

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
12 March 2021	No record, (see A/76/2 , part II, chap. 37)		S/PRST/2021/6
24 March 2021	S/2021/292	Letter dated 26 March 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
16 April 2021	S/2021/381	Letter dated 16 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2570 (2021) 15-0-0 S/2021/373
16 April 2021	S/2021/382	Letter dated 19 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Resolution 2571 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII) S/2021/374
17 May 2021	S/2021/483	Letter dated 19 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
21 May 2021	S/2021/498	Letter dated 25 May 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

11. The situation in Mali

During the period under review, the Council held five meetings and adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in connection with the situation in Mali. Three of the meetings took the form of briefings and two were convened for the adoption of decisions.⁴⁴⁰ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1 below. Council members also held two open videoconferences in connection with the item.⁴⁴¹ More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below. The Council also held one private meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) pursuant to resolution [1353](#)

(2001).⁴⁴² In addition to the meetings and open videoconferences, Council members held closed videoconferences and informal consultations of the whole.⁴⁴³ In 2021, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSMA.⁴⁴⁴

In 2021, the Council was briefed three times by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSMA and once each by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and by a civil society representative. Briefings were conducted in connection

⁴⁴⁰ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁴⁴¹ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁴⁴² The private meeting was held on 7 June in connection with the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”; see [S/PV.8788](#) and [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 20.

⁴⁴³ See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 38. See also [S/2021/683](#), [S/2021/1014](#), [S/2021/1084](#) and [S/2021/1032](#). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences.

⁴⁴⁴ See [S/2021/261](#) and [S/2021/262](#).

with the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali.⁴⁴⁵ The Council was also briefed once by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali.

On 13 January, at an open videoconference,⁴⁴⁶ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General informed Council members that the period under consideration had been marked by the negotiations for the establishment of the National Transition Council. He recalled that the Transition Council would serve as the national Parliament during the transition and was in charge of approving the political, institutional, electoral and administrative reforms that were crucial for the consolidation of democracy and the success of credible elections, allowing for a return to constitutional order. Despite the lack of consensus throughout the negotiations on the appointment of members of the Government and the National Transition Council, all organs of the transition were operational. With regard to security, the Special Representative emphasized that MINUSMA continued to adapt and strengthen its capacities to better respond to the two strategic priorities set forth in its mandate, adding that the Mission remained committed to supporting the Government's strategy in addressing a worrisome security environment in Mali and the region and intercommunal violence in the centre of the country. With regard to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015, he informed Council members that on 18 December 2020 the signatory parties had adopted a new revised road map of priority actions to speed up the Agreement's implementation.

On 6 April, at an open videoconference,⁴⁴⁷ the Under-Secretary-General informed Council members about a recent major attack against MINUSMA peacekeepers, which served as a reminder of the challenges facing Mali and the Sahel subregion alike. He noted that the attack had taken place against the backdrop of a deteriorating security situation in central and northern Mali. Against that backdrop, the Under-Secretary-General reiterated the call of the Secretary-General to scale up and strengthen the response of the international community to the issue of terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel region. Expressing concern about ongoing destabilizing activities by militias operating along ethnic lines in central Mali, he further called on Mali's transitional Government to devise a comprehensive approach to improve the security situation in parallel with efforts to protect civilians and restore State authority and basic social services. Noting that any sustainable improvement in the security situation in Mali was predicated on the success of the political transition, the

Under-Secretary-General underlined that that would depend on the commitment of the Malian stakeholders to ensure that the transition and the key reform processes underpinning it remained inclusive, transparent and credible. He encouraged Malian political actors to work in a spirit of compromise and enact reforms aimed at creating an environment conducive to peaceful, inclusive, transparent and credible elections. While the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation had remained slow, a positive momentum and a new sense of trust among the Malian parties had emerged. In that regard, he urged Malian stakeholders to build on that momentum to accelerate the redeployment and effective use of the reconstituted units of the army in the north of the country, the operationalization of the Northern Development Zone and the establishment of the territorial police. In closing, the Under-Secretary-General emphasized that the support of the international community and that of the Council remained of the utmost importance to ensure that national stakeholders lived up to their commitments.

