



# YOUNG VOTER MOBILIZATION TACTICS

A compilation of the most recent research on  
traditional & innovative voter turnout techniques

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THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF  
POLITICAL MANAGEMENT

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Young Voter Strategies, a project of the Graduate School of Political Management at The George Washington University with support from The Pew Charitable Trusts, provides the public, parties, candidates, consultants and nonprofits with data on the youth vote and tools to effectively mobilize this electorate for upcoming elections.

This compilation of the most recent academic research on voter mobilization techniques is one of many toolkits that Young Voter Strategies has developed to assist campaigns and organizations in developing their own strategies for engaging the increasingly large youth demographic.

For more information about past reports and upcoming research please visit our website at [www.youngvoterstrategies.org](http://www.youngvoterstrategies.org).



**CIRCLE**

The Center for Information & Research  
on Civic Learning & Engagement

This booklet was compiled with the help of CIRCLE (The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement) at the University of Maryland. CIRCLE promotes research on the civic and political engagement of Americans between the ages of 15 and 25. Although CIRCLE conducts and funds research, not practice, the projects that they support have practical implications for those who work to increase young people's engagement in politics and civic life. CIRCLE is also a clearinghouse for relevant information and scholarship. CIRCLE is funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts and Carnegie Corporation of New York.

# Contents

## Winning Young Voters

This booklet outlines the best ways to reach and turn out young voters, from phone banks to door knocks. Each tactic is evaluated through a randomized field experiment in order to determine how much that tactic increases a person's likelihood to vote and for its cost-effectiveness. We also outline what does not work and is not worth a campaign's time or money.

We saw in 2004 that young people will vote when asked. This booklet gives non-profits and political campaigns the tools to turn out young voters in 2006 and beyond.

## Key Themes

Themes from the research findings .....5

## Case Studies on Turnout Techniques

Research case studies by tactic (with impact & costs analyses) .....9

## Tips for campaigns

Advice based on the research findings .....20

# Turning Out Young Voters

In 2004, young voter turnout increased more than in any election since 18 year olds won the right to vote 35 years ago. Turnout among our nation's youngest voters ages 18-24 increased 11 percentage points from 36 percent to 47 percent; turnout among 18-29 year olds increased 9 points from 40 percent to 49 percent. (U.S. Census Bureau 2005)

This trend continued in 2005 when student-dense precincts in Virginia saw a turnout increase of 15 percent. (New Voters Project and CIRCLE 2005)

Leading campaign professionals, analysts and academics agree that one of the key factors driving this recent increase in turnout is that there has been, for the first time in decades, a major investment in mobilizing these voters. Non-partisan organizations that ran peer-to-peer field operations, media, and visibility campaigns spent an estimated \$40 million on registering and turning out young voters, a presidential campaign made a media buy targeting young voters, and partisan organizations both inside and outside of the party structures mobilized supportive youth.

These turnout efforts paid off on Election Day 2004 as more than 20 million 18-29 year old voters went to the polls.

The lesson learned is that today's young adults are an engaged generation that will vote in higher numbers if they are asked. Given their sheer size—topping 42 million in 2006 and growing rapidly—it is a crucial demographic to engage and ask to vote. The question now becomes...

## What is the most cost-effective way to ask a young person to vote?

In this booklet we have compiled the best and most recent randomized field experiments done on traditional and innovative campaign tactics. For each tactic, we estimate the cost per additional vote and the impact on young voters' turnout. We start with themes that run through the most successful turnout tests and end with tips for putting these most effective tactics into practice. We hope you will use this information to better incorporate young voters into your campaign plans in the future.

### What is a randomized field experiment?

The community of non-partisan and partisan organizations, foundations and researchers dedicated to engaging young voters has been conducting randomized field experiments for more than six years to study various types of voter contact and quantify their impact. The Pew Charitable Trusts has funded most of this research, conducted in conjunction with scholars at Yale University. In 2004, the Beldon Fund, JEHT Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, and Solidago Foundation funded additional experiments through CIRCLE. Meanwhile, in 2004, The Student PIRGs New Voters Project successfully implemented and took to scale many findings from the research to date.

These randomized field experiments are essentially like running prescription drug trials for politics, where people in a treatment group get a knock on the door or a phone call and people in the control group do not. After the elections, county records are collected to find out at what rate the treatment and the control groups voted and to determine the impact of the door knocking or phone calling.

These results mean that organizers for youth vote campaigns and political campaigns can predict with reliability the results of their work.

