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Notes from the Executive Director

Sanjyot Mehendale

As announced in the last *Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter*, the Berkeley Caucasus/Caspian littoral initiative has been institutionalized through the establishment of the Caucasus and Central Asia Studies Program (CCASP) under the auspices of the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ISEEES). I am happy to report that for the next four years, CCASP has secured funding from the National Security Education Program, as well as from the Ford Foundation through the Institute of International Studies. The NSEP grant will include funds for workshops/conferences, visiting scholars, a visiting speaker series, graduate fellowships, language training, and administrative support.

This first issue of the newly incepted *Caucasus and Central Asia Studies Program Newsletter* is published amidst a firestorm. The attacks of September 11 have catapulted the region of Central Asia to the center of world attention. Now that there is some recognition of the vital importance of this region to global politics and policies, however, Central Asia scholars must be vigilant not to allow Central Asia to be viewed solely through the lens of September 11 and the military/strategic responses thereto.

This caveat notwithstanding, the magnitude of the events have led us to devote this CCASP Newsletter in its entirety to September 11, its aftermath, and its context. Included is an article regarding the implications of the conflict for Turkey and its role in Eurasia by Ruben Safrastyan, Director of Turkish Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies in the Armenian National Academy of Sciences. Further, this issue includes the proceedings of a round-table discussion at UC Berkeley entitled, “Central Asia and Russia: Responses to the ‘War on Terrorism’,” with papers by Adrienne Edgar, Edward Walker, Vadim Volkov, and Gail Lapidus.

The newly constituted program will report directly to ISEEES Director Professor Victoria Bonnell. The program will also work closely with Barbara Voytek, Executive Director of ISEEES, and Edward Walker, Executive Director of the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies and director of the recent Caucasus/Caspian littoral initiative. CCASP activities will be overseen by a faculty committee which includes Professors Harsha Ram and Johanna Nichols, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures; Leslie Peirce, History and Near Eastern Studies;

Guitty Azarpay and David Stronach, Near Eastern Studies; Victoria Bonnell, Sociology; and Stephan Astourian, Visiting Professor of Armenian Studies.

CCAsP will have a very broad regional focus, encompassing the Caucasus region and the five Soviet successor states in Central Asia—Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—as well as Xinjiang Province in western China, Mongolia, and the smaller republics of Buryatia, Tuva, Gorno-Altai, and Khakassiya. In addition, CCAsP will emphasize a cross-disciplinary approach to the regions, aiming to bring together scholars who have traditionally worked in different area studies programs and departments. CCAsP will continue the erstwhile Caucasus/Caspian Littoral initiative's focus on contemporary developments in the region, but it will also include an expanded interest in the region's histories.

Thanks to support from the Ford Foundation, in 2001, CCAsP was able to organize a visiting speaker series as well as a conference titled "Central Asia Palimpsest: (Re) Emerging Identities and New Global Imprints" which took place in April. The Ford Foundation grant will support the organization of a conference titled "Currents, Cross-Currents, and Conflict: Transnationalism and Diaspora in the Caucasus and Central Asia" to be held March 16-17, 2002, as well as providing funds for visiting scholars. CCAsP is also organizing a panel discussion on the impact of September 11 on Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, entitled "From 1991 to 9-11: A Decade of Independence in the Caucasus," to be held in April 2002.

CCAsP will coordinate its activities with ISEEES and BPS and also with other departments and units on campus such as Slavic Languages and Literatures, Near Eastern Studies, the Townsend Center's Central Asia/Silk Road Working Group and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

In addition to collaboration with academic units on campus, in 2002 CCAsP will be working with Cal Performances to organize residency activities around the Silk Road Project of cellist Yo Yo Ma. Yo Yo Ma and his Silk Road music ensemble will be on the UC Berkeley campus in late April 2002. In conjunction with this visit, CCAsP has organized a two-day conference, April 22-23, tentatively titled "A Musical Journey Along the Silk Roads." The conference will bring together academics, musicians, and composers to create a forum on cultural exchanges along the ancient and modern Silk Roads.

Further, in partnership with the Electronic Cultural Atlas Initiative (ECAI) at UC Berkeley, CCAsP hopes to develop a digital resource regarding Central Asia and the Caucasus. Its first projects will include the digitization of pre-1979 images of Afghanistan, as well as the creation of historical and cultural maps of the region. These resources will be publicly accessible over the Internet.

CCAsP will also continue to publish a hardcopy bi-annual newsletter with articles related to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Modeled on the preceding *Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter*, the CCAsP newsletter will include articles on both modern and ancient Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as information on UC Berkeley activities related to the region. CCAsP will also annually publish two working papers on Central Asia as part of the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper series.

We hope that the institutionalization of a Caucasus and Central Asia program will signal the further development of curriculum and research on this region at UC Berkeley. CCAsP intends to apply for additional grants to ensure financial support for CCAsP as well as for innovative research programs.

For more information on CCAsP activities, please visit our website at <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/caucasus/index.html>. The CCAsP office is located at 260 Stephens Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA, 94720-2304. You may also email CCAsP at ccasp@uclink.berkeley.edu or contact us by phone at (510) 643-5845 or (510) 643-5844.

Turkey and Eurasia in the Aftermath of the September 11 Tragedy: Some Observations on Geopolitics and Foreign Policy

Ruben Safrastyan

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have many dimensions and have led to significant changes in the sphere of international relations. One of the most important consequences has been the inclusion of Russia in the anti-terrorist coalition under US leadership, a strong indication of how much relations between the West and Russia have changed since the end of the Cold War. From the broader historical perspective, these changes comprise yet one more step towards the emergence of a “post” post-cold war world order.

Although the current crisis is a global one, it plays itself out primarily in Eurasia and has particular implications for those regional powers. Turkey, as one of the most important actors in the area, has striven to play a more active role. The significance of Turkey’s policies in the current crisis stems from its political and economic engagement in Eurasia, as well as its historical, cultural, religious, and ethnic ties with many of the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Military action to this point has taken place far from Turkey’s borders, and at this stage it remains unclear what part Turkey will play in the struggle against international terrorism in the coming months and perhaps years. Regardless of the direction of future developments, it is safe to say that the conflict will reshape the country’s relations with Eurasian and Western states, and it may even contribute to the long-delayed redefinition of Turkey’s role in the emerging new order.

This paper explores elements of Turkey’s international policy in the wake of September 11. First, it gives a brief survey of Turkish geopolitical visions and political strategies in Eurasia, as well as the main trends and results of Turkey’s policies toward the Caucasus and Central Asia from their independence up to September 11. Second, the paper will closely examine current Turkish foreign policy as it pertains to Central Asia and the Caucasus. Finally, it will evaluate Turkish goals and strategies during the current crisis, with attention to the peculiarities of foreign policy behavior and decision-making.



Eurasia in Turkish political discourse of 1990s: Geopolitical visions and stratagems

The notion of Eurasia has occupied a central place in Turkish political discourse since the early 1990s. It is regarded as the fundamental concept that shapes Turkey’s geopolitical strategy, its international relations, and its national security. Despite its centrality, or perhaps because of it, the term “Eurasia” is highly politicized and poorly defined. Some politicians and political scientists consider Eurasia to be the region inhabited predominantly by Turkic peoples, comprised of Turkey itself, parts of the Caucasus, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, the Volga region of Russia, and Northern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this ethnic definition is less popular than two variants based on more exclusively political notions. One considers Eurasia as the South, as

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opposed to the rich and developed North, while the other encompasses only the eight newly sovereign states of the south Caucasus and Central Asia. Despite the flexibility of the term in political parlance, the narrowest definition of Eurasia as the eight former Soviet republics is recognized as the most commonsensical. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives a strictly geographical description of Eurasia on its official website, defining it as a “large landscape [...] stretching from Europe to Central Asia.”¹ But according to my observations, most Turkish diplomats do not use the official definition but rather use the term to refer to the eight former Soviet republics.

Eurasia as an object of Turkish domination

The concept of Eurasia has been central to the field of geopolitics, a discipline that has recently developed in Turkey as a result of the significant changes in the regional geopolitical environment. The classical western approaches, beginning from H. J. Mackinder and ending with Zbigniew Brzezinski, have had a strong influence on Turkish thought in this area, but Turkish theorists have modified these western models.

Let's start with the so-called theoretical or pure geopolitics. In my opinion, the most remarkable and complete geopolitical concept in this sense was devised by Ramazan Ozey of Marmara University. His concept is entitled *The Theory of Domination by Turks*.² The essential elements of Ozey's concept can be summarized as follows: Anatolia is the “pillow” (*kale*) of the world and control of Anatolia leads to domination over an “internal circle,” namely the Balkans, the Middle East, and Eurasia. Moreover, the state which rules the “internal circle” rules the world. Thus, Ozey legitimizes Turkish domination of Eurasia by suggesting that it is a natural consequence of its geography. Moreover, he regards Turkish domination over Eurasia not as an objective in itself, but as means to a broader end. Other publications of Turkish geopolitics are not so direct, but most advocate the establishment of Turkish predominance over Eurasia in different forms.

Such geopolitical approaches are invoked by fractions of the Turkish political and intellectual elite on the far right (pan-Turkists and some Islamists), as well as by some centrist forces, as theoretical support for political polemics.

Eurasia as a strategic alternative

In the 1990s, leftist intellectuals and politicians, as well as some Islamists, presented a more politicized vision of Eurasian politics as an alternative to traditional western-oriented Kemalist foreign policy strategy. The basis for this approach is cooperation between the main Eurasian pow-

ers, including Turkey, Iran, and Russia, against “Western imperialism.” Proponents of this view support taking active part in Eurasian politics and cooperating with other regional powers as an alternative to Turkey's current foreign policy, which they consider to be subordinate to the interests of the West. Supporters of this point of view include prominent representatives of both leftist and Islamist intellectual and political circles. One advocate, the well known veteran of the socialist movement in Turkey Dogu Perincek, chose a characteristic title for one of his books: *The Choice of Eurasia: An Independent Foreign Policy for Turkey*.³

Eurasia as a trump card

Political and intellectual elites of modern Turkey are, notwithstanding, mostly Western-oriented and remain loyal to the strategic choice of Ataturk. They are pragmatic and know very well that economically and politically, Turkey still is not ready to become the single dominant power in Eurasia. Even in 1992, one high-ranking Turkish diplomat told me that Turkey was able to assume a dominant role only in Azerbaijan. For this reason, they consider the Eurasian direction of Turkish foreign policy subordinate to relations with the West and try to coordinate their policy in Eurasia in accordance with the aims of the West, particularly the US. Meanwhile, they consider the expansion of Turkish influence in the Eurasian region to be an important trump card in bargaining with the West over such problems as access to the European Union.