At the meeting held on 14 June,⁴⁴⁸ the Special Representative recalled that he had, in the context of a private meeting, briefed the Council on the events leading up to 24 May 2021 when the President and Prime Minister of the National Transition Government had been overthrown. He reported that the coup had been condemned by the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), meeting in Accra on 30 May, and by the African Union Peace and Security Council, meeting in Addis Ababa on 1 June. The Special Representative noted that Colonel Assimi Goïta had been sworn in on 7 June 2021 as President of the transition and that he had on the same date signed a decree appointing Choguel Maïga as Prime Minister. The formation of a new government had been announced on 11 June. He also informed Council members that the transitional President and the Prime Minister had provided reassurances that they would respect the transitional calendar, in which it was envisaged that elections would be held by February 2022, and that neither the President nor the Prime Minister would run for office. They had also reiterated their commitment to working with the signatory armed movements to the Algiers process. It was necessary to translate those commitments into urgent and concrete action, which required the constructive contribution of all Malian stakeholders. The time had come for Malian leaders to rise above partisan politics and personal interests and work together in earnest to address the crisis in the interest of their country and its future. In that regard, the support of MINUSMA would remain critical. The Special Representative reported that following

⁴⁴⁵ See S/2020/1281, S/2021/299, S/2021/519 and S/2021/844.

⁴⁴⁶ See S/2021/47.

⁴⁴⁷ See S/2021/336.

⁴⁴⁸ See S/PV.8794. See also S/2021/683.

his assumption of duties in MINUSMA, the Mission had developed a 60-day plan, based on Malian ownership and leadership, which outlined priority action to be implemented by the end of the Mission's mandate on 30 June 2021. The Special Representative also said that MINUSMA had developed an action plan for central Mali, focusing on promoting political engagement to stabilize the centre, enhancing the protection of civilians, fostering community engagement, social cohesion and reconciliation, and facilitating the return of State administration and services.⁴⁴⁹ In closing, he underscored the need for the continued support of the Council and the broader international community, which was key for Mali not to slide into further instability with far-reaching consequences for the Sahel subregion and beyond.⁴⁵⁰

Following the Special Representative, the independent consultant, founding member and President of the Coalition des femmes leaders nord, sud et centre du Mali, underlined that the realization of the women and peace and security agenda in Mali remained dependent on strong political will and relative political and institutional stability. She said that the most recent coup showed that there was a long way to go to stabilize Mali and that without a more meaningful treatment of the root causes of the multifaceted crisis that had shaken the country since 2012, the vicious cycle of instability would continue, including the issues of inclusive and equitable governance of land and productive resources and access to justice. She focused on two points, together with recommendations: first, the observation of a marked deterioration in women's rights before and during the transition; and secondly, the priorities and challenges of the transition in relation to the women and peace and security agenda and their implications for the mandate of MINUSMA. She underlined that despite notable progress, which saw nine women from the signatory parties become members of the Agreement Monitoring Committee for the first time in six years, the overall situation of women's rights remained critical. With regard to the second point, she noted that the Council and MINUSMA had a key role to play in putting the issue of gender and the implementation of resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) back at the heart of the transition's priorities. She also recommended that the Council broaden the political and operational mandate of MINUSMA beyond the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 to include reconciliation and peace efforts through political dialogue and negotiations with armed groups and, together with MINUSMA, to urgently support the transition authorities in affirming and respecting Mali's national and international commitments, particularly with

regard to the representation of women in appointed and elected posts. She called for accorded priority in the new MINUSMA mandate to a tightened women and peace and security agenda with precise indicators, particularly with regard to the issue of prosecuting cases of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and the holistic care of survivors of such violence.