# Section I: Key Themes

We found several key themes that dominate the research findings. These themes help explain how to effectively turn out new young voters who would not otherwise go to the polls.

## Quality counts

Actual votes per contact will be higher when the contact is more personalized and interactive.

The research shows that the most effective method of generating a new voter is an in-person door knock by a peer. The next greatest impact was seen by phonebanks with longer, chattier phone scripts or volunteers making the calls. Also, recent survey data by Young Voter Strategies shows that the online tools that are most effective are the ones where the young voter either opts-in to the conversation or gets to interact in some way.

The Section II case studies demonstrate that the less personal and interactive outreach tactics are, the less effective they are in turning out voters. One study (Ramírez 2005) allows a direct comparison between volunteer phone banks, direct mail, and robocalls. The volunteer phone banks are ten times more cost-effective than the automated phone calls or “robocalls.”

## Begin with the basics

Young people need nuts-and-bolts practical information about how to vote. And efforts that make voting more convenient are quite effective.

An experiment in which high school students were taught to use a voting machine raised turnout dramatically. As Elizabeth Addonizio writes, this program increased “the probability that an 18-year-old will vote by 19 to 24 percentage points.” (Addonizio forthcoming) Another experiment which simply reminded voters to go to the polls on Election Day and provided polling place information in New Jersey in 2003 resulted in turnout increasing by almost 14 points. (Green 2004)

Also, the research findings illustrate that efforts to make the voting process easier increase turnout in cost-effective ways. An absentee ballot request mailer generated additional votes at \$8 per vote for voters under 30, a significantly more efficient impact than with older voters. (Mann 2006)

## The medium matters more than the message

To date, the growing body of experimental research has not found that any type of message works better than another. It is more about making a quality contact.

Several studies have varied the message to compare partisan versus nonpartisan or negative versus positive content. None of these studies have shown a significant impact difference between messages. (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2005; McNulty 2005; Nickerson, Friedrich, and King 2006; Panagopoulos 2006)

## Young people are easy to incorporate into your lists and turnout programs

Excluding young voters from your turnout efforts is a mistake. The research findings all demonstrate that young people are just as responsive to voter contact as older voters. (Nickerson, forthcoming)

While voters under 30 respond to turnout tactics at the same rates as older voters, in some communities they are more difficult to reach, so targeting must take this into consideration. Efforts in ethnic communities found young people as easy to reach as older voters, and student areas and apartment building have dense residences that lead to very high contact rates.

## Ethnic and immigrant youth are cost-effective targets

When targeting ethnic or immigrant communities, it is cost-effective to target young voters, particularly because there is less need to translate materials into languages other than English.

When working in ethnic or immigrant communities, be sure to ask all voters you contact to volunteer to reach out to their neighbors: research also indicates that in ethnic and immigrant communities the most trusted messenger is someone who looks like the potential voter. (Michelson 2004) This is the case with most voters, but even more so in these communities.

Also, youth are at least as easy to reach as older voters. Latino 18-29 year-olds are easier to reach than those in the 30-39 age range and the same as 40-59 year-old Latinos. For Asians, young voters were less likely to be contacted than the older Asian-American voters but as easy to contact as those in the 30-49 age ranges. (Ramírez and Wong 2006)

## Initial mobilization makes for repeat voters

Successful mobilization in one election raises people's propensity to vote in subsequent elections. Parties, candidates and interest groups should expect long-term benefits from mobilizing youth today.

In one study, the authors found that 50 percent of the effect of canvassing during the 1998 New Haven election persisted in 1999, even though there were no additional efforts to get out the vote. (Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003) Another influential study (based on survey research, not experiments) found that once people begin to vote, their propensity to participate in future elections rises. (Plutzer 2002) Finally, a new study that tracked 10 canvassing experiments over time indicate that voting is habit-forming. The study found that if you get a person to vote in one election, they will be 29 percentage points more likely to vote in the next election. (Nickerson 2004)

Studies conducted in previous decades found that adults' party identification was remarkably stable over the course of their lives. If these patterns persist in the current era, then the odds are high that someone who is mobilized to vote for a particular party will continue to vote for that party for decades to come. (Sears and Levy 2003, p. 79)

## Section II: Case Studies on Turnout Techniques

The following case studies provide examples of voter mobilization strategies that have been rigorously tested in field experiments. The cost per additional vote refers to the cost for each vote that would not have been cast without the mobilizing effort. (A randomized experiment with control groups can estimate such effects reliably.) Cost figures include all staff and materials costs plus overhead, unless otherwise noted. The research is organized by tactic (canvassing, phone calling, direct mail and new techniques), with the results arranged in order of efficiency, the most cost-effective tactics listed first.