The military

Research into the real geopolitical and geostrategical views of influential high ranking Turkish military officials concerning Eurasia shows that they have much in common with the views of Western-oriented elites discussed above, but also that they differ to some extent. The military considers Eurasia, and above all the south Caucasus, to be an unstable region that endangers the national security of Turkey and, accordingly, it promotes a more cautious policy. The military believes that main threat comes from Russia, specifically that the growth of Russian influence in the South Caucasus is an immediate threat to Turkey itself.⁴ Thus, the military's attention focuses primarily on the three states of the south Caucasus.

According to my observations during visits in Turkey and meetings with representatives of Turkish academia and mass media, the last three years have seen the appearance of a pro-Western and specifically pro-American group among high ranking Turkish military officials, who also oppose integration with the European Union. They view Eurasia primarily not as a source of instability, but as an important

geopolitical advantage for Turkey. Despite their pro-Western orientation, they predict stiff competition in this region with western European powers, especially Germany. These conclusions were confirmed by Colonel Nazmi Cizmeçi in a lecture during the 1998 workshop, "The Importance of Turkey vis-à-vis the Caucasus, Middle Asia, and Eurasia."⁵

The current government

Under the current coalition government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is under the control of the Democratic Leftist Party (DLP), and for this reason, special attention will be paid to the views of the leading politicians of this party. In general, they support a Western-oriented strategy, but their approach has some distinctive elements connected with their leftist stance. For instance, in 1995, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit still proposed an initiative on "Regional Centered Foreign Policy." He considers Eurasia in classical terms: a super-region that will be integrated in the future and that will draw on elements from Europe and Asia. He even uses the term *avasyalasma*—"Eurasiation"—to signify the process of integration between Europe and Asia, and he considers Turkey one of the important actors in this fusion.⁶ The point of view of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, is more clear. Recently he stated: "We will be accepted in the EU, but our vision is much greater. Our aim is to become the decision-making center of Eurasia."⁷

Ten years of policy toward Caucasus and Central Asia

Main aims and conceptual background

All of the theories and visions discussed here helped to define the main goal of Turkish policy towards Eurasia: to promote Turkey as a major actor in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This policy was expressed in 1990s by slogans that promoted the "Turkish model," "Turkey as a bridge between West and East," and "historical ties/common origin with Eurasian peoples," or simple "Turkishness." Dozens of articles and monographs have already been written on these concepts and their impact on political processes, so I will not dwell on this question here. I would like to emphasize, however, that the US supported Turkish policy based on notions of Turkey's role as a bridge between the West and the East and the so-called "Turkish model."⁸

Realization and results

Turkey was remarkably active in the Eurasian states during the 1990s, especially in comparison with its usual level of involvement on the international stage, but it still failed to achieve the desired results. As a result, the "Turkish model" and the "Turkish bridge" had very short careers in Central Asia. Central Asian political élites rejected the

Turkish model on the grounds of its internal weaknesses as well as the difficulties in adapting it to the specific conditions of the post-Soviet political environment, with its rising pre-Soviet traditions. They have preferred to establish direct relations with West, bypassing the "Turkish bridge." "Turkishness" fared better, as it became institutionalized in different economical and cultural organizations, periodic official and semi-official meetings and conferences, and regular political consultations between Turkey and the Turkic states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. These ties notwithstanding, leaders of Turkic states have preferred to create and to develop separate state-centered concepts of identity rather than to embrace a common Turkic identity. "Turkishness" has been most successful in the case of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations, where high-ranking bureaucrats and diplomats from both sides frequently use the expression "One nation – two states."

Despite Turkey's efforts to promote political and cultural ties with the newly independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, in many cases, Turkish diplomacy preserved its traditional cautiousness. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the suggestion of veteran pan-Turkist and leader of the PNA, Alparslan Turkes, to create a government-sponsored "Turkic Commonwealth."⁹

In some cases, Turkish diplomacy failed to demonstrate needed flexibility. In particular, in the case of Turkish-Armenian relations, Turkey refused to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia, imposed an economic blockade on the country, and attempted to put pressure on Armenia. I believe this geopolitical strategy was erroneous and contributed to the reinforcement of Russian influence in Armenia particularly, and in the south Caucasus in general. Turkey's unilateral support of Azerbaijan in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh excluded Turkey from the conflict resolution process and weakened its diplomatic position.

By the end of 1990s, it was clear to many Turkish foreign policy specialists and politicians that Turkey had not attained its main strategic goal: to obtain the leading role in this region.

Turkey's foreign policy during the current crisis: A short survey

Turkey's first reaction to the terrorist attack of September 11 and possible American retaliation was instinctively cautious. Turkey has stated officially that Washington and Ankara share a confluence of interests in fighting global terrorism, but in the meantime it has avoided more specific promises to help the US. Talk of collaboration has remained in the context of collective actions approved by NATO on the basis of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, its mutual

defense clause which states that if one member state is under attack all other member nations will defend it. In this regard, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem has emphasized, "Under these new circumstances, the security of the Turkish people is more important than anything."¹⁰

It is remarkable that first contact between American and Turkish high ranking officials regarding the US response to the attacks took place rather late. Secretary of State Colin Powell called Cem only on September 17 to inform him about a possible strike on Afghanistan. After that, Turkish leaders had a chance to calculate their policy more precisely in this rapidly changing situation.

The first public reaction of Turkish leaders to the US resolution to launch a war on terrorism on Afghan territory was concern about the potential negative effects of such a move on Central Asian states. Subsequently, Turkish Chief of Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu warned the United States repeatedly against sending ground troops to fight in the mountains of Afghanistan and said that "units sent to that terrain would be lost."¹¹ He even went so far as to state unofficially that any potential ground operation in Afghanistan would be "madness."¹²

Despite these reservations, though, Turkey has indicated its willingness to assist the US in this war. The main concern of Turkish leaders was the question of what form Turkey's participation would take. According to the clear statements of Prime Minister Ecevit on September 27, sending Turkish troops in Afghanistan to take part in military actions against Taliban forces was "not on the agenda."¹³ On the same day as the meeting between Cem and Powell, the Deputy Chief of Staff General Yasar Büyükanit elaborated what forms of assistance Turkey would prefer to offer. Specifically, he stated that Turkey would "share information, exchange ideas, and cooperate in security in all areas" with the US. In other words, Ankara was ready to give the US necessary intelligence information and to participate in training and equipping the forces of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, particularly the forces of General Dustum, who has well known connections with Turkey (he spent three years in Turkish exile after being driven from northern Afghanistan in 1998).

After Cem's meetings in Washington, Turkey agreed to give the US diplomatic assistance in the Eurasian region and among Islamic states. It also promised to send a small detachment of special forces to Afghanistan, as a pure symbolic gesture. The talks in Washington were very satisfactory for the Americans, and Powell praised Turkey for granting every request for assistance in waging the war on terror. For its part, Ankara has interpreted the results of those talks as a diplomatic triumph and as a green light for conducting a

more active policy.

The main aims of Turkey's policy were finalized during the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Ankara on October 5. They are, according to my interpretation, as follows:

1. To use participation in antiterrorist operations to gain concessions from the US and the EU in matters critical for Turkish policy, such as access to the EU and to decision-making mechanisms within the EDSP, the Cyprus problem, and financial assistance from the IMF, WB, and the US.
2. To use these positive changes in the political and geopolitical situation, from Turkey's standpoint, to expand Turkish political and military influence into the Eurasian states, including Afghanistan.

Turkish policy has subsequently taken a more active stance. The governmental *Turkish Daily News* has stated that "the Turkish public should be convinced that we can and should play a key role in the fight against terrorism."¹⁴ In striving for this leading role, Turkey has developed a number of diplomatic initiatives. One case in point is its offer to host a meeting between representatives of the member-states of the EU and the Islamic Conference Organization. This initiative was approved, but its realization has been delayed until February 2002. Ankara's proposal to organize a meeting between representatives of different anti-Taliban forces has failed due to the negative response of Pushtun members of the coalition. Cem's visit to Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan in October aimed to demonstrate Ankara's engagement in Eurasia, though it did not have tangible results. The media wrote that his visit was "centered on a wide, even vague agenda of humanitarian aid, inter-religious dialogue and security cooperation."¹⁵ During his visit, he appealed to feelings of "Turkishness" in an attempt to revive a traditional concept of Turkish foreign policy regarding Eurasia. In Ashgabat, before meeting with the Turkmen president he stated: "These members of the great family that I have visited and will be visiting are more aware now of the need to depend on each other, and that is the meaning of this trip."¹⁶ But once again this appeal failed, as in the 1990s.

Turkish diplomacy has also shown new activity in the south Caucasus. In an attempt to capitalize on the new geopolitical situation, Ankara has sought US support and approval for two new initiatives in the region. Namely, Turkey has proposed to expand the existing tri-party preliminary agreement on economic cooperation between Ankara, Washington, and Tbilisi, concluded in early 2001, to in-

clude political and military affairs as well. The second proand military cooperation between Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to protect the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, first discussed in Trabzon last year during meeting between Cem and Georgian Foreign Minister Irakli Menagarishvili.¹⁷

These initiatives contradict the Stability and Cooperation Pact in the South Caucasus, which had been proposed previously by Cem and former President Suleyman Demirel. The primary goal of these new agreements is to isolate Armenia and to weaken Russia's position in the region. In fact, they constitute an attempt to promote anti-integration trends in the south Caucasus and could threaten regional stability. They are also at odds with the strategic interests of the US in the area and certainly did not receive American backing.

Turkey aspires to play an active role in the post-war regulation process in Afghanistan as well. Turkish troops, about one thousand in total, are currently part of international peacekeeping forces. It is foreseen that beginning in summer 2002, Turkey will play a leading role in these forces.

Generally, during the months since September 11, Turkey has managed to improve its geopolitical position in Eurasia. The recognition of Turkish forces as a leading part of the multinational peacekeeping effort in the region has created a favorable new situation for the revival of Turkish aspirations, particularly in Central Asia. Turkish policy in the Caucasus has been less successful to date, but the improvement in Turkey's status in Central Asia is striking.

