Munir Ahmad Khan

Munir Ahmad Khan
Born	(1926-05-20)20 May 1926 Kasur, Punjab, British India (Present day in Punjab in Pakistan)
Died	22 April 1999(1999-04-22) (aged 72) Vienna, Austria
Citizenship	Pakistan
Alma mater	Government College University University of Punjab North Carolina State University
Known for	Pakistan's nuclear deterrent program and nuclear fuel cycle
Awards	Hilal-e-Imtiaz (1989) Nishan-e-Imtiaz (2012)
Scientific career
Fields	Nuclear reactor physics
Institutions	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission International Atomic Energy Agency Institute of Applied Sciences University of Engineering and Technology International Center for Theoretical Physics
Thesis	Investigations on Model Surge Generator (1953)
Academic advisors	Walter Zinn

Munir Ahmad Khan (Urdu: منير احمد خان; b. 20 May 1926 – 22 April 1999), NI, HI, was a Pakistani nuclear reactor physicist who is credited, among others, with being the "father of the atomic bomb program" of Pakistan for their leading role in developing their nation's nuclear weapons during the successive years after the war with India in 1971.

From 1972 to 1991, Khan served as the chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) who directed and oversaw the completion of the clandestine bomb program from its earliest efforts to develop the atomic weapons to their ultimate nuclear testings in May 1998. His early career was mostly spent in the International Atomic Energy Agency and he used his position to help establish the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Italy and an annual conference on physics in Pakistan. As chair of PAEC, Khan was a proponent of the nuclear arms race with India whose efforts were directed towards concentrated production of reactor-grade to weapon-grade plutonium while remained associated with nation's key national security programs.

After retiring from the Atomic Energy Commission in 1991, Khan provided the public advocacy for nuclear power generation as a substitute for hydroelectricity consumption in Pakistan and briefly tenured as the visiting professor of physics at the Institute of Applied Sciences in Islamabad. Throughout his life, Khan was subjected to political ostracization due to his advocacy for averting nuclear proliferation and was rehabilitated when he was honored with the Nishan-i-Imtiaz (Order of Excellence) by the President of Pakistan in 2012— thirteen years after his death in 1999.

Youth and early life

Munir Ahmad Khan was born in Kasur, Punjab in the British Indian Empire on 20 May 1926 into a Kakazai family that had long been settled in Punjab. After completing his matriculation in 1942 in Kasur, Khan enrolled at the Government College University in Lahore and was a contemporary of Abdus Salam, the 1978 Nobel Laureate in Physics. In 1946, Khan graduated with a Bachelor of Arts (BA) in mathematics and enrolled at the Punjab University to study engineering in 1949.

In 1951, Khan graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Engineering (BSE) in electrical engineering and was noted for his academic standing when he was named to the Roll of Honor for his class of 1951. After graduation, Khan served on an engineering faculty of the University of Engineering and Technology (UET) in Lahore, and earned a Fulbright Scholarship to study engineering in the United States.

Under the Fulbright Scholarship program, Khan attended North Carolina State University to resume his graduate studies in electrical engineering and graduated with a Master of Science (MS) in electrical engineering in 1953. His master's thesis, titled: "Investigation on Model Surge Generator" contained fundamental work on applications of the impulse generator.

In the United States, Khan gradually lost interest in electrical engineering and took an interest in physics when he started taking graduate courses on topics involving the thermodynamics and kinetic theory of gases at the Illinois Institute of Technology. In 1953, Khan left his graduate studies in physics at the Illinois Institute of Technology when he accepted to be a participant in the Atoms for Peace policy of the United States and started his training program in nuclear engineering offered by the North Carolina State University in cooperation with the Argonne National Laboratory in Illinois in 1953.

In 1957, Khan completed his training at the Argonne National Laboratory, and college classes in nuclear engineering, that allowed him to graduate with an MS degree in nuclear engineering, with strong emphasis on nuclear reactor physics, from North Carolina State University.

Early professional work

$k=\eta fp\varepsilon P_{FNL}P_{TNL}$
The six-factor equations for determining the multiplication of a nuclear chain reaction in a non-infinite medium.

