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People's Trilogy #3
The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962-1976
After the economic disaster of the Great Leap Forward that claimed tens of millions of lives from 1958–1962, an aging Mao Zedong launched an ambitious scheme to shore up his reputation and eliminate those he viewed as a threat to his legacy. The stated goal of the Cultural Revolution was to purge the country of bourgeois, capitalistic elements he claimed were threatening genuine communist ideology. Young students formed the Red Guards, vowing to defend the Chairman to the death, but soon rival factions started fighting each other in the streets with semiautomatic weapons in the name of revolutionary purity. As the country descended into chaos, the military intervened, turning China into a garrison state marked by bloody purges that crushed as many as one in fifty people.
The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962–1976 draws for the first time on hundreds of previously classified party documents, from secret police reports to unexpurgated versions of leadership speeches. Frank Dikötter uses this wealth of material to undermine the picture of complete conformity that is often supposed to have characterized the last years of the Mao era. After the army itself fell victim to the Cultural Revolution, ordinary people used the political chaos to resurrect the market and hollow out the party's ideology. In short, they buried Maoism. By showing how economic reform from below was an unintended consequence of a decade of violent purges and entrenched fear, The Cultural Revolution casts China's most tumultuous era in a wholly new light.
The Cultural Revolution: A People's History, 1962–1976 draws for the first time on hundreds of previously classified party documents, from secret police reports to unexpurgated versions of leadership speeches. Frank Dikötter uses this wealth of material to undermine the picture of complete conformity that is often supposed to have characterized the last years of the Mao era. After the army itself fell victim to the Cultural Revolution, ordinary people used the political chaos to resurrect the market and hollow out the party's ideology. In short, they buried Maoism. By showing how economic reform from below was an unintended consequence of a decade of violent purges and entrenched fear, The Cultural Revolution casts China's most tumultuous era in a wholly new light.
396 pages, Hardcover
First published June 7, 2016
About the author
Frank Dikötter
20 books452 followersFrank Dikötter (Chinese: 馮客; pinyin: Féng Kè) is the Chair Professor of Humanities at the University of Hong Kong and Professor of the Modern History of China on leave from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
Born in the Netherlands in 1961, he was educated in Switzerland and graduated from the University of Geneva with a Double Major in History and Russian. After two years in the People's Republic of China, he moved to London where he obtained his PhD in History from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 1990. He stayed at SOAS as British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow and as Wellcome Research Fellow before being promoted to a personal chair as Professor of the Modern History of China in 2002. His research and writing has been funded by over 1.5 US$ million in grants from various foundations, including, in Britain, the Wellcome Trust, the Arts and Humanities Research Council, The Economic and Social Research Council and, in Hong Kong, the Research Grants Council and the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation.
He has published a dozen books that have changed the ways historians view modern China, from the classic The Discourse of Race in Modern China (1992) to China After Mao: The Rise of a Superpower (2022). His 2010 book Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe was selected as one of the Books of the Year in 2010 by The Economist, The Independent, The Sunday Times, the London Evening Standard (selected twice), The Telegraph, the New Statesman and the BBC History Magazine, and is on the longlist for the 2011 Samuel Johnson Prize for non-fiction.
Born in the Netherlands in 1961, he was educated in Switzerland and graduated from the University of Geneva with a Double Major in History and Russian. After two years in the People's Republic of China, he moved to London where he obtained his PhD in History from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 1990. He stayed at SOAS as British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow and as Wellcome Research Fellow before being promoted to a personal chair as Professor of the Modern History of China in 2002. His research and writing has been funded by over 1.5 US$ million in grants from various foundations, including, in Britain, the Wellcome Trust, the Arts and Humanities Research Council, The Economic and Social Research Council and, in Hong Kong, the Research Grants Council and the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation.
He has published a dozen books that have changed the ways historians view modern China, from the classic The Discourse of Race in Modern China (1992) to China After Mao: The Rise of a Superpower (2022). His 2010 book Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe was selected as one of the Books of the Year in 2010 by The Economist, The Independent, The Sunday Times, the London Evening Standard (selected twice), The Telegraph, the New Statesman and the BBC History Magazine, and is on the longlist for the 2011 Samuel Johnson Prize for non-fiction.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 213 reviews
November 12, 2020
Moved to gwern.net due to length.
September 5, 2017
The final in a very good trilogy on the three phases of China under Mao.
I turned 17 when Mao died. After his death I recall the trials of the Gang of Four even receiving coverage on the very limited news services in Brisbane Australia. It was very exotic (for want of a better word) and in a faraway country I had not really given any thought to at the time. It seemed such an odd name. Gang of Four! One had images of four young hoodlums holding up old ladies for the small change in their purses. It was a name I associated as an insult by the new regime. Nope! On page 306 of this fascinating read it says that it was coined by Mao himself. “Mao was playing one faction off against the other in the hope that none would be strong enough to challenge him” the author write. And that was the politics of The Cultural Revolution. Mao playing one faction off against another. To the detriment of the population at large.
This review hardly needs to explain the Cultural Revolution, there are plenty of resources out there. But books such as this do throw up events and individuals that play minor roles in the narrative but are nonetheless part of the complex history told. Damansky Island incident in March 1969 for example. In chapter 16 Preparing For War the author discusses the usual political machination and propaganda that Mao used in pursuit of his domestic goals. The USSR and China had disputed the island previously but now Chinese troops eventually shot at a border post. Two weeks later the clashes involved thousands of troops. Soon after Mao called a halt. “He had achieved his aim, which was to put the Soviet Union on notice…..” and as soon as the confrontation was over the internal propaganda came to the fore. “Prepare for War” became the new slogan. All this to control the outcome of the Ninth Party Congress that was due two weeks later. The only problem was the USSR took all this very seriously as one would expect and a few months later the USSR actually asked the USA how it would feel if they took out a Chinese nuclear facility. The US ignored the question. Then Pravda began a campaign against the Chinese and appealed to the world to understand the threat the Chinese had become. “The chairman was stunned.” wrote the author. This was after all a border dispute, useful for the Machiavellian politics of Mao, not an all-out war with a vastly superior opponent. China agreed to talk and concessions were made. But Mao, ever the paranoid leader put the country on a war footing nonetheless with both the USSR and the USA at the end of the internal propaganda.
My one fault with the book for me is a big one and marks it down from outstanding. During the narrative the author uses the term Mao’s Great Famine to describe the terrible years of the Great Leap Forward. This is the title of his excellent book of the same name. I had no issue with the use of that in that book but not in this one. It reeks of self-promotion when there was no need. I have also put the term in search engine and each search comes to his book. For the trilogy to be considered a definitive history of China under Mao there was no need for such promotion. A small quibble some may say.
In the end though I have come out of the trilogy repeating what I have said before. Why read fantasy when there is the history of China. To think I know so little and have so much more to read.
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
I turned 17 when Mao died. After his death I recall the trials of the Gang of Four even receiving coverage on the very limited news services in Brisbane Australia. It was very exotic (for want of a better word) and in a faraway country I had not really given any thought to at the time. It seemed such an odd name. Gang of Four! One had images of four young hoodlums holding up old ladies for the small change in their purses. It was a name I associated as an insult by the new regime. Nope! On page 306 of this fascinating read it says that it was coined by Mao himself. “Mao was playing one faction off against the other in the hope that none would be strong enough to challenge him” the author write. And that was the politics of The Cultural Revolution. Mao playing one faction off against another. To the detriment of the population at large.
This review hardly needs to explain the Cultural Revolution, there are plenty of resources out there. But books such as this do throw up events and individuals that play minor roles in the narrative but are nonetheless part of the complex history told. Damansky Island incident in March 1969 for example. In chapter 16 Preparing For War the author discusses the usual political machination and propaganda that Mao used in pursuit of his domestic goals. The USSR and China had disputed the island previously but now Chinese troops eventually shot at a border post. Two weeks later the clashes involved thousands of troops. Soon after Mao called a halt. “He had achieved his aim, which was to put the Soviet Union on notice…..” and as soon as the confrontation was over the internal propaganda came to the fore. “Prepare for War” became the new slogan. All this to control the outcome of the Ninth Party Congress that was due two weeks later. The only problem was the USSR took all this very seriously as one would expect and a few months later the USSR actually asked the USA how it would feel if they took out a Chinese nuclear facility. The US ignored the question. Then Pravda began a campaign against the Chinese and appealed to the world to understand the threat the Chinese had become. “The chairman was stunned.” wrote the author. This was after all a border dispute, useful for the Machiavellian politics of Mao, not an all-out war with a vastly superior opponent. China agreed to talk and concessions were made. But Mao, ever the paranoid leader put the country on a war footing nonetheless with both the USSR and the USA at the end of the internal propaganda.
My one fault with the book for me is a big one and marks it down from outstanding. During the narrative the author uses the term Mao’s Great Famine to describe the terrible years of the Great Leap Forward. This is the title of his excellent book of the same name. I had no issue with the use of that in that book but not in this one. It reeks of self-promotion when there was no need. I have also put the term in search engine and each search comes to his book. For the trilogy to be considered a definitive history of China under Mao there was no need for such promotion. A small quibble some may say.
In the end though I have come out of the trilogy repeating what I have said before. Why read fantasy when there is the history of China. To think I know so little and have so much more to read.
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...
May 26, 2022
The Cultural Revolution failed on an ideological level. The plot to overthrow communism succeeded, and capitalism (with Chinese characteristics) is the economic model of the People's Republic. On a more practical level it secured Mao's unchallenged power so well that his successors are in control a half century later.
The Cultural Revolution ('66-'76) was a mass movement of students and workers unleashed by Mao against perceived enemies within the party and army. During the Great Leap Forward ('58-'62) collective farming and command economy starved thirty million people to death. Mao's political capital was expended and comrades were emboldened to criticize his policies. It was at once a brilliant and ruthless gambit to weaponize the people against his political enemies.
When the Cultural Revolution was over the party was purged and comrades were chastised, notably Mao's Number Two Liu Shaoqi (who died under Mao's arrest) and future leader Deng Xiaoping (who survived to succeed Mao). The student uprisings nearly led to civil war until Mao dialed them down and declared the military in charge by late '68. Mao's cult of personality had been unquestionably established and backed by his junta he was worshipped throughout the land.
In later phases the people too were excoriated by military led committees. Ordinary citizens were denounced, interrogated, imprisoned or executed for fabricated class based crimes. Professionals, teachers, and students were banished from the large cities to be re-educated in the countryside. They labored and starved among a peasant population unable to absorb them. The revolution devolved into endless upheaval whose purpose was to intimidate and control the people.
This last volume of a trilogy on post WWII China is told through recently available memoirs, articles and archives. They run from popular accounts to unpublished diaries. Anecdotes are pasted together like snippets in a scrapbook, arranged chronologically to form a narrative. This becomes a formidable wall of information with an absence of analysis apart from interjected comments. Readers are left to their own conclusions but the events speak for themselves.
The book does not take an overtly polemical stance although some may assert that it does. Is Dikotter a red-baiter or Mao hater? Interviews on National Public Radio and in the South China Post noted the dilemma that he faced was 'the level of horror to present'. The book does have a sensational tenor at times. Perhaps it is the extremity of the era but it is also a focus of the author. Dikotter reflects that 'to be silent risks complicity' a line of thought expressed by Elie Wiesel.
What is described in this book is so troubling that unless one doubts its veracity one must criticize the regime that made it possible. The hardest lesson may not be what an unchecked leader can do to his people but rather what an unchecked people can do to each other. It is a disturbing portrait of the events that unfolded.
The Cultural Revolution ('66-'76) was a mass movement of students and workers unleashed by Mao against perceived enemies within the party and army. During the Great Leap Forward ('58-'62) collective farming and command economy starved thirty million people to death. Mao's political capital was expended and comrades were emboldened to criticize his policies. It was at once a brilliant and ruthless gambit to weaponize the people against his political enemies.
When the Cultural Revolution was over the party was purged and comrades were chastised, notably Mao's Number Two Liu Shaoqi (who died under Mao's arrest) and future leader Deng Xiaoping (who survived to succeed Mao). The student uprisings nearly led to civil war until Mao dialed them down and declared the military in charge by late '68. Mao's cult of personality had been unquestionably established and backed by his junta he was worshipped throughout the land.
In later phases the people too were excoriated by military led committees. Ordinary citizens were denounced, interrogated, imprisoned or executed for fabricated class based crimes. Professionals, teachers, and students were banished from the large cities to be re-educated in the countryside. They labored and starved among a peasant population unable to absorb them. The revolution devolved into endless upheaval whose purpose was to intimidate and control the people.
