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Financial Capability in Der Kunde Bank Beziehung Eine Wissensbasierte Analyse Und Modellkonzeption Nadine Mayer
Financial Capability in Der Kunde Bank Beziehung Eine Wissensbasierte Analyse Und Modellkonzeption Nadine Mayer
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Nachhaltigkeit und Finanzen
Nadine Mayer
Financial Capability
in der Kunde-Bank-
Beziehung
Eine wissensbasierte Analyse
und Modellkonzeption
Nachhaltigkeit und Finanzen
Financial Capability
in der Kunde-Bank-
Beziehung
Eine wissensbasierte Analyse
und Modellkonzeption
Mit einem Geleitwort von
Univ.-Professor Dr. Henry Schäfer
Nadine Mayer
Stuttgart, Deutschland
Springer Gabler
© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2018
Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung, die
nicht ausdrücklich vom Urheberrechtsgesetz zugelassen ist, bedarf der vorherigen Zustimmung
des Verlags. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Bearbeitungen, Übersetzungen,
Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen.
Die Wiedergabe von Gebrauchsnamen, Handelsnamen, Warenbezeichnungen usw. in diesem
Werk berechtigt auch ohne besondere Kennzeichnung nicht zu der Annahme, dass solche
Namen im Sinne der Warenzeichen- und Markenschutz-Gesetzgebung als frei zu betrachten
wären und daher von jedermann benutzt werden dürften.
Der Verlag, die Autoren und die Herausgeber gehen davon aus, dass die Angaben und Informa
tionen in diesem Werk zum Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung vollständig und korrekt sind.
Weder der Verlag noch die Autoren oder die Herausgeber übernehmen, ausdrücklich oder
implizit, Gewähr für den Inhalt des Werkes, etwaige Fehler oder Äußerungen. Der Verlag bleibt
im Hinblick auf geografische Zuordnungen und Gebietsbezeichnungen in veröffentlichten Karten
und Institutionsadressen neutral.
Es ist eigentlich verwunderlich, wie wenig bisher in der Forschung und in der
Praxis des Bankmarketings, des Verbraucherschutzes und der Bankenregulierung
die Bedeutung von Wissen und Handlungskompetenz von Kunden als notwendi-
ge Voraussetzung für effiziente Finanzmärkte behandelt werden. Die vorliegende
Dissertation hat sich dieses, in der Forschung längst überfälligen Themengebie-
tes angenommen. Zu diesem Zweck beschreitet sie einen völlig neuen paradig-
matischen Weg und wirft etliche der bisherigen ordnungspolitischen Grundlagen
sowie Standardmarketing-Vorstellungen im Bankbereich „über Bord“. Dies wird
in besonderer Weise durch die neuartige Verbindung von wissensbasierter Un-
ternehmenstheorie und der ebenfalls wissensbasierten Financial Capability-
Schule deutlich. Das Resultat ist das Verständnis einer marktmäßigen Interaktion
von (Privat)Kunden und Kreditinstituten als eine wissensbasierte Learning Rela-
tionship.
Die Arbeit grenzt ihre Analysen auf den Kreis der Privathaushalte ab. Sie geht
der Frage nach, wie Privatpersonen bei mangelnder finanzieller Bildung und sich
verstärkenden finanziellen sowie Risikoherausforderungen diese mit passenden
Finanzdienstleistungen meistern können. Dabei geht es nicht unerheblich auch
um sozialpolitische Belange. Auf der anderen Seite zeigt die Arbeit, dass Kredit-
institute mit ihrem bisherigen produktlastigen Privatkundengeschäft kaum in der
Lage sein dürften, Kunden zu binden, indem sie deren Bedarfe adäquat befriedi-
gen. Die eigenen Geschäfts- und Produktmodelle von Banken sind in dieser Hin-
sicht bislang zu wenig zukunftsfähig.
Die zweigeteilte Betrachtungsweise – Privatkunden und Kreditinstitute – zieht
sich als „roter Faden“ durch die gesamte Arbeit. Und ein methodisches Grund-
merkmal der Arbeit ist der kausale Zusammenhang zwischen den informa-
tionsökonomischen Anforderungen an ein effizientes Agieren der Marktparteien
„Kreditinstitut und Privatkunde“ einerseits und der bisher verkannten notwendi-
gen Schaffung von Wissen und Kompetenzen auf der anderen Seite. Die Arbeit
positioniert sich damit vor dem Hintergrund der Wissens- und Risikogesell-
schaft. Dazu wird eine Breite unterschiedlicher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher
Theorieansätze aus der Neo-Institutionenökonomik, der Financial Literacy, der
verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Betriebswirtschaftslehre (insbesondere des Marke-
tings), der Organisationstheorie und der Banktheorie neuartig miteinander ver-
bunden und zu einem systemischen Konzept verknüpft. Ergänzend wird in einer
eigenen empirischen Untersuchung der Gehalt des zuvor entwickelten Wissens-
VI Geleitwort
Die Idee zu dieser Arbeit entstand während meiner Zeit als wissenschaftliche
Mitarbeiterin und Doktorandin am Lehrstuhl für Finanzwirtschaft von Univ.-Pro-
fessor Dr. Henry Schäfer an der Universität Stuttgart. Eine Kernkompetenz des
Lehrstuhls stellt die Forschung zum Thema „Nachhaltigkeit und Finanzen“ dar.
Während meiner Mitarbeit in verschiedenen Forschungsprojekten zu diesem
Thema und nicht zuletzt unter den Eindrücken der Finanzkrise rückte insbeson-
dere die Frage nach einer nachhaltigen Ausgestaltung der Finanzen von Privat-
kunden in Zusammenhang mit einer langfristigen Kunde-Bank-Beziehung in
meinen Forschungsfokus.
Hierbei zeigte sich, dass in der Diskussion um nachhaltige Geldanlagemöglich-
keiten für Privatkunden häufig ein wesentlicher und grundlegender Nachhaltig-
keitsaspekt zu kurz kam und auch heute noch zu kurz kommt: die ökonomische
Nachhaltigkeit der privaten Finanzen selbst. In diesem Zusammenhang erwiesen
sich unter anderem der individuelle Grad an Finanzkompetenz zur bedarfsge-
rechten Auswahl und die Verfügbarkeit tatsächlich bedarfsorientierter Finanz-
dienstleistungsprodukte als entscheidende Voraussetzungen für eine ökonomisch
nachhaltige Ausgestaltung privater Finanzen.