After graduating from North Carolina State University (NCSU) in 1953, Khan found employment with Allis-Chalmers in Wisconsin before joining the Commonwealth Edison company in Illinois. At both engineering firms, Khan worked on power generation equipment such as generators and mechanical pumps and participated in a federal contract awarded to Commonwealth Edison to design and construct the Experimental Breeder Reactor I (EBR-I) which built up his interests in practical applications of physics that led him to attend the Illinois Institute of Technology, and to attend the training program in nuclear engineering offered by NCSU.

In 1957, Khan served as a Resident Research Associate in the Nuclear Engineering Division at the Argonne National Laboratory where he was trained as a nuclear reactor physicist and worked on design modifications of the Chicago Pile-5 (CP-5) reactor before working for a brief time at American Machine and Foundry as a consultant until 1958.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

In 1958, Khan left the United States after accepting employment with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Austria, joining the nuclear power division at a senior technical position, and was noted as the first Asian person from any developing country to be appointed to a senior position there. During this time, Khan was taken as an advisor on energy issues by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and represented his country at various energy-based conferences and seminars for nuclear power generation. At IAEA, Khan's work was mostly based on reactor technology and he worked on the application of nuclear reactor physics to the utilization factor of nuclear reactors, overseeing technical aspects of the nuclear reactors as well as conducting a geological survey for the construction of commercial nuclear power plants.

His work on nuclear reactor physics, specifically determining neutron transport and the interaction of neutrons within the reactor, was widely recognized and he was often known as "Reactor Khan" among his peers at the nuclear power division of the IAEA. Khan was also known to have gained expertise in producing isotopic reactor-grade plutonium, deriving it from neutron capture, that is frequently found alongside with the uranium-235 (U²³⁵) civilian reactors, in the form of low enriched uranium.

At IAEA, Khan organized more than 20 international technical and scientific conferences and seminars on the topics of constructing deuterium-based (heavy water) reactors, gas-cooled reactor systems, efficiency and performance of nuclear power plants, the fuel extraction of uranium, and production of plutonium. In 1961, he prepared a technical feasibility report on behalf of the IAEA on small nuclear power reactor projects of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

In 1964 and 1971, Khan served as scientific secretary to the third and fourth United Nations International Geneva Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Between 1986–87, Khan also served as Chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors and headed Pakistan's delegations to IAEA General Conferences from 1972–90. He served as a Member of the IAEA Board of Governors for 12 years.

International Centre for Theoretical Physics

Main articles: International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Abdus Salam, Theoretical physics, and Education in Pakistan

The ICTP building in Italy that was established from the lobbying of Khan on behalf of Salam at IAEA in 1964.

While studying at the Government College University in Lahore in 1940s, Khan had acquainted with Abdus Salam and was supportive of Salam's efforts for his vision to put his country engaged towards scientific education and literacy as an adviser in the Ayub administration in 1960s. While working at IAEA, Khan recognized the importance of Theoretical physics but was more interested in studying its "real world" applications that related to the field of physics of nuclear reaction in a confined nuclear reactor.

In September 1960, Salam confided Khan about establishing a research institute dedicated towards advancement of mathematical sciences under IAEA which Khan immediately supported the idea by lobbying at IAEA for financial funding and sponsorship– thus founding of the International Center for Theoretical Physics (ICTP). The idea mostly met with favorable views from the member countries of the United Nations's scientific committee though one of its influential member— Isidor Rabi from the United States— opposed the idea of establishment of ICTP. It was Khan who convinced Sigvard Eklund, Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to intervene in this matter that ultimately led to the establishment of the International Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste in Italy. The IAEA eventually entrusted Khan to oversee the construction of the ICTP in 1967, and played an instrumental role in establishing the annual summer conference on science in 1976 on Salam's advice.

Even after his retirement from the PAEC, Khan remained concern with the physics education in his country, joining the faculty of the Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences to instruct courses on physics in 1997— the university that he oversaw its academic programs in 1976 as Center for Nuclear Studies. In 1999, Khan was invited as a guest speaker at the opening ceremony of the National Center for Physics— the national laboratory site— that works in close proximity with the ICTP in Italy. In 1967, Khan and Salam had prepared a proposal for setting up a fuel cycle facility and plutonium reprocessing plant to address the energy consumption demand— the proposal was deferred by Ayub administration on economic grounds.