This last volume of a trilogy on post WWII China is told through recently available memoirs, articles and archives. They run from popular accounts to unpublished diaries. Anecdotes are pasted together like snippets in a scrapbook, arranged chronologically to form a narrative. This becomes a formidable wall of information with an absence of analysis apart from interjected comments. Readers are left to their own conclusions but the events speak for themselves.
The book does not take an overtly polemical stance although some may assert that it does. Is Dikotter a red-baiter or Mao hater? Interviews on National Public Radio and in the South China Post noted the dilemma that he faced was 'the level of horror to present'. The book does have a sensational tenor at times. Perhaps it is the extremity of the era but it is also a focus of the author. Dikotter reflects that 'to be silent risks complicity' a line of thought expressed by Elie Wiesel.
What is described in this book is so troubling that unless one doubts its veracity one must criticize the regime that made it possible. The hardest lesson may not be what an unchecked leader can do to his people but rather what an unchecked people can do to each other. It is a disturbing portrait of the events that unfolded.
July 25, 2022
Page 109 (my book)
She sent the Chairman a letter, pointing out the “the Cultural Revolution is not a mass movement. It is one man with a gun manipulating people”. The nineteen-year-old was arrested and sent to prison for thirteen years.
This is the last of the series of three volumes on Mao Zedong’s rule of China from 1949 to 1976. It is not a reverential portrayal of China under his long dictatorship.
Mao is ruthless and unconcerned with the suffering of his people which resulted from his trying to make a Marxist utopian state using collectivization in the rural countryside, abolishing private enterprise and property, and instituting government control at all levels.
Mao set out in the early 1960s through the Cultural Revolution to weed out what he saw as the bourgeois conservative forces that were threatening his grip on power. He encouraged young people to not only challenge authority, but to rebel against it. This set-in motion forces that moved beyond his control.
Page 80-81
Appearing on the rostrum next to Chairman Mao, Lin Biao had exhorted his youthful audience to go forth and destroy “all the old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits of the exploiting classes.”
Mao was also trying to establish or reinforce his leadership position as an idol for the masses of the Chinese people.
Page 36 from Quotations of Chairman Mao Zedong from the Little Red Book
“Read Chairman Mao’s book, listen to Chairman Mao’s words, act according to Chairman Mao’s instructions, and be a good fighter for Chairman Mao.”
Many came to worship him and his quotations – in fact, some would memorize passages from the Little Red Book. Mao became a new Chinese God, with his image and words proliferating across the country. Like Stalin, Mao was enshrining himself – the Cult of Personality.
The rebellion started by the Cultural Revolution took its toll. The Red Guards - the students and then the factory workers who were “assigned” to propagate the cause – were attacking any and all institutions (schools, factories, the Red Army…). In many areas civil war broke out with even factions of the Red Guards battling each other – and each saying that they represented the true orthodoxy of the Chairman.
It became that the only safe mode of expression were Mao symbols – books, badges, quotations, posters… All else was taboo and represented antiquated ways. There were book burnings, libraries were destroyed, and education was attacked.
Page 148
People started using the Cultural Revolution to right personal wrongs, exact retribution for past injustices or set up vigilance teams to impose their own version of justice.
China was becoming fragmented with warring rival cliques. These anarchic conditions also made it possible for the underground economy to expand – in other words, a capitalist market not under government control. During the 1970s this underground economy was the beginning of a new growth.
Page 284 in the 1970s
In one way or another, people were emboldened by the failure of the Cultural Revolution to take matters in their own hands – “people decided they did not want to go on living the way they were doing and they were setting up ways to get themselves out of their predicament”. It was an uneven, patchy revolution from below, and one that remained largely silent, but eventually it would engulf the entire country.
There was a mass exodus of urban students, in the millions, who were recruited during the Cultural Revolution to work in the countryside. The aim was to ingratiate themselves with the long-toiling masses. It didn’t quite work out that way. Many became disillusioned by the poverty and debilitating conditions they encountered. Young women were sexually harassed. They were no long true believers in the Mao cult.
It should also be pointed out that starvation remained a constant in Chinese rural society. At least 20 percent of the population was malnourished (page 266). If one adhered to government parameters one likely starved; if, however, you started an enterprise your chances of making money, of eating through trading were increased – and your family could survive.
Page 275
Villagers who had survived the horrors of Mao’s Great Famine were not about to be intimidated [from participating in a small village market stall] by a tax official hanging about at a roadblock.
This final volume of the Mao years gives us a profound picture of China up to Mao’s death. It is a fragmented and impoverished society struggling to reassert itself and overcome a dictatorship that imposed societal and economic restrictiveness. It is essential for understanding what China represents today.
She sent the Chairman a letter, pointing out the “the Cultural Revolution is not a mass movement. It is one man with a gun manipulating people”. The nineteen-year-old was arrested and sent to prison for thirteen years.
This is the last of the series of three volumes on Mao Zedong’s rule of China from 1949 to 1976. It is not a reverential portrayal of China under his long dictatorship.
Mao is ruthless and unconcerned with the suffering of his people which resulted from his trying to make a Marxist utopian state using collectivization in the rural countryside, abolishing private enterprise and property, and instituting government control at all levels.
Mao set out in the early 1960s through the Cultural Revolution to weed out what he saw as the bourgeois conservative forces that were threatening his grip on power. He encouraged young people to not only challenge authority, but to rebel against it. This set-in motion forces that moved beyond his control.
Page 80-81
Appearing on the rostrum next to Chairman Mao, Lin Biao had exhorted his youthful audience to go forth and destroy “all the old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits of the exploiting classes.”
Mao was also trying to establish or reinforce his leadership position as an idol for the masses of the Chinese people.
Page 36 from Quotations of Chairman Mao Zedong from the Little Red Book
“Read Chairman Mao’s book, listen to Chairman Mao’s words, act according to Chairman Mao’s instructions, and be a good fighter for Chairman Mao.”
Many came to worship him and his quotations – in fact, some would memorize passages from the Little Red Book. Mao became a new Chinese God, with his image and words proliferating across the country. Like Stalin, Mao was enshrining himself – the Cult of Personality.
The rebellion started by the Cultural Revolution took its toll. The Red Guards - the students and then the factory workers who were “assigned” to propagate the cause – were attacking any and all institutions (schools, factories, the Red Army…). In many areas civil war broke out with even factions of the Red Guards battling each other – and each saying that they represented the true orthodoxy of the Chairman.
It became that the only safe mode of expression were Mao symbols – books, badges, quotations, posters… All else was taboo and represented antiquated ways. There were book burnings, libraries were destroyed, and education was attacked.
Page 148
People started using the Cultural Revolution to right personal wrongs, exact retribution for past injustices or set up vigilance teams to impose their own version of justice.
China was becoming fragmented with warring rival cliques. These anarchic conditions also made it possible for the underground economy to expand – in other words, a capitalist market not under government control. During the 1970s this underground economy was the beginning of a new growth.
Page 284 in the 1970s
In one way or another, people were emboldened by the failure of the Cultural Revolution to take matters in their own hands – “people decided they did not want to go on living the way they were doing and they were setting up ways to get themselves out of their predicament”. It was an uneven, patchy revolution from below, and one that remained largely silent, but eventually it would engulf the entire country.
There was a mass exodus of urban students, in the millions, who were recruited during the Cultural Revolution to work in the countryside. The aim was to ingratiate themselves with the long-toiling masses. It didn’t quite work out that way. Many became disillusioned by the poverty and debilitating conditions they encountered. Young women were sexually harassed. They were no long true believers in the Mao cult.
It should also be pointed out that starvation remained a constant in Chinese rural society. At least 20 percent of the population was malnourished (page 266). If one adhered to government parameters one likely starved; if, however, you started an enterprise your chances of making money, of eating through trading were increased – and your family could survive.
Page 275
Villagers who had survived the horrors of Mao’s Great Famine were not about to be intimidated [from participating in a small village market stall] by a tax official hanging about at a roadblock.
This final volume of the Mao years gives us a profound picture of China up to Mao’s death. It is a fragmented and impoverished society struggling to reassert itself and overcome a dictatorship that imposed societal and economic restrictiveness. It is essential for understanding what China represents today.
May 21, 2017
This is a great book. It's tremendously readable and astonishingly clear given the complexity of the events described. When you're finished with it (actually even before you're finished with it), you are smarter than when you started. What else can you ask for in a book?
Please don't think I'm saying that just because I won a hardcover copy of this book in a Goodreads giveaway.
I saw a movie once where a character said that he preferred reading book reviews to books themselves because book reviews not only told you what the book was about, they also told you what to think about them. While not actually believing that book reviews are adequate substitutes for books, I often consult them because the people telling me what to think also ensure I'm not missing something really important. Being of a fundamentally pre-digital state of mind, I believe that the opinions expressed in publications of long standing are more likely to contain worthwhile insights than, say, the random unedited thoughts of somebody on social media, like this one. The writer in an edited publication might be a scholar in the topic, or at least a journalist who has in the past had some connection with the matter at hand, so might have insights not obvious to those newly-arrived at the topic. The two previous sentences seem so obvious that they are almost an embarrassment to type, but they are so at odds with the spirit of the age that I feel they bear repeating.
In a generally positive (“well-researched and readable”) review on the web site of the Guardian, reviewer Julia Lovell seems to think that Dikotter's portrayal of Mao as “a scheming megalomaniac” lacks complexity, because Mao was also an “ideologue”. I wondered: why does it make an difference whether Mao was one or the other? Does it make a difference to the high school teachers who were beaten to death, or the urban teenaged girls raped because they were sent unprotected to country villages? Obviously not, but I guess it makes a difference to some of us, still (as of this writing) comfortable and insulated in prosperous societies.
Can we test, even as a dreaded “thought experiment”, for megalomaniac versus ideologue? As I understand the word, a megalomaniac is interested exclusively in the advancement, or at least maintenance, of his (given the circs., I feel comfortable with the male pronoun) personal power. An ideologue is devoted to an ideology. Ideologues interpret ideologies. Was it ever a possibility that Mao (or any other leader) would step up one day and say “I have thought long and hard about the ideology to which I have professed devotion, and I have concluded that is it best for the advancement of the ideology if I, the leader, step down”? Negative propositions are unprovable, of course, but Mao didn't do that. It seems unlikely he would have even if circumstances had been different. I vote for megalomaniac.
To return to the previous question: does it matter? It seems like it matters to Julia Lovell, the reviewer. Why? Because, I speculate, that if you can portray Mao as an ideologue, you can then portray him as a mistaken ideologue, which means that the appearance of unmistaken ideologues is still possible. The ideology is still correct. It's just that the correct implementation of the ideology hasn't appeared yet.
How many tries does the ideology get?
Please don't think I'm saying that just because I won a hardcover copy of this book in a Goodreads giveaway.
I saw a movie once where a character said that he preferred reading book reviews to books themselves because book reviews not only told you what the book was about, they also told you what to think about them. While not actually believing that book reviews are adequate substitutes for books, I often consult them because the people telling me what to think also ensure I'm not missing something really important. Being of a fundamentally pre-digital state of mind, I believe that the opinions expressed in publications of long standing are more likely to contain worthwhile insights than, say, the random unedited thoughts of somebody on social media, like this one. The writer in an edited publication might be a scholar in the topic, or at least a journalist who has in the past had some connection with the matter at hand, so might have insights not obvious to those newly-arrived at the topic. The two previous sentences seem so obvious that they are almost an embarrassment to type, but they are so at odds with the spirit of the age that I feel they bear repeating.
In a generally positive (“well-researched and readable”) review on the web site of the Guardian, reviewer Julia Lovell seems to think that Dikotter's portrayal of Mao as “a scheming megalomaniac” lacks complexity, because Mao was also an “ideologue”. I wondered: why does it make an difference whether Mao was one or the other? Does it make a difference to the high school teachers who were beaten to death, or the urban teenaged girls raped because they were sent unprotected to country villages? Obviously not, but I guess it makes a difference to some of us, still (as of this writing) comfortable and insulated in prosperous societies.
Can we test, even as a dreaded “thought experiment”, for megalomaniac versus ideologue? As I understand the word, a megalomaniac is interested exclusively in the advancement, or at least maintenance, of his (given the circs., I feel comfortable with the male pronoun) personal power. An ideologue is devoted to an ideology. Ideologues interpret ideologies. Was it ever a possibility that Mao (or any other leader) would step up one day and say “I have thought long and hard about the ideology to which I have professed devotion, and I have concluded that is it best for the advancement of the ideology if I, the leader, step down”? Negative propositions are unprovable, of course, but Mao didn't do that. It seems unlikely he would have even if circumstances had been different. I vote for megalomaniac.
To return to the previous question: does it matter? It seems like it matters to Julia Lovell, the reviewer. Why? Because, I speculate, that if you can portray Mao as an ideologue, you can then portray him as a mistaken ideologue, which means that the appearance of unmistaken ideologues is still possible. The ideology is still correct. It's just that the correct implementation of the ideology hasn't appeared yet.