This is all about INCREASING turnout. Obviously, there is also a benefit in persuading those who will already vote to opt for your candidate or initiative. But in close elections, new voters can make a winning difference and may be hard to find. Here are some of the best and worst ways to find and turn out voters under 30.

## Canvassing

**Canvassing has the greatest impact on turning out young people to vote.**

For between \$11 and \$14, you can get to the polls a new voter that would not have otherwise voted. Overall, we consistently found a 7 to 10 percentage point increase among young voters contacted through a door-to-door canvass – a good reason to keep young voters on your walk lists. Canvassing is especially beneficial in dense student neighborhoods and apartment buildings where you can reach more people in less time, helping keep costs low.

### Partisan Door-to-Door Canvassing

Cost per additional vote : \$10.40

**Context:** Canvassing by a candidate in an open county seat during spring 2004 Democratic primary elections in Bernalillo County, NM. The candidate faced two other opponents and won by 48 percent of the vote.

**What is considered a contact:** Talking to target in person, even if they indicate they are not interested.

**What is the contact rate per hour:** 20 attempts per hour.

**What goes into the cost calculation:** \$16 per hour for labor.

**Impact:** One additional vote per 13 attempts

(Note from Professor Kevin Arceneaux: This cost is figured out by dividing one by the intent-to-treat effect (1/0.076). A campaign could use this information to adjust the expected cost-per-vote to fit their situation. For example, if they only thought they could attempt to contact 10 per hour and the total cost of canvassing (including overhead, etc.) was \$20 an hour, the expected cost-per-vote for their operation would be  $13/10 * \$20 = \$26$  per vote. The dependent variable in this analysis was whether a campaign supporter voted or not. So, “cost-per-mobilized-supporter” might be more accurate.)

Source : Arceneaux 2006



“Canvassing has the greatest impact on turning out young people to vote.”

### Partisan Leaflets

**Cost per additional vote:** \$14 not including overhead  
**Context:** Michigan Democratic Party tested this tactic during the 2002 Michigan assembly races.  
**What is considered a contact:** Leaflet dropped at door.  
**What is the contact rate per hour:** 45 per hour  
**What goes into the cost calculation:** \$0.10 per leaflet an hour plus \$10 per hour for staff, not including overhead.  
**Impact:** One additional vote per 66 contacts  
**Source:** Green and Gerber 2004

### Nonpartisan Door-to-Door Canvassing

**Cost per additional vote:** \$19 not including overhead  
**Context:** Nonpartisan efforts in New Haven 1998; Boulder, Eugene 2000; Bridgeport, Detroit, St. Paul, Minneapolis, Columbus, Raleigh, Dos Palos (CA) 2001; Fresno, South Bend 2002; Kansas City, Phoenix 2003 mostly done by volunteer college students.  
**What is considered a contact:** Talking to target or other voters in the household.  
**What is the contact rate per hour:** 12 per hour  
**What goes into the cost calculation:** Most of the cost is in supervision and training and travel at \$16 per hour, no additional overhead is considered.  
**Impact:** One additional vote per 14 contacts (not including spillover to non-targeted voters contacted at the door)  
**Source:** Green and Gerber 2004

### Timing of Canvass Contacts

**Cost per additional vote:** During the last 3 weeks: \$20. Prior periods: \$105  
**Context:** Young Democrats of America ran a test during the final three months of Virginia's 2005 gubernatorial race to determine whether the timing of door-to-door contact impacts turnout.  
**What is considered a contact:** Contacting the targeted person in person.  
**Contact rate:** 20 attempts per hour with roughly a 13% overall contact rate, so 2.6 contacts per hour.  
**What goes into the cost calculation:** Approximately \$15 an hour for labor and materials.  
**Impact:** The last three weeks saw turnout increase by 25% and the prior weeks are between 0 and 5.5%. This is a new voter for 4 additional contacts in the last three weeks.  
**Source:** Nickerson 2006

## Partisan Door Hangers

Cost per additional vote: \$23

**Context:** The Michigan Democratic Party Youth Coordinated Campaign targeted registered Democrats and Independents, ages 18-35, in the 2002 Michigan gubernatorial race.

**What is considered a contact:** A contact consisted of successfully leaving a hanger on or immediately near the front door (i.e., front gate does not count).

