House or the Senate is to go over there and file a House Simple 16 Resolution with the Chief Clerk and then what will 17 happen is exactly what happened in the Carrillo case, 18 and then we would reach this point in time. 19 20 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Not necessarily so, 21 Mr. Salem. 22 MR. SALEM: How would it be prevented, Mr. Speaker? 23 24 SPEAKER CLAYTON: The House makes its 25 decision along with the committee.

MR. SALEM: But, Mr. Speaker, the House hasn't had an opportunity to make a decision since the proceedings started.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Salem, the House made a decision to appoint a Select Committee. The House made its decision to refer this resolution to that committee and asked that it report. The House also passed a Resolution 221, which would call this body back into session should that committee report. Had that committee not found the desire to report this body would not have been called back into session.

MR. SALEM: To further my parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker, and to take it one step further, let us assume that we reach a point in time when you are not Speaker of the House and most of the members who are here are not serving in the Legislature. According to what I have before me, all that an individual has to do to put a man through what Judge Carrillo has gone through in the committee or any committee would be to introduce a House Simple Resolution. It is then up to the Speaker of the House to send that resolution to any committee that he might choose to send it to, and then you would start the investigation and they would be working on that resolution.

Is this not correct?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: That is correct, Mr. Salem. That's been the rule since the beginning of our Constitution in 1876.

MR. SALEM: Well, what I'm asking to further my parliamentary inquiry is that what could possibly happen—and I don't address myself to whether an individual is guilty or not guilty—but an individual could be taken before any committee—the Committee on Agriculture if the Speaker of the House decided to send that impeachment resolution to them—and he would sit there for week in and week out, week in and week out, listening to testimony. The press would be carrying all of these things about the individual, and in effect, what would have been done, the man would have been destroyed in the press before he even had his day in court.

## Is this not correct?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: That is an assumption, Mr. Salem. And we're not going to debate that issue. The issue before us is going to be the resolution.

MR. SALEM: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Members of the House, if I might have your attention, before we proceed with our business.

Members of the House assembled here in this

unusual session, the third of its kind in the history of this State, I would remind you that the price of justice is not cheap, but the system works. The proof of this is in the coming celebration of our 200th year as a nation. Though trials and tribultions may sometimes beset us, our faith in God and a government of the people has carried us to even greater heights and will continue to be our guidepost for tomorrow.

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Our system of government requires that the governed, or the people, must also govern. This is most appropriately accomplished by those elected officials closest to the people, the Legislators. But our system divides the responsibilities among three branches, a Legislative, Executive and Judicial branch, each performing proper functions. The Legislative branch makes the law, the Judicial interprets, and the Executive implements. Within this system, the Legislature provides the structure by which the other branches of government accomplish their constitutional duties. However, some would say that what we consider here today is a waste of the taxpayers' money, not a legislative responsibility and a matter that reeks of political revenge. But if a government of the people continues to work, we must meet our responsibility as set out in the Constitution and the laws of this State.

House Simple Resolution 161 establishing a Select Committee on Impeachment was proper in its introduction and its passage by an overwhelming majority.

Now we must proceed with the committee's report, not to decide guilt or innocence, but rather to carry out our Constitutional mandate to assess to the satisfaction of our own minds and consciences whether or not Articles of Impeachment should be brought in the case of the judge of the 229th Judicial District Court.

Time will note and history will record our actions here today. To properly fulfill our role, we must ensure that the cause of justice is accomplished, and that no man's inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are jeopardized nor suppressed.

Your committee has worked hard; they have furnished you with the needed information for the deliberation of this matter. With the same type of determination and dedication shown by you in the 64th Regular Session, I am sure that the House will dispense with its responsibility and we can be adjourned within a few hours.

The Chair lays out how Simple Resolution Number One. The Clerk will read the resolution.

MR. REYNOLDS: House Simple Resolution,

No. 1, by Evans:

"Resolved that the House of Representatives of the 64th Legislature now convened for the purpose of impeachment hereby provide that members of the House as provided by Article 3, Section 24, of the Texas Constitution receive during the impeachment section per diem of \$30 for each day the House is in session and a mileage allowance in travel to and from the seat of government at the same rate as prescribed by law for employees of the State of Texas."

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Evans to explain his resolution.

MR. EVANS: Mr. Speaker, Members, this is just a simple resolution in accordance with the Constitution whereby we get paid while we're here.

I move its adoption.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Is there objection to the adoption of the resolution? Is there objection?

The Chair hears none. The resolution is adopted.

Mr. Hale for a motion.

MR. HALE: Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, I move to suspend all necessary rules which would

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specifically include Rule 9, Section 3; Rule 17, Section 5; Rule 9, Section 15, and any other rules necessary in order to permit the staff of the House Select Committee on Impeachment to sit here on the floor of the House in order that they may work with and advise the members of the committee during the debate of this House Simple Resolution 161.

This is a procedure that we have always followed on appropriation bills, on tax bills, and other complicated matters. We have permitted the staff of the committee to be here on the floor in order to render expert advice and guidance to the committee members and to the members of the House if you want to talk to them about anything. I think it would be very helpful for them to be on the floor, and I move to suspend the rules in order that this be done.

MR. SALEM: Mr. Speaker?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Salem, for what

MR. SALEM: Will the gentleman yield for

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Do you yield, Mr. Hale?

MR. HALE: I'll yield to the senator from

MR. SALEM: I appreciate it. Mr. Hale,

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let me ask this question: In what capacity does Attorney
Terry Doyle sit on as a staff member of the committee?

MR. HALE: Mr. Doyle has been employed as counsel for the House Select Committee on Impeachment. He is on the payroll as the committee counsel. However, Mr. Salem, for your information, your point of order a moment ago does not apply to Mr. Doyle because he is a former member of the House. He has the privileges of the floor.

MR. SALEM: But we're not sitting here,
Mr. Hale, as a Legislature. We're sitting here as a
different committee completely, as I understand it,
for impeachment proceedings. But if he is hired to act
as counsel for the committee would he—and I need to ask
this question—would he be representing the committee
should this impeachment go to the Senate for impeachment?
Would he be prosecuting there?

MR. HALE: That decision has not yet been made, Mr. Salem, but the committee would assume that a Board of Managers, to be created by a subsequent resolution of this House in the event articles of impeachment are voted, would have the authority to employ a prosecuting attorney, and the House Select Committee on Impeachment assumed and would certainly recommend to that committee that they employ Mr. Doyle since he has done the work on

this committee report.

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MR. SALEM: Mr. Hale, if they don't employ Mr. Doyle and use Mr. Doyle as a prosecuting attorney, why did the committee find it necessary to use Mr. Doyle as counsel for the committee when 95 per cent of the members of the committee are all attorneys? And I assume the staff members also.

MR. HALE: Well, it wasn't 95 per cent, It was eight out of the eleven, whatever Mr. Salem. that percentage is, were attorneys. The House Select Committee on Impeachment at its first meeting discussed the possibility of employing committee counsel. At that time in the interest of saving funds we decided, because of the fact that eight of the eleven members of the committee were lawyers, because of the fact that Mr. Johnson had been assigned by the Speaker as a consultant to the committee, and Mr. Johnson is a very able attorney, and by reason of the fact that the Legislative Council had several attorneys that the Speaker made available and the Council made available to our committee, we decided not to employ counsel until we reached a point where we were actually going to start drafting articles of impeachment. So as a result the committee did its own legal work through the aid of Mr. Johnson and the Legislative Council until pretty far along in our

committee proceedings.

When we reached the point where we wanted to start actually drafting the language of Articles of Impeachment, we decided at that time that the attorney who would ultimately have the responsibility for prosecuting this should be brought into the picture. And it was at that time that the committee then decided to employ committee counsel. We took applications for it; we received several applications; and the committee was unanimous in its vote to select Mr. Doyle for this purpose, and so he was employed.

MR. SALEM: Well, Mr. Hale, since by what you have written in this document and what the Speaker has just said a while ago, that we are not here to decide innocence or guilt, that we are merely here to decide whether or not articles of impeachment should be held against Judge Carrillo, and since Attorney Doyle will more than likely be the prosecuting attorney in the Senate, I think that it would be wrong to have him sitting here with the rest of your staff acting in that capacity on this floor at this time.

MR. HALE: Mr. Salem, are you familiar with the grand jury system in Texas?

MR. SALEM: Fairly well, Mr. Hale.

MR. HALE: Did you ever hear of a grand

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jury meeting and discussing the matters of possible indictment without the district attorney or a member of his staff being present?

MR. SALEM: Well, but, Mr. Hale, you've said time and time again that your committee was acting much the same as a grand jury, but this is—

MR. HALE: That's true, and this House-

MR. SALEM: —but this is a different breed of cat here. We're not sitting here as a Legis-lature. It's completely different.

MR. HALE: Thank you for your comment, The House is sitting here also in the nature Mr. Salem. of a grand jury. The committee was functioning as a grand jury, a small grand jury, and the House is functioning as a large grand jury under Ferguson versus Maddox. Our function is judicial in character, and the only decision before this body is the same as a decision before a grand jury: Is there sufficient evidence to justify further legal proceedings. We do not find guilt or innocence. We simply say that there is or there is not enough evidence of wrongdoing to justify further legal proceedings. So under the statutes and court decisions in Texas, our function here today is largely that of a grand jury, and for that reason we felt that like a grand jury the district attorney or the

1 prosecuting attorney, if you please, in this case, 2 roughly comparable to a district attorney, should 3 certainly be a party to all of these proceedings and 4 know what the thinking of the House is because he will be representing the House if it goes to a prosecution 6 in the Senate. 7 MR. SALEM: Mr. Hale, you see, I've got 8 to ask these questions so that I can learn a little 9 something. Now, since we are sitting in effect as a 10 grand jury-11 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Laney calls a point 12 of order. The gentleman's time has expired. The point 13 of order is well taken and sustained. 14 MR. SALEM: I move to have the gentleman's 15 time extended. 16 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Salem moves that the 17 gentleman's time be extended. All those in favor of the 18 extension of the time will say "aye," all opposed, "no." 19 (The motion being put to a voice vote, failed.) 20 The gentleman's time is not extended. 21 Mr. Salem, do you want to speak against the 22 motion? 23 No, sir. MR. SALEM: SPEAKER CLAYTON: The question then is on 24 25 this suspension of the rules to allow staff on the floor.

1 All those in favor will vote "aye," all those opposed 2 will vote "no." It's a record vote, the Clerk will ring 3 the bell. 4 Have all members voted? 5 There being 123 "ayes" and 12 "noes,"the rules 6 are suspended. 7 (The motion, being put to a record vote, passed.) 8 The Chair lays out on committee report House 9 Simple Resolution 161. The Clerk will read the resolution. 10 MR. REYNOLDS: House Simple Resolution 11 No. 161, by Canales, providing-12 SPEAKER CLAYTON: The following substitute. 13 The Clerk will read the substitute. 14 MR. REYNOLDS: Committee Substitute for 15 House Simple Resolution No. 161. 16 SPEAKER CLAYTON: The Chair recognizes 17 Mr. Hale for an explanation of the substitute to House 18 Simple Resolution 161. 19 MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker? 20 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Moreno, for what 21 purpose? 22 MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker, I raise a point 23 of order, and I cite Rule 17, Section 4; Rule 8, Section 24 32; Rule 8, Section 27, in that this resolution authorizes 25 an expenditure of money and does not contain a fiscal note

in accordance with the House rules. 1 2 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Moreno raises a 3 point of order pursuant to Rules 17, Section 4; Rule 8, 32; and Rule 8, 27. Rule 8, 27 refers to bills or 4 5 joint resolutions. Rule 8, 32 says that resolutions 6 shall take the same procedure as that set out in Rule 7 8, Section 27. And Rule 17, Section 4 talks about the 8 budget for a resolution, but House Resolution 161 does 9 not authorize the expenditure of funds. The authoriza-10 tion for the expenditure of funds is found in Article 11 5962; therefore, the point of order is respectfully 12 overruled. 13 MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker? 14 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Moreno, for what 15 purpose? 16 MR. MORENO: Parliamentary inquiry. 17 SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, 18 Mr. Moreno. 19 MR. MORENO: Is it correct that I just 20 understood you that the resolution does not call for 21 the expenditure of money? 22 That is correct. SPEAKER CLAYTON: 23 MR. MORENO: I am reading here on House 24 Simple Resolution No. 167, on page 12-25 House Resolution 161 is SPEAKER CLAYTON:

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1	before the House, Mr. Moreno.
2	MR. MORENO: All right, sir.
3	SPEAKER CLAYTON: House 167 has already
4	been adopted.
5	MR. MORENO: All right. House Simple
6	Resolution No. 167 specifically says in line 12, and it
7	says that:
8	"This committee shall expend funds for
9	necessary expenses and employment of per-
10	sonnel, et cetera."
11	Doesn't 167 tie in with 161, Mr. Speaker?
12	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Every resolution stands
13	on its own, Mr. Moreno.
14	MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker, then was also
15	your ruling that a House Simple Resolution is not the
16	same as a Joint Resolution and is treated differently?
17	SPEAKER CLAYTON: That is correct.
18	MR. MORENO: Does the Rule 8, Section 32
19	state as follows:
20	"All reports of simple and concurrent
21	resolutions shall follow and be made the same
22	thing as in all House bills."
23	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Except, Mr. Moreno, if
24	you'll continue to read, "except subject to such differ-
25	ences as may be otherwise authorized or directed herein."

MR. MORENO: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: And Section 27 makes that direction.

MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker, is it proper at this time to be heard for a motion on this resolution?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Not at this time. I'm going to recognize Mr. Hale for an overview of the committee report. Then I'll recognize you, Mr. Moreno, for a motion.

Mr. Hale.

## PRESENTATION BY MR. HALE

MR. HALE: Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, it becomes my responsibility as Chairman of the Select Committee on Impeachment to open the debate on H.S.R. 161 and to give you an overview of the work of the committee and our committee report with respect to this important and historic document.

We meet here today, as the Speaker pointed out, under authority of House Simple Resolution 221 to consider and act upon House Simple Resolution 161, requesting the institution of impeachment charges against the Judge of the 229th Judicial District of Texas.

The authority of the House to act upon this resolution is contained in Article 15, Section 1, of the Constitution of Texas which provides that the power of

impeachment shall be vested in the House of Representatives. This constitutional authority is made more precise and procedures are outlined in Articles 5961 and subsequent articles of Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, a series of statutes enacted in 1917 by a rather farseeing legislature who had just been through the ordeal of the impeachment of a governor of Texas without any statutory guidelines. And I want to publicly commend the members of that legislature for the enactment of these detailed procedural statutes as having made our responsibilities much easier.

The proposition before us today imposes upon the House of Representatives a heavy responsibility and a very solemn duty, and I know that each of you feel as I do a keen sense of history as we attempt to meet this challenge.

For more than a century and a half Texas has been blessed with many great men serving in the judicial branch of government. These men have maintained high standards of courage, honesty and integrity. We, the members of the House and the members of the Senate and all people of Texas, are dedicated to the protection of the honor of the judicial branch of the government.

MR. TRUAN: Mr. Speaker, will the

gentleman yield?

happy to yield.

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Mr. Hale, will you yield? SPEAKER CLAYTON: MR. HALE: I would appreciate the gentleman waiting until I've completed my remarks, and then I'll be

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman doesn't yield at this time, Mr. Truan.

MR. HALE: To do this we must leave nothing undone in our efforts to uncover misconduct in any area which would tarnish the reputation of the judiciary.

At the same time I know that each of you shares my feeling and the feeling of your House Select Committee on Impeachment that we should strive in everything we do to protect any innocent from charges which are not well founded in fact. That was the task and the challenge before your Select Committee. That was the challenge we attempted to meet over a period of more than two months in which we have been working upon this very thankless task.

The perimeters of our responsibility has been well defined by the Supreme Court of Texas in a landmark case rendered on July 12, 1924, styled Ferguson versus Maddox, and with your permission so that you will understand the nature of our responsibility here today, I would like to quote briefly from the Supreme Court opinion

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"The sole function of the House and Ho

Senate is not to compose the legislature and to act together in the making of laws. Each in the plainest language is given separate pleniary power and jurisdiction in relation to matters of impeachment: the House, the power to impeach; that is, to prefer charges; the Senate, the power to try those charges. These powers are essentially judicial in their nature. Their proper exercise does not in the remotest degree involve any legislative function. In the matter of impeachment the House acts somewhat in the capacity of a grand jury. It investigates, hears witnesses, and determines whether or not there is sufficient ground to justify the presentment of charges, and if so, it adopts appropriate articles and prefers them before the Senate. In doing these things the House is not legislative, nor is it conducting an investigation in order that it may be in better position to legislate. It is investigating facts in order that it may determine whether one of the people's servants has done an

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official wrong, worthy of impeachment under the principles and practices obtaining in such cases, and if so to present the matter for trial before the constituted tribunal. All of this is judicial in character."

Thus the Supreme Court has defined the function of this legislature, of this House of Representatives, as being judicial in character rather than legislative. Our responsibility is neither that of prosecutor nor jury. Our sole function is to conduct an investigation to determine whether or not there are sufficient grounds to justify the presentment of charges, and if so, to adopt appropriate articles of impeachment and represent such articles for the consideration of the House of Representatives.

In carrying out that heavy responsibility the House followed the customary procedure that has been followed for more than five hundred years in the Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction, a procedure originated in the House of Commons of the British Parliament, carried forward into the House of Representatives of the United States Congress, and embodied in every constitution that Texas has had since the Constitution of 1845, the Constitution of the Republic.

In following out that mandate the House decided

last May that we would proceed with this matter and the method of procedure would be the appointment of a select committee on impeachment, which was done under authority of House Simple Resolution 161. The committee held its organizational meeting on May 19, 1975, and commenced public hearings the following day. At that time, as you know, the Legislature was in session, and we had to have our hearings at night. The burden became overwhelming on the committee, and on May 27, the committee decided to recess until the end of the regular session of the Legislature, and we recessed until June the 3rd, 1975, when we again commenced public hearings.

Those hearings were continued intermittently until July 16, 1975, when the committee adopted the articles of impeachment and a committee substitute for H.S.R. 161. This substitute and the H.S.R. 161 was then filed with the Chief Clerk on July 17, 1975, triggering this session of the Legislature for impeachment purposes.

During our deliberations the Select Committee held 21 meetings, in excess of 90 hours in committee session. We heard 32 witnesses, involving approximately 70 hours of public hearings. We have a record which is available to all of you of fifteen volumes of testimony of all these witnesses which has been transcribed by our committee reporter.

We also have introduced into evidence 166
documents which you have copies available over here for
your examination. We have set up some tables. There are
extra copies of the committee reports. There are
multiple copies of the fifteen volume statement of facts.
There are multiple copies of the 166 exhibits which are
there for the use of the members of this House.

The committee report, which was distributed to you by mail to your home address, is this blue covered booklet, and there are extra copies of that available over here if any of you have misplaced your copy or you left it at home; there are extra copies of it available at the committee desk over to the right of where I speak.

You will find in Part V we have gone into a detailed annotation of each Article of Impeachment, those annotations being to the records which the committee made in the statement of facts and the exhibits, so that if you read the summary of the testimony and then you want to read the exact words that the witness said, you can go get the statement of facts and read exactly what the witness said. The committee has made every attempt to keep you, the members of the House, fully informed of what we've been doing, and we tried to make available to you everything that you would need to carry out your heavy responsibilities in connection with the task before

us here today.

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Throughout this procedure—and I want to emphasize this—the committee has adopted the posture in several areas of activity that I want to make clear to Number one, the committee has never felt that it was in the role of prosecutor. We did not feel that during our committee hearings; we do not feel it today. The House Select Committee is not appearing before you today in the role of prosecutor of the Judge of the 229th Judicial District. You assigned us a thankless task; you told us by a Simple Resolution, you directed us to hear the testimony, to prepare a report, and to give you our findings. We have attempted to the best of our ability to perform that task, and do it well. I, personally, am proud of the work of this committee, and I want to publicly commend the other ten members of the committee for the diligent efforts that they put into the work of the committee, and for the courage which they exercised in carrying out this very pressure-packed responsibility that you imposed upon us.

The second thing which the committee decided initially was the fact that we wanted to be sure that the rights of the accused was protected in every way possible, consistent with the responsibility imposed upon us. Now, the question may arise, "Why did you not permit cross

examination of witnesses?"

No grand jury permits cross examination of witnesses. The purpose of cross examination is to test the credibility of witnesses, to attempt to impeach their testimony, to develop other areas. That is not the function of a grand jury. That is the function of the trial court, and we were not engaged in a trial in this instance. We were simply there to determine whether or not there were sufficient facts to justify recommending articles of impeachment. We have carried out that responsibility, and we present it to you here today on the basis of our committee report.

Thirdly, the committee attempted in every way possible to accord every possible consideration to Judge Carrillo and to his attorney, Mr. Arthur Mitchell. We invited them to sit in our hearings. Every bit of testimony that was adduced before the committee was done in public hearing, although that would not be true in a grand jury proceeding. Any lawyer here will tell you, if you're not familiar, that all grand jury proceedings are conducted in secret. We threw our meetings open, open to the public, open to Mr. Mitchell, open to Judge Carrillo, and I think I'm correct in saying this, that there was not a single iota of evidence ever introduced before this Select Committee wherein either Judge Carrillo

or Mr. Mitchell, his attorney, or some representative from Mr. Mitchell's office was not present. We gave to Mr. Mitchell as attorney for Judge Carrillo a complete copy set of the fifteen volume statement of facts. We gave him photocopies of every exhibit that was introduced before the committee, all free of charge. We made the facilities of the committee available to him in every way possible, consistent with the orderly transaction of our business and a timely presentation to you of a report upon the nature of our deliberations.

Based upon that two months' work, the committee voted eleven Articles of Impeachment, and these are contained in the report of which you have a copy. Each of those articles is annotated. As the report indicates, some of these Articles of Impeachment were not unanimous in the committee. I believe six of the eleven articles, or perhaps seven, were unanimous. The votes are given in the committee reports. You can read it for yourself.

But once the committee substitute was adopted, the committee was unanimous in recommending adopting the committee substitute, and the committee was unanimous in reporting House Simple Resolution 161 back to the House.

As to our procedure here today, what we would like to do is follow something along this line so that you will understand how the proceedings will operate.

Following the brief overview of the committee report, which I am now making to you, I would hope that the Chair would recognize the vice-chairman of the committee, Mr. Maloney, who will give you an overview of the eleven Articles of Impeachment as contained in H.S.R. 161, simply by way of explanation and broad overview of the entire recommendation of the committee.

Following Mr. Maloney's presentation, we would anticipate a motion would be made—and we would hope that you would concur in this—that the Articles of Impeachment be debated, considered, amended, and voted upon article by article. That would give each of the articles due deliberation before the House. If that motion is carried then each member of the committee will have the floor responsibility for explaining to you one of the eleven Articles of Impeachment and attempting to answer any questions which you have with respect to that.

At the conclusion of the House consideration and debate upon all eleven articles, then at that point, of course, the floor would be open for amendments. If there are anyone who wants to add additional articles of impeachment by way of amendment that would be in order at that time, or any other motions concerning the entire committee report.

Then, having worked through all articles, then

remarks.

the committee substitute as amended would be up for adoption, and if adopted then the vote would be on the adoption of H.S.R. 161. That, in general, would be the procedure as we envision it as members of your committee.

MR. TRUAN: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield at this time?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Hale, do you yield?

MR. HALE: As soon as I've completed my

SPEAKER CLAYTON: As soon as the gentleman has completed, Mr. Truan.

MR. HALE: Having said that, I have explained to you the nature of the work of our committee. Our committee feels that it has met its responsibility which you imposed upon us. We have not prosecuted, we have not judged; we have only searched for the truth, for it's the truth as we see it that must be the basis for any decisions which this House makes today or subsequent days of this session concerning H.S.R. 161.

As chairman of this committee, I want to tell you how proud I am again of the members of the committee. None of the members of this committee sought this assignment. None of them shirked the responsibility when duty called and imposed this responsibility upon them. Each member dedicated his talents and energies

in a way that more than justified in my opinion the confidence of the Speaker in appointing him to this committee.

I feel that our labors together, that we have done a fair, impartial, and thorough job of fulfilling the responsibilities of the committee and in that process I hope that we have strengthened the House as an institution in its public image.

And today we come to the moment of truth. The House comes to the moment of truth, one which was faced by the committee on July 16, 1975.

I can say to you, it's not an easy job, and it won't be an easy job for you to vote on the matters of gravity that we consider here this week, but I am supremely confident that each of you will have the courage to vote your convictions, whatever they be, firm in the belief that right and justice will be achieved thereby.

I would conclude my brief remarks by a quotation from one of my favorite statesmen, a man who in a sense was really a legend in his own time, Winston Churchill, when he said at one time, "It's not enough that we do our best. Sometimes we have to do what's required."

What's required this week by the House of

Representatives and by each of you is a decision on the matters which have been committed to our consideration, and I know that each of you will search his conscience and vote your conviction on these matters. That's all we would ask of you; no one could ask any more. And we, your Select Committee, feels that none of you could do any less.

I thank you for your attention on this report.

MR. TRUAN: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Do you yield, Mr. Hale?
The gentleman yields, Mr. Truan.

MR. TRUAN: Mr. Hale, during your deliberations and inquiring into this matter concerning Judge Carrillo, did you ever ask the Judicial Qualifications Commission to come before your committee?

MR. HALE: Mr. Truan, at the outset of our proceedings, either at the organizational meeting on May the 19th, or at the first meeting on May the 20th—and I sometimes get a little hazy on exact dates—the committee decided that we would attempt to find out what information was available in other areas that had already been developed that might be of some benefit to our committee. In that process we made contact with the Judicial Qualifications Commission. We made contact with

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the Attorney General's office, and we made contact with the U. S. District Attorney's office in Houston which is the office prosecuting the federal indictment against Judge Carrillo in the Corpus Christi Federal Court.

Each of those agencies indicated to us— Well, let me take them one at a time.

The Judicial Qualifications Commission advised us that they had no information that would be of any value to the committee.

Number two, the Attorney General advised us the same thing, that the work-

MR. TRUAN: Let me ask you this.

MR. HALE: Let me answer your question.

MR. TRUAN: I just ask about the Judicial Qualifications Commission, Mr. Hale, because that's a State commission. And I'm interested as a layman. I'm not an attorney like you all, but I understood that we had established the Judicial Qualifications Commission for purposes such as this: to look into those matters similar to what your committee has been looking into. I'm not clear yet as to whether you did request the Executive Director or other members of the Commission to come before your committee to give you testimony, sworn testimony, with respect to their work, or whether you called on them to carry on their work in this area

now.

so that they would carry out their mandate. As far as I know they're supposed to be doing this kind of work.

