



*Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council*

25<sup>th</sup> Supplement

2022

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs - Security Council Affairs Division  
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## Part II

# Provisional rules of procedure and related procedural developments

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## **Introductory note**

Part II of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Security Council in relation to its provisional rules of procedure and relevant Articles of the Charter of the United Nations. Since the provisional rules of procedure are routinely applied by the Council at its formal meetings, the focus of part II is on special applications of the rules in the proceedings of the Council, rather than on the standard applications of the rules.

Part II is divided into 10 sections, in the order of the relevant chapters of the provisional rules of procedure, as follows: section I, meetings and records (Article 28 of the Charter of the United Nations and rules 1 to 5 and 48 to 57); section II, agenda (rules 6 to 12); section III, representation and credentials (rules 13 to 17); section IV, presidency (rules 18 to 20); section V, Secretariat (rules 21 to 26); section VI, conduct of business (rules 27, 29, 30, and 33); section VII, participation (Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter and rules 37 and 39); section VIII, decision-making and voting (Article 27 of the Charter and rules 31, 32, 34 to 36, 38 and 40); section IX, languages (rules 41 to 47); and section X, status of the provisional rules of procedure (Article 30 of the Charter).

The remaining rules are covered in other parts of the present Supplement, as follows: rule 28, concerning subsidiary organs of the Council, in parts IX and X, and concerning Security Council missions, in part VI; and rule 61, concerning relations with other United Nations organs, in part IV.

During the period under review, there were no instances of the application of rules 58 to 60 concerning the admission of new Members, and the present Supplement therefore contains no material relating to those rules.

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During the period under review, the Council held 292 meetings, of which 276 meetings were public and 16 were private. The members of the Council held 127 informal consultations of the whole in 2022. Council members continued to hold informal interactive dialogues and Arria-

formula meetings. During the period under review, Council members also continued the practice of holding informal “wrap-up” sessions at the end of the month.

In 2022, the Council was seized of 68 agenda items. The Council added two new items to the list of matters of which it was seized, namely, “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine” and “Letter dated 13 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2022/688](#))”. While being seized of 68 agenda items, the Council only considered 47 items. Of the 47 items considered by the Council in 2022, 26 concerned country-specific and regional situations and 22 dealt with thematic and other issues.<sup>1</sup>

During the period under review, the Council adopted 54 resolutions and seven statements by the President. The Council also issued 18 notes by the President and 27 letters from the President. Three draft resolutions were not adopted due to the lack of the required nine affirmative votes and four draft resolutions were not adopted because of the negative vote of one or more permanent member. In 2022, objections to the adoption of the agenda and to the extension of invitations pursuant to rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure led to procedural votes on two occasions. The Council also adopted resolution [2623 \(2022\)](#) by which it called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly, and which was adopted despite the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council consistent with General Assembly resolution [377\(V\) A](#).

In 2022, with the continued improvement of the situation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic in New York City, the Council fully resumed all in-person activities, including the holding of meetings in person and the adoption of decisions at the Security Council Chamber. The Council also discontinued the use of videoconferences, the written voting procedure as well as all other aspects of the remote working methods established at the outset of the pandemic in March 2020.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, Council members did not hold any videoconferences or adopt any decisions using the written voting procedure during the year.

This notwithstanding, in a letter dated 17 January 2022 addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Council, the presidency of the Council for the month

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<sup>1</sup> See [S/2023/10](#).

<sup>2</sup> For more information on the working methods developed by Council members in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, see *Repertoire, Supplements* covering the period 2020 and 2021, part II. sect. I.

(Norway), noted that it would strive to continue to maintain the regular conduct of business, while indicating that if the situation related to the pandemic deteriorated, the Council could consider reverting to the working methods outlined in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Council addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Council.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, in a letter dated 7 March 2022, the presidency of the Council (United Arab Emirates) outlined several recommended restrictions and precautions for the conduct of the Council's work given that the pandemic continued to evolve and change around the world, including in New York City.<sup>4</sup> Both letters reiterated that, as in previous cases, the working methods and guidelines outlined therein were a response to the exceptional and unprecedented circumstances and would not set a precedent for the future. The practice of circulating letters outlining the agreed upon interim working methods for the month was subsequently discontinued by presidencies of the Council. In addition to the views expressed in Council meetings, particularly in the annual open debate on working methods of the Council held on 28 June 2022,<sup>5</sup> in a letter dated 29 December 2022, the five outgoing elected members of the Council transmitted their views on the procedures adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic and recommendations on how to ensure the continuity in the work of the Council in future extraordinary circumstances.<sup>6</sup>

Aspects relating to the working methods of the Council continued to be raised and discussed by Council members, in particular at the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council, held under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))" (see cases 1, 3, 4 and 5).<sup>7</sup> The discussions focused on how to ensure transparency, efficiency and effectiveness in the work of the Council, particularly as it related to the format of Council meetings, the agenda, the role of the Council presidency, the Secretariat, participation in Council meetings and other activities, inclusivity in the decision-making process, the practice of penholdership and the use of the veto.

In a letter dated 25 January 2022 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, in her capacity as the Chair of the Informal

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<sup>3</sup> See [S/2022/32](#). See also letter dated 7 May from the President of the Council addressed to the Permanent members of the Council ([S/2020/372](#)).

<sup>4</sup> See [S/2022/196](#).

<sup>5</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#) and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>6</sup> See [S/2022/1011](#).

<sup>7</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#) and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions in 2020 and 2021, shared her reflections and recommendations on the work of the Informal Working Group during her tenure.<sup>8</sup> As an annex to the letter, the representative submitted a demonstration of an index to the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)) and the subsequently adopted presidential notes on working methods, intended to enhance the user-friendliness of those documents. By making it easier to manoeuvre within the texts, the index would assist in the preparation of written monthly commitments, contribute to members' acquaintance with the presidential note dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)) and subsequently adopted notes and thereby support their implementation.<sup>9</sup>

In a letter dated 30 December 2022 addressed to the President of the Council, the Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions transmitted the first annual report of the working group since its establishment in 1993, covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2022.<sup>10</sup> During the period under review, the Informal Working Group held five meetings and an informal retreat in Tirana, Albania, from 5 to 7 October 2022. In 2022, among other issues, the Informal Working Group discussed the status of the implementation of the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)) and the 13 subsequently issued presidential notes on working methods, mainstreaming gender in the work of the Council, the division of labour on subsidiary bodies and penholdership, cooperation with other principal organs of the United Nations, access for elected members to confidential documents of the Council predating their membership, and the participation of civil society representatives in Council meetings. As a standing agenda item in its meetings, the Informal Working Group also discussed the extent of their implementation of the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 through regular briefings by Council members on their respective presidencies and on their respective responsibility as penholders.

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<sup>8</sup> See [S/2022/88](#).

<sup>9</sup> For subsequently adopted notes by the President on working methods, see [S/2019/990](#), [S/2019/991](#), [S/2019/992](#), [S/2019/993](#), [S/2019/994](#), [S/2019/995](#), [S/2019/996](#), [S/2019/997](#), [S/2021/645](#), [S/2021/646](#), [S/2021/647](#), [S/2021/648](#) and [S/2021/1074](#).

<sup>10</sup> See [S/2022/1032](#).

## I. Meetings and records

### Note

Section I covers the practice of the Security Council concerning meetings, publicity and the records of the Council, in relation to Article 28 of the Charter of the United Nations and rules 1 to 5 and 48 to 57 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

### *Article 28*

*1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.*

*2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.*

*3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.*

### *Rule 1*

*Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of the President at any time he deems necessary, but the interval between meetings shall not exceed fourteen days.*

### *Rule 2*

*The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council.*

*Rule 3*

*The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any question to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.*

*Rule 4*

*Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held twice a year, at such times as the Security Council may decide.*

*Rule 5*

*Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations.*

*Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such place.*

*Rule 48*



*Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.*

*Rule 49*

*Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to the representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting.*

*Rule 50*

*The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in rule 49, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record.*

*Rule 51*

*The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in a single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.*

*Rule 52*

*Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives on the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence of objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested.*

*Rule 53*

*The verbatim record referred to in rule 49 or the record referred to in rule 51, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by rules 50 and 51, respectively, or which has been corrected in accordance with the provisions of rule 52, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council.*

*Rule 54*

*The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official languages as soon as possible.*

*Rule 55*

*At the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a communiqué through the Secretary-General.*

*Rule 56*

*The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations.*

*Rule 57*

*The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.*


This section comprises five subsections, namely: A. Meetings, concerning the convening of meetings pursuant to rules 1 to 5 as well as rule 48; B. Informal consultations of the whole; C. Other informal meetings of the members of the Security Council; D. Discussions concerning meetings; and E. Records, maintained pursuant to rules 49 to 57.

During the period under review, the Council held 292 meetings compared to 164 in 2021 and 81 in 2020. Of the 292 meetings, 276 were public and 16 were private. The Council also held a total of 127 informal consultations of the whole (also known as consultations or informal consultations), compared to 67 in 2021 and 46 in 2020. The number of Council meetings and informal consultations combined was the highest since 2018. The significant increase of meetings and informal consultations experienced in 2022 is explained, in part, due to the discontinuation of the use of videoconferences, which were not considered meetings of the Council and were introduced *in lieu* of meetings as part of the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic.

During the period under review, the Council continued the practice of conducting wrap-up sessions at the end of the month, except for the months of February and September, and most of these sessions followed the “Toledo-style” format, whereby, in addition to the President, other members of the Council presented jointly the activity of the Council for the relevant month as a panel and in an interactive manner. Council members also held five informal interactive dialogues and 21 Arria-formula meetings. Figure I shows the total number of meetings and informal consultations held from 2013 to 2022.

**Figure I**

**Number of meetings, consultations and videoconferences, 2013-2022**



## A. Meetings

### 1. Application of rules relating to meetings

During the period under review, there were no intervals exceeding 14 days between meetings of the Council, as provided for under rule 1 of the provisional rules of procedure. The Council continued to convene more than one meeting a day, on certain occasions.

In 2022, the Council did not hold any periodic meetings pursuant to rule 4 or any meetings away from Headquarters in accordance with rule 5.

During the reporting period, no communications were received from Member States requesting the Council to convene a meeting that explicitly cited rule 2 or 3 as the basis of the request. Table 1 below lists eight communications requesting an urgent or special meeting either explicitly or implicitly invoking Article 35 of the Charter under which Member States or States that are not members of the United Nations may refer disputes to the Council.<sup>11</sup>

**Table 1**

**Letters in which Member States requested an urgent or special meeting, 2022**

<i>Letter addressed to the President of the Council</i>	<i>Summary</i>	<i>Meeting convened (agenda item and date)</i>
Letter dated 19 February 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General ( <a href="#">S/2022/133</a> )	Requesting to hold an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council on the escalation of the conflict on the state border of Ukraine	<a href="#">S/PV.8970</a> (Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2014/136</a> ) 21 February 2022)
Letter dated 24 March 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/261</a> )	Requesting the President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under the agenda item entitled "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea"	<a href="#">S/PV.9004</a> (Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea 25 March 2022)
Letter dated 9 May 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/379</a> )	Requesting the President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under the agenda item entitled "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea"	<a href="#">S/PV.9030</a> (Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea 11 May 2022)

<sup>11</sup> For more information on Article 35 of the Charter, see part VI, sect. I.

<i>Letter addressed to the President of the Council</i>	<i>Summary</i>	<i>Meeting convened (agenda item and date)</i>
Letter dated 22 July 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/574</a> )	Submitting an urgent complaint to the Security Council and calling upon it to fulfil its role under the Charter and hold an emergency meeting to discuss this aggression by Türkiye. Also calling upon the Council to form a committee to follow up on the situation between Iraq and Türkiye and to add an agenda item on the repeated Turkish attacks	<a href="#">S/PV.9100</a> (The situation in Iraq 26 July 2022)
Letter dated 13 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/688</a> )	Requesting an emergency meeting of the Security Council, based on Article 35 (1) of the United Nations Charter	<a href="#">S/PV.9132</a> (Letter dated 13 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/688</a> ) 15 September 2022)
Letter dated 4 October 2022 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/742</a> )	Requesting the President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under the agenda item entitled "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea"	<a href="#">S/PV.9146</a> (Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea 5 October 2022)
Letter dated 3 November 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/829</a> )	Requesting the President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the ballistic missile launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under the agenda item entitled "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea"	<a href="#">S/PV.9183</a> (Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea 4 November 2022)
Letter dated 18 November 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/870</a> )	Requesting the President of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the ballistic missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under the agenda item entitled "Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea"	<a href="#">S/PV.9197</a> (Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea 21 November 2022)

### *Complaints raised by Member States concerning the application of rule 2 or 3*

During the period under view, Council members exchanged contrasting views regarding the application of rules 2 and 3 of the provisional rules on procedure in the context of two sets of requests for a meeting on the conflict in Ukraine in April and June 2022.

In a letter dated 4 April 2022 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed his delegation's protest and disappointment with a "clear abuse" by the United Kingdom of its prerogatives as the presidency of the Council.<sup>12</sup> In that regard, the Permanent Representative stated that, on 3 April, following reports of what he termed a "Ukrainian provocation" in Bucha, Ukraine, the Russian Federation had called for a Council meeting to take place on 4 April under the item entitled "Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))" to discuss the issue. He added that, even though the request was filed under rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure, which made it necessary for the presidency to take action as requested by a Council member, the presidency had denied the right of a member to call for a meeting and instead suggested postponing the discussion until the next scheduled meeting on Ukraine, which was on 5 April under a different agenda item. Further noting that a second request for a meeting filed by his delegation on 4 April was also rejected, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation stated that the presidency should not impose its view regarding the urgency of matters and block an initiative to hold a Council meeting by a Council member, and that, in so doing, the presidency had "trampled on the Council's rules of procedure".

At the meeting described in the letter, which was held on 5 April 2022 under the item entitled "Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))", before the adoption of the provisional agenda, the representative of the Russian Federation protested the manner in which the United Kingdom, as the presidency in April, handled their two requests to convene an emergency Council meeting in connection with the "Ukrainian provocation in the city of Bucha".<sup>13</sup> According to the representative, the first request of the Russian Federation, made on 3 April, was for a Council meeting to be held on Monday, 4 April at 3 p.m. After that request was denied, the Russian Federation then requested an emergency meeting to take place on 4 April at 12 p.m. The representative of the Russian Federation questioned on what grounds, and without coordinating with anyone else, the presidency had decided that it would be better to discuss the topic at the meeting on 5 April. He further questioned why the presidency did not, if

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<sup>12</sup> See [S/2022/286](#).

<sup>13</sup> See [S/PV.9011](#).

it did not agree with the proposal of his delegation, convene a meeting and put the issue to a vote. He also demanded a guarantee that, in the future, the presidency would not challenge the right of Council members to request meetings as enshrined in rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure. Responding to the Russian Federation, the President of the Council underscored that her delegation did not reject the requests, but had proposed either scheduling the meeting alongside or sequentially, one after the other, the meeting of 5 April. She stated that two proposals, both of which were rejected by the Russian Federation, were well within the 48-hour limit that was the convention of the Council and involved a deferral of less than 24 hours. She added that the presidency shared the view that this was an urgent situation and did everything in line with the provisional rules of procedure and precedent.

In a letter dated 11 April 2022, further elaborating on the issue and in response to the letters of the Russian Federation dated 4 and 5 April, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom stated that the presidency of the Council did not block the request of the Russian Federation for a meeting or question its urgency.<sup>14</sup> She explained that, while the provisional rules of procedure obligated the presidency to hold a meeting when requested, rule 1 was clear that the presidency retained discretion over timing. She noted that convention suggested that a request for an “urgent meeting” was usually scheduled within 48 hours. According to the Permanent Representative, upon receipt of the request from the delegation of the Russian Federation, the presidency proposed for the meeting to be combined with an existing meeting on the same topic already scheduled within a 48-hour window, an approach for which there were multiple precedents and for which a number of Council members had expressed support.

In a letter dated 14 April 2022, the representative of the Russian Federation rejected the description of “convention” in the letter from the United Kingdom and stated that the practice of the Council, at least for the past five years, clearly indicated that an urgent meeting was to be convened in three hours’ time.<sup>15</sup> He added that, by claiming that it had the right to schedule the requested meeting at a moment up to 48 hours after the request of the Russian Federation, the presidency denied the right to request for a meeting, in a clear breach of rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure.

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<sup>14</sup> See [S/2022/309](#).

<sup>15</sup> See [S/2022/320](#).



In another instance, by a letter dated 29 June 2022, the representative of the Russian Federation objected to the decision of the presidency of the Council, held by Albania, to convene a meeting of the Council on 28 June further to a request from Ukraine.<sup>16</sup> Taking note of protracted discussions among Council members on the application of rule 3 of the provisional rules of procedure, he stated that there were multiple examples of situations in which a request from a Member State for a meeting was not granted given that no Council member called for it. The representative added that in such cases, or in a situation in which it was applying rule 1 of the provisional rules of procedure, the presidency should have consulted the members of the Council.

On 18 July 2022, writing in response to the letter of the Russian Federation, the representative of Albania stated that rule 3 of the provisional rule of procedure mandated the President of the Council to call a meeting if a dispute or a situation was brought to the attention of the Council under Article 35 of the Charter.<sup>17</sup> Noting that the practice of the Council offered multiple examples in that regard, the Permanent Representative stated that rule 3 did not contain any requirement for consultations upon receiving a request for a meeting, despite the fact that this had occasionally happened, nor did it require the President to wait for a request from a Council member to call the meeting.

Similarly, in a letter dated 19 July 2022, the Permanent Representative of the United States emphasized that the use of the word “shall” in rule 3 indicated that the President had no discretion regarding calling a meeting of the Council at the request of a Member State.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, while noting that there had been a few rare and exceptional instances in which the Council determined that the best course of action would be to hold closed consultations after receiving a request for a Council meeting from a Member State, the representative stated that there was no requirement for the presidency to wait for a concurring request from a Council member prior to calling the formal meeting. She further expressed the view that the course of action taken by the presidency of Albania was consistent with the letter and spirit of rule 3.

## **2. Format**

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<sup>16</sup> See [S/2022/528](#). See also [S/PV.9080](#).

<sup>17</sup> See [S/2022/565](#).

<sup>18</sup> See [S/2022/567](#).

### *Public meetings*

The Council continued to convene meetings in public as provided for in rule 48 of the provisional rules of procedure, mainly for the purposes of: (a) hearing briefings on country-specific or regional situations or thematic issues under its consideration; (b) holding debates on particular items;<sup>19</sup> and (c) adopting decisions.<sup>20</sup> In 2022, the Council held a total of 292 meetings, of which 276 or 94.5 per cent were public.

During the period under review, Council members held 23 meetings at which two or more Council members were represented at the ministerial or higher levels. A total of 17 of these meetings were held in connection with thematic items and six in connection with regional and country-specific situations. In addition, the Council held five meetings in which one or more Council members were represented at the level of Head of State or Government.

Table 2 lists all high-level meetings and videoconferences held in 2022 at which two or more Council members were represented at ministerial or higher levels.

**Table 2**  
**High-level meetings, 2022**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Sub-item/topic</i>	<i>High-level participation</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8949</a> 18 January 2022	Women and peace and security	Protecting participation: addressing violence targeting women in peace and security processes	<b>Ministerial level (5)</b> <b>Albania</b> (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), <b>Ghana</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration), <b>Norway</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs), <b>United Arab Emirates</b> (Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs), <b>United States</b> (Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights)
<a href="#">S/PV.8950</a> 19 January 2022	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question		<b>Ministerial level (4)</b> <b>Ghana</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration), <b>Norway</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs), <b>United Arab Emirates</b> (Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political

<sup>19</sup> In 2022, the Council continued the practice of holding meetings from 10 am to 1 pm and from 3 pm to 6 pm with resumptions in the case of several open debates (see, for example, [S/PV.8949](#), [S/PV.8949 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9016](#), [S/PV.9016 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9099](#), [S/PV.9099 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9174](#), [S/PV.9174 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9181](#), [S/PV.9181 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9220](#) and [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#)).

<sup>20</sup> On the formats of public meetings, see also [S/2017/507](#), annex, sect. II.C.1.