How many tries does the ideology get?
February 21, 2024
The Cultural Revolution was Mao’s second attempt to become the historical pivot around which the socialist universe revolved.
This is a reasonable attempt to survey an event or period which by most metrics would be regarded as irrational. There wasn't a singular, contained Cultural Revolution, it was a series of practices and developments which occurred over a period of time across the vast expanses of the PRC. One can suggest that while Stalin's Great Terror was completely calculated, the Cultural Revolution was an improvisation in the name of cynicism. I would assert there wouldn't have been a Cultural revolution if not for the Secret Speech of Khruschev. Chairman Mao was very conscious of the criticism circulating in the wake of his own Great leap Forward which starved millions due to its idiocy. He wasn't about to welcome a successor blaming him, well, not without an experiment first in provocation. He began stating that progress was being halted by counter-revolutionary spirit. He thoughts such was being maintained by dubious intellectuals and educators. Later Chairman Mao would assert that the medical field was a repository of decadent capitalists and that in fact anyone could provide medical care: hence the barefoot doctor program where barely literate farmers were given ten days of training and sent on their way.
In this new world steeped in red, all the senses were bombarded.
It is safe to say that while the Cultural Revolution was myriad, it can be divided between soft and hard applications. Most people are familiar with the soft applications: students denouncing teachers and, neighbor against neighbor where the hounding and bullying became standard practice. The hard application was actual warfare between factions utilizing all weapons from tanks and artillery down to small arms and improvised spears. It was a civil war in all but name and the author credits it with being the conditions which ultimately destroyed Chinese collectivization. Needless to say there isn't comprehensive documentation for the numbers involved but the estimates are staggering. Dikötter doesn't give us polished prose but does offer grisly anecdotes.
Likely closer to three stars rounded up.
This is a reasonable attempt to survey an event or period which by most metrics would be regarded as irrational. There wasn't a singular, contained Cultural Revolution, it was a series of practices and developments which occurred over a period of time across the vast expanses of the PRC. One can suggest that while Stalin's Great Terror was completely calculated, the Cultural Revolution was an improvisation in the name of cynicism. I would assert there wouldn't have been a Cultural revolution if not for the Secret Speech of Khruschev. Chairman Mao was very conscious of the criticism circulating in the wake of his own Great leap Forward which starved millions due to its idiocy. He wasn't about to welcome a successor blaming him, well, not without an experiment first in provocation. He began stating that progress was being halted by counter-revolutionary spirit. He thoughts such was being maintained by dubious intellectuals and educators. Later Chairman Mao would assert that the medical field was a repository of decadent capitalists and that in fact anyone could provide medical care: hence the barefoot doctor program where barely literate farmers were given ten days of training and sent on their way.
In this new world steeped in red, all the senses were bombarded.
It is safe to say that while the Cultural Revolution was myriad, it can be divided between soft and hard applications. Most people are familiar with the soft applications: students denouncing teachers and, neighbor against neighbor where the hounding and bullying became standard practice. The hard application was actual warfare between factions utilizing all weapons from tanks and artillery down to small arms and improvised spears. It was a civil war in all but name and the author credits it with being the conditions which ultimately destroyed Chinese collectivization. Needless to say there isn't comprehensive documentation for the numbers involved but the estimates are staggering. Dikötter doesn't give us polished prose but does offer grisly anecdotes.
Likely closer to three stars rounded up.
June 12, 2020
As with his other books, Prof. Dikötter has done an excellent job providing a detailed account of China, this time under Mao’s last years. I had this thought that Mao, sensing the consequences of the disastrous Great Leap Forward Backward, and reacting to the potential implications of Khrushchev’s demise, permitted his politically ambitious fourth wife, Jian Qing, and others, to foment the Cultural Revolution, which appears to be a case of a snake eating its tail. What better way to deflect attention from his many incompetencies than to set his fellow countrymen upon one another with vengeance.
I think I’m now benumbed to tales of mass horror, the murders, the starvations, the many brutalities, for these misfortunes were limited in neither time nor number in our past century. No, they were repeated through the decades and often involved tens of millions of persons at a time. At least I now feel I understand the reason for this conduct. Defying justice, many of the leaders of these sordid events lived out their natural lives; not so Jian Qing, who, in the end, got her just dessert, though that course was self-serve following years of imprisonment.
I think I’m now benumbed to tales of mass horror, the murders, the starvations, the many brutalities, for these misfortunes were limited in neither time nor number in our past century. No, they were repeated through the decades and often involved tens of millions of persons at a time. At least I now feel I understand the reason for this conduct. Defying justice, many of the leaders of these sordid events lived out their natural lives; not so Jian Qing, who, in the end, got her just dessert, though that course was self-serve following years of imprisonment.
October 9, 2021
this is an incredible record of a horrible time ... Dikotter has collected material from many sources and organized it superbly ... so far I have read through the events of 1967 ... quite a bit to do as I do research for what I hope will be a new novel
July 9, 2016
Dikötter has, with this book, completed his trilogy documenting the horrific and criminal betrayal of China's revolution of 1949. The sheer, unadulterated cynicism employed by Mao is shown to be principally in support of his manipulation of people around him. If you stepped on his toe in 1934, you could be sure that he'd remember -- and that you'd pay for it somehow. What you didn't know is that you might well be branded a "capitalist-roader", a spy, a counter-revolutionary, or just "black." Black, not red.
Dikötter does an amazing job keeping the facts straight, which is amazing in itself. The country is huge, and there were so many responsible for so many crimes; yet the story holds together as a linear narrative.
I can't wait to see what Frank Dikötter comes up with next. Maybe he can expose Nixon -- oh, no, Rick Perlstein already did that!
Dikötter does an amazing job keeping the facts straight, which is amazing in itself. The country is huge, and there were so many responsible for so many crimes; yet the story holds together as a linear narrative.
I can't wait to see what Frank Dikötter comes up with next. Maybe he can expose Nixon -- oh, no, Rick Perlstein already did that!
June 3, 2016
A very meticulous examination the political intrigues surrounding the Cultural Revolution. It was less a "People's History" in offering a ground-level view (though there was some of that) than a head-spinning accounting of the coups and counter-coups that characterized the era. The thing that I was most looking for - examinations of the transformation in Chinese culture during the period - was in relatively short supply. Dikotter is also clearly a historian and not a writer because this was written in absolutely turgid and uninspiring prose for the most part.
Nonetheless this work as being driven largely from primary source documents so does an undeniable service to history. At the risk of sounding like a philistine, the archival pictures including were also pretty remarkable.
Nonetheless this work as being driven largely from primary source documents so does an undeniable service to history. At the risk of sounding like a philistine, the archival pictures including were also pretty remarkable.
April 20, 2021
The Mao badge was a gateway drug to the profit motive—and so socialism in China collapsed under the weight of its personality cult. One of Dikötter's possibly counterintuitive theses is that the chaos of the Cultural Revolution gave individuals the chance to slip under the radar, an opportunity they almost invariably used to pursue private enterprise or cultivate the self. People divided themselves, outwardly presenting a facade of Maoist radicalism while quietly tending to private plots, smuggling tractors to farmers who might sell their wares in city centers, reading Waiting for Godot (sometimes filched by Red Guards from homes they were sacking) or even erotica (The Heart of a Maiden might have been the second most-read book behind the Little Red one)... with some pursuing both at once by hunting for arbitrage opportunities in the Mao badge market.
The Mao badge fever was roughly exclusive to the first five years of the Cultural Revolution, starting with the Red August of 1966 and dying along with the chief progenitor of the Mao cult Lin Biao. The badges were a hot commodity among Red Guards primarily because they "individualized an otherwise uniform outfit." Production couldn't keep pace with demand and a blackmarket was born. Secret markets sprouted in Shanghai and Beijing where thousands of Red Guards (and others) traveling the country as part of the Great Networking—travel, lodging, and food was free for Red Guards, many of whom used the CR to travel the country for the first time—gathered to acquire orthodox souvenirs. Badges were not "bought 买” but rather "requested 请" as naked commodification of Mao's image was a bridge too far. At the Shanghai and Beijing markets, Red Guards were able to trade groups of small badges for larger badges, or photographs of Mao for choice designs. The greatest hoarders were unsurprisingly those highest up in the pyramid. Ye Qun, Lin Biao's wife (and frequent stand-in on standing committee meetings—she was eventually elected to the Politburo herself), commandeered thousands of badges in the misguided hope of presenting 10,000 of them to Mao. An astronomical amount of aluminum was wasted in pursuit of the fad. Approximately 4.8 billion badges were manufactured using 96,000 tons of aluminum—roughly enough to produce 39,600 planes. The craze only ended when an exasperated Mao said, "give me back my airplanes 还我飞机." When Mao's successor Lin Biao died, ironically in a plane crash, Mao badges were abruptly retired which itself presented a conundrum: how to get rid of the paramount leader in a respectful manner (and without letting all that aluminum go to waste)? In 1980, the Central Committee issued a directive that badges should be returned to neighborhood committees. By 1988, 90% of badges had been handed in and so Mao was buried.
Except... there was a brief revival in Mao badge collection in the 1990s inspired partly by nostalgia and later predominantly by, what else, profit. The Mao badge became a piece of commoditized kitsch. I would say Mao is turning in his grave but I know he is not. Instead he is on display, forever—superficially a symbol of the Party's continued glory but upon closer inspection utterly dead.
Bill Bishop pointed me to his master's thesis on Mao badges, which informed this review: http://museums.cnd.org/CR/old/maobadge/
The Mao badge fever was roughly exclusive to the first five years of the Cultural Revolution, starting with the Red August of 1966 and dying along with the chief progenitor of the Mao cult Lin Biao. The badges were a hot commodity among Red Guards primarily because they "individualized an otherwise uniform outfit." Production couldn't keep pace with demand and a blackmarket was born. Secret markets sprouted in Shanghai and Beijing where thousands of Red Guards (and others) traveling the country as part of the Great Networking—travel, lodging, and food was free for Red Guards, many of whom used the CR to travel the country for the first time—gathered to acquire orthodox souvenirs. Badges were not "bought 买” but rather "requested 请" as naked commodification of Mao's image was a bridge too far. At the Shanghai and Beijing markets, Red Guards were able to trade groups of small badges for larger badges, or photographs of Mao for choice designs. The greatest hoarders were unsurprisingly those highest up in the pyramid. Ye Qun, Lin Biao's wife (and frequent stand-in on standing committee meetings—she was eventually elected to the Politburo herself), commandeered thousands of badges in the misguided hope of presenting 10,000 of them to Mao. An astronomical amount of aluminum was wasted in pursuit of the fad. Approximately 4.8 billion badges were manufactured using 96,000 tons of aluminum—roughly enough to produce 39,600 planes. The craze only ended when an exasperated Mao said, "give me back my airplanes 还我飞机." When Mao's successor Lin Biao died, ironically in a plane crash, Mao badges were abruptly retired which itself presented a conundrum: how to get rid of the paramount leader in a respectful manner (and without letting all that aluminum go to waste)? In 1980, the Central Committee issued a directive that badges should be returned to neighborhood committees. By 1988, 90% of badges had been handed in and so Mao was buried.
Except... there was a brief revival in Mao badge collection in the 1990s inspired partly by nostalgia and later predominantly by, what else, profit. The Mao badge became a piece of commoditized kitsch. I would say Mao is turning in his grave but I know he is not. Instead he is on display, forever—superficially a symbol of the Party's continued glory but upon closer inspection utterly dead.
Bill Bishop pointed me to his master's thesis on Mao badges, which informed this review: http://museums.cnd.org/CR/old/maobadge/
May 21, 2016
Superb-a terrifying history of leaders run amok. Mao's attempt to salve his reputation and retain power after the disastrous Great Leap Forward led to an absurd but tragic series of purges, denunciations and counter purges, destroying the lives of millions. An essential read to understanding modern China-Dikotter's underlying thesis is that as the central government fell apart and retreated from the more isolated areas of countryside, villagers secretly readopted market capitalism as a way of survival-leading eventually to the rebirth of it nationally after Mao's death
April 29, 2020
important history book about the period of time when China collectively dissolved into madness. style is fine and tight, and skill of the historian Dikotter is evident.
June 18, 2016
I am a tutor and am currently working with a Chinese gentleman, who lives in the US, on his English. We talk for 1 1/2 hours per day and even Skype for a short time when he is in China. One day he commented that it was the 50th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution. We discussed it a bit. On the way home, thanks to Terry Gross and Fresh Air, I heard an interview with the author of this book and had to read it.