MR. HALE: Mr. Truan, if you want to drive from Corpus Christi to Austin there are a number of ways you could come. You could go through Sinton and Victoria to come up here. You could go through Kenedy, Karnes City, Luling and Lockhart and come up here. You could go through Karnes City and up to San Antonio and come here. In any event, you would get from Corpus Christi to Austin.

There are three ways outlined in the Constitution of Texas for the removal of a district judge, One by the governor, one by the Supreme Court—

MR. TRUAN: I realize that, but youMR. HALE: Let me answer your question

MR. TRUAN: You've answered my question—

MR. HALE: If you're going to yield to a question, Mr. Truan, give me the courtesy of allowing me to complete my answer.

MR. TRUAN: If you would just answer my question, I do not want to monopolize the time because you took a great deal of it, and if you're going to run out of time and other members might wish to ask you some questions. I'm just interested in the Judicial

Qualifications Commission.

MR. HALE: I answered your question on the Judicial Qualifications Commission. We contacted them. They said they had no ewidence. Why should we waste our time calling them as witnesses?

MR. TRUAN: Okay. Did I understand correctly that members of your committee will be called upon to the front mike to explain the various articles and to give us a summary of why they're recommending those particular articles?

MR. HALE: I hope that the House will authorize us to do that, article by article. That is our recommendation to the House.

MR. TRUAN: Did your committee recommend that the witnesses, those key witnesses that you heard, come before this body so that we could hear their testimony and at the same time so that we would have an opportunity to ask them some questions as members of your committee did?

MR. HALE: No, sir. We did not make a recommendation on that, but one of the procedures of the House, as I see it, can play one of two ballgames at this point, Mr. Truan. One ballgame would be to go ahead and act on the basis of the committee report; the report plus all of the transcript, the statement of

facts, all of the exhibits, the testimony which is available to you, and to base your decision on that. That is one ballgame.

A second ballgame would be for you to say,
"We want to discard what the committee did. We want to
hear the testimony ourselves." And if you want to do
that your proper procedure would be, I think, to move to
dissolve the House into a committee of the whole for the
purpose of hearing testimony.

Now, let me say, those are two different ballgames. Our committee takes no stand on which way you
proceed on that. You can do it either way you want to.

If you go the first route I think we can conclude our
deliberations in two or three days; at the outside, this
week. If you use the second ballgame, I can tell you
from the experiences of our committee, you're going to
be here at least a month, maybe two months. But the
House can make that decision.

MR. TRUAN: Okay. But you will agree with me that expediency is not always the best, especially when it involves an individual who, if these articles of impeachment were to pass and then of course were to be tried and convicted that it would deprive an individual of his office and of ever holding an office for that matter, so we're not striving for expediency here, I hope.

MR. HALE: Keep in mind that what this House does is not going to be the final decision. If we vote articles of impeachment there will be a trial in the Senate, and at that time the trial will be conducted exactly as a district court would conduct it, with cross examination of witnesses, with all of the attorneys and everything, so that all rights will be protected at that stage.

MR. TRUAN: Yes, but that, of course, is the responsibility of the Senate. We have a responsibility likewise here as members of the House.

MR. HALE: You are so right.

MR. TRUAN: Did I understand correctly, I was going to inquire of the Speaker, the method of going about in getting witnesses to appear before us? I would be interested in this because I think it would give us a good benefit personally of the witnesses and what they had to say before your committee. Do I understand correctly, Mr. Hale, and if you wish, I would ask the Speaker. Does it require a resolution or just a motion?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Truan, if you're addressing that as a parliamentary inquiry, the Speaker will answer it.

To accomplish the purpose for which you have

1	asked, it will require a motion of resolving the House
2	into a committee of a whole.
3	MR. TRUAN: What vote does that require,
4	sir?
5	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Simple majority.
6	MR. TRUAN: Thank you.
7	MR. VALE: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman
8	yield for a question?
9	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Do you yield, Mr. Hale?
10	MR. HALE: Yield.
11	SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,
12	Mr. Vale.
13	MR. VALE: Mr. Hale, I noticed that in
14	your presentation you alluded to the fact that this
15	thirteen volumes of evidence and exhibits-
16	MR. HALE: Fifteen.
17	MR. VALE: Fifteen—are available and have
18	been available. Is that correct?
19	MR. HALE: Yes, sir. That is correct.
20	MR. VALE: Are you informed of the fact
21	that in order for them to have been available to members
22	like me that I had to come down here to Austin and check
23	those volumes out and that I was allowed to check them
24	out only two at a time?
25	MR. HALE: Well, we provided, Mr. Vale-

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No, I wasn't aware of that. We did provide for the Sergeant at Arms to require a check-out of those volumes.

MR. VALE: Yes, sir-

Let me finish and explain the MR. HALE: situation on that. The committee debated among itself at one of our meetings on whether or not we should reproduce 150 copies of that big fifteen volume statement of facts and mail one to every member of the House. We talked to a number of members of the House-I did and other members of the committee did—to sort of get the feel of the House as to whether that was necessary. I didn't find a single member that thought that was necessary. So the committee finally decided that we would reproduce only fifty copies of it, and we did. We reproduced fifty copies, and we provided each member of the committee with a copy, some to the State Library, and then there are about 25 or 30 sets of those that we put in the Sergeant at Arms office and notified each one of you by mail that they were available there for your inspection and your use.

MR. VALE: Let me ask you this: Have you ever heard of a grand jury voting an indictment against a person based upon a summary of evidence given to them, rather than by listening to witnesses?

MR. HALE: Well, of course, a grand jury,

I'm not sure what basis a grand jury indicts. I've never served on it, and all of their proceedings are secret.

So you never know for sure what goes on in a grand jury room unless you're a member of that grand jury or the district attorney. But they do call witnesses.

MR. VALE: That's right.

MR. HALE: And they hear the witnesses in whatever numbers they feel is necessary to justify an indictment. But they do not go into the depths of it that a trial court does because if they did then you would never have an acquittal in the trial court. If the grand jury went into it in an extent of determining guilt or innocence there would be no point in a trial later on.

MR. VALE: I understand that. The reason I asked that is, I find it very, very hard to reconcile this, to listen to summary of testimony by other persons telling me what witnesses have testified to.

MR. HALE: That's not what's in the statement of facts. The statement of facts over here is a transcript of the exact words, questions and answers, and you can read what the witness says for yourself.

MR. VALE: That's right. Now, I have been coming to Austin, and I've been reading those transcripts, Mr. Hale, and I have been required to check them out two

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at a time, see. They have been available, but they have not been available, in my opinion, in the manner and the method that they should have been, and as I recall, as they were promised to have been made available, right there from the front podium.

We were told that we would be furnished at our home offices in our district offices a complete copy of all the transcripts of all the testimony and exhibits that came before the committee in sufficient time to give us plenty of time to acquaint ourselves with those facts so that we could come down here and then be prepared after having read them or having had an adequate opportunity to read them. There is a difference between availability and an adequate availability to do things.

I just find it— Have you ascertained that those documents were available only two transcripts at a time?

MR. HALE: No, I wasn't aware of that.

The complete set was available. We put several sets in the library where the complete set was available, and of course, if you were working here the complete set is available to you, Mr. Vale.

Let me say this: If you've read that entire fifteen volume set of transcripts, or even two volumes of it, I commend you for your diligence, and I hope every member of the House has.

MR. VALE: I've read four of them.

MR. HALE: That's the only way we could do that. The way you would like it done, we would have had to have printed 150 copies of it and; after talking to many members of the House, the committee felt like that was an unnecessary expense, and we would not go to it.

I'm sorry if the complete record wasn't available to you.

Of course, I don't see how—You're not going to read all fifteen volumes in one night anyway—

MR. VALE: I know that. It's taken me a long time to read through about five or six of them and I still haven't finished. I don't know of any person in any position that is going to decide a matter as important as whether to prefer these articles of impeachment or not, to decide it on the basis of what people are going to summarize to us what other witnesses have said at a committee hearing.

MR. HALE: Then you should go read the statement of facts now, Mr. Vale, and base your decision on what the witnesses say, not what the committee says.

We don't want you to do anything on the basis of what we say. We're not here as prosecutor; we're not asking you to do anything. We were told by the House to investigate this matter—

MR. VALE: I'm telling you, Mr. Hale-

MR. HALE: Let me finish. 1 We were told by the House to investigate this 2 matter and make a report, and we have done that with our 3 recommendation. Now it's in your hands. You do what 4 your conscience dictates. 5 MR. VALE: I'm going to do that. I'm 6 going to do exactly that. I'm just telling you that I 7 find it very hard to be called upon by you and by this 8 committee and the leadership of this House to come down 9 here to vote on something when those records that you're 10 mentioning have not been made available to us in the 11 manner that they should have been. 12 MR. HALE: Now, what is your question, 13 Mr. Vale? 14 MR. VALE: I'm making that statement to 15 you right now, Mr. Hale. I was asking you whether you 16 were aware of the fact-17 MR. HALE: I was not aware of it. 18 MR. VALE: I want you to know that. 19 MR. HALE: Okay. Thank you. 20 Thank you, members of the House. 21 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Moreno, did you 22 have a motion? 23 The Chair recognizes you at this time. 24 MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker, pursuant to

1	Rule 8, Section 13, I move to recommit H.S.R. 161 to the
2	Select Committee, and that this committee—that it be
3	recommitted and that this House instruct that this
4	procedure be turned over to the Judicial Qualifications
5	Commission, and I would like to be heard on my motion,
6	Mr. Speaker.
7	SPEAKER CLAYTON: The Chair recognizes
8	you on your motion, Mr. Moreno.
9	MR. MORENO: Parliamentary inquiry before
10	I start, Mr. Speaker.
11	SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry,
12	Mr. Moreno.
13	MR. MORENO: It is my understanding that
14	when a motion to recommit with instructions is fully
15	debatable and the whole proposition can be debated.
16	Am I correct or not, Mr. Speaker?
17	SPEAKER CLAYTON: That is correct, Mr.
18	Moreno.
19	MR. MORENO: Thank you.
20	MR. NABERS: Mr. Speaker?
21	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Nabers.
22	MR. NABERS: I raise a point of order
23	that that's not a proper motion for consideration.
24	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Bring your point of
25	order forward.

The point of order is withdrawn. Proceed, Mr. Moreno.

MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker, Members: As I have stated I have been doing a lot of homework on my rules. My motion is fully debatable. This is my purpose of making it first of all. That means that the whole proposition, which is the matter of impeachment, is debatable before this floor.

As you recall, when we first introduced House Simple Resolution 161, I told you that the Bar was properly equipped to take care of this matter. Now, my motion is very simple. It is to have this House Simple Resolution go back to the committee, and that this House instruct them that they recommend that this procedure be handed over to the Judicial Qualifications Commission.

Now, let me tell you my reasoning. All of us are in accord that however long it takes us in this House to either draft this impeachment resolution to the Senate, that the Senate is going to take a great amount of time in deliberating this issue. I'll venture to say that it is going to take at least two months, and I'll tell you, it might even go up to four months.

Please understand that the Senate, when it has this particular impeachment procedure, that every witness

1	will be subject to cross examination. This is going to
2	take a great deal of time.
3	Now, let me tell you, the present Constitution
4	provides—
5	MR. BARRIENTOS: Mr. Speaker, could we
6	have some order please?
7	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Surely can, Mr. Barrien-
8	tos.
9	Members, let's have your attention. Mr. Moreno
10	is discussing his motion, and we'll not proceed until
11	we have order on the floor.
12	Members, as soon as we have a little order
13	we're going to proceed with the debate.
14	MR. BLAKE: Mr. Speaker, could I have a
15	parliamentary inquiry while we're getting the attention?
16	SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry,
17	Mr. Blake.
18	MR. BLAKE: If Mr. Moreno's motion should
19	carry, does that mean that we would go home today, by
20	noon?
21	SPEAKER CLAYTON: If that motion should
22	carry, this committee report would be re-referred.
23	MR. BLAKE: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
24	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Proceed with your
25	discussion, Mr. Moreno.

MR. MORENO: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Let me clarify some things that can happen in this impeachment procedure. The Judicial Qualification Act is presently in our Constitution. It is Article 5. This Commission was set up to do exactly what we are attempting to do, and that is to remove a district judge, or any judge for that matter, from office.

Now, for some of you that are disturbed that this man might be able to serve in another office, let me tell you what can happen if the Judicial Qualifications Commission does in fact find the judge who is in question guilty of some act or some crime. I can guarantee you this man is going to be disbarred. It's very simple. You cannot hold public office in this state if you have been found guilty of any crime involving moral turpitude. This man will not be eligible for office.

Now, we also have another section of the Constitution, Article 15, which says that the Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court, can remove a judge from office.

So now we're talking of two different procedures now in our Constitution that can eliminate what we are trying to do here and save the State of Texas a great deal of money.

Now, let me tell you another thing. Let's

And another thing, let me tell you, the Judicial Qualifications Commission has set the date of September the 10th, at 9:30, to commence deliberations on this case.

The Texas Supreme Court is under mandate from the Constitution to also take care of this matter, and to in fact take whatever action it deems necessary to take this man out of office.

We are going to be here for—Well, the Senate is going to be here for a long time trying this man, and it's going to cost the State of Texas a lot of money.

MR. HENDRICKS: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

MR. MORENO: In just a moment, Mr. Hendricks

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman doesn't

yield at this time, Mr. Hendricks.

MR. MORENO: That's all I'm trying to tell you. I'm not attacking the committee; I'm not attacking the House; I'm not saying anything. I say that we have two other avenues that is going to save the State a great deal of money, and I suggest that we

1	take either one, and it is going to reach the same
2	objective.
3	I'll yield, Mr. Speaker.
4	SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,
5	Mr. Hendricks.
6	MR. HENDRICKS: Mr. Moreno, can you advise
7	the House how many judges that the Judicial Qualification
8	has removed from the bench?
9	MR. MORENO: None, Mr. Hendricks.
10	MR. HENDRICKS: None?
11	MR. MORENO: None. Yes, sir.
12	MR. HENDRICKS: This is a procedure that
13	ends up eventually in the Supreme Court of Texas, is it
14	not?
15	MR. MORENO: I didn't hear your question.
16	I'm sorry.
17	MR. HENDRICKS: This is a procedure that
18	will eventually surely end up in the Supreme Court of
19	the State of Texas?
20	MR. MORENO: Yes, sir.
21	MR. HENDRICKS: Let me ask you this
22	question also: If the House votes to recommend impeach-
23	ment, what is the position of Judge Carrillo? Does he
24	stay on the bench?
25	MR. MORENO: No, sir. He is immediately

removed.

MR. HENDRICKS: All right. Let me ask
you this question: If we were to vote for your motion
and the Judicial Qualifications took this up over the
next several years, what is the position of Judge Carrillo?
Would he stay on the bench?

MR. MORENO: As far as I know, yes, sir.

MR. HENDRICKS: Thank you, Mr. Moreno.

MR. MORENO: Let me just further my answer in that we do have a Supreme Court, as you well know, Mr. Hendricks, and you know darned good and well like I do as a practicing attorney, as a very learned attorney, that the Supreme Court of Texas is not going to permit a judge if he is guilty of some willfull act to remain in office. Now you know of lawyers who've been disbarred for lesser things than this, and the Judicial Qualifications Commission is under fire, the Texas Supreme Court is under fire, and we're going to clean up this mess one way or the other, but let me tell you, the cheapest way to do it is through the procedure that is outlined in the Constitution in Section 5 and Section 15.

That's all I'm saying, Mr. Hendricks.

MR. HENDRICKS: Mr. Moreno, let me ask you this: When did the Judicial Qualifications start their hearings on this matter?

MR. MORENO: As far as I understand it was set for September the 10th.

MR. HENDRICKS: Their first hearing is set for September the 10th?

MR. MORENO: Yes, sir.

MR. HENDRICKS: Are you advised that they had complaints filed with them long before the House voted this Simple Resolution on Impeachment?

MR. MORENO: Yes, sir. I have, and I know of all the criticisms, Mr. Hendricks, that have been levied against the Commission. I am in complete accord with you that this Commission has not done its job. But let me tell the Commission right now that they'd better get to work and get this mess out of here because it's going to be cheaper. They're sitting down there with an appropriated amount of \$61,000 I understand, and they're not doing anything. Let's do away with them, and if nothing else, let's impeach them.

MR. HENDRICKS: Well, to reiterate then, if we vote impeachment the judge is immediately removed, but if we follow your motion, then the judge might possibly be on the bench for the next several years while we're waiting action by the Judicial Qualifications Commission.

Is that correct?

MR. MORENO: Yes, sir. Your assumption is

very correct. But again, Mr. Hendricks, again, let me remind you that the judge is still an attorney and that there are disbarrment procedures, and it can last two years, three years, ten years, whatever the case may be, but I do not think that the State Bar is going to permit such an issue to remain open for this long a time as you say. I agree with you that there is that possibility.

MR. HENDRICKS: Thank you, Mr. Moreno.

MR. MORENO: Are there any more further questions, Mr. Speaker? I would appreciate an "aye" vote on my motion, and I request a record vote.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Okay. Mr. Moreno moves to recommit H.S.R. 161 to the Select Committee on Impeachment, and at the same time instruct the committee to refer all matters to the Judicial Qualifications Commission.

The Chair is going to recognize Mr. Chavez to speak against the motion.

MR. CHAVEZ: Mr. Speaker, Members, I think that the House of Representatives made a decision last May when we voted for this article, and the appointment of the committee. The committee conducted an investigation, an exhaustive investigation in my opinion. I presume that we could have stayed in session another month or two and dug up more material. The committee

motion.

felt after the examination that they conducted, the investigation, that there was ample evidence to warrant presenting these Articles of Impeachment for your consideration. I guess the easiest thing for us to have done was to have turned our face and looked at the things of wrongdoing that were alleged, the items of wrongdoing that were presented to us by testimony and evidence, and we could have said, "Well, this is too hot a political thing to handle, and just forget it."

MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Moreno.

MR. MORENO: Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my

SPEAKER CLAYTON: All right. Mr. Moreno withdraws his motion.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Garcia for a motion.

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, Members, I would like to move that further consideration of H.S.R. No. 161 be postponed to a date certain, that is, November 3rd, 1975 at ten o'clock a.m., and I'd like to be heard on my motion.

Mr. Garcia on his motion.

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, Members, I'll attempt to be just as brief as possible. I recognize

that we are here this morning on a very significant matter.

As the Speaker stated in his address to the House, this is only the third time in the history of the State of Texas that the House has been assembled to consider a matter of this magnitude. That is, the impeachment of a State officer. All of us have been subjected to considerable pressures with reference to this proceeding, and the pressures have centered around the fact that can we economically sustain to our constituency why we are here to consider articles of impeachment when there are other ways that this can be accomplished.

I'm not going to speak to the merits of the resolution, and I will not in any way attempt to impugn that the committee did not do that which they were charged to do. By majority vote this committee was created; they have worked, and they have worked diligently, and I'll not speak to the innocence or guilt of the man whose impeachment is being sought by this action. But I do think that because of the fact that in 1970 we created a commission to specifically address itself to matters of this type that we should not relieve them of that responsibility.

When serving on the Appropriations Committee during the 63rd session, there was some discussion with

reference to the activity of this commission, whether or not there was justification for their existence, whether or not money should be appropriated from State coffers to sustain the actions of this commission. And there was argument that they did fulfill a function, despite the fact that there has been no sizable matter or matter of significant merit considered by them at that time that there was justification for their existence. And I feel that what we should do is postpone the consideration of these articles until the 3rd day of November.

We do two things. We let the Judicial Qualifications Commission know that we are not attempting to resolve ourselves of the responsibility, or one of the responsibilities, that is imposed upon us by the Constitution. We don't run from that responsibility. We put them on notice that we're going to sit back and determine whether or not they are going to take the initiative in this matter and do what they are charged with doing, by law and by the Constitution.

We are also by this action letting the Supreme Court know that we are aware that under another procedure, and that is the affidavits of ten lawyers being presented to the Supreme Court, that the Supreme Court is also authorized to take action to remove a judge who is accused of malfeasance in office.

MR. SHERMAN: Mr. Speaker?

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MR. GARCIA: I'll not yield, Mr. Speaker, until I've finished my remarks and then I will yield.

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SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman doesn't

MR. GARCIA: It is not only the action

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yield at this time, Mr. Sherman.

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that we are called upon to exercise today. And I've

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heard the discussion on the floor that if we dispose of

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this in three days it's not going to cost the taxpayers

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that much money. Well, gentlemen, we are merely the

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grand jury in this matter. We charge the Senate by our

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action today with proceeding with the trial of the case.

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There were eleven members on the Select Committee.

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31 Senators are going to make an indepth analytical

There are 31 Senators, and I can assure you that those

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determination of whether or not these witnesses are

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credible and should be believed and whether or not this

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judge should be impeached.

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There are people who have said that this matter can be resolved in six days in the Senate. I say it cannot be resolved in six days. I question whether or not it can be resolved in thirty days. I question whether or not it can be resolved in sixty days. And we are going to have to explain to our constituency why we selected this route after this Legislature had spoken

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and after the people of the State of Texas had spoken
with reference to the creation of a Judicial Qualifications
Commission.

The Judicial Qualifications Commission has only involved itself in one severe action heretofore to my knowledge, and that involved a district judge who when he was tried or in the process of trial resigned from office.

There are many who say that Judge Carrillo should resign his post, and I have no fixed opinions as to that. But there is much that can transpire between now and November the 1st. I do not see any severe emergency or any irreparable harm or damage that can result to this State, to the 229th Judicial District, to the image of this Legislature, and to our responsibility to the people of the State of Texas by delaying this action until November the 3rd.

I ask you to vote with me on this motion so that we can go back to our homes and look upon those who are charged also with the responsibility to do what we are being asked to do today, and that is to police the judiciary, to clean their own kitchen.

Someone made the comment that removing Judge Carrillo from the situation which exists in the lower country would be like taking one tick off of a cow.

They're contending that there is much to be done. Well, I tell you gentlemen that by this impeachment action we would be leveling our force, our strength, our control at one man. The Judicial Qualifications Commission would be speaking loud and clear, that the Legislature by stepping back and letting us know that they expect us to take action, expect us to clean up the judiciary of this state, and I'm satisfied that they would do it.

on this motion to postpone. Let's wait and see what they are going to do. They know that we want them to do something. If by November the 1st they have done nothing it will at least give us an opportunity to go over these volumes of testimony that were taken by this committee. Many of us have not read these volumes of testimony. We have a responsibility to ourselves before we vote articles of impeachment to at least know what the witnesses said.

And now I will yield.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields, Mr. Sherman.

MR. SHERMAN: Mr. Garcia, what's magic about November 3rd?

MR. GARCIA: I believe that it will give the Judicial Qualifications Commission ample time to take

1	whatever action is necessary. If they can't get on this
2	case, appoint a master in chancery, get their facts into
3	their order, remove the judge if they find that there is
4	cause for it, then we can come back and do it.
5	MR. SHERMAN: Why not November 10th?
6	MR. GARCIA: November 10th would be fine.
7	I have no fixed date in mind, Mr. Sherman.
8	MR. SHERMAN: Mr. Garcia, you said that
9	we couldn't do this in one day, it's going to take about
10	six. That would put us here on election day for the
11	State Constitution and focus attention here rather than
12	at the polls on November 4th, wouldn't it?
13	MR. GARCIA: I would be glad to take a
14	substitute motion to make it November the 10th. Let's
15	see what the people think about that provision in the
16	Constitution that takes from the Legislature the right
17	to handle or hear impeachment matters on district judges.
18	Let's let them speak. I'd be glad to accept an amendment.
19	MR. HARRIS: Mr. Speaker, will the gentle-
20	man yield?
21	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Do you yield, Mr. Garcia?
22	MR. GARCIA: I will yield.
23	SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,
24	Mr. Harris.
25	MR. HARRIS: The gentleman from Fort Worth

raised the point that I think that all of us would do well to bear in mind, would be on November the 4th we'll be voting on the adoption of the Constitution proposed by this group, will we not?

MR. GARCIA: That is correct.

MR. HARRIS: Mr. Garcia, how long do you think it will take the Senate to try the guilt or innocence of Judge Carrillo when they get started?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Harris, the committee spent something like a hundred hours of committee work. They heard 35 witnesses. I understand that Mr. Mitchell—and this is from newspaper accounts—that Mr. Mitchell submitted something in excess of fifty subpoenas which were not honored. That is an adversary proceeding over there. There will be confrontation. There will be cross examination. Our committee worked very hard and spent considerable time, something like seventy-some-odd hours, fourteen volumes of testimony. I don't think that I would be far wrong by saying that bottom, two months.

MR. HARRIS: And do you have any thought as to the cost of the trial by the Senate?

MR. GARCIA: I'd hate to venture a guess, but I wouldn't want to justify the cost to my constituency.

MR. HARRIS: And during that two months of the trial just prior to the time we vote on the

Constitution, we'll have quite a spectacle over in the east end of the building, will we not?

MR. GARCIA: I didn't quite understand that, Mr. Harris.

MR. HARRIS: During the two months that the Senate will be trying Judge Carrillo, we'll have quite a spectacle in the process over there, will we not?

MR. GARCIA: I'm sure that there will be a spectacle. This is not something which happens every day in the State of Texas.

MR. HARRIS: One of the Senators will be turning us into pumpkins every night at midnight, and every Senator will have a counsel, and the Watergate prosecutor will be there, and there won't be very many people thinking about whether or not Texas should adopt a new Constitution in November in September of 1974 if we hand it over to the Senate at this time will there?

MR. GARCIA: If we hand it over to the Senate, say it took us four days here, Mr. Harris, by the time it got over to the Senate, by the time they set up their mechanics to start working on this case, they could well be in the trial of the Carrillo impeachment on the day that we are voting on the new Constitution. That is correct.

MR. HARRIS: And that's November the 4th,

is it not?

MR. HARRIS: So, Mr. Garcia, you gave us an opportunity to avoid spending hundreds of thousands of dollars, avoiding the spectacle of having a trial at the time when we should all be campaigning for the adoption of the new Constitution. And you also give the

MR. GARCIA: Yes, sir. That is correct.

sary for us to proceed farther. Is that not correct?

system an opportunity to work that would make it unneces-

MR. GARCIA: That is correct, Mr. Harris.