Affairs), **United States** (Permanent Representative and Member of the President's Cabinet)

[S/PV.8953](#)  
25 January 2022

Protection of  
civilians in armed  
conflict

War in cities:  
protection of  
civilians in urban  
settings

**Heads of State or Government (2)**

**Ghana** (Vice-President), **Norway** (Prime Minister)

**Ministerial Level (3)**

**Gabon** (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **United Arab Emirates** (Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs), **United States** (Permanent Representative and Member of the President's Cabinet)

[S/PV.8954](#)  
26 January 2022

The situation in  
Afghanistan

**Heads of State or Government (1)**

**Norway** (Prime Minister)

**Ministerial Level (1)**

**Gabon** (Minister for Foreign Affairs)

[S/PV.8968](#)  
17 February 2022

Letter dated 13  
April 2014 from  
the Permanent  
Representative of  
the Russian  
Federation to the  
United Nations  
addressed to the  
President of the  
Security Council  
([S/2014/264](#))

**Ministerial Level (3)**

**Russian Federation** (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), **United Kingdom** (Minister of State for Europe and North America), **United States** (Secretary of State)

[S/PV.8989](#)  
8 March 2022

Women and peace  
and security

Women's  
economic  
inclusion and  
participation as a  
key to building  
peace

**Ministerial Level (5)**

**India** (Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs), **Ireland** (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defense), **Mexico** (Vice-Minister for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights), **United Arab Emirates** (Minister for Climate Change and Environment), **United States** (Permanent Representative and Member of the President's Cabinet)

[S/PV.9001](#)  
23 March 2022

Cooperation  
between the  
United Nations  
and regional and  
subregional  
organizations in  
maintaining  
international  
peace and security

League of Arab  
States

**Ministerial Level (2)**

**India** (Foreign Secretary), **United Arab Emirates** (Minister of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation)

<a href="#">S/PV.9014</a> 11 April 2022	Maintenance of international peace and security	Implementation of resolutions <a href="#">2532 (2020)</a> and <a href="#">2565 (2021)</a>	<b>Ministerial Level (3)</b> <b>United Arab Emirates</b> (Minister of State for Advanced Technology), <b>United Kingdom</b> (Minister of State for South and Central Asia, North Africa, the United Nations and the Commonwealth, and the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict), <b>United States</b> (Permanent Representative and Member of the President’s Cabinet)
<a href="#">S/PV.9016</a> 13 April 2022	Women and peace and security	Accountability as prevention: Ending cycles of sexual violence in conflict	<b>Ministerial Level (2)</b> <b>United Kingdom</b> (Minister of State for South and Central Asia, North Africa, the United Nations and the Commonwealth, and the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict), <b>United States</b> (Permanent Representative and Member of the President’s Cabinet)
<a href="#">S/PV.9036</a> 19 May 2022	Maintenance of international peace and security	Conflict and food security	<b>Ministerial Level (10)</b> <b>Albania</b> (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), <b>Gabon</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs), <b>Ghana</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration), <b>India</b> (Minister of State for External Affairs), <b>Ireland</b> (Minister of State for Overseas Development Aid and Diaspora), <b>Kenya</b> (Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs), <b>Mexico</b> (Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development), <b>Norway</b> (Minister of International Development), <b>United Arab Emirates</b> (Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs), <b>United States</b> (Secretary of State)
<a href="#">S/PV.9052</a> 2 June 2022	Maintenance of international peace and security	Strengthening accountability and justice for serious violations of international law	<b>Heads of State or Government (1)</b> <b>Albania</b> (Prime Minister) <b>Ministerial Level (4)</b> <b>India</b> (Minister of State for External Affairs), <b>Ireland</b> (Attorney-General), <b>United Arab Emirates</b> (Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs), <b>United States</b> (Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights)
<a href="#">S/PV.9064</a> 15 June 2022	Women and peace and security	Keeping the promises: the role of regional organizations in implementing the women and peace and security agenda in the face of political turmoil and	<b>Ministerial Level (5)</b> <b>Albania</b> (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), <b>Ghana</b> (Deputy Minister for Finance), <b>Norway</b> (State Secretary), <b>United Arab Emirates</b> (Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs), <b>United States</b> (Permanent Representative and Member of the President’s Cabinet)

seizures of power  
by force

[S/PV.9090](#)  
12 July 2022

United Nations  
peacekeeping  
operations

The key role of  
strategic  
communications  
for efficient  
peacekeeping

**Ministerial Level (3)**

**Brazil** (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **Ghana** (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration), **India** (Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs)

[S/PV.9135](#)  
22 September 2022

Maintenance of  
peace and security  
of Ukraine

**Heads of State or Government (1)**

**Norway** (Prime Minister)

**Ministerial Level (14)**

**Albania** (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), **Brazil** (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **China** (State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs), **France** (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), **Gabon** (Minister of Foreign Affairs), **Ghana** (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration), **India** (Minister for External Affairs), **Ireland** (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence), **Kenya** (Director General), **Mexico** (Secretary of Foreign Affairs), **Russian Federation** (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **United Arab Emirates** (Minister of State for International Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation), **United Kingdom** (Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs), **United States** (Secretary of State)

[S/PV.9147](#)  
6 October 2022

Peace and security  
in Africa

Strengthening the  
fight against the  
financing of  
armed groups and  
terrorists through  
the illicit  
trafficking of  
natural resources

**Ministerial Level (5)**

**Gabon** (Minister of Foreign Affairs), **Ghana** (Minister for National Security) **India** (Minister of State for External Affairs), **United Arab Emirates** (Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), **United States** (Permanent Representative and Member of the President's Cabinet)

[S/PV.9149](#)  
11 October 2022

Cooperation  
between the  
United Nations  
and regional and  
subregional  
organizations in  
maintaining  
international  
peace and security

African Union

**Ministerial Level (3)**

**Gabon** (Minister for Foreign Affairs), **United Arab Emirates** (Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs), **United States** (Permanent Representative and Member of the President's Cabinet)

<a href="#">S/PV.9150</a> 12 October 2022	Threats to international peace and security	Climate and security in Africa	<b>Ministerial Level (4)</b> <b>Gabon</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs), <b>Norway</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs), <b>United Arab Emirates</b> (Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs), <b>United States</b> (Permanent Representative and Member of the President’s Cabinet)
<a href="#">S/PV.9151</a> 12 October 2022	Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2016/53</a> )		<b>Ministerial Level (2)</b> <b>Gabon</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs), <b>Norway</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
<a href="#">S/PV.9158</a> 20 October 2022	Women and peace and security	Strengthening women’s resilience and leadership as a path to peace in regions plagued by armed groups	<b>Ministerial Level (3)</b> <b>Albania</b> (Deputy Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), <b>United Arab Emirates</b> (Permanent Representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs), <b>United States</b> (Permanent Representative and Member of the President’s Cabinet)
<a href="#">S/PV.9181</a> 3 November 2022	Peacebuilding and sustaining peace	Integrating effective resilience-building in peace operations for sustainable peace	<b>Ministerial Level (5)</b> <b>Gabon</b> (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), <b>Ghana</b> (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration), <b>India</b> (Foreign Secretary), <b>Ireland</b> (Minister of State for European Affairs), <b>United States</b> (Permanent Representative and Member of the President’s Cabinet)
<a href="#">S/PV.9188</a> 10 November 2022	Threats to international peace and security	Counter-terrorism in Africa: an imperative for peace, security and development	<b>Heads of State or Government (1)</b> <b>Ghana</b> (President) <b>Ministerial Level (3)</b> <b>Gabon</b> (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs), <b>United Arab Emirates</b> (Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), <b>United States</b> (Assistant to the President for Homeland Security)
<a href="#">S/PV.9220</a> 14 December 2022	Maintenance of international peace and security	New orientation for reformed multilateralism	<b>Ministerial Level (4)</b> <b>Ghana</b> (Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration), <b>India</b> (Minister for External Affairs), <b>United Arab Emirates</b> (Cabinet member and Minister for Culture and Youth),

[S/PV.9221](#)  
15 December 2022

Threats to  
international  
peace and security

Global counter-  
terrorism  
approach –  
principles and the  
way forward

**United States** (Permanent Representative and Member  
of the President's Cabinet)

**Ministerial Level (7)**

**Ghana** (Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for  
Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration), **India**  
(Minister for External Affairs), **Ireland** (Minister for  
Foreign Affairs and Defence), **Kenya** (Principal  
Secretary for Foreign Affairs), **United Arab Emirates**  
(Cabinet member and Minister for Culture and Youth),  
**United Kingdom** (Minister of State for the Foreign,  
Commonwealth and Development Office), **United  
States** (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs)

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*Private meetings*


During the period under review, the Council continued to hold meetings in private, in accordance with rule 48 of the provisional rules of procedure. Private meetings continued to constitute a small percentage of all Council meetings, with 16 private meetings of a total of 292 meetings, a 5.5 per cent, held in 2022 (see figure II).<sup>21</sup> As indicated in table 3 below, 11 of those meetings were held with troop- and police-contributing countries under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”.

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<sup>21</sup> On the formats of private meetings, see also [S/2017/507](#), annex, sect. II.C.2.

**Figure II**

**Public and private meetings, 2022**



**Table 3**

**Private meetings, 2022**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>
Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1353 (2001)</a> , annex II, sections A and B	<a href="#">S/PV.8947</a> , 12 January 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.8985</a> , 3 March 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.9057</a> , 7 June 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.9060</a> , 9 June 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.9093</a> , 13 July 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.9111</a> , 16 August 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.9148</a> , 10 October 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.9185</a> , 7 November 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.9186</a> , 7 November 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.9209</a> , 6 December 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.9212</a> , 7 December 2022
The situation in Myanmar	<a href="#">S/PV.8959</a> , 28 January 2022 <a href="#">S/PV.9049</a> , 27 May 2022
Peace and security in Africa	<a href="#">S/PV.9160</a> , 21 October 2022



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<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>
Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice	<a href="#">S/PV.9166</a> , 26 October 2022
Threats to international peace and security	<a href="#">S/PV.9172</a> , 27 October 2022

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## **B. Informal consultations of the whole**

Informal consultations of the whole are not official meetings of the Council. The members gather in private for the purpose of holding discussions and receiving briefings from the Secretariat and representatives of the Secretary-General. These meetings are normally held in the Consultations Room, adjacent to the Security Council Chamber. During the period under review, with the continued easing of the health and safety restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, Council members gradually resumed the holding of informal consultations in the Consultations Room in April 2022. Most frequently, informal consultations continued to be held immediately after public meetings on the same issue. In 2022, with the return to in-person activities of the Council, the number of informal consultations increased significantly with 127 held in 2022 compared with 67 in 2021 and 46 in 2020 (as shown in figure I).

Pursuant to the Council's established practice, no official records of informal consultations were issued, and non-members were not invited. Frequently, however, statements to the press were issued or elements to the press were read out by the President of the Council after informal consultations.

## **C. Other informal meetings of the members of the Security Council**

During the period under review, Council members continued to hold informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings.<sup>22</sup> Informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings are convened at the initiative of one or more members of the Council. Informal interactive dialogues are convened with the participation of all Council members, while Arria-formula meetings are convened with the participation of all or some Council members. While informal interactive dialogues are presided over by the President of the Council, Arria-formula meetings are not. Frequently, the member or one of the members of the Council convening the

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<sup>22</sup> For more information on informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings, see [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 92, 95 and 97–99.

Arria-formula meeting also serves as the chair. Neither of the two types of meetings are considered formal meetings of the Council. They are not announced in the *Journal of the United Nations* or in the Council's programme of work and no official records are prepared. Invitees to informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings include Member States, relevant organizations and individuals. In past practice, Arria-formula meetings were closed to the public while, more recently, they have been open and broadcast. Informal interactive dialogues are not open to the public or broadcast.

### *Informal interactive dialogues*

According to the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)), when it deems appropriate, the Council may utilize informal dialogues to seek the views of Member States that are parties to a conflict and/or other interested and affected parties.<sup>23</sup> In addition, on 12 July and in relation to the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council adopted resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#), which encouraged the convening of a Security Council informal interactive dialogue every two months with the participation of donors, interested regional parties and representatives of the international humanitarian agencies operating in the country in order to regularly review and follow-up on the implementation of the resolution, including progress in early-recovery projects.<sup>24</sup> As shown in table 4, the Council held five informal interactive dialogues in 2022, all of which concerned country-specific or regional situations, and three of which related to the humanitarian situation in Syria.<sup>25</sup>

**Table 4**  
**Informal interactive dialogues, 2022**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Participants (including non-members of the Council)</i>
24 May 2022	The situation in Libya (European Union military operation in the Mediterranean-Operation Irtini)	All Council members, Director for Integrated Approach for Peace and Security, European Union

<sup>23</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 92.

<sup>24</sup> Resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#), para. 6. For further information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 19.

<sup>25</sup> For information on the evolution of informal interactive dialogues, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2008–2009 to 2021*.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Participants (including non-members of the Council)</i>
26 September 2022	The situation in the Middle East (humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic)	All Council members, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syrian Arab Republic, Deputy Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis, Ecuador, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, Canada, Germany, Sweden, European Union, Iran, Syrian Arab Republic Türkiye
28 September 2022	Peace and security in Africa (Ethiopia/Tigray)	All Council members, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia
21 November 2022	The situation in the Middle East (humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic)	All Council members, Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim for the Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations Development Programme, Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye, Islamic Republic of Iran, , Sweden, Germany, Canada, European Union
16 December 2022	The situation in the Middle East (humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic)	All Council members, Director of Operation and Advocacy, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator ad interim for the Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye, Islamic Republic of Iran, Sweden, Germany, Canada, European Union

### *Arria-formula meetings*

As provided for in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)), Arria-formula meetings are utilized by members of the Council as a flexible and informal forum for enhancing their deliberations and contact with civil society and non-governmental organizations.<sup>26</sup> In accordance with the note, Council members may invite, on an informal basis, any Member State, relevant organization or individual to participate in Arria-formula meetings.

In 2022, Council members held 21 Arria-formula meetings, compared with 32 in 2021, and 22 in 2020 and 2019, respectively. In terms of publicity, 20 were open and broadcast via United Nations WebTV and one was closed. In some instances, members and non-members of the Council transmitted concept notes, summaries and compilations of statements made by

<sup>26</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 98.

participants in Arria-formula meetings, as well as other communications concerning these meetings.<sup>27</sup> Arria-formula meetings held during the period under review are listed in table 5.

**Table 5**  
**Arria-formula meetings, 2022**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Organiser(s) and sponsor(s)</i>	<i>Concept Note</i>	<i>Summary or compilation of statements</i>
9 March 2022	Climate finance for sustaining peace and security	United Arab Emirates	<i>N/A</i>	<i>N/A</i>
25 March 2022	Ensuring access to mental health and psychosocial support in conflict, post-conflict and humanitarian settings	Mexico	<i>N/A</i>	<a href="#">S/2022/456</a>
6 April 2022	Threats to international peace and security emanating from military biological activities in regions across the globe	Russian Federation	<i>N/A</i>	<i>N/A</i>
21 April 2022	Conflict and hunger	Ireland	<a href="#">S/2022/338</a>	<i>N/A</i>
27 April 2022	Ensuring accountability for atrocities committed in Ukraine	Albania, France, Ukraine Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and European Union	<a href="#">S/2022/352</a>	<a href="#">S/2022/375</a>

<sup>27</sup> See, for example, a Note Verbale from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela concerning the Arria-formula meeting held on 2 November on the topic of “Ongoing protests in Iran” ([S/2022/830](#)).

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Organiser(s) and sponsor(s)</i>	<i>Concept Note</i>	<i>Summary or compilation of statements</i>
6 May 2022	Systematic and mass grave violations of the international humanitarian law as well as other war crimes committed by the Ukrainian military personnel and militia and discovered in the course of ongoing special military operation of the Russian armed forces	Russian Federation	<a href="#">S/2022/363</a>	<a href="#">S/2022/990</a>
24 May 2022	Protection of journalists	Ireland	<a href="#">S/2022/406</a>	<a href="#">S/2022/564</a>
3 June 2022	Syrian women's voices on detainees and the disappeared in Syrian Arab Republic	Albania, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Qatar, Türkiye, Syrian Negotiations Commission, United Kingdom, United States	<i>N/A</i>	<i>N/A</i>
24 June 2022	Twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Rome Statute: reflections on the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council	Albania, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Malta, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom	<a href="#">S/2022/494</a>	<a href="#">S/2022/705</a>
11 July 2022	Neo-Nazism and radical nationalism: exploring root causes of the crisis in Ukraine	Russian Federation	<i>N/A</i>	<a href="#">S/2022/626</a>
14 July 2022	A milestone year for a peaceful future: Transitional justice in Colombia	Colombia, Ireland, Norway	<a href="#">S/2022/553</a>	<i>N/A</i>
15 July 2022	Destruction of cultural heritage as a consequence of the Russian aggression against Ukraine	Albania, Poland, Ukraine	<a href="#">S/2022/551</a>	<i>N/A</i>
27 July 2022	Collective security through equitable burden sharing: strengthening regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security	Ghana	<i>N/A</i>	<a href="#">S/2022/629</a>
11 August 2022	Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 August 2017 ( <a href="#">S/2017/507</a> ): Penholdership	Russian Federation	<i>N/A</i>	<i>N/A</i>
31 August 2022	Threats to international peace and security caused by transnational activities of terrorist groups	Kenya, United Arab Emirates	<i>N/A</i>	<i>N/A</i>

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Organiser(s) and sponsor(s)</i>	<i>Concept Note</i>	<i>Summary or compilation of statements</i>
24 October 2022	Engaging Afghanistan (closed)	Norway	<i>N/A</i>	<i>N/A</i>
2 November 2022	Ongoing protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran	Albania, United States	<i>N/A</i>	<i>N/A</i>
17 November 2022	Preventing economic collapse and exploring prospects for recovery and development in Afghanistan	Russian Federation	<i>N/A</i>	<i>N/A</i>
29 November 2022	Climate, peace and security: opportunities for the United Nations peace and security architecture	Albania, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Malta, Mozambique, Nauru, Norway, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States	<a href="#">S/2022/999</a>	<a href="#">S/2022/999</a>
12 December 2022	Marking the seventh anniversary of the youth, peace and security agenda	Ecuador, Ghana, Ireland	<a href="#">S/2023/13</a>	<a href="#">S/2023/13</a>
22 December 2022	Transitioning from protracted conflict and fragility into peace through sustainable development	Brazil, China, Ecuador, Ireland, Kenya, Sierra Leone, United Kingdom	<a href="#">S/2022/949</a>	<i>N/A</i>

### *Other informal meetings*

Following the practice started in 2007, the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held their seventh informal joint seminar and sixteenth annual joint consultative meeting in New York on 14 October 2022.<sup>28</sup>

## **D. Discussions concerning meetings**

During the period under review, questions pertaining to meetings were raised in communications and meetings of the Council. In a letter dated 16 February 2022 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Finland transmitted the report of the nineteenth

<sup>28</sup> See [A/77/2](#). For information on prior practice concerning the informal joint meetings of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009 to Supplement 2021*. For more information on the cooperation with regional and subregional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter, see part VIII.

annual workshop for newly elected members of the Council, which was held on 18 and 19 November 2021.<sup>29</sup> It was noted in the report that the workshop participants reflected upon, among other issues, the balance between transparency, effectiveness and efficiency, as well as the use of videoconferences and contingency procedures for the Council in future crisis situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

Council members and the wider membership also discussed issues pertaining to the format of meetings and other informal gatherings during the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council, held on 28 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” (see case 1). They also discussed issues concerning the frequency of meetings at a meeting held on 29 September under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, specifically with regard to the implementation of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) (case 2).

### Case 1

#### **Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))**

On 28 June 2022, at the initiative of Albania, which held the presidency of the Council for the month and whose Permanent Representative chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions in 2022,<sup>30</sup> the Council convened an open debate on its working methods under the item entitled “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” and sub-item entitled “Working methods of the Security Council”<sup>31</sup>. In their discussions, members and non-members of the Council exchanged views on how different formats of meetings and other Council activities impacted the efficiency, effectiveness and transparency in the Council’s work. Following the return of the Council to the full in-person conduct of business in 2022, participants also discussed the lessons learned from the remote working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic and how to ensure continuity in its work in future extraordinary circumstances.

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<sup>29</sup> [S/2022/128](#).

<sup>30</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 21 June 2022 ([S/2022/499](#)).

<sup>31</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#) and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2022/842](#).

In that regard, several delegations underlined that the Council needed to strike a balance between open and closed meetings.<sup>32</sup> For example, the representative of Malta expressed the view that striking the right balance between effectiveness and transparency was not easy and noted that open briefings allowed Council members to make their positions known and gave the opportunity to non-Council members and the public to follow the discussions. On the other hand, the representative noted that closed consultations served an important purpose, particularly when dealing with more sensitive and polarized issues. The representative of Switzerland, speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, stated that all available formats should be explored by the Council in order to forge consensus.

Some participants called on the Council to convene more open meetings as a means of ensuring transparency.<sup>33</sup> The representatives of Cuba, Italy and Pakistan were of the view that closed meetings should be restricted to a minimum and be the exception and not the rule.<sup>34</sup> The representative of Egypt stated that all meetings should be public, with the exception of those that addressed issues relating to the national security of States.<sup>35</sup> The representative of Germany welcomed the increase in open and public debates and called on Council members to stop blocking certain topics from being discussed publicly, as a matter of principle. Conversely, the representative of France stated that some issues had to be preserved for confidential discussions and negotiations, as they allowed Council members to adjust their positions and reach compromise.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that some discussions had to be held in private to ensure that the Council could solve problems through interactive debate, consensus-building, responsible penholdership and decision-making.

The representative of Switzerland underlined the need for open debates to be more effective and inclusive. The representative of Ecuador opined that discussions and meetings had to be able to rely on a prior and solid base of information, including real statistics, projections and proposals for solutions, not just the general information provided in concept notes. The representative of Singapore called on the Council to improve the focus and interactivity of open debates. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that it was essential to limit the

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<sup>32</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#), Russian Federation, Ireland (on behalf of the elected members of the Council), France and Austria.

<sup>33</sup> Republic of Korea, Pakistan and Morocco; and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Italy and Egypt.

<sup>34</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#), Pakistan and Cuba; and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Italy.

<sup>35</sup> See [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>36</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).



length of statements in open debates to ensure that all Member States had an equal opportunity to speak.<sup>37</sup> The representatives of Kuwait called for allowing Member States to submit written statements in connection with open debates.<sup>38</sup>

Some delegations addressed the issue of transparency and the modalities of informal consultations. The representative of Pakistan noted that much of the Council's real work increasingly took place behind closed doors in informal meetings which had no records and therefore did not assign responsibility or provide explanations for most of the decisions taken by the Council. The representatives of Cuba and Singapore called on the Council to issue and circulate records from informal consultations. The representative of China stated that, when briefing the media on the proceedings of closed consultations, some Council members distorted the positions of other members by quoting them out of context. He expressed the view that this undermined the consultations, affected their outcomes and eroded unity among the members. The representative of Malta stated that closed consultations should be frank, interactive and aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions, and should not be another forum in which Council members delivered written statements and reiterated well known positions.