Part of the importance of this book is that it has new information and is not just a rehash of the old. Archives have been opened in China that weren't available previously and people's memoirs, diaries, and sometimes even the people themselves, are available. Dikotter took advantage of all of these to give us a history that shows much about the Chinese people during these times.
A simple explanation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution that many people hear is that the students, called the Red Guard, took after the people they thought of a "capitalist-roaders," who had an incorrect understanding of Mao Zedong thought and no appreciation for the Communist way of life. Eventually they were sent to the countryside for "reeducation." And that's that.
This revolution is more twisted than that and the most twisted that I've ever read about. All revolutions have bad times but this one was one long bad time.
When students began to criticize their teachers for inadequate support of Mao Zedong thought, Mao himself encouraged them saying that criticism was good. Before long, all students of "good" background (higher social classes) were marching through the streets to people's houses, tearing them apart, looking for evidence of "old thinking." It got out of hand. Mao had to rein them in and find a convenient scapegoat. But something else had to be encouraged instead.
Also during this time, collectivisation in the country was being quietly overridden by peasants who were gradually taking land back for private uses. The country had fallen into a famine because of the amount of grain and other resources that were "tribute" to the Party and the cities. China clamped down and demanded collectivisation again. Its city populations had grown during this time because people in the country came to the city due to starvation. So, the Party first deported those who had come from the country back to the country, then sent city residents out to "learn" from the peasant lifestyle. Many students volunteered to move, even though it meant that they could not return to the city. Most found the conditions horrid and, for them, unliveable. Many tried to get back to the cities.
Since the collectivisation didn't work - more famine - the State had to look the other way and allow private property and private businesses again. However, it appeared that there might be war with Russia, so many essential businesses (steel making, etc.) were literally moved to the interior of the country to protect them. Bad soil, not fit for farming, brought more famine to these workers.
Everytime something went wrong, which it did almost daily, Mao had someone else blamed for it. He was the supreme leader and could not be faulted. If he had stated in his speeches that something must be done, it must, and if that something turned out wrong, one of his associates had not done it properly.
The Chinese people during these 10 years were in a revolving door. Many of them simply kept their heads down and tried to sneak through life unnoticed. Every few days, things changed. What you were to believe and profess one day was treason the next. There was no rhyme or reason to who might be taken to jail at any time. Other people took advantage of the changes to get even with anyone who had crossed them at any time in their lives. However, they had to worry that, when the tables turned, they would be the victims.
Dikotter does a wonderful job of making these twists and turns understandable (which is more than the Chinese going through them could). He uses the people's memoirs, interviews, diary excerpts, whenever he can to give a good picture of how the average Chinese lived through the mess. In a way, it's amazing that they could, but when you look at it, it's just about the same today. People can only shrug their shoulders, roll their eyes at the stupidity of the government and hold their tongues.
Part of the importance of this book is that it has new information and is not just a rehash of the old. Archives have been opened in China that weren't available previously and people's memoirs, diaries, and sometimes even the people themselves, are available. Dikotter took advantage of all of these to give us a history that shows much about the Chinese people during these times.
A simple explanation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution that many people hear is that the students, called the Red Guard, took after the people they thought of a "capitalist-roaders," who had an incorrect understanding of Mao Zedong thought and no appreciation for the Communist way of life. Eventually they were sent to the countryside for "reeducation." And that's that.
This revolution is more twisted than that and the most twisted that I've ever read about. All revolutions have bad times but this one was one long bad time.
When students began to criticize their teachers for inadequate support of Mao Zedong thought, Mao himself encouraged them saying that criticism was good. Before long, all students of "good" background (higher social classes) were marching through the streets to people's houses, tearing them apart, looking for evidence of "old thinking." It got out of hand. Mao had to rein them in and find a convenient scapegoat. But something else had to be encouraged instead.
Also during this time, collectivisation in the country was being quietly overridden by peasants who were gradually taking land back for private uses. The country had fallen into a famine because of the amount of grain and other resources that were "tribute" to the Party and the cities. China clamped down and demanded collectivisation again. Its city populations had grown during this time because people in the country came to the city due to starvation. So, the Party first deported those who had come from the country back to the country, then sent city residents out to "learn" from the peasant lifestyle. Many students volunteered to move, even though it meant that they could not return to the city. Most found the conditions horrid and, for them, unliveable. Many tried to get back to the cities.
Since the collectivisation didn't work - more famine - the State had to look the other way and allow private property and private businesses again. However, it appeared that there might be war with Russia, so many essential businesses (steel making, etc.) were literally moved to the interior of the country to protect them. Bad soil, not fit for farming, brought more famine to these workers.
Everytime something went wrong, which it did almost daily, Mao had someone else blamed for it. He was the supreme leader and could not be faulted. If he had stated in his speeches that something must be done, it must, and if that something turned out wrong, one of his associates had not done it properly.
The Chinese people during these 10 years were in a revolving door. Many of them simply kept their heads down and tried to sneak through life unnoticed. Every few days, things changed. What you were to believe and profess one day was treason the next. There was no rhyme or reason to who might be taken to jail at any time. Other people took advantage of the changes to get even with anyone who had crossed them at any time in their lives. However, they had to worry that, when the tables turned, they would be the victims.
Dikotter does a wonderful job of making these twists and turns understandable (which is more than the Chinese going through them could). He uses the people's memoirs, interviews, diary excerpts, whenever he can to give a good picture of how the average Chinese lived through the mess. In a way, it's amazing that they could, but when you look at it, it's just about the same today. People can only shrug their shoulders, roll their eyes at the stupidity of the government and hold their tongues.
August 5, 2018
Like the other parts of Dikotter's trilogy of Chinese Communist mass murder, this book is too loaded with excessive anecdotes and minor characters. The chronology of events, which is so essential in a complicated and evolving story such as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, is winding and often backslides without explanation. But Dikotter still manages to show that the Cultural Revolution should go down in history as perhaps the greatest outbreak of insanity to ever befall a nation.
The opening of this campaign that ultimately killed millions, and ruined the lives of tens of millions more, was, of all things, a theater review. Since 1962, Chairman Mao Zedong had preached a "Socialist Education Campaign" to eradicate any lingering criticism of his disastrous Great Leap Forward and capitalist culture. But in 1965, a propagandist, with the assistance of Mao, publishes a 10,000 word criticism of a play by Wu Han, a vice mayor of Beijing, accusing the play and its supporters in the party itself being secret counterrevolutionaries. By the following year, many of the major communist figures in Beijing and the Army are removed, and a "May 16th Circular" accuses the party of being infiltrated by the bourgeoisie reactionaries. Mao calls on students in Middle School, High School and University to attack the party itself and root out these cancers, while giving them free transportation to do so. He also tells the rest of society that they can't touch the students. In a fit of power, the students form "Red Guards" as pseudo-military units and begin taking over parts of party committees and municipal governments. At the same time, they hound and denounce millions in "struggle session," many to their deaths. Gradually, the Red Guards fractionalize and warring factions of each ally with warring units of the military to create a genuine civil war, yet all claiming to support Mao himself.
The burning of the British delegation in Beijing in August 1967 brings the most chaotic period of the cultural revolution to an end. Mao tells the Red Guards that they can no longer attack the military. The military, led by Lin Biao, uses the moment to consolidate control over the new revolutionary city and province committees. By December 1968, the People's Daily tells the Red Guards students who had just been rioting to move to the countryside to be educated by the masses. This is not a suggestion. Students are deported in droves to impoverished and unprepared areas to sweat out the years until Lin Biao, in mysterious circumstances, dies in a plane crash in 1971. Gradually the country return to "normal," but everyone knows the chaos and destruction unleashed to no apparent purposes discredits the party in the eyes of the nation. When Mao dies in 1976, most eyes are dry, and most are ready to move to a new way of life.
As this winding chronology should demonstrate, the cultural revolution was really a series of different movements and revolutions and battles, most of them springing seemingly ex nihilo out of the Chairman's head (to be generous) or out of the chaotic flow of events. Dikotter often does a terrible job of keeping to a chronology or explaining the importance of events as he describes them. Yet it is a story like no others, one everyone in and outside China should know.
The opening of this campaign that ultimately killed millions, and ruined the lives of tens of millions more, was, of all things, a theater review. Since 1962, Chairman Mao Zedong had preached a "Socialist Education Campaign" to eradicate any lingering criticism of his disastrous Great Leap Forward and capitalist culture. But in 1965, a propagandist, with the assistance of Mao, publishes a 10,000 word criticism of a play by Wu Han, a vice mayor of Beijing, accusing the play and its supporters in the party itself being secret counterrevolutionaries. By the following year, many of the major communist figures in Beijing and the Army are removed, and a "May 16th Circular" accuses the party of being infiltrated by the bourgeoisie reactionaries. Mao calls on students in Middle School, High School and University to attack the party itself and root out these cancers, while giving them free transportation to do so. He also tells the rest of society that they can't touch the students. In a fit of power, the students form "Red Guards" as pseudo-military units and begin taking over parts of party committees and municipal governments. At the same time, they hound and denounce millions in "struggle session," many to their deaths. Gradually, the Red Guards fractionalize and warring factions of each ally with warring units of the military to create a genuine civil war, yet all claiming to support Mao himself.
The burning of the British delegation in Beijing in August 1967 brings the most chaotic period of the cultural revolution to an end. Mao tells the Red Guards that they can no longer attack the military. The military, led by Lin Biao, uses the moment to consolidate control over the new revolutionary city and province committees. By December 1968, the People's Daily tells the Red Guards students who had just been rioting to move to the countryside to be educated by the masses. This is not a suggestion. Students are deported in droves to impoverished and unprepared areas to sweat out the years until Lin Biao, in mysterious circumstances, dies in a plane crash in 1971. Gradually the country return to "normal," but everyone knows the chaos and destruction unleashed to no apparent purposes discredits the party in the eyes of the nation. When Mao dies in 1976, most eyes are dry, and most are ready to move to a new way of life.
As this winding chronology should demonstrate, the cultural revolution was really a series of different movements and revolutions and battles, most of them springing seemingly ex nihilo out of the Chairman's head (to be generous) or out of the chaotic flow of events. Dikotter often does a terrible job of keeping to a chronology or explaining the importance of events as he describes them. Yet it is a story like no others, one everyone in and outside China should know.
July 12, 2024
Zaczęłam trylogię od ostatniego tomu, ale wszystkie można czytać tak naprawdę osobno. Świetna książka, bardzo przesiąknięta polityką i osobistymi relacjami Mao z poszczególnymi politykami. Dogłębna analiza Rewolucji Kulturalnej, chociaż większy nacisk został położny na przedstawienie zmian zachodzących w partii, przez co widzimy rewolucję przede wszystkim oczami polityków.
May 31, 2016
Frank Dikötter's The Cultural Revolution: A People's History 1962-1976 completes the trilogy begun with 2010's Mao's Great Famine and continued in 2013 with a prequel volume, The Tragedy of Liberation. While I have not had the opportunity to read these earlier, highly-regarded works, his narrative history of the Cultural Revolution manages to hold up well as an independent volume analyzing the period.
Indeed, most Westerners will have certain images in mind regarding the Cultural Revolution, namely the Little Red Book, Red Guards marching brazenly through the streets, and the systematic destruction of much of China's ancient heritage in an attempt to bring China firmly into line with socialist ideology as espoused by Chairman Mao("Mao Zedong Thought"). While these are all part of what turns out to be a quite disturbing picture, Dikötter goes to great length to emphasize the human scale of the tragedy which, although nowhere near the colossal disaster of the Great Leap Forward in terms of sheer numeric scale, exceeds that tragedy in its current repercussions and ability to undermine the Chinese Communist Party, as much of what Dikötter writes casts the largest political party to have ever existed, aside from India's BJP, in an exceedingly negative light.
In terms of his argument, Dikötter portrays Mao as using the Cultural Revolution as a means to consolidate what had increasingly become a weakening grip on the Party. While many of the author's attempts to create parallels between Stalin's predicament in the 1930's and Mao's in the 1960's seem forced and short on elaboration, he is able to convincingly demonstrate how Mao might have been sidelined during this time. However, Dikötter effectively explains how Mao used the charge of revisionism à la Khrushchev in order to silence opposition and to place potential reformers firmly on the defensive.
Once the Red Years begin(1966-1968), it is challenging indeed to envision any political opposition forming, as what were sporadic and improvised attacks on intellectuals, artists, and "bourgeois elements" turn into a systematic, highly-organized attempt to "destroy all remnants of old society." Again, Dikötter overstrains analogies-this time with the Nazi plunder of Paris-yet his point is solid. He writes, "What the Nazis did not burn, they cherished, but the same could not be said of the Red Guards. The vast majority of the loot was left to rot." No mention is made by the author of the contrast in situation-the Nazis were attempting to pacify a restive enemy while the Red Guards perceived themselves as an elite, purifying force within a larger, depoliticized population-yet, that the Red Guards displayed a contempt for elements of traditional culture cannot be argued.