I feel that it is a very realistic and reasonable approach to the problem. I don't think that any of us if we voted to postpone consideration of this would have to apologize to anybody for delaying it. I think that there is reason to put it in the hands of the Judicial Qualifications

Commission or possibly within that period of time ten lawyers with guts—

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. McDonald from Dallas calls point of order. The gentleman's time has expired. Point of order is well taken and sustained.

MR. HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. Garcia.

MR. GARCIA: If there is no objection from the House, I'd like to amend the motion to make it the 10th of November which will be the following Monday, the Monday after we vote on the Constitution.

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1	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Is there objection?
2	The Chair hears none. So ordered.
3	The Chair recognizes Mr. Chavez to speak against
4	the motion, the postponement.
5	MR. HENDRICKS: Mr. Speaker?
6	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Hendricks.
7	MR. HENDRICKS: Will the gentleman yield
8	before he gets into his remarks?
9	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Will you yield, Mr.
10	Chavez?
11	MR. CHAVEZ: Yes.
12	SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,
13	Mr. Hendricks.
14	MR. HENDRICKS: Mr. Chavez, Mr. Garcia
15	said this delay wouldn't hurt anything. Are you advised
16	that there is two commissioners' courts now in Duval
17	County?
18	MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir, I sure am.
19	MR. HENDRICKS: Are you advised that the
20	people that work for the county down there have not been
21	paid since last April because of this chaotic situation?
22	MR. CHAVEZ: I sure am aware of that.
23	MR. HENDRICKS: Well, don't you think the
24	delay might hurt somebody?
25	MR. CHAVEZ: It will hurt those employees,

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1	and a lot of other people.
2	MR. HENDRICKS: Thank you, sir.
3	MR. CLARK: Mr. Speaker, will the gentle-
4	man yield?
5	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Chavez, do you
6	yield to Mr. Clark?
7	The gentleman yields, Mr. Clark.
8	MR. CLARK: Mr. Chavez, how long has the
9	committee been in taking testimony and compiling the
10	records and so forth? You all started before the end
11	of the session, didn't you?
12	MR. CHAVEZ: We spent three evenings
13	during the session. Yes, sir.
14	MR. CLARK: Three evenings?
15	MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir.
16	MR. CLARK: And you've been at it fairly
17	regularly since the session was over with?
18	MR. CHAVEZ: Well, off and on.
19	MR. CLARK: Sir?
20	MR. CHAVEZ: Off and on.
21	MR. CLARK: Off and on. Now, you're
22	making a recommendation that we turn it over to the
23	Senate. You've heard the questions from the previous
24	Speaker. How long do you think it will take the Senate
25	over there to hear the case?

1 MR. CHAVEZ: I have no idea. I don't 2 think that we really ought to decide here, or whatever 3 we do, I don't think we ought to decide it on what the 4 Senate is going to do or not do. That is their business 5 over there. 6 MR. CLARK: In order for us to make a 7 reasonable decision that's in the best interest of the citizens of this state, don't you think we ought to take 8 all of it into consideration? 9 10 MR. CHAVEZ: Well, I've seen some murder 11 trials that have taken months to try, but I've never 12 seen any judge or district attorney turn those people 13 loose just because it's going to take a long time to 14 try them. 15 MR. CLARK: A thirty man jury, how many of those have you seen? 16 MR. CHAVEZ: I didn't set up the Consti-17 tution. 18 19 MR. CLARK: You didn't set up the Con-20 No, but the courts are set up. We do have stitution. 21 some other ways. 22 MR. CHAVEZ: We have some other ways to 23 do it, but the Judicial Qualifications Committee has not done anything. They've had complaints there since 1972, 24

and they haven't done anything.

MR. CLARK: How long has it been in 1 How long has the Judicial Qualifications 2 existence? Commission been in existence? Isn't hasn't been too 3 4 long I know, a few years. MR. CHAVEZ: I know they've been in exis-5 tence since 1972 because they've heard complaints about 6 this man since then, and nothing has been done. 7 MR. CLARK: Have they had a lot of money 8 9 to do anything with? MR. CHAVEZ: I beg your pardon? 10 MR. CLARK: Have they had a lot of money 11 12 to do anything with? MR. CHAVEZ: I don't know. They've got 13 14 about sixty thousand a year. MR. CLARK: Sixty thousand a year. 15 you think that is-16 MR. CHAVEZ: We gave them another forty 17 thousand just a few months ago. 18 That's barely enough to keep 19 MR. CLARK: the office open. Isn't that right? Not much more than 20 pay the salaries down there? And you expect eleven men 21 to come over here and make a recommendation that we 22 150 people here today make a determination that's been 23 brought out of all of the testimony that you've taken 24

over there, for me to intelligently vote on making a

recommendation to the Senate that they give this consideration over there of impeachment?

MR. CHAVEZ: I think that the committee will make an adequate presentation for you to make your consideration on the articles.

MR. CLARK: You've been two months over doing it, and now the Senate is going over there and start taking the testimony in a court hearing type of situation and sit as a jury and determine in a few days, you think each one of the Senators is going to determine in a few days how they're ready to vote impeachment or against impeachment?

MR. CHAVEZ: I have no idea what the Senate is going to do.

MR. CLARK: I'm sure you don't. And that's about the way of most everybody in this House today. They're up here because they've been brought up here, but as far as really knowing what's going to take place and what should be done, they don't have because they haven't been privy to the information only what they've been reading in the papers.

Thank you.

MR. CHAVEZ: I don't think doing our duty depends on how much time the Senate is going to take up with this thing. At least that's my feeling on it.

Mr. Speaker, and Members, as I indicated earlier, by postponing consideration of these articles is another way of saying, "Well, we see the wrongdoing but we don't want to face up to it. We don't want to handle it. Let somebody else do it."

Mr. Garcia mentioned a while ago that if we postponed it until November that a lot of things could happen. Well, I think that there is a lot of truth and a lot of merit in that statement. Probably some of the things that could happen would be that the county employees would not be paid; that perhaps other political enemies of the judge could be removed; that another school could lose its accreditation; that other people could be tried, indicted, or convicted, summarily by this man. These things could happen. Some of those things did happen. And because some of those things did happen that's what triggered this situation. Those matters were quite evident in the testimony that we received from the various witnesses.

The other thing, while I have not been personally told nor have I read it in the newspapers, but I understand that some people that are opposed to our conducting this session have mentioned the fact that it's too costly; that it's going to cost a lot of money. Well, Article 5962 says that the members of the House when so convened

shall receive the same mileage and per diem pay as is provided for members of the Legislature when in legislative session. And the members of the committees of the House when so convened and serving upon such committees when the House itself is not in session shall receive the said per diem pay to be paid out of the appropriation then existing.

So as I read this article is-

MR. TRUAN: Mr. Speaker, will the gentle-man yield?

MR. CHAVEZ: Just let me finish this particular statement.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Not at this time, Mr. Truan.

MR. CHAVEZ: On the per diem, as I read the statute, if we postpone it until November the 3rd or November the 10th, then every member of this House is entitled to per diem, thirty dollars per diem until then, and you can count the days up yourself and figure out how much money the State is going to spend merely because we postponed this action. So I don't understand that postponing squares with the argument that we want to save money.

I'll yield to Mr. Truan.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,

Mr. Truan.

MR. TRUAN: Thank you. Mr. Chavez, you are a member of this committee that heard all the testimony, and whatever way you voted on the various articles you had the benefit of being there and questioning the witnesses. I was there several times, and you were indeed questioning witnesses with respect to their testimony. The majority of us were not here. For all practical purposes, the majority of the hearings took place after the legislature ended its deliberations during this session.

I for one feel, don't you agree, that we could have some time to at least look through the information, the testimony that has been compiled, that has not really been made available to us.

I can appreciate the fact that you were there, where the action was, but we were not, and yet we're going to be called upon to vote on these matters.

MR. CHAVEZ: Mr. Truan, I suggest then that you permit us to go forward and to present at least the first article and listen to our presentation, and if you don't think that our presentation is adequate for you to make a proper determination on the article, then at that time I think we can decide to postpone it to receive more evidence or do something else. But you

don't know, and I don't know either, that the presentation that we make might be adequate to satisfy the doubts of the members of the House. It might be and then it might not be. But if it isn't, we can always stop and postpone it until we can satisfy ourselves.

MR. TRUAN: Let me ask you this: If we were to proceed under the rules that we're operating with right now we're going to actually depend upon members of the committee giving us this information and receiving it really secondhand. Would you agree?

MR. CHAVEZ: Not really secondhand, because we have the transcript; it's up here. At least in my presentation I'm going to refer you to some pages of that transcript which will be available to you.

MR. TRUAN: Yes, but for all practical purposes this is not the same as reading it yourself. Would you be amenable to changing the rules to get the people that testified before your committee to testify before our House meeting as a committee as a whole?

MR. CHAVEZ: No, I would not, because we would be here another month, and I certainly am sympathetic with the people who want to save the State some money. It would just be too costly and too time consuming, and it would just be a duplication of effort in my opinion.

MR. TRUAN: But you will agree that this is a very serious matter. And I recall your asking one of the witnesses that whether they realized—and I'm sure you realize—and seriousness of what will happen assuming that the articles of impeachment are indeed adopted.

MR. CHAVEZ: It's a very serious matter, Mr. Truan. I don't quarrel with you on that. But I think that you have to understand that what we do here today we're not going to be passing on the guilt or innocence of the man. We're going to determine whether or not there is some adequate evidence to merit his facing trial in the Senate.

MR. TRUAN: I realize that, but we're going to be called upon to vote here, and of course, we can't wait until the Senate meets because we have to take action first, and we have a responsibility, you agree.

MR. CHAVEZ: We're charging him, is what the effect of this thing is.

MR. TRUAN: You talk about money. I haven't been made aware of how much budget the committee spent, how much monies the committee has already spent. Could you enlighten us on this matter?

MR. CHAVEZ: I have no idea, Mr. Truan.

MR. TRUAN: Would you be able to ask the

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1	chairman there, since he is chairman of the committee,
2	to give you those figures?
3	MR. CHAVEZ: We don't have the actual
4	figures, Mr. Truan. I am advised that perhaps a rough
5	estimate would be in the neighborhood of approximately
6	\$30,000.
7	MR. TRUAN: \$30,000?
8	MR. CHAVEZ: Yes. That seems high to me,
9	but that's what I'm advised.
10	MR. TRUAN: Thank you.
11	MR. SHERMAN: Mr. Speaker, will the gentle-
12	man yield?
13	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Do you yield, Mr. Chavez
14	The gentleman yields, Mr. Sherman.
15	MR. SHERMAN: Did I understand you correct
16	ly that if we accept this motion that we will be entitled
17	to draw per diem even though we go home from now until
18	November 3rd?
19	MR. CHAVEZ: That's the way I read the
20	statute, Mr. Sherman.
21	MR. SHERMAN: Mr. Speaker, parliamentary
22	inquiry.
23	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Vale raises a point
24	of order. The gentleman's time has expired. The point
25	of order is well taken, and sustained.

1 Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. MR. SHERMAN: 2 Speaker. 3 SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, 4 Mr. Sherman. 5 MR. SHERMAN: The statement has been made that if we accept this postponement and go home that we 6 7 would be entitled to draw thirty dollars per diem even 8 though we are not here until the time that we take this 9 up again. Is this correct? 10 SPEAKER CLAYTON: That is an interpretation 11 of the statute, Mr. Sherman. 12 MR. SHERMAN: You may have just switched 13 a lot of votes. 14 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Hendricks to speak 15 against the resolution. 16 MR. HENDRICKS: Mr. Speaker and Members, could I have your attention just a moment, please. 17 18 has been a lot of discussion about how long it will take 19 to try this in the Senate. Now, there is no way any of 20 us can give you any idea of how long any trial will take. 21 All we can do is go back to the one time the Senate has 22 tried a district judge on impeachment charges, and that 23 was the Price trial. We can give you the figures on that if you're interested in it. 24 25 That trial began on September the 10th. The

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judgment in it was entered on September the 30th. That's twenty days from the time the trial began until the final judgment was entered, and it did involve a district judge.

I will state this to you: It's my opinion that this judge probably should have stepped down when federal indictments were returned against him. There is no article of impeachment concerning the federal indictments in this case. That is strictly my opinion. But I think he should have stepped down and waited on the judgment of the federal courts.

As I say, that is my opinion. If you vote impeachment, that does not remove him from the bench; it merely suspends him from the bench until that trial can be had in the Senate. It is my opinion that he should be suspended until these charges are met in the Senate, and I believe as responsible citizens of the state and members of this House that it's our duty to get on with it.

Now if you want to leave this man on the bench down there in Duval County with those people not being paid since last April you should vote for this motion.

If not, I ask you to vote with me, and I move to table,

Mr. Speaker.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Garcia to close on his motion.

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, Members, I understand that some of the membership is in a quandry with reference to an inquiry which was made from the back microphone, that in the event the motion to postpone further consideration of these proceedings to November the 10th does prevail, will the members continue receiving their per diem.

I would urge that in the event the motion does prevail that we should very seriously consider the filing of a resolution suspending any per diem pay so that there will not be any unjust enrichment on the part of any tembers while this matter is pending, because I don't feel that we should be sitting back home taking in thirty dollars per diem when our entire effort is trying to save our constituency the onerous expense of proceeding in this fashion.

You know, Mr. Chavez said that the Judicial Qualifications Commission has had this matter since 1972\_\_\_

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

MR. GARCIA: I will not yield until I finish.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman doesn't yield at this time, Mr. Donaldson.

MR. GARCIA: -that there have been

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complaints pending before the Judicial Qualifications

Commission since 1972. Well, I might answer that by

stating that in the event these incidents were occurring

since 1972 we have had one prior legislative session,

that is the 63rd Legislature, when this matter could have

been submitted if things were that onerous down there in

Duval County.

Ladies and gentlemen, today is August the 4th. What I'm asking you to do is to postpone consideration until November. This is three months away. A time when we should be out working for the passage of the new Constitution, a time when we should not turn our State Capitol into a circus, because you know what happens during these trials, especially this one, that has received the notoriety that it has. It will be tried in the Senate in a circus atmosphere. Visualize if you will every Senator having his own counsel. And you know and I know because you served with our illustrous Senators during the Constitutional Convention. They, not unlike us, have some prima donna tendencies, and I can assure you that everyone will be interrogating every witness to the"nth' degree.

Are we talking about three weeks? We're talking about three months. We're talking about a period of time when we finish to the time that they finish transgressing

Mr. Donaldson.

past the date that our Constitution is to be considered.

I ask you to put priorities where they belong.

I ask you to consider what you're about to do. Don't take the easy way out. Take the most conscionable, the most realistic, the way out that you will have no trouble explaining to your constituency back home, that we created a body to take care of these things and then we swept them under the rug telling them that we were not satisfied, that they had not taken sufficient action to do away with what we considered to be a problem. I think that the reasonable thing to do is to vote in favor of this motion, and I ask for your vote. And I will yield.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Garcia, I believe you stated that we could be resolution suspend payment of the per diem?

MR. GARCIA: We just got through passing one authorizing the payment of thirty dollars a day a moment ago.

MR. DONALDSON: Now, the statute says that we will be paid that though. Can you suspend the imposition of that statute by resolution?

MR. GARCIA: If that is the interpretation of the statute, then what is the necessity of passing the

resolution authorizing payment?

MR. KASTER: Mr. Speaker, will the gentle-

MR. GARCIA: I will yield.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,

Mr. Kaster.

man yield?

MR. KASTER: Mr. Garcia, the thing that bothers me about your motion concerns 283 county employees of Duval County whose average pay is approximately \$225 a month who have not been paid since April because of the chaotic situation of two commissioners' courts being there. The county depository has reverted the money back to the county, said they would not honor any checks until it's finally determined. Now this has been going on since April, and these people have not been paid, and to wait until November to just rock along is very detrimental to those people. And I also question how much is the price of justice worth?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Kaster, let me answer you.

Are you so naive as to believe that by our action in this

House in this impeachment proceeding on something that

has become a way of life in an area of Texas that by

removing one man you're going to relieve the plight of

two hundred and some-odd county employees?

MR. KASTER: I certainly do because the

governor would then the power to appoint a temporary judge to try and straighten the situation out.

MR. GARCIA: Well, I understand that there is seventeen Rangers down there, Mr. Kaster. And I had always heard, ever since I was a little boy growing up in this great state of Texas, "one riot, one Ranger," and I can't understand what seventeen Rangers are doing down in Duval County.

MR. KASTER: That has nothing to do with the paychecks that these people are not receiving, Mr. Garcia.

MR. GARCIA: There are courts of civil appeals and there are supreme courts that could respond to that problem. Up to this point, and this is from the newspaper accounts, the court of civil appeals has refused to overturn the actions of Judge Carrillo in the removal of Judge Parr. The matter has been taken to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has refused to intercede.

I don't know whether that answer your question.

MR. KASTER: And the people still aren't getting paid.

MR. GARCIA: Are you assuring this House and chose two hundred and some-odd county employees down in Duval County that if we vote articles of impeachment

1 that they're going to start receiving a paycheck? Is 2 that your guarantee? 3 MR. KASTER: That's quicker than waiting 4 until November the 3rd to start considering it. Yes, sir, 5 that's exactly what I'm telling you. 6 MR. GARCIA: I don't accept that, and I 7 think that you're engaging in an act to inflame the 8 passions of this House in an effort to move this thing 9 along when the most realistic thing to do would be to 10 delay it until November the 10th. 11 MR. KASTER: I'm not trying to inflame 12 I'm telling you exactly the testimony that we anyone. 13 heard, Mr. Garcia, that's in the bound volumes over 14 there. 15 MR. GARCIA: Do you have any other 16 questions, Mr. Kaster? 17 MR. KASTER: That was responding to your 18 statement that I'm inflaming the House. 19 MR. SALEM: Mr. Speaker, will the gentle-20 man yield? 21 SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields, 22 Mr. Salem. 23 MR. SALEM: Mr. Garcia, are you aware-24 and I can't say exactly what date it was-but in the local 25 paper that is printed in Corpus Christi there was a

news story that these employees were now going to be paid, that checks would be issued? Are you aware of that?

MR. GARCIA: I'm not aware of it.

MR. SALEM: I'm going to try to find out the exact date, and perhaps I can get you the story on it in just a little bit.

MR. GARCIA: Thank you.

Let me just say something in conclusion, Members. If I may have your attention. I resent; I resent this House being used to settle a political squabble. And I don't think that anyone up to this point has denied that that is exactly what is involved in the Carrillo-Parr-Manges situation: a political squabble. If there were any credibility to this situation possibly I might be inclined to feel differently. But I do not feel differently. And I think that the Judicial Qualifications Commission or the Supreme Court is well able to act on this matter, and I say that we charge them with that responsibility by voting to postpone further consideration of these proceedings until November the 10th.

Mr. Speaker, I will ask for a record vote.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Garcia moves that postponement of further consideration of House Simple Resolution 161 be until November 10, 1975. All those in favor of postponement— Mr. Hendricks moved to table.

1 The question will occur on the motion to table. All 2 those in favor of the motion to table, vote "aye", all 3 those opposed, "no." It's a record vote. The Clerk will 4 ring the bell. 5 Have all members voted? There being 118 "ayes" and 24 "noes", the motion 6 7 to table prevails. 8 The Chair recognizes Mr. Maloney, for an over-9 view on the articles. 10 MR. MALONEY: Mr. Speaker, Members, it will be my function before you today to go briefly over each 11 12 of the Articles of Impeachment that the committee has 13 voted out before you. 14 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Maloney, just a 15 minute. 16 Mr. Davis moves that the House stand recessed 17 until 1:45. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and accordingly the 18 House stands recessed until 1:45 p.m. 19 20 (Whereupon the luncheon recess was taken.) 21 22 23 24 25

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AFTERNOON SESSION

(The House of Representatives reconvened at 1:45 p.m., pursuant to the luncheon recess.)

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The House will come to order. The Chair recognizes Mr. Maloney for a continuation of an overview of the articles.

PRESENTATION BY MR. MALONEY

MR. MALONEY: Mr. Speaker, Fellow Members, it will be my function here before you this afternoon to go over the various Articles of Impeachment that the committee has voted out, with a short explanation and run-down as to the area that the article is intended to cover. I will not go into any great detail outlining what evidence actually supports it by which witnesses and which exhibits because it would be our intention that as each individual article is considered by the House that each of these articles would be fully debated. I simply want to give you some idea of the general area that is being covered by each of these articles.

If I may, I will proceed with the articles as they appear in numerical order. I want you to understand that these are not necessarily chronological, and that each article generally has some overlap with some other article, but I will try to confine my remarks to the

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specific area in each article.

Article I deals with the question of whether or not Judge Carrillo—and I will say at this time for Mr. Salem's benefit, I will not yield since each of the articles will be debated.

MR. SALEM: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield at all after he is through?

MR. MALONEY: Yes. I will answer any questions you may have.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman will yield, Mr. Salem.

MR. MALONEY: Article I deals with the question of whether or not Judge Carrillo obtained groceries for his own use and benefit, these groceries being paid for by the County of Duval.

The testimony that was developed before the committee was that Duval County had a welfare system that was created by the county and pretty much for the use of each of the county commissioners. To keep this in context you will need to know that O. P. Carrillo's brother, Ramiro Carrillo, was the county commissioner of Precinct 3 of Duval County.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Just a minute, Mr.

We're going to have a little order before we

proceed.

Now, Members, if you would give your attention to Mr. Maloney we'll be able to proceed right away into the debate on article by article of these Articles of Impeachment.

Proceed, Mr. Maloney.

MR. MALONEY: As I was saying, Ramiro

Carrillo, the brother of O. P. Carrillo, was and is

county commissioner of Precinct 3 of Duval County, which

includes the city of Benavides, which is the home town

of Judge Carrillo and his family.

The testimony that came before the committee was that a store that is located in Benavides, which has the name of The Cash Store, was the main supplier of groceries in the area. The county used, to begin with, a welfare system in which the commissioner or someone at his direction would sign a little slip of paper that had someone's name and an amount on it; the person would take this slip to this Cash Store and receive in turn groceries or supplies from this store up to the amount that was indicated on the slip.

Testimony before the committee indicated that many of these slips that were presented to the Cash Store were in the names of fictitious persons, and other parties would take the slips in. At the end of the month The Cash

Store would total all of these slips and bill the county, and the county would issue a warrant directly to The Cash Store, paying for these groceries.

The slips that were introduced before the committee were signed ostensibly by O. P. Carrillo with his initials. It later developed that apparently this was too difficult a system to manage, and O. P. Carrillo was extended a line of credit at the Cash Store for groceries. The line of credit extended up to \$300 a month. In other words, the County of Duval would pay \$300 a month for any groceries that were purchased at the instance of O. P. Carrillo.

The testimony before the committee indicated that the groceries that were bought for O. P. Carrillo were bought by three persons: Roberto Elizondo, who was the court reporter for Judge Carrillo; Tomas Elizondo, who was the bailiff for Judge Carrillo; and Patricio Garza, who was the ranch hand or ranch foreman for Judge Carrillo on his ranch. These persons would come into the Cash Store, order whatever groceries they desired, and the proprietor of the Cash Store, Mrs. Lauro Yzaguirre, would hold these slips until the end of the month. The groceries were taken to Judge Carrillo's ranch. This was admitted by the persons who purchased the groceries. The groceries were used to feed the people who worked on the

ranch during roundup on the judge's ranch.

As I said, the judge's limit of credit was \$300 to be paid by Duval County. On some months the judge's bill would not total \$300; it would be somewhat less. In that event any balance or any difference between the \$300 and the amount of groceries actually purchased would be credited toward the judge's next month's purchases. If the judge or his agents had bought more than \$300 worth of groceries, the judge or his agent would come in at the end of the month and give a check for the difference. And there are checks in the record that indicate that this is what was being done.

This testimony comes mainly through an employeethe employees of Judge Carrillo—and through Mrs. Yazguirre.

So basically this is what this article deals with, the fact that the Duval County was paying for the personal groceries of Judge Carrillo.

Article II deals with items that the committee felt reflected badly upon the judicial system of the State of Texas. They deal with areas in which it was felt that both the Constitution of this state and the code of judicial ethics were violated by the actions of Judge Carrillo in each of two instances in litigation that was before him, and in actions that he took in the

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comprisal of the Duval County Grand Jury and the members of the Benavides Independent School District.

> MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Speaker.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: More a point of information than a question. Would it be proper to ask questions as Mr. Maloney goes through his presentation as to each of the separate articles?

Mr. Washington, what SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Maloney is attempting to do is to give an overview of each of the articles. At the conclusion of his presentation he is going to make a motion to divide the issues to take up article by article. So each article then will be debated in full length. Mr. Maloney will yield at the end of his presentation if you would prefer to direct a question to him, or if you would prefer, there are going to be different members of the committee taking up different articles, one by one, and you could direct questions to them. So it will be your choice.

> MR. WASHINGTON: Parliamentary inquiry. SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, Mr.

MR. WASHINGTON: Will the committee member assigned to discuss as it were to present each article do so in the fashion that Mr. Maloney is doing now?

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some factual questions on what evidence there is to support the factual allegations that he's making now.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Yes, sir. We hope that is the way that they present it, Mr. Washington, and also to give reference in the testimony to where they're taking their information from.

MR. WASHINGTON: Thank you, sir.

MR. MALONEY: In Article II, Article II is divided into four specific instances which the committee felt justified an Article of Impeachment, any one of those or all of those.

Subsection 1 deals with a case that came before Judge Carrillo almost immediately after he had assumed the bench in 1971. This case was styled "Clinton Manges versus M. A. Guerra, et al." The question involved in the case was concerning some property in Starr County that belonged to a partnership called "M. A. Guerra and Son." This partnership as its assets owned extensive ranch holdings in Starr County as well as the controlling interest of the First State Bank and Trust of Rio Grande City in Starr County. Mr. Clinton Manges was the petitioner or the plaintiff in this lawsuit in which he wanted the court to approve an agreement by which he would have the stock of the First State Bank and Trust of Rio Grande City and clear title to all of the ranch

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lands owned by M. A. Guerra and Son.

The issue was brought before the court in 1973, in which it was moved that Judge Carrillo remove himself from this case, recuse himself or disqualify himself because he had financial ties with one of the litigants, to-wit: Mr. Clinton Manges.

A hearing was held in which it was developed three things that constituted financial ties between Judge Carrillo and Mr. Clinton Manges.