Turkey's foreign policy during the current crisis: an evaluation

Foreign policy decision-making in contemporary Turkey has some peculiarities. First of all, the participation of the military in this process must be emphasized, especially in discussing strategically important matters in the Council of National Security (CNS) where the military enjoys the right to have the last word. This right is legitimized by the constitution, according to which military officials must outnumber civilians in the CNS. The staff of CNS prepares drafts for important decisions, using recommendations from both the General Staff and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for routine decisions, but for more important decisions, mid-level representatives of the MFA customarily consult with their colleagues on from the General Staff. This mechanism was put in place after the military coup of 1980 and has worked properly during last two decades. It was disrupted only during the Gulf War, when former President Turgut Ozal assumed control and forced the resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief of General Staff.

During the current crisis, Prime Minister Ecevit has tried to modify this mechanism. Important matters are discussed during special meetings of top civilian and military leaders, as well as during meetings of the Council of Ministers. But the military elite has retained its leading role in security policy, as proposals for recent activity have been prepared by the Crisis Management Center, which was established within the structure of the National Security Council on September 12.

The effectiveness of decision-making in the first days after the terrorist attack of September 11 has been under question. As one Turkish daily wrote, "the government could only comprehend the meaning of the September 11 tragedy a week later."¹⁸ However, many leading Turkish journalists praised the further activity of government in this sphere.

In the Caucasus, Turkish diplomacy has made mistakes, specifically in promoting the above-mentioned initiatives. It is worth noting that former President Suleyman Demirel has criticized these initiatives and has repeated his proposal to establish a South Caucasus Cooperation Pact which would include all the states of the south Caucasus.

The strategic planning of foreign policy is accomplished by the MFA and its affiliated think tanks, such as ASAM and TESEV. Recently the General Staff has established its own think tank—SAREM—under the directorship of the general.¹⁹ This move suggests, I would argue, that the military elite is preparing to expand its role in strategic planning of foreign policy.

Some internal factors

Turkish public opinion was predominantly against the US-led war in Afghanistan, with approximately 70% opposed to the operation and 90% opposed to sending Turkish troops to Afghanistan.²⁰ However, public opposition to government policy was sporadic, and anti-government and anti-American demonstrations were very small. This passivity, in my view, stems from the weakness of Islamist political parties in Turkey today and the increase of radical nationalistic groups, many of which support the growth of Turkish influence in Eurasia and recognize the opportunity for Turkey to benefit from the war on terrorism.

The problem of Iraq

Turkish leaders, both civilian and military, have repeatedly and unequivocally declared that they are against any military action against Iraq. Turkey fears that the collapse of Iraq could promote the establishment of a Kurdish

state in the northern third of the country, which could encourage Kurds in southeast Turkey to pursue political independence as well. Such a development would be unacceptable for Turkey, of course.

In reality, Ankara does not have enough leverage to prevent US attacks on Iraq. This allows me to suggest that, in the case of military operation against Saddam Hussein, Turkey would send its troops to the Northern regions of Iraq and attempt to use the Turkic speaking minority around Mosul to its own advantage. In this case, Turkey would stand to gain access to Iraqi oil facilities and a role in drawing up the map for a future Iraq. Perhaps in anticipation of such developments, Turkey deployed a special unit of 500 soldiers and 120 more tanks to northern Iraq at the beginning of December, augmenting the 30 to 40 tanks already positioned there.²¹

I will conclude with one final remark. Turkish foreign policy had begun to abandon the principles of Ataturk before September 11, and the new realities of the region have accelerated this process. 2002 will be a year of new risks and new temptations for Turkey.

[The present paper was completed in the end of December 2001. RS]

A note on transliteration. The diacritic marks from some letters were omitted during printing, and any errors are the responsibility of the editorial staff. We apologize for any inconvenience.

Notes

¹ See *Turkish Foreign Policy*, in: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/>.

² Ramazan Özey, *Jeopolitik ve Jeostratejik Açidan Türkiye* (Istanbul: Marifet Yayinlari, 1998), pp. 57-59.

³ Dogu Perinçek, *Avrasya Seçeneği: Türkiye İçin Bağımsız Dis Politika* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, 1996).

⁴ For the approaches of top Turkish military officials, see *Turkey in the Center of Changing Strategies*, written

by Necip Torumtay, retired Chief of the General Staff (*Degisen Stratejilerin Odagında Türkiye* [Istanbul: AD Yayincilik, 1996]).

⁵ See Kaan Ögüt, *Avrasya Stratejileri Üzerine*. – In: *Aydinlanma 1923*, Sayı: 21 (on-line version).

⁶ See Ecevit's statements in: "Avrasya Topluluğu Basbakanla," *Avrasya Dergisi*, II (on-line version).

⁷ See Kaan Ögüt, *Avrasya Stratejileri Üzerine*, in: *Aydinlanma 1923*, Sayı: 21 (on-line version). He means, surely, the official definition of Eurasia.

⁸ For a detailed examination of the above-mentioned concepts, see, for instance: Idris Bal, *Turkey's Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: The Rise and Fall of the 'Turkish Model'* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000); and Ian O. Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992).

⁹ See William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 292.

¹⁰ *Hürriyet*, September 14, 2001.

¹¹ *Milliyet*, October 2, 2001

¹² *Star*, October 2, 2001

¹³ *Milliyet*, September 28, 2001

¹⁴ *Turkish Daily News*, October 15, 2001

¹⁵ Steve Bryant, "Turkey woos ex-Soviet states over Afghan crisis," in: *Reuters English News Service*, October 22, 2001.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Turkish Daily News*, October 18, 2001.

¹⁸ *Türkiye*, October 15, 2001.

¹⁹ *Milliyet*, December 27, 2001.

²⁰ *Turkish Daily News*, October 4, 2001

²¹ See *Özgür Politika*, December 7, 2001.

Identities, Communities, and Nations in Central Asia: A Historical Perspective

Adrienne L. Edgar

In the many news reports on Central Asia and Afghanistan that have appeared over the past six weeks, we've heard a great deal about ethnic groups in the region. Journalists now speak knowledgeably about the ethnic basis for the various political movements in Afghanistan. We are told, for example, that the Taliban is predominantly made up of Pashtuns, while the opposition Northern Alliance is mostly made up of ethnic minorities such as Tajiks and Uzbeks. Americans who could scarcely identify Central Asia on a map before September 11 now know that Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are directly to the north of Afghanistan, and that there are Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen minority populations across the border in northern Afghanistan.

Given the importance of ethnic identity in our own society, we tend to assume that it is equally important in Central Asia. We imagine that there must be a close relationship, or at least a bond of sympathy, between the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen of the former Soviet republics and their coethnics in northern Afghanistan. More generally, we tend to assume that ethnicity is an important determining factor in people's behavior, and that knowing who belongs to which ethnic group will help us to understand events in Central Asia.

The goal of my talk today is to examine these assumptions. How much information do we really have when we learn that a group of people is Uzbek or Tajik or Turkmen? Can we predict anything at all based on this knowledge? I'm going to argue that while ethnic identity does matter to a certain extent, it doesn't matter nearly as much as we think it does. Identities and loyalties in Central Asia are far too complex to allow ethnicity to serve as a primary explanatory factor.

The Central Asian nations—and the ethnic groups on which they are based—are of recent vintage. They are creations of the twentieth century. One hundred years ago, there was no Kyrgyzstan or Turkmenistan. One hundred years ago, it would have been difficult to find individuals in Central Asia who, when asked to identify themselves, would have declared unambiguously: "I am a Tajik" (or a Turkmen or an Uzbek). They would have been more likely to name the state or region in which they lived or the descent group to which they belonged. They might simply have identified themselves as Muslims. Even if you had found people who identified themselves as Uzbeks, Tajiks, or Turkmen, the label wouldn't necessarily have meant what we imagine it does.

We tend to assume that the world is divided up into nationalities or ethnic groups, each of which has its own territory, language, and history or origins. But this was not true of Central Asia prior to the twentieth century. Due to the region's position as a frontier between nomadic and sedentary civilizations, Central Asia was long home to a rich and complex mix of peoples, languages, and cultures. The region



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historically featured an overarching cultural unity along with a bewildering array of population groups, dialects, and ways of life. Diverse communities lived intermingled and interdependent, while sharing a common Turco-Persian Islamic culture.

Within this complex brew, it is difficult to identify distinct ethnic groups prior to the twentieth century. First of all, there was the problem of overlap and intermixing between groups. Populations and dialects blended into each other without any clear boundaries. Our notion that an ethnic group brings together language, territory, and descent in a single package did not apply in Central Asia. People who claimed a common history or descent did not necessarily speak the same language; people who spoke the same language and lived on the same territory did not necessarily consider themselves to belong to the same ethnic group. As an example of the second phenomenon, I can point to certain tribes that lived on the territory of present-day Turkmenistan. They spoke Turkmen dialects, lived interspersed with the Turkmen population, and appeared in every way to be Turkmen. Yet they viewed themselves—and were viewed by their Turkmen neighbors—as Arabs, descendants of one of the early Muslim caliphs. These groups, known as “sacred tribes,” played a special role as religious leaders and mediators in Turkmen communities.

The boundary between Uzbeks and Tajiks was especially hard to draw. Descriptions of Central Asia often advance the proposition that the region can be broadly divided into “Turks” speaking a Turkic language—such as Uzbek—and “Tajiks,” who speak a language related to Farsi. In fact, there was not historically such a clear distinction between Uzbek and Tajik. Many people in the region were bilingual in both Turkic and Farsi, regardless of ancestry. The idea that language determined identity was unfamiliar. The labels Uzbek and Tajik were not linguistic but had more complicated meanings relating to history, genealogy, and way of life. When queried in population surveys conducted in the late imperial and early Soviet periods, many Central Asians were unable to say whether they were Tajiks or Uzbeks. Sometimes siblings within a single family would claim different ethnic identities. To this day, there are people living in Uzbekistan who declare themselves to be Uzbeks, yet speak Tajik as their first language.

Along with the question of blurred boundaries between ethnic groups, there was the matter of multiple levels of identity. Supraethnic and subethnic loyalties often were more important to people than ethnic categories. Particularly among sedentary Central Asians, it was common to consider oneself simply a “Muslim” or to identify with the state or region in which one lived—the Bukharan emirate,

or the city of Samarqand. Among educated elites in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some identified with a supraethnic Turkestani or Turkic identity.