**What is the contact rate per hour:** 40 per hour. The overall contact rate was 74 percent.

**What goes into the cost calculation:** The wage rate was \$15 an hour, plus about two-thirds of the labor was free.

**Impact:** One additional vote per 77 contacts

**Source:** Nickerson 2005; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006

## Nonpartisan Leaflets

Cost per additional vote: \$43 not including overhead

**Context:** Students dropped leaflets at the doors of registered voters in Hamden, CT.

**What is considered a contact:** Leaflet dropped at door

**What is the contact rate per hour:** 45 per hour

**What goes into the cost calculation:** \$0.10 per leaflet an hour plus \$10 per hour for staff plus overhead costs.

**Impact:** One additional vote per 200 contacts

**Source:** Gerber and Green 2000

Tactic	% Point Effect	Cost per Additional Vote
Partisan canvass (20 attempts/hr)	7.7	\$10.40
Partisan door hanger (45 contacts/hr)	1.3	\$14*
Nonpartisan canvass (12 contacts/hr)	7.1	\$19*
Partisan door hanger (40 contacts/hr)	1.3	\$23
Nonpartisan leaflets (45 contacts/hr)	0.5	\$43*

\* this cost does not include overhead

# Phone Calls

Phone calls are a good and relatively inexpensive way to turn out new young voters—if the calls are done right. 2002 studies by Don Green and Alan Gerber found that a professional phone bank calling college areas had much more success with a longer, chattier script. Specifically, callers using a longer script (\$1.50/complete) generated one additional vote per 30 completes, while a shorter call (\$0.50/complete) took 400 contacts to generate a new vote, and a robocall had no detectable effect.

Recent research bolsters these findings. Volunteer phone banks or professional phone banks using a longer and chattier script consistently generate better voter turnout results. The more conversational and interactive the phone call, the better. Good phone banks saw a new voter going to the polls for just over \$10 in a primary campaign and, on average, good phone call campaigns generated a 2 to 5 percentage point increase in turnout. Conversely, studies make clear that robocalls are not effective.

## Professional Phone Bank

**Cost per additional vote:** \$10.50. Assumes that the phone bank would contact 50 percent of those attempted. So, cost-per-vote=  $\$1.50 \times 0.50 \times 14$ .

**Context:** Professional phone bank calling registered Democrats off a phone list in a Democratic primary in Bernalillo County, New Mexico.

**What is considered a contact:** Talking with a live person on the phone. Messages do not count.

**What is the contact rate per hour:** The campaign did not share this information, but the overall rate was 50 percent.

**What goes into the cost calculation:** \$1.50 per complete call where they get someone on the phone who listens to enough of the message to respond to the first question in the script (e.g., “Can I count on you to vote?”). \$1.50 per complete is a high rate and would pay for a quality, interactive phone script.

**Impact:** One additional vote per 14 attempts

**Source:** Arceneaux 2006



## Bilingual Volunteer Phone Banks

Cost per additional vote: \$22

Context: Nonpartisan GOTV effort in the 2002 general election by National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) by bilingual callers targeting Latino voters in Los Angeles and Orange counties in California.

What is considered a contact: A conversation with the intended voter.

What is the contact rate per hour: 18 per hour

What goes into the cost calculation: The average wage spread across paid staff and volunteers was \$7.00 per hour, plus \$200 for setup fees and \$1000 for supervision.

Impact: One additional vote per 22 contacts

Source: Ramírez 2005

## Volunteer Phone Banks

Cost per additional vote: \$26

Context: Phone banks by the Michigan Democratic Party Youth Coordinated Campaign targeting registered Democrats and Independents age 18-35 in the 2002 Michigan gubernatorial race.

What is considered a contact: Speaking with the voter or leaving a message with a roommate or machine.

What is the contact rate per hour: 18 per hour. The overall contact rate was 50 percent.

What goes into the cost calculation: The wage rate was \$15, but about two-thirds of the labor was free.

Impact: One additional vote per 29 contacts.

Source: Nickerson 2005; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006

## Volunteer Phone Banks

Cost per additional vote: \$26 not including overhead

Context: Phone banks targeting registered voters under the age of 30, mostly college students. Calling was done by Youth Vote Coalition volunteers.

What is a contact: Speaking to the targeted person or leaving a message.

What is the contact rate per hour: 18 per hour. The overall contact rate was 57 percent.

What goes into the cost calculation: \$15 per hour wage rate.