Zulifikar Ali Bhutto's trusted aide

Main article: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto § Nuclear weapons program

After his visit to the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Trombay as part of the IAEA inspection in 1964 and the second war with India in 1965, Khan became increasingly concerned about politics and international affairs. Eventually, Khan voiced his concerns to the Government of Pakistan when he met with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Foreign Minister in Ayub administration at that time) in Vienna about the possible acquisition of nuclear deterrent to address the nuclear threat from India.

On 11 December 1965, Bhutto arranged a meeting between Khan and President Ayub Khan at the Dorchester Hotel in London where Khan made unsuccessful attempt in try convincing the President to pursue nuclear deterrent despite pointing out cheap cost estimates for the acquiring the nuclear capability. At the meeting, President Ayub Khan downplayed the warnings and swiftly dismissed the offer while believing that Pakistan "was too poor to spend" so much money and ended the meeting saying that, if needed, Pakistan would "somehow buy it off the shelf". After the meeting, Khan met with Bhutto and informed him about meeting with Bhutto later quoting: "Don't worry. Our turn will come".

Throughout the 1970s and onwards, Khan was very sympathetic to Pakistan Peoples Party's political cause and President Bhutto had spoke highly of his services while promising to ensure federal funding of the national programs of nuclear weapons at the inauguration ceremony of Karachi Nuclear Power Plant– the first milestone towards the goal of making Pakistan a nuclear power on 28 November 1972. His left-wing association with the Peoples Party continue even after turnover of federal government by the Pakistani military in 1977 as Khan visited Bhutto various times in Adiala State Prison to inform him about the status of the program.

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)

Main articles: Nuclear power in Pakistan and List of cancer hospitals in Pakistan

In 1972, Khan officially resigned from his directorship of the IAEA's reactor division when he was appointed as chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, replacing I. H. Usmani who was appointed secretary at the Ministry of Science in the Bhutto administration. By March 1972, Khan submitted a detailed roadmap to the Ministry of Energy (MoE) that envisioned linking the country's entire energy infrastructure to nuclear power sources as a substitute for energy consumption dependent on hydroelectricity.

On 28 November 1972, Khan, together with Salam, accompanied President Bhutto to the inauguration ceremony for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP)–the first milestone towards the goal of making Pakistan a nuclear power. Khan played a crucial role in keeping grid operations running for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant after its chief scientist, Wazed Miah, had his security clearance revoked, and was forced to migrate to Bangladesh. Khan then established a training facility in cooperation with the Karachi University to fill the void created by Bengali engineers. When Canadian General Electric stopped the supply of uranium and machine components for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant in 1974, Khan worked on developing the nuclear fuel cycle without foreign assistance to make sure that the plant kept generating power for the nation's electricity grid by establishing the fuel cycle facility near the power plant in cooperation with the Karachi University.

In 1975–76, Khan entered into diplomacy with France's Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) for acquiring a reprocessing plant for production of reactor-grade plutonium, and a commercial nuclear power plant in Chashma, advising the federal government on key matters regarding the operations of these plants. Negotiations with France over the reprocessing plant was extremely controversial at home with the United States later intervening in the matter between Pakistan and France over fears of nuclear proliferation. Khan's relations with the Bhutto administration often soured because Khan wanted to engage the CEA long enough until PAEC was able to learn to design and construct the plants itself, while Bhutto administration officials wanted the plants based solely on imports from France. In 1973–77, Khan entered in negotiation with CEA for Chashma Nuclear Power Plant, having advised the MoE to sign the IAEA safeguard agreement with France to ensure the foreign funding of the plant, which the PAEC was designing but the CEA left the project with PAEC taking control of the entire project despite Khan's urging to French CEA to fulfill its contractual obligations. With France's offing, Khan eventually negotiated with China over this project's foreign funding in 1985–86.

In 1977, Khan fiercely opposed the French CEA's proposal to alter the design of the reprocessing plant so that it would produce a mixed reactor-grade plutonium with natural uranium, which would stop the production of military-grade plutonium. Khan advised the federal government to refuse the modification plan as the PAEC had already build the plant itself and manufactured components from local industry— this plant was built by PAEC and is now known as Khushab Nuclear Complex.