Regarding Arria-formula meetings, the representative of Liechtenstein noted that they served to bring to the attention of the Council topics and voices that it had otherwise not heard. He added that, if used as intended, Arria-formula meetings could do a great deal to enhance the Council's inclusivity and relevance and expressed hope that they would be used consistently in accordance with their original intent and purpose. The representative of Malta stated that Arria-formula meetings allowed the Council to consider issues from a specific angle and provided non-Council members with the opportunity to participate in discussions. The representative of Peru stated that the Arria-formula meetings should provide for some kind of follow-up. The representative of Kuwait suggested that, in order to promote transparency, Arria-formula meetings should be included in the *Journal of the United Nations*. The representative of France, while acknowledging the importance of Arria-formula meetings, pointed out that they were too numerous and sometimes misused. She called on Council members to find a way to limit their number and ensure that they were genuinely inclusive by providing interpretation in a systematic manner. The representative of China opined that Arria-formula meetings should be better

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<sup>37</sup> See [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>38</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).

managed in accordance with their original purpose, which was to provide Council members with an opportunity to know more about the issues on its agenda and exchange views in an informal setting. The representative went on to encourage presidencies of the Council to show leadership in steering Arria-formula meetings towards a more rational track.

A number of speakers shared their views regarding the remote working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, including the use of videoconferences. The representative of the United States stated that videoconferences should be considered formal meetings of the Council, under the provisional rules of procedure, so that the Council could adopt draft resolutions through a virtual correspondence process. The representative of the Republic of Korea opined that the innovative adaptation of working methods during the pandemic provided a unique opportunity to look critically at how the Council was doing its work and to explore how to further improve its transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. More specifically, the representative of Liechtenstein stated that the Council should bear in mind the use of videoconference technology to improve inclusiveness. The representative of Peru stated that the practice of broadcasting Council meetings on the United Nations audio-visual system was a genuine democratic opening. The representative of Cyprus stated that, while technology could add value in cases where briefers could not attend a meeting physically, its use should be measured by its contribution to the core function of the Council.<sup>39</sup>

Several speakers addressed the need for the Council to codify the best practices developed during the COVID-19 pandemic and for contingency planning for future extraordinary circumstances.<sup>40</sup> The representative of Peru stated that the Council had to be prepared for new challenges, such as those posed by the pandemic, so that it could continue to discharge its functions and so that dialogue could remain open, inclusive and transparent. The representative of Cyprus stated that the Council had to ensure that it could take all necessary action without delay, enforce its decisions, that its work was transparent and accessible to non-members of the Council, and that it could effectively interact with directedly affected Member States.<sup>41</sup> She also said that a contingency plan did not need to be overly prescriptive, but should include the ability to physically gather a representative from each Council member for decisions

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<sup>39</sup> See [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>40</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#), Ireland (on behalf of the elected members of the Council), United States, Switzerland, Japan, p. 26 (Austria), Portugal, Indonesia, Bahrain and Slovenia.

<sup>41</sup> [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

to be made and designate a location beyond the Council Chamber for meetings to take place in case Headquarters was affected by a disaster. In contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that there was no need to institutionalize the temporary measures developed during the pandemic and that, in case of future crises, the Council could turn to the procedures enshrined in the letters from the President of the Council which were circulated each month.

## Case 2

### The situation in the Middle East

At a meeting held on 29 September under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the Council heard a monthly briefing by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs on the implementation of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) regarding the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.<sup>42</sup> In his remarks, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed “bewilderment” at the decision of the presidency of the Council to not grant his delegation’s urgent request to convene a meeting on the situation regarding the Nord Stream pipeline.<sup>43</sup> Instead, the Council was discussing the report of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the implementation of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) issued in August 2022 which, according to the representative, had no urgency. He further stated that there was no point in discussing the Syrian chemical weapons issue in the Council every month as discussions were going around in circles and that open meetings once every quarter would be sufficient to ensure a transparent discussion of the subject. In a similar vein, the representative of Brazil said that it was incontrovertible that the frequency of the meetings on the issue had to change. He noted that, while regular OPCW reports continued to be a valuable tool for monitoring the file, holding monthly meetings with the Council when the reports pointed to little or no relevant new developments on the ground did not seem efficient in terms of both time and resources. The representative of China, echoing this view, stated that like most members of the Council, its delegation would like to see the Council meet less frequently to consider the Syrian chemical weapons issue. Nonetheless, the

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<sup>42</sup> See [S/PV.9141](#).

<sup>43</sup> For further information concerning the Nord Stream pipeline discussed under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, see part I, sect. 34.

representative of France emphasized that the repetitive nature of meetings should not make the Council members lose sight of what was important and that the perpetrators of the chemical weapons attack on the outskirts of Damascus in August 2013 should be identified and held to account. The representative of Norway expressed concern that the Council must convene amid no progress made on the file for the entirety of 2022, underlining the Syrian Arab Republic's lack of fulfilment of its obligations in line with the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#). The representative of the United States noted that the desire to end the outrageous behaviour of the Al-Assad regime and its "Russian enablers" was what brought the Council to those meetings each month, to speak truth and urge the regime to comply with its international obligations. The representative of Ireland said that until the Council saw real assurance by the Syrian Arab Republic that its chemical weapons programme was verifiably and definitively destroyed, it should uphold the international legal norm against chemical weapons by holding the Syrian Arab Republic to its obligations under resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) and the Chemical Weapons Convention and by supporting the OPCW in its mandated tasks.

At another briefing held on 7 November under the same agenda item, the representative of the Russian Federation pointed out that there were no other subjects within the Council's mandate-reporting cycle that had been considered with such frequency, underlining that the previous meeting on the implementation of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) was held less than two weeks prior.<sup>44</sup> He further stated that it was "simply absurd" given that there had been no developments on the situation at all.<sup>45</sup> The representative of China strongly appealed to the Council to reduce the frequency of deliberations on the Syrian issue or consider combining Syria-related issues to economize meeting resources and improve the Council's efficiency. In a similar vein, the representative of the United Arab Emirates pointed out that the Council was meeting only several days after the most recent meeting on the same file without any developments that warranted the holding of the meeting and that it was unfortunately still scheduled every month without regard for its usefulness. In that connection, he stressed the importance of using the time and resources of the Council wisely. While supporting the convening of a meeting on the chemical weapons in Syria dossier following any relevant developments, the representative underlined the shared

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<sup>44</sup> See [S/PV.9184](#). For further information on meetings held under "The situation in the Middle East" relating to the Syrian Arab Republic, see part I, sect. 1.

<sup>45</sup> See [S/PV.9184](#).

responsibility of Council members to reconsider the meetings that the Council held on the issue to ensure the efficiency of the Council. The representative of Brazil said that his delegation did not believe that holding successive Council meetings when there were no developments on the ground was efficient in terms of time or resources. He also elaborated that his delegation's position on readdressing the frequency of meetings on the agenda item was strictly with regards to the efficiency of the Council's work, as recognized by most of the Council members. The representative of Ghana, speaking on behalf of the African members of the Council, namely Gabon, Kenya and his own country, expressed concern over the lack of tangible progress in addressing the issue in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, calling into question the propriety of the frequency with which the Council met on the Syria chemical-weapons file. He joined other members of the Council in calling for a review of the status quo to enable the Council to focus its attention and resources on other existing challenges facing the Syrian people. The representative of India also stated that discussions on the Syrian Arab Republic and chemical weapons should reflect progress on the ground, which remained at a standstill for several months. The representative of the United States said that as long as there were discrepancies in the chemical weapon statement of the Syrian Arab Republic, the monthly meetings remained necessary and fully appropriate. The representative of the United Kingdom, acknowledging that there was an understandable frustration in the Council about the lack of progress, underlined that the problem was not how many meetings the Council held, but the behaviour of the "Syrian regime" in breach of core international norms, including resolutions of the Council. The representative of Albania opined that the cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic by answering the questions put forward by the report of the Declaration Assessment Team should precede the call for fewer meetings on its chemical weapons programme. The representative of Ireland stated that actions by the Syrian Arab Republic were important to closing the file and that it was only through its genuine engagement that the OPCW would be able to provide the necessary assurance that the chemical weapons programme was a thing of the past. Until then, she added that the Council could not "simply shrug its shoulders" and that regular discussions were needed to show that the lack of cooperation from the Syrian Arab Republic would not go unanswered.

## E. Records

During the period under review, verbatim records were issued following each public meeting of the Council, in accordance with rule 49 of the provisional rules of procedure, while communiqués were issued following private meetings, in accordance with rule 55. No explicit reference was raised at Council meetings to rules 49 to 57 in connection with the preparation, access to and issuance of verbatim records, communiqués or other documents. Nevertheless, the content and preparation of records was raised at the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council held on 28 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#))”.<sup>46</sup> In his statement at the meeting, the representative of Liechtenstein welcomed the fact that the Council was able to follow up on the working methods aspects of General Assembly resolution [76/262](#), which provided for the President of the Assembly to convene a debate within 10 working days of the casting of a veto by one or more permanent members of the Council.<sup>47</sup> He further noted that that it was essential to have records of relevant Council meetings produced as expeditiously as possible in the future in order to ensure maximum flexibility for the scheduling of a General Assembly meeting.

Notwithstanding the Council’s full return to in-person conduct of business, at the beginning of 2022, the front page of the verbatim records of in-person open debates provided that, in accordance with the procedure set out in the letter dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Council, which had been agreed in the light of the extraordinary circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic, the official record of the Council would be supplemented by a compilation of statements submitted by interested non-Council members who were unable to participate in person.<sup>48</sup> The last open debate to feature a compilation of statements in addition to verbatim records took place on 8 March 2022.<sup>49</sup> The practice was discontinued thereafter.

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<sup>46</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#) and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>47</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#). For more information on General Assembly resolution [76/262](#), see part IV, sect. B.

<sup>48</sup> See, for example, [S/PV.8949](#), [S/PV.8950](#), [S/PV.8953](#) and [S/PV.8989](#). See also corresponding compilation of written statements submitted by Member States for example, [S/2022/38](#), [S/2022/39](#), [S/2022/54](#) and [S/2022/207](#).

<sup>49</sup> See [S/PV.8989](#) and [S/2022/207](#).

## **II. Agenda**

### **Note**

Section II deals with the practice of the Council concerning the agenda, in relation to rules 6 to 12 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

#### *Rule 6*

*The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.*

#### *Rule 7*

*The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council.*

*Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.*

#### *Rule 8*

*The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.*

*Rule 9*

*The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.*

*Rule 10*

*Any item on the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.*

*Rule 11*

*The Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives on the Security Council a summary statement of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.*

*Rule 12*

*The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before the opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the*



*notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the Agenda at any time during a periodic meeting.*

*The provisions of rule 7, paragraph 1, and of rule 9, shall apply also to periodic meetings.*

During the period under review, the Secretary-General continued the practice of distributing communications from States, organs of the United Nations or himself concerning any matter for the consideration of the Council, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and pursuant to rule 6 of the provisional rules of procedure. The Secretary-General also continued to draw up a provisional agenda for each meeting of the Council and to communicate the provisional agenda to the representatives on the Council, in accordance with rules 7 and 8. No periodic meetings were held in 2022 and rule 12 was not applied. The present section is focused on the practice and discussion regarding rules 9 to 11 and is organized under the following three main headings: A. Adoption of the agenda (rule 9); B. Matters of which the Security Council is seized (rules 10 and 11); and C. Discussions concerning the agenda.

#### **A. Adoption of the agenda (rule 9)**

In accordance with rule 9 of the provisional rules of procedure, the first item of the agenda for each meeting of the Council is the adoption of the agenda.

##### *Voting on the adoption of the agenda*

In 2022, an objection was raised to the adoption of the provisional agenda, which led to a procedural vote on one occasion. At a meeting of the Council held on 31 January under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, despite the objection raised, the procedural vote resulted in the adoption of the provisional agenda.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> See [S/PV.8960](#). For further details on the discussion, see sect. C and part I. sect. 34.


*Newly introduced agenda items*

During the period under review, the Council added two new items to the list of matters of which it was seized. The Council held a total of 18 meetings under the new item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, the first of which took place on 11 April 2022.<sup>51</sup> The Council also convened two meetings under the new item entitled “Letter dated 13 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2022/688](#))”, the first of which was held on 15 September 2022.<sup>52</sup>

From 2000 to 2007, the Council added between 8 and 23 new items to its agenda every year. Since 2008, however, the number of new items introduced each year has decreased significantly, with no more than three new items introduced in any given year. Figure III provides information on the number of newly introduced agenda items since 2000.

**Figure III**

**Number of newly introduced agenda items per year, 2000-2022**



<sup>51</sup> See [S/PV.9013](#). For more information, see part I, sect. 19.C.

<sup>52</sup> See [S/PV.9132](#). For more information, see part I, sect. 16.

*Consideration of country-specific situations under existing items of a regional nature and region-specific situations under existing thematic items*

During the period under review, the Council continued the practice of using existing items of a regional nature for the consideration of evolving country-specific situations. For example, Council members continued to consider the situations in the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon and Yemen under the items entitled “The situation in the Middle East” and “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.<sup>53</sup> The Council also considered the situation in Ethiopia under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”.<sup>54</sup>

Furthermore, the Council continued to utilize thematic items on its agenda to discuss country and region-specific situations. For example, under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, Council members continued to deliberate on the work of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, established pursuant to resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#).<sup>55</sup> In 2022, the Council also utilized this item to regularly discuss the situation in the Ukraine,<sup>56</sup> while also convening meetings under it to discuss climate and security in Africa<sup>57</sup> and counter-terrorism in Africa.<sup>58</sup> Under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council deliberated on its cooperation with regional organizations such as the African Union,<sup>59</sup> the Collective Security Treaty Organization,<sup>60</sup> the European Union<sup>61</sup> and the League of Arab States.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, Council members discussed the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action under the items entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”<sup>63</sup> and “Non-proliferation”.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> For more information, see part I, sects. 20 and 21.

<sup>54</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 9.

<sup>55</sup> See, for example, [S/PV.9059](#) and [S/PV.9206](#).

<sup>56</sup> See, for example, [S/PV.8960](#), [S/PV.8988](#), [S/PV.9124](#) and [S/PV.9216](#).

<sup>57</sup> See [S/PV.9150](#).

<sup>58</sup> See [S/PV.9188](#).

<sup>59</sup> See [S/PV.9149](#).

<sup>60</sup> See [S/PV.8967](#).

<sup>61</sup> See [S/PV.9065](#).

<sup>62</sup> See [S/PV.9001](#).

<sup>63</sup> See [S/PV.9167](#).

<sup>64</sup> See [S/PV.9085](#) and [S/PV.9225](#).

*Inclusion of new sub-items under existing items*

During the period under review, the Council continued the practice of adding new sub-items to the existing items, for the consideration of evolving threats to international peace and security. Table 6 provides a list of new sub-items introduced in 2022 in chronological order of their introduction.<sup>65</sup>

**Table 6**

**New sub-items added to existing items at formal meetings, 2022**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>New sub-item</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8949</a> 18 January 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Women and peace and security	Protecting participation: addressing violence targeting women in peace and security processes
<a href="#">S/PV.8953</a> 25 January 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	War in cities: protection of civilians in urban settings
<a href="#">S/PV.8962</a> 7 February 2022	General issues relating to sanctions	Preventing their humanitarian and unintended consequences
<a href="#">S/PV.8989</a> 8 March 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Women and peace and security	Women's economic inclusion and participation as a key to building peace
<a href="#">S/PV.9014</a> 11 April 2022	Maintenance of international peace and security	Implementation of resolutions <a href="#">2532 (2020)</a> and <a href="#">2565 (2021)</a>
<a href="#">S/PV.9016</a> 13 April 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Women and peace and security	Accountability as prevention
<a href="#">S/PV.9036</a> 19 May 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Maintenance of international peace and security	Ending cycles of sexual violence in conflict Conflict and food security
<a href="#">S/PV.9039</a> 23 May 2022	Maintenance of international peace and security	Technology and security
<a href="#">S/PV.9052</a> 2 June 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Maintenance of international peace and security	Strengthening accountability and justice for serious violations of international law
<a href="#">S/PV.9064</a> 15 June 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Women and peace and security	Keeping the promises: the role of regional organizations in implementing the women and peace and security agenda in the face of political turmoil and seizures of power by force
<a href="#">S/PV.9090</a> 12 July 2022 <sup>a</sup>	United Nations peacekeeping operations	The key role of strategic communications for efficient peacekeeping
<a href="#">S/PV.9106</a> 8 August 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Peace and security in Africa	Capacity-building for sustaining peace

<sup>65</sup> The table excludes cases of routine sub-items relating to briefings on Council missions, briefings by the Chairs of subsidiary bodies, letters addressed to the President of the Council, reports of the Secretary-General, and meetings of the Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B.

<a href="#">S/PV.9112</a> 22 August 2022	Maintenance of international peace and security	Promote common security through dialogue and cooperation
<a href="#">S/PV.9147</a> 6 October 2022	Peace and security in Africa	Strengthening the fight against the financing of armed groups and terrorists through the illicit trafficking of natural resources
<a href="#">S/PV.9150</a> 12 October 2022	Threats to international peace and security	Climate and security in Africa
<a href="#">S/PV.9158</a> 20 October 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Women and peace and security	Strengthening women’s resilience and leadership as a path to peace in regions plagued by armed groups
<a href="#">S/PV.9181</a> 3 November 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Peacebuilding and sustaining peace	Integrating effective resilience-building in peace operations for sustainable peace
<a href="#">S/PV.9188</a> 10 November 2022	Threats to international peace and security	Counter-terrorism in Africa: an imperative for peace, security and development
<a href="#">S/PV.9220</a> 14 December 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Maintenance of international peace and security	New orientation for reformed multilateralism
<a href="#">S/PV.9221</a> 15 December 2022	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Global counter-terrorism approach – principles and the way forward

<sup>a</sup> The 8949<sup>th</sup>, 8953<sup>rd</sup>, 8989<sup>th</sup>, 9016<sup>th</sup>, 9036<sup>th</sup>, 9052<sup>nd</sup>, 9090<sup>th</sup>, 9106<sup>th</sup>, 9158<sup>th</sup>, 9181<sup>st</sup> and 9220<sup>th</sup> meetings were resumed in the afternoon of the same day (see [S/PV.8949 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.8953 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.8989 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9016 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9036 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9052 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9090 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9158 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9181 \(Resumption 1\)](#) and [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#)).

## **B. Matters of which the Security Council is seized (rules 10 and 11)**

During the period under review, pursuant to rule 11 of the provisional rules of procedure and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017,<sup>66</sup> the Secretary-General continued to communicate each week to the members on the Council a summary statement of matters of which the Council was seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.<sup>67</sup> The practice of including an agenda item in the summary statement upon its adoption at a formal meeting of the Council remained unchanged.

In 2022, the Council added the items entitled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine” and “Letter dated 13 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2022/688](#))” to the summary statement, which were respectively considered for the first time at meetings held on 11 April and 15 September.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>66</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 15 and 16.

<sup>67</sup> See, for example, [S/2022/10/Add.1](#) and [S/2022/10/Add.2](#).

<sup>68</sup> See [S/2022/10/Add.16](#) and [S/2022/10/Add.38](#). See also [S/PV.9013](#) and [S/PV.9132](#).

In accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the preliminary annual summary statement issued in January each year by the Secretary-General of matters of which the Council is seized, identifies the items that have not been considered by the Council during the preceding three calendar years and that are therefore subject to deletion. An item is deleted unless a Member State notifies the President of the Council, by the end of February, of its request that the item be retained on the list, in which case the item will remain on the list for an additional year. If no Member State requests the item's retention on the list, the first summary statement issued in March of that year reflects its deletion.<sup>69</sup>

During the period under review, in accordance with rule 11 and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)), the Council continued the practice of reviewing the summary statement at the beginning of each year in order to determine whether the Council had concluded its consideration of any items.<sup>70</sup> In 2022, of the 16 items identified for deletion in January, the item entitled "The situation in Liberia" was deleted, while the other 15 items were retained for one additional year at the request of Member States, as illustrated in Table 7.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 15 and 16.

<sup>70</sup> See [S/2022/10](#).

<sup>71</sup> See [S/2022/10/Add.10](#).

**Table 7**

**Items proposed for deletion from the summary statement in 2022**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Date of first and last consideration</i>	<i>Status in March 2022</i>
The India-Pakistan question	6 January 1948; 5 November 1965	<b>Retained</b>
The Hyderabad question	16 September 1948; 24 May 1949	<b>Retained</b>
Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General	21 February 1958; 21 February 1958	<b>Retained</b>
Letter dated 11 July 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	18 July 1960; 5 January 1961	<b>Retained</b>
Letter dated 31 December 1960 from the Minister for External Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	4 January 1961; 5 January 1961	<b>Retained</b>
The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent	4 December 1971; 27 December 1971	<b>Retained</b>
Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	9 December 1971; 9 December 1971	<b>Retained</b>
Complaint by Cuba	17 September 1973; 18 September 1973	<b>Retained</b>
The situation between Iran and Iraq	26 September 1980; 31 January 1991	<b>Retained</b>
Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	2 October 1985; 4 October 1985	<b>Retained</b>
Letter dated 19 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	21 April 1988; 25 April 1988	<b>Retained</b>
Letter dated 2 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	9 February 1990; 9 February 1990	<b>Retained</b>
The situation in Liberia	22 January 1991; 19 April 2018	<i>Deleted</i>
The situation in Georgia	8 October 1992; 15 June 2009	<b>Retained</b>
The situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	22 December 2014; 11 December 2017	<b>Retained</b>
Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)	14 March 2018; 6 September 2018	<b>Retained</b>

*Items considered at Security Council meetings*

Following the deletion of one item in March 2022, the Council was seized of 68 items during the review period.<sup>72</sup> Of the 68 items, the Council considered 47 items at its formal meetings, of which 26 were country and region-specific and 21 were thematic. Table 8 provides an overview of the items on the agenda of the Council and the items considered at formal meetings of the Council.