Eine genauere Betrachtung dieser beiden Faktoren ergab jedoch, dass sowohl die
Finanzkompetenz von Privatkunden als auch die Kompetenz der Kreditinstitute
zur bedarfsgerechten Ausgestaltung von Finanzdienstleistungen durchaus Ver-
besserungspotenziale aufweisen. Gleichzeitig verfügen sowohl Privatkunden als
auch Kreditinstitute über spezifisches Wissen, das den jeweils anderen Akteur
bei der Herausbildung seiner jeweiligen Kompetenz unterstützen kann.
Doch wie können Privatkunden und Kreditinstitute in einen für beide Seiten nut-
zenstiftenden wechselseitigen Austausch des jeweils relevanten Wissens kom-
men? Wie kann eine wissensbasierte Learning Relationship zwischen Privatkun-
den und Kreditinstituten ausgestaltet sein? Diese Überlegungen bildeten den
Initialpunkt für die vorliegende Dissertation.
Bei der Entstehung dieser Arbeit haben mich viele Menschen unterstützt. Ihnen
möchte ich an dieser Stelle danken.
Besonderer Dank gilt meinem Doktorvater und Mentor, Herrn Professor Dr.
Henry Schäfer, für die inspirierende und konstruktive Unterstützung während der
Promotionszeit und auch für sein Vertrauen und die Möglichkeit, als wissen-
VIII Vorwort
Geleitwort ............................................................................................................ V
Vorwort .............................................................................................................. VII
Abbildungsverzeichnis..................................................................................... XIII
Tabellenverzeichnis ........................................................................................... XV
Abkürzungsverzeichnis ................................................................................... XVII
Symbolverzeichnis ........................................................................................... XIX
Zusammenfassung ........................................................................................... XXI
Abstract ........................................................................................................... XXV
1 Einleitung ................................................................................... 1
1.1 Problemstellung der Arbeit und Relevanz der Thematik .......................... 1
1.2 Forschungsziel und Abgrenzung der Arbeit ........................................... 10
1.3 Vorgehen der Arbeit ............................................................................... 14
Abs. Absatz
AdFLAG Adult Financial Literacy Advisory Group
AG Aktiengesellschaft
AnlEntG Anlegerentschädigungsgesetz
APuZ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte
Art. Artikel
AV abhängige Variable
AVmS Bildungsinitiative „Altersvorsorge macht Schule“
BaFin Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
BAföG Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz
BDA Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände
BGB Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
BMAS Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales
BMBF Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung
BMELV Bundesministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Verbrau-
cherschutz
BMF Bundesministerium für Finanzen
BMJV Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz
BPA Bundespresseamt bzw. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundes-
regierung
BVR Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisen-
banken
BWI Betriebswirtschaftliches Institut der Universität Stuttgart
BWL t.o. Technisch orientierte Betriebswirtschaftslehre
CLV Customer Lifetime Value
CRM Customer Relationship Management
DeSeCo Definition and Selection of Competencies: Theoretical and
Conceptual Foundations
Dr. Doktor
DSGV Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband
d. Verf. Durch die Verfasserin (Nadine Mayer)
DVV Deutscher Volkshochschul-Verband e.V.
EAEG Einlagensicherungs- und Anlegerentschädigungsgesetz
EBA Einstellung zu Banken im Allgemeinden
EHB Einstellung zur Hausbank
EinSiG Einlagensicherungsgesetz
XVIII Abkürzungsverzeichnis
Erg. d. Verf. Ergänzung durch die Verfasserin (Nadine Mayer) der vorliegen-
den Arbeit in Zitaten
FCA Financial Conduct Authority
FINCAP Financial Capability
FN. Fußnote
FSA Financial Services Authority
G8 Achtjähriges Gymnasium
G9 Neunjähriges Gymnasium
Haspa Hamburger Sparkasse
Hrsg. Herausgeber
iböb Initiative für bessere Ökonomische Bildung
i.d.R. in der Regel
iff Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen e.V.
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, zu deutsch: Richt-
linie über Märkte für Finanzinstrumente oder kurz: Finanzmarkt-
richtlinie
o.J. ohne Jahresangabe
o.Jg. ohne Jahrgangsangabe
o.O. Ohne Ortsangabe
o.V. ohne Verfasserangabe
PNG Pflege-Neuausrichtungs-Gesetz
S. Seite
Sic! So! Anzeigen einer falschen oder von der bisherigen Verwen-
dung abweichenden Schreibweise eines Worts in einem Zitat.
SRI Sustainable and Responsible Investments
SSRN Social Science Research Network
StGB Strafgesetzbuch
Univ. Universität(s)
UV Unabhängige Variable
Vl Versuchsleiter
Vpn Versuchsperson
VVG Versicherungsvertragsgesetz
vzbv Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.
WpHG Wertpapierhandelsgesetz
zfb Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
zfbf Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
ZKG Zahlungskontengesetz
zugl. zugleich
Symbolverzeichnis
§ Paragraph
% Prozent
H0 Nullhypothese
µ1 Mittelwert (arithmetisches Mittel) der abhängigen Variable in der ersten
Befragung
µ2 Mittelwert (arithmetisches Mittel) der abhängigen Variable in der zwei-
ten Befragung
O die abhängige Variable bzw. das zu untersuchende Konstrukt
r Pearson Korrelationskoeffizient
Sig. Signifikanzniveau
X unabhängige Variable bzw. das sog. Treatment darstellt
Zusammenfassung
Furthermore, it appears that banks have not looked at the potential of the interac-
tive knowledge sharing process with their customers so far. Against the back-
ground of the dynamically changing conditions the relationship with the custom-
ers from the knowledge cooperation may constitute a platform to generate
temporary competitive advantages on a recurring basis as the solutions are
adapted to customer needs in a flexible manner regularly.