Among traditionally nomadic and semi-nomadic groups such as the Turkmen and Kazakhs, ethnic labels were somewhat more meaningful. This was because identity was reckoned genealogically among these groups. All those who claimed to be Turkmen, for example, traced their origins back to a single mythical ancestor. Being a Turkmen, therefore, had a clearer meaning than being a Tajik or an Uzbek. Nevertheless, subethnic identities based on kinship were more important than broader ethnic categories among nomadic groups. The Turkmen were divided into a number of tribes and subtribes, each of which was thought to descend from a common ancestor. A similar situation prevailed among the Kazakhs and among the Pashtuns of Afghanistan. This genealogical system was a source of potential unity, since all believed they shared a common descent. But it was also a source of divisiveness. In the nineteenth century, the major Turkmen descent groups were as likely to be in conflict with each other as with outsiders.

Finally, it is important to realize that there was no historical relationship between ethnicity and statehood in Central Asia. Prior to the Russian conquest in the late nineteenth century, the prevailing model of statehood was the Muslim dynastic state ruling over a multiethnic population. State legitimacy depended on dynastic claims and the ruler’s pledge to uphold the Islamic faith. The notion that a state should exist for the benefit of a single ethnic group was unfamiliar.¹

In 1924, the Soviet rulers of Central Asia tried to prune this thicket and clarify the ethnic map of the region. Always good rationalizers and modernizers, the Soviets were determined to make ethnic boundaries correspond to administrative boundaries and to create territorial and linguistic nations on the Western model. Guided by the work of ethnographers and linguists and assisted by indigenous communists, Soviet authorities dissolved the region’s three multiethnic political entities and created a handful of “national” republics, each named for a single ethnic group. After a number of boundary shifts and adjustments, the final result was the map of Central Asia we see today, with the five national republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, there were a number of smaller, “autonomous republics” for minorities who did not quite qualify for their own national republic, in the Soviet view.

Drawing the boundaries was not an easy process, since the population was so territorially mixed. Quite a bit of fudging had to be done in assigning populations to their

“correct” republics. Populations located on the border between two prospective republics often could not easily be identified as belonging to one group or another. On the border between the projected Uzbek and Turkmen republics, there were people who spoke dialects with a mix of Turkmen and Uzbek elements and who were unable to say whether they were Uzbeks or Turkmen. Another border group claimed to be Turkmen, only to have this identification declared “erroneous” by Soviet ethnographers. Some of the major cities of Uzbekistan had populations consisting predominantly of Tajik speakers.

It was also not always easy to tell which groups were ethnic groups in their own right and which were simply subgroups of other ethnic groups. The Soviet authorities engaged in ethnic consolidation, assimilating smaller ethnic groups into larger ones by decree. Each of the major nationalities of Central Asia was cobbled together out of smaller groups that may or may not have had a common identity in the past. To cite just one example, there were a number of groups in the mountainous areas of what is today Tajikistan who spoke languages that were quite different from Tajik and were not originally considered Tajiks. These “Pamiri nationalities” were eventually defined as “mountain Tajiks” and incorporated, at least officially, into the Tajik ethnic group.

Despite the problematic origins of these Central Asian nations, they became fairly well entrenched in the Soviet period—so much so that the nation-state appeared to be the only viable form of political organization after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Predictions that the region would turn to pan-Turkism or pan-Islam after 1991 proved to be false. In fact, during the Soviet period, each ethnic group became more rooted in and committed to its Soviet-demarcated territory. Within each republic, Soviet policy called for preferential treatment for the “titular nationality” and the promotion of the indigenous language and culture. This gave people a vested interest in their own national republics—particularly the elites who got good jobs in Soviet cultural and political institutions. Indigenous Central Asians gradually came to dominate their republics demographically and politically. Through education, urbanization, and the growth of the means of mass communication, the citizens of each republic became more closely linked to their compatriots. National languages became the vehicles of communication in schools and newspapers, seeking to supplant the numerous local dialects. The republics came to resemble nation-states in many respects, although of course they lacked real sovereignty.²

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the republics of Central Asia became sovereign national states.

The republics’ communist leaders rapidly refashioned themselves as nationalists, trading the hammer and sickle for symbols of nationhood. Yet despite the seemingly solid entrenchment of Central Asian nations, many of the complexities of identity have remained.

First and most obviously, the titular nationality is not the only ethnic group within each state. Soviet border drawing was not and could not be perfect; inevitably, significant indigenous minorities remained within each republic. Due to large-scale migration during the Soviet period, there are also significant Russian populations in each Central Asian state. Others, such as Germans, Koreans, and Crimean Tatars, arrived in the region as a result of Stalinist deportations. In Kazakhstan, the Kazakh and Russian populations are almost equal in size. Kyrgyzstan is only slightly more than half Kyrgyz. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are a bit more homogeneous, with just over 70 percent of the population belonging to the titular nationality.

Like all multiethnic states, these states have to negotiate a precarious balance between statehood based on ethnic identity and statehood based on civic identity. Are they nation-states, in which one ethnicity is dominant and others must adopt the dominant group’s language and culture? Or are they pluralistic states, acknowledging multiple languages and ethnic groups? Kazakhstan, with its large Russian population, is trying to be both an ethnic homeland for Kazakhs and a pluralistic state for its entire population; it remains to be seen whether this will succeed in the long run. Those states that are more ethnically homogeneous, such as Turkmenistan, have pursued a more overtly ethnonationalist policy.

At the same time, it is important to remember that even among people officially categorized as belonging to the “correct” nationality for their republic, alternative identities remain potentially important. Smaller groups that were consolidated into larger ones, such as the Turkmen “sacred tribes,” have not necessarily forgotten their origins. Subethnic and supraethnic levels of identity remain extremely important. Regional and kinship-based identities have salience throughout Central Asia. An overarching sense of Muslim identity still exists. Even for completely secular Central Asians, Islam is an important source of cultural identity that sets them apart from non-Muslims in the region. Yet this Muslim identity coexists with what might be called a “post-Soviet” identity, especially among elites. Many urban, Russian-speaking Central Asians still feel they have more in common with educated Russians and Russian-speakers in other former Soviet republics than they do with the Muslim elites of Iran, Pakistan, or Turkey.

Let me come back, in conclusion, to the question I

posed at the beginning of my talk—how much does ethnicity matter in Central Asia? It should be clear from what I have said that ethnic categories such as Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen do have meaning, and that their significance increased greatly in the Soviet period due to the institutionalization of ethnicity in the Soviet republics. Certainly, we can identify instances when ethnic affinity seems to be a factor in the policies of Central Asian governments. Yet it would be a mistake to exaggerate its importance. Take Turkmenistan, for example, the Central Asian state that has been most determined to promote ethnonationalism. The Turkmen government has invited ethnic Turkmen from neighboring countries to conferences of the “world Turkmen community,” and Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov has declared that Turkmenistan is the “ancestral homeland” of all Turkmen. Yet Turkmenistan has been reluctant to accept ethnic Turkmen refugees, in part because of fears that this would change the tribal balance within the country. Moreover, Turkmenistan has maintained good relations with the Taliban, despite the Turkmen state’s secular stance and the Taliban’s poor treatment of ethnic minorities. Here there are compelling pragmatic interests at stake, most notably the Turkmen regime’s desire to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan. This example, like many others I could cite, underscores the need to keep in mind the myriad interests and identities of Central Asians when seeking to interpret events in the region.

Notes

¹ For more detail on the complexities of identity discussed here, see Beatrice Manz, “Historical Background,” in Beatrice Manz, ed., *Central Asia in Historical Perspective* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000); John Samuel Schoeberlein-Engel, “Identity in Central Asia: Construction and Contention in the conceptions of ‘Ozbek,’ ‘Tajik,’ ‘Muslim,’ ‘Samarqandi,’ and other groups,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1994).

² On Soviet nationality policy, see Ronald G. Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

For more information relevant to the events of September 11, 2001, please visit the 9-11 page maintained by the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies at:

<http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~iseees/9-11page.html>

This webpage contains links to a listing of regional experts at UC Berkeley, bibliographies of works on Afghanistan and Central Asia, related courses offered at UC Berkeley, announcements of public events on September 11 and its aftermath, and to other useful sites.

Roots of Rage: Militant Islam in Central Asia

Edward W. Walker

Let me begin by correcting an impression that I may have given in choosing the phrase "Roots of Rage" in my title today. I did not mean to suggest that Central Asians are, in fact, deeply enraged, hostile to their governments, radically anti-Western or pro-Taliban, or sympathetic to fundamentalist or militant Islam in general. On the contrary, polling data and anecdotal evidence suggest that overwhelming majorities are deeply fearful that the conflict in Afghanistan and Islamic militancy will destabilize their countries. Large majorities also appear to support their governments (with the exception of Tajikistan) despite the fact that none are particularly liberal or democratic—and, in the cases of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, are very repressive. While most see Russia as their most important source of external support, most also have generally favorable attitudes towards the United States and the West. As for Islam, significant majorities describe themselves as believers, but large majorities also feel that secular, not Islamic, law should govern and that Islamic parties should be banned. And, until recently at least, few had even heard of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (the IMU), the Islamic militant group that was designated a terrorist organization by the State Department last year and that President Bush mentioned in his War on Terrorism speech last month.

So the first point I want to make is that Central Asia is not Afghanistan. With the exception of Tajikistan, governments in the region have managed to preserve order, and society is politically demobilized and for the most part unarmed (again with the exception of Tajikistan). Above all, Central Asians value personal security, internal order, and material well being, and they will support governments that can provide those valued goods at a time when all are seen as being at great risk.

Nevertheless, Central Asian officials are deeply concerned about a perceived threat from militant Islamic movements, which they claim are products of external meddling. They accordingly refer to all Islamic radicals as "Wahhabis," a reference to the Islamic puritanical movement of the early eighteenth century that was adopted by the Saudi royal family and is Saudi Arabia's state religion today.

What I want to do in my twenty minutes, then, is try to assess whether these fears are justified and consider whether there really is a significant risk that militant Islam will find fertile soil in Central Asia.

First, however, let me say just a few words on terminology. I make two types of distinctions. The first is between "traditionalist" Islam and "fundamentalist" Islam, a distinction that mirrors that which was made during the Afghan "Mujahideen War" with the Soviets between so-called "tradition-



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alist” and “Islamist” parties. Traditionalists are Muslims who support forms of Islam traditionally practiced in most parts of the Islamic world—that is, an Islam that accommodates practices, beliefs, laws, and social institutions not specifically prescribed by the Koran or the sayings and actions of the Prophet (the sunna). Fundamentalists, on the other hand, advocate a literal interpretation of the Koran and sunna, oppose accommodation to tradition or to changing social conditions, and espouse a return to an idealized vision of Islam as practiced at the time of Muhammed and/or the caliphates. This is not to suggest that one or the other is any more or less “modern”—“fundamentalism” in Central Asia, for example, is arguably a modern phenomenon, despite its atavistic qualities.