**Table 8**

**Items on the agenda of the Council and items considered at formal meetings, 2022**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Considered at a formal meeting</i>
<b>Country-specific and regional situations</b>	
<b>Africa</b>	
Central African region	Yes
Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General	No
Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	No
Letter dated 19 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	No
Peace and security in Africa	Yes
Peace consolidation in West Africa	Yes
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Yes
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Yes
The situation concerning Western Sahara	Yes
The situation in Burundi	No
The situation in the Great Lakes Region	Yes
The situation in Guinea-Bissau	No
The situation in Libya	Yes
The situation in Mali	Yes
The situation in Somalia	Yes
The situation in the Central African Republic	Yes
<b>Americas</b>	
Letter dated 11 July 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	No
Letter dated 31 December 1960 from the Minister for External Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	No
Complaint by Cuba	No

<sup>72</sup> See [S/2022/10](#), [S/2022/10/Add.10](#) and [S/2022/10/Add.49](#).



<i>Item</i>	<i>Considered at a formal meeting</i>
Letter dated 2 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	No
Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2016/53</a> )	Yes
The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	No
The question concerning Haiti	Yes
<b>Asia</b>	
The situation in Afghanistan	Yes
The situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	No
The Hyderabad question	No
The India-Pakistan question	No
The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent	No
The situation in Myanmar	Yes
Letter dated 13 September 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/688</a> )	Yes
<b>Europe</b>	
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yes
The situation in Cyprus	Yes
The situation in Georgia	No
Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2014/136</a> )	Yes
Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2014/264</a> )	Yes
Security Council resolutions <a href="#">1160 (1998)</a> , <a href="#">1199 (1998)</a> , <a href="#">1203 (1998)</a> , <a href="#">1239 (1999)</a> and <a href="#">1244 (1999)</a>	Yes
Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2018/218</a> )	No
Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine	Yes
<b>Middle East</b>	
Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/10409</a> )	No
The situation between Iran and Iraq	No
The situation concerning Iraq	Yes
The situation between Iraq and Kuwait	Yes
The situation in the Middle East	Yes
The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Yes

<i>Item</i>	<i>Considered at a formal meeting</i>
<i>Total, country-specific and regional situations</i>	26 items
<b>Thematic and other issues</b>	
Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	Yes
Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council	Yes
Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice	Yes
Briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Yes
Children and armed conflict	Yes
Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly	Yes
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Yes
General issues relating to sanctions	Yes
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2017/507</a> )	Yes
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	Yes
Maintenance of international peace and security	Yes
Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution <a href="#">1353 (2001)</a> , annex II, sections A and B	Yes
Non-proliferation	Yes
Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Yes
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Yes
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace	Yes
The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security	No
Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Yes
Security Council mission	No
Small arms	No
Threats to international peace and security	Yes
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Yes
United Nations peacekeeping operations	Yes
Women and peace and security	Yes
<i>Total, thematic and other issues</i>	21 items
<b><i>Total number of items on the agenda<sup>a</sup></i></b>	<b>68 items<sup>a</sup></b>
<b><i>Total number of items considered</i></b>	<b>47 items</b>

<sup>a</sup> In 2022, the Council also considered the item entitled “Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice”, ([S/PV.9073](#)) which was not on the list of items of which it was seized.

### C. Discussions concerning the agenda

During the period under review, Council members discussed the agenda and matters of which the Council was seized in several meetings.

At a meeting held on 31 January under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, the representative of the Russian Federation requested a procedural vote on the provisional agenda. Explaining his request for the procedural vote, the representative expressed his delegation’s objection to the view of the United States’ delegation, which had proposed the holding of the meeting, that the deployment of troops of the Russian Federation on its own territory was a threat to international peace and security.<sup>73</sup> He stated that it was tantamount to unacceptable interference in the domestic affairs of the Russian Federation and an attempt to mislead the international community about the situation. He reminded Council members that the Russian Federation, as the president of the Council in February 2022, planned to hold an annual discussion on the situation in Ukraine at which the United States delegation could add any information concerning the situation in question. In response, the representative of the United States explained that her delegation’s request for the meeting was based on the actions of the Russian Federation on the border with Ukraine and the protection of peace and security of a Member State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. She further underlined that it was the right time to hold a public meeting, taking note of the numerous private meetings the United States had with officials of the Russian Federation and in consultation with European and Ukrainian colleagues. The provisional agenda was put to the vote and adopted.<sup>74</sup>

At the first meeting convened under the new item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine” on 11 April 2022, following the adoption of the provisional agenda, the representative of the Russian Federation, while noting that his delegation was not against adding the new item to the agenda of the Council, suggested deleting the two other existing items pertaining to the situation in Ukraine entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))” and “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))”.<sup>75</sup> He stated that, since the new item covered all aspects of the

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<sup>73</sup> See [S/PV.8960](#).

<sup>74</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States; *against*: China and the Russian Federation; *abstaining*: Gabon, India and Kenya.

<sup>75</sup> See [S/PV.9013](#).

situation in Ukraine, it was universal in character and that the deletion of the previous two items would reflect common sense and the current situation. He called on the presidency of the Council to take the necessary procedural steps to formalize the new agenda item and delete the two previous items at an early date so that future presidencies would not have problems on agreeing on the Council's programme of work. The representative of the United States said that the meeting under the new item was proposed by her delegation without prejudice to the two existing items. She expressed the view that the existing items had to remain in place because, while the scope of the situation in Ukraine had grown far beyond the circumstances in 2014, it was important to recognize its history and that it was possible that Member States would wish to focus on Crimea during future meetings. The representative of the United Kingdom, in her capacity as President of the Council, recalled that the process for removing items from the list of items of which the Council was seized was governed by the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)) and usually took three years. Given the split views among Council members, she proposed discussing the issue separately and seeking to agree on a way forward. In his remarks, the representative of Ukraine underscored that the title of the new item, "Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine", was exceptional for conflict-specific issues, which mostly referred to "situations in" specific countries or "questions concerning" them. According to the representative, this was an acknowledgment that the peace and security of Ukraine had been violated from abroad and that the Council would remain seized of the matter until it was restored.

At a meeting held on 26 July under the item entitled "The situation concerning Iraq", the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq called on the Council to include the item "The situation concerning Iraq and Türkiye" to its agenda, considering the repeated Turkish violations of Iraqi territories and airspace for several years and stating that Türkiye was illegally expanding its military presence.<sup>76</sup>

In 2022, the agenda of the Council was also discussed in more detail during the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council held on 28 June under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))" (see case 3).

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<sup>76</sup> See [S/PV.9100](#).

### Case 3

#### **Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))**

On 28 June, at the initiative of Albania, which held the presidency of the Council for the month and whose Permanent Representative chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions in 2022,<sup>77</sup> the Council convened an open debate on its working methods under the item entitled “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” and sub-item entitled “Working methods of the Security Council”.<sup>78</sup> In their statements, Council members exchanged views on the content and scope of the Council’s agenda.

In her remarks, the representative of the Russian Federation cautioned against the practice of individual members using the Council to expand its agenda through domestic, political, human rights, climate or other questions.<sup>79</sup> The representative argued that this practice ignored the fact that the Council, under the Charter of the United Nations, should not be a venue for and could not help with the resolution of those problems. The representative of China stated that the Council had seen a steady increase in the number of emerging issues and a continuous proliferation of cross-cutting issues on its agenda, some of which were clearly beyond its core mandate. He opined that the Council should focus on the major pressing issues that threatened international peace and security and avoid taking on new topics without due consideration, which did not produce the desired effects and took up too much of its resources. Furthermore, the representative thought that there should be a reasonable division of labour between the Council and other bodies on cross-cutting issues to avoid overlap and redundancy. Citing the Council’s discussions on the Syrian Arab Republic as an example, he added that issues on the agenda and arrangements for deliberations should be adjusted as and when the situation on the ground changed.

The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasized that the Council should exercise caution when introducing new topics for consideration and avoid duplication of efforts and encroaching on the mandate of the General Assembly. The representative of the Sudan

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<sup>77</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 21 June 2022 ([S/2022/499](#)).

<sup>78</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#) and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2022/842](#).

<sup>79</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).

underscored that the reform of the Council’s working methods under Article 24 of the Charter required the Council to adhere to its Charter-mandated functions, adding that a quick glance at the agenda of the Council revealed that it was rapidly expanding, necessitating a pause for reflection and meaningful review. In a similar vein, also speaking on behalf of India, the representative of Brazil stated that there were items on the agenda of the Council on which discussion had not been held since the creation of the United Nations, and suggested that members begin discussions on the review of items on the list of matters of which the Council was seized in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)).<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).

### **III. Representation and credentials**

#### **Note**

Section III covers the practice of the Council concerning representation and the credentials of its members, in relation to rules 13 to 17 of the provisional rules of procedure.

#### *Rule 13*

*Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative on the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he takes his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.*

#### *Rule 14*

*Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the first meeting which he is invited to attend.*

#### *Rule 15*

*The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representative appointed in accordance with rule 14 shall be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval.*

*Rule 16*

*Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council in accordance with rule 15, such representative shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives.*

*Rule 17*

*Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter.*

During the period under review, in accordance with rule 13 of the provisional rules of procedure, the credentials of the representatives of the members of the Council were communicated to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General subsequently submitted his report to the Council pursuant to rule 15. Such reports were transmitted to the Council when there were changes in the representation of the members of the Council,<sup>81</sup> as well as when representatives of the newly elected members of the Council were designated prior to the beginning of each term.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> See, for example, [S/2022/27](#), [S/2022/238](#), [S/2022/262](#), [S/2022/778](#) and [S/2022/784](#).

<sup>82</sup> See [S/2022/1020](#).



No discussions regarding the interpretation and application of rules 13 to 17 arose during the period under review. However, the issue of authorization to represent a Member State was raised on one occasion. At a meeting held on 29 March under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))”, the representative of Ukraine said that, while he recognized the representative of the “aggressor State” in the permanent seat of the Soviet Union, the representative of the Russian Federation was not authorized to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> See [S/PV.9008](#).

## IV. Presidency

### Note

Section IV covers the practice of the Council concerning the monthly rotation of the presidency, the role of the President and the temporary cession of the chair by the President during the consideration of a particular question with which the Member State he or she represents is directly connected, in relation to rules 18 to 20 of the provisional rules of procedure.

#### *Rule 18*

*The presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office for one calendar month.*

#### *Rule 19*

*The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations.*

#### *Rule 20*

*Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfilment of the responsibilities of the presidency he should not preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he shall indicate his decision to the Council. The presidential chair shall then devolve, for the purpose of the consideration of that*

*question, on the representative of the member next in English alphabetical order, it being understood that the provisions of this rule shall apply to the representatives on the Security Council called upon successively to preside. This rule shall not affect the representative capacity of the President as stated in rule 19, or his duties under rule 7.*

This section comprises two subsections, namely: A. The role of the President of the Security Council (rules 18 and 19); and B. Discussions concerning the presidency of the Security Council. In 2022, there were no instances of the application of rule 20.

#### **A. Role of the President of the Security Council (rules 18 and 19)**

During the period under review, in accordance with rule 18 of the provisional rules of procedure, the presidency of the Council was held in turn for one calendar month by the members of the Council in the English alphabetical order. In addition to continuing to preside over meetings of the Council, informal consultations of the whole and informal interactive dialogues, the President of the Council continued to perform several other functions under the authority of the Council, including: (a) briefing non-members of the Council and the media on the monthly programme of work at the beginning of the month and holding “wrap-up” sessions with non-Council members and briefings with the media at the end of the presidency; (b) representing the Council and delivering statements on its behalf, including the presentation of the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly;<sup>84</sup> (c) holding monthly meetings with the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly; and (d) delivering statements or

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<sup>84</sup> At a meeting held on 20 May 2022 (see [S/PV.9037](#)), the Council issued a note by the President (see [S/2022/403](#)), adopting its report to the General Assembly covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2021 (see [A/76/2](#)). The report was introduced to the General Assembly at the 79<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting of its 76<sup>th</sup> session on 9 June 2022 by the President of the Council for the month of June (Albania). See also part IV, sect. I.F.

elements to the press following informal consultations of the whole or whenever Council members reached an agreement on a text.<sup>85</sup>

The presidency of the Council continued the practice of holding wrap-up sessions with the wider membership of the United Nations, except during the months of February and September. The wrap-up sessions were held in accordance with the note by the President dated 27 December 2019,<sup>86</sup> following the “Toledo-style” format, whereby members of the Council presented jointly the activity of the Council for the month as a panel and in an interactive manner.<sup>87</sup> In December 2022, as President of the Council for the month, India held a joint wrap-up session with Ireland, Kenya, Mexico and Norway, the four other outgoing elected members of the Council, to brief the wider membership on the Council’s activities during the month and reflect on their two-year tenure.<sup>88</sup> Council members also continued to submit, in their national capacities, monthly assessments providing an overview of the work of the Council during their presidencies.<sup>89</sup>

Consistent with the note by the President dated 12 July 2021,<sup>90</sup> in 2022, Council presidencies continued the practice of circulating written monthly commitments providing a list of priorities and measures to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency of the Council. Monthly commitments were circulated among Council members, at the beginning of the month and on an informal basis. In some cases, monthly commitments were submitted jointly by a set of successive or like-minded presidencies. In their monthly commitments Council members would indicate the priorities of each presidency’s priorities in terms of working methods focusing, inter alia, on the following: convening of briefings on the informal programme of work and wrap-up sessions for the wider membership, establishing a good balance between public meetings and informal consultations, requesting speakers to deliver their statements in five minutes or less in public meetings, encouraging interactivity and dialogue in informal

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<sup>85</sup> Not all statements to the press are issued as a result of informal consultations or closed videoconferences. Council presidencies referred to the practice of delivering press statements and elements to the press in their respective monthly assessments (see, for example, [S/2022/924](#), [S/2022/917](#), [S/2022/868](#), [S/2023/40](#), [S/2022/989](#), [S/2023/82](#) and [S/2023/107](#)).

<sup>86</sup> See [S/2019/994](#).

<sup>87</sup> See, for example, [S/2022/924](#), [S/2022/917](#), [S/2022/1017](#) and [S/2022/989](#).

<sup>88</sup> See [S/2023/107](#).

<sup>89</sup> As of the date of this publication, eight out of the twelve monthly presidencies submitted monthly assessments: [S/2022/924](#), [S/2022/917](#), [S/2022/868](#), [S/2022/1017](#), [S/2023/40](#), [S/2022/989](#), [S/2023/82](#) and [S/2023/107](#).

<sup>90</sup> See [S/2021/647](#).

consultations and the use of elements to the press, further strengthening the participation of civil society in Council meetings and ensuring zero tolerance for any reprisals against them, regularly seeking the views of affected Member States and regional and subregional organizations on the Council's informal programme of work, and enhancing coordination with the other principal organs of the United Nations and the Peacebuilding Commission.

During their respective presidencies of the Council in January and March 2022, Norway and the United Arab Emirates developed and launched digital platforms for the Council's monthly programme of work, featuring all formal and informal activities, which were published on the websites of their respective permanent missions. The United Arab Emirates made available the programme of work in a digital form in both English and Arabic.

Council presidencies also continued implementing and further building upon the joint working methods commitments entitled "Security Council Presidency Trio for Women, Peace and Security", originally developed by the delegations of Ireland, Kenya and Mexico in September 2021. In a letter dated 3 February 2022 addressed to the President of the Council, the representatives of these three former elected members of the Council submitted a handover and summary report from the so-called "Presidency Trio", which also outlined several recommendations for future presidencies.<sup>91</sup> In a letter dated 27 December 2022, the representative of Norway submitted an updated statement of shared commitments on women and peace and security on behalf of 15 signatories.<sup>92</sup> In addition to Ireland, Kenya and Mexico, the signatories included Niger as the presidency in December 2021, Norway, the United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Albania, Brazil and France, as presidencies in 2022, and Japan, Malta, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Albania, Brazil and Ecuador as future presidencies in 2023. Among the priorities outlined in the document, the signatories committed to: (i) the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in meetings of the Council; (ii) including gender perspectives in Council meetings and products; and (iii) transparency in advancing the women and peace and security agenda in the Council.

In 2022, some Council presidencies continued the convening of "sofa talks" at the level of permanent representatives, a practice initiated in 2019 for Council members to raise issues of concern to international peace and security in an informal setting. On 13 January 2022, as the

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<sup>91</sup> See [S/2022/91](#).

<sup>92</sup> See [S/2022/1009](#).

Council presidency for the month, Norway organized a President’s retreat, also referred to as the “Mini Oslo Forum”, on preventive diplomacy and mediation in Manhasset, New York, which was held in the format of extended “sofa talks” for the 15 Security Council ambassadors.<sup>93</sup>

Following previous practice, and in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the introduction to the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly for 2021 was prepared under the coordination of the President of the Council for the month of July 2021 (France).<sup>94</sup>

In 2022, Council presidencies continued bringing to the attention of the Council emerging and evolving issues related to international peace and security by organizing meetings under thematic items, sometimes adding new sub-items or proposing new topics. In most cases, Council presidencies transmitted concept notes in their national capacities to guide the discussion.<sup>95</sup> In a letter dated 21 June 2022, the representative of Albania transmitted a concept note for the annual open debate on the Council’s working methods which was held on 28 June 2022 under the item entitled “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”.<sup>96</sup> Furthermore, during a meeting held on 22 August under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and sub-item entitled “Promote common security through dialogue and cooperation”, the President of the Council took the floor ahead of the briefers invited under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to draw the attention of Council members to the concept note and explain the purpose and objectives of the meeting.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> See [S/2022/924](#).

<sup>94</sup> See [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 127.

<sup>95</sup> See, for example, the concept note on the sub-item “Protecting participation: addressing violence targeting women in peace and security processes” ([S/2022/22](#), annex) circulated by the representative of Norway prior to a high-level meeting of the Council held on 18 January (see [S/PV.8949](#)); the concept note on the sub-item “League of Arab States” ([S/2022/240](#), annex), circulated by the representative of the United Arab Emirates prior to a meeting held on 23 March (see [S/PV.9001](#)); the concept note on the sub-item “Strengthening women’s resilience and leadership as a path to peace in regions plagued by armed groups” ([S/2022/743](#), annex) circulated by the representative of Gabon prior to a high-level meeting held on 20 October (see [S/PV.9158](#)); and the concept note on the sub-item “Global counter-terrorism approach – principles and the way forward” ([S/2022/906](#), annex) circulated by the representative of India prior to a high-level meeting held on 15 December (see [S/PV.9221](#)).

<sup>96</sup> [S/2022/499](#). See also [S/PV.9079](#) and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#). An analytical summary of the debate was circulated after the meeting by the representative of Albania ([S/2022/842](#)).

<sup>97</sup> See [S/PV.9112](#). See also [S/2022/617](#).

## **B. Discussions concerning the presidency of the Security Council**

In 2022, the role of the presidency was discussed in multiple instances in communications and meetings of the Council.

### *Communications*

During the period under review, in seven letters submitted to the President of the Council and the Secretary-General, the representatives of the Russian Federation, Albania and the United States exchanged competing views on the role of the presidency and alleged misuse of its prerogatives in, among other issues, (i) addressing requests for Council meetings under rules 2 and 3, (ii) the participation of a Member State by videoconference under rule 37, and (iii) the participation of a civil society representative under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.<sup>98</sup> Furthermore, in a letter dated 12 September 2022 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Ethiopia expressed deep concern about the decision of the delegation of France, as the presidency of the Council during the month, to circulate a letter from a non-State actor, a group designated as a terrorist under the laws of Ethiopia.<sup>99</sup> The representative stated that it went against the fundamental tenants of the Charter of the United Nations, which established a State-centred and intergovernmental multilateral system founded on the respect for the sovereignty of Member States. He further stated that the action of the President of the Council was “unprecedented and highly regrettable” and urged France to rectify it.

In a letter dated 16 February 2022, the representative of Finland transmitted the report of the nineteenth annual workshop for the newly elected members held on 18 and 19 November 2021.<sup>100</sup> In the report it was noted that participants discussed the modalities for the preparation of press elements following informal consultations and the role of the President of the Council in delivering them. In that regard, during the discussion it was noted that press elements allowed the Council to convey a message of unity and that they did not need to be extensive. Some speakers thought that press elements had become more serious than they should be, with members negotiating them as though they were press statements. It was suggested that the

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<sup>98</sup> For more information on participation, see sect. VII. See also part I, sect. 19.C.

<sup>99</sup> See [S/2022/686](#).

<sup>100</sup> See [S/2022/128](#).

presidency of the Council needed some flexibility in speaking on behalf of the Council, lest they became so cautious that they told the press nothing. Several participants, however, favoured caution in that regard, noting that the President should not deliver press elements without securing the agreement of the entire membership. One of the participants said that presidencies needed to be careful in answering questions on behalf of the Council and that differences among members in consultations on sensitive issues should not be shared with the press. Several speakers said they were willing to try the practice whereby the President could leave the stakeout after reading the press elements without answering questions. Participants also reflected on the role of Council presidencies in promoting priorities through joint initiatives such as the working methods commitments. In that regard, several speakers welcomed the “Presidency Trio for Women, Peace and Security”, with one of them particularly noting that, given that elected members were limited to two-year terms, promoting joint priorities across presidencies was a good way to address the challenge of sustaining priorities.