Impact: One additional vote per 26 contacts.

Source: Nickerson 2006

## Bilingual Student Phone Banks

Cost per additional vote: \$27

Context: A class at the University of Southern California called registered Asian-American voters in high-density Asian communities in Los Angeles, California during the 2002 general election.

What is considered a contact: Contact was considered successful if the caller spoke directly to the person he or she requested to speak with and if they were able to complete the entire get-out-the-vote message.

What goes into the cost calculation: Major expenditures included funds for volunteer recruitment, stipends for volunteers, food for volunteers at the phone bank site, purchase of a list of registered Asian American voters, printing costs for mailers, postage, translation of materials, and overhead costs. Total cost for 183 additional votes was \$5000.

Impact: One additional vote per 45 contacts

Source: Wong 2005

## Robocalls

Cost per additional vote: \$275

Context: Nonpartisan automated calls from NALEO to registered voters in Latino-heavy precincts in six counties across the country in 2002. Standard call center rates and costs are assumed.

Impact: One additional vote per 2800 people assigned to receive call

Source: Ramírez 2005

Tactic	% Point Effect	Cost per additional vote
Professional phone bank	7.1	\$10.50
Bilingual volunteer phone banks (18 contacts/hour)	4.6	\$22
Volunteer phone banks (18 contacts/hour)	3.4	\$26
Volunteer phone banks (18 contacts/hour)	3.8	\$26*
Bilingual student volunteer phone banks	2.2	\$27
Robocalls	0.03 (this is not statistically distinguishable from zero)	\$275

\* this cost does not include overhead

# Direct Mail

Research shows that direct mail is not a cost-effective way to turn out new young voters. This less personal approach makes little to no impact on targeted young voters.

## Partisan Direct Mail to Indian Americans

Cost per additional vote: \$40 not including overhead

**Context:** Nonpartisan direct mail campaign targeting registered Indian Americans in Queens, New York with Hindu or Sikh surnames.

**What is a contact:** Receipt of direct mail postcard.

**What goes into the cost calculation:** The total cost was \$2000. The cost calculations include: obtaining the target list from the NYC Board of Elections, small stipends to volunteers who helped organize the list (likely only 2-3 percent of total costs), printing the postcards, and postage for mailing the postcards. It does not include overhead. The majority of the \$2000 went towards printing/mailing.

**Impact:** One additional vote per 91 contacts

**Source:** Trivedi 2005

## Nonpartisan Direct Mail to Latinos

Cost per additional vote: \$100-150

**Context:** Nonpartisan direct mail from Latino advocacy group NALEO to registered voters in Latino-heavy precincts in Colorado and Texas during the 2002 general election. Messages were tested in focus groups and mail sent two to four times to each target voter.

**What is considered a contact:** Mail sent.

**What goes into the cost calculation:** Nearly one million pieces of mail were sent at just over \$0.30 per piece

**Impact:** Minimal. Only one of all targeted sites saw a significant turnout impact of one new voter for every 546 mail pieces sent. Almost identical tests done in California saw an even smaller impact that raised the cost to \$600 per additional vote.

**Source:** Ramírez 2005

## Partisan Direct Mail

Cost per additional vote: \$200

**Context:** Republican U.S. House re-election campaign to non-base voters.

**What is considered a contact:** Receipt of direct mail postcard

**What goes into the cost calculation:** \$0.50 per piece to make and mail.

**Impact:** One additional vote per 600 recipients

**Source:** Gerber 2004; Green and Gerber 2004

## Partisan and Nonpartisan Direct Mail in Virginia 2005

Cost per additional vote: Infinite (no turnout impact).

**Context:** Direct mail in varying intensities (two to four pieces) targeting 18-30 year olds with phone numbers in Virginia in 2005. The same test was run by a nonpartisan youth organization and a Republican direct mail firm.

**What is a contact:** Mail sent.

**What goes into the cost calculation:** \$0.45 to make and send mail to 10,000 voters.

**Impact:** None

**Source:** Malchow 2005

Tactic	% Point Effect	Cost per additional vote
Direct mail to Indian American voters in NY	1.1	\$40
Direct mail to Latino voters from advocacy group	0-0.18	\$100-\$150
Direct mail to Republican house campaign	0.17	\$200
Partisan and nonpartisan direct mail (VA 2005)	None	Infinite

# New Techniques

As politics evolves, new techniques are being introduced, many of which are cost-effective and directed toward young people. In particular, the use of email, text messaging, online social networking sites and other new technologies gives us cheap and easy ways to reach young voters where they are--online or on their cell phones.