Much has been made of Dikötter's sources, many of which are used here for the first time. I found them compelling and humanizing, but specialists might find them off-putting. Furthermore, the work's final chapters are its weakest, as Mao recedes from the spotlight, so does the urgency of Dikötter's narrative. Yet still, for a general readership, Dikötter's work will be essential reading for years to come.
Indeed, most Westerners will have certain images in mind regarding the Cultural Revolution, namely the Little Red Book, Red Guards marching brazenly through the streets, and the systematic destruction of much of China's ancient heritage in an attempt to bring China firmly into line with socialist ideology as espoused by Chairman Mao("Mao Zedong Thought"). While these are all part of what turns out to be a quite disturbing picture, Dikötter goes to great length to emphasize the human scale of the tragedy which, although nowhere near the colossal disaster of the Great Leap Forward in terms of sheer numeric scale, exceeds that tragedy in its current repercussions and ability to undermine the Chinese Communist Party, as much of what Dikötter writes casts the largest political party to have ever existed, aside from India's BJP, in an exceedingly negative light.
In terms of his argument, Dikötter portrays Mao as using the Cultural Revolution as a means to consolidate what had increasingly become a weakening grip on the Party. While many of the author's attempts to create parallels between Stalin's predicament in the 1930's and Mao's in the 1960's seem forced and short on elaboration, he is able to convincingly demonstrate how Mao might have been sidelined during this time. However, Dikötter effectively explains how Mao used the charge of revisionism à la Khrushchev in order to silence opposition and to place potential reformers firmly on the defensive.
Once the Red Years begin(1966-1968), it is challenging indeed to envision any political opposition forming, as what were sporadic and improvised attacks on intellectuals, artists, and "bourgeois elements" turn into a systematic, highly-organized attempt to "destroy all remnants of old society." Again, Dikötter overstrains analogies-this time with the Nazi plunder of Paris-yet his point is solid. He writes, "What the Nazis did not burn, they cherished, but the same could not be said of the Red Guards. The vast majority of the loot was left to rot." No mention is made by the author of the contrast in situation-the Nazis were attempting to pacify a restive enemy while the Red Guards perceived themselves as an elite, purifying force within a larger, depoliticized population-yet, that the Red Guards displayed a contempt for elements of traditional culture cannot be argued.
Much has been made of Dikötter's sources, many of which are used here for the first time. I found them compelling and humanizing, but specialists might find them off-putting. Furthermore, the work's final chapters are its weakest, as Mao recedes from the spotlight, so does the urgency of Dikötter's narrative. Yet still, for a general readership, Dikötter's work will be essential reading for years to come.
February 19, 2019
An excellent history of one of China's political upheavals. Frank Dikötter does an excellent job of combining primary sources and daily life into a clear, dramatic, and very accessible history.
I won't reprise the Cultural Revolution here. The Wikipedia entry is a good starting place. Suffice to say that Mao, fading from power, launched a chaotic series of events upon China which he more or less managed to control. The CR let Mao rebuild his power immensely at the cost of economic, personal, and cultural devastation.
Several points in particular struck me.
First, the role of the army. Dikötter sees the People's Liberation Army playing a key role in the Revolution, stepping in to manage chaos, while not being ordered into position by Mao. At times the state becomes a military regime. Lin Biao emerges from the narrative as an ambitious yet fragile player, Mao's number two, a potential Caesar undone by a still obscure plot.
Second, the role of war fever. After the revolution thundered for a couple of years, Mao added fears of conflict with both the USSR and USA. Slight yet significant armed clashes triggered a nation-wide panic. Huge amounts of industry were relocated into central China. Extensive underground tunnels were dug, not always well. And, of course, even more power accumulated in Mao's hands.
Third, the 1950s' Great Leap Forward disasters continued into the 60s. Mass starvation, peasant suspicion of the state, economic devastation all persisted. The CR tried to overwrite the GLP, as it were, and didn't always succeed. When the Cultural Revolution ended unresolved Great Leap Forward issues remained.
Fourth, student life was insane to a possibly unique level in world history. Mao kicked off the CR by giving students, including middle schoolers, a revolutionary remit. Students formed into Red Guards who pledged themselves to Mao then terrorized their communities, schools included. Once Mao got what he wanted from this period, he then send millions of those students to work in rural drudgery and suffering. I'm still trying to imagine what kind of adults that combined experience formed.
Fifth, the sheer contrast with what will happen next. After Mao dies and the Gang of Four fall, Deng led China into a strange future, a hybrid of communism and capitalism that became history's greatest upward arc. Never had so many people moved out of poverty, so many factories - entire cities! - built. After the Cultural Revolution's chaos and bitterness comes a golden age, at least in terms of economic growth and political stability.
As a Soviet studies buff, I was also struck by the persistence of Khrushchev as a kind of revisionist character.
Obviously recommended for anyone with interest in China or 20th century history. Also for anyone with an interest in history.
I won't reprise the Cultural Revolution here. The Wikipedia entry is a good starting place. Suffice to say that Mao, fading from power, launched a chaotic series of events upon China which he more or less managed to control. The CR let Mao rebuild his power immensely at the cost of economic, personal, and cultural devastation.
Several points in particular struck me.
First, the role of the army. Dikötter sees the People's Liberation Army playing a key role in the Revolution, stepping in to manage chaos, while not being ordered into position by Mao. At times the state becomes a military regime. Lin Biao emerges from the narrative as an ambitious yet fragile player, Mao's number two, a potential Caesar undone by a still obscure plot.
Second, the role of war fever. After the revolution thundered for a couple of years, Mao added fears of conflict with both the USSR and USA. Slight yet significant armed clashes triggered a nation-wide panic. Huge amounts of industry were relocated into central China. Extensive underground tunnels were dug, not always well. And, of course, even more power accumulated in Mao's hands.
Third, the 1950s' Great Leap Forward disasters continued into the 60s. Mass starvation, peasant suspicion of the state, economic devastation all persisted. The CR tried to overwrite the GLP, as it were, and didn't always succeed. When the Cultural Revolution ended unresolved Great Leap Forward issues remained.
Fourth, student life was insane to a possibly unique level in world history. Mao kicked off the CR by giving students, including middle schoolers, a revolutionary remit. Students formed into Red Guards who pledged themselves to Mao then terrorized their communities, schools included. Once Mao got what he wanted from this period, he then send millions of those students to work in rural drudgery and suffering. I'm still trying to imagine what kind of adults that combined experience formed.
Fifth, the sheer contrast with what will happen next. After Mao dies and the Gang of Four fall, Deng led China into a strange future, a hybrid of communism and capitalism that became history's greatest upward arc. Never had so many people moved out of poverty, so many factories - entire cities! - built. After the Cultural Revolution's chaos and bitterness comes a golden age, at least in terms of economic growth and political stability.
As a Soviet studies buff, I was also struck by the persistence of Khrushchev as a kind of revisionist character.
Obviously recommended for anyone with interest in China or 20th century history. Also for anyone with an interest in history.
June 23, 2016
It’s a good book, but one I heard trouble following at times. It finishes up a trilogy Dikotter wrote on China under Mao – a heavily critical trilogy to put it mildly. Then again – it’s hard to be critical of Mao given how badly he bungled China.
Dikotter begins by noting that Mao had two intertwined goals: 1) create his vision o the socialist world free of revision, and 2) revenge on those party leaders who sidelined him after the Great Leap Forward fiasco. Death toll estimates vary wildly, but usually it’s believed that 1.5 to 2 million died, with many more lives ruined.
Mao never liked reform that wasn’t aggressive, and did the 100 Flowers Campaign as a way to make China go his way – but it backfired. Mao saw his opponents as Chinese Khrushschevs – people he couldn’t trust. In the opening parts of the book, the concern over a Chinese Khrushchev comes up repeatedly. There was a chance to dump Mao after the Great Leap, but it didn’t happen. Mao apologized for his mistakes at a big party meeting, but did so in a way that opened the door for other party leaders to do likewise. There was a punishment campaign on the underground economy – a Socialist Education Campaign – that cost over 700,000 lives. Liu Shaoqi was in charge. Deng ran the post-100 Flowers anti-rightist campaign. Thus when The Cultural Revolution got going, plenty wanted to take aim at them.
Mao began to criticize art. He didn’t believe in “art for art’s sake.” It always had an agenda, and some he didn’t like the message. He also promoted the cult of Lei Feng. This shifted to an attack on the Four Olds: old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits. The Red Guards went into action and destroyed much. There was even a massacre of cats. The outburts lasted only a few weeks but left a big mark. The uniformity and plainness became required – clothes, hair, food. Many categories of people became unemployed (like florists). 2-5 billion Mao buttons were made, using up much of the nation’s aluminum. The Red Guards were given free travel for a spell, which had some background class resentments against them. It also caused a meningitis epidemic that killed 160,000.
The rebels began – kids of bad class background (“born black”). The red/black meaning shifts, though, when Mao saw the Red Guards as to feudal in their stressing of their famly backgrounds. Now party leaders became targeted by the new wave. It was rebels versus royalists. Mao tapped into a deep pool of resentment – much aimed at Deng and Liu. These new guards wanted to be seen as true revolutionaries.
Big battles broke out in Shanghai. The economy was badly hurt and fragmented. Mao saw to the smashing of courts, police, and prosecutions. The army took over, and was suspicious of all the guards. The army opposed the Cultural Revolution’s leaders, but Mao got the support of Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao. Mao bullied down the military leaders. By June 1967, the nation’s economy was in chaos. The movement itself was splintering. Rebels assaulted army arsenals and military commands. Armed battles went on, often over personal vendettas. Embassies were attacked and threatened – and that’s when things went too far.
Maso saw the danger and promised to reign it in. The Cultural Revolution’s posters were taken down. A new faction emerged: those disaffected by all the CR. The Cult of Mao was increased, and the CCP’s prestige down. The loyalty dance and Mao statues rose. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao waged a proxy war. Liu Shaoqi was expelled from the CCP. A campaign went on to ferret out class enemies and clear the ranks. 68,000 enemies were found in Beijing alone in the summer of 1968. Teachers were now harassed by Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams instead o Red Guards. Many died and many committed suicide due to this campaign.
The students were told to go to the countryside to learn. Illusions were shattered. Many lacked food and were destitute. Many died of disease, hunger, and suicide. 18-20 million were banished to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. Border battles with the USSR happened, leading the militarization of China. Lin Biao’s power peaked. Tunnels were built for possible war. Almost everyone heleped build shelters. Factories were built deep in the infrastructure. It was called “the Third Front.” A massive investment, it was 2/3 of all of China’s industrial investment from 1964-71. There was a campaign for self-reliance.
Zhou Enlai was protected in a new purge. Liu Shaoqui died. Millions were persecuted – maybe as many as 16 million. It was to create a docile population. Mao became suspicious of Lin Biao, and he fled. They disagreed with Mao’s new line to America, among other things.
After Lin Biao died, Nixon visited and some purged came back. The military’s role declined. The economy was in poor shape with 200,000,00 suffering some degree of malnutrition. Places started taking on elements of the market economy. This was caused by division atop of China. Radial collectivists were ousted. The underground economy and underground movement of people was HUGE. AN underground society also emerged: traditional culture survived. Illicit radio listening went on. The strength of the family and religion survived. Mao pulled back and sorta had an anti-Zhou Enlai campaign. Jing Qing overreached and Deng ended up the most important person under Mao. Then Mao shifted to the left and an anti-Deng movement occurred. Then they all died and Deng came to power.
The author argues that economic change pre-dated Deng. The last part was the weakest, though, as it was all tacked on and given short shrift. The earlier parts were a little confusing, as it wasn’t always clear who was up and down. Then again, the Cultural Revolution itself was confusing. It’s an OK book, but a bit disappointing.
Dikotter begins by noting that Mao had two intertwined goals: 1) create his vision o the socialist world free of revision, and 2) revenge on those party leaders who sidelined him after the Great Leap Forward fiasco. Death toll estimates vary wildly, but usually it’s believed that 1.5 to 2 million died, with many more lives ruined.
Mao never liked reform that wasn’t aggressive, and did the 100 Flowers Campaign as a way to make China go his way – but it backfired. Mao saw his opponents as Chinese Khrushschevs – people he couldn’t trust. In the opening parts of the book, the concern over a Chinese Khrushchev comes up repeatedly. There was a chance to dump Mao after the Great Leap, but it didn’t happen. Mao apologized for his mistakes at a big party meeting, but did so in a way that opened the door for other party leaders to do likewise. There was a punishment campaign on the underground economy – a Socialist Education Campaign – that cost over 700,000 lives. Liu Shaoqi was in charge. Deng ran the post-100 Flowers anti-rightist campaign. Thus when The Cultural Revolution got going, plenty wanted to take aim at them.