### *Meetings*

On 18 January, at a meeting held under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, the representative of the United Arab Emirates said that her delegation, alongside Albania, Niger and Norway, was committed to remaining vigilant with Council briefers and taking a zero-tolerance approach toward reprisals, as reflected in their shared working methods commitments on women and peace and security.<sup>101</sup> The representative of the European Union, urging the members of the Council to continue to invite more women human rights defenders and civil society briefers while taking all the necessary precautions to ensure their safety, said that the innovative women and peace and security shared commitments, launched by the “Trio Presidency” of Ireland, Kenya and Mexico in 2021 and continued by Albania, Niger, Norway and the United Arab Emirates, were positive steps in that regard.

At a meeting held on 25 February under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))”, the representative of Ukraine said that the Russian Federation, by occupying the seat of a Council member in 1991, violated not only the Charter of

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<sup>101</sup> See [S/PV.8949](#).



the United Nations, but also rule 20 of the provisional rules of procedure, as it should not have presided over the Council during the consideration of a particular matter with which it was directly connected.<sup>102</sup> At a meeting held on 27 February under the same item, the representative of Ukraine expressed regret that, once again, rule 20 had not been properly applied by the presidency.<sup>103</sup>

At a meeting held on 5 April under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))”, before the adoption of the provisional agenda, the representative of the Russian Federation protested the manner in which the presidency of the Council, held by the United Kingdom, handled the requests of his delegation to convene a Council meeting in connection with what he termed the provocation of the Ukrainian radicals in Bucha.<sup>104</sup>

At a meeting held on 29 April under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of the Russian Federation, taking the floor to make a further statement at the end of the meeting and noting that this was the last meeting of the month, expressed his regret that the presidency of the Council had considerably undermined both written and unwritten rules on which the trust and cooperation in the Council was based.<sup>105</sup> The President assured Council members that the United Kingdom would continue to uphold the United Nations Charter and the Council’s provisional rules of procedure in its future terms as President, just as it had done during the then current presidency.

At a meeting held on 27 July under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, the representative of the United Arab Emirates, encouraging Council members to further engage with the Peacebuilding Commission, including by continuing to invite it to brief and provide written advice to the Council on relevant matters, suggested that Council members could coordinate with the Commission before and during their assumption of the Council presidency.<sup>106</sup> According to the representative, this coordination would not only identify issues pertinent to the Peacebuilding Commission, but would also allow enough time for it to make the necessary preparations in an effective manner ahead of Council meetings and consultations.

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<sup>102</sup> See [S/PV.8979](#).

<sup>103</sup> See [S/PV.8980](#).

<sup>104</sup> See [S/PV.9011](#). For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. I19.A. For more information about the referral of a dispute or situation to the Council by States, see sect. I.A,

<sup>105</sup> See [S/PV.9026](#).

<sup>106</sup> See [S/PV.9101](#).

The role of the President of the Council was also discussed in greater detail at the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council held on 28 June under item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” (case 4).

#### Case 4

#### **Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))**

On 28 June 2022, at the initiative of Albania, which held the presidency of the Security Council for the month and whose Permanent Representative chaired the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions in 2022,<sup>107</sup> the Council convened an open debate on its working methods under the item entitled “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” and sub-item entitled “Working methods of the Security Council”.<sup>108</sup> In their statements, participants discussed different aspects of the work of the President of the Council, including its engagement with the wider membership and other principal organs of the United Nations, the preparation of monthly assessments and the practice of circulating monthly working methods commitments.

Speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, the representative of Ireland stressed the important role of the presidency in the engagement with the other principal organs of the United Nations.<sup>109</sup> In that regard, she noted that the organization of briefings on the informal programme of work to Member States, the media and civil society were useful tools and encouraged the holding of interactive monthly wrap-up sessions. The representatives of Austria, Liechtenstein and Slovenia underlined the need for those sessions to be more interactive. Recalling the non-paper presented by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group on the subject in 2021, the representative of Austria expressed hope that Council members would consider those meetings as an opportunity to further shape public opinion at the United Nations in order to render them more substantial. The representative of Peru opined that the “Toledo format” should continue to be conducted jointly and interactively in wrap-up sessions, with a view to a more analytical exchange to enhance the transparency and information regarding the

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<sup>107</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 21 June 2022 ([S/2022/499](#)).

<sup>108</sup> For an analytical summary of the discussion, see [S/2022/842](#).

<sup>109</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).

Council's work. Beyond wrap-up sessions, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic singled out the role of the President in communicating with non-Council members that were being discussed on the Council's agenda.<sup>110</sup> The representative of Egypt called for more briefings to all Member States in order to hear their views on the programme of work and to keep them informed about Council visits and various activities.

Participants also discussed the monthly assessments of Council presidencies. In her briefing at the beginning of the meeting, the Director of Security Council Procedure and co-author of *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, Loraine Sievers, recalled that the note by the President dated 12 June 1997,<sup>111</sup> by which monthly assessments were launched, stated that those documents were prepared by Council members "under their own responsibility" and should not be considered as representing the views of the Council.<sup>112</sup> Noting the decrease in the number of assessments submitted since 2015 as a result of the view of some Council members that the assessments had to be agreed by consensus, she appealed to all Council members to return to the letter and spirit of the 1997 presidential note, so that publication could return to 100 per cent. The representative of Ireland said that monthly assessments which were prepared under the authority of each presidency, constituted useful records of the Council's action and inaction. She highlighted the importance of the assessments being timely and frank in their analysis and assessment of the work of the Council, and added that Member States, civil society and academia should be able to consult such documents and find accurate reflections of the realities of the Council, rather than lists of meetings.

Several speakers discussed the importance of the monthly working methods commitments circulated by Council members at the beginning of their presidencies. The representative of Ireland stated that this growing practice was a step towards the implementation of the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)) and the subsequent 13 presidential notes and towards greater transparency and accountability. Speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, the representative of Switzerland stated that the monthly working methods commitments offered a way to promote agility and institutionalize commitments towards greater effectiveness and transparency. The representatives of

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<sup>110</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#) (Resumption 1).

<sup>111</sup> See [S/1997/451](#).

<sup>112</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).

Luxembourg, Malta and Switzerland specifically welcomed the commitment to the women and peace and security agenda initiated by the presidencies of Ireland, Kenya and Mexico in 2021, joined by a growing number of presidencies, highlighting that they had made tangible contributions to its implementation across the Council's agenda. Similarly, the representative of Slovenia pointed out that the use of shared thematic commitments to the women and peace and security agenda was an important and innovative step towards promoting its implementation. She added that a similar approach could be useful to advance other issues on the Council's agenda.

## V. Secretariat

### Note

Section V covers the practice of the Security Council concerning the functions and powers of the Secretary-General in connection with meetings of the Council, in relation to rules 21 to 26 of its provisional rules of procedure.<sup>113</sup>

#### *Rule 21*

*The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.*

#### *Rule 22*

*The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.*

#### *Rule 23*

*The Secretary-General may be appointed by the Security Council, in accordance with rule 28, as rapporteur for a specified question.*

#### *Rule 24*

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<sup>113</sup> For specific instances in which the Secretary-General was requested or authorized by the Security Council to carry out other functions in accordance with Article 98, see part VI.

*The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.*

*Rule 25*

*The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.*

*Rule 26*

*The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.*

During the period under review and in accordance with previous practice, the Secretary-General and senior officials of the Secretariat continued to attend Council meetings and provide oral briefings and written reports to the Council, as requested. The Council continued to request briefings by senior officials from the Secretariat.

The various functions of the Secretariat were addressed in several communications meetings of the Council, particularly with respect to its role under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) on the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a letter dated 21 October 2022 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom expressed their deep concern by the transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation in violation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which were being used by the Russian Federation in its “war of aggression” against Ukraine.<sup>114</sup> The representatives stated that they would welcome an

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<sup>114</sup> See [S/2022/781](#).

investigation by the Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Expressing a similar concern, in a letter issued on the same day and addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the United States requested that the Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to conduct a technical and impartial investigation.<sup>115</sup> The representative further urged the Council to meet in its “2231 format” to review the information and determine an appropriate response.

In another letter dated 21 October 2022, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed concerns regarding the attempts of certain Member States to give instructions to the Secretariat in violation of Article 100 of the Charter, as demonstrated in the letter from the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom,<sup>116</sup> and the statements of some Secretariat officials about their intention to accept these instructions.<sup>117</sup> He stressed that no mandate had ever been given to the Secretariat by the Council for any investigation in the context of the resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and requested the Secretariat to abstain from any engagement in any investigation with regard to claims of alleged violation of the resolution.

The role of the Secretariat with respect to the implementation of resolution of [2231 \(2015\)](#) was further discussed at a meeting held on 26 October under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> See [S/2022/782](#).

<sup>116</sup> See [S/2022/781](#).

<sup>117</sup> See [S/2022/783](#).

<sup>118</sup> See [S/PV.9167](#). For a detailed overview of the discussion, see part VI, sect. II.B.

## **VI. Conduct of business**

### **Note**

Section VI covers the practice of the Council concerning the conduct of business at its meetings, in relation to rules 27, 29, 30 and 33 of its provisional rules of procedure.

#### *Rule 27*

*The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.*

#### *Rule 29*

*The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council.*

*The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.*

#### *Rule 30*

*If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.*

#### *Rule 33*

*The following motions shall have precedence in the order named*



*over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:*

- 1. To suspend the meeting;*
- 2. To adjourn the meeting;*
- 3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;*
- 4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;*
- 5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or*
- 6. To introduce an amendment.*

*Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.*

In 2022, no explicit reference was made to rules 27, 29 and 30 in the meetings of the Council. The President of the Council continued to request speakers to limit their statements in Council meetings in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 which, as a general rule, encourages all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, in Council meetings to deliver their statements in five minutes or less.<sup>119</sup> For example, at a meeting held on 25 April, before giving the floor to non-Council members, the President reminded all speakers to limit their statements to no more than four minutes and noted that the flashing lights on the collar of the microphone would prompt speakers to bring their remarks to a close.<sup>120</sup> Following previous practice, during the period under review, joint statements were delivered by

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<sup>119</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 22.

<sup>120</sup> See [S/PV.9021](#) and [S/PV.9021 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/PV.9016](#) and [S/PV.9016 \(Resumption 1\)](#); [S/PV.9042](#) and [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#); [S/PV.9052](#), [S/PV.9096](#); [S/PV.9079](#) and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#); [S/PV.9106](#) and [S/PV.9106 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

Council members,<sup>121</sup> and non-Council members invited to participate in Council meetings.<sup>122</sup> Moreover, briefers were also encouraged to be succinct and to limit their remarks to five to seven minutes.<sup>123</sup> Similarly, at a meeting held on 28 September, during the remarks of the briefer, the President of the Council requested him to provide the factual segment of his statement in written form and to move on to the substance of the briefing.<sup>124</sup>

According to the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the speaking order for meetings of the Council is established as a general practice by a draw. In addition, the President of the Council delivers his or her national statement last of all Council members.<sup>125</sup> However, in certain cases, the speaking order is established by the use of a sign-up sheet, and the President of the Council may make his or her national statement before the other members take the floor.<sup>126</sup> In certain cases, the President of the Council may adjust the list of speakers and inscribe first the delegation(s) responsible for the drafting process in order to allow them to make an introductory or explanatory presentation.<sup>127</sup> When an unscheduled or emergency meeting is convened, the

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<sup>121</sup> In 2022, in a number of instances, the representatives of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya delivered joint statements on behalf of the three African members of the Council (referred to as the “A3”) (see, for example, [S/PV.9012](#) and [S/PV.9141](#)). In several instances, Council members also delivered joint statements as co-penholders on a particular issue (see, for example, [S/PV.9038](#) and [S/PV.9068](#)). At a meeting held on 28 June 2022 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”, the representative of Ireland delivered a statement on behalf of the elected members of the Council, namely Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway and United Arab Emirates, while the representative of Brazil also delivered a statement on behalf of Brazil and India (see [S/PV.9079](#)).

<sup>122</sup> For example, at a meeting held on 19 April 2022 under the item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, the representative of Sweden spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) (see [S/PV.9018](#)); at a meeting held on 25 May 2022 under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, the representative of Switzerland delivered a joint statement on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (see [S/PV.9042](#)) and the representative of Croatia delivered a joint statement on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect (see [S/PV.9042 \(Resumption 1\)](#)); and, at a meeting held on 14 July 2022 under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the representative of Indonesia spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Safety and Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (see [S/PV.9090](#)).

<sup>123</sup> See, for example, [S/PV.8943](#), [S/PV.8952](#) and [S/PV.8955](#).

<sup>124</sup> See [S/PV.9139](#). At public and private meetings, briefers are encouraged to limit initial remarks to 15 minutes, unless otherwise decided by the Council (see [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 56).

<sup>125</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 24 and 25.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.* For example, at a meeting held on 7 February 2022 under the item entitled “General issues relating to sanctions”, the representative of the Russian Federation (President of the Council) took the floor and delivered his national statement after the briefers, but before the other members of the Council (see [S/PV.8962](#)); at a meeting held on 23 May 2022 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of the United States (President of the Council) took the floor and delivered his national statement after the briefers, but before the other members of the Council (see [S/PV.9039](#)).

<sup>127</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 26. For example, at a meeting held on 27 October 2022 under the item entitled “The situation concerning Western Sahara”, the representative of the United States, as penholder of resolution [2654 \(2022\)](#) which was adopted at the meeting, took the floor first after the vote to provide explanatory remarks (see [S/PV.9168](#)).

President may adjust the list of speakers so that the delegation that requested the meeting can speak before other Council members in order to present the rationale for convening the meeting.<sup>128</sup> The President may also inscribe first the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Council when they present their work, as was the case on several occasions during the period under review.<sup>129</sup>

According to established practice and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the list of speakers was adjusted according to protocol when high-level officials were representing Council members at a meeting.<sup>130</sup> In 2022, consistent with past practice under these items and in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, non-members of the Council having a direct interest in the matter under consideration spoke before Council members in meetings held under the items entitled “Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)” and “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 26. For example, at a meeting held on 4 March 2022 under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))”, the representative of the United Kingdom, having requested the Council meeting, delivered a statement after the briefers, but before the other members of the Council (see [S/PV.8986](#)).

<sup>129</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 27. For example, at a meeting held on 21 June 2022 under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia”, the representative of Ireland spoke before the other members of the Council and briefed the Council in her capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia (see [S/PV.9071](#)). Pursuant to resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), in November 2022, the Council modified the name of the Committee to “Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab” (see resolution [2662\(2022\)](#), para. 24). For more information, see part VII, sect. III.A and part IX, sect. I.B.1(a).

<sup>130</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 29-30. For example, at a meeting held on 25 January 2022 under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, the Prime Minister of Norway (President of the Council) took the floor after the briefers, but before the other Council members (see [S/PV.8853](#)); at a meeting held on 8 March 2022 under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, the Minister for Climate Change and Environment of the United Arab Emirates (President of the Council) took the floor after the briefers, but before the other Council members (see [S/PV.8989](#)); and, at a meeting held on 11 October 2022 under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Gabon (President of the Council) took the floor after the briefers, but before the other Council members (see [S/PV.9149](#)). At a meeting held on 29 July 2022 under the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad of the Central African Republic took the floor first after the adoption of resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#), before the members of the Council (see [S/PV.9105](#)). At a meeting held on 26 July 2022 under the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq took the floor after the briefer and before the representative Türkiye and the Council members (see [S/PV.9100](#)). For more information on high-level meetings, see sect. II. B.

<sup>131</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 33. See also, for example, [S/PV.9019](#), [S/PV.9021](#), [S/PV.9099](#), [S/PV.9107](#), and [S/PV.9155](#).

The Council continued to use videoconferencing technology to facilitate participation at in-person meetings.<sup>132</sup> In 2022, Council members were briefed by speakers participating via videoconference in 127 out of 292 meetings (43.5 per cent).<sup>133</sup>

At a meeting held on 5 April under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)”, at the request of President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, an audiovisual recording showing the situation in Ukraine was played in the Council Chamber.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 60.

<sup>133</sup> For more information on participation via videoconference, see sect. VII.

<sup>134</sup> See [S/PV.9011](#). For more information about discussions in Council meetings and communications regarding participation of rule 37 invitees via videoconference, see sect. VII.

## VII. Participation

### Note

Section VII covers the practice of the Council concerning the extension of invitations to non-members of the Council to participate in meetings of the Council. Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter of the United Nations and rules 37 and 39 of the provisional rules of procedure describe circumstances in which invitations can be extended to non-members of the Council to participate, without a vote, when the Council so decides.

#### *Article 31*

*Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.*

#### *Article 32*

*Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.*

#### *Rule 37*

*Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.*

*Rule 39*

*The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.*

During the period under review, the Council continued to invite non-members of the Council to participate in its meetings. The invitations were extended by the President of the Council at the beginning or during Council meetings either under the “relevant provisions” of the Charter without an explicit reference to a specific Article or rule of the provisional rules of procedure, or under rule 37 or rule 39. Specifically, Member States continued to be invited under rule 37, while representatives of the Secretariat, other United Nations organs, specialized agencies, funds and programmes, regional and other intergovernmental organizations, or other invitees, including representatives of non-governmental organizations and civil society, were invited under rule 39. While Member States requested invitations in letters addressed to the President of the Council, in most cases these were not circulated as documents of the Council. In addition, in 2022, the President of the Security Council requested written advice from the Peacebuilding Commission under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure in connection with a number of Council meetings.

During the period under review, in accordance with the notes by the President dated 30 August 2017 and 27 December 2019, the Council invited newly elected members to observe all

meetings of the Council and informal consultations of the whole, including consultations on Council outcome documents from 1 October, for the three months immediately preceding their term of membership.<sup>135</sup>

This section is divided into four subsections, namely: A. Invitations extended under rule 37; B. Invitations extended under rule 39; C. Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39; and D. Discussions relating to participation.

### **A. Invitations extended under rule 37**

In accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure, all States, whether Members of the United Nations or not, can be invited to participate in Council meetings when: (a) the interests of a Member State are “specially affected” (Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37); (b) a Member State or a non-Member State is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Council (Article 32 of the Charter); and (c) a Member State of the United Nations brings a matter to the attention of the Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter (rule 37).<sup>136</sup>

In 2022, with the continued improvement of the situation regarding the COVID-19 pandemic in New York City and the full resumption of Council meetings, restrictions on the participation of non-Council members were progressively removed. During the first months of the year, several aspects of the remote working methods developed during the pandemic related to the participation of non-Council members continued to be implemented. In a letter dated 17 January 2022 addressed to the representatives of the members of the Council, the President of the Council (Norway) outlined the working methods agreed upon by the members for the month.<sup>137</sup> While noting that the presidency planned to hold Council meetings in person in the Council Chamber, the President indicated that non-Council members would continue to be able to participate in open debates through the submission of written statements. In a letter dated 7 March 2022, the President of the Council (United Arab Emirates) further indicated that non-Council members could participate in open debates either in person or through the submission of

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<sup>135</sup> [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 140-141 and [S/2019/993](#).

<sup>136</sup> For more details on the referral of a dispute or situation to the Council by States, see sect. I.A and part VI, sect. I.A.

<sup>137</sup> See [S/2022/32](#).

written statements.<sup>138</sup> Accordingly, Council members continued the practice of having the President of the Council circulate a compilation of statements submitted by interested non-Council members who were not able to participate in person until March 2022 when the practice was discontinued. Despite the restrictions described above, there were no changes to the procedure for extending invitations to Member States to participate in the proceedings of the Council.

Consistent with previous practice, Member States invited under rule 37 continued to speak on occasion in other capacities. For example, at private meetings held on 28 January and 27 May 2022 under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cambodia participated under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure in his capacity as Special Envoy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Chair on Myanmar.<sup>139</sup> In addition, there were several instances of representatives of Member States participating under rule 37 who delivered statements on behalf of groups of states.<sup>140</sup> In 2022, there were several instances of representatives of non-Council members invited in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, who participated in meetings via videoconference.<sup>141</sup>

At two meetings held in 2022, Council members raised issues of concern regarding invitations to Member States pursuant to rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. First, an objection to the extension of an invitation pursuant to rule 37 of the provisional rules of

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<sup>138</sup> See [S/2022/196](#).

<sup>139</sup> See [S/PV.8959](#) and [S/PV.9049](#).

<sup>140</sup> For example, at a meeting held 18 January on 2022, the representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security, the representative of Switzerland spoke on behalf of Human Rights and Conflict Prevention Caucus, the representative of Belgium spoke on behalf of the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and the representative of Denmark spoke on behalf of Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (see [S/PV.8949](#) and [S/PV.8949 \(resumption 1\)](#)). At a meeting held on 19 July 2022, the representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict and the representative of Botswana spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect (see [S/PV.9096](#)). At a meeting held on 28 October 2022, the representative of Pakistan spoke on behalf of the State members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the representative of Saudi Arabia spoke on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the representative of Azerbaijan spoke on behalf of the 120 member states of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see [S/PV.9174](#) and [S/PV.9174 \(resumption 1\)](#)).