At the meeting held on 29 October,⁴⁵¹ the Special Representative expressed appreciation for the visit of the Council to Bamako, which underscored the Council's continued support for Mali and the unwavering support for MINUSMA. In reference to the mission of the Council, he noted that the situation on the ground remained extremely challenging, confronted by a context marked by increased insecurity in northern, central and parts of southern Mali and a worrisome humanitarian situation. The Special Representative referred to the various interlocutors of the Government who had highlighted during the Council's mission the deteriorating security situation as the main concern for the average Malian, along with a plea for the delivery of basic services. Similarly, local communities expressed the need for profound political and governance reforms to create the conditions for credible elections and lasting stability. In that context, he affirmed that MINUSMA remained crucial. He described the military and security response to the situation by MINUSMA and acknowledged that significant gaps remained in requirements for enabling capabilities, which were critical to ensure greater mobility and flexibility of the existing MINUSMA uniformed component. He acknowledged that the Mission was overstretched and recalled the Secretary-General's recommendation to augment its operation, including with additional assets such as attack and utility helicopters. The Special Representative also addressed the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation, noting that progress had been frustratingly slow on key provisions relating to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, institutional reforms and development in the north. He also said that the transition had reached a critical stage and elaborated on the key elements for the holding of credible elections and ensuring the return to constitutional rule. He concluded by assuring the Council that MINUSMA would continue to assess and recalibrate its approach to adapt to the evolving situation in Mali and better support the Malian people's aspirations for democracy, peace and security.

On 8 December, the Council held a meeting⁴⁵² to hear a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#). The Chair informed the

⁴⁴⁹ For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

⁴⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8794](#).

⁴⁵¹ See [S/PV.8893](#).

⁴⁵² See [S/PV.8922](#). For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), see part IX, sect. I.

Council about the activities of the Committee during 2021. He also reported that eight individuals were on the Committee's sanctions list pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) and that the Committee had during the period under review received one request for an exception to the ban on international travel.

In the discussions in the Council during the period under review, Council members expressed concern at the security situation in Mali. Many Council members highlighted the need to address the root causes of instability in the country and the wider Sahel region. In that regard, some Council members emphasized the need to support sustainable development,⁴⁵³ as well as to address the adverse impact of climate change.⁴⁵⁴ Most Council members recognized the contribution of MINUSMA to stabilizing the security situation in Mali, and while some underlined the need to continue its adaptation plan in order to strengthen its effectiveness in protecting civilians in central Mali,⁴⁵⁵ others emphasized the need to provide the Mission with enough resources to implement its mandate.⁴⁵⁶

Regarding the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, several Council members emphasized the need for the continued active participation of the Malian army in its counter-terrorism operations⁴⁵⁷ and called for enhanced support, including from the Council and the United Nations.⁴⁵⁸ Speakers held differing views regarding authorization under Chapter VII of the Charter in support of the Joint Force.⁴⁵⁹ While the representative of Mali reiterated his call to the Council for a robust and adapted mandate, under Chapter VII, the representatives of France

and the United States held that such a mandate was not necessary.⁴⁶⁰

Council members expressed concern at the humanitarian situation in Mali, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Some Council members expressed concern in particular at the abuse and violation of human rights and international humanitarian law in Mali,⁴⁶¹ including by the Malian army and the Joint Force.⁴⁶² In response, several Council members focused on the need to bring the perpetrators to justice.⁴⁶³ In the context of increased attacks on civilians, MINUSMA peacekeepers, the Malian army and other international forces in Mali, some Council members emphasized the need to improve the safety of peacekeepers,⁴⁶⁴ while others focused on the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of crimes committed against peacekeepers.⁴⁶⁵

On the political front, Council members welcomed the progress in implementing the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 and emphasized the importance of its further implementation, which was key in stabilizing the situation in Mali and for achieving durable peace. Some Council members also expressed concern at the coup of 24 May 2021 that had led to the forced resignation of the transitional President and the Prime Minister of the transitional Government.⁴⁶⁶ They also expressed concern at the potential impact of the coup on

⁴⁵³ See [S/2021/47](#) (China and Ireland); [S/2021/336](#) (Mexico and Norway); and [S/PV.8794](#) (France and Norway).

⁴⁵⁴ See [S/2021/47](#) (Ireland and Norway); and [S/PV.8794](#) (Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Viet Nam and Estonia).

⁴⁵⁵ See [S/2021/47](#) (France and Ireland); [S/PV.8794](#) (Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Russian Federation).