Considering the developed and discussed knowledge based cooperation model
this thesis demonstrates the potentials as well as the challenges from a
knowledge based evolution of strategies of market processing for the retail cus-
tomer segment of credit institutions.
1 Einleitung
1 So beziffert Oehler (2011) den im Zeitraum 2001 bis 2010 durch mangelhafte oder falsche Bera-
tung bzw. ein zu inflexibles Produktangebot entstandenen Schaden im Kapitallebensversiche-
rungs- und private Rentenversicherungsbereich auf 160 Milliarden Euro. Vgl. Oehler, (2011), S.
2. In einer weiteren Studie aus dem Jahr 2012 schätzt Oehler die Schäden durch Falschberatung
in der Altersvorsorge und auch allgemeinen Verbraucherfinanzfragen auf jährlich 50 Milliarden
Euro. Vgl. Oehler, (2012), S. 1 ff.
2 Vgl. hierzu exemplarisch die nationalen und internationalen Studien von Atkinson/Messy,
(2012), S. 10 und S. 40 und Kaminski/Friebel, (2012), S. 12 sowie die Ausführungen der Kapitel
3.1.5 und 3.2 der vorliegenden Arbeit.
3 Die Begriffe Verbraucher und Privatkunden werden nachfolgend synonym verwendet, da die
dieser Arbeit zugrundeliegende Privatkunden-Definition sich überwiegend auf private Einzelper-
sonen bzw. die Mitglieder von Privathaushalten bezieht. Vgl. zur Privatkunden-Definition Kapi-
tel 1.2 der vorliegenden Arbeit.
4 Vgl. hierzu exemplarisch Kaminski/Friebel, (2012), S. 19.
5 Exemplarisch hierfür seien die Ergebnisse der MetallRente Studie „Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen
2016“ genannt, vgl. Hurrelmann/Karch/Traxler, (2016), S. 10.
hend deren soziales Umfeld.6 Hierbei ist z.B. an die Bedeutung von Geld für die
Möglichkeiten der Freizeitgestaltung und dem damit verbundenen sozialen Nut-
zen, wie Gruppenzugehörigkeit, Anerkennung und Prestige, zu denken. 7
Finanzdienstleistungen, wie z.B. das Girokonto, die Kreditkarte oder auch Raten-
kredite, sind somit für viele Menschen zu Instrumenten des täglichen Lebens
geworden, die nicht nur die wirtschaftliche, sondern indirekt auch die gesell-
schaftliche Teilhabe ermöglichen.8 Darüber hinaus haben sie, wie private Alters-
vorsorgeprodukte und diverse Produkte zur Absicherung von Lebensrisiken, eine
existenzsichernde Funktion, indem sie bisher durch den Staat geleistete Auf-
gaben der sozialen Sicherung ergänzen bzw. teilweise substituieren.
Eine zunehmende Dynamisierung der sozioökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen
der Verbraucher erzeugt darüber hinaus komplexere Problemstellungen, durch
die sich die Bedeutung von Finanzentscheidungen und somit auch von Finanz-
dienstleistungen für das eigene Leben verändert.
Die Ursachen dieser Dynamisierung liegen in einer zunehmenden Unsicherheit
über die Entwicklung der individuellen Lebenssituation aufgrund der wachsen-
den Bedeutung sog. „Life [E]vents“9 begründet. Hierbei handelt es sich um die
individuelle sozioökonomische Lebenssituation betreffende disruptive Entwick-
lungen,10 die in enger Interdependenz zu gesellschaftlichen Veränderungen, wie
dem Wandel vom Wohlfahrts- zum Sozialinvestitionsstaat,11 die Veränderung
der finanziellen Für- und Vorsorge-Verhältnisse im privaten Bereich und die
damit einhergehende Notwendigkeit zur Sicherstellung der individuellen finan-
ziellen Versorgung und Unabhängigkeit12 oder der Flexibilisierung des Arbeits-
markts13 und auch dem wachsenden Stellenwert von Konsum in der sog. Kon-
sumgesellschaft14,15 stehen.
6 Vgl. exemplarisch Reifner, (2003), S.15 und Piorkowsky, u.a., (2008), S. 20.
7 Vgl. exemplarisch Reifner, (2003), S.15, The Money Advice Service, (2014), S. 34 und 37 und
Opaschowski, (1990), S. 112 f.
8 Vgl. exemplarisch Reifner, (2003), S.15.
9 Vgl. The Money Advice Service, (2014), S. 48 und Elliott, u.a., (2010), S. 50.
10 Zur Definition disruptiver Entwicklungen vgl. Langer, (2011), S. 79 ff. sowie die Ausführungen
in Kapitel 5.1 der vorliegenden Arbeit.
11 Vgl. hierzu Schäfer, (2001a), S. 129 bzw. die Ausführungen von Giddens, (1999) zum sog. „drit-
ten Weg“ und Kapitel 3.1.1.1 der vorliegenden Arbeit.
12 Vgl. hierzu exemplarisch Reifner, (2003), S. 30 oder Reifner, u.a., (2004), S. 6 sowie Hab-
schick/Jung/Evers, (2004), S. 8 und Kapitel 3.1.1.2 der vorliegenden Arbeit.
13 Vgl. exemplarisch Weinmann, (2010), S. 18 und Blancke/Schmid, (2000) und Kapitel 3.1.1.3 der
vorliegenden Arbeit.
14 Zum Begriff der Konsumgesellschaft bzw. deren Entwicklungsgeschichte vgl. exemplarisch
Kleinschmidt, (2008), S. 7 ff. und insbesondere S. 12 f.
15 Vgl. auch Kapitel 3.1.1.4 der vorliegenden Arbeit.
1.1 Problemstellung der Arbeit und Relevanz der Thematik 3
Aber nicht nur die Einsatzgebiete von Finanzdienstleistungen haben sich erwei-
tert, auch die Finanzdienstleistungen selbst weisen eine wachsende Komplexität
auf. Die Breite und Tiefe des Produktangebots nehmen stetig zu, die Anzahl und
Art der untereinander konkurrierenden Anbieter steigt und es entstehen mit dem
informationstechnologischen Fortschritt immer neue Zugangswege zu Finanz-
dienstleistungen.