Second, I distinguish between moderate, radical, and militant forms of Islam. By moderate Islam I basically mean tolerant Islam—that is, an Islam that is willing to accommodate both other religions as well as other forms of Islam itself. Radical Islam is the opposite—that is, Islam that is intolerant of “heretical” or non-Islamic beliefs and practices. Militant Islam, finally, is any form of Islam that advocates the use of violence in an effort to impose a particular form of Islam on others. In principle, then, one could be a militant traditionalist—as indeed was the case for some of the mujahideen parties fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan that were willing to take up arms in defense of traditional way of practicing Islam and tribal law (for example, pushtunwali for the Pushtuns). Likewise, one could be a radical but non-militant fundamentalist, as in the case of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir party, which advocates the establishment of a caliphate throughout the Muslim world but by non-violent means.

Let me turn now, briefly, to historical background. Islam arrived in the region that we know today as Central Asia—which is part of what was once referred to as Transoxiana, or the entire region of Turco-Persian civilization from today’s Iran in the west to Xianjiang province in the east, that included Afghanistan, Pakistan, even much of India—at the hands of Arab invaders at the beginning of the seventh century. It was embraced only gradually and variously, however, becoming the majority religion around the ninth century. By the tenth century, Central Asia had become one of the great centers of Islamic learning and culture, particularly the great Silk Road cities of Bukhara and Samarkand.

The vast majority of Central Asians are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi’i school (or mazhab), one of the four main branches of Sunni Islam (the other three being the Shafi’, Hanbali’i, and Maliki’i mazhabs). The stan-

dard argument is that Sunni Islam ultimately prevailed over Shia Islam in the region because it was better able to accommodate local practices and traditions, including eventually Sufism, a mystical and popularized form of Islamic worship that is very open to customary practices and that is particularly offensive to many of today’s fundamentalists. Shia Islam became the dominant form of Islam only in Iran and across the Caspian Sea, in what is now Azerbaijan, but it is also practiced by the Khazaras of Afghanistan, the Ismailis of the Pamir region of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, as well as minority groups among certain Central Asian nationalities, such as the Turkmen.

The speed and degree to which Islam was embraced by the peoples of the region varied. In general, formal Islam was accepted more readily by the sedentary peoples of the region—particularly ancestors of today’s Uzbeks and Tajiks. The region’s nomadic peoples—ancestors of today’s Turkmen, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz—converted more slowly and retained more pre-Islamic beliefs and practices in the culture. Likewise, formal and orthodox Islam was more prevalent in urban than in rural areas. As Adrienne has already indicated, the region was also home to a tremendous diversity of cultural influences. Linguistically, the vernacular tended to be a Turkic language, with the exception of the version of Persian spoken in Tajikistan, while the predominant language of literature was Persian and the language of religion was Arabic.

Russian colonization in the nineteenth century was driven primarily by geopolitical, not religious, concerns, and as a result, Russian colonial administrators, who already had centuries of experience accommodating Muslim peoples in the empire, were for the most part willing to allow local peoples to practice Islam in peace. The Soviets, in contrast, launched a full-scale assault on Islamic institutions and practices in the mid-1920s, a campaign that intensified dramatically during Stalin’s “revolution from above” and the purges of the late 1920s and 1930s. The great majority of mosques were destroyed as a result, and most members of the Islamic clergy were imprisoned or shot. Nevertheless, Islamic beliefs and practices of everyday life survived, while World War II brought a softening of the campaign against organized religion.

Eventually, an accommodation of sorts was reached between the regime and Islam. While the clergy was formally prohibited from proselytizing, the church was legalized. A so-called Muslim Religious Board was established in Tashkent for Central Asia and Kazakhstan,

which became the most prestigious and powerful of four such Religious Boards in the USSR (the others were in Makhachkala, Dagestan, in Ufa, Bashkortostan, and Baku, Azerbaijan). While the official clergy was deeply penetrated by the political police and important appointments were vetted by Communist Party organs, the official clergy was also given a substantial measure of autonomy, albeit within hazy and shifting limits. At the same time, Central Asians, like Muslims elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, adapted Islamic beliefs and practices to Soviet conditions—clerics found ways to represent Islam as politically non-threatening, and lay believers engaged in non-politicized practices such as daily prayer, the visiting of shrines, the veneration of ancestors and saints, and use of Islamic life cycle rituals such as circumcisions, marriages, and funerals. Even Communist Party officials, for example, would frequently be buried in accordance with Islamic practices.

Islam thus remained an important part of everyday practice and identity in Soviet Central Asia. So-called “parallel” Islam (as opposed to the official Islam overseen by the Spiritual Boards and the Communist Party) was not, however, necessarily political or hostile to the

regime. Even less was it fundamentalist. A great many Central Asians smoked tobacco, drank alcohol, and prayed intermittently at best (although few would eat pork), while women almost never covered their faces in public, let alone wore the full burqas that we see in Afghanistan today (although many would cover their hair with scarves, particularly in rural areas). Women also had more-or-less equal access to education and employment. In general, better-educated urban residents tended to be more sovietized and secular than residents of rural or highland areas.

With the launching of the Gorbachev reforms, the region began to undergo an “Islamic revival.” The number of Central Asians making the hadj to Mecca increased dramatically, and many new mosques were built, much of it with funding from Islamic governments, charitable organizations, and wealthy individuals abroad. The number of imams and mullahs, and the number of students studying in Islamic schools both in the region and abroad, also increased dramatically.

Nevertheless, both elites and society in Central Asia remained politically conservative throughout the Gorbachev period, suspicious in general of Gorbachev’s

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liberalizing reforms and very opposed to the breakup of the USSR. Independence for them was for the most part an unwelcome surprise.

In the decade since, Central Asia's Islamic revival has continued, and the great majority of the traditionally Muslim peoples of the region today identify themselves as believers. Nevertheless, all five states are formally secular, and only Tajikistan has legalized Islamic parties or allowed an Islamic party to participate in government. There is, however, considerable variation in the way that Islam is practiced in the five Central Asian successor states, as well as in the way that different regimes have reacted to politicized Islam.

I do not have time today to take up the situation in each country, so let me instead make instead a few broad observations, with particular reference to the crisis in Afghanistan.

First, we should distinguish between the region's frontline states and those that do not share a border with Afghanistan—that is, between Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, on the one hand, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on the other. Kyrgyzstan, however, is quite close to Afghanistan, and its territory also includes part of the Ferghana Valley (which I'll talk more about in a moment). Of the five Central Asian states, then, the one that is the least directly affected by turmoil in Afghanistan and that is least concerned about destabilization by Islamic militants is Kazakhstan.

Second, a distinction should be made between the three states whose borders extend into the Ferghana Valley—Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—and those that do not. While it makes up only a tiny portion of the total territory of the region, the Ferghana Valley is the most densely populated and fertile part of Central Asia. It's also an ethnic patchwork with a substantial number of residents living on territory that isn't part of their titular homeland. It has been the scene of most of the political violence in the region, with the exception of the Tajik civil war, as well as a source of constant tension between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. And it's the region where Islamic militants have been most active.

Finally, of the five successor states, the two most important for regional stability are Uzbekistan and, to a lesser extent, Tajikistan. The Tajik civil war, which killed some 50,000 people, completely devastated the Tajik economy. Its population is also now the most armed and militarized in the region, and it has an extremely weak government that is unable to exercise any writ over large parts of Tajik territory. More Tajiks than any other na-

tionality identify themselves as Muslim believers. There are also many Tajiks in northern Afghanistan, and Tajiks make up the core of the fighting forces of the Northern Alliance, which I should note is comprised only of parties that describe themselves as "Islamist." Finally, the peace agreement that ended the Tajik Civil War in 1997 afforded the Islamic Renewal Party a share of power. The settlement, I should note, remains extremely precarious.

As for Uzbekistan, it has the region's largest population—roughly 25 million. Its strong-arm leader, President Islam Karimov, is convinced that Uzbekistan deserves to be the dominant power of the region. Uzbekistan has by far the strongest military in Central Asia, and it has tried to intimidate its neighbors in various ways and at various times. Uzbekistan has been most resistant to Russian influence, and it has had a special defense relationship with the US since the mid-1990s. There are a significant number of ethnic Uzbeks in Afghanistan, where Tashkent has supported the Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, who was a major and brutal player in the Afghan civil war and is currently leading the Northern Alliance forces attacking Mazar-i-Sharif.

To date, Uzbekistan has also been the most cooperative Central Asian government in the US-led campaign against the Taliban. Tashkent has apparently agreed to allow the US to use its territory not only for humanitarian assistance but for offensive operations as well, in exchange for which the US is stepping up economic assistance. More importantly, Washington has apparently offered the Uzbeks a rather vague security guarantee. A joint Uzbek-US statement issued on October 12 reads, "We recognize the need to work closely together in the campaign against terrorism. This includes the need to consult on an urgent basis about appropriate steps to address the situation in the event of a direct threat to the security or territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan." All this is hardly likely to further endear Uzbekistan to Islamic militants, and it risks encouraging Tashkent to be even more repressive internally and aggressive externally.

Indeed, the Uzbek government has already been extremely aggressive in repressing non-sanctioned Islamic groups, including kidnapping and the "disappearing" of many Islamic opposition figures (most notably, the well-known Islamic activist, Abdulavi Qori Mirzoev of Andijan, in 1995). It targets people who make public their sympathies with non-official Islam, forcibly cutting

men's beards, harassing people who wear Islamic costume, arresting unofficial mullahs, and closing down non-sanctioned mosques and Islamic schools (madrassas). The Uzbek government, like the Soviet government before it, vigilantly monitors the activities of the Spiritual Board of Muslims in Tashkent, as well as officially-sanctioned mosques and mullahs, to the point that it frequently gives the official clergy instructions on what to say or not say in sermons. Tashkent was also the site of Central Asia's most significant terrorist attack when six bombs went off in February 1999 that killed 13 people and wounded many more, and very nearly killed Karimov himself. Uzbek officials blame the attack on the IMU, a claim that is given additional credence by the fact that the Uzbek government, and Karimov in particular, have been the "Great Satans" for the IMU, at least until the beginning of the US bombing of Afghanistan.