In 1982, Khan expanded the scope of nuclear technology for harnessing the agriculture and food irradiation process by establishing the Nuclear Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIAB) in Peshawar while moving the PAEC's scope towards the medical physics research by securing federal fundings for various cancer research hospitals in Pakistan in 1983–91.

1971 war and atomic bomb project

See also: Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction

On 16 December 1971, Pakistan ultimately called for a unilateral ceasefire to end their third war with India when the Yahya Khan administration acceded to the unconditional surrender of the Pakistani military on the eastern front of the war, resulting in the secession of East Pakistan as the independent country Bangladesh from the Federation of Pakistan.

Upon learning the news, Khan returned to Pakistan from Austria, landing in Quetta to initially attend the winter session to meet with PAEC's scientists before being flown to Multan. This winter session, known as the 'Multan meeting', was arranged by Abdus Salam for scientists to meet with President Bhutto who, on 20 January 1972, authorized the crash program to develop an atomic bomb for the sake of "national survival". President Bhutto invited Khan to take over the weapons program work—a task that Khan threw himself into with full vigor. In spite of having been unknown to many senior scientists, Khan busied himself on development of the program, initially assisting in the complicated fast neutron calculations. Although Khan was not a doctorate holder, his extensive experience as a nuclear engineer at the reactor physics division at IAEA enabled him to direct senior scientists working under him on classified projects. In a short time, Khan impressed the conservatively-aligned Pakistani military with the breadth of his knowledge, and grasp of engineering, ordnance, metallurgy, chemistry, and interdisciplinary projects that would distinguish from field of physics.

"We were not just making the bomb, but building science and technology....

— Munir Khan describing the atomic bomb efforts,

In December 1972, Abdus Salam directed two theorists, Riazuddin and Masud Ahmad, at the International Center for Theoretical Physics to report to Khan on their return to Pakistan where they formed the "Theoretical Physics Group" (TPG) in PAEC— this division eventually went to commit itself to perform tedious mathematical calculations on fast neutron temperatures. Salam, who saw this program as an opportunity to ensure federal government's interest and funding to promote scientific activities in his country, took over the TPG's directorship with Khan assisting in the solutions for fast neutron calculations and binding energy measurements of the atomic bomb.

The research operational scope of the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, the national laboratory site, was well expanded from a school building to a several buildings, which were erected in great haste, in Nilore. At this laboratory site, Khan assembled a large group of the top physicists of the time at the Quaid-e-Azam University, where he invited them to conduct classified research with federal funding rather than teaching the fields of physics in the classrooms.

In 1972, the earlier efforts were directed to a plutonium boosted fission implosion-type device whose design was codenamed:Kirana-I. In March 1974, Khan, together with Salam, held a meeting at the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology with Hafeez Qureshi, a mechanical engineer with an expertise in radiation heat transfer, and Dr. Zaman Shaikh, a chemical engineer from the Defense Science and Technology Organization (DESTO). At that meeting, the word "bomb" was never used but it was understood the need for the development of explosive lenses, a sub-critical sphere of fissile material could be squeezed into a smaller and denser form, and the reflective tamper, the metal needed to scatter only very short distances, so the critical mass would be assembled in much less time. This project required manufacturing and machining of key parts that required another laboratory site, leading Khan, assisted with Salam, to meet with the Lieutenant-General Qamar Ali Mirza, Engineer-in-Chief of the Corps of Engineers to handle its part in the atomic bomb project, where he requesting the construction of the Metallurgical Laboratory near the Pakistan Ordnance Factories in Wah. Eventually, the project was relocated at the Metallurgical Laboratory with Qureshi and Zaman moving their staff and machine shops from the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology with the assistance from the military.