Die sich hieraus ergebende Unübersichtlichkeit des Produktangebots und dessen
Inflexibilität oder auch eine zu geringe Orientierung an den sich u.U. im Laufe
des Lebens dynamisch verändernden sozioökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen
bzw. den daraus resultierenden Bedürfnissen der Verbraucher beeinflussen eben-
falls deren Entscheidungsverhalten. In der Konsequenz werden existenziell wich-
tige finanzielle Entscheidungen nicht selten auf unbestimmte Zeit verschoben,
bewusst nicht getroffen oder wieder revidiert – mit zumeist erheblichen finanzi-
ellen Nachteilen.16
Verbraucher sind deshalb mehr denn je gefordert, kompetente, d.h. ihre Ziele und
Bedürfnisse befriedigende Finanzentscheidungen zu treffen. Der Finanzentschei-
dungsprozess, also der Weg von der Identifizierung eines Finanzdienstleistungs-
bedarfs bis zum Abschluss des finalen Finanzdienstleistungsvertrags, gewinnt für
sie folglich immer mehr an Relevanz. Verbraucher bedürfen deshalb in ihrer
Rolle als Privatkunden von Kreditinstituten heutzutage einer ausgeprägten
Finanzkompetenz zum Treffen fundierter finanzieller Entscheidungen.
Aufgrund der oben beschriebenen mangelnden Finanzkompetenz weiter Bevöl-
kerungskreise benötigen Verbraucher fachkundige Unterstützung bei der Bewäl-
tigung ihrer komplexen finanziellen Aufgabenstellungen. Kreditinstituten kommt
in diesem Zusammenhang immer häufiger die Rolle von Problemlösern zu, d.h.
Verbraucher erwarten in ihrer Rolle als Privatkunden kompetente Lösungen ihrer
finanziellen Fragestellungen seitens der sie beratenden Kreditinstitute. 17 Die Er-
eignisse der jüngsten Finanzkrise18 haben jedoch eindrücklich verdeutlicht, dass
Kreditinstitute durch ihre bisherige Beratungspraxis die oft missliche Lage der
Privatkunden eher förderten bzw. verstärkten, als ihr im Sinne ihrer ursprüng-
lichen Rolle als Finanzintermediäre entgegenzuwirken: Mitunter wies und weist
die Beratungsqualität von Kreditinstituten in den vergangenen Jahren starke
26 Vgl. hierzu exemplarisch die in Kapitel 2.3 vorgestellten Definitionen des Mass Customization-
Ansatzes von Piller, (2006), S. 176 und Oehler, (2004), S. 34.
27 Vgl. Stauss, (2002), S. 276 f. und die Ausführungen in Kapitel 2.3 sowie 4.2.3.
28 Vgl. hierzu ähnlich Oehler, (2004), S. 34 ff. oder Kleiner, (2008), S. 2 ff. sowie die Ausführun-
gen des zweiten Kapitels der vorliegenden Arbeit und hier insbesondere Kapitel 2.3.
29 Vgl. exemplarisch Piorkowsky, u.a., (2008), S. 11 ff. und die Ausführungen in Kapitel 3.1.3.
30 Vgl. ähnlich Thomas, (2008), S. 18: Finanzdienstleistungen sind demnach ein „Mittel zum
Zweck“ zur Befriedigung eines Primärbedarfs.
31 Vgl. Schäfer, (1995a), S. 122.
6 1 Einleitung
32 Auch die ganzheitlichen und als bedarfsorientiert geltenden Beratungsansätze beziehen sich auf
ein vorher festgelegtes Produktsortiment. Insofern kann auch hier von einer gewissen Produkto-
rientierung ausgegangen werden. Eine ausführlichere Erläuterung dieses Gedankens findet sich
u.a. in Kapitel 2.3.
33 Vgl. exemplarisch Hagen, (2014).
34 Vgl. Corsten, (1990), S. 122. Der Begriff der Produktionsfunktion kommt ursprünglich aus der
mikroökonomischen (Produktions-)Theorie. Dort bildet eine Produktionsfunktion kurz gespro-
chen die technisch und organisatorisch effiziente Transformation von Einsatzfaktoren in Produk-
te bzw. Dienstleistungen ab. Vgl. Varmaz, (2006), S. 172. Grundsätzlich gibt es in der wissen-
schaftlichen Literatur unterschiedliche Auffassungen darüber, ob und inwiefern für Banken
Produktionsfunktionen existieren. Vgl. Corsten, (1990), S. 122. Selbst unter den Ansätzen, die
von der Existenz einer Produktionsfunktion von Banken ausgehen, gibt es wiederum unter-
schiedliche Auffassungen bezüglich deren Ausgestaltung bzw. deren Merkmale. Vgl. hierzu
exemplarisch die Ausführungen der Übersichtsdarstellung von Corsten, (1990), S. 122 ff. oder
Varmaz, (2006), S. 226 f. Die vorliegende Arbeit verzichtet auf die Darstellung der entsprechen-
den wissenschaftlichen Diskussion und verweist den interessierten Leser auf die angeführten re-
levanten Literaturstellen, da im Kontext der vorliegenden Arbeit der Begriff der Produktions-
funktion lediglich als vereinfachender Überbegriff für die Technologie des bankbetrieblichen
Leistungserstellungsprozesses, d.h. der bankbetrieblichen Produktion im Sinne eines weiten Pro-
duktionsbegriffs, unter den die Leistungserstellungsprozesse aller Unternehmungen subsumiert
werden können (vgl. Corsten, (1990), S. 122), verstanden werden soll.
35 Zum Begriff der Wissensasymmetrie vgl. allgemein Minkler, (1993), S. 18 ff. oder Langer,
(2011), S. 54 und 77 ff. sowie die Ausführungen in Kapitel 4.1 zur Unterscheidung von Wissens-
und Informationsasymmetrien.
36 Vgl. allgemein und grundlegend zu Heuristiken als entscheidungsvereinfachenden Regeln Gige-
renzer/Brighton, (2011), oder Heiner, (1983), S. 567 ff.
