

"4. *Calls upon* all countries receiving mercenaries who have participated in the armed attacks against the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take appropriate measures to prevent them from renewing their activities against any State;

"5. *Calls upon* all Member States to co-operate with the Security Council in the implementation of this resolution;

"6. *Decides* that the Security Council should remain seized of the question and requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution."

SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (I)

INITIAL PROCEEDINGS

By letter ²⁴⁶ dated 23 May 1967, the representatives of Canada and Denmark requested that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be convened to consider "the extremely grave situation in the Middle East which is threatening international peace and security". Referring to the warning of the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council of 19 May 1967,²⁴⁷ that the current situation in the Near East "is more disturbing, indeed . . . more menacing, than at any time since the fall of 1956", the representatives concluded that the time had come for the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

At the 1341st meeting of the Security Council on 24 May 1967, the Security Council had before it a provisional agenda which contained the following item:

²⁴⁶ S/7902, O.R., 22nd yr., *Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967*, pp. 118-119.

²⁴⁷ S/7896, O.R., 22nd yr., *ibid.*, pp. 109-113. In this report, the Secretary-General stated that in his considered opinion, the prevailing state of affairs in the Near East as regards relations between the Arab States and Israel, and among the Arab States themselves, was extremely menacing. There had been a steady deterioration along the line between Israel and Syria. El Fatah activities consisting of terrorism were a major factor, since they provoked strong reactions in Israel by the Government and population alike. Bellicose official and non-official utterances reported by the press and radio were more or less routine on both sides of the lines in the Near East. There had been further persistent reports about troop movements on the Israel side of the Syrian border. The Israel Government, however, very recently had assured the Secretary-General that no military action would be initiated by its armed forces unless such action was first taken by the other side. The decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to terminate its consent for the continued presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on United Arab Republic controlled territory in Gaza and its decision to move its troops up to the line had eliminated the buffer function which the Force has been performing. The operation of the Force was based entirely on its acceptance by the governing authority on the territory on which it operated, and that was not in any sense related to Chapter VII of the Charter. Neither the United Nations Emergency Force nor any other United Nations peace-keeping operation thus far undertaken would have been permitted to enter the territory if there had been any suggestion that it had the right to remain there against the will of the governing authority. Since the announcement of the decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic with regard to the Force, tension in the area had mounted, troop movements on both sides had been observed, and the confrontation along the line between the armed forces of the two countries quickly began to reappear. Unless there was very great restraint on both sides of the line, a series of local clashes across the line, that could easily escalate into heavy conflict, could be envisaged.

"Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902)."

Following a procedural discussion on the convening of the meeting, the agenda was adopted.²⁴⁸

The question was considered by the Security Council at its 1341st and 1342nd meetings on 24 July 1967; at its 1343rd to 1361st meetings between 29 May to 14 June 1967 and at its 1365th and 1366th meetings on 8 and 9 July 1967.

The following representatives were invited to take part in the discussion during the period ending with the 1366th meeting, the invitations being renewed at each of the subsequent meetings: at the 1341st meeting, the representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic; at the 1343rd meeting, the representatives of Jordan and Syria; at the 1344th meeting, the representative of Lebanon; at the 1345th meeting, the representatives of Iraq and Morocco; at the 1346th meeting, the representatives of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; at the 1348th meeting, the representatives of Tunisia and Libya; at the 1360th meeting, the representative of Pakistan; and at the 1366th meeting, the representative of Algeria.²⁴⁹

Decision of 24 May 1967 (1342nd meeting): *Statement by the President: Adjournment of the meeting*

At the 1341st meeting, the representative of Denmark stated that since the beginning of the withdrawal of the UNEF, the situation along the borders between Israel and the United Arab Republic had been constantly deteriorating at an alarming speed. There had been a military build-up along the borders of Israel and the United Arab Republic and the stage had been set for a military clash. Only two days ago, the President of the United Arab Republic declared that Israel ships and other ships carrying cargoes to Israel would be barred from the Straits of Tiran, whereas the Israel Government had also stressed that it would consider such a move as an attack. It would have been preferable to defer any action by the Council until it had received the Secretary-General's report on his current efforts to bring about an easing of the tension. However, the Secretary-General's mission alone could not relieve the Council of any of its primary responsibilities. For those reasons, the Government of Denmark had considered it necessary, together with the Government of Canada, to ask for an urgent meeting of the Security Council. Their only concern had been the preservation of peace in that area.²⁵⁰

At the 1342nd meeting on 24 May 1967, the representative of the United States said that the Security Council should call upon all States to avoid any action which might exacerbate the tense situation which had prevailed when the Secretary-General had departed on his mission. The obligation of the parties was to ensure that there was

²⁴⁸ 1341st meeting (PV), p. 36. See in chapter I, Case 3.

²⁴⁹ 1341st meeting (PV), p. 36;
1343rd meeting (PV), pp. 2-6;
1344th meeting (S/PV), pp. 3-5;
1345th meeting (S/PV), p. 2;
1346th meeting (PV), pp. 3-5;
1348th meeting (PV), pp. 2-5;
1360th meeting (PV), p. 17;
1366th meeting (PV), pp. 3-5.

²⁵⁰ 1341st meeting (PV), pp. 37-42.

no interference with existing international rights long enjoyed and exercised in the area by many nations.²⁵¹

The representative of Japan expressed the view that the confrontations existing in the area must not be permitted to escalate into armed conflict. The utmost restraint was essential not only with regard to land borders and air space, but also with regard to the waterways.²⁵²

At the same meeting, the representative of Canada introduced a draft resolution²⁵³ jointly submitted with Denmark, under which the Council would: (1) express full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to pacify the situation; (2) request all Member States to refrain from any steps which might worsen the situation; and (3) invite the Secretary-General to report to the Council upon his return to enable the Council to continue its consideration of the matter.