Number one, Judge Carrillo had been elected to the board of directors of the First State Bank of Rio Grande City. He was, let me say, "given" ten shares of stock which qualified him to be a director. At that time the book value of such stock was \$750 a share or there-No consideration was given for this stock unless you accept the testimony of Mr. Manges and Judge Carrillo in the trial that the consideration was a house in Benavides in which Mr. Manges was to move his family. This was a house that was located on a lot behind the residence of Judge Carrillo. The house was a vacant house, totally in shambles; would not have been suitable for occupancy by any person. So the consideration for the stock was to be this house, plus Mr. Manges gave a check to an automobile company in excess of \$6900 to pay for Judge Carrillo's Cadillac. This was done prior, just

prior to the judge taking the bench. So the judge at the time that he was to rule on Mr. Manges' lawsuit was a director of the bank due to the actions of Mr. Manges, and had entered into transaction with the house with Mr. Manges.

In addition, at the very time that the judge was to rule on the lawsuit, the judge had accepted the fact that he would be able to graze his cattle on Mr. Manges' land, some five to six thousand acres of land.

The judge testified, and Mr. Manges testified, that there was a gentlemen's agreement between them that the judge would pay a thousand dollars per acre per year for a period of three years—a dollar an acre for the grazing lease—a total then of \$15,000 minimum over the three year period.

It was never established whether Judge Carrillo paid anything to Mr. Manges for this. But he was accepting this benefit from Mr. Manges at the time that this lawsuit was being considered.

The motion was made for the judge to disqualify himself in accordance with the code of judicial ethics because he had accepted a benefit from one of the litigants in the case and certainly had close financial ties. The judge refused to do so, and it took a hearing in 1973 by a visiting judge to finally disqualify Judge Carrillo.

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In the second instance, the case of the State of Texas on relation of Jose Nichols versus Archer Parr. This was a case in which the ranch foreman, Mr. Jose Nichols, the ranch foreman of the Duval County Ranch Company, which is an entity owned by Clinton Manges, filed a lawsuit to have County Judge Archer Parr removed as county judge.

Now, at this particular time Judge Parr had been convicted in federal court of perjury. The committee did not take issue with the merits of whether or not Judge Parr should be removed, there being a specific statute which does allow someone to be removed if they have been convicted by a petit jury. The question that the committee considered the important question was whether or not Judge Carrillo should hear the lawsuit since it was established that the day before the lawsuit was filed before Judge Carrillo, and Judge Carrillo removed Judge Parr and put a person who is known to be aligned with Judge Carrillo as county judge, pending the outcome of the lawsuit, the question was whether Judge Carrillo should be sitting in judgment against a political opponent. The day before the lawsuit was filed Judge Carrillo had stated publicly that he had split with the Parr faction and now would be opposing them.

In other words, he had established that he was

politically aligned against the Parrs. Whether that is good or bad, the committee felt that this certainly, in the interest of the Code of Judicial Ethics, he should have removed himself and had another judge hear the case.

That is number two.

Number three deals with the Constitution and influence exerted upon the Duval County Grand Jury.

The Duval County Grand Jury was selected by Judge Carrillo in February of this year; selected as the commissioners to select the grand jury were people which Judge Carrillo had a close political alliance. The people selected by the grand jury commissioners were also people who had a very close alliance with Judge Carrillo.

It was established by testimony of the secretary of the grand jury that before the grand jury was even sworn in that Mr. Manges had already decided who was to be the foreman of the grand jury—once again Mr. Jose Nichols, the foreman of the Duval County Ranch Company, Mr. Manges' property—and who was to be the secretary of the grand jury. And coincidentally, that is exactly the way that it happened.

During the deliberations of the grand jury there were questions raised as to whether or not the grand jury was indicting people fast enough, and a conference was held between Judge Carrillo and Mr. Manges

and Mr. Correa, the secretary of the grand jury, as to why Mr. Correa was dragging his feet and not returning indictments against the Parr people.

Now whether or not indictments needed to be returned against the Parr people was not the issue that was before our committee. The issue before us was the propriety of outsiders, people not even connected with the government of Duval County, and in addition, the judge, questioning the actions and bringing to bear political influence upon members of the grand jury to return indictments. The committee felt that this was certainly improper.

Section four had to do with Judge Carrillo's successful attempt to control the Board of Trustees of the Benavides Independent School District.

Now, the Benavides Independent School District actually includes the town of Benavides and Freer, which is the area in which Mr. Manges lives. But the way they operate their school district down there is a little different than I believe that any of us in the Legislature would anticipate. They have two boards in the same school district: one that runs the Benavides school and one that runs the Freer school.

The testimony before the committee had to do with the Benavides Independent School District. On the

same date that Jose Nichols, Mr. Manges' employee, had filed the removal suit against Judge Parr, Mr. Nichols also filed a removal suit against— I can't remember the exact number—against four of the members of the Benavides Independent School District. These were all "heard"—once again I put "heard" in parenthesis—before Judge Carrillo who issued an immediate order without hearing, removing these four members of the Benavides Independent School District.

As it would happen, the four members who were removed were all Parr sympathizers. The relatives of Judge Carrillo who were on the school board were not removed. Another person who was not aligned with either party, as I recall the testimony, was removed at that time. At the time the judge removed these four people he appointed four people who supposedly were all Carrillo people. As it turned out one of them stated publicly that he was a Parr person, and immediately upon his having made that statement, he was removed and another person substituted for him.

Once again, the merits of whether or not these members of the Board of Trustees of the school district should have been removed was not the issue that the committee felt was important. It was the abitrary manner in which it was handled; that the political opponents

were removed and the political allies were left on the school board until they could be joined by other political allies of the Carrillo faction.

We felt that the way these four things were handled reflected very badly upon the judicial system of the State of Texas.

Article III deals with the diversion by Judge Carrillo of the services of county employees to his personal use and benefit.

The article sets out five instances in which employees that were paid only by the county were used to work on Judge Carrillo's ranch or in business entities controlled and owned by Judge Carrillo.

Number one deals with a Cleofas Gonzalez. Mr. Gonzalez was paid by the County of Duval to work in the county shop. Now the county shop was in Benavides, and it was on a piece of property that also included a business entity of Judge Carrillo and his brother, Commissioner Ramiro Carrillo, that was called the Farm and Ranch Store, a retail outlet for farm and ranch supplies and equipment.

Mr. Gonzalez though paid solely by Duval County, his duties were to run the Farm and Ranch Store, which under his own testimony was all that he did except on occasion when he could do something and had occasion to

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do something in the county shop which was on the same premises. But by far the great majority of his work was done for the Farm and Ranch Store and for the Zertuche General Store, which we will get to later. These were all entities owned by and controlled by Judge O. P. Carrillo and his brother, Ramiro Carrillo.

Pat Gonzalez, who is now deceased so he was not a witness before the committee, was a person who did the same thing, who worked in the Farm and Ranch Store but was paid by Duval County.

Francisco Ruiz, who was a witness before our committee, testified that he was employed by and paid by Duval County, but that on one specific occasion that he spoke to before the committee, he was sent out to work as a welder to repair certain equipment on Judge Carrillo's ranch.

Oscar Sanchez, an employee of Duval County not paid in any other manner by Judge Carrillo, was sent to work on a reservoir on Judge O. P. Carrillo's ranch.

Patricio Garza, who had been paid on a contract labor status rather than being actually on the payroll of the county, was the person that I alluded to earlier as the ranch hand for Judge Carrillo's ranch.

So Article III deals with specific instances in which employees of the county were used to perform

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services on Judge Carrillo's ranch or in one of his business entities and were not paid otherwise than by county funds.

Article IV, which is similar to Article III except that Article IV directs itself to the improper misapplication of county equipment by Judge Carrillo. This involves five instances which were related to the committee in which certain county equipment was used to perform work on Judge Carrillo's ranch: the use of a backhoe to construct a building on the ranch; the use of equipment to construct the water reservoir that was alluded to earlier; the use of a truck that was mounted with a posthole digger in order to dig postholes to fence Judge Carrillo's ranch; the use of the welding equipment by the employee previously referred to to make repairs of equipment on the Carrillo ranch; and the use of various county trucks and equipment to haul equipment back and forth between where it might be and the ranch.

So they are similar. One deals with services; the other deals with equipment.

Article V, which constituted or took a great deal of the committee's time, deals with a sham transaction that was set up so that the county officials—and when it began Judge Carrillo was a county officials. He was county attorney before he was elected district judge—

constituted a continuing transaction so that the county officials would not appear to be doing business with the county entities that they represented. What was done was, as I told you, Judge Carrillo and Ramiro Carrillo were partners in an entity called the Farm and Ranch Store. So since Judge Carrillo and Ramiro Carrillo were county officials they could not by law do business with the County of Duval. So what was done was a fictitious company was set up. It was called the Zertuche General Store.

The testimony before the committee and the exhibits introduced before the committee indicated that there was not a Zertuche General Store; that invoices were created that had the name of the Zertuche General Store but that no one else in Benavides knew where it was located or had heard of it before, other than there having been previously in Duval County a general store.

And what would happen was that the County of
Duval would be billed for equipment and supplies, the
rental of equipment, by Zertuche General Store, which
carried no inventory, owned no equipment, and when the
county then, or the water district, or the school district
paid Zertuche General Store this warrant was deposited
in a bank account that was called "Zertuche General Store."
Almost immediately, and through the checks and statements

the pattern developed, and it continued from about 1967 through 1971, that as soon as this money was deposited in the bank account of Zertuche General Store, it was taken out and put in the Farm and Ranch Store or sent to an entity that we later learned was a trust for Judge Carrillo called "Ramiro Carrillo and Brothers," or was paid to Ramiro Carrillo.

So that generally the Zertuche General Store carried very close to a zero balance. The ostensible owner of the Zertuche General Store was one Arturo Zertuche, I believe a nephew of the Carrillos, and he was to be the front man, but he directed none of the operations of the Zertuche General Store. Its location, if it had one, was the same location as the Farm and Ranch Store.

It was testified to before the committee that there were two billing entities in the Farm and Ranch Store: one register that had to do with Zertuche General Store, and the other that had to do with the Farm and Ranch Store. All retail orders were placed through the Farm and Ranch Store, but when the county was to be billed it was sent through the Zertuche register.

Mr. Cleofas Gonzalez while working at the Farm and Ranch Store handled all of these transactions. He deposited the money into the Zertuche General Store

bank account; then using a check that had been pre-signed by Arturo Zertuche, would take the money back out and distribute it as directed by Ramiro Carrillo or O. P. Carrillo.

So this was simply nothing more than a sham that was to get around the statutes of this state which prohibited a person from—an elected official or an appointed official of a governmental entity—doing business with the governmental entities they represent.

This same sham transaction, though it was not considered from the technical standpoint, is the area in which the U.S. Government has returned its indictment against Arturo Zertuche, Ramiro Carrillo, and O.P. Carrillo.

Article VI deals with the financial statement filed by Judge Carrillo with the Secretary of State, which is to disclose his financial interests as a state employee, to-wit: a district judge.

In this financial statement Judge Carrillo did not indicate that he had any interest in this trust which we found to be called the "Ramiro Carrillo and Brothers Trust." The trust income was reported by Judge Carrillo on his income tax return, with him as trustee for this trust. The returns that we were allowed to see indicated that he had anywhere from six to eight thousand dollars

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a year income from this trust, and it was a trust constituted or for the benefit of various members of the Carrillo family.

He did not indicate that he was a trustee of this trust nor did he indicate that he had any interest in the trust, all of which is required under the Financial Disclosure.

Article VII was the question that one of the witnesses, Cleofas Gonzalez, testified that as part of his duties when he was working in the county shop for Duval County was to fuel the county equipment from a gasoline pump and a diesel pump located there in the county yard. It was his testimony that Judge Carrillo used this fuel for his personal use; his equipment was brought in to be fueled; his automobiles were brought in to be fueled, and that the cost of this fuel was then paid by Duval County.

Article VIII deals with the question of whether fictitious equipment was rented to Duval County. There was testimony before the committee that bills were sent to Duval County, to the Benavides Independent School District, and to the Water Reclamation District, for the rental of certain equipment. This rental was billed, once again, through the Zertuche General Store; that certain heavy equipment was to have been used by the

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county, and rather than the county using its own equipment, was to have rented it from Zertuche General Store.

The committee was unable to find that Zertuche General Store ever owned any equipment whatsoever that could have been rented to Duval County or the other governmental entities, but that periodically he would be simply told to bill the county for a certain amount of money and classify the invoice as rental, and it would be paid, and it was.

Article IX deals with the payment of county funds to Arturo Zertuche. Once again, Arturo Zertuche is the person who was the titular owner of the Zertuche General Store. But during the time that the store was supposedly in existence and was operating, the county was also paying Mr. Arturo Zertuche \$225 a month for some labor that he was supposed to be doing for the County of Duval, which the committee could never determine was ever done nor what those duties were supposed to have been.

In addition, at the time that the \$225 per month was being paid, Mr. Zertuche was a student at North Texas State University and was not even in Duval County for any period that the committee was able to ascertain.

I will come back to a sidelight on this, but

since this is so similar to the next two articles I will move on to the next article.

Article X is the same scheme to pay someone out of funds for Duval County for contract labor when such person was not an employee of Duval County, and in truth and in fact, did not render any labor or services to Duval County.

Article X deals with one Roberto Elizondo, who at this time was the court reporter for Judge Carrillo's court. Roberto Elizondo has been the court reporter since September of 1973, when he went on the payroll as a court reporter having just finished a court reporting school for some eighteen months in Houston. However, during the eighteen months that Roberto Elizondo was in court reporting school learning to be a court reporter, the County of Duval issued a check to him once a month for \$225 for some services that were supposedly rendered.

Now, Mr. Elizondo did testify before the committee, and he testified that the services that he performed were on weekends he would come in from Houston, some 250 miles from Duval County, and do some work in the judge's office: answering mail, certain clerical things on the weekend.

Guard that Mr. Roberto Elizondo was in the National Guard

at this time, and that on many of these weekends he was actually in service with the National Guard, and it would be almost inconceivable that he could have been doing this work for Judge Carrillo.

In addition to that, the receptionist for Judge Carrillo, Mrs. Montemayor who was receptionist during this period when Roberto Elizondo was to be receiving this money, testified that she did not at any time see Roberto Elizondo doing any of this work for the judge; that she worked up to the last time of day on Friday as the judge's receptionist and knew what work was to be done, and that come Monday morning that work had not been done and still remained to be done; that when there was any work to be done it was done by the then court reporter of Judge Carrillo's court, Mr. Jerry Parmer, who handled those clerical things for the judge.

So it was felt that this money being paid to Roberto Elizondo was merely a supplement paid to him while he was in court reporting school.

Article XI deals with the county funds being paid, \$225 a month once again, to Patricio Garza, whom all the testimony except Mr. Garza's own testimony, indicated always had been the ranch hand or ranch foreman of Judge Carrillo's ranch. No one had ever seen him doing work for the county nor recalled him ever

working for the county. However, Mr. Garza himself testified that he did work up until about eighteen months ago—I guess it would be about twenty months ago now—for the county, occasionally fixing flat tires.

You may have noticed that there is a duplication somewhat with Mr. Garza in a previous article where the article goes to whether or not Mr. Garza as a county employee was diverted to work on the judge's ranch. This is the converse of that because there is no middle ground. Either Mr. Garza was an employee during that period or he was not. If he was an employee, as he says he was, then his services were diverted to the judge's ranch. If he was not an employee, as the evidence seems to indicate, then he should not have been being paid \$225 a month. So the committee simply closed the gap. It must be one or the other; you can't have your cake and eat it too.

Now, in regards to Article IX, X, and XI, you need to know how these \$225 a month sums were paid. What is called a "claim for labor" was filed once a month for each of these persons. It was sent in, supposedly notarized by each of these persons as a claim. They swore that they did the work and that the sum was just, due and owing to them. And then it was approved by the county commissioner, Ramiro Carrillo.

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The committee discovered that over this period that none of these parties had ever signed any of these claims for payment. All of these claims for payment were signed by a notary public who works as a clerk in Judge Carrillo's office, and that this notary public did he himself sign all of these, and that no claim for payment was given to him monthly; he just every month filled out these claims and sent them in for payment and notarized each of the signatures that he had signed, and that probably he would continue to pay these forever until somebody—and he in all fairness would not say Judge Carrillo-told him to stop. So the committee in its investigation found that not only were the services being paid to people who were not entitled to them, but a fraud on the whole system of notary publics was being perpetrated by this clerk who worked full time in Judge Carrillo's office. The claims for payment to Arturo Zertuche, Patricio Garza, and Roberto Elizondo.

Now those are the articles that have been presented before you.

The committee debated other areas that were brought to our attention, but the committee had repeatedly everytime they had some evidence from some source as to misconduct, looked to see whether that testimony could be substantiated by other evidence before we bring it

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before this House.

We rejected those allegations of misconduct which we could not substantiate or have the time to substantiate. And we have only brought you those which we feel are the cold, hard facts.

I will yield if there are any questions at this point.

MR. SALEM: Mr. Speaker, will the gentle-

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,

MR. SALEM: Mr. Maloney, I read the H.S.R. No. 161, and I need you to help me to try to understand. It says:

"Be it resolved by the House of Representatives that impeachment charges be preferred against O. P. Carrillo, judge of the 229th Judicial District of the State of Texas, and the Senate of the State of Texas, for the following cause:

He has been indicted by a grand jury of the United States of America on multiple counts for violation of federal income tax laws."

Now, I have here the first three volumes of the

transcript of the proceedings, and it starts out, it says here:

"Tonight I will introduce several witnesses or at least several witnesses are
present available to the committee."

Those are the words of Mr. Canales. And then he goes right into the allegations of these eleven Articles of Impeachment, and I don't find any place in the first three volumes of proceedings here where the committee addressed itself to the alleged violations of income tax evasion.

Now, at what point did the committee consider that?

MR. MALONEY: We did consider that, Mr.

Salem, and since we felt that this was a matter that was presently under litigation in the federal courts, the income tax laws being federal laws, that that would be left to the federal officials, and simply the fact that a person is under indictment, to return an article of impeachment for that fact and that fact only, would be a travesty of justice, because the presumption of innocence does attach, and we were not going to bring that and set any type of precedent that a person would be able to have a grand jury indict them and in effect by that very indictment remove the person from office. The committee

did have this as an article before them, and the committee voted to remove it.

MR. SALEM: Well, let me ask you this,

Counselor: You say here that he has been indicted by
a grand jury of the United States of America on multiple
counts for violation of federal income tax laws.

Do you feel that I would be in order to raise a point of order against further consideration of these eleven Articles of Impeachment in that they do not address themselves top side or bottom to H.S.R. No. 161 for which the impeachment proceedings were called.

Would I be in order to do that?

MR. MALONEY: If your question is to me as to whether or not you would be in order, the answer is no. But I think it should be addressed to the Chair.

MR. SALEM: Well, do you feel that—and I understand that the federal courts have not spoken to whether the judge is guilty or not guilty. Do you feel that you addressed yourself, or the committee addressed themselves to this resolution in these eleven Articles of Impeachment?

MR. MALONEY: Yes. But I don't feel that the committee was limited by the scope of the original resolution.

MR. SALEM: Let me ask you this, Counselor:

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 What if we bring these Articles of Impeachment, and we send it to the Senate, and the Senate impeaches Judge Carrillo, and then the federal courts try the man and they say he is innocent of income tax evasion. Do we then come back and try to unimpeach him?

MR. MALONEY: No. There is no article in here that has anything to do with his income tax evasion.

MR. SALEM: All right. Do you not feel that justice would have been better served if this man was tried in the criminal courts rather than by the Legislature?

MR. MALONEY: Are you asking my personal opinion?

MR. SALEM: Yes, sir.

MR. MALONEY: No, that is not my personal opinion. My personal opinion is that we have a duty to oversee those state employees with which we're charged with the responsibility of them fulfilling the conditions of their employment. It is my feeling that Judge Carrillo has not done that, and that he should be removed.

MR. SALEM: Mr. Speaker, so that I can understand this a little bit more, I want to raise a point of order against further consideration of these Articles of Impeachment in that the Articles of Impeachment do not address themselves to H.S.R. No. 161.

1	H.S.R. No. 161 addresses itself to an indict-
2	ment by a federal grand jury for alleged violations of
3	income tax.
4	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Salem, H.S.R. 161
5	addresses itself to impeachment, and H.S.R. No. 167 that
6	was passed by this body also sets out that the Select
7	Committee shall investigate charges, other charges,
8	brought against the judge. Therefore, the committee
9	substitute is within the purview of House Simple Resolu-
10	tion 161, and your point of order is respectfully over-
11	ruled.
12	MR. SALEM: Parliamentary inquiry, Mr.
13	Speaker.
14	SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, Mr.
15	Salem.
16	MR. SALEM: Mr. Speaker, do we not have
17	H.S.R. No. 161 before us, and that's what we're working
18	on?
19	SPEAKER CLAYTON: That is correct.
20	MR. SALEM: And you still feel that H.S.R.
21	161 opens it up to anything that the committee wants to
22	open it up to?
23	SPEAKER CLAYTON: That was my ruling, Mr.
24	Salem.
25	MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman

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yield?

Mr. Garcia.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Maloney, in following you along as you explained generally each of these articles, I note that in many instances the phrase is used, "This testimony was uncontradicted." And my inquiry is whether or not the witnesses who testified in these matters were all witnesses who indicated a willingness to come before the committee to testify?

MR. MALONEY: Yes, for some; no, for

others. We subpoensed some.

MR. GARCIA: The greater majority of the witnesses were witnesses which were made available to the committee through the intercession or work of Mr. Canales, the sponsor of the resolution. Is that not correct?

MR. MALONEY: I wouldn't say the great majority. Yes, there were some, and some of the witnesses, very important witnesses.

MR. GARCIA: The reason I asked this is because in the introductory remarks made by Mr. Canales to the committee, he gives the committee just a brief resume of what each witness is going to testify to, and alludes to the fact that this was information related to

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him prior to the hearings before the Select Committee.

Is that not correct?

MR. MALONEY: I cannot recall exactly what he said. If the record shows that, I'm sure that is what he said. But what Mr. Canales said or did not say carried no weight with the committee. The committee was interested in the evidence introduced before it.

MR. GARCIA: I understand this. All right, now my next question is, with reference to the allegations that address themselves to ownership, such as the ranch of O. P. Carrillo, the Cadillac of O. P. Carrillo, the Farm and Ranch Store owned by Ramiro Carrillo and O. P. Carrillo, Zertuche General Store, I think you referred to it as a sham contrived for the purpose of negotiating the sale of certain items of personalty to the county and attempting to circumvent the statutory law which prevents contracting between the county official and the county. Are there in the transcripts and statement of facts any documentation that establish ownership, that is, deeds and things of that type?

MR. MALONEY: Yes. Judge Carrillo's own financial statements says he has one half interest in the Farm and Ranch Store.

MR. GARCIA: Well, what I'm getting at, are there any deeds that are part of the record?

MR. MALONEY: Any deeds?

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MR. GARCIA: Deeds. Yes. In other words, you speak of O. P. Carrillo's ranch. Is there a deed, a copy of a deed, indicating that the ranch where these witnesses allegedly worked was the ranch owned by O. P. Carrillo?

MR. MALONEY: Not by deed. No.

MR. GARCIA: Are there any articles of partnership? There are allegations that O. P. Carrillo and Ramiro Carrillo were involved in a partnership. Are there any articles of partnership which were introduced into evidence and made a part of the transcript in the hearings before the committee?

MR. MALONEY: Only the judge's own sworn financial statement.

MR. GARCIA: Submitted to who?

MR. MALONEY: Submitted to the Secretary of State, of this state.

MR. GARCIA: Now I note that with reference to—and I believe it was Zertuche General Store—
I think some of the contentions are that there were certain items that— No, let me correct that. That there were certain individuals that worked for Zertuche General Store and the county, and I believe that the remarks or the charge starts off that "while acting in the capacity

1 of a district judge," or something along those lines. 2 weren't a lot of these incidents, incidents that trans-3 pired before he assumed the bench? 4 MR. MALONEY: Yes, some would have. 5 Zertuche General Store instance, it was one that begun 6 while Judge Carrillo was county attorney and continued 7 after he became district judge. 8 MR. GARCIA: How far back did the committee 9 go in its investigation? 10 MR. MALONEY: I would say, for just a 11 general statement, probably 1967; not at our instance 12 but at the instance of Mr. Arthur Mitchell, Judge 13 Carrillo's attorney. He introduced evidence that was 14 pertaining to transactions that took place in 1967, and 15 1968, and this led the committee into going to times 16 that were before the judge actually assumed the bench. 17 MR. GARCIA: Now you have been a criminal 18 district attorney, have you not? 19 MR. MALONEY: Yes. 20 MR. GARCIA: You are aware that there are 21 certain statutes of limitations with reference to certain 22 criminal violations? 23 MR. MALONEY: Correct. 24 MR. GARCIA: And in many of these instances, 25 Mr. Maloney, actually the committee circumvented these

statutes of limitations and went behind a date when any accusation would be barred by limitation could not be filed, would it not?

MR. MALONEY: If you're just talking about the statutes of limitation as to whether or not a person could be prosecuted in a criminal case for these events and transactions, you're correct. I do not believe that this House is under any restriction as far as the statute of limitations.

MR. GARCIA: No, nor am I contending this. This was merely an inquiry to bring to light the fact that a lot of these things that were enlisted from witnesses with reference to alleged criminal violations were in truth and in fact violations that if you attempted to proceed criminally against any person, either the county commissioner—some of these employees I think admitted that they had been involved in criminal violations—those would be barred by limitation. That is, you could not proceed against them criminally. Is that correct?

MR, MALONEY: That's correct.

MR. GARCIA: Thank you.

MR. TRUAN: Mr. Speaker, will the gentle-

man yield?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Do you yield, Mr. Maloney

MR. MALONEY: I will yield.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,

Mr. Truan.

MR. TRUAN: Mr. Maloney, I realize there will be members of the committee that will cover each article in greater detail. If I may, I'd like to ask you some general questions with respect to several of the articles.

Relating to Article I, did you hear testimony to the effect that anyone without any doubt testified that Judge Carrillo had used the groceries for his own use?

MR. MALONEY: I never heard anyone who testified differently. We had a great deal of testimony on that point, and all of the testimony was directed to the fact that he did use it for his own use. There was no contradictory testimony on that point.

MR. TRUAN: Did the committee have investigators that went down to Duval County to substantiate this testimony or verify it?