1.1 Problemstellung der Arbeit und Relevanz der Thematik 7
37 Vgl. die Ausführungen in Kapitel 2.1.1 und speziell Büschgen/Büschgen, (2002), S. 44, Peters,
(2011), S. 2 und 17 oder Schäfer, (2001a), S. 129.
38 Zum Begriff des impliziten oder taciten Wissens vgl. grundlegend Polanyi, (1985) sowie die
Ausführungen in Kapitel 4.2.2.2 der vorliegenden Arbeit.
39 Vgl. zur Teilung impliziten Wissen grundlegend Nonaka, (1994) bzw. Nonaka/Takeuchi, (1997)
sowie die Ausführungen in Kapitel 4.2.2.2 der vorliegenden Arbeit.
40 „Bedürfnisse werden in der modernen Mikroökonomie in der Form von Präferenzen und daraus
abgeleiteten ordinalen Nutzenfunktionen dargestellt“, Gösele, (1994), S. 4.
41 Vgl. Oehler, (2004), S. 29 bzw. die Ausführungen in Kapitel 3.1.1.
8 1 Einleitung
42 Exemplarisch seien in diesem Zusammenhang die sog. Richtlinie über Märkte für Finanzinstru-
mente (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)), die Beratungs- und Dokumentati-
onspflichten nach §§ 61 und 62 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG) für den Versicherungsbe-
reich, für den Kreditbereich die sog. Verbraucherkreditrichtlinie bzw. das Gesetz zur Umsetzung
der Verbraucherkreditrichtlinie, des zivilrechtlichen Teils der Zahlungsdiensterichtlinie sowie
zur Neuordnung der Vorschriften über das Widerrufs- und Rückgaberecht sowie für den grauen
Kapitalmarkt das Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz genannt. Vgl. hierzu auch die ausführlichen Be-
schreibungen in Kapitel 2.1.2.
43 Vgl. die Ergebnisse einer bevölkerungsrepräsentativen Umfrage der Unternehmensberatung Co-
finpro aus dem Jahr 2013, Cofinpro, (2013a).
44 Vgl. exemplarisch Ankert, (2012), und Cofinpro, (2013a).
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That is, as I say, the most characteristic and the most significant
episode, as it is the most amazing, of the defence. Paris was not to
fall, was not even to be attacked. Attila was surfeited with destruction
and loot, he was forced now to concentrate his attention upon the
attack on the Visigoths of the south lest Rome and Aetius should
stand in his way and imperil his whole campaign. His plan must be to
defeat the Visigoths before he was forced to face Aetius coming up
out of Italy, and with this on his mind he set out from Metz with his
main army, passed through Toul and Rheims, which were gutted,
through Troyes and Sens, which he was in too great haste to
destroy, and over the Sologne, held then by his ally the King of the
Alans, Sangibanus, and marched directly upon Orleans. That march
represented the work of a whole month. He left Metz in the early
days of April, he arrived before Orleans in the early days of May.
Orleans stands upon the most northern point of the Loire, the
great river which divides Gaul east and west into a northern and a
southern country. It has been the point around which the destinies of
the Gauls have so often been decided—one has only to recall the
most famous instance of all, the deliverance under Joan of Arc—that
it is without surprise we see it fulfilling its rôle in the time of Attila
also. From time immemorial, before the beginning of history, it had
been an important commercial city, for it stood not only on one of the
greatest and most fruitful rivers of western Europe, but, as I have
said, upon the marches of the north and south, whose gate it was.
No one could pass without its leave, at least in safety. Anciently it
was known as Genabum and there had been planned and conceived
the great revolt which so nearly engulfed Julius Cæsar, who burnt it
to the ground. It stood then, as later when it rose again, upon the
northern bank of the river and was joined with the south by a great
bridge. The resurrection after that burning was not long delayed, but
it seems to have been less magnificent than might have been
expected and it certainly suffered much from war, so that in 272, in
the time of Aurelian, it was rebuilt with a wall about it, and for this
cause took the name of the Emperor. Times, however, were sadly
changed with the great city when Attila came into Gaul. Much
certainly was in ruin, the municipal government in full decadence or
transition and it was therefore with a dreadful fear in her heart that
Orleans watched the oncoming of the Huns. Nevertheless the city
put herself into a state of defence. The first direct assault upon her
was made by that Sangibanus, King of the Alans, and Attila’s ally,
who requested to be allowed to garrison it. Orleans refused and
closed her gates. At the same time she sent forth her bishop (and
this is as significant of the true state of affairs of government in Gaul
as the facts about Tongres, Rheims and Paris) into the south, still
Roman, to Arles to learn when Aetius might be expected in relief and
how far the Visigoths would move, not for their own defence only, but
against the common enemy.
Anianus, for such was the bishop’s name, thus appears as the
representative, the ambassador and the governor of the city. In
Arles, to his delight, he found not only a secure and even splendid
Roman government, but the great general himself, Aetius, who
received him with impress. Anianus urged the necessity of an
immediate assistance. He reckoned that it would be possible to hold
out till the middle of June, but no longer. Aetius heard him patiently
and promised that by then he would relieve the city. Anianus was not
too soon, he had scarce returned to Orleans when Attila began the
siege.
It will be asked, and with reason, why it was that Rome had waited
so long before interfering to defend her great western province
against this “wild beast”? Why had Aetius not marched out of Italy at
the head of his armies months before? why had he waited till all the
North was a ruin before he carried the eagles over the Alps and
confronted this savage and his hordes with the ordered ranks of the
army of civilisation? The answer may be found in the war we are
fighting to-day against a similar foe. The French failed to defend the
North against the modern Attila because they were too long
uncertain which way he would come and where he would strike
hardest. They could not be sure which was the decisive point of the
German attack. This it was that kept so great a proportion of their
armies in Alsace and upon that frontier. They credited the German
with more subtlety than he possessed. They failed to grasp the
gigantic simplicity of the Barbarian plan; the mighty hammer-stroke
that shattered Belgium and plunged in to destroy all the North of
France. They looked for something less blindly brutal and more wise.