⁴⁵⁶ See [S/2021/47](#) (India and Ireland); [S/2021/336](#) (Ireland, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8794](#) (France and Viet Nam).

⁴⁵⁷ See [S/2021/47](#) (China, France and Russian Federation); [S/2021/336](#) (China and Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8794](#) (Russian Federation).

⁴⁵⁸ See [S/2021/47](#) (France, India and Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)); [S/2021/336](#) (France, India and Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia)); [S/PV.8794](#) (France, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), China and India); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia) and India).

⁴⁵⁹ For more information on the discussion, see part VII, sect. IV.

⁴⁶⁰ See [S/2021/336](#) (Mali); [S/PV.8794](#) (France, United States and Mali); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Mali). For more information on the discussion, see part VIII, sect. III.

⁴⁶¹ See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia, Ireland, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/2021/336](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Norway, United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8794](#) (United States, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom and Estonia); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Ireland, Estonia, United Kingdom, India and Norway).

⁴⁶² See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia); [S/2021/336](#) (Ireland and United States); and [S/PV.8794](#) (Ireland, Norway and Estonia).

⁴⁶³ See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, United Kingdom and United States); [S/2021/336](#) (Estonia, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and United States); [S/PV.8794](#) (United States, Norway, United Kingdom and Estonia); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Ireland, Estonia and United Kingdom).

⁴⁶⁴ See [S/2021/47](#) (China); [S/2021/336](#) (China, India, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8794](#) (China, India and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8893](#) (India and China).

⁴⁶⁵ See [S/2021/47](#) (China, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); [S/2021/336](#) (China, United Kingdom and Viet Nam); and [S/PV.8794](#) (China, Mexico, Ireland, Norway and India).

⁴⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8794](#) (France, Mexico, United States, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, India, Viet Nam and Estonia).

the transitional process⁴⁶⁷ and on the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation.⁴⁶⁸ Some Council members further underscored the need for the meaningful, full and equal participation of women in Mali's political process⁴⁶⁹ to create a more inclusive, stable and sustainable peace.⁴⁷⁰ In addition, Council members discussed their mission to Mali and the Niger, which had allowed them to express support for MINUSMA and its personnel, hear first-hand about the challenges that Mali and the Sahel subregion were facing and listen to the concerns expressed by the transition authorities in Mali.⁴⁷¹

During the period under review, the Council adopted two resolutions in connection with the item, one relating to the mandate of MINUSMA and one in connection with the sanctions measures concerning Mali. On 29 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, extending the mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June 2022 and renewing its authorization to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate.⁴⁷² The Council welcomed the efforts by

MINUSMA to implement its adaptation plan, expressed its full support for the continuation of the plan's implementation and requested the Secretary-General to take all appropriate measures to accelerate it, notably in generating the required assets. It encouraged Member States to contribute to the plan by providing the capabilities needed for its success, particularly air assets.⁴⁷³ The Council included support for the political transition in Mali as part of the first strategic priority of MINUSMA and reiterated the Mission's second strategic priority, which was to facilitate the implementation by Malian actors of a comprehensive, politically led strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish State presence, State authority and basic social services in Central Mali.⁴⁷⁴ In addition, the Council modified and added new elements to the existing tasks.⁴⁷⁵ The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a report no later than 15 July 2021 on the progress in the implementation of the Force adaptation plan, including recommendations on the force levels and ceiling of MINUSMA uniformed personnel and how it would accompany a Government-led strategy for the centre of the country.⁴⁷⁶ On 30 August, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), extending until 31 August 2022 the asset freeze and travel ban imposed by the Council by resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#).⁴⁷⁷ The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 30 September 2022.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8794](#) (Mexico, United States, Norway, United Kingdom, India and Viet Nam).

⁴⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8794](#) (Mexico and Viet Nam).

⁴⁶⁹ See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/2021/336](#) (Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam); [S/PV.8794](#) (France, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Mexico, United States, Ireland, United Kingdom and Estonia); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Ireland, United States, Estonia and Norway).

⁴⁷⁰ See [S/2021/47](#) (Estonia and Norway); and [S/PV.8893](#) (Ireland).