Mao began to criticize art. He didn’t believe in “art for art’s sake.” It always had an agenda, and some he didn’t like the message. He also promoted the cult of Lei Feng. This shifted to an attack on the Four Olds: old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits. The Red Guards went into action and destroyed much. There was even a massacre of cats. The outburts lasted only a few weeks but left a big mark. The uniformity and plainness became required – clothes, hair, food. Many categories of people became unemployed (like florists). 2-5 billion Mao buttons were made, using up much of the nation’s aluminum. The Red Guards were given free travel for a spell, which had some background class resentments against them. It also caused a meningitis epidemic that killed 160,000.
The rebels began – kids of bad class background (“born black”). The red/black meaning shifts, though, when Mao saw the Red Guards as to feudal in their stressing of their famly backgrounds. Now party leaders became targeted by the new wave. It was rebels versus royalists. Mao tapped into a deep pool of resentment – much aimed at Deng and Liu. These new guards wanted to be seen as true revolutionaries.
Big battles broke out in Shanghai. The economy was badly hurt and fragmented. Mao saw to the smashing of courts, police, and prosecutions. The army took over, and was suspicious of all the guards. The army opposed the Cultural Revolution’s leaders, but Mao got the support of Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao. Mao bullied down the military leaders. By June 1967, the nation’s economy was in chaos. The movement itself was splintering. Rebels assaulted army arsenals and military commands. Armed battles went on, often over personal vendettas. Embassies were attacked and threatened – and that’s when things went too far.
Maso saw the danger and promised to reign it in. The Cultural Revolution’s posters were taken down. A new faction emerged: those disaffected by all the CR. The Cult of Mao was increased, and the CCP’s prestige down. The loyalty dance and Mao statues rose. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao waged a proxy war. Liu Shaoqi was expelled from the CCP. A campaign went on to ferret out class enemies and clear the ranks. 68,000 enemies were found in Beijing alone in the summer of 1968. Teachers were now harassed by Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams instead o Red Guards. Many died and many committed suicide due to this campaign.
The students were told to go to the countryside to learn. Illusions were shattered. Many lacked food and were destitute. Many died of disease, hunger, and suicide. 18-20 million were banished to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. Border battles with the USSR happened, leading the militarization of China. Lin Biao’s power peaked. Tunnels were built for possible war. Almost everyone heleped build shelters. Factories were built deep in the infrastructure. It was called “the Third Front.” A massive investment, it was 2/3 of all of China’s industrial investment from 1964-71. There was a campaign for self-reliance.
Zhou Enlai was protected in a new purge. Liu Shaoqui died. Millions were persecuted – maybe as many as 16 million. It was to create a docile population. Mao became suspicious of Lin Biao, and he fled. They disagreed with Mao’s new line to America, among other things.
After Lin Biao died, Nixon visited and some purged came back. The military’s role declined. The economy was in poor shape with 200,000,00 suffering some degree of malnutrition. Places started taking on elements of the market economy. This was caused by division atop of China. Radial collectivists were ousted. The underground economy and underground movement of people was HUGE. AN underground society also emerged: traditional culture survived. Illicit radio listening went on. The strength of the family and religion survived. Mao pulled back and sorta had an anti-Zhou Enlai campaign. Jing Qing overreached and Deng ended up the most important person under Mao. Then Mao shifted to the left and an anti-Deng movement occurred. Then they all died and Deng came to power.
The author argues that economic change pre-dated Deng. The last part was the weakest, though, as it was all tacked on and given short shrift. The earlier parts were a little confusing, as it wasn’t always clear who was up and down. Then again, the Cultural Revolution itself was confusing. It’s an OK book, but a bit disappointing.
April 8, 2022
昨晚听了一个文革背景的恐怖故事，这是那个人妖颠倒年代发生的千千万万悲剧中的又一个真实的恐怖故事，可以被纳入我的文革恐怖故事英译集里。我就用这个故事当做书评，以此来铭记一下那个群魔乱舞的年代。故事被我稍作修改。
讲的是，60年代末文革高潮期的某一年某一天，一个20几岁年轻貌美的初中女教师被批斗。因为她是混血儿，所以特别漂亮，也正因为是混血儿，被打为特务间谍，而她的丈夫“罪名”更重。这位女教师姓英。英老师被连续当众批斗了好几天，直到有一天，她在批斗台上流产了。是的，裤子上，脚下都是血。于是英老师被送到医务室，被“简单处理”后，又被投入监房，连医院都不送去。英老师并没有因为流产和失血而死，但这为她迎来后面更悲惨的遭遇。
批斗的人当中有个叫王晖的年轻红卫兵头子，18岁，高中生，在现在看来可以用恶贯满盈来形容。在英老师刚被押上台的第一刻，他就对这个美女老师有了邪恶念头。在英老师流产后再次被扔进监房的那天起，王晖就要求亲自审问，并且是在夜里单独审问英老师。
然后，我就简单直接的说了。王晖从此每晚强暴、���虐和殴打英老师，把她折磨的体无完肤。二十几天后，王晖终于玩腻了，而英老师也成了活鬼，如同一具包着皮的骷髅，遍体鳞伤，奄奄一息。英老师被组织“改造”完毕后送回了家。她的丈夫和他们所在居民区的其他大多数居民则早已被发配新疆劳改，结果当然也是被折磨致死。
又过了一个多月，邻居终于闻到从英老师家传出的臭味。由于英老师家的门窗关的很紧，尸体被发现着实晚了很多。当英老师的尸体被抬出来时，所有在场目睹的人都吓得奔溃，就连四十几岁的大汉也被惊得后退和倒吸冷气。英老师的尸体不是那种通常的腐尸胀气导致的巨人型，而像干尸。但是那令人作呕的恶臭却传遍了整个街区，一星期后依然可以清楚闻到。更可怖的是，她的手脚因为皮肤肌肉的剥离而显得特别长，那种恐怖诡谲的长。而英老师的头不在她的身体上，因为英老师回家当天就上吊自尽了，一个多月后尸体腐烂让身体脱离落下，头部连着部分进椎骨还挂在绳子上。
又过了几天，王晖到派出所自首，他也看上去像个活鬼。他一进入警局就跪下磕头，请求枪毙他。他一心求死是因为他彻底奔溃了，但又不敢自杀。
因为就在几天前的晚上，半夜里王晖被猛烈的敲门声吵醒，他骂骂咧咧的去开门，就在手放在门栓上时敲门声还没停下。可当他开门后发现门外一个人也没有，而看到了门口放着一个布包。他打开包袱后发现里面全是英老师在被他囚禁折磨期间的衣服和随身物品，有被他打碎的眼镜，被他弄脏撕裂的衣裤，等等。这些东西都应该在英老师家里，或者，和尸体一同被送去火化和扔掉的。他先想到的是有人整他，可想破脑袋也想不到有谁会这样做。当晚他就把这个包袱扔到很远的郊外河道里了。
第二夜，敲门声，布包，物品，原原本本的又出现在王晖的家门口。他吓闷了，但骗自己是某人在报复他，再次强作镇定连夜把这些东西又扔到了更远的郊外树林里，并且确信没有人看到。
第三夜，发生了同样的事情。王晖奔溃了，但同时把那些东西当场烧毁了，他看着它们被烧得一点不剩。
第四夜，还是敲门声，还是所有那些东西原封不动的出现在他家门口。他不敢就那样把那些东西放在门口，最终拿进了院子里，塞进了角落。
第五天，他发现那些东西没了，除了他没人知道这个布包和这些东西。难道放布包的人进来拿走了？
第五夜，敲门声，布包，物品，再次出现在他家门口……
王晖向警察坦白了这些之后，还交待了他在其他批斗活动中，强奸、凌虐妇女，和其他见不得人的所作所为。后面发生的是，因为特殊时期，并且他承认罪行和一心求死，法院很快走了流程，满足了他
唉，真是太便宜他了
讲的是，60年代末文革高潮期的某一年某一天，一个20几岁年轻貌美的初中女教师被批斗。因为她是混血儿，所以特别漂亮，也正因为是混血儿，被打为特务间谍，而她的丈夫“罪名”更重。这位女教师姓英。英老师被连续当众批斗了好几天，直到有一天，她在批斗台上流产了。是的，裤子上，脚下都是血。于是英老师被送到医务室，被“简单处理”后，又被投入监房，连医院都不送去。英老师并没有因为流产和失血而死，但这为她迎来后面更悲惨的遭遇。
批斗的人当中有个叫王晖的年轻红卫兵头子，18岁，高中生，在现在看来可以用恶贯满盈来形容。在英老师刚被押上台的第一刻，他就对这个美女老师有了邪恶念头。在英老师流产后再次被扔进监房的那天起，王晖就要求亲自审问，并且是在夜里单独审问英老师。
然后，我就简单直接的说了。王晖从此每晚强暴、���虐和殴打英老师，把她折磨的体无完肤。二十几天后，王晖终于玩腻了，而英老师也成了活鬼，如同一具包着皮的骷髅，遍体鳞伤，奄奄一息。英老师被组织“改造”完毕后送回了家。她的丈夫和他们所在居民区的其他大多数居民则早已被发配新疆劳改，结果当然也是被折磨致死。
又过了一个多月，邻居终于闻到从英老师家传出的臭味。由于英老师家的门窗关的很紧，尸体被发现着实晚了很多。当英老师的尸体被抬出来时，所有在场目睹的人都吓得奔溃，就连四十几岁的大汉也被惊得后退和倒吸冷气。英老师的尸体不是那种通常的腐尸胀气导致的巨人型，而像干尸。但是那令人作呕的恶臭却传遍了整个街区，一星期后依然可以清楚闻到。更可怖的是，她的手脚因为皮肤肌肉的剥离而显得特别长，那种恐怖诡谲的长。而英老师的头不在她的身体上，因为英老师回家当天就上吊自尽了，一个多月后尸体腐烂让身体脱离落下，头部连着部分进椎骨还挂在绳子上。
又过了几天，王晖到派出所自首，他也看上去像个活鬼。他一进入警局就跪下磕头，请求枪毙他。他一心求死是因为他彻底奔溃了，但又不敢自杀。
因为就在几天前的晚上，半夜里王晖被猛烈的敲门声吵醒，他骂骂咧咧的去开门，就在手放在门栓上时敲门声还没停下。可当他开门后发现门外一个人也没有，而看到了门口放着一个布包。他打开包袱后发现里面全是英老师在被他囚禁折磨期间的衣服和随身物品，有被他打碎的眼镜，被他弄脏撕裂的衣裤，等等。这些东西都应该在英老师家里，或者，和尸体一同被送去火化和扔掉的。他先想到的是有人整他，可想破脑袋也想不到有谁会这样做。当晚他就把这个包袱扔到很远的郊外河道里了。
第二夜，敲门声，布包，物品，原原本本的又出现在王晖的家门口。他吓闷了，但骗自己是某人在报复他，再次强作镇定连夜把这些东西又扔到了更远的郊外树林里，并且确信没有人看到。
第三夜，发生了同样的事情。王晖奔溃了，但同时把那些东西当场烧毁了，他看着它们被烧得一点不剩。
第四夜，还是敲门声，还是所有那些东西原封不动的出现在他家门口。他不敢就那样把那些东西放在门口，最终拿进了院子里，塞进了角落。
第五天，他发现那些东西没了，除了他没人知道这个布包和这些东西。难道放布包的人进来拿走了？
第五夜，敲门声，布包，物品，再次出现在他家门口……
王晖向警察坦白了这些之后，还交待了他在其他批斗活动中，强奸、凌虐妇女，和其他见不得人的所作所为。后面发生的是，因为特殊时期，并且他承认罪行和一心求死，法院很快走了流程，满足了他
唉，真是太便宜他了
November 14, 2019
Before reading* Frank Dikotter’s book, my knowledge of the Cultural Revolution came mainly from photos and movie scenes of urban workers in matching cotton uniforms, students waving copies of the Little Red Book, and class enemies being marched through the streets in paper dunce caps. The actual Revolution began with such demonstrations but quickly became something much darker: a civil war between rival political militias backed by Mao and his putative successors, fought in cities large and small with rifles, machine guns, and explosives. The violence continued from 1966 to 1969, when an undeclared border war with the Soviet Union forced the central government to shift from domestic violence to civil defense. After 1970 the regime imposed martial law and forced young revolutionaries into rural re-education centers. By then, violence, terror, illness, hunger, and a destructive agricultural reform scheme had killed over 1.5 million people and trashed the nation’s economy. China came to rely on extra-legal private farms and workshops, the black market, and large-scale smuggling to feed and supply its people. The government never managed to regain the prestige it had lost, nor regain control of the economy, though Dikotter’s hasty conclusion elides its attempts to do both, particularly during the early years of Deng Xiaoping’s administration and in the post-1989 period.