They could not believe that the German would destroy his whole
case and outrage the moral consciousness of the world by violating
the neutrality of Belgium. They failed to comprehend the essential
stupidity of the Barbarian. They were wrong.
Aetius was wrong also, but with perhaps more excuse. He could
not make up his mind where the real attack of Attila upon the Empire
was to be delivered. What if the descent upon Gaul were but a feint
and Italy were the real objective, Lombardy the true battlefield?
There was this also; in Africa, Genseric, Attila’s ally, waited and
threatened to descend upon the coast. Aetius overrated the
intelligence of his enemy as much as did Joffre. Neither understood
the force which opposed him, which it was to be their business and
their glory to meet and to break.
Like Joffre, too, when Aetius at last found himself face to face with
the reality of the situation he must have dared only not to despair.
The successes of the Huns had decided the Visigoths to remain on
the defence within their own confines; they refused to attack.
Everywhere the Roman delay had discovered treason among the
tribes who should have been their allies against a common foe.
Aetius could only not despair. He addressed the Visigoths, though
perhaps with more right, much as we might address to-day the
Americans. “If we are beaten you will be the next to be destroyed;
while if you help us to win yours will be the glory.” The Visigoths
replied as America is doing to-day: “It is not our business; see you to
it.”
They were wrong, the victory of Rome was as necessary for the
future as our victory is to-day.
Much indeed was already achieved to that end by the mere
presence of Aetius in Gaul. Suddenly the whole country was
changed, everywhere the peoples sprang to arms, the noble and the
peasant, the bourgeois of the cities, the bond and the free. From
Armorica came an heroic company, the Ripuarian Franks and the
Salian Franks having seen the ruin of the Roman cities of the
country they had been permitted to occupy, the Burgundians also
returned to, if they had indeed ever left, their old allegiance. So
successful at last was the diplomacy of Rome that when even
Sangibanus appeared Aetius feigned to be ignorant of his treason.
The great general prepared with a good heart for the attack, but was
determined to do everything possible to mobilise the Visigoths with
his other forces. It was with this object that at last he sought the aid
of Avitus, the senator, a very great Gaulish nobleman who lived in
the city of Clermont, the chief town of the Auvergne.
In Avitus we have a figure which at once arrests our attention amid
all the welter of Barbarians of which even Gaul was full. In him we
see, and are assured, that the civilisation of Rome was still a living
thing in the West, that it had not been overwhelmed by savages or
lost in a mist of superstition. Avitus indeed seems to have stepped
suddenly out of the great Roman time, he reminds us of what we
have learned to expect a Roman noble of the time of Marcus
Aurelius, or for that matter of St. Ambrose, to be. In him we see one
we can greet as a brother; we should have been able to discuss with
him the decline of the Empire. A rich man, coming of a noble family
which for long had enjoyed the highest honour and the heaviest
official responsibility, a scholar, a connoisseur, above all a somewhat
bored patriot, he was also a soldier distinguished for his personal
courage. He had already in 439 been successful in arranging a
treaty for Rome with the Visigoths, and it was to him in this hour of
enormous peril that Aetius turned again. He found him in his
beautiful, peaceful and luxurious villa of Avitacum amid the foothills
of the mountains of Auvergne, living as so many of our great nobles
of the eighteenth century lived, half a farmer, half a scholar, wholly
epicurean and full of the most noble self-indulgence, surrounded by
his family, his son and daughter, and his friends, poets and scholars
and delightful women. His son Ecdicius was the heir both of his
wealth and his responsibilities, his daughter Papianella had married
Sidonius Apollinaris of Lyons, a man already famous as a poet and
coming of a distinguished Gallo-Roman family. It was this man who
in the moment of crisis appeared on behalf of civilisation at the
Visigoths’ Court—we could not have had a more noble
representative.
His mission was wholly successful; but the time spent in showing
the Visigoths where their interests lay was to cost Orleans dear. The
devoted city wholly surrounded and every day submitted to the
assaults and the clouds of arrows of the Huns, hearing no news of
any relief, was in despair. In vain the Bishop Anianus went in
procession through the streets, and even among the troops on the
ramparts, bearing the relics of his church; they called him traitor. Still
firm in his faith in God and in the promise of Aetius, daily he made
men climb the last high tower in expectation of deliverance. None
came, no sign of the armies of Aetius could be discerned. Day after
day the mighty roads southward lay in the sun white and empty of all
life. At last he sent by stealth a messenger to Aetius with this
message: “My son, if you come not to-day it will be too late.” That
messenger never returned. Anianus himself began to doubt and at
last heard counsels of surrender almost without a protest; indeed
consented himself to treat with the Huns. But Attila was beside
himself at the length of the resistance, he would grant no terms.
Nothing remained but death or worse than death.
Upon the following morning, the week having been full of thunder,
the first rude cavalry of the Huns began to enter the city through the
broken gates. The pillage and massacre and rape began, and, as to-
day in Belgium, we read with a certain order and system. Nothing
was spared, neither the houses of the citizens, nor their holy places,
neither age nor sex. It seemed as though all would perish in a vast
and systematic vandalism and murder.
Suddenly a cry rose over the noise of the butchery and
destruction. The Eagles! The Eagles! And over the mighty bridge
that spans the Loire thundered the cavalry of Rome, and the
tumultuous standards of the Goths. They came on; nothing might
stop them. Step by step they won the bridge head, they fought upon
the shore, in the water, through the gates. Street by street, fighting
every yard, the Imperial troops pushed on, the glistening eagles high
overhead. House by house, alley by alleyway was won and filled with
the dead; the Huns broke and fled, the horses stamped out their
faces in the byways, in the thoroughfares there was no going, the
Barbarian carrion was piled so high; Attila himself was afraid. He
sounded the retreat.
That famous and everlasting day was the 14th of June, for Aetius
had kept his word. Orleans had begun the deliverance of Gaul and of
the West.