MR. MALONEY: I went down to Duval County.

I did not talk to anyone from the Cash Store at that time
for the reason that it was a Sunday and the store was not
open, but I would have had I been there.

MR. TRUAN: But you did not. You were not

an investigator as such for the committee? 1 2 No. I went down for the MR. MALONEY: purpose of looking at some bank records so that we could 3 facilitate the work of the committee; since the committee 4 had subpoenaed voluminous records from the banks, it was 5 going to take weeks and weeks to get those records unless 6 we could be selective and tell the bank what it was that 7 8 we wanted. So my purpose in going down there, and those 9 who went with me, was to select those portions of the records that we felt were pertinent to our investigation. 10 MR. TRUAN: How many other members went 11 12 with you to Duval County? 13 MR. MALONEY: I'm sorry, Mr. Truan. 14 MR. TRUAN: How many members of the 15 committee went with you to Duval County? MR. MALONEY: Mr. Chavez, Mr. Kaster, 16 myself. 17 MR. TRUAN: Could you relate to us- You 18 19 were there during the daytime and then in the evening. Did you have any sort of gathering with the witnesses? 20 21 MR. MALONEY: I spoke with Mr. Cleofas 22 Conzalez, who had been a witness before the committee, and I spoke with a Mr. Canales, who had been a witness 23 24 before the committee. I spoke with a Mr. Ruben Chapa,

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who had been a witness before the committee.

1 MR. TRUAN: All of this took place when you 2 were officially convened or in a social gathering? 3 MR. MALONEY: No one was officially con-4 I was there in a social gathering. I would assume vened. that I would say that. I was not down there for any 6 other purpose other than asking directions as to where 7 this place was or that place was. 8 MR. TRUAN: I see. The people were not 9 really talking to you under oath as such? 10 MR. MALONEY: Absolutely not. 11 MR. TRUAN: I see. So for all practical 12 purposes what they were telling you could have been 13 hearsay? 14 MR. MALONEY: Easily. And nothing of what 15 they have told me has entered into any of my deliberations 16 on this matter other than what was sworn testimony. 17 MR. TRUAN: Did the committee have any 18 investigators that compiled information independently 19 of those witnesses that Representative Canales presented 20 to the committee? 21 MR. MALONEY: Well, I don't know what you 22 mean by an investigator. We did make use of the Depart-23 ment of Public Safety with the Rangers to go and check 24 some numbers on some equipment. We did go into the bank 25 and look at these records on Judge Carrillo.

MR. TRUAN: Let me ask more specifically, did the Rangers or anyone bring back information to the effect that Judge Carrillo and his family had in effect used the groceries for their own use?

MR. MALONEY: I'm sorry.

MR. TRUAN: Did any of the people that you utilized, including amongst them you mentioned the Texas Rangers, report to you in their findings that the Carrillo family, Judge Carrillo's family, had in effect used groceries for their own personal use?

MR. MALONEY: I don't believe that we had any testimony or any indication from the Rangers as regards the groceries.

MR. TRUAN: I see. With respect to Article II, excuse my question as a layman; I'm not an attorney, but relating to Judge Carrillo not disqualifying himself on a case mentioned in Article II, could you enlighten us as to whether whatever decision was reached was it appealed?

MR. MALONEY: In which part of Article II?

MR. TRUAN: Article II, subsection 1,

relating to the relationship that Judge Carrillo had had

with Clinton Manges and the fact that he did not dis
qualify himself.

MR. MALONEY: The disqualification hearing

was a hearing in the trial court. It was not, as I understand it, an appeal matter. In fact, I believe later Mr. Mitchell introduced a letter before the committee in which his allegation was that Judge Carrillo had voluntarily excused himself, but it was found not to be so since there was an absolute—since Judge Carrillo had opposed the disqualification and an order was entered against Judge Carrillo. To my knowledge it was never—that order against Judge Carrillo was never appealed.

MR. TRUAN: I see. So the merits of the case or how the judge ruled was not taken into consideration by the committee?

MR. MALONEY: No. And I don't think that it would have been properly so. The question was whether or not the judge could be impartial in a matter in which he had very strong financial ties; in fact, had borrowed some three hundred to four hundred thousand dollars from the bank controlled by Mr. Manges. What his ruling would have been, whether it was perfectly just and impartial, I don't know, and I would not be prepared to pass on.

MR. TRUAN: The fact is in Article II,

Judge Carrillo is being incriminated because of the fact
that he had had previous business dealings with one of
the people involved in the case here, Mr. Manges.

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MR. MALONEY: Not the dealings themselves, Mr. Truan. A person certainly can have whatever dealings they want, but if these dealings create such a situation in which the judiciary is going to be looked at very much askance because in ruling in a case in which you have very strong financial ties yourself, it's no more than you having to push your white button up here if it's a case that involves your financial ties. I think that it reflects with discredit upon our judiciary.

MR. TRUAN: Are you aware as to whether this was reported to the Judicial Qualifications Commission?

MR. MALONEY: I am not aware of that. It may have been; I don't know. I did have a conversation with the Judicial Qualifications Commission after we had had about a week of testimony, and as I think you know, most of the work of the Judicial Qualifications Commission is carried on in a confidential manner. At that point all that I was informed was that they did not have anything under investigation at that time.

MR. TRUAN: Further on under Article II
you make reference—or the committee rather—makes
reference to Judge Carrillo removing Judge Parr, and the
fact that at this time they had broken publicly their
political contact. Could you enlighten us as to why

MR. MALONEY: The allegation in the removal suit was that he had been convicted of the federal case of perjury, which I think gives him a perfect right to, in my own opinion—I'm not expressing a legal opinion; just my own opinion—gave him a right

Judge Carrillo removed Judge Parr as county judge?

MR. TRUAN: But the committee is still recommending that he be impeached because of that?

to remove Judge Parr under the statutes of this state.

MR. MALONEY: Wait just a moment, Mr. Truan.

It was not the removal itself because the judge is empowered to do that. It's when it came to the fact issues that were going to be decided before the court, and Judge Carrillo was publicly an opponent of Judge Parr, that we felt it was highly improprietous for him to be the fact finder in such a case.

Once again, we're not talking about the merits as to whether or not Judge Parr should have been removed or not have been removed. That is a matter that needs to be litigated in the courts.

MR. TRUAN: I want you to understand that it concerns me because I cannot differentiate—and maybe it's because of my lack of legal training—but I had been led to believe that Judge Carrillo had arbitrarily removed Judge Parr from office because they're political

opponents. But I understand that Judge Parr had indeed been not only indicted but convicted on a given offense as you mentioned.

MR. MALONEY: That is correct.

MR. TRUAN: But the committee did not consider that as perhaps being-

MR. MALONEY: We felt that the manner in which Judge Carrillo handled his judicial function was arbitrary and perhaps—not any perhaps; for sure—was not the way that a district judge should sit in judgment on a case; a case in which he is going to pass judgment himself on a political foe, someone he has announced publicly he is out to get. Now, I think that's wrong, and I think you'd probably agree with me on that.

MR. TRUAN: Well, the committee, of course, did not have any previous experience in dealing with removing of judges. That's why some of us related to the Judicial Qualifications Commission whom we assumed would have those aredentials.

Let me ask you further on Article II, you make reference only to the fact that Judge Carrillo removed four members of the Benavides Independent School District without indicating why he removed them.

Why did Judge Carrillo remove those members?

MR. MALONEY: No, no. I didn't indicate

why he removed them. In the lawsuit itself there was an indication. It was alleged in the petition of removal that the school board members had acted improperly in paying some very large attorneys' fees that were supposed to be out of all proportion to the services performed by the attorneys; that a former superintendent who was, I believe, at the time serving time in the federal penitentiary, was being paid, I believe, a thousand dollars a month as a consultant; and the destruction of some school records that the grand jury was investigating.

There is nothing in the record that indicates that none of these things happened. In fact, it's probably the contrary, that all three of these things did happen and probably would give you just cause to wonder what the school board was doing. But you'll notice that he did not remove the school board. He only removed his political opponents. Had he removed all of the school board I would question in my mind whether it was arbitrary, but when you only remove your opponents and leave your friends on, who must be equally guilty of improper conduct, I begin to smell a rat.

MR. TRUAN: Did the testimony before your committee indicate that the other members that were not removed had supported paying this former superintendent who had already been indicted and convicted and by that

1	time supposedly he was already serving time? Did your
2	records indicate or testimony before your committee
3	indicate that the other members that were not removed
4	by Judge Carrillo had also supported?
5	MR. MALONEY: It could not be established
6	because, as you recall, the school board records had
7	been destroyed.
8	MR. TRUAN: Well, how can you say without
9	equivocation of the front mike that he did not remove
10	those other members when you cannot say for sure whether
11	those other members indeed supported the former super-
12	intendent or not?
13	MR. MALONEY: Your point is very well
14	taken. Neither could Judge Carrillo because the records
15	were destroyed. Then I began to wonder how he knew.
16	MR. TRUAN: Did Judge Carrillo testify
17	before your committee?
18	MR. MALONEY: No. He was offered the
19	opportunity. His attorney said that he would plead the
20	Fifth Amendment.
21	MR. TRUAN: Well, then how can you say that
22	Judge Carrillo could not?
23	MR. MALONEY: I beg your pardon?
24	MR. TRUAN: I'm sorry. How can you say
25	Judge Carrillo could not tell either?

MR. MALONEY: Because it was established that there was no hearing, so basically if there was anything for him to go on it must have been those things that were in the pleadings. That was not in the pleadings. The judge heard no evidence on this. And certainly if he did hear evidence outside of court, this would have been improper conduct.

MR. TRUAN: The various people mentioned in Article III, page 53—

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Sherman calls point of order. The gentleman's time has expired. The point of order is well taken and sustained.

Mr. Truan, there will be individuals that will be relating each of these articles if you want to ask them these questions.

MR. TRUAN: Well, Mr. Speaker, we have a train of thought here underway, on one of the articles, but I thought perhaps I could continue. I'd like to ask you if the members would allow me to continue my question—

SPEAKER CLAYTON: You're recognized for that motion. Mr. Truan moves that the gentleman's time be extended. Is there objection? All those in favor say "aye"; all those opposed, "no."

(The motion, being put to a voice vote, failed.)
The gentleman's time is not extended.

1	MR. TRUAN: Thank you.
2	SPEAKER CLAYTON: The Chair recognizes
3	Mr. Chavez on Article I.
4	Just a minute. Mr. Maloney, do you have a
5	motion?
6	MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Speaker?
7	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington, for what
8	purpose?
9	MR. WASHINGTON: Go ahead and let him make
10	his motion.
11	SPEAKER CLAYTON: All right. Mr. Maloney
12	for a motion.
13	MR. MALONEY: Mr. Speaker and Members, I
14	move that House Simple Resolution 161 as substituted be
15	considered article by article, and voted on article by
16	article.
17	SPEAKER CLAYTON: All right. Members,
18	you've heard the motion. Is there objection?
19	The Chair hearing none, it is so ordered.
20	Mr. Washington, for what purpose?
21	MR. WASHINGTON: Parliamentary inquiry,
22	Mr. Speaker.
23	SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, Mr.
24	Washington.
25	MR. WASHINGTON: I know that the Speaker

ordinarily refrains from ruling on Constitutional questions, but inasmuch as there is a good add-mixture and co-mingling of Constitutional authority as well as Legislative authority, both by being here and as for our purpose in being here, will the Speaker entertain points of order based upon Constitutional grounds because of the nature of these proceedings?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: I'm going to have to look at each one of them as they come, Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: Get ready, Mr. Speaker.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: I'm ready.

MR. WASHINGTON: I raise a point of order against further consideration of House Simple Resolution No. 161 in that it violates Article 2, Section 1, of the Texas Constitution. It deals with the separation of powers of the three co-equal branches of government.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Bring your point forward, Mr. Washington.

Mr. Washington, as in other points of order raised on Constitutional issues, the Chair has not ruled, and in this instance the Chair will follow that procedure, and believing that the House has acted itself in the passage of House Simple Resolution 167. Therefore, the Chair will not rule on the point of order.

MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Speaker?

1	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington.
2	MR. WASHINGTON: Parliamentary inquiry.
3	SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry,
4	Mr. Washington.
5	MR. WASHINGTON: Inasmuch as the 64th
6	Regular Session of the House has adjourned sine die,
7	are we here by constitutional or statutory authority?
8	SPEAKER CLAYTON: I'd say, Mr. Washington,
9	by constitutional, statutory, and resolution authority.
10	MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Speaker, parliamentar
11	inquiry.
12	SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry,
13	Mr. Washington.
14	MR. WASHINGTON: Is the resolution by
15	which the Speaker determines that we are here a product
16	of the 64th Session, regular session, or of a special
17	session of the 64th Session of the Legislature?
18	SPEAKER CLAYTON: The 64th Regular Session
19	MR. WASHINGTON: Parliamentary inquiry.
20	SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry,
21	Mr. Washington.
22	MR. WASHINGTON: If the Chair will not
23	rule on Constitutional questions, does that not then
24	limit any consideration of the improper use or exercise
25	of any authority by this body at this time to having

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been waived as a result of not having been presented prior to the time that the Speaker referred House Simple Resolution 161 to the committee?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Restate your question, Mr. Washington. I didn't get the essence of it.

MR. WASHINGTON: If you're saying, Mr. Speaker, that you won't rule on a Constitutional question now, does that not mean that any question that could have and should have been raised regarding either the regularity of the proceedings or the resolution itself would have been waived at the time that the resolution was introduced and referred to committee?

What I'm suggesting is that if you won't rule on a Constitutional question, then you don't reach the merits of the proposition raised, Mr. Speaker, and if there is an infirmity on invalidity in the process by which we're here today, then if you won't rule on a Constitutional issue, which is the only issue that can be raised which is the broad parameter by which we determine whether we're here rightfully or wrongfully, and if you won't rule on such a question—

SPEAKER CLAYTON: I don't think the Speaker has to rule on that, Mr. Washington. I think the courts have ruled on that. It's a procedural matter. The enjoining of the House was just thrown out by the federal

district judge just the other day, so I think that the procedure so far as us being here is appropriate, or action would have been taken there.

MR. WASHINGTON: But my point of order doesn't go to whether we're here by proper authority. The question that I raised is much more grave and severe. It goes to the Constitution. I don't think that Judge Brown in his memorandum opinion nor Judge Roberts in his procurium opinion most recently ruled on the question that I raised, and that is whether or not this violates the separation of power.

As I understand Mr. Hale's proposition—and I think it's probably an adequate one—is that Maddox versus Ferguson is the landmark case on the question of the legislative branch impeaching either the executive or the judicial branches. But if you don't rule on the question then it cannot be properly raised for consideration here or it cannot be the proper predicate for later proceedings pursuant to whatever we do here.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington, I think that you have preserved your point of order for future use by my stating that the Chair would not rule on Constitutional matters; is in essence the same as over-ruling the point of order.

MR. WASHINGTON: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker?

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SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: May I raise additional points of order against these proceedings?

> SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your point, Mr.

Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: I raise a point of order that under Article 15, Section 6, sets out specifically the Constitutional authority by which a district judge of the State of Texas may be discharged of his responsibility in office, and that the general principle of constitutional and statutory construction of exclusio alterias, "exclusio unis est inclusio alterias;" that is, to include the specific excludes the general, and that you may not consider the impeachment of a district judge by any other procedure than that set out in the Constitution. And although Section 2 deals with the trial of impeachment in the Sanate, I submit that this body may not proceed inasmuch as Section 6 sets out the manner of impeachment of a district judge of this state may be by the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, and that the inclusion of that specific provision, being more specific than the general provision which has to do with impeachment of high officers generally, is more specific, and that that quoted language from the Latin which is a

general rule of statutory construction, and is not constitutional; that is, to include the specific is to exclude the general, must be used by this body in determining under what article, if any, impeachment proceedings may take place; and therefore, since we are not proceeding pursuant to Article 15, Section 6, these proceedings are unconstitutional under our own Constitution.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington, once again the Chair takes the same position, and he will not rule on constitutional matters but believes that this question has already been settled by the Maddox versus Ferguson case.

MR. WASHINGTON: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Please note my exception.

In light of the Maddox versus Ferguson case—Well, before I get to that, I wish to raise the additional and further point of order against further proceedings herein under Article 15, Section 7, wherein it is stated that:

"The Legislature shall provide by law for the trial and removal from office of all officers of this state, the modes for which have not been provided in this Constitution."

Since Mr. Hale takes the position that there are three separate and distinct means by which the question

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of impropriety on the part of a district judge may be raised, since you have seen fit not to rule on the method under Section 6 wherein the Supreme Court may remove a district judge, I submit very respectfully, Mr. Speaker, that Section 7 is also a method, and since the Legislature in its wisdom, or lack of it, has seen fit to create by legislative authority a Judicial Qualifications Commission, the Legislature has delegated its authority over district judges to the Judicial Qualifications Commission which has the sole and exclusive responsibility for determining the qualifications and fitness of district judges to hold office in this state, and therefore, since we have delegated this authority pursuant to the constitutional authority set out in Article 15, Section 7, we have no right and indeed no power to proceed with these proceedings.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington, again and along the same lines, we feel that this question has been answered since three provisions have been set out in the Constitution, that these have been answered in the Maddox versus Ferguson case, and consequently, will not rule on your point of order being a constitutional matter.

AUSTIN, TEXAS

MR. WASHINGTON: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
And finally, on the question of Maddox versus

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Ferguson, wherein not only does it speak to the question that has been so eloquently addressed by our speaker as regards the separation of power and the general authority of the Legislature in this proceeding. The case among other things stands for the proposition that the Constitution of the State of Texas was then and is now too vague and ambiguous a document by which reasonable notice could be given to a person before whom charges are brought, and that the Constitution does not set out the duties and responsibilities such that a fair notice and warning is given to an individual who may be subject to impeachment, as is set out in Maddox versus Ferguson, and that therefore, the due process clause of the State Constitution as well as of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is breached; that is, as Maddox versus Ferguson points out. Due process at least requires of Judge O. P. Carrillo that the document by which he is charged and brought before this body for impeachment, Article 15, must set out within its parameters that conduct which is proscribed; that is, which is prohibited. And since, as Maddox versus Ferguson, which the Speaker has quoted, also stands for the proposition that this Constitution is too vague and indefinite to be that due process requirement, then it cannot be the authority by which a district judge can be impeached

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because it doesn't give that fair warning and notice that is required in Maddox versus Ferguson.

For that reason, Mr. Speaker, I respectfully urge that these proceedings are improper, that fair notice is not given by Article 15 of the Texas Constitution, and that to proceed with Articles of Impeachment against the Honorable O. P. Carrillo, District Judge, would be a gross travesty of justice, would be improper under the Texas Constitution as well as the Federal Constitution, and would be a denial of the equal protection of the laws and the due process of law to him and to every other district judge who is not put on notice of what conduct is prohibited and subject to impeachment.

For that reason I respectfully urge that you grant my point of order and let us go home.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington, the Speaker again refuses to rule on a constitutional point, but believes that many of these parameters which you have suggested are set up or set out statutorily; also believes that the federal courts in dismissing the cause of enjoining the House did in fact believe that official and proper notice had been given. Therefore, we note your objection, but again, will not rule.

> MR. WASHINGTON: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

MR. COLEMAN:

Mr. Speaker?

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SPEAKER CLAYTON:

Mr. Coleman, for what

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purpose?

Coleman.

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MR. COLEMAN:

Parliamentary inquiry.

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SPEAKER CLAYTON:

State your inquiry, Mr.

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MR. COLEMAN: I think this will be a little easier. On the motion by Mr. Maloney that we just recently passed, when we get in article by article consideration, which was adopted by this body, when we get, for example, to Article II or III where we have conduct including but not limited to one or more of the following, my question is this: Will we actually be considering number one, number two, number three, or number four, or will we be asked merely to vote "yes" or "no" on an article? For example, if in Article II this body were to determine that one of four allegations, I suppose you'd call them, in Article II were true, would you then be required to vote, or at least feel you had to vote at least "aye" on Article II, yet you may not agree with all the charges within Article II?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Coleman, the procedure is as follows: Each article will be presented.

If you feel there are certain allegations or charges in one of the articles that is not pertinent, that you feel

it is not true, you can offer an amendment to that 1 2 particular article to strike that particular point. But the vote will be on the entire article. It can be 3 amended. 4 5 MR. COLEMAN: Everyone is capable of offering amendments to delete or add? 6 SPEAKER CLAYTON: That is correct. 7 MR. COLEMAN: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. 8 MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Speaker? 9 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington. 10 MR. WASHINGTON: I wish to raise the point 11 of order, and I'm not being dilatory and wasting the 12 House's time, but I'm sure Mr. Johnson will understand, 13 also Mr. Hale, what I'm doing. 14 15 I wish to raise the point of order that I have raised four points of order: Articles 2, Section 1, of 16 the Texas Constitution; Article 15, Section 6; Article 15, 17 Section 7; and also the violation of the due process 18 clause of the State and Federal Constitution as well as 19 the equal protection clause of both of those documents. 20 My point of order is that the Speaker has not ruled on 21 22 my points of order. That's tough. 23 SPEAKER CLAYTON: MR. WASHINGTON: I have to have a guling. 24 25 SPEAKER CLAYTON: The Speaker has indicated

to you, Mr. Washington, that he would not consider constitutional points, but has noted your objections and noted your points of order, and has stated to you in the first point that not ruling on the point has the same effect as an overrule.

MR. WASHINGTON: But it doesn't, Mr.

Speaker. That's where I beg to differ with you. If you will simply overrule that last point of order I think my point will be made. But I have not gotten any affirmative relief that I requested. So I come back now and raise the point of order that you've not ruled on my point of orders so that at least I will have preserved for review by appropriate authorities if there be any, and I don't know that there are any, but I've not been an advocate at the microphone. I have not gotten an adverse ruling from you, and I need an adverse ruling to set the record straight. So if you'll merely overrule my point of order that you have not ruled on my points of order, which I think you can do.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington raises a point of order that the Speaker has not ruled on his points of order. The point of order is well taken and overruled.

MR. WASHINGTON: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
MR. VALE: Mr. Speaker, parliamentary

SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, 2 Mr. Vale. 3 MR. VALE: Am I led to believe that we 4 can offer additional language and verbage in sections 5 to this resolution? 6 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Yes. Amendments can be 7 offered, Mr. Vale. 8 MR. VALE: Is it limited to articles 9 and language relating only to this judge, or can it be 10 extended to other office holders? 11 SPEAKER CLAYTON: It has to be within the 12 confines of the resolution before us, Mr. Vale. 13 Mr. Vale, Mr. Whitehead has already asked that 14 question. He had some ideas. 15 The Chair recognizes Mr. Chavez for an explana-16 tion of Article I. 17 PRESENTATION OF ARTICLE I 18 MR. CHAVEZ: Mr. Speaker and Members, it 19 becomes my duty on behalf of the Select Committee on 20 Impeachment to present for your consideration the first 21 proposed Article of Impeachment against the Honorable 22 O. P. Carrillo, Judge of the 229th Judicial District of 23 Texas. 24 25 You have been furnished a copy of the proposed

inquiry.

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Substantially what it says is that O. P. Carrillo, as a State District Judge, and because he held the office, conspired with others but principally with his brother, Ramiro Carrillo, a Duval County commissioner, to cause county funds to be used in the payment of groceries for his personal use and benefit when he was not lawfully entitled to receive this benefit.

Permit me, Mr. Speaker and Members, to give you a little background which will facilitate my presentation of the evidence substantiating this article.

Duval County, as most counties, has had a welfare program by which it provides funds for the payment of food for eligible recipients. Incredibly, Judge Carrillo was an official that authorized food vouchers for recipients.

I refer you to Exhibits No. 26 and 27, which are copies of the small food vouchers which were initialed by Judge Carrillo.

Recipients also received food authorization

from the county commissioner, Ramiro Carrillo, either

directly from him or through one of his precinct employees,
namely, Mr. Cleofas Gonzalez.

I would invite your attention to the transcript of testimony in Volume I, page 52. Substantially the

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transcript that I refer to you goes like this.

The witness was Cleofas Conzalez, and he was being asked about these food authorizations, and the question to him was:

"How do they work?"

His answer:

"Well, a lot of people go in there looking for Mr. Ramiro Carrillo, that they need an order to buy some food because something went wrong and they didn't get their check or they don't have no work, or people used to go to me and then I would talk to Mr. Carrillo, and if he gave me an okay I would give them out an order."

"Question: You give out these white slips to people?"

"Answer: No, sir. These white slips were given to me by a store owner. At the end of the month he would come and tell me. O. P. went and got this merchandise and he wants you to make orders to these names here."

"Question: Would you please go through these slips..."

And they asked him about the slips.

testimony comes from Cleofas Gonzalez who was an employee of Precinct 3, which was the precinct of Ramiro Carrillo, and who was one of the go-betweens so to speak that handled these things for him.

Again, questioning him about these slips, it says, the question was:

"Are you testifying here that these, or some of these people on these slips which have been okayed by Judge O. P. Carrillo do not exist or do not live in that area?"

"Answer: I think that there are some people that don't exist, like this Rita Rodriguez. She exists but she lives in Corpus Christi.

Yzaguirre, who with her husband co-owns a grocery store known as the Cash Store. The Cash Store is situated in the town of Benavides where Judge Carrillo also resides. Benavides is a small town with approximately 2500 inhabitants, lying southwest of the Duval County seat. There is no bank in Benavides, and the Cash Store renders a sort of banking service to its customers by cashing their checks. It will become important to remember this fact because of an apparent defense by Judge Carrillo to this article of impeachment which I will explain later.

I invite your attention to Volume V, page 64 1 and 65, the testimony of Mrs. Lauro Yzaguirre under the 2 examination of Chairman Hale. 3 Mr. Yzaguirre testified that Commissioner 4 Ramiro Carrillo informed her that Judge O. P. Carrillo 5 was allowed a monthly budget of \$300 to be paid out of 6 county funds and used in payment of groceries obtained by or for Judge Carrillo for his personal use and benefit. 8 The questioning of Mrs. Yzaguirre was: 9 "Did O. P. Carrillo himself ever come in 10 to pay his bill?" 11 "Answer: I haven't recalled for a long 12 time." 13 "Question: Do you recall if he ever did?" 14 "Answer: Sometimes he did if there was 15 a balance over what his budget was. That is 16 what was told to us, that he had a \$300 17 budget, and whatever balance he would pay 18 the difference, you know." 19 "Question: Who told you there was a 20 \$300 budget?" 21 "Answer: His brother, the commissioner, 22 Ramiro Carrillo." 23 Again, a question about the checks. 24 25 "What kind of checks were they? Were

they county checks or personal checks that were used for payment of the groceries?"