* Or, rather, trudging through it. Dikotter adopts a particularly repetitive and plodding prose style.
* Or, rather, trudging through it. Dikotter adopts a particularly repetitive and plodding prose style.
June 21, 2016
Frank Dikotter's chronicle of the Chinese Cultural Revolution is splendid. The Cultural Revolution is a popular history, showing how the masses shaped Maoism and eventually forced its destruction. As one observer recorded in the book noted, the "people decided they did not want to go on living the way they were doing, and they were setting up ways to het themselves out of their predicament." This plotting loosened the state's grip on industry, commerce, and agriculture, unspooling the mission of the Cultural Revolution and Maoism. Dikotter's history underlines a crucial, oft-overlooked history of tension between the popular masses and the power-wielders in high office.
November 23, 2016
Getting through 321 pages of the Cultural Revolution is a true challenge. The author includes lots of numbers and talks about the repetitive and (seemingly) never-ending reality of purges. Even now, I am confused a little bit about when did certain purges take place, who was persecuted and why, but I assume that is exactly the point: Mao's Cultural Revolution was a one big mess. If I were to change anything on this book, then to make it shorter and more concise (in terms of wording), but otherwise, very well written book! If you want to understand what the Cultural Revolution was about, then it's a must. Dikötter is a true expert in his discipline :)
Want to read
July 11, 2020
圖一：當年文化大革命中共宣傳樣版
圖二：當年眾多口號、標語宣傳畫中的一幅
一、文革的聖經是《毛語錄》，也就是圖一解放軍手中拿的那本紅色小冊子。想當年《毛語錄》是人人一本在手，人人朗朗上口。
二、威脅毛澤東地位的「劉少奇集團」在此運動中全數遭到整肅。而為了避嫌，這才附帶整肅了一批無辜的權貴。
三、文革後建立毛澤東在中國至高無上，再也無法撼動的絕對領導地位。
請睜大眼睛看清楚：毛澤東發動文革的動機就是玉石俱焚──假如不讓他當中國的最高領導人，他不惜把整個國家砸個稀巴爛！
文革徹徹底底把中國砸了個稀巴爛──危害之深、之重、之巨，可能中國數百年都無法回復元氣！然而，把整個國家砸個稀巴爛──講起來容易，做起來難──毛澤東是如何做到的？
他把整個國家帶入一種「沒有法治，讓人民為所欲為，把獸性發揮到極致」的混亂狀態。
混亂才能帶來機會，混亂也是冒險家的天堂！
可是，誰是傻瓜，會跟著他一起混亂？
年長的人有事業基礎，有家庭負擔，也有見識，看透了世間人情冷暖。這種人不容易煽動、難以效忠，更不會拚命。
只能利用年輕人！
年輕人涉世未深，容易受騙。
年輕人什麼都沒有，為了追逐一點成就感，敢於拚命。
年輕人血氣方剛，充滿了理想抱負，最容易挑起激情。
假如你熟讀史書，會明白在造反團體之中，都是以年輕人，甚至是幼童的組織最為激烈、最為忠心、最為拚命，也最沒有人性、殘酷到了極點。
毛澤東必然了解這個道理。
於是，文革的主角──紅衛兵──就選定了十幾歲的年輕學生。
今天類似的政治鬥爭不也發生在台灣？
若是不信，請想一想：2016年總統大選，目前在野誰的呼聲最高？
如何確保能贏？
當然是經濟越糟越好、社會越亂越好、人民對政府的不滿越高越好──不是嗎？
管他社會是動亂或走向毀滅，那全都是次要的。
重要的是贏得2016年的執政權！
是不是這樣？
——黃河《文革在台灣》2014/3/26
一、誰發動文革，動機是什麼？
毫無疑問，發動文革的是毛澤東。
一九八一年舉行的中共第十一屆中央委員會，第六次全體會議一致通過，毛澤東應為文革「負上責任」，文化大革命是一場由領導者錯誤發動，被反革命集團利用，給黨、國家和各族人民帶來嚴重災難的內亂。
接著問題來了，毛澤東為什麼要發動文革？
這得要回到文革發動之初（一九六六年），中國大陸的政治背景。
一九四九年中共建國，開始幾年大刀闊斧地改革，的確做了一些事，也有幾分成果，給全國人民帶來美好的希望。
可惜毛澤東好大喜功，不滿意當時進步的速度，在一九五八年提出「加快社會主義建設速度」，緊接著推動一連串錯誤的政策──成立人民公社，推動大躍進、大煉鋼。
最糟糕的是大煉鋼。全國九千萬農民被徵召進入煉鋼場，農業生產停滯，最終導致全國性、延續三年之久，兩千萬到五千萬人民餓死的大饑荒。
餓死兩千萬到五千萬人，其他熬過來的人會好過嗎？
不也是苟活在飢餓、瀕臨死亡的邊緣？
全國人民即使不被餓死，也必須勒緊褲帶，持續在飢餓的邊緣掙扎，苦苦熬了三年。
這項嚴重的錯誤，導致毛澤東的政治地位下滑，經濟問題退居決策的第二線。
決策的第一線，交給當時的國家主席劉少奇，以及中央書記處總書記鄧小平。他們挺身而出，堅持修訂大躍進的部分政策，解散公社，實行三自一包。
三自就是「自留地、自由市場、自負盈虧」，一包是「包產到戶」。
簡單地說，��本徹底吃大鍋飯、高唱理想的「共產制度」，如今做了調整，加入較適合人性，也比較實用的「小資本主義」。
這項修正挽救了中共瀕臨破產的經濟，帶給人民一口喘息的機會。
自此以後，劉少奇在中共的權力愈益鞏固、地位日漸爬升。
一九六二年，在北京召開的中共「中央工作擴大會議」，劉少奇集合七千位中共重要幹部，在大會上他代表中共中央向大會報告，提出總結經驗教訓的問題，公然糾正毛澤東三面紅旗的錯誤。
三面紅旗就是「總路線、大躍進、人民公社」。
毛澤東在會上講話，作了自我檢討，承認中央（他自己）犯了主觀主義和脫離群眾的錯誤。
相片二：劉少奇玉照
這次大會劉少奇沒有出面承擔「一線工作」的領導責任，卻提出「三分天災、七分人禍」的說法。
七分人禍是誰？
毛澤���自我檢討在先，七分人禍的責任歸屬大家就心知肚明了。
這次大會的政治意義，是中共領導階層的實力派（劉少奇），發動對毛澤東的公然挑戰。
接下來三年，一直到文革發動以前，中共領導階層基本上分成兩派鬥爭。
一派是作風務實、掌握實權的劉少奇，另一派是高唱理論、有名無權的毛澤東。
兩派人馬有點像今天台灣的藍綠內鬥，反正你說東，我就說西；你說西，我就說東。
然而，理論終究擋不過實權，毛澤東在中共的領導地位岌岌可危。
一九六四年全國工作會議上，毛澤東試圖起死回生，就「四清、五反」問題進行批評。劉少奇與鄧小平毫不客氣地反擊，兩派激烈矛盾，也造成從此與毛澤東公開決裂的關係。
同年底，劉少奇出席第三屆全國人民代表大會第一次會議，再次當選中華人民共和國主席，並擔任國防委員會主席。
劉少奇在黨的地位扶搖直上。
毛澤東心裡清楚，想要鞏固自己的地位，就必須除掉心腹之患劉少奇。
一山容不下二虎。
不是你，就是我。
走到必須攤牌，最後決戰的時刻了！
假如劉少奇只是一個人，這事好
辦。
可是，劉少奇代表的是「一幫子人」，而且都是當時掌權的一幫子高幹。
如果你是這時的毛澤東，請設身處地想一想，你要如何絕地大反攻？
從體制內反攻，沒有足夠的權力基礎，不敢說一定會輸，但至少沒有必贏的把握。
沒有辦法，只能從體制外下手。
他是怎麼想的呢？
舉一個簡短的例子：
幾個朋友共同出資，在精華地段成立了一家精品店，共推張三擔任店長。
店長負責店務的管理與營運。
這工作很適合張三，因為他擁有強烈的權力欲望。
可惜，張三是一個武斷、不聽建言的獨夫。
兩年過去了，生意不單沒有起色，反而每況愈下。
幾個投資朋友看不下去，建議的事情張三又不聽，於是集結了股權，軟硬兼施逼迫張三下台。
即將失勢的張三氣急敗壞，拿起大榔頭，把精品店裡的陳設和商品逐一敲碎；一邊敲，他一邊威脅：不讓我當店長，我就把整個店砸得稀巴爛！
這就是毛澤東發動文革的動機──玉石俱焚──假如不讓他當中國的最高領導人，他不惜把整個國家砸個稀巴爛！
二、文革為什麼有如此大的影響力？
前面那句話──把整個國家砸個稀巴爛──講起來容易，做起來難！
毛澤東是如何做到的呢？
他把整個國家帶入一種「沒有法治，讓人民為所欲為，把獸性發揮到極致」的混亂狀態。
混亂才能帶來機會，混亂是冒險家的天堂！
可是，誰是傻瓜，會跟著他一起混亂？
年長的人有事業基礎，有家庭負擔，也有見識，看透了世間人情冷暖。這種人不容易煽動、難以效忠，更不會拚命。
只能利用年輕人！
年輕人涉世未深，容易受騙。
年輕人什麼都沒有，為了追逐一點成就感，敢於拚命。
年輕人血氣方剛，充滿了理想抱負，最容易挑起激情。
假如你熟讀史書，會明白在造反團體之中，都是以年輕人……，甚至是幼童的組織最為激烈、最為忠心、最為拚命，也最沒有人性、殘酷到了極點。
毛澤東必然了解這個道理。
於是，文革的主角──紅衛兵──就選定了十幾歲的年輕學生。
全國有那麼多的年輕學生，管他張三李四王八趙六，管他是外向好動害羞文靜，管他上智下愚貧富貴賤……，全部要動員起來，也不是一件容易的事啊！
講到這，我不得不佩服毛澤東對人性黑暗面的了解。
假設你是十五、六歲的學生，設想一下全國發生以下狀況，假如你身處其境，會如何反應呢：
教育部宣布全國停課，每天都放假，在家沒有家庭作業，沒有考試壓力，如果接到通知再到學校開會。
來到學校，居然是鬥爭大會。
管他鬥爭的對象是誰，大家都可以指著他的鼻子罵，高聲數落他的罪狀。
開始你只是跟著別人起鬨，後來凡是你討厭的人──罰過你的訓導主任、考試太嚴的數學老師、曾經責罵你不知上進的導師……，你都可以檢舉，把他推向被清算鬥爭的行列。
再接著，鬥爭的對象擴及一般牛鬼蛇神，什麼村里幹事、警察、富農、資產階級、臭老九（知識份子）……，只要看不順眼，曾經結過仇，就想盡了方法、找盡了理由舉發。
鬥爭的手段也越來越狠，從開始的開會批判、漫罵，到後來的遊街、砸石子、吐口水、拿木棍打、拿竹鞭抽……。
假如你不狠、不敢鬥，就等著別人鬥你。
為了生存，你不得不鬥。
鬥得越凶越狠，在紅衛兵組織的地位也就越高。
至於那些往日在鄉里橫行的「惡霸、權貴」，更是要鬥。甚至大會鬥不過癮，就衝進他富有的家「打、砸、搶」，帶不走的就打爛，值錢的可以偷偷藏起來。
從開始幾十個紅衛兵合夥的「打家劫舍」，到後來為了取得武器，可以發動幾百、幾千人的小型戰鬥──偷襲警局、搶劫軍事單位的彈藥庫。
什麼市政府、消防局、交通大隊、居委會……，全都不在你的眼裡。
這些往日囂張跋扈的大人物，如今見了你，全都要鞠躬哈腰、向你問好。
有地位的紅衛兵領袖，可以和軍事單位的司令員坐下談判。他手下調度的金錢、油彈、車輛、食糧、人員……，數量大到會讓他以為自己是項羽、劉邦！
又因為大部分城市成立了一個以上的紅衛兵組織，彼此為了爭權，相互就爆發了武鬥。
這時候，整個社會已經進入到徹底的無政府、無道德、失控的狀態。
武鬥中如果抓到對方組織的女人，推到地上就強姦，接著是大家輪姦。
姦死了不單不算犯法，還是英雄。晚上的時候，你可以大聲對著眾人自豪地說：我今天Ｘ了對方幾個女人！
姦不死就集體關起來。性慾一起，開了牢門，隨便拖出一個，脫了褲子就上。
要殺就殺、要姦就姦、要搶就搶、要砸就砸……
我的天啦，這只是一群年輕、心智未開，鬍子都沒長齊的學生啊！
假如文革之初就是槍林彈雨、打打殺殺、腥風血雨，哪一個純潔的學生敢投入？
可是，毛澤東採取的是逐漸導入、無限放權……，徹底撩撥起人類的獸性，讓年輕學生一旦跨入就沒有回頭路！
毛澤東說過一句話：與天鬥，與地鬥，與人鬥，其樂無窮。
這句話不完全正確，應該再加一句：與天鬥，與地鬥，與人鬥；如果鬥贏了，其樂無窮。
很不幸，文革的鬥爭中，紅衛兵只認他們心目中的紅太陽──毛澤東。
毛澤東的箭頭指向誰，紅衛兵就瘋狂地撲向誰。
劉少奇終而中箭落馬，「劉少奇幫」也被清掃一空。
不過，那已經是十年以後的事。
大陸同胞在混亂失序、完全泯滅人性、徹底發揮獸性的惡劣環境之中，整整被折騰了十年。
十年啊，每天生活在心驚膽戰、你算我計、朝不保夕、弱肉強食的日子裡，那是何等的煎熬和痛苦！
它的影響之大，直到今天，我仍然可以在大陸同胞的行為中看到文革的餘毒──互不信任、不講誠信、不守法治、欺善怕惡。
整整被扭曲十年的人性，要花多久時間才能被導正回來？
文革啊文革，希望全人類歷史，永遠不要再出現第二個文革。
——黃河《文化大革命》2010/9/10
October 14, 2020
DNFing at 29%, for now at least. Very dense and informative but I was sick to my stomach at the content. Will come back to it sometime....maybe.