VII
THE RETREAT OF ATTILA AND THE BATTLE OF
THE CATALAUNIAN PLAINS
The retreat of Attila from Orleans would seem to have been one of
the most terrible of which we have any record. The Gothic chronicler
Jornandes, writing a hundred years after the events he describes,
wholly or almost wholly at the mercy of a Gothic and so a Barbarian
legend, would seem, though poorly informed as to facts and details,
to be fully justified in the general impression he gives of the horror
and disaster which befell the Hunnish host. It is certain that Attila’s
withdrawal of his army must have been not only difficult but
impossible without disaster: too many and too brutal crimes had
been committed for the ruined population of northern Gaul to permit
it an easy passage in retreat. The devastated country could no
longer supply its needs, everywhere ruined men awaited revenge: it
can have been little less than a confused flight that Attila made with
his thousands towards the Rhine, with Aetius and Theodoric ever
upon his flanks.
Nor was he to escape without battle. The Imperial armies pressing
on behind him gained upon him daily, a sufficient comment upon his
state, and it was really in despair that he reached at last the city of
Troyes, more than a hundred miles from Orleans, an open city which
there might, he hoped, be time to loot, and so to restore to some
extent the confidence and the condition of his people. That he was
not able to loot Troyes is the best evidence we could have of the
energy of the Imperial pursuit; but here again we meet with one of
those almost incredible interpositions of the spiritual power that we
have already seen at Tongres, at Rheims, at Paris, and not least at
Orleans. It must have meant almost everything to Attila on his
hurried and harassed road north-east out of Gaul to be able to feed
and to rest his army at Troyes, where the great road by which he had
come crossed the Seine. That he was not able to do this was
doubtless due fundamentally to the pressure of Aetius upon his
flanks, but there was something more, we are told. Just as Anianus
of Orleans had by his prayers saved his city, so Lupus of Troyes
defended his town in the same way. He, the Bishop, and now
perhaps the governor, of Troyes went forth to Attila, faced and
outfaced him, and indeed so impressed and even terrified the
superstitious Barbarian that he left Troyes alone and passed on,
taking only the Bishop himself with him a prisoner in his train. “For,”
said he, mocking him even in his fear, “if I take a man so holy as you
with me I cannot fail of good luck even to the Rhine.”
Attila passed on; he had crossed the Seine; before him lay the
passage of the Aube, and it was here that the advance guard of the
Imperial armies first got into touch with their quarry. It was night.
Attila had left the Gepidae to hold the crossing, and it was they who
felt the first blows of Aetius whose advance guard was composed of
Franks; the fight endured all night and at dawn the passage was won
and some 15,000[12] dead and wounded lay upon the field. Attila had
crossed into Champagne, but the Imperial army was already at his
heels; he would have to fight. The battle which followed, one of the
most famous as it is one of the most important in the history of
Europe, whose future was there saved and decided, would seem to
have been fought all over that wide and bare country of Champagne
between the Aube and the Marne, and to have been finally focussed
about the great earthwork still called the Camp of Attila by Châlons;
it is known to history as the battle of the Catalaunian plains.
It may well be that the fight at the passage of the Aube had given
Attila time to reach that great earthwork, one of the most gigantic
and impressive things in Europe, which rises out of that lost and
barren country of Champagne like something not wholly the work of
man. There he halted; convinced at last that he could not escape
without battle, he encamped his army and made ready for the
conflict.
In this terrible and tragic place he held council, and superstitious
as ever in the supreme moment of his career, began to consult an
endless procession of soothsayers, augurs and prophets upon the
coming battle. From the entrails of birds, or the veins upon the bones
of sheep, or the dying gestures of some animal, his sorcerers at last
dared to proclaim to him his coming defeat, but to save their heads,
perhaps, they added that the general of his enemies would perish in
the conflict. It is sufficient witness to the genius of Aetius, to the fear
he inspired in the Hun, and should be a complete answer to his
enemies and traducers, that Attila, when he heard this, from despair
passed immediately to complete joy and contentment. If after all
Aetius defeated him at the price of his life, what might he not recover
when his great adversary was no more! He therefore made ready
with a cheerful heart for the conflict. Jornandes, whom we are bound
to follow, for he is our chief, if not quite our only authority for all this
vast onslaught of the Hun upon the Gaul, describes for us, though
far from clearly, the configuration and the development of the battle.
In following this writer, however, it is necessary to remember that he
was a Goth, and relied for the most part upon Gothic traditions; also,
above all, it is necessary not to abandon our common sense, protest
he never so insistently.
Jornandes tells us that Attila put off the fight as long as possible
and at last attacked, or so I read him, not without fear and
trepidation, about three o’clock in the afternoon, so that if fortune
went against him the oncoming of night might assist him to escape.
He then sketches the field. Between the two armies, if I read him
aright, was a rising ground which offered so much advantage to him
who should occupy it that both advanced towards it, the Huns
occupying it with their right and the Imperialists with their right,
composed of auxiliaries.
On the right wing of the Romans Theodoric and his Visigoths held
the field, on the left wing Aetius and the Romans; between them
holding the centre and himself held by Aetius and Theodoric was the
uncertain Alan Sangiban.
The Huns were differently arranged. In the midst, surrounded by
his hardest and best warriors, stood Attila considering as ever his
personal safety. His wings were wholly composed of auxiliaries,
among them being the Ostrogoths with their chiefs; the Gepidae with
their King; and Walamir the Ostrogoth; and Ardaric, King of the
Gepidae, whom Attila trusted and loved more than all others. The
rest, a crowd of kings and leaders of countless races, waited the
word of Attila. For Attila, king of all kings, was alone in command and
on him alone depended the battle.
The fight began, as Jornandes insists, with a struggle for the rising
ground between the two armies. The advantage in which seems to
have rested with the Visigoths, under Thorismund, who thrust back
the Huns in confusion. Upon this Attila drew off, and seeing his men
discouraged, seized this moment to harangue them, according to
Jornandes, somewhat as follows:
“After such victories over so many nations, after the whole world
has been almost conquered, I should think it ridiculous to rouse you
with words as though you did not know how to fight. I leave such
means to a new general, or to one dealing with raw soldiers. They
are not worthy of us. For what are you if not soldiers, and what are
you accustomed to if not to fight; and what then can be sweeter to
you than vengeance and that won by your own hand? Let us then go
forward joyfully to attack the enemy, since it is always the bravest
who attack. Break in sunder this alliance of nations which have
nothing in common but fear of us. Even before they have met you
fear has taught them to seek the higher ground and they are eager
for ramparts on these wide plains.