The representative of France observed that for the time being, the Council must limit itself to addressing an appeal to the parties to refrain from any initiatives which might threaten peace. If the appeal was heeded, and taking into account the position of the Powers which bore the main responsibility for peace in the world, the Council would then be able to consider the means by which it could contribute to the peaceful solution of the dispute.²⁵⁴

The representative of the United Kingdom maintained that the Security Council would have to deal with the following questions: how could tensions be relieved and immediate dangers of conflict be removed; how could the rights of free passage through the Strait of Tiran be guaranteed and assured; how could effective United Nations measures and machinery to keep the peace and prevent conflict in the area best be worked out for the future; and what new measures and additional action could be taken to prevent such dangers to the peace from recurring in future years.²⁵⁵

The representative of the United Arab Republic expressed the view that the draft resolution which had been introduced by the representatives of Canada and Denmark was an attempt to sabotage the mission of the Secretary-General.²⁵⁶

The representative of Israel* stated that massive troop concentrations had been built up in the Sinai peninsula, along the southern borders of Israel wherefrom the United Nations Emergency Force had been peremptorily evicted. All these steps were part of an over-all plan, the design of which was unfolding. It was approaching in the threats of President Nasser to interfere with shipping in the Straits of Tiran at the entrance of Aqaba. Before the Secretary-General had an opportunity to meet the President, it had been reported from Cairo that it had been decided to initiate operational measures to interfere with the freedom of navigation in the international waterway, the Straits of Tiran. The action of Egypt constituted a challenge of utmost gravity not only to Israel but also to the whole international community.²⁵⁷

The United States representative requested a short recess of the meeting for immediate consultations between himself and certain other members of the Council.²⁵⁸

After the suspension of the meeting, the representative of the United States stated that it was his understanding that the President (China) had suggested that the best procedure might be to adjourn the meeting for prompt, informal consultations among the members and that the members would be asked to hold themselves available to the Council, in view of the seriousness of the situation for an early further meeting the time of which would be announced after appropriate consultations.²⁵⁹

Subsequent to a brief discussion, the representative of Canada proposed that the Council should adopt the suggestion of the President.²⁶⁰

The President proposed that the meeting be adjourned until further notice.²⁶¹

By letter²⁶² dated 27 May 1967, the permanent representative of the United Arab Republic requested that the following item be included in the Council's agenda of which the Security Council was presently seized:

"Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security."

In the letter, he cited a few instances of continued Israel aggressive policy. He requested the Council that necessary steps be taken to consider the above item urgently because it had indicated "the dangerous situation which has been brought about by Israel's continued violation of the United Nations Charter and the General Armistice Agreements, thus threatening international peace and security".

By letter²⁶³ dated 29 May 1967, the permanent representative of the United Kingdom requested that the Secretary-General's report²⁶⁴ of 26 May 1967 be included in the Council's provisional agenda.

²⁵⁸ 1342nd meeting (PV), pp. 52-55.

²⁵⁹ 1342nd meeting (PV), p. 56.

²⁶⁰ 1342nd meeting (PV), p. 61.

²⁶¹ 1342nd meeting (PV), p. 61.

²⁶² S/7907, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for April-June 1967*, pp. 124-125.

²⁶³ S/7910, *Ibid.*, p. 125.

²⁶⁴ S/7906, *Ibid.*, pp. 120-124. In the report, the Secretary-General stated that the decision of the United Arab Republic to restrict shipping in the Strait of Tiran had created a new situation. Free passage through the Strait was one of the questions which the Government of Israel considered most vital to its interests. The position of the Government of the United Arab Republic was that that Strait was territorial waters in which it had the right to control shipping. The Government of Israel contested this position and asserted the right of innocent passage through the Strait. It had further declared that Israel would regard the closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israel flagships and any restriction on cargoes of ships of other flags proceeding to Israel as a *casus belli*. The important immediate fact was that, in view of the conflicting stands taken by the United Arab Republic and Israel, the situation in the Strait of Tiran represented a very serious potential threat to peace. A clash between the United Arab Republic and Israel over this issue, in the present circumstances, would inevitably set off a general conflict in the Near East. Other problems, however, such as sabotage, terrorist activities and rights of cultivation in disputed areas in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria, would, unless controlled, almost surely lead to further serious fighting. In the view of the Secretary-General, a peaceful outcome of the current crisis would depend upon a breathing spell which would allow tension to subside from its present explosive level. He therefore urged all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions

²⁵¹ 1342nd meeting (PV), pp. 6-10.

²⁵² 1342nd meeting (PV), p. 12.

²⁵³ 1342nd meeting (PV), pp. 12-15.

²⁵⁴ S/7905, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for April-June, 1967*, p. 119.

²⁵⁵ 1342nd meeting (PV), p. 21.

²⁵⁶ 1342nd meeting (PV), pp. 37-40.

²⁵⁷ 1342nd meeting (PV), pp. 41-42.

At the 1343rd meeting on 29 May 1967, the Security Council decided²⁶⁵ to adopt the following agenda:

"Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902);

"Complaint of the Representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled 'Israeli aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security' (S/7907); and

"Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910)."

Decision of 6 June 1967 (1348th meeting):

(i) *Calling upon the Governments concerned to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for cessation of all military activities in the area;*

(ii) *Requesting the Secretary-General to keep the Council currently informed on the situation*

At the 1343rd meeting on 29 May 1967, the representative of the United States referred to the appeal of the Secretary-General to the parties concerned contained in his report of 26 May 1966 and stated that the Security Council must find means to liquidate the conflict between the United Arab Republic and Israel as a military one and to defuse the most sensitive area, the Gulf of Aqaba. Therefore, the Council as an interim measure and without extended debate should endorse the Secretary-General's appeal. With respect to the Aqaba area, forgoing belligerence must mean forgoing any blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba during the breathing spell requested by the Secretary-General, and permitting free and innocent passage of all nations and flags through the Strait of Tiran to continue. Furthermore, the Council must address itself in longer-range terms to the three points of tension identified in the Secretary-General's report: the Gulf of Aqaba situation, the confrontation in the Gaza area and on the Syrian-Israel frontier, and the problem of terrorism. Effective steps must also be taken to reaffirm the General Armistice Agreements and to revitalize the Armistice machinery. Quiet diplomacy by the Secretary-General and the Members, the good offices of Member States, the employment of intermediaries, and all the devices provided for in Article 33 of the Charter should further be used.⁶⁶