"Answer: The difference was paid by personal checks. If there was a difference, you know, like I told you, the judge had a \$300 budget. That is what we were made to understand. If he had a balance of \$357, three hundred and something, well, he paid the difference. And then if he wouldn't come, well, we would just put the balance onto the next month."

"Question: So maybe you would get one check for \$300 and that would be drawn on the county, and then if it was \$357, you would get a check from Judge Carrillo for \$57?"

"Answer: If there was a difference, and if he didn't come—sometimes he didn't come at the end of the month—so all I would do is credit his account for his \$300 from his budget that was given to me by the county check, and the balance, I put a balance there to him."

"Question: Did you receive a check from the county every month for \$300?"

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"Answer: Well, included in that, you know, like-You just saw one for \$700. It was included in that. Not two separate checks. One for \$700 and one for \$300, no."

This practice has occurred for the last year and a half and specifically through March of 1975, which includes Judge Carrillo's present term of office. This period is evidenced by Mrs. Yzaguirre's testimony at Volume V, page 84 and again at page 78 of Volume V. Mrs. Yzaguirre testified that even now Judge Carrillo has a balance owing of \$57 after receiving his \$300 monthly check.

And the questioning of Mrs. Yzaguirre goes like this:

"Question: How long was he limited to \$300? Does this go back some time or do you know?"

"Answer: I guess."

"Ouestion: Well, you're the bookkeeper."

"Answer: As far as I remember."

"Question: For as long as you remember?"

"Yes. He had \$300 a month. I'm the bookkeeper. Before that my father-in-law used to do all of that."

"Question: You have been the bookkeeper

the last year or so, year and a half?"

Yes."

"Question: And so for the last year and a half he has had the \$300 budget?"

"Answer: Yes. Up to that date."

And again, on page 78 of Volume V, asking about the account of Judge Carrillo:

"Question: How much is the account of Judge Carrillo now at your store? What is the balance that he owes you?"

"Answer: Right now, like I tell you, balance, \$57, because there was a credit for \$300."

"He owes you \$57?"

"Yes."

"Answer:

Now, how did all this work? Well, Commissioner Carrillo by virtue of his official office authorized payment of expenditures for his precinct, including the food money I've mentioned. While Judge Carrillo may not have always gone grocery shopping himself, he did authorize personal employees and court employees to purchase groceries in his name and charge them to his account. Among those doing his grocery shopping were Patricio Garza, Tomas Elizondo, and Roberto Elizondo, and this can be seen in Volume V, pages 27, 28; Volume V, pages

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148, 209, 211; admitted by all three of these people who testified before the committee.

The testimony clearly shows that groceries were picked up for the judge for his personal use and that of his ranch hands. Those picking up the groceries would accumulate the charge slips, and at the end of the month would present them to Cleofes Gonzalez. Cleofas Gonzalez would then launder the charge slips by making up fictitious orders so that Commissioner Carrillo could have the same approved for payment by the county.

This is questioning of Cleofas Gonzalez by Chairman Hale:

"Those orders here which ostensibly bear what appears to be an initial on it, how did the judge profit from these?"

"Answer: Well, he got some groceries from the store, and then at the end of the month Mr. Yzaguirre, all that merchandise came from the Cash Store at Benavides, Texas. Mr. Yzaguirre would go at the end of the month and tell me, 'Mr. Gonzalez, O. P. got this merchandise and he said for me to just bring this here and for you to make some welfare orders.' And that's all. So I made them. And I asked Ramiro Carrillo. He's the

one in charge of that welfare orders. I asked him and he said, 'Okay, just make them out, and whenever you get through making them out, take them back to the store.' So I would make out those welfare orders; took them back to the store, and the store owners would give them back to Mr. Carrillo, and Mr. Carrillo would then take them to commissioners' court and get them approved."

On other occasions Cleofas Gonzalez would give

Mrs. Yzaguirre a list of fictitious names to be used to
account for the \$300 monthly allowance for Judge Carrillo's
groceries. This can be seen at Volume V, page 58, 61,
62, 91, 92, and 93.

You might wonder what would happen when he exceeded his monthly budget. Well, then when that occurred the judge would either pay it personally or carry over the excess to be charged against the following month's allowance. I mentioned that a while ago at Volume V, page 65.

If he did not use all of his \$300 allowance for any one month, then he would have a credit for that amount for the following month, so you see, in one way or another, Judge Carrillo used up his \$300 a month

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allowance every month.

Judge Carrillo was only entitled to a monthly one hundred dollars per month supplement pay from Duval County. The entitlement to the grocery allowance was no doubt a scheme designed to illegally have the judge benefit at the county's expense. This scheme was facilitated by the judge's brother being a county commissioner, and therefore, being in a position to approve the expenditures in the manner designed by them.

Now, Judge Carrillo though often invited, did not offer personal testimony, but through his counsel Exhibit Carrillo 32 was offered. This exhibit consists of some fifteen pages and are copies of checks made for various amounts and cashed at the Cash Store. The judge's counsel would imply that these checks paid for the groceries bought on the judge's behalf. However, Mrs. Yzaguirre denied this, saying the judge often cashed checks at her store as did many other people because there was no bank in Benavides to cash them. I refer you to Volume XII, page 114 of the testimony.

Mrs. Yzaguirre admitted receiving checks for payment of excess balances, and if you look at Carrillo Exhibit No. 23 on page 4, there is a check which is No. 418 dated March 15, 1974, payable to the Cash Store with a memo notation reading, "Balance of March." This certainly

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shows that the judge did carry balances from month to month, and probably, as Mrs. Yzaguirre testified, for the excess groceries that he took over and above the monthly allowance he and his brother set him up for.

Most of the checks exhibited to us were for even amounts, but as Mrs. Yzaguirre pointed out, most of these checks were given for cash and not necessarily in payment of merchandise.

Also note the frequency of the checks. You will recall that I earlier mentioned a defense by the judge through his lawyer's introduction of this exhibit. was it. It would appear that the mere introduction of these checks does not totally obviate the facts of the testimony of Mrs. Yzaguirre and Cleofas Gonzalez that a scheme was formed by Judge O. P. Carrillo and his brother the county commissioner, whereby through the methods I have described Judge Carrillo was able to get his groceries paid from money that was allocated for the poor and the needy of Duval County, and whether it was county, state or federal money, Judge Carrillo and his brother through this scheme caused its misapplication and diverted these funds from their intended use. Judge Carrillo thereby received a benefit to which he was not lawfully entitled to receive.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker and Members, the committee

was of the opinion that the judge's conduct was such as to constitute an impeachable offense and accordingly recommends that Article I of Impeachment be adopted and preferred against Judge O. P. Carrillo.

MR. VALE: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a question?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Do you yield, Mr. Chavez?
The gentleman yields, Mr. Vale.

MR. VALE: Mr. Chavez, did a Mr. Yzaguirre appear before the committee?

MR. CHAVEZ: I didn't hear you.

MR. VALE: Did a Mr. Yzaguirre appear before the committee; Mr. or Mrs. Yzaguirre?

MR. CHAVEZ: Both did.

MR. VALE: Did any of those parties need an interpreter or did they testify in English?

MR. CHAVEZ: I think that Mr. Yzaguirre had the benefit of an interpreter partially through his testimony, but he was able to answer some questions.

Mrs. Yzaguirre did not require an interpreter.

MR. VALE: All right. Who was that official interpreter? Or did the committee have one, or whose word did they take for the interpretation?

MR. CHAVEZ: I think Mr. Salem was there at one time and offered to interpret partially for his

part of his testimony, but as I said, he did not require a full interpretation of everything he testified to.

MR. VALE: Was there ever an official interpreter hired by the committee on the role to officially translate truthfully everything that was—

MR. CHAVEZ: There was a young lady, Edna Ramon, that was available and retained by the committee for purposes of interpreting at such times as that occasion arose.

MR. VALE: The question is— I don't want to know if she was available. Did she actually interpret?

MR. CHAVEZ: She interpreted some for some witnesses. Yes, sir.

MR. VALE: How about for these Yzaguirre people?

MR. CHAVEZ: Mrs. Yzaguirre did not require an interpreter.

MR. VALE: How about Mr. Yzaguirre? Did she interpret for him?

MR. CHAVEZ: I don't remember.

I don't think that Ms. Ramon interpreted for Mr. Yzaguirre. Mr. Salem happened to be in the room at that time, and I think that the chairman invited Mr. Salem to come forward to assist.

MR. VALE: Was Mr. Salem sworn to translate

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truthfully?

MR. CHAVEZ: The Chairman declined to do it inasmuch as he was a member of the House.

MR. VALE: Incidentally, Mr. Chavez, I want you to know that I am well acquainted with Mrs. Ramon, and she does not speak the Spanish language. was an employee of the Sergeant-at-Arm's office during the last few days of the regular session, but she was not acquainted nor fluent with the Spanish language.

Now, let me ask you some more questions.

This article says that the judge conspired with others, and you have outlined some scheme or schemes of which some results happened, but I want to know specifically, who did the judge conspire with? And when and where did that conspiracy take place?

MR. CHAVEZ: I would presume that the conspiracy took place-

MR. VALE: No. No, I don't want you to I want you to tell me which witness testified before this committee where Judge Carrillo conspired with what other person; where that conversation or that conspiracy took place; what they did; and how they furthered this conspiracy. I don't want any presumptions.

MR. CHAVEZ: Mr. Cleofas Gonzalez, a precinct employee of Ramiro Carrillo testified that he

assisted the judge and Ramiro Carrillo in handling these food vouchers and taking fictitious names to Mrs.

Yzaguirre for purposes of using these to satisfy the account of \$300, and to cover up the \$300 that Judge Carrillo was taking.

MR. VALE: All right. But-

MR. CHAVEZ: Do you want me to finish answering the question?

MR. VALE: Prior to the time that this scheme was being carried out, prior to the time that this conspiracy was being carried out, when these vouchers were being signed and fictitious or non-existent or persons named who were removed, some place, some time, and somewhere the judge and other persons, just like you say here, got together and conspired to deprive or to have Duval County pay for these groceries for his personal use and benefit. I want to know where that conspiracy took place, the place?

MR. CHAVEZ: From the evidence that we heard and the testimony, it can be safely presumed that it took place in Duval County, Texas.

MR. VALE: Okay. It took place in Duval County. Where specifically in Duval County? In what office? In what office, in what city, and who was present And give me the name of the witness that testified to

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those facts.

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MR. CHAVEZ: Mr. Vale, I don't think-or at least in my determination to vote for this article-I don't think that it was necessary to have witnesses to say, "I was there; I saw them conspiring," because the people that conspired or the people that are guilty of having committed this offense, I'm sure that they're not going to come forward and admit it to you. Now, Judge Carrillo was invited to testify. He declined to do so as was his right. But the chain of circumstances as they developed, the chain of circumstances as they developed, prevailed, show that a conspiracy took place by virtue of the fact that Ramiro Carrillo approved payment of these expenditures as was his duty as the county commissioner, and Cleofas Gonzalez testified that this thing did occur. Mrs. Yzaguirre testified that Ramiro Camillo told her that the judge was entitled to a \$300 a month budget from the County of Duval.

MR. VALE: Can't it be that the commissioner, Ramiro Carrillo, would make a statement like that without the judge knowing about it? Is that not possible?

MR. CHAVEZ: No, I doubt it.

MR. VALE: You doubt it?

MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir. I mean, the judge received these groceries and he paid the balance of the

proceries after receiving credit for \$300. Why would he pay a balance if he didn't know he'd already received the \$300 allowance from the county?

MR. VALE: Okay. Let us agree that he received all those groceries, and that he paid for all those in excess. The question still remains, did he conspire with others, which is what he stands charged here.

MR. CHAVEZ: That's right.

MR. VALE: And if he conspired with others, who did he conspire with?

MR. CHAVEZ: Ramiro Carrillo, Cleofas
Gonzalez—

MR. VALE: Okay. Where did that conspiracy take place?

MR. CHAVEZ: In Duval County, Texas.

MR. VALE: No. Couldn't it have happened in some other place, in Corpus Christi? You know, you're just presuming, Mr. Chavez, that a conspiracy took place, and you're further presuming that it transpired in Duval County. But the question is, which witness testified that the judge, Carrillo, conspired with somebody else—he can't conspire with himself—that he conspired with somebody else to do this? Who was that other person, where did that meeting take place, in what office, in

 what ranch, what building, what street corner? And which witness testified to those facts?

MR. CHAVEZ: The chain of circumstances as developed by the testimony of Cleofas Gonzalez and Mrs. Yzaguirre and the Elizondo brothers lends itself to prove that a conspiracy did take place, and that the conspiracy was carried out. I don't know where it took place, it's not necessarily material, because we don't have a jurisdictional question here, Mr. Vale.

MR. VALE: Let me tell you this: About a week ago an accident happened at an intersection of St.

Mary's and Houston in San Antonio. By virtue of that happening I could assume, the way you're saying, that the two drivers had conspired to have an accident there because the occurrence happened. This is what you're telling us, that an occurrence happened and therefore a conspiracy existed.

What is the definition that this committee used for defining "conspiracy"? How did you all define this conspiracy? What is a conspiracy?

MR. CHAVEZ: We did not have any definitions set out with respect to any of the allegations here. The committee, by examining the testimony that was received, concluded that an agreement had been entered into between Ramiro Carrillo and O. P. Carrillo whereby fictitious

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names would be used to cover up for groceries that would be ourchased for the benefit of Judge Carrillo, used by him and on his ranch.

MR. VALE: But, Mr. Chavez-

MR. CHAVEZ: And that this money, these groceries, would be paid by Duval County, which payments would be approved by Ramiro Carrillo. That was the agreement; that was the conspiracy; that was what was carried out.

MR. VALE: Okay. That was the agreement.

MR. CHAVEZ: That was what?

MR. VALE: That was the agreement. This is what you've stated.

MR. CHAVEZ: That is the agreement that we-

MR. VALE: Which witness testified to the fact that the judge had that agreement with the commissioner, his brother, Ramiro Carrillo?

MR. CHAVEZ: Nobody came up and said, "I saw them enter into an agreement." I've already told you that.

MR. VALE: That's what I'm getting at.

MR. CHAVEZ: I told you, Mr. Vale, that circumstances—the evidence may be circumstantial—but nevertheless, it was all together which started off and led to the conclusion by the committee that they had

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1	point of order is well taken and sustained.
2	MR. VALE: I move to extend the gentleman'
3	time, Mr. Speaker.
4	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Vale moves to extend
5	the gentleman's time. Is there objection?
6	All those in favor of the extension of time
7	say, "aye"; all opposed, "no."
8	Vote aye, vote no. Division vote.
9	Have all members voted?
10	There being 36 "ayes" and 64 "noes", one present
11	not voting, the motion to extend fails.
12	MR. TRUAN: Mr. Speaker, parliamentary
13	inquiry.
14	SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, Mr.
15	Truan.
16	MR. TRUAN: We are operating under the rule
17	that we adopted at the beginning of the regular session
18	which limits the time to how long now?
19	SPEAKER CLAYTON: Twenty minutes opening
20	with one extension by a simple majority, second extension
21	by unanimous vote.
22	MR. TRUAN: I see. And do I gather that
23	the leadership of this House does not consider it necessar
24	to revise or change the rules so that we could have enough
25	time if there were enough members that wish to pursue the

## questioning?

are deciding that issue as we come to it. If the majority of the membership desired more time they would have voted to extend the member's time.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Truan, the members

MR. TRUAN: The committee that supported this resolution did not offer any changes to the rules, I gather. Is that correct?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: That is correct.

Does anyone want to speak against adoption of Article I?

Mr. Vale to speak against the adoption of Article T.

## PRESENTATION AGAINST ARTICLE I

MR. VALE: Mr. Speaker, Members of the House, I had not anticipated speaking against Article I because I intended to try to debate this issue as fully and as fairly as we could under the rules of the House. However, the House under the rules saw fit not to extend the time for Mr. Chavez so that we could have the benefit of the thinking of the committee as represented by Mr. Chavez here before us so that we could use that in making a decision in our judgment of this matter.

But I want you all to know that I was impressed by the fact that Mr. Chavez stated to us here from the

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front mike that not one witness came before that committee to testify to an overt act of a conspiracy between the judge and others as to a conspiracy between the judge and others to have this scheme implemented.

I will admit that under the evidence that they have in the committee and the exhibits that they have there that a certain scheme can be shown. But just because a certain scheme can be shown, certain facts that have occurred, does not lead us to the conclusion that a conspiracy existed between two persons. In order to have this proof, the evidence first, if it's circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial evidence must be so strong and must be so overriding as to allow no other reasonable hypotheses to exist. In other words, reasonable persons cannot come to any other conclusion based from the evidence that they have before them.

What we have here is simply a scheme that has existed down in Duval County where some groceries were being paid, where the judge would come over and pay something in excess of whatever the amount was over \$300.

Now, does that in itself show that prior to that time Judge Carrillo conspired with other persons to have all these things done? And if he conspired, who did he conspire with, where did that conspiracy take place, who was a party to it? None of those things have been

brought forth here to us for our consideration.

The only thing that has been brought forth is this evidence of some payouts of some vouchers, some groceries, and then the judge coming over and paying the excess of over \$300.

Now, based upon that-

MR. HENDRICKS: Mr. Speaker?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Hendricks.

MR. HENDRICKS: Will the gentleman yield?

MR. VALE: When I get through.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: When he gets through,

Mr. Hendricks.

MR. VALE: Based upon that they want us to come here and to vote affirmatively on an article of impeachment showing a conspiracy.

I tell you first that under that circumstantial evidence that reasonable persons can differ as to whether or not prior to the time that scheme was implemented there had actually been an agreement or an overt act by the judge and other persons in furtherance of this scheme so as to have a conspiracy exist.

I asked Mr. Chavez, "What is the definition that you all used to define "conspiracy?"

He wouldn't tell us. He said he didn't know.

I wanted to go further and ask him what their

definition was of circumstantial evidence so that we could be also enlightened about that, but we did not have time to get into it.

Be that as it may, it is a very, very serious thing that we are about in voting articles of impeachment on a public official of this state, and I say that in order for us to be called upon to affirmatively cast our vote, the proof and the evidence must be there. And where we have an allegation of a conspiracy and we have no proof, and we have the proponent of this article state to this House that not one witness came forth before that committee to testify about a conspiracy, about an agreement I say to you that we are not justified in voting affirmatively, and I ask you in all sincerity to please vote no. I yield.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields, Mr. Hendricks.

MR. HENDRICKS: Mr. Vale, legally what difference does it make where a conspiracy takes place?

MR. VALE: Legally, it doesn't make any difference.

MR. HENDRICKS: All right. It doesn't make a bit of difference where the conspiracy took place, does it?

MR. VALE: As long as a conspiracy took

place. 2 MR. HENDRICKS: All right. 3 MR. VALE: As long as a conspiracy took 4 place. 5 MR. HENDRICKS: All right. Let's go a little further than that. Are we operating under a 6 preponderance of evidence, or are we operating under 7 beyond a reasonable doubt, was this committee? Which 8 9 rule was it under? 10 MR. VALE: I would prefer myself to use "beyond a reasonable doubt." 11 12 MR. HENDRICKS: I personally used it, and 13 I agree with you. 14 MR. VALE: All right. Now, but I think 15 that here we are on a prepo derance of the evidence. 16 MR. HENDRICKS: All right. Let's examine-Wouldn't you consider this as evidence of a conspiracy? 17 MR. VALE: Let me ask you something, Mr. 18 19 Hendricks. 20 MR. HENDRICKS: I'm asking the questions. MR. VALE: Well, I'm going to answer your 21 22 question with a question. Does the mere fact that something conspired, does that prove conclusively that a 23 24 conspiracy existed? Does a mere fact that an automobile

accident happened at an intersection prove conclusively

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 that those persons conspired to have an accident?

MR. HENDRICKS: Not necessarily, but when you've got an employee of someone that testifies, "Well, this man told me to go over here and take these grocery "chits" and get them signed;" Mrs. Yzaguirre comes in and she testifies, "Yeah, Cleofas came over here and I signed them. Nobody got the groceries. He took them back." Cleofas Gonzalez says, "I took them to the commissioners' court and they approved them for the judge's and the commissioner's groceries and paid them."

Don't you think that's evidence of a conspiracy?

MR. VALE: No, sir. That does not prove

at all that prior to that time-

MR. HENDRICKS: Wouldn't you say that it would be a fact question that should go to the jury?

MR. VALE: I don't think that it even comes close to being a fact question, Mr. Hendricks, because you can't prove that before those facts happened—

MR HENDRICKS: Well, I operated under "beyond a reasonable doubt," and I consider—

MR. VALE: You can't prove that because those facts happened that prior to that time there had been a conspiracy between those individuals to have those things happen.

MR. HENDRICKS: Well, the judge wasn't

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losing any weight he didn't look like.

MR. VALE: It would be a whole lot easier just to make an allegation that this man took these personal groceries for his own use and benefit. from that point to a conspiracy are two different things. Now, we're not talking about an individual who is accused here in the article of having taken these groceries for his personal use and benefit. We're talking here about an individual having conspired with somebody else, which is an entirely different animal, and which, I am sure, just like Mr. Chavez, he was not willing to admit that that evidence had been brought before the committee.

We're talking about the conspiracy; not about the fact that these groceries were taken to the judge's ranch and used for his own personal use and benefit. is not charged with that offense in this article of impeachment. He is charged with having conspired. I say to you that under the evidence that was presented to the committee, under the evidence that has been summarized to us here in this House by Mr. Chavez, that there is not one iota of word of truth to it as to a conspiracy, and ask you to vote no.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Chavez to close on the article.

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## CLOSING ARGUMENT FOR ARTICLE I

MR. CHAVEZ: One thing that I think we ought to understand is that we're not trying the judge here today. The nature of this proceeding is whether or not there is probable cause for these charges to be made against the judge and let him stand trial in the Senate.

Now, Mr. Vale says that we didn't mention anything about an overt act. Well, let me-

MR. GARCIA: Will the gentleman yield?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Do you yield, Mr. Chavez?

MR. CHAVEZ: Not at this time.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Not at this time, Mr.

Garcia.

MR. CHAVEZ: Volume I, page 52, where Cleofas Gonzalez was asked:

"Do you give out these white slips to people?"

"Answer: No, sir. No. These white slips were given to me by a store owner. At the end of the month he would come and tell me, 'O. P. went and got this merchandise and he wants you to make orders to these names here."

Okay. Again at Volume I, page 74, Chairman Hale asked the question of Cleofas Gonzalez:

"These orders here, which ostensibly bear what appears to be an initial on it, how did

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the judge profit from these?"

"Answer: Well, he got some groceries from the store and then at the end of the month Mr. Yzaguirre—all that merchandise came from the Cash Store at Benavides, Texas-and Mr. Yzaguirre would go at the end of the month and tell me. 'Mr. Gonzalez, O. P. got this merchandise and he said for me just to bring this here and for you to make some welfare orders.' And that's all. So I made them. And I asked Ramiro Carrillo-he's the one in charge of that welfare orders-I asked him and he said, 'Okay. Just make them out, and whenever you get through making them out, take them back to the store.' So I would make those welfare orders, took them back to the store, and the store owners would give them back to Mr. Carrillo, and Mr. Carrillo would take them to the commissioners' court and get them approved."

Again, the testimony of Mrs. Yzaguirre, Volume V, page 55:

"Question: How do you get paid then? When do you get paid by Judge Carrillo?"

"Answer: At the end of the month his

brother, the commissioner, brings a check and pays for his and for Judge O. P. Carrillo."

"Is that a personal check or a check drawn on the treasury of Duval County?"

"Most of the time it is by the county, Duval County."

"County check."

"That's right."

Again, Volume V, page 64, inquiring about the balance:

"If there was a balance," says Mrs.

Yzaguirre, "over what his budget was, that
is what was told to us, that he had a \$300
budget, and whatever balance he would pay the
difference, you know."

"Question: Who told you there was a \$300 budget?"

"Answer: His brother, the commissioner, Ramiro Carrillo."

Now, if you don't think that's circumstantial enough, if you don't think that shows you there was a conspiracy, I don't know what will. I've tried some conspiracy cases myself, and I've never let any of my co-conspirators go and admit that they engaged in a conspiracy, and I doubt that any lawyer does, and certainly

Mr. Garcia.

Mr. Mitchell didn't allow his client to testify, which is his right, and I'm not saying that just because he didn't testify that you ought to find against him. But Commissioner Carrillo was invited to testify, and he took the Fifth Amendment and declined after numerous questions.

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, I would like to raise a point of order against the statements being made by Mr. Chavez. He is not confining his remarks to the charge at hand. He is going outside of the record, certainly not being material in any way to what action this House should take.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The Chair was not advised of the remarks, but the Chair would ask Mr. Chavez or anyone else when addressing themselves to the Articles of Impeachment that they stay within the confines of those particular articles.

MR. GARCIA: Will the gentleman now yield, Mr. Speaker?

MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,

MR. GARCIA: I don't have the statement of facts that you have there, Mr. Chavez, but last Friday I received a blue-bound book dated July 23rd, 1975, the "Report of the Select Committee on Impeachment," and if

you have a copy of it there, I'd like to invite your

MR. CHAVEZ: What page, sir?

MR. GARCIA: Page 43, third line, commenc-

"If the amount charged to O. P. Carrillo in a particular month exceeded his \$300 allowance, he either stopped by and paid the balance or it was carried over to the next month, and if it was less than his monthly allowance, the balance carried over to the next month."

Now, do you recall there being testimony to that

MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir.

MR. GARCIA: By the witnesses?

Yes, sir.

MR. GARCIA: Now do I understand that someone came in to the store- Might we have some order, Mr. Speaker? If somebody would get the Speaker's attention, I'd like to have a little order if we might. debating a very important issue.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Members, Mr. Garcia does not have your attention. The House needs a little order that you might hear him ask the questions and Mr. Chavez's This is a very pressing matter, one that needs answer.

your undivided attention. We'll not proceed with the debate until we do have order.

Okay, Mr. Garcia. You may proceed.

MR. GARCIA: I always admire the Speaker's ability to get order at a given time.

Do I understand that there was testimony that there was a \$300 allowance created for Judge Carrillo for the purchase of groceries? Was that the testimony?

MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir.