⁴⁷¹ See [S/PV.8893](#) (Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Ireland, United States, Estonia, United Kingdom, India, Russian Federation, China and Norway). For further information on the mission, see sect. 30 below.

⁴⁷² Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), paras. 17 and 20. For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I. For more information on the authorization of use of force by the Council, see part VII, sect. IV.

⁴⁷³ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), twentieth preambular paragraph and para. 25.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 21. See also resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), paras. 22 and 30.

⁴⁷⁵ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), paras. 27, 30–32, 53 and 55.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

⁴⁷⁷ Resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Mali, see part VII, sect. III.

⁴⁷⁸ Resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), para. 3. For more information on the Committee and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

Table 1
Meetings: the situation in Mali

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8794 14 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2021/519)		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the	12 Council members, ^a all invitees	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Letter dated 1 June 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/520)			United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, independent consultant, founding member and President of the Coalition des femmes leaders nord, sud et centre du Mali		
S/PV.8809 29 June 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2021/519)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2021/610)			Five Council members (China, India, Niger, ^b United Kingdom, United States)	Resolution 2584 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
	Letter dated 1 June 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/520)					
S/PV.8844 30 August 2021	Letter dated 6 August 2021 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/714) and S/2021/714/Corr.1)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2021/750)				Resolution 2590 (2021) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8893 29 October 2021	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2021/844)		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Nine Council members, ^c all invitees	
S/PV.8922 8 December 2021					One Council member (Mexico) ^d	

^a China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

^b The representative of the Niger spoke also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia.

^c China, Estonia, India, Ireland, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^d The representative of Mexico spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali.

Table 2
Videoconferences: the situation in Mali

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
13 January 2021	S/2021/47	Letter dated 15 January 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
6 April 2021	S/2021/336	Letter dated 8 April 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

Americas

12. The question concerning Haiti

During the period under review, the Council held four meetings, adopted one resolution and adopted one presidential statement under the item entitled “The question concerning Haiti”. Two meetings took the form of briefings, one was a private (closed) meeting⁴⁷⁹ and one meeting was convened for the adoption of a decision.⁴⁸⁰ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in table 1 below. Council members also held one open videoconference in connection with the item, more information on which is provided in table 2 below.⁴⁸¹ In addition to meetings and an open videoconference, Council members held a closed videoconference and informal consultations of the whole in connection with the item.⁴⁸²

In 2021, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) gave three briefings⁴⁸³ to Council members in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General on the Mission’s

activities⁴⁸⁴ and once following the assassination of the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, on 7 July 2021.⁴⁸⁵ The Council also heard briefings by three representatives of Haitian civil society.⁴⁸⁶ At the meetings and videoconferences, Haiti was represented by its President, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In her statements to the Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported on the political crisis in the country involving the further postponement of legislative, municipal, local and presidential elections, the security situation in the context of increased levels of gang violence, efforts by the Government and stakeholders in Haiti to address the root causes of the crisis, and the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the earthquake of 14 August 2021.

At the open videoconference held on 22 February,⁴⁸⁷ in the presence of the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, the Special Representative stated that the institutional crisis into which the country had plunged since the Parliament had ceased to function in January 2020 risked growing deeper as relations between the executive and the judicial branches of power appeared increasingly fraught and Mr. Moïse continued to govern by decree. The efforts of part of

⁴⁷⁹ See [S/PV.8815](#).

⁴⁸⁰ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.

⁴⁸¹ For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II, sect. I, and *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁴⁸² See [A/76/2](#), part II, chap. 7. See also [S/2021/1060](#). In 2021, some informal consultations of the Council were held in the form of closed videoconferences. See also [S/2021/1032](#).

⁴⁸³ See [S/2021/174](#), [S/PV.8799](#) and [S/PV.8871](#).

⁴⁸⁴ [S/2021/133](#), [S/2021/559](#) and [S/2021/828](#).

⁴⁸⁵ See [S/PV.8815](#).

⁴⁸⁶ See [S/2021/174](#), [S/PV.8799](#) and [S/PV.8871](#).

⁴⁸⁷ See [S/2021/174](#).