The representative of the United Arab Republic* stated that on 7 April 1967, a considerable number of Israel jet fighters crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line and penetrated deeply into Syrian territory, as far as the Damascus area, in order to provoke Syria into a full-scale war. On 13 May 1967, the Government of the United Arab Republic had received accurate information that Israel had been concentrating huge armed forces on the Syrian border and had every reason to believe that on 17 May, the Israel authorities had seriously contemplated an attack against Syria. In the discharge of its responsi-

lities and in fulfilment of its sovereign rights, the Government had decided, in co-operation with its Arab allies, to defend the Arab nation by all measures. Since the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force would have conflicted with that decision and also for the sake of the safety of the Force, the Government, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, had requested the Secretary-General to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force. Thus, it had peacefully restored the situation back to what it was before the 1956 aggression against the United Arab Republic. With regard to the Gulf of Aqaba, the representative stated that it had been under continued and uninterrupted Arab domination and sovereignty for over one thousand years. Israel's presence on the Gulf lacked legitimate foundation, as its occupation took place two weeks after the signing of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel in violation of various provisions of the Agreement and decisions of the Security Council. In view of those violations, Israel's possession of the coastal strip did not entitle it to any legal claim to sovereignty. Neither the Armistice Agreement nor the presence of UNEF had changed the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba and consequently they could not affect the United Arab Republic's rights over its territorial waters. The policy to preclude enemy vessels from ingress into and egress from the Gulf had been scrupulously maintained since 1950. There was also established a legal precedent that no innocent passage could be attributed to combatant parties. The Security Council, in considering this problem, should take into account the fact that the unilateral denunciation by Israel of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement was legally invalid and consequently its violation of that Agreement was responsible for the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, threatening peace and security. Accordingly, the Council should call upon Israel to abide by its obligations under the Agreement and instruct the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to reinstate the headquarters of the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission in El Auja within two weeks. The Secretary-General should be requested to report to the Security Council within fifteen days.²⁶⁷

The representative of Argentina pointed out that the main objective of the Security Council should be to avoid a belligerent confrontation by endeavouring to prevent aggression and avoid a breach of the peace or to prevent a threat from becoming action. It must seek a settlement of the question by peaceful means in accordance with international law.⁶⁸

The representative of Brazil pointed out that if anything could be done by the Council, it was to initiate or support all efforts, without taking sides in the confrontation, to prevent further aggravation of the crisis.²⁶⁹

The representative of the United Kingdom observed that the Security Council would not fail to concentrate first and foremost on the vital need for a solution of the problem of the Gulf of Aqaba.²⁷⁰

The representative of Israel* stated that the unfounded charge of alleged Israel troop concentration was the keystone of the Egyptian case for moving its forces against

which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the crisis and to seek solutions (paras. 10, 12-14).

²⁶⁵ 1343rd meetings (PV), p. 2.

²⁶⁶ 1343rd meeting (PV), pp. 8-16, 18-20.

²⁶⁷ 1343rd meeting (PV), pp. 23-25, 27, 40, 42, 46-47.

²⁶⁸ 1343rd meeting (PV), pp. 48-50.

²⁶⁹ 1343rd meeting (PV), p. 56.

²⁷⁰ 1343rd meeting (PV), p. 58.

Israel. On 15 May, his Government had assured the Secretary-General that Israel had not concentrated any troops anywhere and harboured no aggressive designs against any of its Arab neighbours and had requested the Secretary-General to convey these assurances to the Arab Governments concerned. The Secretary-General had acted without delay on that request and added that the facts conveyed to him by Israel had been confirmed by independent inquiries through his representatives in that area. On 16 May, President Nasser had moved against UNEF and deployed heavy Egyptian forces right along the Israel border. In the light of these sudden and threatening moves, the Israel Government was compelled to take limited precautionary measures. While the Secretary-General was en route to Cairo, President Nasser had proclaimed the blockade of the international waterway of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. The position of the Government of Israel remained that every interference with the freedom of navigation in these waters was an offensive action and an act of aggression against Israel, the infringement of the sovereign rights of all nations to the unimpeded use of the international waterway and a gross violation of international law. The eviction of UNEF from its position at the entrance to the Strait at Sharm el Sheikh was not only an act of defiance of the United Nations and a violation of Egypt's pledged word, but was the signal for the revival of belligerence after ten years of tranquillity in the Gulf of Aqaba. The proclaimed policy of belligerence pursued by the Government of the United Arab Republic was the crux of the matter. This was the underlying case for the present and other crisis situation in the Middle East. The two central violations of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement were the denial of free passage in the Suez Canal and in Aqaba. The Israel Government believed that five immediate steps should be taken in the present crisis: all inflammatory statements and threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State should cease; the Charter obligation of non-belligerence must be strictly complied with; the armed forces should be withdrawn from their positions as of the beginning of the month; all forms of armed incursions, acts of sabotage and terrorism should cease and the Governments concerned should take all steps to prevent their territory from being used for these hostile acts; and there should be no interference with any shipping in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. If those steps were taken promptly, the present dangerous tensions would subside.²⁷¹

The representative of Ethiopia maintained that the Council should concentrate its attention on the report and recommendations of the Secretary-General. The first objective at this step should be the avoidance of a conflict and of any steps which could lead to confrontation. With this urgent objective in view and by way of endorsing the efforts of the Secretary-General as outlined in his report, the representative was ready to join in an effort to work out an urgent appeal to all the parties concerned to exercise restraint and to refrain from taking any action which could give rise to confrontation and conflict. The avoidance of all such action would allow the Security Council to proceed with its urgent mission of the preservation of peace in the region.²⁷²

²⁷¹ 1343rd meeting (PV), pp. 66-67, 68, 71-72.

²⁷² 1343rd meeting (PV), p. 81.