MR. GARCIA: And did a witness testify that this was information related by Ramiro Carrillo, the county commissioner?

MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir.

MR. GARCIA: Did you or any member of your committee, Mr. Chavez, go down to Duval County and examine the minutes of commissioners' court to ascertain whether or not an order was ever entered by commissioners' court providing that Judge O. P. Carrillo as a salary supplementation was to receive anything over and above or in the nature of groceries?

MR. CHAVEZ: We did not go to check, but when Commissioner Ramiro Carrillo was present we asked him that question and he declined to answer it.

MR. GARCIA: Are you assuming that by his silence there is no such order? Was that the assumption

1 engaged in by the committee? 2 MR. CHAVEZ: The financial statement which 3 Judge Carrillo filed with the Secretary of State reflects 4 that in addition to his state salary he only receives 5 a \$100 a month supplementary pay from Duval County, cash 6 payment. MR. GARCIA: Where is a copy of this 8 financial statement that you speak of? 9 MR. HALE: In the record. MR. GARCIA: I know it's in the record. 10 11 Mr. Hale, but I want to know where in the record it is. 12 MR. CHAVEZ: We'll get the financial 13. statements, Mr. Garcia. 14 MR. GARCIA: While they're getting that 15 for us, Mr. Chavez, did this witness testify-16 MR. CHAVEZ: Did which witness? 17 MR. GARCIA: Well, whatever witness was testifying that there was a \$300 a month allowance. 18 19 don't know who the witness was. Who was it? 20 MR. CHAVEZ: Mrs. Lauro Yzaguirre. 21 MR. CARCIA: All right. When Mrs. Yzaguir#e 22 testified that there was a \$300 allowance, do I under-23 stand that she testified that if a given month the \$300 24 in grocerian was not purchased that the deficit or the 25 residue was carried over to the following month?

1 MR. CHAVEZ: That's correct. 2 MR. GARCIA: And so the following month 3 Judge Carrillo might purchase \$400 worth of groceries. 4 Is that what you're saying? 5 MR. CHAVEZ: That's correct. 6 MR. GARCIA: All right. Now, why is it, 7 why is it that the witness testified that Judge Carrillo 8 when he went over \$300 would come in and personally pay 9 for those groceries? Was there ever an explanation as 10 to that? Why wasn't the overage charges against the next 11 month's purchases? 12 MR. CHAVEZ: On occasion, the witness 13 testified, the overage was charged against the following 14 month's allowance. On occasion the judge would come and 15 pay personally by his personal check. MR. GARCIA: So do I understand that there 16 was a \$300 limit each month? 17 MR. CHAVEZ: That's correct. 18 19 MR. GARCIA: And that's what you and the 20 committee concluded was the result of a conspiracy between 21 Ramiro Carrillo and Judge O. P. Carrillo? 22 MR. CHAVEZ: That's correct. 23 MR. GARCIA: Was there any testimony, Mr. 24 Chavez, to the effect that these groceries which were 75 picked up either by the judge or someone who purportedly

worked for the judge were not delivered to someone other

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than the judge?

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MR. CHAVEZ: The witnesses testified. Mr.

Roberto and Tomas Elizondo, and Mr. Patricio Garza, that they went to the store, purchased the groceries, signed the judge's name, by them; that these groceries were used at the ranch, Judge Carrillo's ranch. What they were doing is that on weekends they would go to the ranch and work, fix fences, do other things on the ranch, run cattle, whatever they did, roundup, and that these groceries were purchased because when they went out to work on weekends they stayed out there all weekend and they didn't go home, so these groceries were used to feed the people out at the ranch, and that on occasion the judge would have anywhere from fifteen, twenty, twenty-five people out there at the ranch.

MR. GARCIA: You don't know whether or not any of these people might be welfare recipients, do you, Mr. Chavez?

MR. CHAVER: Well, it would not surprise me if they were, Mr. Carrillo.

MR. MARCIA: Was there any evidence- The name is Garcia.

MR. CHAVEZ: It was not a matter that was within our inquiry. We were not inquiring whether any

of the other people were doing anything improperly. 1 2 were just investigating the judge. 3 MR. GARCIA: Do you have the financial statement there? 4 MR. CHAVEZ: I'm trying to get them to 5 locate the testimony- There was some evidence. Mr. 6 Garcia, that was brought in which were copies of the 7 8 auditor's report showing the people that were paid salaries and out of what funds they were paid, and in 9 that there was shown that Judge Carrillo was paid \$100 10 11 a month from the fund that was available for that particular thing. The auditor testified to that, Mr. Garcia. 12 13 MR. GARCIA: What was the \$100 a month 14 for? 15 MR. CHAVEZ: Supplementary pay for the district judge from the County of Duval. 16 MR. GARCIA: That's on that financial 17 statement that Mr. Maloney spoke about as containing 18 19 information about ownership of ranches, existence of partnerships, associations, et cetera? 20 21 MR. CHAVEZ: Well, you see, his salary as reflected here on this financial statement for the 22 calendar year ending 1974 reflects that salary from his 23 judicial services amounted to \$23,605.52. 24 25 financial statement he included it all.

1	MR. GARCIA: Mr. Chavez, are you telling me
2	that the judge's statement indicates that he was receiving
3	as salary the sum of \$23,500 for his district judgeship?
4	MR. CHAVEZ: He shows \$23,605.52. He also
5	shows income from law practice, blank, oil royalties
6	and partnerships, directors fees-
7	MR. GARCIA: I'm not interested in that.
8	I'm talking about his judicial salary. The reason I
9	ask is because in the 63rd session, as I recall, we
10	increased all district judges' salaries from state monies
11	to 25,000.
12	MR. CHAVEZ: I think Mr. Maloney mentioned
13	something about this statement not being quite accurate.
14	That may be. I don't know.
15	MR. GARCIA: You say that Maloney says
16	that the statement was not quite accurate?
17	MR. CHAVEZ: I'm just reading to you what
18	he wrote down and sent to the Secretary of State, Mr.
19	Garcia.
20	MR. GARCIA: Is that the financial state-
21	ment you were speaking about?
22	MR. CHAVEZ: Well, this is a financial
23	statement from the judge showing his salary as a district
24	judge.
25	MR. GARCIA: You don't have a copy, do you?

1	MR. CHAVEZ: I don't have a copy here.
2	MR. HALE: It is in the exhibits, 67.
3	MR. GARCIA: Mr. Chavez, the ranch that
4	has been spoken of as being the ranch where county
5	employees were supposed to have worked, where was it
6	located?
7	MR. CHAVEZ: Most of it was in Duval
8	County.
9	MR. GARCIA: Is that his place of residence
10	MR. CHAVEZ: That is his place of residence
11	Yes.
12	MR. GARCIA: Is in Duval County?
13	MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir. It shows he's
14	got some 5,684 acres in Duval County.
15	MR. GARCIA: Now, let me ask this one
16	question in conclusion. All of these incidents that
17	you've spoken about involving groceries, when did they
18	take place?
19	MR. CHAVEZ: They took place during the
20	time that he was the judge, which would be since 1971
21	up through March of 1975.
22	MR. GARCIA: I want more specifics on
23	that. You say since the time he was judge-
24	MR. CHAVEZ: I can read you all the months
25	in those years, Mr. Carcia.

MR. GARCIA: Are you telling me that every month during the year 1971, and during the year 1972, and during the years '73, '74, and through March of '75, each month there was at least \$300 worth of groceries delivered to O. P. Carrillo, district judge of the 229th Judicial District, under a conspiracy? Is this what you're saying?

MR. CHAVEZ: That's the testimony that was presented to us.

MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Speaker?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: Will the gentleman yield for a question?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Do you yield, Mr. Chavez?
The gentleman yields, Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Chavez, my primary concern at this point has not to do with the merits of the considered—the committee deliberations and your ultimate findings and report, sir, but let me ask you several questions dealing with the procedural aspect of the committee hearings.

In your organization, or as the work of the committee evolved, were there members of the committee who ultimately took the role of questioning the witnesses that appeared in an adversorial nature?

MR. CHAVEZ: I don't know whether I can answer that truthfully, Mr. Washington. I know that when we started off, I wasn't too convinced that a lot of this testimony might be accurate, and I, you might say, took after some of the witnesses a little bit, attempting to in my own mind, satisfy their credibility and to try and satisfy myself as to how they would stand up under cross examination, and I'm not authorized to speak for the other members, but I think Mr. Hendricks did the same thing. In other words, we kind of took the position first that "this man is innocent and if you are alleging wrongdoing, by gosh, you show us."

MR. WASHINGTON: Yes, sir. You, of course, have heard the old adage, Mr. Chavez, that the lawyer who represents himself represents a fool, and I think that that would largely be true that if a person sits in a judicial or decision making authority it's very difficult to maintain that relationship that allows for the adversorial process by the person who ultimately must make the decision. Would you agree with that general principle, sir?

MR. CHAVEZ: I don't know, Mr. Washington.

It could go one way or the other. I listened to the testimony and I concluded in my own mind-

MR. WASHINGTON: Once you start making up

your mind about the testimony before you ultimately reached any conclusion, did you find it difficult to maintain the same adversorial nature that you did at the beginning of the proceedings at which time you've indicated you gave to this man the presumption of innocence?

MR. CHAVEZ: I did not make up my mind during the time that we conducted those hearings, Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: Are you suggesting then that in your opinion you maintained the same degree of neutrality and addressed the witnesses with the same vigor throughout the proceedings?

MR. CHAVEZ: I attempted to do so, as far as I could do, Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: All right. What part, if any, in relation to the committee's work product did Representative Canales play?

MR. CHAVEZ: Mr. Canales initially presented witnesses, summarized what they were going to testify to, and made certain inquiries of some of the witnesses, and then turned the witness over to the committee, and then we proceeded to interrogate the witnesses.

MR. WASHINGTON: In the nature of a

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judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding then, sir, would you suggest that Mr. Canales took upon himself the role of the prosecutor; that is, one who would vouch for the truth and veracity of the witnesses that he proffered?

MR. CHAVEZ: I don't know that he took that position, Mr. Washington, because here was a situation that the committee members had not conducted an investigation themselves; had not interrogated any of the witnesses, and frankly, we didn't know what the heck we were getting into. Mr. Canales apparently had spoken with the witnesses, knew something of the evidence or testimony that they would give, and summarized it, and did question them, and from that we just took off after the witness and proceeded to investigate the witness. One thing led to another.

MR. WASHINGTON: All right. Would you suggest then that as regards a comparison, a fair comparison, with what we know of the judicial process, the witnesses presented were Mr. Canales' witnesses, and that when the committee members would begin this interrogation of the witnesses, other than their ability to perceive and ask questions based upon the witness' direct examination, the committee members were shooting in the blind, so to speak?

MR. CHAVEZ: That would be a fairly

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accurate statement.

MR. WASHINGTON: All right. As we know and understand the judicial process, Mr. Chavez, was there a setting off of issues? Was there an advocate for the proposition that the witness stood for, and ultimately Mr. Canales, and was there a distinct and decided difference and a setting off in opposition to the position that the witness took on each issue?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Edwards calls a point of order. The gentleman's time has expired. The point of order is well taken and sustained.

MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Speaker?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: Because I think that the question, the line of questioning, goes so very gravely in my mind to the procedural aspect of this entire matter, I move that the gentleman's time be extended so that these questions may be answered for all of us.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington moves the gentleman's time be extended. Is there objection?

All those in favor of the extension of time

say "aye." All opposed, "No."

Vote aye, vote no. Division vote, members.

Have all members voted?

There being 65 "ayes" and 53 "noes," the

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gentleman's time is extended.

and Members.

MR. WASHINGTON: Thank you, Mr. Speaker,

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Proceed, Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

What I'm getting at, Mel, is ultimately the House has delegated to that committee the responsibility of looking at the testimony because it's an insurmountable task for all of us to do it.

MR. CHAVEZ: That's correct.

MR. WASHINGTON: Ultimately we will be called upon to make a decision based upon factual allegations. We've not heard the testimony. We end up being a jury without having heard the testimony.

MR. CHAVEZ: No, you're not going to be a fact finder, Mr. Washington. And as you know, in grand jury proceedings the only thing they need to be familiar with is whether or not there is probable cause to warrant charging the individual. That's what we're doing here. The fact finders are going to be across the hall.

MR. WASHINGTON: I understand that. You miss my point. Would you not agree with me, sir, that a grand jury determines probable cause from the factual allegations presented to it?

MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir.

MR. WASHINGTON: If I charged that this room has a gold carpet on it, you would have to see the gold carpet in order to make that decision if that is the decision to be made by you, wouldn't you, sir?

MR. CHAVEZ: All right.

MR. WASHINGTON: All right. Now, I'm not suggesting that we're the ultimate fact finders, but what I'm suggesting is, you have presented to us articles of impeachment which have as their basis factual allegations.

MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir.

MR. WASHINGTON: None of which we have had the privilege of hearing. You would agree?

MR. CHAVEZ: Well, I read some portions of the testimony which substantiate the article that I presented to you.

MR. WASHINGTON: Surely. But you must admit that these are very difficult times. We are talking about, for the purpose of an analogy, of a grand jury of twelve delegating to a committee of the grand jury of perhaps two or three the responsibility of listening to the witnesses, of looking at the factual data, and documents supporting the allegations, and then ultimately coming back with a true bill or no bill based upon that committee's report.

Washington.

MR. CHAVEZ: That's correct.

MR. WASHINGTON: I'm not arguing or differing with you about the procedure, but necessarily in my opinion I must weight very carefully—it's not an attack upon what you and your committee have done with regards to the proceedings—but the responsibility is ultimately mine, and I intend for this one vote to make sure that I am convinced by whatever manner or measure is available to me, and that's the reason I asked the question. I'm not here to chub you.

MR. CHAVEZ: I know. I understand, Mr.

MR. WASHINGTON: All right. Now, was there, in your opinion, in your deliberations someone or some persons who represented the setting off of issues as you and I know and understand it; that is, an adversary proceeding?

MR. CHAVEZ: I don't think that there was an adversary proceeding, Mr. Washington. I would have to say that in my opinion there was not.

MR. WASHINGTON: All right. So questions that are very important, not only as to what a witness says but the manner in which they say it, and the truth and veracity of the witness, in your opinion, were they questioned?

MR. CHAVEZ: Yes.

MR. WASHINGTON: Who vouched for, other than Representative Canales, the truth and veracity of each witness that testified before the committee?

MR. CHAVEZ: I think that each committee member formed their own opinion based upon their demeanor and the testimony that they gave.

MR. WASHINGTON: All right. If you believe, as I think most advocates of the judicial system do, sir, that the cross examination of the witness is the only true means of arriving at the truth, was there in fact cross examination of the witnesses who testified before your committee?

MR. CHAVEZ: Yes, sir. Now, that's why
I told you a while ago that I didn't know whether I could
truthfully answer that question. There was not really,
at least as pertains to this particular article. Mr.
Mitchell did not cross examine any of these witnesses.

I'm sorry. That's correct. Mr. Gonzalez was recalled. Cleofas Gonzalez was recalled, and Mr. Mitchell did cross examine him. But when I say that the adversary atmosphere wasn't there initially, I think that there was and I think that there wasn't. I think the committee members were trying to get the facts out of these people. But at the same time I know that in many of the questions

MR. CHAVEZ: That

MR. CHAVEZ: That's not our job, but I

point questions on matters that I thought were important to my determination with respect to each of the allegations that were being made.

MR. WASHINGTON: I agree with you from my analysis and my cursory examination of the transcripts,

I believe that to be true, but as you know as an advocate of the Bar there is also another side to that, and that's the nature of my inquiry. Was there in your opinion a serious attempt by any member of the committee, and if so, please name that person, to determine the truth and credibility of the witness, not based upon what they were saying, Mr. Chavez, before the truth or falsity of the statement, but the general demeanor and reputation of the witness as to whether they could be impeached by other means?

MR. CHAVEZ: We only tested their credibility, Mr. Washington, by witnessing their demeanor before the committee and the testimony that they gave us. And that was all.

MR. WASHINGTON: In other words, no attempt was made, to your knowledge, by the committee to determine if any of the witnesses had been previously convicted of a felony?

think that some people were asked.

MR. WASHINGTON: I disagree with you on whether or not it's your job. If you're going to believe someone then their credibility is in question, Mr. Chavez. And if their credibility is in question the statutes of this state indicate that a person's credibility may be challenged by showing that they've been previously convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.

MR. CHAVEZ: If I recollect, Mr. Washington,
I think that that question was posed to several of the
witnesses.

MR. WASHINGTON: I see.

MR. CHAVEZ: And their answer was that they had not been previously convicted of a felony.

MR. WASHINGTON: All right, sir. One final question. Did the committee in its wisdom inspect the minutes and records of the county commission of Duval County to ascertain whether or not the allegations made about the \$300 in grocery allowance and the other allowances for goods and services and/or equipment had been approved or ratified by the county commission as a means of supplementing the judge's salary?

MR. CHAVEZ: No, sir, Mr. Washington. And as a member of the committee I would not have gone down

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to look at the minutes or at the pay vouchers for this The testimony that was given to us was this: that he would come by or his employees would come by. purchase the groceries. The lady would type up the list on her adding machine; somebody would sign the slip, "O. P. Carrillo by Tomas Elizondo, Roberto Elizondo;" the lady would keep these there for the month. end of the month they would take these, either Cleofas or Ramiro Carrillo or somebody would bring a list of fictitious names, and they would use the names, give so much money to each one of the names so that they would total \$300. This was submitted to the county commissioner he would take them and they would be included in the total check that the county sent to the Cash Store for the payment of those groceries and groceries given to eligible recipients.

MR. WASHINGTON: Yes, sir. I understand the allegations. But do I understand, or am I misstating the facts when I say that basically, without all of the niceties, your allegations charge the misuse of county funds by the appropriation through an indirect means of money, goods and services, and equipment that belonged to Duval County to the use and benefit of O. P. Carrillo.

MR. CHAVEZ: Not equipment, but the groceries, yes.

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Chavez - Article I MR. WASHINGTON: All right. Now, let me ask you again since you didn't answer my question. Do' you know, or did the committee ascertain, whether there had ever been an approval or ratification of this or any other alternative means of such an allowance for groceries, for equipment, for good and services, or otherwise, by the county commission of Duval County for the use and benefit of O. P. Carrillo as a means of supplementing his salary as a district judge? MR. CHAVEZ: Only to the extent that that question was posed to county commissioner, Ramiro Carrillo, which he declined to answer.

MR. WASHINGTON: So your answer then is that the committee- You don't know personally and the committee did not ascertain whether or not the money paid was paid with the approval of the county commission as a means of supplementing the judge's salary?

MR. CHAVEZ: Well, if it was, Mr. Washington, I don't think that it is reflected in his financial statement that he filed or in the testimony of the county auditor who testified.

MR. WASHINGTON: I understand that.

MR. CHAVEZ: The county auditor testified that the only thing that he was entitled to was \$100 a month.

MR. WASHINGTON: I understand that, Mr. Chavez, but we're not here on the basis of conjecture on your part. Your statement is that the committee did not ascertain whether or not there was a presence or the absence of a ratification of such a means of supplementing the judge's salary, did you?

I take it by your silence that your answer is no.

MR. CHAVEZ: We did not attempt to go forward to look at the county commission minutes, Mr. Washington, to verify whether that was an approved item during a regular meeting of the county court.

MR. WASHINGTON: All right. So may I take it then that when you ask us to vote for this article of impeachment, you do so without knowledge of whether the county commission of Duval County had approved the means that you designed as being criminal, as being misappropriation of funds? You don't know whether the county commission of Duval County had approved and ratified that means of supplementation of the judge's salary as the Harris County commission approved and ratified the payment of some \$13,000 to this district judge, do you, sir?

MR. CHAVEZ: No, sir, I don't, Mr. Washington, because the county auditor was asked the extent of ide 2

the supplement paid that the county had approved for Judge Carrillo, and it was \$100 a month. The circumstantial evidence that was developed by virtue of the testimoney of the various witnesses clearly indicates, at least to me it does, that this was a scheme designed by the judge and his brother, the county commissioner, and this was enough. And I might just add that indirectly I recall—and I don't even remember who told me this—that this had been an agreement between the county judge and the county commissioner and perhaps another county commissioner, and I think that another county commissioner has been indicted—

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Canales calls a point of order. The gentleman's time has expired. The point of order is well taken and sustained.

MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Speaker?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: Parliamentary inquiry.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, Mr.

Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: By what burden of proof will we ultimately measure the truth or falsity of these allegations when we vote on them? Is it by preponderence of the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt in the mind of each member?

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SPEAKER CLAYTON: I think that will have to be the decision of each member, Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: Parliamentary inquiry.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry,

Mr. Washington.

MR. WASHINGTON: Since Mr. Chavez has alluded to what is known in law as circumstantial evidence, and since the test for the truth or falsity of circumstantial evidence is whether the evidence to be believed excludes every other reasonable hypothesis except the proposition cited; that is, whether or not Mr. Chavez is to sustain the burden since he has placed it upon himself, that measure of evidence, circumstantial evidence, may the members then consider the general test of circumstantial evidence which is that in order to convict or make a decision based upon circumstantial evidence, it is not enough that the circumstances render probable the desired result but they must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except the defendant's guilt, and that the circumstances taken on a whole must beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty show that that person and no other person is guilty of the offense charged?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington, that may be the test to the Senate. I think each member of

this body is going to have to make its mind up in its own way, whether or not to vote on the articles of impeachment.

MR. WASHINGTON: One further parliamentary inquiry.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry.

MR. WASHINGTON: Is our basis whether there is probable cause of the truth or falsity of the allegation made? We can't just shoot in the dark, Mr. Speaker, on a hunch, on a notion. I think that due process and our laws require more than that. What is the measure by which ultimately these members, lay and lawyer alike, may make that decision that is very important to some people? That is, what is the measure by which we determine whether there is probable cause that Article I should be sent to the Senate for a vote?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington, I don't know that anyone could answer that question for you. I think that after the study of the committee report and after hearing the article debated and after looking at the documents and transcripts of the hearings, that each individual member is going to have to make that determination for himself.

MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Speaker, then in that regard I would like to raise a point of order against

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further consideration of these proceedings, in that the special committee appointed by the Speaker has had pursuant to the resolution creating that authority the delegation of a non-delegable duty. That is, it is the duty of this House to consider and vote upon the articles of impeachment. And I think that if we're going to resort to mere whim and if members are going to be required to speculate on a result without having heard the testimony—not that I would question the truth or veracity of any other member—but it's obvious each time a member gets up there that his presentation is made on judgments, his own, and not mine, and that I'm called upon at this time to make a very important decision without having any guide or standard by which I may measure not only the judgments of these other persons but ultimately the conduct of the person in question.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Washington, this is a committee report, similar but yet different to what we consider after—in any session of the Legislature—where a committee makes its report. The members have to weigh the fact of the conmittee report, and the committee itself is the ones that hears the testimony and comes to the conclusion of what is best to present to the House.

This is exactly what this committee did, and through its report the members are to weigh in their own

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minds whether or not they feel that the report is proper and whether or not it should receive affirmative or negative vote.

MR. WASHINGTON: Mr. Speaker, I agree with you, and I'm not chubbing and I'm not contesting the committee report, you know, but contrary to what anybody else may believe, we're going to do this right or we're not going to do it at all. I suggest to you that that is not enough of a standard by which a person sitting out here, whether they've heard the presentation or not, may determine whether they're doing the right thing; that is, not whether we're in a hurry to go home, but whether or not justice will be done. And I submit that there must be at least a determination that there's probable cause, that the truth or falsity of the committee report as respects Article I does or does not exist. And if we don't have that mere symblance of judicial proceedings since we're sitting as a quasi-judicial body, then this whole procedure is a mockery.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Garcia.

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: For what purpose?

MR. CARCIA: To follow up on Craig
Washington's contentions, I think that we've been working
since approximately ten o'clock this morning, and I think

it might be a good time for this committee to go back into session and determine what guidelines this House is to follow. I think that Representative Washington has raised a very valid point because I've had members walk up to my desk and say, "What are we bound by? What instructions are we to get? What must we expect this committee to submit to us to satisfy us that articles of impeachment should be returned?"

I think that Representative Hale, being an excellent lawyer and he having several on the committee, I think that he and these other lawyers can get together and come up with a good, solid instruction as to the burden that must be discharged by the committee, so that those members who then may not be interested in the outcome of this thing and they're going to vote merely because they like the particular individual who is presenting one of the articles, can at least have some guidelines to be bound by. And I believe that it's time that this was delineated for the benefit of the membership. Whim and fancy is not enough in this case, Mr. Speaker.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Garcia, this burden again, I must remind you, falls on each individual member of this House. These decisions must be made individually, and it is not the responsibility of the committee to do

anything other than to make its report to the House, 1 which they are doing. 2 MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, that would be 3 tantamount to telling a grand jury that, "I'm not going 4 to tell you what you must demand of the district attorney's 5 office in the presentation of the case." 6 Those on this side of the House can vote "aye" 7 for impeachment because they like the man who's presenting 8 Those of this side may establish other restrictive 9 guidelines that they're going to be bound by. And I don't 10 think that it was the intention of the framers of our 11 Constitution when they inserted the matter of impeachment 12 therein that it should be a fancy or a whimsical thing 13 when something that is serious and something that all of 14 us must be bound by. 15 MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Speaker, point of order. 16 Point of information. 17 SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your point of 18 information. 19 MR. DONALDSON: For what purpose has Mr. 20 Garcia been recognized? 21 22 SPEAKER CLAYTON: For parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Donaldson. 23

that his statements are not in the nature of a parliamentary

I make a point of order

MR. DONALDSON:

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inquiry.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Donaldson, the Speaker is not going to engage in a debate with Mr. Garcia on the issues that he raises, once again, stating that each member of this House knows their own Constitutional rights and responsibilities and duties they're under, and it shall be up to them to make up their decision as to how they vote on this committee report.

So, Mr. Garcia, I'm just not going to enter into debate with you on it.

MR. GARCIA: Yes, sir. It's not my intention to debate the Speaker nor to be disrespectful, but I was hoping that the record in this proceeding would speak out that there was some instruction given specifically to those members who are not lawyers and who wouldn't know probable cause if it walked up and slapped them in the face, Mr. Speaker.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Garcia, I think it should also be noted—and I believe and I hope that the members realize this—that this body is not making on a vote of articles of impeachment a statement of innocence or guilt, but merely suggesting if the articles pass that there should be cause for trial. If they feel that there is not cause for trial then they should vote "no" but they are not voting on innocence or guilt.