October 31, 2018
Lektura równie fascynująca co przerażająca.
October 9, 2020
Many people mistakingly think of Totalitarian societies as extremely rigid and unchanging. This perception is incorrect. Totalitarianism is chaos, for totalitarian governments seek to keep the population in constant fear, and therefore can't afford to be predictable.
Maoist China is probably the best example to illustrate this fact.
Franz Dikotter does a great job of describing the intrigue, the panic, the horror, the ridiculousness and delusionary thinking in China during cultural revolution.
I did find the careers of some of the key actors hard to follow, a lot the names got mixed up in my head.
But if you're looking to learn some valuable lessons from this bizarre period in human history, this book will provide you with the opportunity to do just that.
Maoist China is probably the best example to illustrate this fact.
Franz Dikotter does a great job of describing the intrigue, the panic, the horror, the ridiculousness and delusionary thinking in China during cultural revolution.
I did find the careers of some of the key actors hard to follow, a lot the names got mixed up in my head.
But if you're looking to learn some valuable lessons from this bizarre period in human history, this book will provide you with the opportunity to do just that.
August 23, 2021
On the shortlist of history's bloodiest and most evil dictators, Mao Zedong takes the top slot. His atrocities in China can be divided into two main events: the Great Leap Forward, a mass land and industrial collectivization drive, and the subsequent Cultural Revolution. Historian Frank Dikötter wrote excellent one-volume histories of each.
The Cultural Revolution lasted from 1966 to Mao's death in 1976. In the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward (which according to Dikötter's research killed 45 million Chinese), Mao's power and stature in the Communist Party were seriously weakened. The "Great Helmsman" decided to launch another great Communist project, this time to eradicate everything from China's past and build a new, egalitarian, Communist society from scratch. The goal was to destroy the "Four Olds": Old Ideas, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Customs.
To do this, Mao enlisted millions of university and high school students to "sweep away all monsters and demons!" as it was worded in the People's Daily. Armed with the Little Red Book (the collection of Mao's aphorisms) and full of self-righteous hatred, they banded together into street militia groups called "Red Guards." All over China, but especially in the big cities, the Red Guards went house to house smashing and burning everything -- artwork, books, interior decor, clothing, anything that smacked of the old bourgeois world from before the Revolution. Millions of older people were denounced, humiliated in public, severely beaten, and often executed for taking the "capitalist road" or other such made-up accusations. Many of these victims were fervent Communists who found themselves purged for no reason at all.
A common theme throughout the Cultural Revolution was Mao's deliberate instigation of inter-party warfare. Mao went from siding with Communist Party cadres to siding with the Red Guards and then back again. Early on he issued a famous order to the Red Guards to "bombard the headquarters" and attack and kill higher-ups in the Communist Party.
Many of these Communists, such as Liu Shaoqi, had fought with Mao for decades. Their fidelity to him was unquestionable. Nevertheless he was beaten, humiliated, and killed. Lin Biao, who wrote the forward to Mao's Little Red Book and played a decisive role in the victory of the Communist forces in the Chinese Civil War, was purged also purged. Overnight, the man who was celebrated as the #2 most powerful man in China was denounced as a "capitalist roader" and killed in a mysterious plane crash. The Chairman's contradictory and capricious swings turned the whole country into a war of all against all.
The Communist Party blanketed China with propaganda and slogans. Every city had loudspeakers that blasted Revolutionary songs and slogans from the Little Red Book at all hours of the day. Buildings were plastered with the slogan du jour. Billions of portraits of Mao were distributed worn by anyone who didn't want to get shot or beaten to death on the streets. The political climate was so dangerous that most Chinese became adept at hiding their true feelings about the Chairman and the Revolution. Nearly all went through the motions of Mao worship while inwardly resenting the Chairman and the suffering he inflicted on China. Everyone in China had suffered terribly during the Great Leap Forward the decade before, and many used the Cultural Revolution to settle personal scores.
Dikötter spent years doing research in Chinese provincial archives and interviewing eyewitnesses. His research is excellent and his narrative flows well, although it is easy for a non-specialist like me to get lost with all the Chinese names, which are difficult to keep track of.
Dikötter does an excellent job of telling the "what." He doesn't say anything about the "why," that is, the role of Communist ideology in the events. Dikötter tells us how Mao's Little Red Book was omnipresent during the Cultural Revolution, but he never describes the ideology inside. Maoism, like Marxism-Leninism, is an ideology akin to a secular religion, and no one can understand Communism without understanding its ideological underpinnings. It would have been excellent to weave in more information about Mao's ideological motivations.
The Cultural Revolution lasted from 1966 to Mao's death in 1976. In the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward (which according to Dikötter's research killed 45 million Chinese), Mao's power and stature in the Communist Party were seriously weakened. The "Great Helmsman" decided to launch another great Communist project, this time to eradicate everything from China's past and build a new, egalitarian, Communist society from scratch. The goal was to destroy the "Four Olds": Old Ideas, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Customs.
To do this, Mao enlisted millions of university and high school students to "sweep away all monsters and demons!" as it was worded in the People's Daily. Armed with the Little Red Book (the collection of Mao's aphorisms) and full of self-righteous hatred, they banded together into street militia groups called "Red Guards." All over China, but especially in the big cities, the Red Guards went house to house smashing and burning everything -- artwork, books, interior decor, clothing, anything that smacked of the old bourgeois world from before the Revolution. Millions of older people were denounced, humiliated in public, severely beaten, and often executed for taking the "capitalist road" or other such made-up accusations. Many of these victims were fervent Communists who found themselves purged for no reason at all.
A common theme throughout the Cultural Revolution was Mao's deliberate instigation of inter-party warfare. Mao went from siding with Communist Party cadres to siding with the Red Guards and then back again. Early on he issued a famous order to the Red Guards to "bombard the headquarters" and attack and kill higher-ups in the Communist Party.
Many of these Communists, such as Liu Shaoqi, had fought with Mao for decades. Their fidelity to him was unquestionable. Nevertheless he was beaten, humiliated, and killed. Lin Biao, who wrote the forward to Mao's Little Red Book and played a decisive role in the victory of the Communist forces in the Chinese Civil War, was purged also purged. Overnight, the man who was celebrated as the #2 most powerful man in China was denounced as a "capitalist roader" and killed in a mysterious plane crash. The Chairman's contradictory and capricious swings turned the whole country into a war of all against all.
The Communist Party blanketed China with propaganda and slogans. Every city had loudspeakers that blasted Revolutionary songs and slogans from the Little Red Book at all hours of the day. Buildings were plastered with the slogan du jour. Billions of portraits of Mao were distributed worn by anyone who didn't want to get shot or beaten to death on the streets. The political climate was so dangerous that most Chinese became adept at hiding their true feelings about the Chairman and the Revolution. Nearly all went through the motions of Mao worship while inwardly resenting the Chairman and the suffering he inflicted on China. Everyone in China had suffered terribly during the Great Leap Forward the decade before, and many used the Cultural Revolution to settle personal scores.
Dikötter spent years doing research in Chinese provincial archives and interviewing eyewitnesses. His research is excellent and his narrative flows well, although it is easy for a non-specialist like me to get lost with all the Chinese names, which are difficult to keep track of.
Dikötter does an excellent job of telling the "what." He doesn't say anything about the "why," that is, the role of Communist ideology in the events. Dikötter tells us how Mao's Little Red Book was omnipresent during the Cultural Revolution, but he never describes the ideology inside. Maoism, like Marxism-Leninism, is an ideology akin to a secular religion, and no one can understand Communism without understanding its ideological underpinnings. It would have been excellent to weave in more information about Mao's ideological motivations.
July 26, 2020
Mao created such a mess. Dikotter interprets Mao's every action as his obsession with control, with his own image and power. Yet I wonder how much of it is indeed Mao's sincere beliefs.
Overall the book doesn't make me feel as much shaken as the previous book Mao's Great Famine does. The stories told are still too tame. Perhaps the kind of resources/evidence seems to be under tighter control? After all, the count of deaths and physical tragedies are relatively more straightforward, while the emotional toll on human psyche no matter how great is not as easily revealed. Suicide, suicide, suicide, many were tortured physically yes, but the psychological effects that led them to utter depression? They are no longer here to tell. The ones who survive want to forget. The ones who were born later can only guess.
Overall the book doesn't make me feel as much shaken as the previous book Mao's Great Famine does. The stories told are still too tame. Perhaps the kind of resources/evidence seems to be under tighter control? After all, the count of deaths and physical tragedies are relatively more straightforward, while the emotional toll on human psyche no matter how great is not as easily revealed. Suicide, suicide, suicide, many were tortured physically yes, but the psychological effects that led them to utter depression? They are no longer here to tell. The ones who survive want to forget. The ones who were born later can only guess.
August 31, 2020
Mao really was an absolute monster. His brutal and incompetent leadership killed millions during the ironically named “Great Leap Forward” and by the mid 1960’s he was ready to show the world that he still had the power to make things worse for his country, so he inaugurated the Cultural Revolution. In this gripping book Frank Dikotter tells the whole story from the perspectives both of those who managed the Revolution and those who suffered its consequences. Mao was motivated by a desire to show that he was still in charge and that the people were still behind him, and he didn’t care that he was ruining millions of lives and damaging the economy of his country. In its early stages students were encouraged to denounce their teachers as right wingers and then to beat, torture, and sometimes even kill them. Books were burned, historical treasures destroyed. Ordinary people had their homes broken into by opportunistic thugs who robbed and vandalized with impunity.
As is usual with bouts of radical political violence, soon factions within the left began turning against each other. Every group claimed to be the true champion of socialism while its opponents were monsters, demons, and rightist counterrevolutionaries. Soon the government was chasing shadows at various levels and harassing, jailing, torturing, and driving thousands to suicide. The nightmare logic of Communist China under Mao can be seen in the story of a boy who accused his mother of being a counterrevolutionary because she burned a picture of Mao. After she was shot, he was himself persecuted for being the child of a counterrevolutionary. There was no way to win.
Mao’s attempts to destroy both human nature and Chinese culture were destined to fail. Even before Mao’s death the most resourceful people were already starting their own little businesses, and after his death capitalism, though still governed with a heavy hand, began to breakout everywhere and drive China to its current position on the world stage: wealthy, successful, but still terribly repressive politically.
As is usual with bouts of radical political violence, soon factions within the left began turning against each other. Every group claimed to be the true champion of socialism while its opponents were monsters, demons, and rightist counterrevolutionaries. Soon the government was chasing shadows at various levels and harassing, jailing, torturing, and driving thousands to suicide. The nightmare logic of Communist China under Mao can be seen in the story of a boy who accused his mother of being a counterrevolutionary because she burned a picture of Mao. After she was shot, he was himself persecuted for being the child of a counterrevolutionary. There was no way to win.
Mao’s attempts to destroy both human nature and Chinese culture were destined to fail. Even before Mao’s death the most resourceful people were already starting their own little businesses, and after his death capitalism, though still governed with a heavy hand, began to breakout everywhere and drive China to its current position on the world stage: wealthy, successful, but still terribly repressive politically.
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