The representative of India expressed the view that no State or a group of States should attempt to challenge by force the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic over the Strait of Tiran. A *modus vivendi* was desirable, but any arrangement that was worked out must be within the framework of the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic.²⁷³

At the 1344th meeting on 30 May 1967, the representative of Lebanon* stated that although the Security Council had the primary responsibility for preventing war and maintaining international peace and security, Member States, under Article 51 of the Charter, had the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. The Council had the duty to prevent aggression before it took place and thus preserve the peace.²⁷⁴

The representative of Denmark observed that the discussion seemed to indicate a broad agreement in principle that the Council, in response to the Secretary-General's call for a breathing spell, ought to launch an appeal to the parties for restraint, which should be made. However, only if it were adopted with the greatest possible majority, and preferably unanimously, would it appear as a true expression of the collective will of the United Nations.²⁷⁵

The representative of the United States asserted the legal position of his Government which had consistently been and remained that since there was an Armistice Agreement endorsed by the United Nations which was its principal author, neither side had the right to exercise belligerent rights.²⁷⁶

At the 1345th meeting on 31 May 1967, the representative of Iraq* maintained that the Security Council should consider the real issues which underlied the crisis and without the solution of which there could be no peace in the area. The issues were related to the people of Palestine and to the necessity to reactivate the machinery which the Council had itself established to keep peace in the area.²⁷⁷

The representative of the United States submitted ²⁷⁸ a draft resolution ²⁷⁹ whereby the Security Council, noting that the Secretary-General in his report had expressed the view that "a peaceful outcome to the present crisis would depend upon a breathing spell which would allow tension to subside from its present explosive level", and that he therefore had urged "all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which would increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions" (fourth preambular paragraph), would: (1) call upon all the parties concerned as the first step to comply with the Secretary-General's appeal; (2) encourage the immediate pursuit of international diplomacy in the interest of pacifying the situation and seeking reasonable, peaceful and just solutions; (3) decide to keep the issue under urgent and

²⁷³ 1343rd meeting (PV), p. 86.

²⁷⁴ 1344th meeting (PV), p. 17.

²⁷⁵ 1344th meeting (PV), p. 17.

²⁷⁶ 1344th meeting (PV), p. 58.

²⁷⁷ 1345th meeting (PV), p. 16.

²⁷⁸ 1345th meeting (PV), p. 21.

²⁷⁹ S/7916, *ibid.*, p. 22. See 1346th meeting (PV), p. 6; the statement of the President (Denmark) concerning the revised text of the draft resolution S/7916/Rev.1.

continuous review so that the Council might determine what further steps it might take in the exercise of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of the United States stated that this interim draft resolution took into account the fact that the Council had two types of responsibilities. In addition to its responsibility to avert an imminent clash, it had also the responsibility conferred by Chapter VI of the Charter and described in the Secretary-General's words:²⁸⁰ "... to seek, and eventually to find reasonable, peaceful and just solutions."²⁸¹

At the same meeting, the representative of the United Arab Republic* submitted,²⁸² under rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a draft resolution²⁸³ in accordance with which the Council would: (1) decide that the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement was still valid and reiterate that the United Nations machinery emanating therefrom should be fully operative; (2) call upon the Israel Government to respect and abide by its obligations and responsibilities as stipulated in the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement and to act accordingly; (3) instruct the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO to proceed promptly and reinstitute within two weeks the headquarters of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission at El Auja, wherefrom it had discharged its duties prior to the Israel unilateral action forcing its expulsion from that zone; (4) decide to bolster additional measures necessary for the full implementation of this resolution in the case of non-compliance by the Israel Government with the terms of this resolution; (5) request the Secretary-General to contact the parties to the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement for the immediate implementation of this decision and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days for its approval with regard to additional measures; (6) decide to reconvene to discuss the report of the Secretary-General immediately upon its submission.

At the same meeting, the representative of India said that his delegation would at the appropriate time ask for the vote on the draft resolution submitted by the United Arab Republic under rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.²⁸⁴

At the 1346th meeting on 3 June 1967, the representative of France maintained that the most urgent task of the Security Council was to agree on the terms of an appeal to the parties to abstain during the breathing spell from supporting their claims by a resort to force of whatever nature. This appeal would not be a matter of approving or disapproving the respective positions of the parties as stated in the Council, but only of searching for means which could lead to procedures of peaceful settlement, in other words, which could lead to negotiations.²⁸⁵

At the 1347th meeting on 5 June 1967, the President (Denmark) drew the attention of the members of the

Security Council to a letter²⁸⁶ dated 5 June 1967 from the permanent representative of the United Arab Republic. He stated further that at 0310 that morning, the permanent representative of Israel informed him officially that he had just received reports that Egyptian land and air forces had moved against Israel and Israel forces were engaged in repelling the Egyptian forces. The representative read further to him a communiqué from the Israel defence forces according to which since the early hours of that morning, fierce fighting had broken out between Egyptian air and armoured forces which had moved against Israel and its forces, which had gone into action to contain them. At 0330 that morning, the representative of the United Arab Republic informed him that Israel had committed a premeditated aggression by launching attacks against the Gaza Strip, Sinai, airports in Cairo, in the Suez Canal area and several other airports. The Government of the United Arab Republic, in repelling this aggression, had decided to defend itself by all means, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. The President pointed out also that the information which he had received from the Secretary-General confirmed that exchanges of fire and air activity had been going on in the area since the early hours of the morning. In view of this, in the exercise of his responsibilities as the President of the Security Council, he had felt it to be his duty to convene the Council for an urgent meeting.²⁸⁷

The Secretary-General presented to the Council all information that he had received from the United Nations sources in the Middle East on the outbreak of hostilities.²⁸⁸

After the suspension of the meeting, the President drew the attention of the Council to the supplementary information²⁸⁹ submitted by the Secretary-General, and requested the members of the Council to hold themselves available for consultations before the scheduled time of the meeting the next day.