The question now is on the adoption of Article I.

All those in favor of the adoption of Article I will

vote "aye". All those opposed will vote "no". It's a

record vote. The Clerk will ring the bell.

Have all members voted?

There being 123 "ayes", 19 "nays", two present not voting, Article I is adopted.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Hendricks for an explanation of Article II.

## PRESENTATION OF ARTICLE II

MR. HENDRICKS: Mr. Speaker and Members,
Article II has four parts in it, and it does concern the
Manges-Guerra case and the Parr case, the Duval County
grand jury, and the Benavides Independent School District.

Clinton Manges versus M. A. Guerra, and that was a case originally filed in the 229th District Court, I believe, in 1968. This was prior to the time that Judge Carrillo took office. Well, between '68, the time this case was filed, and to date, Mr. Manges has gained control of the First State Bank and Trust Company of Rio Grande City, of course the Duval County ranch, and many, many holdings.

The Cuerras testified before our committee.

Mr. Guerra and, I believe, his family owned some land in

Duval and surrounding counties, and this case involved a transaction with Mr. Manges in which he was purchasing the land. The suit involved a suit to try to set aside the purchase.

As I say, Mr. Guerra did testify. He gave us his side of the story, and we did have before us under subpoena Clinton Manges—who I assume was Clinton Manges even though he took the Fifth Amendment when we asked him his name and whether he was married and so on and so forth.

Well, the facts of the case really do not make too much difference because what this article is based on is whether or not, when this case came before Judge Carrillo, he should have tried it or disqualified himself from trying the case.

Judge Carrillo through Mr. Manges acquired ten shares of stock in the bank of which Mr. Manges was president. These ten shares were estimated to be valued at some \$750 a share. He was named to the board of directors. We have a check in the amount of \$6,915.55 over here if you want to look at it. It is a photostatic copy. We could not get the original check, and I'll tell you that. That check is signed by Clinton Manges. It's made out to a Cadillac dealer, and it's marked "For O.P.'s Cadillac."

In this transaction there was also a deal made whereby the judge could graze his cattle on some several thousand acres of land that Mr. Manges acquired, although there was testimony that there was to be consideration passed of this. There was no testimony that any consideration ever passed.

Well, all of these things transpired. Yet the judge after a motion being filed to disqualify him from sitting in the case, he refused to disqualify himself, and he confirmed this purchase.

Now, all of these exhibits are over here. I'm not going into detail on them. You can all read. You can check—Bob Vale can't get but two volumes at a time. Of course, I don't know how he can read but one volume at a time. But you can come over here and read them. I can quote the page number to you if you would like to read it. I can show you this check.

But anyway, I think the crux of the matter is when it went before Judge Smith on the matter of disqualification. Judge Magus F. Smith heard the disqualification hearing, and this is his determination of the case, disqualifying Judge Carrillo from the case.

He stated:

"I don't see how a person in that predicament could possibly render an impartial

judgment."

Gentlemen, of course, I tend to place judges a little above the ordinary cut, and I would like to see them remain there. There are certain rules that they have to go by; there are certain rules of conduct; there are rules of ethics of the American Bar Association.

They have to be looked up to by the public. And when you've got a personal friend, someone that you have this many business dealings with and you refuse to disqualify yourself in a case in which he has such a strong financial interest, then you're violating not only the law but the canons of ethics. You're destroying yourself in the public's image.

The second part of Article II involves a case just recently tried in which Judge O. P. Carrillo removed Archer Parr from the county court bench down here in Duval County.

Well, there is not a member of this committee, as we heard this, that did not think that Judge Parr shouldn't be removed from the bench. There's no question about that. But here you've got a judge that has openly fought the man. He stated in the papers that they're enemies. They've openly split. And there's a motion filed to disqualify from hearing that case, and he will not disqualify himself. He not only sits and hears the

case, he takes it away from the jury and renders an instructed verdict. He didn't even let the case go to the jury.

Well, it is not the fact that the man was removed from the bench. I want to make that clear. It's the fact that he's the man that did it. He should have taken himself off of the bench and removed himself and let some disinterested judge come in and try the case.

MR. COLEMAN: Mr. Speaker?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Coleman.

MR. COLEMAN: Will the gentleman yield?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields,

Mr. Coleman.

MR. COLEMAN: Mr. Hendricks, my question in regards to Article II, and one of the things that's bothered me when I just heard the overview given by Mr. Maloney and subsequently when you talked about subsections number one and two, let me ask you this question: What is the population of Duval County? Did you all have that information in the committee?

MR. HENDRICKS: I do not have— It's a small county, but I do not have the information, Ross.

MR. COLEMAN: How many district judges serve that county?

MR. HENDRICKS: The 229th covers three

counties down there, and it is under-populated, is my understanding.

MR. COLEMAN: I'm sorry. I couldn't quite hear you.

MR. HENDRICKS: There is not population enough in all three counties to actually justify a court, but it does serve three counties. I believe that's Starr, Jim Wells and Duval, if I'm not mistaken.

MR. COLEMAN: That one district court then serves Duval County exclusively?

MR. HENDRICKS: Right.

MR. COLEMAN: Mr. Hendricks, you're from a county that's not maybe real, real large, and mine's not gigantic by any means. When we talk about political differences perhaps between groups or between an individual and a judge, first of all, I think we've got to come to one premise, and that is that we do elect judges; they are in the business of politics in the state of Texas. We even, during the Constitutional Convention, we elected, this body sitting as a convention, elected to keep them political; that is, to keep them elected. I'm just wondering whether or not in terms of articles of impeachment we might not, by agreeing that these are reasons for articles of impeachment, I'm wondering if we might not be overstepping our bounds to some extent. I understand

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recusing and disqualifying oneself is critical and important to the fair administration of justice in this state, but at the same time when you talk about a county that's not real large, a county where naturally there are those who are for and against a judge even at election time. It seems to me that to recuse and disqualify oneself in every instance would hinder the administration of justice, and I just think that maybe we might be overstepping our bounds, and in fact, by this particular portion of Article II, the first two that you've just gone over, it seems to me that quite possibly we've gotten into an area that we shouldn't be getting into, based on political reasons, and that bothers me. I'm fearful about voting for such articles, such an article, that would contain these specific provisions.

I was just wondering how you would-

MR. HENDRICKS: Ron, I could agree with you to a certain extent. I mean, certainly a judge couldn't disqualify himself just because he has a cup of coffee with a man or he's known him all his life, this, that, and the other. But when you reach the point, as we have here, in which you serve on a bank board with a man, there's been a check issued to a Cadillac dealer marked "For O. P.'s Cadillac," you're grazing your cattle on his land, and the intertwining of other testimony

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throughout the entire committee— Then, the Parr matter, and as I say, this has been done and it's all for the good, but this man shouldn't have done it. But it's not our— we're not trying the judge at all. That's not our job. Our job is to say whether or not there is enough evidence to send the matter across the ball and let the Senate try it. That's not our job at all. We're acting in a grand jury capacity, and in my opinion, probably on preponderance of the evidence. That's what a grand jury would act on is preponderance of the evidence.

MR. COLEMAN: Bob, I completely agree with that statement that you just made about our function. That's what bothers me to a large extent about number one and two. We're talking about disqualifications of judges, disqualifying themselves. And it seems to me that that is an area which, of course, I think we'd all agree the Judicial Qualifications Commission as set up in the Constitution of the State of Texas is more qualified to handle than are we. That becomes a problem that I'm having with this article, mainly because we're talking about the judge doing something in a strictly judicial function that may or may not have a bearing on I think you and I could probably both in our practice, Bob, cite instances where we thought it would be wise or hopefully on one side or the other as attorneys

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or litigants in a case it would be wise for a judge to disqualify himself but he doesn't, yet we don't bring articles of impeachment against him for that reason. Indeed, the solution that attorneys would use, I would think, in this state would be to send such things to the Judicial Qualifications Commission if it appeared that there was an abuse of this authority. And I'm just saying to you that I understand our function, but to ask in articles of impeachment a judge to even assume that there's probable cause to believe - Number one in there, the case of Manges versus Guerra, that has strong. in my mind, strong implications that there was wrongdoing on the part of a judge, but particularly, in the second one, Nichols versus Parr, just from what I've been told there, the fact that the man publicly solits from the party, is not, in my mind, in and of itself sufficient- If you understand what I'm getting to, Bob-

MR. HENDRICKS: Let me make two more point, one of them concerning the Guerra trial. Let me go back and reiterate what Judge Smith said, who heard this, and we have that transcript over here too if you'd like to read it, the entire proceeding on the disqualification hearing concerning the Manges case.

He went through all of it. He saw all of the investments. But this is his statement, a finding of Eact

judge should have put a disinterested judge on the bench

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and let him try it. He certainly should not have rendered an instructed verdict and took the matter away from the jury. He should have let a jury decide it.

MR. COLEMAN: Well, Bob, there's exactly the kind of point I'm getting to. You say he should not have rendered an instructed verdict. That goes behind, that's the veil, that goes behind what the court's function is. And I don't know that that is proper for this body in considering articles of impeachment to consider. That's the only point I'm making. It's something that concerns me.

MR. HENDRICKS: Well, I can agree with that, and maybe we disagree, but as I say, this all makes up

Article II, and if you will let me go on before my time

runs out, I would like to complete the article.

All right. The third part of Article II concerns the membership of the grand jury itself. Now, this grand jury was impaneled in February of this year, and the grand jury commissioners, appointed by Judge Carrillo, were Roberto Elizondo, who is the judge's court reporter, Morris Ashby, and Manuel Amaya. Ashby is the executive vice president of the Duval County Ranch Company, and of course, he's employed by Clinton Manges, and Manuel Amaya is an immediate past employee of Clinton Manges and the Duval County Ranch Company.

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Well, they selected a grand jury, and seven of those twelve members are either directly related by blood to the judge or they are employed by Clinton Manges; the foreman is Jose Nichols, his foreman. Well. that in itself is not enough to say, "Well, he influenced the membership of it," but you can go further, and you take the testimony of Aurelio Correa, who was the superintendent of the schools, I believe in Freer. could be mistaken there. It's in the transcript. the secretary of the grand jury, and he came in and told his story to us about a meeting prior to the first meeting or even the announcement of the grand jury, in which he met with Clinton Manges and Mr. Amaya, and at that time he was told by Mr. Manges just what this grand jury was going to consider, what they were going to investigate, who was going to be foreman of it, and that he was going to be secretary of it.

Well, all of you know that a grand jury is, under our law, a secret thing that makes investigations in secret. Their proceedings are secret and certainly should not be flaunted out in public. There's no way that if the makeup of this grand jury was not influenced by Mr. Manges or Judge Carrillo that they would even have knowledge of who was going to be secretary, who was going to be foreman.

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They went further in a conversation, and that's recorded in Volume XIV over here, when the point was raised that, "Well, maybe some of our own people might get in trouble," and Manges was quoted as making the statement, "These people that we feel we can grant immunity to, we will grant immunity to."

This all goes to violating the entire grand jury process, and nothing—there's been no indictments come out of the grand jury except enemies of Judge Carrillo, to my knowledge or to the knowledge of the committee. There may have been, but even so, even if they've been a good grand jury, the way it was made up violated every law that we've got.

Going to the fourth article or fourth part of

MR. VALE: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for questions on this specific section?

MR. MENDRICKS: I'll yield when I finish my remarks.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman will yield when he finishes his remarks, Mr. Vale.

MR. WENDRICKS: Going to the fourth part of Article II, concerns the Benavides Independent School District. Of course, Judge Carrillo lives in Benavides. And it alleges that the judge conspired with others to

dominate and control the Benavides Independent School
District by arbitrarily suspending and removing from
office his political opponents. Of course, we have
testimony. He, on March 18th, 1975, after he publicly
announced he split with Parr, there was a suit filed
in which four members of the Benavides School District
were automatically removed by a stroke of his pen.
There was no hearing granted to these people. The
hearing was set up later, but it was postponed and postponed until the time ran the law, and they had no chance
to really go into the court system and decide whether
or not they were disqualified or not.

The appointments he made on this were Morris
Ashby again, Pete Hunter, Lionel Garza, and Bill Ham.
All right. Three of them stayed on there for a while,
but Bill Ham made a statement to the Corpus Christi
paper that he was a Parr supporter. Well, the next day,
Bill Ham was removed from the school board, and there
was an appointment made in his place.

Well, all of these things intertwine with each other to show what power has been grabbed or is trying to be grabbed, and we're the only ones that can do something about it. Here's a man that right now has the grand jury his control. There's a new one today that he's impaneling in Duval County. I'm anxious to see

what the makeup of it is.

The Benavides School District right there; he's removed who he didn't want on the board. They threw out something about they had paid two attorneys too much money, but these attorneys were never indicted. There was nothing ever said about it, but he did get his enemies off of that. And they split with the school board there. That goes back publicly because there was a lady by the name of Parr wanted to run for the school board, and D. C. Chapa, the judge's father, wanted to run too. And he thought that Mrs. Parr ought to quit and she wouldn't. And that caused a split there.

But all of this testimony is intertwined, it is real confusing. We sat up here for two months and listened to it.

And let me say this: When I went into this thing, I went in as a defense attorney. I am a defense attorney. It's been 23 or 24 years since I've been a district attorney, and my leanings are that way. I went in on the judge's side, and if there had been any way in the world that I could have voted to help the man I would have. But, gentlemen, the testimony is here, and we're the only ones that can do anything about it.

If you let the Judicial Qualifications Commission do something, it may be three years from now, and

then he can turn around and run for office again.

But I think we should let the Senate try this.

I think it's a matter that they should try.

Mr. Speaker, I'll yield.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman yields, Mr. Vale.

MR. VALE: Mr. Hendricks, would it be accurate to say that down in Duval County you pretty well have two political camps, and just about everybody down there is on one side or the other?

MR. HENDRICKS: Well, I would fairly say that would be an accurate statement, from what I've heard.

MR. VALE: All right. Then if we have the situation that you have a district judge down there and—

MR. HENDRICKS: You know, we've got two camps up in my area. There are Democrats and Republicans.

MR. VALE: Well, I was going to get to those too later, you know, just talking about them too, Mr. Hendricks.

But in this subsection two of Article II, you know, where apparently there is this article of impeachment based upon the fact that the judge failed and refused to disqualify himself in a case where his political opponent was involved on the other side. Being that we

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have to know the area down there, that it is a political camp with everybody on one side or the other, now we have a situation here where your committee, this committee, says we should recommend articles of impeachment because the judge decided not to disqualify himself in a case where his political opponent was on one side.

What is going to be required of a district judge to do in a case where his political ally, just like Mr. Manges, is on one side?

Now, the reason that I say that, Mr. Hendricks, is because we're coming down here to a situation that it is going to be impossible for any district judge down there in Duval County, in Starr County, to sit in judgment on any case because every person that is going to come before that judge that resides in that district is going to be either a political opponent or his political ally.

MR. HENDRICKS: Is that a question? you want to know the solution to it?

> MR. VALE: Yes.

MR. HENDRICKS: We can abolish that court.

MR. VALE: That's right. We should never have created it in the first place.

MR. HENDRICKS: I'll agree with that.

MR. VALE: All right. Now, but that's the

point we're coming to here. You know, if articles of impeachment are going to be preferred on the basis that a judge refuses to disqualify himself because a political opponent is on one side, down there in this district you are going to have a judge that is going to be unable to preside in any case that comes up because it's going to be a political ally or a political opponent on every

MR. HENDRICKS: Well, now, are you making a speech or asking a question?

MR. VALE: I'm asking, is that not a fact? MR. HENDRICKS: If you want to make a speech or talk against why don't you come down here.

MR. VALE: Is that not a fact?

MR. HENDRICKS: No, it's not a fact. Τf that judge cannot hold himself up above anything that will influence his verdict, he does not need to be sitting on the bench. And I'm not going to turn my back on it, and I do not ask these House members to turn their back on it and say, "Well, that's Duval County. Let's just forget about it and go on." That's what we've done for so long, so many years. And if we don't do something about it now it will never be done.

MR. VALE: The next question is this: Is failure to disqualify oneself from hearing a case,

case.

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is that sufficient grounds for impeachment in and of itself?

MR. HENDRICKS: Probably not, in and of itself. I've seen it happen when I was personally as an advocate in that court— Let me answer your question, please, sir.

I've seen the times that I thought a judge should disqualify himself and he didn't, and I disagreed with him. But not when it happens on this magnitude. I couldn't tie them up financially with a man like Clinton Manges. I don't think we've got anybody up there in Collin County that's got that much money anyway.

MR. VALE: But the question then is, Mr. Hendricks, have there been many other occasions in this state where a judge has failed to disqualify himself in a case coming up before him, and the remedy in that situation in the past has not been to impeach that judge but rather for those litigants to appeal that case and have a ruling on that point and settle it out rather than impeaching the man.

Now, I want to talk about this other section three, where the committee accuses the judge of conspiring with others to improperly influence the membership and proceedings of the grand jury.

Now, in order to justify the allegation of

improper influence of membership, your committee here states that what the judge did is he appointed three friends of his as grand jury commissioners. He appointed his court reporter, the executive vice president—

MR. HENDRICKS: Bob, if you want to ask me a question, ask me a question.

Let me move along here. If you want to speak against this-

Members of the House, in order to save time,

I move adoption of Article II, and I yield the floor.

If Mr. Vale wants to talk against it he can come on down here and talk against it.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Garcia, Mr. Vale, do either one of you want to speak against this?

The Chair recognizes Mr. Garcia in opposition to Article II.

## PRESENTATION AGAINST ARTICLE II

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, Members, I'll try and be just as brief as I possibly can because I think that Representative Vale and Representative Coleman touched upon the very points that Texas jurisprudence speaks to with reference to judges.

There have been liberally hundreds of cases where someone has questioned the right or propriety of

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a judge to sit in judgment of a particular case, and the remedy has not been impeachment. It has been a motion to disqualify; it has been an action such as was held in this particular case.

I think that it might be of interest to you members to know that in 1971 was when Judge Carrillo allegedly took office. It was in 1973 when Judge Magus Smith heard the case. Judge Magus Smith found that the judge was not qualified to sit in the case because of having a, quote, "pecuniary interest," and I am satisfied that he did in truth and in fact have a pecuniary interest. Judge Magus Smith sat the actions of the judge aside, which is the normal procedure that is followed. The lawbook is replete with situations exactly as this, situations where judges have presided in cases where the litigants have been related to him within the third lineal group degree of consanguinity or affinity, where they have had an interest as a stockholder in a corporation that is a party litigant. But the action has not been to impeach. The action has been to go the appeal route and have the judgment of that judge set aside.

Judges are quite realous when they attempt to impress the general public that they can sit in matters of this type without having an interest. But in many instances it is not sufficient because appellate courts

say that they should have disqualified themselves, and that is exactly what happened in this case.

Now, if there had been any impropriety in this matter, if there had been a violation of the canon of judicial ethics of sufficient magnitude, then the proper committee would have taken action against Judge Carrillo.

I think that they have thrown this into this particular proceeding, but I don't think that it is fair to ask this House to return an article of impeachment based on this.

Now, let's talk about the grand jury. And this is one of the sub-charges that they have on Article II.

And the only thing that is required with reference to the appointment of jury commissioners is that the district judge appoint three commissioners; that they be intelligent citizens of the county; that they be qualified jurors in the county; that they have no suit in said court which requires intervention of a jury; that they be resident of different portions of the county; and the same person shall not act as jury commissioner more than once in the same year.

Now there is nothing in this particular rule that says that a judge cannot appoint a friend to act as grand jury commissioner. There is nothing in this rule

that says that a judge cannot appoint an ally. And I know of no judge—and I've been practicing law 24 years—who goes out and seeks an enemy to sit as a grand jury commissioner.

It goes further and states what the duties of the grand jury commissioners are. It says that "they shall select not less," once the commissioners have been appointed, "that they will select not less than fifteen or more than twenty persons from the citizens of different portions of the county to be summoned as grand jurors for the next term of court."

We had a situation in Bexar County that occurred rather recently where a judge appointed his daughter to act as grand jury commissioner. Now, there is no one closer to a judge than one's blood and kin. But to say that Judge Carrillo should be impeached on this basis would be to say that the judge in our county should be impeached because he named his daughter as a grand jury commissioner.

And we don't have to go as far as Bexar County.

Right here in Travis County the judge appointed three commissioners. One of the commissioners— I'm sorry.

Five commissioners. One of the commissioners appointed himself. One of the grand jury commissioners appointed himself to sit as a grand juror. The other commissioner

appointed his wife. The third commissioner appointed himself. Out of the five, four of them either appointed themselves or a member of their family. And there is not one case, one case in the state of Texas, and not one case in any jurisdiction in the United States, that says that this is illegal.

It may smack of something improper, but it is not illegal.

Gentlemen, we can run roughshod in this impeachment proceeding, and we can go right down the line and return each article of impeachment as has been requested by this committee. But I think that we have a duty to ourselves to show some credibility in our actions today and in the days to come; that we should not accept all of the contentions of this committee as being worthy of returning an article; that they must be impeachable offenses. And I submit, gentlemen, that this is not an impeachable offense, and I ask you to vote "no" on this particular article.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Mr. Hendricks to close.

## CLOSING ARGUMENT FOR ARTICLE II

MR. HENDRICKS: Mr. Speaker and Members,
I'll be very brief. I would point out one thing that's
very interesting, is the fact that in the Parr trial
the judge would not disqualify himself, but when it
came to the disbarrment proceeding at the strong suggestion of Judge Alamea, Judge Carrillo disqualified himself in that hearing.

MR. VALE: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for one question?

MR. HENDRICKS: No, I will not.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The gentleman doesn't yield, at this time, Mr. Vale.

MR. HENDRICKS: Gentlemen, these are the little people down there that's suffering. It's not the big ones. I'm surprised at some of the members up here that are ordinarily out here fighting for the rights of the small people in the state of Texas. I've always been able to look at them. I've served with them ever since I've been here, ten years. I've admired them, because they've always hung in there and stuck up for the rights of the little people.

Yet today they come in here and give you all of this in support of a white taco.

Gentlemen, this man needs to be removed from

office. We can't do it. But do we have enough evidence to send it across the hall? I say we do. And that's what I say we should do with it. I move adoption of Article II, Mr. Speaker.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: Okay, Members. The question now is on the adoption of Article II. All those in favor of the adoption of Article II will vote "aye," all those opposed will vote "no." It's a record vote. The Clerk will ring the bell.

Show Mr. Washington voting "no."

Show Mr. Denson voting "aye."

Have all members voted?

Show Mr. Waters voting "aye."

Have all members voted?

There being 118 "ayes" and 27 "noes," Article II is adopted.

Members, we're going to be adjourning shortly. We're going to take advantage of the rain outside and try to see if we can let it stop while Mr. Laney presents Article III.

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## PRESENTATION OF ARTICLE III

MR. LANEY: Mr. Speaker, Members, this
Article III has to do with the district judge of the
229th diverting services of government employees to his
personal benefit when not entitled to receive these
services.

Included in this there was testimony by Cleofas Gonzalez that he worked for the Farm and Ranch Store which is owned by O. P. Carrillo and others.

MR. SHERMAN: Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.

SPEAKER CLAYTON: State your inquiry, Mr. Sherman.

MR. SHERMAN: Before we go further, this
House now has voted two articles of impeachment. They
are contained within a resolution. Nevertheless, we
have voted two articles whether or not we vote any
others. Does the constitutional provision which relieves
the judge of his duties now go into effect or do we have
to adopt the entire resolution even if only these two
are in it?

SPEAKER CLAYTON: The substitute is not yet adopted, Mr. Sherman.

MR. SHERMAN: We have to adopt the resolution then, even though we have adopted two articles of

impeachment?

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SPEAKER CLAYTON: That is correct.

Proceed, Mr. Laney.

MR. LANEY: Okay. Before the committee, Cleofas Gonzalez testified that he was employed by or was paid by the county but worked in the Farm and Ranch Store, which was a retail outlet for farm and ranch supplies.

Also, Pat Gonzalez, until his death sometime in 1973, also worked at the Farm and Ranch Store, was paid entirely by county funds.

Francisco Ruiz was employed by Duval County and worked on Judge Carrillo's ranch.

Also Oscar Sanchez was employed by Duval County, was a paid employee by Duval County, and did work on O. P. Carrillo's ranch in the form of constructing a water reservoir.

Patricio Garza, we had testimony that he was employed by Duval County and worked on O. P. Carrillo's ranch as a cook.

We had testimony by Octavio Hinojosa, the assistant county auditor of Duval County, that substantiated the fact that these people were employed by Duval County, were paid by Dural County, and in the record we have warrants that show that these people were in fact

paid by Duval County.

We had testimony by Cleofas Conzalez that he did in fact work for Farm and Ranch Store and was paid in fact by the county. He also testified that Pat Gonzalez, who died in 1973, worked for was paid by the county and worked for O. P. Carrillo.

We had testimony by Ruben Chapa that Pat Gonzalez worked for the Farm and Ranch Store which was owned by the Carrillos, O. P. Carrillo; that he testified that Pat Gonzalez worked there. So that was collaborated there.

We had testimony by Francisco Ruiz himself that he did in fact receive a check from the county, was paid in full by the county, and did do work on the ranch. He testified that sometimes O. P. Carrillo's brother would tell him to go to the ranch and do the work and sometimes O. P. himself would tell him to go do the work. When asked if he was ever paid by the judge himself, he said, "No."

Mr. Octavio Hinojosa testified that all of these people that I've mentioned before were in fact paid by county warrants, and that was the only source of income he knew they had.

Also Patricio Carza under questioning said be had been working on O. P. Carrillo's ranch.

Mr. Speaker, if there's no questions, I move 1 adoption of this article. 2 SPEAKER CLAYTON: Anyone to speak against 3 Article III? 4 If not, the question is on the passage of 5 Article III. All those in favor will vote "aye," all 6 those opposed will vote "no." It's a record vote. The 7 Clerk will ring the bell. 8 Have all members voted? 9 10 Show Mr. Waters voting "aye." There being 127 "ayes," 15 "noes," two present 11 12 not voting, Article III is adopted. 13 Mr. Laney stopped the rain. 14 Mr. Sullivan moves that the House stand 15 recessed until nine a.m. in the morning. Is there objection? 16 The Chair hears none. The House accordingly 17 stands recessed until nine a.m. 18 19 (Whereupon, the House of Representatives was recessed, to reconvene at nine o'clock a.m., on Tuesday, 20 21 August 5, 1975.) 22 23 24 25