In 1974, Khan took over the work of TPG from Salam when latter left the country in protest over a constitutional amendment with Riazuddin leading the studies. During this time, Khan launched uranium enrichment program which had seen as a backup for fissile material production, delegating this project to Bashiruddin Mahmood who focused on gaseous diffusion and Shaukat Hameed Khan, who pioneered the laser isotope separation method. The uranium enrichment project reached to its acceleration when India announced a surprise nuclear test with Khan confirming the test as nuclear through data provided by I.H. Qureshi on 18 May 1974. Sensing the importance of this test, Khan called up a meeting between Hameed Khan and Mahmood who analyzed different methods but finally agreeing on gaseous diffusion over laser isotope separation method that continue at its own pace under Hameed Khan in October 1974. In 1975, Khalil Qureshi, a physical chemist, was asked to joined the uranium project under Mehmood who did most of the calculations on military-grade uranium. In 1976, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist, joined the program but ejected due to technical difficulties and peer problems that led to program being moved to Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta with Abdul Qadeer Khan being its chief scientist under the Corps of Engineers.

By 1976–77, the entire atomic bomb program was quickly transferred from the civilian Ministry of Science to the military control with Khan, as chief scientist, remaining the technical director of overall bomb program.

Plutonium test: Chagai-II

Main articles: Kirana-I and Chagai-II

In 1976, Khan had tasked Ishfaq Ahmad and Ahsan Mubarak, a seismologist, to scout for a suitable nuclear test site with help from the Corps of Engineers and the Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP). The team searched for a high scalar altitude graphite-mountain that would be suitable to take more than ~40 kilotons (kn) of blast yield, selecting the remote, isolated and unpopulated areas at Chagai Hills and Kharan in Balochistan by 1978–79. Meanwhile, the TPG concluded its research work on Fast neutron calculations, hydrodynamics, and the design of the fission weapons by 1978, and by 1982–83, work on the bomb was completed by PAEC.

The joint work of the various groups working at the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology led to the first cold-test of their atomic bomb design on 11 March 1983. A "cold test" is a nuclear weapon design test without the fissile material inserted to prevent any nuclear fission. on a site that Munir Khan codenamed Kirana-I. A test team headed by Ishfaq Ahmad, the test's preparation and calculations were overseen by Khan; other invitees to witness the test included senior statesman Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and senior military officers including General K. M. Arif.

One of Khan's achievements is his technical leadership of the atomic bomb project, modelled on the Manhattan Project that prevented the exploitation and politicisation of the project in the hands of politicians, lawmakers, and military officials. Khan focused on developing the atomic weapons and a diverse nuclear program, and regarded this clandestine atomic bomb project as building the science and technology for the country.

During a visit to PAEC's Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH), in November 1986, the President of Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq praised the work being carried out in PAEC. He wrote in the visitor's book:

It has been a matter of great pride and satisfaction to see what all is going on in (Pakistan) Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). It was heartening to see the progress that has taken place..... I congratulate Munir and his associates for all that they have done.... The People of Pakistan are proud of their achievements and pray for their success in the future.

Despite many difficulties, Khan and PAEC successfully developed and managed the plutonium infrastructure. Khan lobbied and enlightened the importance of plutonium-tritium device and countered the scientific opposition that was led by fellow scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who opposed the plutonium route and favored the uranium atomic bomb. Khan concentrated the development efforts on plutonium implosion-type fission device, in a single group of TPG, which became to known as Chagai-II. Khan countered and later abandoned the developmental efforts on a uranium gun-type fission weapon, when on developing theoretical design, a problem was discovered by TPG who worked with Qadeer Khan on the gun-type in 1976.

The gun-type fission weapon is a simpler design that only had to work with uranium-235, but the possibility of a weapon's chain reaction to only reach the 'fizzle' level was identified; therefore, they abandoned the gun design in favor of an implosion-type weapon. In May 1998, the success of plutonium bomb was proved when it was reported that PAEC conducted a test of a powerful plutonium device, Chagai-II, to artificially produced the nuclear fission, and this plutonium device had the largest yield of all the uranium bombs.

In 1999, Khan described the scientific efforts and PAEC's contribution in heading up and building Pakistan's atomic bomb project, as he stated:

In 1979–80, the PAEC completed the iron-steel tunnels in Chagai region. On March 11, 1983, we successfully conducted [our] (cold) test of a working atomic bomb. That evening, I went to General Zia with the news that Pakistan was now ready to make an atomic bomb. We conducted this cold test long before the fissile material was available for actual test. We were ahead of others.....

— Munir Ahmad Khan, _{Statement giving to news media in 1999}, source.