At the 1348th meeting on 6 June 1967, the President stated that since the previous meeting of the Council, its members had been continuously engaged in urgent consultations as to the course of action to be taken by the Council in this emergency situation. This consultation had resulted in unanimous agreement on a draft resolution which the President presented to the Council.²⁹⁰

Decision: *The draft resolution was adopted²⁹¹ unanimously as resolution 233 (1967)*

It read:

"The Security Council,

"Noting the oral report of the Secretary-General in this situation,

"Having heard the statements made in the Council,

"Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,

²⁸⁰ S/7906, 22nd yr., para. 14; report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East dated 26 May 1967, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967*, pp. 120-124.

²⁸¹ 1345th meeting (PV), p. 26.

²⁸² 1345th meeting (PV), p. 51.

²⁸³ S/7919, 1345th meeting (PV), pp. 51-52.

²⁸⁴ 1345th meeting (PV), p. 66.

²⁸⁵ 1346th meeting (PV), p. 92.

²⁸⁶ S/7926, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967*, p. 130.

²⁸⁷ 1347th meeting (PV), pp. 3-5.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-15. For the statement of the Secretary-General, see chapter I, Case 26.

²⁸⁹ S/7930. Supplementary information received by the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East. *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967*, pp. 132-134.

²⁹⁰ 1348th meeting (PV), pp. 3-5.

²⁹¹ 1348th meeting (PV), p. 6.

"1. *Calls upon* the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area;

"2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation."

Decision of 7 June 1967 (1350th meeting):

(i) *Demanding the Governments concerned to cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;*

(ii) *Requesting the Secretary-General to keep the Council currently informed on the situation*

By letter ²⁹² dated 7 June 1967, the permanent representative of the USSR requested that a meeting of the Security Council be immediately convened in order "to hear the reports of the parties concerned on their implementation of the Security Council resolution calling for the immediate cessation of military activities".

At the 1349th meeting of the Security Council on 7 June 1967, the Council resumed its discussion of three items inscribed on the agenda.²⁹³

The agenda was adopted.²⁹⁴

At the 1349th meeting of the Security Council on 7 June 1967, the representative of the USSR drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the continuation of military activities by Israel who had not paid any attention to resolution 233 of 6 June 1967, might create an even more menacing situation in the area, and submitted ²⁹⁵ a draft resolution.²⁹⁶

The Secretary-General stated that he had received a cable from the Foreign Minister of Jordan conveying the acceptance by his Government of the cease-fire resolution ²⁹⁷ and informed the Security Council on the development of the situation in the Middle East according to a report of the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO, whom he had instructed to continue his functions and to make his good offices available to the parties whenever there was an opportunity to do so.²⁹⁸

At the 1350th meeting of the Security Council on 7 June 1967, the representative of Canada suggested that after voting on the USSR draft resolution, the Council should take up a draft resolution ²⁹⁹ submitted by him, according to which the President of the Council, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, would be requested to take the necessary measures to bring about full compliance with resolutions S/7935 of 6 June 1967 and S/7940 of 7 June 1967.

At the same meeting, the USSR draft resolution was adopted ³⁰⁰ unanimously as resolution 234 (1967). The resolution read:

"*The Security Council,*

"*Noting* that, in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East [*resolution 233 (1967)*], military activities in the area are continuing,

"*Concerned* that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area,

"1. *Demands* that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;

"2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation."

The President stated that the representative of Canada had proposed to adjourn the meeting until such time as the Council could vote on the Canadian draft resolution in order to adopt it by unanimity.³⁰¹

The proposal to adjourn the meeting was adopted ³⁰² unanimously.

Decision of 9 June 1967 (1352nd meeting):

(i) *Confirming its previous resolutions about immediate ceasefire and cessation of military action;*

(ii) *Demanding that hostilities should cease forthwith;*

(iii) *Requesting the Secretary-General to contact the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions*

By letter ³⁰³ dated 8 June 1967 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent representative of the United States requested that in view of the fact that fighting still continued in the Middle East despite the two Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire and despite the indications of the acceptance of the cease-fire by Jordan and Israel, an urgent meeting of the Security Council be convened "to consider the present grave situation".

By letter ³⁰⁴ dated 8 June 1967, the permanent representative of the USSR requested, in view of the continuation of Israel's military activities and despite the two cease-fire resolutions by the Security Council, that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be convened to consider "the question of condemning Israel's aggressive acts, the immediate cessation by the aggressor of military activities against the Arab States and the effective withdrawal of Israel troops to the Israel side of the Armistice Line".

At the 1351st meeting of the Security Council on 8 June 1967, the agenda was adopted.³⁰⁵

At the same meeting, the Secretary-General read to the Council a message from the Foreign Minister of Kuwait and the information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO.³⁰⁶

²⁹² S/7938, *O.R.*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for April-June 1967*, pp. 162-163.

²⁹³ The agenda comprised the same three communications which were included in the agenda at its 1343rd meeting on 29 May 1967.

²⁹⁴ 1349th meeting (PV), pp. 2-5.

²⁹⁵ 1349th meeting (PV), p. 6.

²⁹⁶ S/7940, *Ibid.*, p. 7-10. The same text as resolution 234 (1967); see below.

²⁹⁷ Resolution 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967.

²⁹⁸ 1349th meeting (PV), pp. 11-15.

²⁹⁹ S/7941, *O.R.*, 22nd yr., 1350th meeting (PV), p. 6.

³⁰⁰ 1350th meeting (PV), pp. 6-10.

³⁰¹ 1350th meeting (PV), pp. 44, 45. See also in chapter I, Case 41.

³⁰² 1350th meeting (PV), pp. 44-45.

³⁰³ S/7950, *O.R.*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for April-June 1967*, p. 168.

³⁰⁴ S/7954, *ibid.*, p. 172.

³⁰⁵ 1351st meeting (PV), pp. 2-5. The agenda read as that adopted at the 1343rd meeting.

³⁰⁶ 1351st meeting (PV), p. 6.

The representative of the United States submitted a draft resolution³⁰⁷ which, in its third revised form,³⁰⁸ provided for the Security Council: (1) to insist on the continued scrupulous implementation by all the parties concerned of the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step toward the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East; (2) to request the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on compliance with the cease-fire; (3) to call for discussions promptly among the parties concerned, using such third party or United Nations assistance as they might wish, looking towards the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East; and (4) to request also the Secretary-General to provide such assistance as might be required in facilitating the discussions called for in paragraph 3.