Just a few words about the IMU. The movement emerged out of an Islamic group, Adolat (Justice), that was based in the Uzbek city of Namangan in the Ferghana Valley at the time of the Soviet dissolution. In late 1991, Adolat seized effective control of local government in Namangan, emphasizing above all its ability to stamp out crime and official corruption in the city. Karimov ordered a crackdown in early 1992, which led to the arrest of many and the flight of others, some of whom ended up fighting alongside Tajik Islamists in the Tajik civil war. Others fled to Afghanistan and fought in the Afghan civil war as well. By 1997, with the Tajik civil war winding down and the Taliban in control of Kabul, the IMU became increasingly active in the Ferghana Valley, where its stated goal is to establish a new Islamic caliphate. At that point, Karimov concluded that the main challenge to his regime was no longer the liberal-democratic opposition but the Islamic opposition, and the result was even harsher repression, which only further intensified in the wake of the Tashkent bombing in early 1999. Then, in the summer of 1999 and again in the summer of 2000, IMU militants carried out armed incursions into Uzbek territory that led to scores of deaths. Even more Uzbeks, moderates and radicals alike, fled across the border into Tajikistan and Afghanistan as a result of the violence and Tashkent's harsh reaction, many of whom took up arms with the IMU. By the beginning of this year, Western estimates put the number of IMU fighters at between 2,000 and 3,000, with Russian intelligence estimates even higher—5,000 to 6,000. Most, if not all, of the IMU's fighters were based in Afghanistan, where they received safe-haven from the Taliban as well as training, funding, and military supplies from al-Qaeda.

In addition, however, they have had relatively unrestricted access to much of Tajik territory, with its mountainous terrain and weak state. Many Uzbek officials are also convinced that the Tajik government, which has had very poor relations with Tashkent and includes members of the Islamic Revival Party, is at least turning a blind eye to the activities of the IMU, if not aiding them outright.


Let me conclude with a few brief comments on the roots of Islamic militancy in Central Asia. Certainly both internal and external factors are important. External influences include the safe-haven provided to militants by the Taliban; access to terrorist and guerilla training camps in Afghanistan; funding from wealthy individuals and charitable organizations sympathetic to militant Islam; and the provision of weapons and supplies. However, most important, in my opinion, is the fact that Islamic radicals abroad offer up an extremely effective mobilizing ideology of resistance to a region that is deeply troubled and where communism and socialism have been discredited by 70 years of Soviet power; where nationalism has been undermined by the multi-ethnic nature of society and by numerous competing sub-national and supra-national identities; and by the apparent inability of liberalism or democracy to provide answers to the region's profound problems. Moreover, militant Islam has an extraordinarily effective, decentralized, and autonomous propaganda apparatus available to it in the form of often well-funded mosques and madrassas led by militantly anti-Western and orthodox mullahs and imams, an apparatus that benefits from the fact that in most cases both Islamic and non-Islamic governments are reluctant to intrude into spiritual affairs.

While external factors look more significant in the wake of September 11 and what we've learned since about al-Qaeda, internal factors are at least as important. Population pressures, land scarcity, depletion of water resources, environmental degradation, widespread corruption, drug smuggling and consumption, growing inequality, and extremely high unemployment have given Central Asians much to be disgruntled about. The social base of militant Islam in Central Asia, as elsewhere, are young unemployed males, both rural and urban, poor and middle class, who feel that their life opportunities are minimal. Moreover, in most of Central Asia, as in much of the Islamic world, opportunities for articulating grievances are minimal. State intrusion into spiritual affairs—and particularly the cooptation of the official clergy by the state—help discredit the official clergy. And in Uzbekistan, where many thousands have been arrested

and even more harassed or beaten for their religious beliefs, most now have family members, friends, fellow villagers, or clan members who have been victims of government abuse.

On the other hand, it is important to reiterate that, as of yet at least, militant Islam has relatively few supporters, even in the Ferghana Valley, and there are powerful obstacles to its popularization in the region. The form of Islam traditionally practiced in Central Asia is neither puritanical nor fundamentalist. Fundamentalist Islam, not to speak of militant Islam, is opposed not only by the great majority of political and economic elites but also by the traditional Muslim establishment, which views it as a threat to its influence and position. Central Asians in general, and urban professionals in particular, find the

asceticism of Islamic fundamentalism very difficult to accept. Even more importantly, fundamentalism has to overcome the many national, ethnic, clan, and regional lines of cleavages in the region. Indeed, only in Uzbekistan is religion the most salient political cleavage today. In Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, it is ethnicity, while in Tajikistan it is regionalism. Throughout the region, moreover, there is a tendency to view Wahhabi style fundamentalism as a non-indigenous “Arabic” form of Islam that is alien to Central Asia’s Turko-Persian traditions. And finally, and perhaps most importantly, unlike Afghanistan and Chechnya, the region has managed to avoid, with the partial exception of Tajikistan, a complete breakdown of internal order, civil war, and the arming of the civilian population.



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Russia's Stakes in the Anti-Terrorist Campaign

Vadim Volkov

The day after the tragic events of September 11, Russian citizens brought flowers to US Consulates across the country. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, intimated in an interview to a German magazine that he wanted to cry watching the collapse of the twin towers. But he also stressed that Russia has long warned the Western community of the threat of the so-called "terrorist international," a militant network connecting anarchic warlord enclaves in an effort to create a pan-Islamic fundamentalist state. In tune with widely shared popular sentiments, Putin made a formal statement of Russia's condemnation of the attack and support for US retaliation, swiftly and firmly proclaiming his country an American ally in the imminent war. This was followed by a set of equally strong statements made by the Russian president in Bonn and Brussels with regard to Russia's closer cooperation with NATO and the EU, wrapped in the rhetoric of Russia's strategic pro-Western choice.



But what did Russia offer to the coalition? Russia has defined the terms of participation in the anti-terrorist coalition in the following way: (1) the provision of intelligence data on Afghanistan; (2) the opening of its airspace for humanitarian missions only; (3) helping, or at least not obstructing, US efforts to secure military bases in the former Soviet Central Asian states, mainly Uzbekistan; (4) providing public political support and approval of the US military action; and (5) supplying weapons and supporting by other means the Northern Alliance, Taliban's current enemy and, therefore, the US's current ally.

Let me assess the value of these offers. Russia may have indeed provided intelligence data, but its contents and relevance are unlikely to be disclosed in the near future. Moreover, as Russia's defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, has indicated, interaction between Russian and US intelligence was already substantial before the September attacks and has only intensified after. As for the opening of Russia's airspace to humanitarian missions, Putin's declaration in fact served to emphasize and publicize Russia's military non-involvement. Moscow was also well aware that Uzbekistan would cooperate with the United States regardless of Moscow's preferences. In the absence of any real leverage over Tashkent, the wisest option was to endorse Uzbekistan's "free self-determination." On the other hand, Tajikistan, another vital border state, was bound to follow Russia because of its political and military dependence, and Tajikistan continues to be Russia's key access point to both military and political activities in Afghanistan. As for Russia's vocal political and moral support of US retaliation, one could hardly imagine a different stance, given Russia's own record of what it has been calling the "anti-terrorist operation" in Chechnya. Public endorsement of the US's actions can thus be exploited on a symbolic level at little cost and with few practical consequences. Finally, Russia's widely advertised military aid to the Northern Alliance began long before the current crisis. It now provides an even greater opportunity for the Russian military to earn money, \$45 million recently, from selling its old arsenals, but this time out of British funds rather than drug trafficking revenues of the mujahideens.

On the whole, then, Russia's support has in practice been fairly modest, above all because the terms of its participation in the coalition were realistically calculated on the basis of the country's current

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resources and objectives.

The questions that one should therefore ask are: first, what objectives Russia really pursues by participating in the anti-terrorist campaign (ATC)? Second, what are the objective constraints at home and abroad that may correct or impede these pursuits? And third, what accounts for Russia's perception of the current crisis as well as the US perception of Russia's involvement? I will attempt to address these questions by referring to three major contexts in which Russia's stakes are defined: domestic, regional, and global.

The domestic scene

On the domestic front, it is the cautious and mixed attitude of the population, the pressure from the conservative part of the establishment, and the fragility of economic recovery that define the terms of Russia's participation in the ATC. According to opinion polls conducted in the end of September, over 70 percent of the population expressed positive attitude towards the USA. However, when it came to questions about practical participation in the ATC, 54 percent insisted that Russia should maintain a neutral stance. Twenty-eight percent felt that moral and political support should be offered to the West, while 20 per cent would support Russia's military action alongside the US. A huge majority of Russians, 95 per cent, condemn and regret the attacks on US, but at the same time 50 per cent agreed with the following statement: "Americans got what they deserved and now they know what people felt in Hiroshima, Iraq, and Yugoslavia." The cautious attitude of Russians also stems from fear of instability and flows of refugees that could disrupt Russia's still shaky economic recovery.

An even more serious domestic factor that the Russian government cannot ignore is the 20 million citizens who are members of traditionally Muslim nationalities inside the country, almost 10 per cent of the total. Of these, about 14 million are practicing Muslims. This compels Russia to avoid any confrontation along religious or civilizational lines.

While Russia's economy, after a decade of severe decline, seems to be improving over the past year and a half, its economic (i.e., strategic) potential still remains very modest. The dissonance between Russia's reduced resource base and its superpower aspirations has been, over the last decade, one of the major sources of inconsistency in Russia's foreign policy. Despite many of his sweeping international initiatives, Putin is a realist to the bone. Behind his active but carefully non-confrontational stance on the international scene there is, I believe, a latent mission. Putin's strategy is to withdraw from costly superpower politics in order to allow for a concentration of resources and attention to do-

mestic economic recovery, perhaps with a view to a comeback on the international stage in the future. So again, the frantic international activity since September 11 is designed to create favorable conditions for Russia's retreat, not for an offensive. The recent decision to abandon military installations in Cuba and Vietnam is a reflection of this as well, but the timing allows Moscow to cast these moves as gestures of friendliness and goodwill.

Russia's intellectual elite has repeatedly warned Putin against making one-sided concessions to the West. One analyst went as far as to suggest that "in American political culture there is no concept of gratitude." But Russian decision-makers understand that the West will not give a penny for Russia's friendliness if it stems from weakness. Creating a more harmonious and friendly environment and a secure buffer zone along Russia's borders is exactly what is needed for effective domestic recovery.