Arms race and diplomacy with India

See also: Operation Opera and Operation Brasstacks

By 1979, Pakistans atomic bomb program was no longer a secret to the world, especially to India who were alarmed by the success of the program. Aggressive measures were taken towards modernizing the Indian nuclear programme in parallel to advancing the Indian space programme. As a military policy maker, Khan initiated clandestine defence projects in the Pakistani military, including lobbying for missile program and other strategic projects.

Witnessing the successful launch of the Indian Space Research Organisation's (ISRO) Rohini satellite in 1980 through its own Satellite Launch Vehicle, Khan lobbied for elevation of the Space Research Commission, securing funds for space projects. Helping to appoint Salim Mehmud as chairman of Space Research Commission, Khan secured fundings for the development of country's first, the Moon-I, which was eventually launched in 1990. Development on unguided-gravity bombs, tactical weapons for Pakistan Air Force's (PAF) Air Force Strategic Command were watchfully completed under Khan's guidance. The air force engineers successfully installed the system in PAF's Mirage-5, A-5, and the F-16s as the F-16s successfully performed and mastered the low-level laydown aerial techniques, conventional free-fall drop—a method to drop gravitated nuclear bomb through fighter jets. At international conferences, Khan criticised India for its nuclear programme, and in 1999, Khan defended Pakistan's non-nuclear weapon policy as well as the nuclear tests when he summed up his thoughts:

In 1972, we (Pakistan) made a [nuclear policy] statement... that [Pakistan] wanted a nuclear-free zone in South Asia (so) that the resources in the sub-continent could be focused on solving problems of poverty and deprivation of [one] billion people in this region of the world. But India did not listen to (Pakistan).... Now that we have responded to India's nuclear aggression, (Pakistan) hope that they will listen to us...

— Munir Ahmad Khan, stating his views on Operation Shakti in 1999,

In 1981, Israel's Operation Opera attacked Iraq's Osirak Nuclear Reactor. Great panic was caused in Pakistan and hectic daily discussions began to take place between the ministries of Science, Foreign Affairs, and Defence over this issue. In 1983, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) gained advance knowledge of similar plans to attack Pakistan's facilities, namely the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) and Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH). Although the Pakistan Air Force was on high alert, the Pakistan government leaked information to Khan who was at the IAEA to mediate the tensions in the region. At that time, Khan was attending the IAEA's General Conference on nuclear safety issues and received a secret-coded message, via the Ambassador of Pakistan to Austria, Abdul Sattar, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Khan invited Dr. Raja Ramana of the Atomic Energy Commission of India to dinner at the Imperial Hotel in Vienna to confirm the veracity of the information. Reportedly, Khan told Ramana that "any attack on Pakistan's [nuclear] facilities would trigger a possible Pakistan retaliatory strike on Indian nuclear facilities at Trombay, which will result in the release of radioactivity causing a major disaster." Upon returning, Raja Ramana leaked information to the Indian government, and conveyed Khan's message to the Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi about Pakistan's retaliatory strikes. Plans were postponed and the matter subsequently shelved.

In 1988, the governments of India and Pakistan signed the Agreement Between India and Pakistan on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities concessions agreeing that both countries would not attack each other's nuclear facilities.

Government work and advocacy

Main article: Nuclear power in Pakistan

Since 1975, Khan had been lobbying for resolving energy crises by depending on nuclear power sources, and had been in direct negotiation with British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) and France's Commissariat à l'énergie atomique (CEA) for a nuclear reprocessing plant at Chashma. Despite each facility being put under IAEA inspections, none of the plans were feasible due to United States objections. By the time, the CEA cancelled the project, the PAEC had acquired 95% of the detailed reprocessing plant plans which resulted in local constructions of the New Labs. By the 1980s, Khan had been serving as the Science Advisor playing an integral role in implementing policies on science.

In 1985, Khan lobbied for another plutonium production plant at Khushab, the Khushab Nuclear Complex; and gained approval for Khushab I— a multipurpose heavy water plant, and a tritium production complex. In 1987, Khan had been lobbying for acquiring nuclear power plants from China, which resulted in the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant. Acting as Minister of State, he assisted Foreign Minister. Yaqub Khan in Beijing where he signed the agreement on behalf of Pakistan with Chinese Premier Li Peng.