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had received a communication from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations according to which its Government had decided to accept the cease-fire call as contained in the resolution of the Council on 6 and 7 June 1969 on the condition that the other party ceased fire.³⁰⁹

The representative of the USSR submitted³¹⁰ a draft resolution according to the revised form³¹¹ of which the Security Council would: (1) vigorously condemn Israel's aggressive activities and its violations of Security Council resolutions 233 of 6 June 1967 and 234 of 7 June 1967 of the United Nations Charter and of United Nations principles; and (2) demand that Israel should immediately halt its military activities against neighbouring Arab States and should remove all its troops from the territory of those States and withdraw them behind the armistice lines and respect the status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the General Armistice Agreements.

The representative of Bulgaria pointed out that the Security Council must insist that the Government of Israel immediately order the withdrawal of the troops that had invaded the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria, and that this be the imperative condition for the re-establishment of calm in the Middle East.³¹²

At the 1352nd meeting on 9 June 1967, the President (Denmark) informed the Council that he had received a cable from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria according to which the Government of Syria had decided to accept the two appeals in the resolution of the Security Council for a cease-fire provided that the other party agreed upon the cease-fire. The President stated further that he had received a communication from the permanent representative of Israel according to which heavy Syrian artillery fire continued to be directed against Israeli villages. He stated also that he had received a request from

the representative of Syria for an urgent meeting of the Security Council.³¹³ The Secretary-General read to the Council a message from the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission and submitted to the Council further information concerning the situation on the Syrian-Israeli border.³¹⁴

The representative of Syria* stated that one hour later following the decision of the Syrian Government to accept the cease-fire, the Israel military forces had unleashed vast air and land operations which were proceeding with an increasing intensity, leaving no doubt that the aim was the total invasion of Syria. This invasion of Syria, premeditated and well prepared, was a violation of the cease-fire and also of the Charter of the United Nations.³¹⁵

The representative of Israel* stated that at the same time that Syria had acknowledged its acceptance of the cease-fire, it opened an attack of unusual vehemence against Israel villages and had increased its military action against Israel.³¹⁶

The President stated that he had consulted all members of the Council and it was his understanding that there was agreement that before the Security Council would proceed with its business, it ought to adopt urgently, a resolution demanding that hostility cease forthwith. Therefore, in his capacity as President of the Council, he presented a draft resolution.³¹⁷

The draft resolution was adopted³¹⁸ unanimously as resolution 235 (1967). The resolution read:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 235 (1967) of 6 June and 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967,

"Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

"Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,

"1. Confirms its previous resolutions about immediate cease-fire and cessation of military action;

"2. Demands that hostilities should cease forthwith;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now."

At the 1353rd meeting on 9 June 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his communications to the Foreign Ministers of Israel and Syria and of communications from the Permanent Mission of Syria and the Foreign Minister of Syria and from the permanent representative of Syria concerning the situation on the Syrian-Israel border.³¹⁹

The representative of the United States observed that what would solve the problem before the Security Council

³⁰⁷ S/7952, 1351st meeting (PV), pp. 11-12.

³⁰⁸ S/7952/Rev.3, OR, 22nd yr., Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967, p. 171; S/7952/Rev.1 and S/7952/Rev.2, *ibid.*, pp. 169-171.

³⁰⁹ 1351st meeting (PV), pp. 18-20.

³¹⁰ 1351st meeting (PV), p. 26.

³¹¹ S/7951/Rev.1, OR, 22nd yr., Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967, p. 169.

³¹² 1351st meeting (PV), p. 52.

³¹³ 1352nd meeting (PV), p. 6.

³¹⁴ 1352nd meeting (PV), pp. 7-12.

³¹⁵ 1352nd meeting (PV), pp. 13-16.

³¹⁶ 1352nd meeting (PV), p. 17.

³¹⁷ S/7960, 1352nd meeting (PV), p. 22. See also in chapter I, Case 10.

³¹⁸ 1352nd meeting (PV), p. 22.

³¹⁹ 1353rd meeting (PV), pp. 12-15.

was, first, ascertainment of the facts; and, second, action by United Nations machinery to make sure that the cease-fire was properly implemented. Those were two ways in which the Security Council must proceed.³²⁰

The representative of the USSR requested the President to ask the Secretary-General to take effective measures so as to utilize the machinery which was in existence and to pay due attention to the information from that machinery and to report to the Security Council without delay.³²¹

The President (Denmark) stated that it appeared that all members of the Council agreed that the Council should request the parties concerned to extend all possible co-operation to the United Nations Observers in the discharge of their responsibilities, that it should request the Government of Israel to restore the use of Government House in Jerusalem to the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO and should ask the parties to re-establish freedom of movement. The President added that the next meeting would take place on 10 June 1967 in the morning.³²²

Decision of 11 June 1967 (1357th meeting):

- (i) *Condemning any and all violations of the cease-fire;*
- (ii) *Requesting the Secretary-General to continue his investigations;*
- (iii) *Affirming that its demand for a cease-fire and discontinuance of all military activities included a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire;*
- (iv) *Calling for the prompt return to the cease-fire position of any troops;*
- (v) *Calling for full co-operation with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the observers in implementing the cease-fire*

By letter³²³ dated 9 June 1967 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the permanent representative of the USSR requested that an item entitled "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israeli forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression" be included in the Council's agenda.

At the 1354th meeting on 10 June 1967, the President (Denmark) pointed out that a new item had been included in the provisional agenda in response to the request from the representative of the USSR circulated in document S/7967. The agenda was adopted.³²⁴ It read:

"Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902)

"Complaint by the representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled:

"Israeli aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security' (S/7907)

"Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the permanent representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910)

"Letter dated 9 June 1967 from the permanent representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning an item entitled:

"'Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israeli forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression.'"

The Security Council decided³²⁵ to consider the four items simultaneously.