The regional dimension

This brings me to the second key dimension—regional. Russia has long identified the Taliban as the major military threat to its Southern borders. Another threat, by the way, is cheap heroin from the south. Russian troops and border guards are stationed in the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan, and currently only a tiny piece of territory controlled by the Northern Alliance separates Russian border guards from Taliban troops. By crushing the Taliban, the US is doing what Russia could only dream of but had neither determination nor power to do. Still, the Russian military and the conservative part of the establishment keep on asking whether it is good for Russia if a US military presence in Central Asia is substituted for the Taliban.

While much still depends upon the military success of the operation and Russia's military is abstaining from any serious involvement, politicians are trying to work out the terms of a post-war settlement. It is here that some US-Russian disagreements are becoming evident. Crudely speaking, there are three forces in Afghanistan: the Pushtun Taliban, actively supported until recently by Pakistan; the Uzbek-based militia of General Abdul Rashid Dustum, which is loosely affiliated with the Northern Alliance; and the Tajik-based group of the former president of the still internationally-recognized Afghanistan government, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and the troops formerly under the command of Akhmed Shah Masoud until his assassination a few days before the attack on the US. While the United States, which is taking into account the interests of its current ally, Pakistan, wants the former king of Afghanistan Zakhir Shah to create a coalition government that includes what is referred to as "moderate Taliban" (to my mind, an oxymoron), Rus-

sia is supporting Rabbani and the Tajiks. The result may well be a partitioning of Afghanistan into two or even three zones along ethno-political lines, with one zone, from Kabul to the northern border with Tajikistan, reserved for Rabbani, and a US-Pakistan zone in the southeast.

As part of the postwar settlement, Russia can do little but accept an inevitable US presence in Central Asia. What it could do in addition, however, is encourage the United States to become the guarantor of the security of Russia's southern frontiers. But to achieve this, a broad joint security framework involving not only the United States but also NATO has to be designed and put into place.

The global dimension

Which brings us to the global dimension. Before the current crisis, Russia was largely defined by critically-

minded intellectuals as an Asiatic power striving to enter into Europe; now it has to be redefined as a European power stretching into Asia that holds the key to Europe-Asian security. The question, therefore, is how to create institutions and mechanisms for a joint US-NATO-Russia security system. Currently, except for the old idea of admitting Russia into the NATO decision-making process, no realistic technical solution has been suggested. But the possibility of a qualitative upgrade in security cooperation between Russia and NATO is clearly there. No significant results were achieved during the brief US-Russian meeting in Shanghai, so Putin is looking forward to visiting Texas to meet George W. Bush in mid-November. If the United States and Russia are to receive any real benefits from cooperation, they have to come up with organizational solutions and not just exchange friendly statements.



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Central Asia in Russian and American Foreign Policy After September 11, 2001

Gail W. Lapidus

September 11 brought with it a dramatic reconfiguration of the entire international security environment as well as a fundamental shift in the ranking of American foreign and security priorities. Virtually every other foreign policy priority was now subordinated to the effort to create an anti-terrorist coalition. This reorientation has had important consequences for American-Russian relations, as well as for US relations with Central Asia in general and with Uzbekistan in particular.



Both in Russia and in Uzbekistan, the new situation has evoked considerable confusion and contradictory reactions. On the one hand, there is a widespread concern that American military actions in Afghanistan, and the broader campaign against terrorism, will entangle Russia, Uzbekistan, and other countries of the region in a dangerous and potentially destabilizing set of military and political activities, along with the risk that an eventual American withdrawal will leave the states in the region to deal with the consequences alone. On the other hand, there are fears that the United States, once drawn into this region, may stay. And there are those who seem to hold both views simultaneously, unable to decide which of the two alternatives would be worse.

Turning first to the question of Russian relations with Central Asia, and how they are altered by the events of September 11 and their aftermath, let me make a few brief points. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, which created 15 independent states from what were previously merely regions in a larger empire, required all of them to elaborate foreign policies which defined their relations to each other as well as to the great variety of other actors in the international system. Russia, as well as the new states of Central Asia, began with a token commitment to the goals of democratization and market reform, along with a desire to preserve and strengthen their sovereignty and independence. The Central Asian countries, however, retreated from the pursuit of democratization and economic reform over the next decade in the name of stability. Stability, it was argued, required authoritarian regimes prepared to deal harshly with political dissent and Islamic extremism in a threatening and unstable geopolitical environment.

Notwithstanding this shared set of domestic concerns, the Central Asian states have pursued different and increasingly divergent foreign and security policies. Turkmenistan has sought to preserve its neutrality and has avoided joining a variety of political coalitions and regional organizations. Uzbekistan, by contrast, has actively engaged itself in a great variety of associations and organizations, while others fall somewhere in between. All these states have also sought to maintain their continuing and important economic, political and cultural ties with Russia—a subject to which I will return shortly—while at the same time developing new relationships with the United States and other Western countries.

Russian policy, meanwhile, has been preoccupied with preserving Russian political, cultural, economic, and security influence in the region without placing an excessive burden on the country's

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constrained economic resources. It has been a difficult balance to strike. For a number of years, Russians referred to the region as part of Russia's "near abroad," an area that occupied a special position in the hierarchy of Russian foreign policy priorities. To this day it is asserted by leading Russian officials—most recently by Sergei Ivanov—that Russia has a distinctive and preeminent, if not exclusive, set of economic and security interests in this region which other foreign powers should be obliged to accept. The tendency to see American engagement in the region in zero-sum terms, whereby any gains for the United States automatically meant a loss for Russia, meant that considerable efforts were devoted to blocking or limiting American political, economic, and military involvement in Central Asia. Russian foreign and security policy elites expressed a continuing fear that American involvement in the region, particularly in the development of energy resources, was simply the opening wedge of what would ultimately become an American military presence. American corporations might lead the process, but the Pentagon would quickly follow.

At the same time, the Russian elite began to appreciate that its own security environment was changing in dramatic ways. In the new Russian security doctrine which began to evolve in the mid 1990s, Russian analysts and officials increasingly came to realize that the major threats to Russia's security no longer came from NATO, in the form of a conventional or nuclear attack on Russian territory. Rather, the emerging new threats to Russian security were internal as well as external, and they came from the Caucasus and Central Asia. In short, the real dangers threatening Russia were the potential for instability and turmoil along Russia's southern borders.

Not only did the focus of Russian security concern shift southward, but security issues began to be defined in terms far broader than simple military balances. Increasingly, the flows of weapons, of drugs, of refugees, and of Islamist radicalism and terrorism came to be viewed as major new threats to security. The drug trade took on particular importance because of its role in financing civil wars and insurgencies across the entire region, beginning with the civil war in Tajikistan and extending to the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Russian elites have also become increasingly concerned of late about the dangers of nuclear proliferation and of biological and chemical weapons in the hands of terrorists in the region. They welcomed American efforts to remove nuclear warheads from the three other successor states that possessed them—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—and acquiesced as well in American efforts to remove stocks of fissile materials from Kazakhstan. More

recently the threat of biological terrorism has become an increasing concern. The Soviet government had developed a large-scale secret research program on biological warfare, and engaged in the development and testing of biological agents such as anthrax on the territory of Uzbekistan, among other sites. With the shrinking of the Aral Sea, one of those sites—Uzbekistan's Vozrozhdenie Island—poses a serious hazard to the safety of populations in the region, and the United States is working with the government of Uzbekistan to find ways to neutralize this material.

Yet a third set of Russian interests, of course, has been economic. Not only is the Central Asian region a major source of gas and oil, but it also competes with Russian energy resources in attracting Western investment. In the past Russian policy has sought to minimize energy development in this region, both by directing foreign investment toward Siberia and other parts of Russia and by blocking alternative new pipeline routes that would carry energy from Central Asia and Azerbaijan directly to western markets without transiting Russia, as all of the existing pipelines routes do currently. Russian discussions have adopted the imagery of the "new Great Game" to describe the competition for control over energy resources and their export.

In view of these Russian interests and concerns, there is understandably a good deal of disquiet about the prospects of a major American presence, not only economic but now also a military presence, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. But there is also clearly a trade-off between costs and benefits. It has been argued—and this argument has clearly persuaded President Putin—that American reinforcement of the stability of the Central Asian countries and of Russia's southern borders could be of considerable benefit at a time when Russia alone is incapable of managing the new threats in the region.

The development of American relations with these countries began under the Clinton administration—virtually from a clean slate—after the Soviet dissolution in 1991. The Clinton administration moved rapidly to create diplomatic, political and economic ties with countries about which the American government was relatively ignorant in those early years. One story describes a newly-arrived ambassador charged with creating the first embassy in the region using his suspenders to run an American flag up a makeshift flagpole. But an effort was made to establish an American presence in all of these new states and, as part of the Clinton administration's pursuit of a "New World Order," to view the Central Asian countries, like Russia, as potential members of a new community of democratic and market-oriented states. In retrospect, some of these expectations appear naive and utopian. But there was a good deal of ex-

citement at the time about the prospect that democracy and market economies might extend not only to Central and Eastern Europe, and not only to the Baltic states and Russia, but southward across the Caucasus and into Central Asia, and that Western investment would help bring prosperity and stability to the entire region.

The United States also committed itself to promoting and protecting the security and the sovereignty of these new states. As a consequence of the sharp cutbacks in funding for the State Department and for other political instruments of American foreign policy in previous administrations, some of the initiative fell almost by default to the Pentagon. Under the imaginative leadership of Defense Secretary William Perry, the Partnership for Peace program was inaugurated as both a way of handling the delicate issue of NATO enlargement but also as a way to develop broader ties with the Central Asian countries and to promote the democratization of their Soviet-style military institutions and behaviors. This program would lay the foundation for a growing network of cooperative political and military ties—to Uzbekistan in particular—which would play an unexpected but significant role in facilitating the joint efforts after September 11.

Many of the hopes for democratic development in Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian states dimmed over time as these countries turned to increasing authoritarianism and repression. In the West, criticism mounted over their human rights records and their harsh treatment of domestic opposition, while the governments in the region were in turn increasingly disappointed by an apparent loss of American interest and support for their internal development and by what they viewed as insufficient appreciation for the serious challenges and threats they faced.

The case of Uzbekistan is of particular interest. Its leadership sought to maneuver in very complex ways between the United States and Russia in trying to promote its domestic and foreign policy interests. On the one hand, it went further than any of the other Central Asian country in resisting Russian efforts to preserve its hegemony over the region, not only playing an active role in the Partnership for Peace program but also pursuing regional cooperation with like-minded states by joining the GUUAM group (GUUAM stands for Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), which was created as a counterpoise to the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States and has sought to develop closer links to the US and to European countries.