<sup>141</sup> The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cambodia at meetings held on 28 January and 27 May 2022 under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar” (see [S/PV.8959](#) and [S/PV.9049](#)); the President of Ukraine at a meeting held on 5 April 2022 under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))” (see [S/PV.9011](#)); and the President of Ukraine at meetings held on 28 June, 24 August, 27 September and 23 November 2022 under the item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine” (see [S/PV.9080](#), [S/PV.9115](#), [S/PV.9138](#) and [S/PV.9202](#)).



procedure led to a procedural vote on one occasion. At the meeting held on 24 August under the item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed his delegation’s objection to the participation of the President of Ukraine in the meeting via videoconference.<sup>142</sup> Speaking ahead of the procedural vote, the representative clarified that his delegation was not opposing the participation of the President of Ukraine or his representative, but underlined that such participation had to be in person in the Council Chamber, in accordance with the rules that governed the work of the Council. While noting that the President of Ukraine had already spoken to the Council twice via videoconference in 2022, instances which were described as exceptions by certain other Council members, the representative stated that, while a precedent was not set after one or two times, a third time was no longer an exception. He further noted that the meeting was announced a week in advance and that the President of Ukraine had the opportunity to travel to New York. In response, the President of the Council, while agreeing that virtual participation under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure should be an exception in the post-COVID-19-pandemic situation, reiterated that the justification for the exception in the case remained unchanged from the previous times when the Council agreed that the President of Ukraine could address the Council via videoconference. He added that when a fully military attack on Ukraine was ongoing, the Council could not reasonably demand that the President of Ukraine travel to New York. The proposal to invite the President of Ukraine to participate in the meeting was put to a vote and adopted by majority.<sup>143</sup>

Secondly, at a meeting held on 31 October under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” and in relation to the diversion of Ryanair Flight FR-4978 over Belarus airspace, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed his delegation’s surprise and disappointment at the decision of the President of the Council to allow representatives of several States of the European Union to participate in the meeting, as they had no connection with the agenda item.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> See [S/PV.9115](#).

<sup>143</sup> *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States; *against*: Russian Federation; *abstaining*: China.

<sup>144</sup> See [S/PV.9175](#).

In 2022, Member States continued to submit communications raising issues of concern regarding invitations pursuant to rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. In a letter dated 5 April 2022, addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the Russian Federation protested the decision of the President of the Council (United Kingdom) to grant the participation of the President of the Ukraine under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure via videoconference at a meeting on Ukraine held on the same day under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))”.<sup>145</sup> The representative stated that this ran contrary to established practice and ignored the principle that all Member States invited to address the Council should do so in person. In a letter dated 11 April 2022 addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of the United Kingdom recalled that the presidency of the Council had explained in advance the exceptional nature of the approach to allow the President of Ukraine to participate via videoconference, on the basis that he was unable to travel to New York given the circumstances in Ukraine, which was in line with precedent and for which there was broad support in the Council.<sup>146</sup>

In a letter dated 29 June 2022, the representative of the Russian Federation once again objected to the participation of the President of Ukraine via videoconference at a meeting held on 28 June, which he maintained ran counter to established practice.<sup>147</sup> The representative further noted that similar requests for participation via videoconference from other Member States had been declined by previous presidencies and that the presidency of Albania had denied such participation for at least one other Member State. He added that such an approach by the presidency demonstrated that it had exploited its prerogatives in a biased manner. In a letter dated 18 July 2022, the representative of Albania recalled that the presidency had clearly specified that the participation of the President of Ukraine via videoconference was an exceptional case that would not constitute a precedent.<sup>148</sup> Moreover, he added that granting the President the possibility to remotely address the Council, when his country remained under invitation, could not, by any reasonable standard, be called biased or selective, considering that the presidency had not received any request from any other country under similar circumstances.

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<sup>145</sup> See [S/2022/292](#). See also [S/PV.9011](#).

<sup>146</sup> See [S/2022/309](#).

<sup>147</sup> See [S/2022/528](#). See also [S/PV.9080](#).

<sup>148</sup> See [S/2022/565](#).

The representative further recalled that, before taking such a decision, the presidency consulted across the Council and found wide support for the proposal.

In a letter dated 15 August 2022, the representative of Pakistan stated that, in relation to the briefing of the Council held on 9 August under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, his delegation, not being a member of the Council, did not have an opportunity to participate and, considering that the item was of vital interest to Pakistan, was submitting its comments for circulation as an annex.<sup>149</sup> In a letter dated 21 October 2022, the representative of Lithuania, transmitting a joint statement by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Czechia in connection with the Council briefing held on the same day under the item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, expressed the delegation’s disappointment with the decision of the President of the Council to reverse its previously communicated decision to allow Lithuania to participate and deliver a statement.<sup>150</sup>

Furthermore, during the period under review, a number of Member States requested the circulation of their own individual or joint statements with other Member States in connection with meetings in which they did not participate. The majority of these meetings were held in the briefing format under items related to Ukraine.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> See [S/2022/620](#) and [S/PV.9108](#).

<sup>150</sup> See [S/2022/790](#) and [S/PV.9161](#).

<sup>151</sup> For example, in separate letters dated 7 March 2022 addressed to the President of the Council, the representatives of eight Member States submitted their statements in connection with a briefing held on 7 March under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” concerning the humanitarian situation in Ukraine in which they did not participate (see [S/2022/185](#), [S/2022/187](#), [S/2022/188](#), [S/2022/189](#), [S/2022/190](#) and [S/2022/195](#)). See also [S/2022/127](#), [S/2022/138](#), [S/2022/153](#), [S/2022/165](#), [S/2022/166](#), [S/2022/184](#), [S/2022/241](#), [S/2022/242](#), [S/2022/245](#), [S/2022/273](#), [S/2022/289](#), [S/2022/290](#), [S/2022/305](#), [S/2022/306](#), [S/2022/311](#), [S/2022/615](#), [S/2022/640](#), [S/2022/717](#), [S/2022/790](#) and [S/2022/792](#). In another example, in letters dated 14 March 2022, the representatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, jointly, as well as Romania and Slovakia, individually, transmitted their statements in relation to the Council’s meeting held on the same day under the item entitled “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe” (See [S/2022/221](#), [S/2022/224](#) and [S/2022/228](#)). In letters dated 19 and 20 May 2022, the representatives of Slovakia and Georgia, respectively, transmitted statements in relation to the open debate of the Council held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” in which they did not participate (See [S/2022/407](#) and [S/2022/408](#)). In a letter dated 28 June 2022, the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines transmitted a statement in relation to the Council’s annual open debate on its working methods held on the same day under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” in which she did not participate ([S/2022/519](#)).

## **B. Invitations extended under rule 39**

In accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, members of the Secretariat or other persons may be invited to supply the Council with information or give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

Following previous practice, an invitation under rule 39 was extended to a representative of a Member State, on an exceptional basis, if his or her participation was in a role other than that of a representative of a State, for example, as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.<sup>152</sup>


In 2022, a total of 445 invitations were extended under rule 39 in comparison with 354 in 2021 and 304 in 2020 (see figure IV).

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<sup>152</sup> For example, at meetings held on 7 and 27 July, 8 August and 12 October 2022, respectively under the items entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa” (see [S/PV.9086](#)), “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace” (see [S/PV.9101](#)), “Peace and security in Africa” (see [S/PV.9106](#)) and “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))” (see [S/PV.9151](#)), the representatives of Bangladesh briefed Council members in their capacity as the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.

**Figure IV**

**Invitations under rule 39, 2013-2022**




Of the 445 invitees under rule 39, a total of 242 were men and 203 were women. As shown in figure V, in recent years, both the total number and percentage of female speakers invited to Council meetings under rule 39 had increased, with the latter being 45.6 per cent in 2022 compared to 43.8 per cent in 2021. Moreover, in 2022, as part of their monthly working methods commitments, several presidencies of the Council continued to place specific emphasis on ensuring the participation of women briefers in the meetings of the Council.<sup>153</sup>

<sup>153</sup> For more information on the monthly working methods commitments of Council presidencies, see sect. V above.

**Figure V**

**Invitations under rule 39, 2013-2022**




For the purposes of this part of the *Repertoire*, invitations extended under rule 39 are classified according to four main categories, namely:<sup>154</sup> (a) officials of the United Nations system; (b) invitees from international organizations other than the United Nations; (c) officials representing regional intergovernmental organizations; and (d) representatives of other entities such as non-governmental and civil society organizations. As shown in figure VI, invitations under rule 39 were most often extended to officials of the United Nations system and non-governmental and civil society organizations. The number of civil society representatives increased from 86 in 2021 to 89 in 2022, which was the highest number of invitees recorded in this category. In terms of sex-disaggregated data for each category, of the 272 invitations to United Nations officials, 150 (55 per cent) were extended to men and 122 (45 per cent) to women. Of the 70 invitations to officials representing regional intergovernmental organizations,

<sup>154</sup> In earlier Supplements, separate categories were used for invitees of the Secretariat and Council subsidiary bodies and those representing other United Nations organs, subsidiary bodies or agencies. Since the *Repertoire Supplement 2016-2017*, these two categories have been subsumed under the category “United Nations system”.

58 (83 per cent) were extended to men and 12 (17 per cent) to women. Of the 14 invitations to international organizations other than the United Nations, 10 (71 per cent) were extended to men and four (29 per cent) to women. Finally, of the 89 representatives of other entities such as non-governmental organizations and civil society, 24 (27 per cent) were extended to men and 65 (or 73 per cent) to women.

**Figure VI**  
**Breakdown of rule 39 invitations by category, 2013-2022**



In 2022, there were no changes to the procedure for extending invitations under rule 39 to participate in meetings of the Council. There were also no instances wherein an invitation extended to participate in a Council meeting was put to a vote.

Nevertheless, invitations under rule 39 were discussed in several communications submitted to the Council. In a letter dated 29 June 2022 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the Russian Federation objected to the choice of a civil society

briefers by the Council presidency (Albania) at a meeting held on the Syrian Arab Republic on the same day.<sup>155</sup> The representative stated that it was unacceptable that the briefer used foul language, insulted Member States and addressed unfounded accusations, adding that this “actor-like” behaviour did not contribute to the discussion. He concluded that this was a clear indication of the need to reconsider the approach to the question of the presence of civil society representatives at Council meetings in order to exclude such incidents. In a letter dated 18 July 2022, the representative of Albania acknowledged the concern of the delegation of the Russian Federation regarding the inappropriate tone and language used by the civil society briefer on 29 June and underlined the need for everyone to respect the decorum of the Council.<sup>156</sup> He added that his delegation strongly supported the free and unimpeded participation of representatives of civil society in the work of the Council, as it enriched its deliberations and common efforts to advance and preserve international peace and security.

During the period under review, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission submitted written advice in response to the invitation by the President of the Council to do so under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure in connection with a number of meetings held in connection with regional and thematic items.<sup>157</sup>

### **C. Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39**

During the period under review, the Council extended several invitations not expressly under rule 37 or rule 39 (see table 9).

Invitations to representatives of the Holy See and the State of Palestine to participate in meetings of the Council were routinely extended “in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard”, without specification of any rules.

**Table 9**

#### **Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39**

<i>Invitee</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>
	<a href="#">S/PV.8953</a> , 25 January 2022	Protection of civilians in armed conflict

<sup>155</sup> See [S/2022/528](#). See also [S/PV.9083](#).

<sup>156</sup> See [S/2022/565](#).

<sup>157</sup> For further information in relation with the Peacebuilding Commission, see part IX, sect. VII.



Holy See	<a href="#">S/PV.9042</a> , 25 May 2022	
	<a href="#">S/PV.9016</a> , 13 April 2022	Women and peace and security
	<a href="#">S/PV.9099</a> , 26 July 2022	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine	<a href="#">S/PV.8973</a> , 23 February 2022	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question
	<a href="#">S/PV.9021</a> , 25 April 2022	
	<a href="#">S/PV.9046</a> , 26 May 2022	
	<a href="#">S/PV.9099</a> , 26 July 2022	
	<a href="#">S/PV.9107</a> , 8 August 2022	
	<a href="#">S/PV.9174</a> , 28 October 22	
Palestine	<a href="#">S/PV.9042</a> , 25 May 2022	Protection of civilians in armed conflict
	<a href="#">S/PV.9052</a> , 2 June 2022	Maintenance of international peace and security
	<a href="#">S/PV.9096</a> , 19 July 2022	Children and armed conflict

#### **D. Discussions relating to participation**

During the period under review, when non-members of the Council were invited to participate in a meeting, Council members generally spoke before Member States invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure and before those not expressly invited under any rule, except on some occasions when parties directly involved in the matter under consideration took the floor before Council members.<sup>158</sup> The practice of the Council with regard to invitees under rule 39 was less consistent and the order of speakers depended on whether or not they were participating to brief the Council. In 2022, matters concerning participation in Council meetings were raised in meetings of the Council.

For example, at a meeting held on 28 February under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed disappointment that the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) declined to participate in the meeting, even though the Council extended an invitation to him, and expressed regret that he was unable to find time to schedule a briefing to the Council, which was the second time this had happened following May 2021.<sup>159</sup> At a meeting held on 20 July under the same item, the representative of the Russian Federation said that his delegation expected to see the Director-General of OPCW among the briefers and hoped that he would find an opportunity to address the members of the Council at the next meeting.<sup>160</sup>

<sup>158</sup> For more information on the order of speaking see sect. VI above.

<sup>159</sup> See [S/PV.9272](#).

<sup>160</sup> See [S/PV.9097](#).

At a meeting held on 11 May under the item entitled “The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed reservations regarding the participation of Mr. Christian Schmidt in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, as his delegation did not consider him to be the legitimate High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>161</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation asserted that Mr. Schmidt’s appointment was not approved by the Council and highlighted that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was on the Council’s agenda under Chapter VII of the Charter. He further underscored that Mr. Schmidt did not have the right to speak on behalf of the international community or to submit documents to the Council, and that there was no basis for inviting him to meetings of the Council as High Representative, as his presence in the Chamber in that capacity undermined the authority of the Council and of the United Nations in general. The representative of the Russian Federation added, however, that the Council had a practice that allowed individuals to brief the Council in their personal capacity to determine whether their further participation was required, which was how the Russian Federation viewed Mr. Schmidt’s presence at the meeting in question. Similarly, the representative of China stated that, in the light of the fact that the appointment of Mr. Schmidt had not been endorsed by the Council, his delegation believed that it was inappropriate for him to brief the Council in the capacity as High Representative.

Participation in Council meetings was also discussed in greater detail during the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council held on 28 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” (see case 5).

## Case 5

### **Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))**

At a meeting held on 28 June at the initiative of Albania, which held the presidency of the Council for the month and whose Permanent Representative held the Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions in 2022,<sup>162</sup> the Council convened an open debate on its working methods under the item entitled “Implementation of the

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<sup>161</sup> See [S/PV.9029](#).

<sup>162</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 21 June 2022 ([S/2022/499](#)).

Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” and sub-item entitled “Working methods of the Security Council”.<sup>163</sup> In their statements, participants discussed the importance and modalities of participation in Council meetings, with a focus on the wider membership and civil society representatives.

Members and non-members of the Council widely agreed on the need to ensure the participation of the United Nations wider membership in Council meetings. Speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, the representative of Switzerland argued that the Council should return to a more inclusive approach on the acceptance of requests for participation under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure. The representative of Liechtenstein stated that there should be timely and regular opportunities to address the Council under rule 37. The representative of Germany stated that Council presidencies should, to the greatest extent possible, give affected countries the opportunity to participate in meetings, in accordance with rule 37 and in line with paragraph 74 of the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)).<sup>164</sup> He added that artificially limiting the number of participants in Council meetings would seriously undermine the Council’s inclusivity and legitimacy. The representative of Slovakia echoed this view and called for interaction and dialogue between the Council and other Member States, particularly those directly concerned and affected by a specific situation, which needed to be further enhanced and widened through a continued thorough application of rule 37. The representative of Cyprus suggested that establishing an informal channel through the presidency of the Council could help account for the perspective of Member States primarily involved in a situation under discussion and that such States could be invited to offer their perspectives in closed consultations before the Council began its closed deliberations.

Specifically regarding participation in different formats of Council meetings, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that even though it was essential to limit the length of statements given during open debates to ensure that all Member States had an equal opportunity to speak, restricting the right of States concerned in an agenda item to express their positions during meetings thwarted their ability to present their national perspectives and respond to concerns raised. The representative of Guatemala stated that the continuation of the practice of

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<sup>163</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#) and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>164</sup> See [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

open debates was conducive to the greater participation of non-Council members.<sup>165</sup> The representative of Algeria opined that ensuring open debates were held in a virtual format would allow for the broadest possible participation of Member States.<sup>166</sup> The representative of Bahrain opined that the regular meetings on the working methods of the Council were of importance to all Member States and made it possible to review the progress and developments made in adapting them to continual changes.<sup>167</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation reiterated her delegation's support for discussing the working methods of the Council in an open format with the participation of all interested Member States, which was an opportunity to increase Council's coordination with a broad number of them.

Speakers also reflected on the participation of briefers under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, particularly representatives of civil society. The representative of Ireland, speaking on behalf of the elected members of the Council, stated that Council presidencies should strive for gender balance and diversity when selecting briefers. The representative of France called for more to be done to achieve parity for women and young people at Council meetings. Moreover, participants called for more civil society representatives as briefers in Council meetings,<sup>168</sup> including female briefers and youth representatives.<sup>169</sup> The representative of Malta called on the Council to ensure that civil society and non-governmental organizations were given adequate space to make their voices heard, as they had a crucial role to play in providing a clear and factual picture of the situation on the ground. The representative of Germany expressed concern over cases in which civil society briefers had faced threats after making statements in the Council. He underlined the importance of civil society briefers being able to speak openly in the Council and that all forms of pressure on them should be countered. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that participation of representatives of civil society and non-governmental organizations should bring added value to the Council's work and that they should benefit the Council with their experience with the subject matter. He added that their participation should in no way constitute an attack on or offend any Member State, promote biased points of view, or convey a false or non-objective picture of the situation

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<sup>165</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).

<sup>166</sup> See [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>167</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).

<sup>168</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#), China, Luxembourg, Republic of Korea and Liechtenstein; and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Italy.

<sup>169</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#), Republic of Korea and Malta.

discussed. In a similar vein, the representative of China encouraged Council presidencies to strengthen the screening process during the selection of civil society briefers to ensure that they were truly well-informed on the topics discussed and that their positions were objective and impartial in order to facilitate the discussions of the Council and search for solutions.<sup>170</sup> The representative of Indonesia stated that as conflict became more regionalized, the Council should ensure the inclusion of regional and subregional organizations in discussions related to their region. He emphasized that regional organizations could help mend fractured relationships between United Nations missions and their respective host countries by bridging the two and constructively responding to the situation on the ground.

Several participants also emphasized the importance of in-person participation in Council meetings. The representative of Luxembourg strongly encouraged the Council to ensure that all Member States and all relevant stakeholders were involved, with a particular focus on the participation of civil society representatives in Council meetings and underlined the importance of in-person participation of Member States and observer States in open meetings of the Council. The representative of Liechtenstein stated that the Council should prioritize in-person access for all States and civil society. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that there was no alternative to in-person discussions and personal interaction of Council Members.

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<sup>170</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).

## VIII. Decision-making and voting

### Note

Section VIII covers the practice of the Council with regard to decision-making, including voting. Article 27 of the Charter and rule 40 of the provisional rules of procedure govern the voting in the Council. They provide that decisions on procedural matters require an affirmative vote of nine of the 15 Council members, while decisions on substantive matters require an affirmative vote of nine Council members, including all of the permanent members.

This section also covers rules 31, 32, 34 to 36 and 38 of the provisional rules of procedure, which govern the conduct of business with regard to voting on draft resolutions, amendments and substantive motions.

### *Article 27*

- 1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.*
- 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.*
- 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.*

### *Rule 31*

*Proposed resolutions, amendments and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing.*

### *Rule 32*

*Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission.*

*Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.*

*Rule 34*

*It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.*

*Rule 35*

*A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.*

*If the motion or draft resolution has been seconded, the representative on the Security Council who has seconded it may require that it be put to the vote as his motion or draft resolution with the same right of precedence as if the original mover had not withdrawn it.*

*Rule 36*

*If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original*

*proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds to or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.*

*Rule 38*

*Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council.*

*Rule 40*

*Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.*

This section comprises five subsections, namely: A. Decisions of the Council; B. Penholdership and sponsorship in accordance with rule 38; C. Decision-making by voting; D. Decision-making without a vote; and E. Discussions concerning the decision-making process.

In 2022, rule 31 of the provisional rules of procedure was routinely applied in Council meetings. There were no instances of motions or amendments requiring voting, withdrawal of draft resolutions or requests for separate voting on parts of a draft resolutions. Consequently, there were no instances of explicit invocation of rules 32, 34 and 36. Nonetheless, there were instances of competing draft resolutions submitted, which were voted upon in their order of submission pursuant to rule 32, as described in section A below.



## **A. Decisions of the Council**

During the period under review, the Council continued to adopt resolutions and statements by the President of the Council at its meetings, in addition to making procedural decisions. Decisions of the Council also took the form of notes by the President and letters from the President, which were not adopted at meetings and were issued as official documents of the Council.


In 2022, the Council adopted a total of 54 resolutions and issued seven presidential statements. The Council also issued 18 notes by the President and 27 letters from the President. The number of letters from the President issued in 2022 constituted a significant decrease with respect to the 170 and 242 letters issued in 2021 and 2020, respectively. The decrease of the number of letters from the President issued in 2022 is largely explained by the progressive return to the working methods existing prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, namely, the return to the practice of adopting resolutions at in-person meetings thereby ending the use of the written voting procedure and the return to in-person meetings thereby reducing the compilations of written statements submitted by interested non-Council members who were unable to participate in person.<sup>171</sup> Figure VII shows the total number of resolutions and presidential statements adopted and notes and letters from the President issued during the past decade (2013-2022).

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<sup>171</sup> For more information on the written voting procedures and compilations of written statements, see *Repertoire* supplements 2020 and 2021, part II, sect. I. For more information on the compilations of written statements in 2022, see sect. I.E above.