The President stated that this emergency meeting had been convened at the urgent request of the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs of Syria who had informed him that the situation in the area had seriously deteriorated and that the Israel forces had occupied Kuneitra and had been heading towards Damascus.³²⁶

The Secretary-General submitted to the Council reports from the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission.³²⁷

The representative of Syria* stated that Israel had moved its forces and occupied Kuneitra, about thirty-five miles from Damascus, and a battle was taking place between the Syrian and Israel forces. The representative of Israel was deliberately attempting to mislead the Council by his assertion that Israel was abiding by the cease-fire. The attacking Israel forces should be withdrawn behind the Armistice Lines and sanctions should be applied by the Council.³²⁸

The representative of the USSR stated that the information presented by the Secretary-General, though fragmentary, had indicated clearly that the Israel air force had bombed Damascus, and that Israel forces were continuing their advance on Syrian territory. That was sufficient evidence of the flouting by Israel of the decision of the Security Council. Therefore it was necessary to take urgent and decisive measures to halt the aggressor.³²⁹

The representative of Israel* stated that despite two acceptances of the cease-fire resolutions, Syria had not ceased shelling Israel villages along the Israel-Syrian frontier. There was no foundation whatsoever for the allegation that Israel was planning to take Damascus. Its only activity was directed against the artillery emplacements which were attacking Israel villages.³³⁰

At the 1355th meeting on 10 June 1967 the Secretary-General read a message from the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission.³³¹

The representative of Israel* stated that Israel troops were only engaged in silencing gun emplacements in Syria and they were doing so purely in the exercise of the right of self-defence.³³²

³²⁵ 1354th meeting (PV), p. 3.

³²⁶ 1354th meeting (PV), p. 3.

³²⁷ 1354th meeting (PV), pp. 3-7; for subsequent statements by the Secretary-General, see: *ibid.*, pp. 51-55, 63-65; 66.

³²⁸ 1354th meeting (PV), pp. 11-15.

³²⁹ 1354th meeting (PV), pp. 16-21.

³³⁰ 1354th meeting (PV), pp. 21-22.

³³¹ 1355th meeting (PV), pp. 3-5; see also p. 31.

³³² 1355th meeting (PV), pp. 7-11.

³²⁰ 1353rd meeting (PV), p. 48.

³²¹ 1353rd meeting (PV), pp. 83-85. For the reply of the Secretary-General, *ibid.*, pp. 87-90, see in chapter I, Case 21.

³²² 1353rd meeting, p. 107. See also in chapter I, Case 11.

³²³ S/7967, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967*, p. 181.

³²⁴ 1354th meeting (PV), p. 2.

The representative of Syria* observed that it had been established beyond any doubt that a large invading army, with tanks, armour and air force, was invading Syria. Therefore, it was the imperative duty of the Council to see to it that the hostilities cease and that the invaders withdraw.³³³

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had received a message from the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO that he had notified the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission that Israel was prepared to co-operate on a cease-fire together with no further troop movement provided that Syria would accept the same and provided further that United Nations Military Observers would be deployed on each side of the lines at the same time that the cease-fire was fixed. The Chief of Staff proposed a cease-fire to be effective 1630 hours GMT on 10 June.³³⁴

At the 1356th meeting on 10 June 1967, the President read a letter³³⁵ dated 10 June 1967 from the representative of the USSR requesting that in view of the continuation of Israel's military activities despite the adoption by the Security Council of the resolutions on a cease-fire, a meeting of the Council be urgently convened to consider the question of the flagrant violation by Israel of the decisions of the Council on the cessation of military activities. The President stated that he had decided, in response to this letter, to convene the meeting on short notice. He also said that a joint draft resolution had been submitted by Argentina, Brazil, and Ethiopia.³³⁶

The representative of the USSR stated that soon after the Security Council had adjourned its last meeting, Damascus had been subjected to a new attack by the Israel air force. There still had been fighting in the region of Kuneitra, fifty-five kilometres from the capital of Syria. The Security Council had no right to postpone the condemnation of Israel for its flagrant violations of the decisions of the Security Council.³³⁷

The Secretary-General read the messages from the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO concerning the situation in the area.³³⁸

The representative of the United States submitted a draft resolution³³⁹ whereby the Security Council would: (1) request the Secretary-General to order a full investigation of all reports of violations of the cease-fire; (2) demand that all parties scrupulously respect its cease-fire appeals contained in resolutions 233, 234 and 235; and (3) call upon the Governments concerned to issue categorical instructions to all military forces to cease all firing and military activities as required by those resolutions.

By letter³⁴⁰ dated 11 June 1967 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the permanent representa-

tive of Syria requested that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be convened in order to discuss the grave situation resulting from Israel's further penetration into Syrian territory and to take the necessary action with a view to putting an end to it.

At the 1357th meeting on 11 June 1967, the President (Denmark) stated that the meeting had been convened in response to the request of the representative of Syria.³⁴¹

The Secretary-General read to the Council messages received from the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO.³⁴²

The representative of Syria* stated that a column of Israel armoured cars and tanks, in violation of the three previous Security Council resolutions calling for the cease-fire, had advanced from Rafid, which was also occupied after the cease-fire, to the south and east. The Council's action should aim at stopping this invasion from proceeding any further; furthermore, violations of the cease-fire should be condemned by the Council and the violator should be ordered to withdraw to the points from which his conquest had started.³⁴³

The representative of Israel* stated that with respect to the military movements in the Rafid area, there had been a movement of some military vehicles, but that movement took place within the truce lines. There was no advance beyond the truce lines established by the cease-fire on 10 June at 1630 hours GMT. Furthermore, there was no firing and no fighting whatsoever anywhere along the front line, and the cease-fire was being scrupulously observed.³⁴⁴

After suspension of the meeting, the President stated that on the basis of consultations, he was submitting a draft resolution which was adopted³⁴⁵ unanimously as resolution 236 (1967).