This accord opened the way for Pakistan to receive Chinese assistance in setting up four 300 MWe commercial nuclear power plants under IAEA safeguards at Chashma. Therefore, PAEC reached an agreement with China in November 1989 to supply the 300 MWe CHASHNUPP-I commercial nuclear power plant. In February 1990, French President François Mitterrand visited Pakistan and announced that France had agreed to supply a 900 MWe commercial nuclear power reactor to Pakistan under IAEA safeguards. Shortly afterward, Khan stated that the signing of civil nuclear cooperation agreements with China and France had broken a fifteen-year virtual embargo by Western states on the supply of nuclear power plants to Pakistan. In 1990, Khan entered into negotiations with France but was unsuccessful in acquiring commercial nuclear plants from them when Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was dismissed from government.

Death

On 22 April 1999, Khan died following complications from heart surgery at the age of 72 in Vienna, Austria. He is survived by his wife, Thera, three children and four grandchildren.

Legacy

Main articles: Chagai-I and Chagai-II

When Abdus Salam was ejected from his position in 1974, Khan symbolised of many scientists thinking they could control how other peers would use their research. During the timeline of atomic bomb project, Khan was seen as a symbol of both moral responsibility of scientists, and to the contribution to the rise of Pakistan's science while preventing the politicisation of the project. Popular depiction of Khan's views on nuclear proliferation as a confrontation between right-wing militarists who viewed that security interests with Western world incompatible (symbolized by Abdul Qadeer Khan) and left-wing intellectuals who viewed maintaining alliances with Western world (symbolized by Munir Khan) over the moral question of weapons of mass destruction. Babar portrayed Khan as "tragic fate but consciously genius", and also dubbed him as "Nuclear Sage" of Pakistan. In 1999, Khan staunchly backed his country's nuclear technology project, as he puts it:

The genius of Pakistan (since its establishment in 1947) is her science and her scientists and engineers. Mixing science with politics is very, very dangerous. This will contaminate the politics which is never clean, with radioactivity, and it will destroy the science as we witnessed in [Nazi] Germany in 1940s when their atomic bomb project was politicised for [absolute] political gain. Without a comprehensive [nuclear and political] policy, things do not work, and no country can go developed its nuclear project without having some kind of framework in which to operate. We had to develop a political strategy to launch our project without arousing great deal of suspicion and opposition at the international level, because no body in the world wanted to see Pakistan to become nuclear power. But we had no choice [as mentioned by Bhutto in 1965]. I can tell you...... that it is not only the Western countries; we were wronged by some of the countries who we regard as our friends. It is not because the people in those countries oppose this project, but the governments felt, the rulers felt that Pakistan would become too strong.

— Munir Ahmad Khan, statement on May 1999, source

As a scientist, Khan is remembered by his peers as brilliant researcher and engaging teacher, the founder of nuclear engineering in Pakistan. In spite of his academic discipline, Khan had diverse interests in nuclear physics and theoretical physics where he researched and worked under his mentor Abdus Salam on many problems arising theoretical physics and the nuclear engineering. An award, Munir Ahmad Khan Gold Medal, is named after him at Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences. After years of urging of many of Khan's colleagues in PAEC and his powerful political friends who had ascended to power in the government, President Asif Ali Zardari bestowed and honored Khan with the prestigious and highest civilian state award, Nishan-e-Imtiaz in 2012 as a gesture of political rehabilitation.

As military and public policy maker, Khan was a technocrat leader in a shift between science and military, and the emergence of the concept of the big science in Pakistan. During the Cold war, scientists became involved in military research on unprecedented degree, because of the threat communism and Indian integration posed to Pakistan, scientists volunteered in great numbers both for technological and organizational assistance to Pakistan's efforts that resulted in powerful tools such as laser rangefinder, the proximity fuse and operations research. As a cultured, intellectual, nuclear engineer who became a disciplined military organiser, Khan represented the shift away from the idea that scientists had their "head in the clouds" and that knowledge on such previously esoteric subjects as the composition of the atomic nucleus had no "real-world" applications .