“We all know how feebly the Romans bear their weight of arms; it
is not at the first wound, but at the first dust of battle they lose heart.
While they are forming, before they have locked their shields into the
testudo, charge and strike, advance upon the Alans and press back
the Visigoths. Here it is we should look for speedy victory. If the
nerves are cut the members fail and a body cannot support itself
upright when the bones are dragged out of it. Lift up your hearts and
show your wonted courage, quit you like Huns and prove the valour
of your arms, let the wounded not rest till he has killed his enemy, let
him who remains untouched steep himself in slaughter. It is certain
that nothing can touch him who is fated to live, while he will die even
without war who will surely die. And wherefore should fortune have
made the Huns the vanquishers of so many nations if it were not to
prepare them for this supreme battle? Why should she have opened
to our ancestors a way through the marshes of Azov unknown till
then if it were not to bring us even to this field? The event does not
deceive me; here is the field to which so much good fortune has led
us, and this multitude brought together by chance will not look into
the eyes of the Huns. I myself will be the first to hurl my spear
against the enemy, and if any remain slothful when Attila fights, he is
but dead and should be buried.”
These words, says Jornandes, warmed the hearts of the Huns so
that they all rushed headlong into battle.
We know really nothing of the tremendous encounter which
followed, the result of which saved the Western world. It is true that
Jornandes gives us a long account of it, but we are ignorant how far
it is likely to be true, whence he got it, and how much was his own
invention. That the battle was immense, we know; Jornandes asserts
that it had no parallel and that it was such that, if unseen, no other
marvel in the world could make up for such a loss. He tells us that
there was a tradition that a stream that passed over the plain was
swollen with blood into a torrent: “they who drank of it in their thirst
drank murder.” It was by this stream, according to Jornandes, that
Theodoric, King of the Visigoths, was thrown from his horse and
trampled under foot and slain, and so fulfilled the prophecy which
Attila’s sorcerers had declared to him. The fall of the King appears
so to have enraged the Visigoths—and here we must go warily with
Jornandes—that they engaged the enemy more closely and almost
slew Attila himself in their fury. Indeed, it was their great charge
which flung him and his guard, the Hunnish centre, back into the
mighty earthwork which before them seemed but a frail barrier so
enormous was their rage. Night fell upon the foe beleaguered and
blockaded within that mighty defence.
In that night Thorismund, the son of Theodoric, was lost and found
again. Aetius, too, separated in the confusion of the night from his
armies, found himself, as Thorismund had done, among the
waggons of the enemy, but like Thorismund again found his way
back at last and spent the rest of the night among the Goths.
When day dawned, what a sight met the eyes of the allies. The
vast plains were strewn with the dying and the dead, 160,000 men
had fallen in that encounter, and within that terrible earthwork lay
what was left of the Huns, wounded and furious, trapped as Alfred
trapped Guthrum later upon the Wiltshire downs.
The battle had cost the Imperialists dear enough. Nor was their
loss all. The death of Theodoric brought with it a greater anxiety and
eventually cost Aetius his Gothic allies. A council of war was called.
It was determined there to hold Attila and starve him within his
earthwork. In the meantime search was made for the body of
Theodoric. After a long time this was found, “where the dead lay
thickest,” and was borne out of the sight of the enemy, the Goths
“lifting their harsh voices in a wild lament.” It is to be supposed that
there Theodoric was buried. And it is probable that the bones and
swords and golden ornaments and jewels which were found near the
village of Pouan by the Aube in 1842 may well have been the
remains of Theodoric and his funeral, for the fight doubtless raged
over a great territory, and it is certain that the king would be buried
out of sight of the foe. On the other hand, these bones may have
belonged to a Frankish chief who had fallen in the fight for the
passage of the Aube.
But it is in his account of the events that followed the burial of
Theodoric that we most doubt our guide Jornandes. He declares that
Thorismund, Theodoric’s son and successor, wished to attack the
Hun and avenge his father’s death; but that he consulted Aetius as
the chief commander, who “fearing if the Huns were destroyed, the
Goths might still more hardly oppress the Empire, advised him to
return to Toulouse and make sure of his kingdom lest his brothers
should seize it. This advice Thorismund followed without seeing the
duplicity of Aetius.” Such an explanation of the treason of the Goths
was doubtless accepted by the Gothic traditions and especially
comfortable to Jornandes. It is incredible, because any observer
could see that Attila was not so badly beaten that he was not a far
greater danger to the Empire than ever the Visigoths could be. To let
him escape, and that is what the departure of Thorismund meant,
was treason, not to the Goths, but to the Empire. It served the cause
not of Aetius but of Thorismund, not of Rome but of the Goths,
whose loyalty was never above suspicion and whose slow adhesion
to the Imperial cause had been the talk of Gaul and the scandal of
every chancellery.
But Aetius could not have been much astonished by the desertion,
and it was no less, of Thorismund. Rome was used to the instability
of her Barbarian allies who if they really could have been depended
upon, if they had really possessed the quality of decision, and known
their own minds would no longer have been Barbarians. It was Attila
who was amazed. He had given himself up for lost when looking out
from that dark earthwork at dawn he saw the Visigothic camp empty
and deserted, and at the sight “his soul returned into his body.”
Without a moment’s hesitation, broken as he was, he began a retreat
that Aetius was not able to prevent or to turn into a rout, which he
could only ensure and emphasise. Upon that long march to the
Rhine all the roads were strewn with the Hunnish sick and wounded
and dead, but the main army, what was left of the half-million that
had made the invasion, escaped back into the forests of Germany.
Gaul was saved, and with Gaul the future of the West and of
civilisation. But Attila was not destroyed.
FOOTNOTES:
[12] Jornandes, R. Get., 41. According to the Abbe Dubos the
“XC millibus” which appears in the text of Jornandes is the
mistake of a copyist for “XV millibus.”
VIII
ATTILA’S ATTACK UPON AND RETREAT FROM
ITALY