**Figure VII**

**Resolutions and statements adopted and notes by and letters from the President issued, 2013-2022**



*Multiple decisions in one meeting*

During 2022, the Council continued the standard practice of adopting a single decision in a meeting with one exception. At a meeting held on 20 December under the item entitled “The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions [2666 \(2022\)](#) and [2667 \(2022\)](#).<sup>172</sup> There was also one instance when more than one draft resolution was put to a vote at a single meeting. At a meeting held on 8 July under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the Council failed to adopt a draft resolution submitted by Ireland and Norway, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.<sup>173</sup> A second draft resolution, submitted by the Russian Federation, was not adopted having failed to obtain the required number of votes.<sup>174</sup>

<sup>172</sup> See [S/PV.9226](#).

<sup>173</sup> See [S/PV.9087](#). See also [S/2022/538](#).

<sup>174</sup> See [S/2022/541](#).

## **B. Penholdership and sponsorship in accordance with rule 38**

A draft resolution may be submitted by any member of the Council. The note by the President dated 30 August 2017 provides that the members of the Council support, where appropriate, the informal arrangement whereby one or more Council members, as penholder(s), initiate and chair the informal drafting process.<sup>175</sup> In accordance with the note, any member of the Council may be a penholder and more than one Council member may act as co-penholders, when it is deemed to add value, taking into account as appropriate the expertise and/or contributions of Council members on the subject. In the note, Council members reaffirmed that all members of the Council should be allowed to participate fully in the preparation of, inter alia, resolutions, presidential statements and press statements of the Council and that the drafting of all documents such as resolutions and presidential statements and press statements should be carried out in an inclusive manner that would allow participation of all members of the Council. The members of the Council also encouraged the penholder or co-penholders, depending on the subject as well as the urgency of the situation on the ground, to provide reasonably sufficient time for consideration by all Council members when draft resolutions, presidential statements and press statements of the Council were placed under a silence procedure. In 2022, while the majority of decisions of the Council continued to be drafted by some permanent members, 14 out of 53 resolutions (26.4 per cent) were drafted or co-drafted by one or more elected members of.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> See [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 78- 82.

<sup>176</sup> For example, draft resolution [S/2022/147](#) submitted by Mexico was adopted as resolution [2622 \(2022\)](#) in connection with agenda item “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” on 25 February 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/160](#) submitted by Albania and the United States was adopted as resolution [2623 \(2022\)](#) in connection with agenda item “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))” on 27 February 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/237](#) submitted by Norway was adopted as resolution [2626 \(2022\)](#) in connection with agenda item “The situation in Afghanistan” on 17 March 2022; draft resolution [S/2022/62](#) submitted by Ghana and Norway in connection with the item “Peace and security in Africa” was adopted as resolution [2634 \(2022\)](#) on 31 May 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/501](#) submitted by Gabon was adopted as resolution [2637 \(2022\)](#) in connection with the agenda item “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals” on 22 June 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/546](#) submitted by Ireland and Norway was adopted as resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#) in connection with the agenda item “The situation in the Middle East” on 12 July 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/560](#) submitted by Mexico and the United States was adopted as resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#) in connection with the agenda item “The question concerning Haiti” on 15 July 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/650](#) submitted by France and Mexico was adopted as resolution [2649 \(2022\)](#) in connection with the agenda item “The situation in Mali” on 30 August 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/765](#) submitted by Mexico and the United States was adopted as resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) in

Pursuant to rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure, any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with rule 37 or in application of Article 32 of the Charter to participate in the discussions of the Council may also submit proposals and draft resolutions, but proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a Council member. Those Member States that submit a draft resolution become sponsors of the draft resolution. A draft resolution is described as a presidential text if all the Council members agree to be co-sponsors. In 2022, no presidential text was tabled, compared with six in 2021 and one in 2020.<sup>177</sup>

During the period under review, the Council considered a total of 60 draft resolutions, five of which were co-sponsored by non-members of the Council, as shown in table 10.

**Table 10**

**Draft resolutions co-sponsored by non-members of the Council, 2022**

<i>Draft resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Council member sponsors</i>	<i>Non-Council member co-sponsors</i>
<a href="#">S/2022/62</a>	Peace and security in Africa	<a href="#">S/PV.9050</a> 31 May 2022	Resolution <a href="#">2634 (2022)</a>	8 Council members (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Norway, United States)	30 Member States <sup>a</sup>
<a href="#">S/2022/155</a>	Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations	<a href="#">S/PV.8979</a> 25 February 2022	Not adopted due to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council	5 Council members (Albania, France, Ireland, United Kingdom, United States)	77 Member States <sup>b</sup>

connection with the agenda item “The question concerning Haiti” on 21 October 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/804](#) submitted by Mexico and the United Kingdom was adopted as resolution [2655 \(2022\)](#) in connection with the agenda item “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))” on 27 October 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/809](#) submitted by Ireland in connection with the item “The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” was adopted as resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#) on 2 November 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/881](#) submitted by Mexico was adopted as resolution [2663 \(2022\)](#) in connection with the agenda item “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” on 30 November 2022; the draft resolution [S/2022/925](#) submitted by Ireland and the United States in connection with the item “General issues relating to sanctions” was adopted as resolution [2664 \(2022\)](#) on 9 December 2022; and draft resolution [S/2022/977](#) submitted by Mexico in connection with the item “United Nations peacekeeping operations” was adopted as resolution [2668 \(2022\)](#) on 21 December 2022.

<sup>177</sup> For more information on past practice concerning presidential texts, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009 to Supplement 2021*, part II, sect. VIII. B.

<i>Draft resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Council member sponsors</i>	<i>Non-Council member co-sponsors</i>
	addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)				
<a href="#">S/2022/231</a>	Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)	<a href="#">S/PV.9002</a> 23 March 2022	Not adopted due to an insufficient number of affirmative votes	Russian Federation	Three Member States (Belarus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Syrian Arab Republic)
<a href="#">S/2022/718</a>	Maintenance of international peace and security	<a href="#">S/PV.9140</a> 29 September 2022	Resolution <a href="#">2652 (2022)</a>	Four Council members (Albania, France, Ireland, Norway)	25 Member States <sup>c</sup>
<a href="#">S/2022/925</a>	General issues relating to sanctions measures	<a href="#">S/PV.9214</a> 9 December 2022	Resolution <a href="#">2664 (2022)</a>	Six Council members (Albania, Brazil, France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, United States)	46 Member States <sup>d</sup>
<a href="#">S/2022/977</a>	United Nations peacekeeping operations	<a href="#">S/PV.9229</a> 21 December 2022	Resolution <a href="#">2668 (2022)</a>	Seven Council members (Albania, Gabon, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates)	45 Member States <sup>e</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Angola, Benin, Chad, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Gambia, Guinea, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo and Tunisia.

<sup>b</sup> Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and Ukraine.

<sup>c</sup> Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

<sup>d</sup> Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary,

Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine.

<sup>c</sup> Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and Türkiye.

### **C. Decision-making by voting**

According to Article 27 (2) and (3) of the Charter, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine Council members. On all other matters, that is, substantive or non-procedural matters, an affirmative vote of nine Council members is required, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.

The result of a vote in the Council often does not in itself indicate whether the Council considers the matter voted upon to be procedural or substantive. For example, whether a vote is procedural or not, cannot be determined when a proposal is: (a) adopted by a unanimous vote; (b) adopted by an affirmative vote of all permanent members; or (c) not adopted, having failed to obtain the nine affirmative votes required. When a proposal is adopted, having obtained nine or more affirmative votes, with one or more permanent members casting a negative vote, that indicates that the vote is considered procedural. Conversely, if the proposal is not adopted, the matter voted upon is considered to be substantive. On certain occasions, in its early years, the Council found it necessary to decide, by vote, the question of whether the matter under consideration was procedural within the meaning of Article 27 (2). This procedure is known as the “preliminary question”, after the language used in the San Francisco Statement on Voting Procedure. In recent years, including during the period under review, however, there have been no instances of the Council deciding to examine the preliminary question. Furthermore, procedural motions, such as the adoption of the agenda, the extension of invitations to participate in meetings, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting, have generally been decided upon by the Council without a vote. When such motions were voted upon, the vote was considered procedural.

In 2022, procedural matters were put to a vote on two occasions, compared with none in 2021 and one in 2020. At a meeting of the Council held on 31 January under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, further to an objection raised, Council members

held a procedural vote and adopted the provisional agenda.<sup>178</sup> At a meeting held on 24 August under the item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, further to an objection raised, Council members voted on whether to extend an invitation under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure to the President of Ukraine, and adopted the proposal.<sup>179</sup>

Additionally, at a meeting held on 27 February, the Council adopted resolution [2623 \(2022\)](#) deciding to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly to examine the question concerning “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))”.<sup>180</sup> Pursuant to General Assembly resolution [377\(V\) A](#), the Council adopted the resolution, with 11 votes in favour and three abstentions despite the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council, taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the meeting held on 25 February had prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>181</sup>

#### *Adoption of resolutions*

During the period under review, 36 out of 54 (66.7 per cent) of resolutions were adopted unanimously, compared to 48 out of 57 (84.2 per cent) in 2021 and 44 out of 57 (77.2 per cent) in 2020. A total of 18 resolutions were adopted without a unanimous vote (see table 11).

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<sup>178</sup> See [S/PV.8960](#). For further details on the discussion, see sect. I.C above and part I., sect. 34.

<sup>179</sup> See [S/PV.9115](#). For further details on the discussion, see sect. VII.A above.

<sup>180</sup> See [S/PV.8980](#). For more information, see part IV, sect. I.C. The Council had previously adopted a total of seven resolutions calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly, the last of which was adopted as resolution [500 \(1982\)](#) on 28 January 1982 (See [S/PV.2330](#)). For more information, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1981-1984*, chapter VI, part I, sect. B.

<sup>181</sup> At the meeting held on 25 February, the Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have decided “that the Russian Federation [should] immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” (see [S/2022/155](#)). The vote on the draft resolution was as follows: *for*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, United States 11 votes in favour, *against*: Russian Federation; *abstain*: China, India, United Arab Emirates. It failed to be adopted due to the negative vote of a permanent member (see [S/PV.8979](#)).

**Table 11**

**Resolutions adopted without a unanimous vote, 2022**

<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
<a href="#">2623 (2022)</a>	Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2014/136</a> ) <sup>a</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.8980</a> 27 February 2022	11 (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, United States)	1 (Russian Federation) <sup>182</sup>	3 (China, India, United Arab Emirates)
<a href="#">2624 (2022)</a>	The situation in the Middle East <sup>b</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.8981</a> 28 February 2022	11 (Albania, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		4 (Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Norway)
<a href="#">2625 (2022)</a>	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan <sup>c</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.8994</a> 15 March 2022	13 (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		2 (China, Russian Federation)
<a href="#">2626 (2022)</a>	The situation in Afghanistan <sup>d</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.8997</a> 17 March 2022	14 (Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		1 (Russian Federation)
<a href="#">2633 (2022)</a>	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan <sup>c</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9045</a> 26 May 2022	10 (Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America)		5 (China, Gabon, India, Kenya, Russian Federation)
<a href="#">2635 (2022)</a>	The situation in Libya <sup>e</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9053</a> 3 June 2022	14 (Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya,		1 (Russian Federation)

<sup>182</sup> At a meeting held on 27 February 2022, the Council adopted resolution [2623 \(2022\)](#), calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly to examine the question concerning the situation in Ukraine. The resolution was adopted despite the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.



<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
			Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		
<a href="#">2637 (2022)</a>	International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals <sup>f</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9072</a> 22 June 2022	13 (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		1 (Russian Federation)
<a href="#">2640 (2022)</a>	The situation in Mali <sup>g</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9082</a> 29 June 2022	13 (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		2 (China, Russian Federation)
<a href="#">2641 (2022)</a>	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo <sup>h</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9084</a> 30 June 2022	10 (Albania, Brazil, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		5 (China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Russian Federation)
<a href="#">2642 (2022)</a>	The situation in the Middle East <sup>b</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9089</a> 12 July 2022	12 (Albania, Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates)		3 (France, United Kingdom, United States)
<a href="#">2647 (2022)</a>	The situation in Libya <sup>e</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9103</a> 28 July 2022	12 (Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		3 (Gabon, Ghana, Kenya)
<a href="#">2648 (2022)</a>	The situation in the Central African Republic <sup>i</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9105</a> 29 July 2022	10 (Albania, Brazil, France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		5 (China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Russian Federation)
<a href="#">2654 (2022)</a>	The situation concerning Western Sahara <sup>j</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9168</a> 27 October 2022	13 (Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America)		2 (Kenya, Russian Federation)
<a href="#">2657 (2022)</a>	The situation in Somalia <sup>k</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9177</a>	14 (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland,		1 (China)

<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
<a href="#">2659</a> <a href="#">(2022)</a>	The situation in the Central African Republic <sup>i</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9190</a> 31 October 2022 14 November 2022	Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States) 12 (Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		3 (China, Gabon, Russian Federation)
<a href="#">2662</a> <a href="#">(2022)</a>	The situation in Somalia <sup>k</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9196</a> 17 November 2022	11 (Albania, Brazil, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		4 (China, Gabon, Ghana, Russian Federation)
<a href="#">2664</a> <a href="#">(2022)</a>	General issues relating to sanctions <sup>l</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9214</a> 9 December 2022	14 (Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America)		1 (India)
<a href="#">2669</a> <a href="#">(2022)</a>	The situation in Myanmar <sup>m</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9231</a> 21 December 2022	12 (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)		3 (China, India, Russian Federation)

<sup>a</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 19.A.

<sup>b</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 20.

<sup>c</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 7.

<sup>d</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 14.

<sup>e</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 10.

<sup>f</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 25.

<sup>g</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 11.

<sup>h</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 4.

<sup>i</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 5.

<sup>j</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 1.

<sup>k</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 2.

<sup>l</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 28.

<sup>m</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 15.

### *Draft resolutions not adopted*

According to Article 27 (3) of the Charter, a draft resolution on non-procedural matters is not adopted when it fails to obtain the nine affirmative votes required, or when a negative vote is cast by a permanent member. During the period under review, there were three instances in which a draft resolution was not adopted because it failed to obtain the nine affirmative votes

required, compared to one instance in 2021 and four instances in 2020. Furthermore, there were four instances when a draft resolution was not adopted owing to a negative vote cast by one or more permanent member, compared to one instance in 2021 and three instances in 2020 (see table 12).

**Table 12**

**Draft resolutions not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member or for lack of the requisite number of votes, 2022**

<i>Draft resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstention</i>
<a href="#">S/2022/155</a>	Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2014/136</a> ) <sup>a</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.8979</a> 25 February 2022	11 (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Kingdom, United States)	1 (Russian Federation)	3 (China, India, United Arab Emirates)
<a href="#">S/2022/231</a>	Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2014/264</a> ) <sup>b</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9002</a> 23 March 2022	2 (China, Russian Federation)	None	13 (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)
<a href="#">S/2022/431</a>	Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea <sup>c</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9048</a> 26 May 2022	13 (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States)	2 (China, Russian Federation)	None
<a href="#">S/2022/538</a>	The situation in the Middle East <sup>d</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9087</a> 8 July 2022	13 (Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico,	1 (Russian Federation)	1 (China)

<a href="#">S/2022/541</a>	The situation in the Middle East <sup>d</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9087</a> 8 July 2022	Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States) 2 (China, Russian Federation)	3 (France, United Kingdom, United States)	10 (Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates)
<a href="#">S/2022/720</a>	Maintenance of international peace and security of Ukraine <sup>e</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9143</a> 30 September 2022	10 (Albania, France, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America)	1 (Russian Federation)	4 (Brazil, China, Gabon, India)
<a href="#">S/2022/821</a>	Threats to international peace and security <sup>f</sup>	<a href="#">S/PV.9180</a> 2 November 2022	2 (China, Russian Federation)	3 (France, United Kingdom, United States)	10 (Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates)

<sup>a</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 19.B.

<sup>b</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 19.A.

<sup>c</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 32.

<sup>d</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 20.

<sup>e</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 19.C.

<sup>f</sup> For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 34.

#### D. Decision-making without a vote

A procedural or substantive motion may be adopted in the Council without a vote or by consensus. In 2022, there was one instance of a resolution being adopted without a vote.<sup>183</sup> At a meeting held on 22 June under the agenda item entitled “Date of election to fill a vacancy in the International Court of Justice”,<sup>184</sup> the Council adopted resolution [2638 \(2022\)](#) without a vote and by consensus, by which it decided that the election to fill the vacancy in the Court would take place on 4 November 2022, at a meeting of the Council and at a meeting of the General Assembly at its seventy-seventh session.

<sup>183</sup> See resolutions [2638 \(2022\)](#).

<sup>184</sup> See [S/PV.9073](#).

Presidential statements continued to be adopted by consensus. A total of seven presidential statements were adopted during the period under review.<sup>185</sup>

Following past practice, during the period under review, notes and letters from the President were adopted by consensus and issued as official documents of the Council. In 2022, the Council issued 18 notes and 27 letters from the President.<sup>186</sup>

Notes and letters from the President are rarely adopted during Council meetings. During the period under review, consistent with past practice, one note by the President, concerning the adoption of the draft annual report of the Council to the General Assembly for the period from 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021, was adopted during a meeting of the Council, in line with past practice.<sup>187</sup>

### **E. Discussions concerning the decision-making process**

Council members discussed issues pertaining to the decision-making process of the Council in several meetings. For example, at a meeting held on 26 May under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the Council adopted resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#) by which it extended the sanctions measures on South Sudan.<sup>188</sup> The resolution submitted by the United States was adopted with 10 votes in favour, none against and five abstentions.<sup>189</sup> In explaining the decision of her delegation to abstain in the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret that the penholder of the draft resolution ignored the views, not only of South Sudan, but also the agreed position of African countries and the views of other Council members, including the Russian Federation. She added that there was an increasing number of questions regarding the working methods of penholders

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<sup>185</sup> For the complete list of presidential statements adopted during the period under review, see part I, chap. II of the report of the Council to the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly ([A/77/2](#)).

<sup>186</sup> For the complete list of notes by the President of the Council issued in 2022, see part I, chap. 13 of the report of the Council to the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly ([A/77/2](#)) and [www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/notes-president-2022](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/notes-president-2022). For the complete list of letters from the President of the Council issued in 2022, see part I, chap. III, of the report of the Council to the General Assembly ([A/77/2](#)) and [www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/letters-exchanged-between-secretary-general-and-president-security-council-2022](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/letters-exchanged-between-secretary-general-and-president-security-council-2022).

<sup>187</sup> See [S/2022/403](#), adopted at a meeting held on 20 May 2022 (see [S/PV.9037](#)). For more information on annual report of the Council to the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.F.

<sup>188</sup> See [S/PV.9045](#).

<sup>189</sup> See [S/2022/417](#).

and reminded Council members that the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)) stipulated that penholders had to provide their colleagues with the opportunity to participate fully in the drafting of resolutions and conduct consultations in a spirit of openness and flexibility. In a similar vein, the representative of China, highlighting that the responsibility of the penholder was to help the Council come up with a text that had the broadest possible consensus, expressed regret that the fairness and inclusiveness that a penholder should demonstrate were absent.

At a meeting held on the same day under the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, the Council voted on a draft resolution submitted by the United States, which would have condemned in the strongest terms the intercontinental ballistic missile launch conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and decided on additional sanctions measures specified in resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#).<sup>190</sup> The draft resolution received 13 votes in favour and two votes against, and was not adopted owing to the negative votes of two permanent members of the Council.<sup>191</sup> Following the vote, the representative of Ireland, regretting the use of veto to block Council action, noted that her frustration was shared by wider United Nations membership as demonstrated by the consensus adoption of the “veto initiative” resolution [76/262](#) by the General Assembly and looked forward to the swift issuance of a special report by the Council. The representative of Norway called on the Secretariat to produce a report in consultation with the Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural questions. The representative of France, deeply deploring the result of the voting, said that the use of the veto amounted to protecting the North Korean regime and giving it a blank cheque to launch even more weapons. The representative of the United States stated that the text of draft resolution had been circulated for nine weeks and in that time, the countries that vetoed the draft resolution had refused to engage on it. She further remarked that the Council had a remarkable record of consensus and collective action on the issue by unanimously responding to the provocations with resolutions that imposed sanctions and brought collective condemnation. The representative of Japan, deeply regretting the result of the voting, said that despite the destabilizing nuclear and missile activities that gravely threatened the peace and security of the

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<sup>190</sup> See [S/2022/431](#).

<sup>191</sup> See [S/PV.9048](#). *In favour*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America; *Against*: China, Russian Federation. For more information, see part I. sect. 32.C.

region and beyond, there had not been Council resolutions adopted as a result of these activities. Nonetheless, he emphasized that the veto did not negate the need for the strict implementation of the existing Council resolutions that continued to be in effect. The representative of China stated that if the United States had accepted the proposals of China and some other members of the Council, the situation could easily have been averted. He also said that solving the issue of the Korean peninsula did not hinge on whether or not the Council adopted a new draft resolution. In response, the representative of the United States said that the draft resolution failed because of the veto of China and the Russian Federation and that, despite some discussion over several days about a proposal for a presidential statement submitted by China, the United States delegation never saw any draft of that proposal. She further stated that when pressed, China said that the only acceptable provision was to update the weapons-control list, which the Council already had authorization to do pursuant to previous resolutions.

At a meeting held on 22 June under the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”, the representative of the Central African Republic, in line with paragraphs 78 and 79 of the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)), raised the question as to whether, in order to better address priorities and situations in Africa, in particular the Central African Republic and the subregion, it would be advisable for the penholder to be one of the three African members of the Council or the country concerned.<sup>192</sup>

At a meeting held on 27 June under the item entitled “The situation in Libya”, the representative of Libya expressed reservations regarding the procedure for the adoption of draft resolutions and presidential statements.<sup>193</sup> In that regard, he stated that the Council failed to take into account the position of the State concerned because Council members and penholders were not obliged to include the State concerned in their consultations or discussions and that his delegation was only consulted informally.