To date, there has not been a significant amount of academic research on these techniques but enough to draw this very simple conclusion: these are new ways to facilitate peer-to-peer communication and if used with a trusted messenger in a way that engages or gets the young voter to opt-in, it will have a greater impact.

Anecdotal and survey evidence points to the fact that unsolicited emails and text messages will have no turnout impact, but online chats, text messages from friends, and issue or reminder to vote emails just might.

In 2006 Young Voter Strategies is rigorously testing the effectiveness of many of these new technologies--including text messaging and viral communication on youth voter registration.

Beyond new technologies, researchers have tested new applications of old ideas from throwing parties at the polling locations to mailing absentee ballot request forms to reminding young people to go to the polls on Election Day. The most cost-effective of these tests are below. In addition, Young Voter Strategies is testing the impact of various registration techniques on increasing the likelihood of a young person voting while facilitating and compiling new research done by other academic and practitioner group pairings. These findings will be available in the spring of 2007.

## Parties at the Polls

**Cost per additional vote:** \$10

**Context:** In numerous 2005 elections, parties were advertised by local, community groups with robocalls, posters, lawn signs, and advertisements in newspapers and on the radio. All voters were targeted. The tests were performed by Working Assets and Yale University.

**What is a contact:** The parties were broadly advertised.

**What goes into the cost calculation:** Advertising and materials for the party were the primary costs. Cheaper parties got food and entertainment donated.

**Impact:** Preliminary results showed one new voter for every 15 contacts. This research is just now being analyzed. Check out

[www.youngvoterstrategies.com](http://www.youngvoterstrategies.com) for more up-to-date results.

**Source:** Addonizio forthcoming

## Absentee Ballot Request Mailer

**Cost per additional vote:** \$15.65 (\$8 under the age of 30)

**Context:** Direct mail with a tear-off piece to request an absentee ballot was sent to list of supporters of conservation in Colorado in a statewide election. The mail was sent by the Colorado Conservation Voters Education Fund.

**What is a contact:** Mail sent.

**What goes into the cost calculation:** All printing, preparation and postage for the mail, plus full costs (salary, benefits, proportion of rent/utilities/etc) per hour of the staff's time based on time sheets.

**Impact:** One additional vote per 21 contacts

**Source:** Mann forthcoming

## Election Day Reminder Calls

**Cost per additional vote:** \$11.61

**Context:** Young staff and volunteers called a list of registered young voters in New Jersey during the 2003 elections. The voters that were contacted and said yes to voting were given a follow-up call on Election Day. This test was designed to understand the impact of that Election Day reminder call.

**What is a contact:** Contact with targeted voter or message with roommate or machine.

**What is the contact rate per hour:** 77 percent of the treatment group was contacted. Rates varied dramatically depending on how much of the list had been contacted and time of day, but the average was 15 per hour.

**What goes into the cost calculation:** \$650 for supplies and staff time for Election Day effort.

**Impact:** One additional vote per 20 contacts overall and between 7-8 for those who said "yes" during the initial round of contacts.

**Source:** Green 2004

## Section III: Tips for campaigns

Young Voter Strategies offers the following advice based on the above research.

Both parties have a real incentive to target young voters today. **Democrats** won the youth vote (age 18-29) in 2004 by 9 points, and are polling a significantly larger advantage leading up to the 2006 elections. If asked, these young voters can be an integral part of a Democratic victory in the short-term. If turned out, they can also be the beginning of a Democratic base for the future.

In 2006, there is also a real opportunity for **Republicans** among young adults. Polling shows that the youngest voters who identify as Republican are more loyal and more intensely Republican than their older counterparts. This is good news for the Republicans, who lost the youth vote in 2004 by 9 points and cannot afford to let that margin get any bigger. They must continue to engage and turn out the young Republicans.

**Issue and advocacy organizations** should look to these young voters, especially those who voted for the first time in 2004, as new voters who could make the difference on issue initiatives and build your constituency's power. Further, mobilizing young voters creates a larger, more vibrant voting base in the long run, re-energizing our nation's democracy.

### The YVS Top 5 Turnout Tactics:

- Keep young voters on your call lists and walk lists
- Make the call script longer and chattier
- Use volunteers for calling and canvassing
- Use technologies that young people use like text and the internet, but only in ways that allow them to opt in to the dialogue
- Save your money; do not use robocalls or direct mail to TURN OUT this age group

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