At the same time, however, Uzbek leadership was well aware that Russia remained a key player in the region. However well-disposed any given administration might be,

the US was ultimately a distant and uncertain partner, whereas Russia, by geography, by history, and by political, economic, and security interests, was likely to continue to play a considerable role in the region. Both countries also shared similar interests in Afghanistan; Russian political and military support for the Northern Alliance, and hostility to the Taliban, coincided with Uzbekistan's policy. In short, Uzbekistan was in the midst of a very complex set of relationships with Russia and the United States when September 11 suddenly gave a new vitality to the entire Uzbek-American relationship. President Karimov moved very quickly to offer tangible support to the US military campaign, including granting the American government the use of a much-needed military base close to Afghanistan. He managed to win some still-secret security assurances from Washington, as well as promises of political and economic support whose dimensions are not fully clear. (The addition of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to the US State Department's list of terrorist organizations was undoubtedly a welcome gesture.) He presumably also tried to extract some longer-term commitments that the US would remain engaged with Uzbekistan over the longer term and not quickly withdraw its support when the military campaign in Afghanistan ended. In short, the events of September 11 prompted a significantly deeper level of engagement of the two countries, and promised a longer term relationship in the future, although its concrete outlines remain as yet unclear. It also remains unclear how far the American leadership will go in toning down some of its criticism of human rights and political abuses in the interest of cooperation in the war against terrorism.

Let me conclude by pointing to several difficult new challenges that American foreign policymakers will have to address, and which involve American relations with Russia and Uzbekistan in particular. The first problem is one which besets the entire anti-terrorist coalition: the problem of defining terrorism. It has often been argued that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. The new anti-terrorist coalition embraces partners who have divergent and often conflicting agendas of their own. For Pakistan, to take one example, the issue of Kashmir is a driving force in domestic and foreign policy, and the support of Pakistani military and intelligence services for the Taliban and for al-Qaeda was linked to their role in training Islamist insurgents operating in Kashmir. India, on the other hand, views these insurgents as terrorists, and Pakistan's efforts to win Western support for its position vis-à-vis Kashmir complicate the involvement of India in the coalition, as well as efforts to reduce the level of hostilities between the two nuclear-armed countries.

Then there is the problem of Chechnya, which we have not discussed today at any length. In signing on to the anti-terrorist coalition, Russia's President Putin has extracted a shift in American and Western treatment of the conflict in Chechnya. Putin has long insisted that the Russian military campaign in Chechnya is an anti-terrorist war, while the West tended to view the conflict as an ethno-political struggle disguised as an anti-terrorist campaign. In the short run, the United States government, as well as European leaders, has toned down its criticism and appears to be giving President Putin's views of the situation in Chechnya more credence than in the past. This shift in position may not last indefinitely, however, if there are no serious moves by the Putin government toward a political solution in Chechnya.

The United States faces a similar problem in its relations with Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has been repeatedly criticized by the US government and by NGOs for its massive abuses of human rights. For the moment, criticism of those abuses is likely to be muted in the interests of smoothing the relations between the governments, but it may well resurface in the future as a consequence of international and domestic pressures. The cases of Pakistan, Chechnya, and Uzbekistan illustrate a broader problem: the danger that the anti-terrorist campaign will lead to a drastic subordination of concerns with human rights and political repression in countries supporting the coalition and the use of a double standard elsewhere. The argument that domestic stability and the struggle against Islamist radicalism and terrorism require the suspension of civil liberties and the strengthening of authoritarian rule is already finding a more receptive audience in the West.

Differences between the US, Russia, and Uzbekistan are also likely to surface over issues involving

the future of Afghanistan itself. In particular, American policy will have to reconcile the interests of Pakistan, which tends to be supportive of the so-called moderate elements of the Taliban and which wants to see the Pushtun groupings of southern Afghanistan play a major role in a post-war coalition government, with the interests of Russia and Uzbekistan (along with Iran), which strongly support the Northern Alliance and the Rabbani government, even though all sides recognize the need for an inclusive coalition government if Afghanistan is to avoid further civil war.

Finally, perhaps the greatest challenge has to do with how the American government will think about its future role in the region. At the moment, we are engaged in a campaign which is largely defined in military terms. Washington has only just begun to think about a political endgame and to focus on the more limited issue of how to construct a coalition government in Afghanistan. But it remains altogether unclear what role the United States is prepared to play in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and in the stabilization of the region more broadly. While the United Nations may offer the most acceptable institutional framework for these efforts, long-term American engagement and leadership will remain essential to their success.

The events of September 11, and the military campaign in Afghanistan which they precipitated, have involved the United States deeply in a region which was previously treated as marginal to core American interests. In the process, new ties have been forged with political and military leaders in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and other states in the region, ties which create some measure of responsibility for continued engagement in shaping the future of the region. But this challenge has not yet been confronted.

Faculty and students working on the Caucasus and Central Asia at the University of California, Berkeley

CCAsP Executive Committee

Stephan Astourian (history) is a specialist on the history of the Caucasus and Central Asia from the nineteenth century to present. He has written extensively on contemporary developments in both regions, and currently teaches courses on the history of the Caucasus and Central Asia at the undergraduate and graduate level.

Guitty Azarpay (Near Eastern studies, emeritus) is a specialist the art of Silk Roads, the stations on the intercontinental trade routes between China and the Mediterranean in the first millennium AD.

Sanjyot Mehendale (Caucasus and Central Asia Program, Near Eastern studies), is a specialist in the art and archeology of the Silk Roads who has conducted extensive field research in Central Asia. She is the director of the Uzbek Berkeley Archaeological Mission (UBAM), which has contributed to her research in the Shahr-i-Sabz region of Uzbekistan; she is involved with the Electronic Cultural Atlas Initiative at Berkeley; and she is one of two editors for the *Cultural Atlas of the Silk Roads*.

Johanna Nichols (Slavic languages and literatures) is a specialist on the languages and cultures of the North Caucasus. Her current research projects include an Ingush grammar, dictionary, and texts and a Chechen grammar, dictionary, and texts.

Leslie Peirce (Near Eastern studies and history) is a specialist on the early modern Middle East broadly conceived, stretching from the Mediterranean to Central Asia; Ottoman studies (14th-19th centuries); gender and sexuality; and the intersections of religious, legal, and political cultures.

Harsha Ram (Slavic languages and literatures) is a specialist on eighteenth and nineteenth century Russian literature, imperial expansion, and Eurasianism.

David Stronach (Near Eastern studies) is a specialist in Near Eastern art and archaeology who is currently engaged in excavations conducted with Russian specialists in Armenia and Dagestan.

Edward Walker (Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, political science) works on secessionist conflicts and interethnic relations in post-communist societies, with particular focus on Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

Faculty

Shawali Ahmadi (Near Eastern studies) is a specialist on Persian literature. He is teaching a course on the culture and history of Afghanistan in Spring 2002.

Hamid Algar (Near Eastern studies) is an expert on Islam, Sufism, and Iranian culture. He has written extensively on the subject of Iran and Islam, including the books *Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906* and *Mirza Malkum Khan: A Biographical Study in Iranian Modernism*.

Patricia Berger (art history) is a specialist on Chinese art, Mongolian art and culture and the Buddhist art of Xinjiang.

George Breslauer (political science and dean of social sciences) is an expert on Soviet and post-Soviet domestic policy and foreign policy. He is currently working on project that examines the similarities and differences in the political biographies of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin.

Kiren Chaudhry (political science) is a specialist on the Middle East and the politics of Islam. Her recent research has examined how state and market institutions are created and transformed. She serves as chair of the Colloquium on the Moral Economy of Islam, within the Institute for International Studies.

She teaches in the fields of comparative politics, the political economy of development, and the Middle East.

M. Steven Fish (political science) is a specialist on post-Soviet politics and new forms of authoritarianism in, inter alia, Central Asia and the Caucasus. He has made numerous trips to the region and spent the summer of 1998 teaching in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

David Hooson (geography, emeritus) is an expert on Eurasian geography. He has conducted research and taught courses on Central Asia and the Caucasus. His work focuses on the former Soviet Union, in the context of the history of geographical thought and political geography, and his current projects include co-editing a new journal titled *National Identities* (London).

Kenneth Jowitt (political science) specializes in the study of comparative politics, American foreign policy, and postcommunist countries. He is particularly interested in studying types of anti-Western ideologies that might appear in the near future.

Ira M. Lapidus (history, emeritus) is a specialist on the history of the Middle East and Islam.

Michael Nacht (public policy) is an expert on international security. From 1994 to 1997, he served as Assistant Director for Strategic and Eurasian Affairs of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, where he directed the Agency's work on nuclear arms reduction and missile defense negotiations with Russia.

Gérard Roland (economics) is an expert on Soviet and post-Soviet economics and economic transitions.

Alexei Yurchak (anthropology) is a specialist in late- and post-Soviet culture. His current research investigates the way citizens of the former Soviet Union negotiate the changing or multiple ideologies of late communism and the post-communist eras.

Graduate students

Alina Avyazian (Near Eastern studies) plans to advance to candidacy this spring, and is actively involved in an excavation of a palace in Erebuni, the capitol of Urartia in the eighth century BC (in present-day Armenia), sponsored by UNESCO.

Katherine Bullock (Near Eastern studies) is studying trade and cultural exchanges between the Near East and Central Asia in the Bronze and Iron Ages.

Heather Carlisle (geography) is completing a dissertation on water scarcity and politics in the region entitled "Hydropolitics in Post-Soviet Central Asia."

Christopher Codella (Near Eastern studies) is studying Central Asian archaeology and art history.

Ingrid Kleespies (Slavic languages and literatures) is writing a dissertation on Russian and Polish travel narratives as a means of building national identity and national consciousness, with a sizeable part devoted to journeys to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Rebecca Manley (history) is writing a dissertation on the war-time evacuations from Moscow to Tashkent and has conducted substantial research in Uzbekistan and Russia.

Eugene Polissky (history) is writing a dissertation on Soviet involvement in the war in Afghanistan and its impact on Soviet politics and society in the 1980s, with particular attention to Central Asia.

Amita Satyal (history) is planning a dissertation on northern India's overland commerce into Central Asia, 15th -18th centuries.

Emily Shaw (political science) is a first year Ph.D. student interested in questions of transition and individuation in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Jennifer Utrata (sociology) is in the early stages of a comparative dissertation on culture, religion, and the state entitled "Religion and State Secularism in Russia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan."

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