At a meeting held on 13 September under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the representative of China, highlighting the impact of sanctions measures imposed by the Council on the ability of the Government of the Sudan to maintain stability and protect civilians in Darfur, expressed regret that the Council was not able to set benchmarks to adjust the sanctions before 31 August as required by the relevant

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<sup>192</sup> See [S/PV.9074](#).

<sup>193</sup> See [S/PV.9078](#).

resolutions.<sup>194</sup> He urged the penholder to fulfil its responsibilities, resume consultations and spare no effort to achieve consensus. He further noted that the Government of the Sudan had stated its position on the benchmarks which deserved a positive response from the penholder and other Council members. The representative of India emphasized that the Council's ongoing deliberations on the benchmarks should consider the complex interplay of local factors without resorting to an overly prescriptive approach and welcomed the decision of the penholders to keep a decision on sanctions benchmarks in abeyance, which kept the Council united on a sensitive issue. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed her delegation's disappointment by the decision of the penholder to end work on the Council document on benchmarks for the lifting of the arms embargo which it opined was an irresponsible approach by which the Council sabotaged its own decisions on the review of the Sudanese sanctions for the second year in a row.

At a meeting held on 11 October under the item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security", in connection with the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, the representative of Kenya stated that more could be done to make the Council inclusive and responsive to Africa through reforms of its working methods, including penholdership which needed to change in response to African responsibility, knowledge and ownership.<sup>195</sup> He added that this would bring extra life to the Chapter VIII linkage to the African Union. The representative of China, calling for increased cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, affirmed that the Council should support more African members serving as penholders on African issues.

Council members and the wider membership also discussed issues pertaining to the decision-making of the Council, penholdership and the use of the veto by permanent members at the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council held on 28 June under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))" (see case 6) and a meeting held on 14 December under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" (see case 7).

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<sup>194</sup> See [S/PV.9129](#).

<sup>195</sup> See [S/PV.9149](#).



## Case 6

### Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))

On 28 June, at the initiative of Albania, which held the presidency of the Council for the month and whose representative held the Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions in 2022,<sup>196</sup> the Council convened an open debate on its working methods under the item entitled “Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))” and sub-item entitled “Working methods of the Security Council”.<sup>197</sup> As part of the discussion, members and non-members of the Council exchanged views on how to increase inclusivity and transparency in the decision-making of the Council, including the practice of penholdership and consultations with affected countries, as well as the use of the veto by permanent members.

With regard to inclusivity, multiple delegations called for a more equal division of responsibilities between permanent and elected members of the Council and the need for more elected members to serve as penholders and co-penholders on Council decisions and outcomes.<sup>198</sup> In that regard, the representative of the Russian Federation recalled that, in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#)), any Council member could be a penholder and that more than one Council member could act as co-penholder.<sup>199</sup> According to the representative, revisiting the issue of informal penholdership would help improve the effectiveness of the Council. The representative of China stated that penholdership was an informal arrangement that was supposed to reflect shared responsibility and collective engagement. He advocated for a systematic restructuring of the arrangement whereby, as a general principle, there should be two or three co-penholders per topic, to be shared between permanent and elected members. The representative of the Central African Republic maintained that having one or a very limited number of penholding countries resulted in decisions that were imposed unilaterally and served the national agenda of penholders, instead

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<sup>196</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 21 June 2022 ([S/2022/499](#)).

<sup>197</sup> [S/PV.9079](#) and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#). See also [S/2022/842](#).

<sup>198</sup> [S/PV.9079](#), Ireland (on behalf of the elected members of the Council), China, Republic of Korea, Poland, Liechtenstein, Costa Rica, Thailand, Singapore, Kuwait, Portugal; and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Italy and Central African Republic.

<sup>199</sup> [S/PV.9079](#).

of addressing the reality on the ground and helping to find solutions.<sup>200</sup> Underscoring that it was critical for the Council's tasks and responsibilities to be distributed democratically, the representative of the Sudan was of the view that the reform of penholdership was but an actualization of the principle of the sovereign equality of Member States. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that penholding was a flexible practice that supported consistency.<sup>201</sup> Echoing the need for a fair distribution of responsibilities between elected and permanent members of the Council, the representative of Brazil, who also spoke on behalf of India, opined that the process for the distribution of penholdership had to be open, transparent, based on exhaustive consultation and with a more integrated perspective.

More broadly, speakers also called for greater inclusivity and transparency in the Council's decision-making, both among Council members and vis-à-vis the wider membership. For example, the representative of Poland stated that elected members of the Council could play a key role in the decision-making process, making it more transparent and effective. The representative of the Central African Republic stated that all Council members should have the same opportunities to participate fully and meaningfully in the drafting of Council documents on an equal and equitable footing.<sup>202</sup> He added that, with regard to African affairs, special attention had to be paid to the views of the three African members of the Council. The representative of Ireland stated that the chairs of sanctions committees should be more involved in the initial consultations on sanctions renewals led by the penholders.<sup>203</sup>

Multiple delegations further stressed that the views and concerns of countries on the Council's agenda had to be taken into consideration in the preparation of Council decisions.<sup>204</sup> The representative of China stated that penholders should engage closely with the countries concerned, Council members and the competent departments of the Secretariat to maximise consensus and avoid confrontation.<sup>205</sup> The representative of Cuba called for an elimination of exclusive practices to ensure a genuine participation and democratization of the work of the Council, including in decision-making processes. He further stated that the Council had to ensure

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<sup>200</sup> [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>201</sup> [S/PV.9079](#).

<sup>202</sup> [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>203</sup> [S/PV.9079](#).

<sup>204</sup> [S/PV.9079](#), Russian Federation, China and Cuba; and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt, Central African Republic, Libya and Sudan.

<sup>205</sup> [S/PV.9079](#)

that States directly involved or particularly affected could participate in discussions and decision-making in accordance with Article 31 of the Charter. The representative of Libya called for proper consultation by penholders with the countries concerned and for their views to be reflected in the draft resolutions related to them.<sup>206</sup> The representative of the Central African Republic stated that the lack of consultations with countries on the Council's agenda during the drafting of Council documents by penholders had a negative impact on efforts to resolve crises and implement the mandates of United Nations missions. The representative of Indonesia stated that the process of involving troop- and police-contributing countries should not be a mere formality, but an important avenue for the Council to hear their views.<sup>207</sup> He called upon the Council to consider their concerns and use their inputs in the drafting of peacekeeping mandates.

Several speakers discussed the use of the veto in the Council's decision-making, with some delegations calling for limitations or restraints in its use,<sup>208</sup> particularly in cases of mass atrocities.<sup>209</sup> In that regard, speakers encouraged all Member States, but particularly permanent Council members, to join the French and Mexican initiative for the voluntary and collective suspension of the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities and the Code of Conduct regarding Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group.<sup>210</sup> The representative of France opined that permanent members had to use the veto sensibly and that the threat of using the veto at any time as a negotiating tool was unacceptable.<sup>211</sup> While calling upon the members of the Council to fulfil all obligations to enable the Council to discharge its responsibilities, the representative of Switzerland, speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group, recalled that Article 27 of the Charter limited the participation of Council members that were directly involved in a dispute in decisions relating to the peaceful settlement thereof. Conversely, the representative of the Russian Federation underscored that the issue of the veto did not pertain to working methods of the Council, but was rather the linchpin of the entire architecture of the

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<sup>206</sup> [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>207</sup> [S/PV.9079](#).

<sup>208</sup> Ireland, Republic of Korea and Cuba.

<sup>209</sup> [S/PV.9079](#), Ireland, Morocco and Malta; and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Italy and Germany.

<sup>210</sup> [S/PV.9079](#), France, Switzerland (on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group), Luxembourg (on behalf of the Benelux countries), Austria, Singapore, Morocco, Kuwait, Portugal, Malta and Slovenia; and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Italy, Slovakia and Germany.

<sup>211</sup> [S/PV.9079](#).

Council and key to achieving balance in its decisions and ensuring that they had a good chance of being implemented as effectively as possible.<sup>212</sup>

Many delegations welcomed the adoption of General Assembly resolution [76/262 \(2022\)](#), mandating a General Assembly meeting following the casting of a veto by a permanent Council member.<sup>213</sup> Some described the resolution as an important mechanism for ensuring accountability and transparency in the use of the veto.<sup>214</sup> The representative of the United States stated that the resolution provided an opportunity for those casting a veto to explain themselves and for Member States to react to its use. The representative of Singapore opined that permanent members should explain the consistency of their decision to use the veto with the Charter and international law. The representative of Liechtenstein stressed that the special reports of the Council to the General Assembly submitted pursuant to resolution [76/262 \(2022\)](#) should provide a more substantive analysis of the reasons for each veto cast and that the records of relevant Council meetings should be produced as expeditiously as possible to allow for a timely scheduling of the General Assembly meeting. The representative of Portugal encouraged the Council to enclose a special report in its next annual report to the Assembly, together with a summary of the debate in the General Assembly in accordance with resolution [76/262 \(2022\)](#). The representative of Guatemala requested the Council and the Secretariat to include the verbatim records of the meetings during which vetoes were cast in the special report.

## Case 7

### Maintenance of international peace and security

On 14 December, at the initiative of India which held the presidency of the Council for the month,<sup>215</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and sub-item entitled “New orientation for reformed

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<sup>212</sup> For more information on the adoption of General Assembly resolution [76/262](#) and the special reports from the Council to the Assembly submitted pursuant to it, see part IV, sect. I.F.

<sup>213</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#), United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland (on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group), Luxembourg (on behalf of the Benelux countries), Republic of Korea, Poland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Austria, Morocco and Kuwait; and [S/PV.9079 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Italy, Slovakia and Germany. For more information, see part IV, sect. I.C.

<sup>214</sup> [S/PV.9079](#), United Kingdom, Switzerland (on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group), Peru and Slovenia.

<sup>215</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 25 November 2022 ([S/2022/880](#)).

multilateralism”.<sup>216</sup> In their statements, members and non-members of the Council discussed the impact of the use of the veto on the ability of the Council to implement its mandate to maintain international peace and security. Speakers also exchanged views on how to improve inclusivity and transparency in the Council’s decision-making and the practice of penholdership.

A number of delegations expressed the view that the use of the veto prevented the Council from implementing its mandate and taking action to maintain international peace and security, with several delegations noting that the Council’s non-adoption of a decision on the conflict in Ukraine was a clear example in that regard.<sup>217</sup> The representative of Estonia stated that any permanent member that exercised the veto to defend its own acts of aggression against another Member State most seriously undermined the credibility of the Charter, the United Nations and the entire multilateral international rules-based system.<sup>218</sup> The representative of the European Union stated that Council members had to fulfil the highest standards of conduct by upholding international law, including international humanitarian law. He added that, for permanent members of the Council, it meant refraining from using the veto when there was a risk of mass atrocity crimes and not abusing the veto power when they were party to a conflict. The representative of Liechtenstein underscored the need to ensure that the right of the veto was no longer exercised in a way that was at odds with the purposes and principles of the Charter and expressed interest in examining the application of Article 27 (3) of the Charter, whereby parties to a dispute had to abstain from voting. The representative of Ireland expressed the view that the veto was an anachronism that prevented the Council from implementing its mandate and allowed aggressors to evade responsibility.<sup>219</sup>

Multiple speakers exchanged views on how to restrict and ensure accountability for the use of the veto. In that regard, delegations expressed support for the French and Mexican initiative for the voluntary suspension of the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities,<sup>220</sup> as well as for the Code of Conduct regarding Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity

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<sup>216</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#) and [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>217</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#), Ireland; and [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Italy, Liechtenstein, Spain, Australia, Lithuania, Georgia and Ukraine.

<sup>218</sup> See [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>219</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#).

<sup>220</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#), Brazil, France, Albania and Japan; [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Austria, Ecuador, Malta, European Union, Latvia and Lebanon.

or war crimes of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group.<sup>221</sup> The representative of France explained that, being of a voluntary nature, the French and Mexican initiative did not require a revision of the Charter, but only the political commitment by the permanent members of the Council.<sup>222</sup> Having led this initiative at the General Assembly, the representative of Liechtenstein stated that resolution [76/262](#) was an essential step towards addressing the challenges that the use of the veto posed to the effectiveness of the Council and the public perception of the United Nations as a whole.<sup>223</sup> While agreeing with the general intention behind initiatives such as the French and Mexican initiative, the representative of Brazil stated that the veto was an expression of the great divide that stalled the Council rather than the main reason why the organ had become ineffective.<sup>224</sup> Moreover, he added that a veto was cast only after diplomacy and dialogue had not prospered.

More generally on the reform of the Council, the representative of Pakistan stated that it would not serve the purpose of the United Nations to add more members to the elitist club and expand the power of the veto, as it would multiply the possibility of paralysis in the Council. Similarly, the representative of Liechtenstein was of the view that adding more members to those who held the veto power was counterintuitive, given the vast negative impact that the use of the veto already had on the effectiveness of the Council and its decision-making.<sup>225</sup> The representative of Egypt stated that Council reform and the redress of historical injustices imposed on Africa could only be achieved through the “Ezulwini Consensus,” which called for, inter alia, abolishing the right of veto or granting it to new permanent members of the Council.

Speakers also highlighted the need to improve the working methods of the Council, particularly with respect to decision-making and the practice of penholdership. The representative of China called for a systematic change to the penholder system.<sup>226</sup> According to the representative, through the creation of co-penholderships, jointly held and regularly rotated among permanent and elected members, the voices of small and medium-sized countries could be enhanced. The representative of Ecuador reaffirmed that elected members should work to

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<sup>221</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#), Albania and Norway; and [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Switzerland (on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group), Austria, Estonia, Ecuador, European Union, Liechtenstein, Latvia and Lebanon.

<sup>222</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#).

<sup>223</sup> See [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>224</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#).

<sup>225</sup> [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>226</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#).

achieve a fair distribution of responsibilities with regard to the subsidiary bodies and penholdership.<sup>227</sup> The representative of Kenya stated that, while existing penholders often did a commendable job, a strong perception that they used the pen to sustain the history of its use to pursue national interests was almost inevitable, even when that was not the case.<sup>228</sup> He stated that the immediate reform to address that issue was to ensure that all penholders were sensitive to that reality and that existing penholders should be subjected to a review by Council members. Moreover, he urged for one of the three African members of the Council, or the collective, to serve as penholders on all new files from Africa, which he opined would enable the drafting of mandates and statements which were more in keeping with the required solutions and which would enjoy greater confidence among African members and their citizens. The representative of Norway expressed support for the request of the African members of the Council to be penholders or co-penholders on African dossiers and encouraged them, as well as all elected members of the Council, to approach relevant permanent members for a more active role on files that concerned them, and the permanent members to welcome that constructively.

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<sup>227</sup> See [S/PV.9220 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>228</sup> See [S/PV.9220](#).

## **IX. Languages**

### **Note**

Section IX covers rules 41 to 47 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, which relate to the official and working languages of the Council, interpretation and the languages of meeting records and published resolutions and decisions.

#### *Rule 41*

*Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be both the official and the working languages of the Security Council.*

#### *Rule 42*

*Speeches made in any of the six languages of the Security Council shall be interpreted into the other five languages.*

#### *Rule 43*

*[Deleted]*

#### *Rule 44*

*Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the languages of the Security Council. In this case, he shall himself provide for interpretation into one of those languages.*



*Interpretation into the other languages of the Security Council by the interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.*

*Rule 45*

*Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the languages of the Council.*

*Rule 46*

*All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the languages of the Security Council.*

*Rule 47*

*Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides, be published in any language other than the languages of the Council.*

During the period under review, rules 41 to 47 were applied consistently in meetings of the Council. At several meetings, speakers delivered their statements in a language other than the six official languages of the United Nations, as provided in rule 44.<sup>229</sup> The matter of working

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<sup>229</sup> For example, at a meeting held on 5 April under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)”, the President of Ukraine spoke in Ukrainian and the interpretation was provided by the delegation of Ukraine (see S/PV.9011). At meetings held on 28 June, 24 August, 27 September and 23 November under the item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine”, the President of Ukraine spoke in Ukrainian and the interpretation was provided by the delegation of Ukraine (see S/PV.9080, S/PV.9115, S/PV.9138 and S/PV.9202). At a meeting held on 11 May 2022 under the item entitled “The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina spoke in Bosnian and the interpretation was provided by the delegation

languages of the Council was addressed in meetings and communication submitted to the Council.

For example, at a meeting held on 20 May under the item entitled “Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly”, the representative of France, as the drafter of the introduction to the annual report on the activities of the Council in 2021, emphasized the importance of multilingualism which, he noted, suffered greatly during the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>230</sup> He added that it was essential to ensure that all the work of the Council, including its subsidiary bodies and Arria-formula meetings, benefited from interpretation into the six official languages of the United Nations.

At a meeting held on 28 June under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”, the representative of France, expressing the view that there were too many Arria-formula meetings and that they were sometimes misused, encouraged the Council to find a way to limit the number of meetings in the format and ensure that they were genuinely inclusive by providing interpretation.<sup>231</sup>

In a letter dated 29 December 2022 to the President of the Council, the representatives of India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico and Norway, as elected members of the Council in 2021 and 2022, transmitted a note on the working methods developed by the Council during the COVID-19.<sup>232</sup> In that regard, they expressed the view that upholding multilingualism during this period was a significant challenge. While noting that a solution was eventually implemented in August 2020 by using a remote interpretation platform for open videoconferences, in some instances, the platform experienced technical challenges and was not agreed by all Council members for use in closed or informal discussions, which were largely conducted in English only. As part of their recommendations for future consideration by the Council should physical meetings again become impossible, the representatives stressed the need for solutions to be found to ensure multilingualism in line with the note by the President dated 12 July 2021.<sup>233</sup>

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(see [S/PV.9029](#)). At a meeting held on 15 December 2022 under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, a briefer invited under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure spoke in Hindi and the interpretation was provided by the delegation of India which held the presidency of the Council for the month (see [S/PV.9221](#)).

<sup>230</sup> See [S/PV.9037](#).

<sup>231</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).

<sup>232</sup> See [S/2022/1011](#).

<sup>233</sup> See [S/2021/648](#).

In a letter dated 20 December 2022 from the Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting the report on the Committee's activities from 1 January to 31 December 2022, the Chair noted that, owing to the lack of interpretation services, the members of the Committee agreed, on an exceptional basis, to hold a virtual meeting, in the form of a closed videoconference, on 27 May.<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>234</sup> See [S/2022/995](#). For more information on the Committee, see part VII, sect. III.A and part IX, sect. I.B.1(a).

## X. Status of the provisional rules of procedure

### Note

Section X covers the deliberations of the Council concerning its provisional rules of procedure. Article 30 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Since its adoption by the Council at its first meeting held on 17 January 1946, the provisional rules of procedure have been amended 11 times, with the last amendment adopted in 1982.<sup>235</sup> On 27 December 2019, the Council issued a note by the President providing that, in line with the efforts of the United Nations and its Member States to promote the advancement of women and greater gender inclusivity and equality in their policies and practices, the members of the Council confirmed, as a matter of existing practice, that any reference to a male person in the Council's provisional rules of procedure was deemed not to be limited to male persons and also constituted a reference to a female person, unless the context clearly indicated otherwise.<sup>236</sup>

### *Article 30*

*The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.*

During the period under review, the question of the status of the provisional rules of procedure, including in connection with Article 30 of the Charter, was raised at the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council, held on 28 June under the item entitled

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<sup>235</sup> The provisional rules of procedure of the Council were amended 11 times between 1946 and 1982: five times during the Council's first year at its 31st, 41st, 42nd, 44th and 48th meetings on 9 April, 16 and 17 May, and 6 and 24 June 1946; twice in its second year, at the 138th and 222nd meetings, on 4 June and 9 December 1947; and at its 468th meeting on 28 February 1950; 1463rd meeting, on 24 January 1969; 1761st meeting, on 17 January 1974; and 2410th meeting, on 21 December 1982. Previous versions of the provisional rules were issued under the symbols [S/96](#) and [S/96/Add.1](#), with subsequent versions being issued as revisions, the latest of which was issued under the symbol [S/96/Rev.7](#).

<sup>236</sup> [S/2019/996](#).

“Implementation of the Note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”.<sup>237</sup> In his remarks, the representative of Thailand pointed out that while the Council’s provisional rules of procedure allowed the Council flexibility in its work, adopting permanent rules of procedure would bring about greater predictability and transparency. He suggested that, with various amendments and a number of documents supplementing its working methods, the Council could better function with standing rules in place. The representative of Cuba called on the Council to adopt its rules of procedures to put an end to the provisional status that its rules had had since the establishment of the organ.

In a letter dated 25 January 2022, transmitting her reflections as the Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG) in 2020 and 2021, the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stated that the Council should consider the issue of the status of virtual meetings and the application of the provisional rules of procedure therein and further build on the provisions of the note by the President dated 22 December 2021.<sup>238</sup> In a letter dated 29 December 2022 to the President of the Council, the representatives of India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico and Norway, as elected members of the Council in 2021 and 2022, transmitted a note providing their reflections and recommendations on the working methods developed by the Council during the COVID-19 pandemic. They noted that the Council’s provisional rules of procedure were not applied in videoconferences and that, therefore, procedural voting in virtual meetings was not possible. In that regard, they recommended that the Council should agree parameters for virtual meetings to be considered as formal meetings of the Council and agree to apply the provisional rules of procedure, even when meeting virtually, to the fullest extent possible, including the possibility of undertaking procedural votes.<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> See [S/PV.9079](#).

<sup>238</sup> See [S/2022/88](#). See also [S/2021/1074](#).

<sup>239</sup> See [S/2022/1011](#).