Quotes by Khan

• "We have to understand that nuclear weapons are not a play thing to be bandied publicly. They have to be treated with respect and responsibility. While they can destroy the enemy, they can also invite self destruction."
• "While we were building capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, we started in parallel the design of a nuclear device, with its trigger mechanism, physics calculations, production of metal, making precision mechanical components, high-speed electronics, diagnostics, and testing facilities. For each one of them, we established different laboratories".
• "Many sources were tapped after the decision to go nuclear. We were simultaneously working on 20 labs and projects under the administrative control of PAEC, every one the size of Khan Research Laboratories."
• "On 11 March 1983, we successfully conducted the first cold test of a working nuclear device. That evening, I went to General Zia with the news that Pakistan was now ready to make a nuclear device."

State Honors

• Nishan-e-Imtiaz (2012; Posthumous)
• Hilal-e-Imtiaz (1989)
• Gold medal, PAS (1992)
• Fulbright Award (1951)
• Roll of Honor, GCU (1946)

• Fellowship, PNS (1999)
• Fellowship, ANS (1999)
• Fellowship, Pakistan Institute of Electrical Engineers (1992)
• Fellowship, Sigma Xi Society (1953–1956)
• Rotary International Fellowship (1951)

References

Notes

Citations

Anecdotes

• Biographical sketch
• Scientist dr. Munir Ahmad
• Who's the father of the atomic bomb- IISS
• IN Memoriam: Munir Ahmad Khan, IAEA

• The Physics war of Munir Khan and A.Q. Khan
• The Nuclear Supremo Munir Khan
• Munir Ahmed Khan gold medal
• Mineral Research Laboratories

Bibliography

• Rahman, Shahid (1998). "§Munir Ahmad Khan: An interview with Author; §Theoretical Physics Group, a "Cue" from Manhattan Project"?; §Pakistan nuclear technology project: from Pakistan's Theoretical Physics to the making of the bomb; §Operation Sun Rise— Army and the militarized atomic science". In Rahman, Shahid (ed.). Long Road to Chagai. Islamabad, Pakistan: Printwise publication. pp. 27–157. ISBN 978-969-8500-00-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Malik, Hafeez (1998). "§Munir Ahmad Khan: Technical Director of Atomic Bomb Project". In Malik, Hafeez (ed.). Pakistan: founder's aspirations and today's realities. University of Michigan: Oxford University Press, 2001. pp. 149–209pp. ISBN 978-0-19-579333-8. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Sardar, Zia-uddin (12 February 1998). "§Munir Ahmad Khan: Pakistan's nuclear supremo". In Malik, Hafeez (ed.). New Scientist. London, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1981. pp. 402–406pp. ISSN 0262-4079. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Babar, Farhatullah (17 February 2000). "§Golden years of Pakistan: a journey from the 1960s Pakistan school of Theoretical physics to the 1998 year of testings". In Babar, Farhatulla (ed.). The Nuclear Sage. Karachi, Sindh Province: Pakistan Science Publishing co. Ltd. pp. 100–150. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Hassan, Mubashir (2000). "§Aspects of atom bomb projects: a political history of physics". In Hassan, Mubashir (ed.). The Mirage of Power. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 200–250. ISBN 978-0-19-579300-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Khan, Munir Ahmad (24 November 1996). "§Theoretical Physics in Pakistan: A strange love-bonding relationship between the Theoretical Physics and the atom bomb science". In Hassan, Mubashir (ed.). Salam Passes into Nuclear History. Islamabad: The News International. p. 2. ISSN 1563-9479. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Chaudhri, M.A. (May 2006). "§Nuclear technology project: The military and the bomb". Separating Myth from Reality. Karachi: Defence Journal. p. 2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Riazuddin (June 1999). "§A versatile phase shift from engineering to Theoretical physics". Physics in Pakistan. Karachi: Proceedings of Theoretical Physics. p. 6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Khan, Feroz Hassan (2012). "§The Secret Nuclear R&D Program; §Covert Arsenal and Delivery Means". Eating grass the making of the Pakistani bomb. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. pp. 95–286. ISBN 978-0804784801. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Ali, Tariq (2012). "§The Washington Quartet: The Soldier of Islam". The Duel: Pakistan on the flight path of American Power (google books). New York [u.s]: Scriber publications. p. 2000. ISBN 978-1471105883. Retrieved 21 January 2015. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)

External links

• PAEC official page