The resolution read:

"The Security Council,

"Taking note of the oral reports of the Secretary-General on the situation between Israel and Syria made at the 1354th, 1355th, 1356th and 1357th meetings and the supplemental information supplied in document S/7930 and Add.1-3,

"1. Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire;

"2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his investigations and to report to the Council as soon as possible;

"3. Affirms that its demand for a cease-fire and discontinuance of all military activities includes a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire;

"4. Calls for the prompt return to the cease-fire positions of any troops which may have moved forward subsequent to 1630 hours GMT on 10 June 1967;

"5. Calls for full co-operation with the Chief of Staff of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the observers in implementing the cease-fire, including freedom of movement and adequate communications facilities."

³³³ 1355th meeting (PV), p. 37.

³³⁴ 1355th meeting (PV), pp. 92-93; for subsequent statements by the Secretary-General, see 1356th meeting, pp. 46-47, 52-56, 106, 107.

³³⁵ S/7970, 1356th meeting (PV), pp. 6-10.

³³⁶ S/7968, *OR, 22nd yr., Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967*, p. 182; subsequently revised as S/7968/Rev.1, S/7968/Rev.2, *Ibid.*, pp. 182, 183 and S/7968/Rev.3; same text as resolution 237 (1967).

³³⁷ 1356th meeting (PV), pp. 6-10, 16.

³³⁸ 1356th meeting (PV), p. 17, 21.

³³⁹ 1356th meeting (PV), p. 46.

³⁴⁰ S/7973, *OR, 22nd yr., Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967*, pp. 243-244.

³⁴¹ 1357th meeting (PV), pp. 3-5.

³⁴² 1357th meeting (PV), pp. 3-6.

³⁴³ 1357th meeting (PV), pp. 11, 16.

³⁴⁴ 1357th meeting (PV), pp. 17, 97.

³⁴⁵ 1357th meeting (PV), p. 111.

Decision of 14 June 1967 (1360th meeting):

Rejection of the USSR draft resolution

By letter ³⁴⁶ dated 13 June 1967 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the permanent representative of the USSR requested that a meeting of the Security Council be convened for urgent consideration of the item "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of Israel forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which have been seized as the result of an aggression".

At the 1358th meeting of the Security Council on 13 June 1967 following the adoption of the agenda,³⁴⁷ the President (Denmark) stated that he had convened the meeting at the request of the representative of the USSR. He further drew the attention of the Council to a revised draft resolution ³⁴⁸ which had been presented by the USSR Government for consideration at that meeting.³⁴⁹

The representative of the USSR stated that the decisions of the Security Council on the cessation of hostilities were only a first step, the minimum which was possible to attain under current circumstances. All the decisions taken so far by the Security Council had been only initial measures which could be accepted in order to protect the victims of Israel aggression on a short-term basis. In the present situation, the Council could no longer merely repeat or confirm earlier resolutions which were totally inadequate. The Council must take the most effective and appropriate measures against Israel and insist on an unconditional withdrawal of armed Israel forces from the occupied territories of the Arab States. In view of the changes that had taken place in the situation in the Near East, he was submitting for the consideration by the Council a revised text of his draft resolution ³⁵⁰ according to which the Security Council would: (1) rigorously condemn Israel's aggressive activities and its violations of Security Council resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967 and 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967, of the United Nations Charter and of United Nations principles; (2), demand that Israel should immediately halt its military activities against neighbouring Arab States and should remove all its troops from their territory and withdraw them behind the armistice lines and respect the status of the demilitarized zone, as prescribed in the General Armistice Agreements.³⁵¹

The representative of the United States, commenting on the USSR draft resolution, stated that it did not encompass a genuine approach to the solution of hostilities, but was rather a step backward towards another war. What the Near East needed most were new steps towards real peace, not just a cease-fire, a fragile armistice or withdrawal. The aim of a real peace was well conceived in the United States draft resolution ³⁵² the objective of which was to encourage a decision by the warring parties to live together in peace and ensure international assistance to this end.

The representative of Israel* stated that until all Governments concerned had relinquished belligerence and abided by the resolutions of the Security Council, Israel could not regard the cease-fire as being fully in effect.³⁵³

The representative of the United Arab Republic,* referring to operative paragraph 2 of the United States draft resolution (S/7952), stated that that provision tended to legalize the Israel aggression by the Council.³⁵⁴

At the 1360th meeting on 14 June 1967, the President (Denmark) pointed out ³⁵⁵ that the Security Council had before it the following draft resolutions: draft resolution ³⁵⁶ (S/7941) submitted by Canada; draft resolution ³⁵⁷ (S/7951/Rev. 2) submitted by the USSR; draft resolution ³⁵⁸ (S/7952/Rev.2) submitted by the United States; draft resolution ³⁵⁹ (S/7968/Rev.1) submitted by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia; and draft resolution ³⁶⁰ (S/7971) submitted by the United States.

The representative of Pakistan* contended that the following measures should be taken by the Council: a condemnation of the aggression committed by Israel; a demand under Article 39 of the Charter for the immediate withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel to the demarcation lines laid down in the Armistice Agreements; after the completion of withdrawals, active participation by the Security Council in the exploration of ways and means by which the substantive resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council on the Palestine problem could be implemented.³⁶¹

The representative of Argentina expressed the view that any arrangement arrived at under the threat or the use of force, in violation of the principles of the Charter would be invalid; therefore, the Council must endeavour to establish conditions under which there would be no negotiation under the threat of pressure or coercion. However, these conditions could not be arrived at unless troops, on the one hand, were withdrawn and, on the other hand, if assurances of free transit through international maritime waterways were allowed. That meant, that the feeling of belligerence must be set aside and both parties should be enabled to express freely their will in the course of negotiations.³⁶²

The representative of Mali submitted an amendment to the draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia ³⁶³ (S/7968) to add to its operative part the following third paragraph: "3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the present resolution and to report to the Security Council thereon."³⁶⁴

At the same meeting, the representative of Canada suggested to the President that the joint draft resolution

³⁵³ 1358th meeting (PV), pp. 109-111.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-165.

³⁵⁵ 1360th meeting, para. 2.

³⁵⁶ See footnote 299 above.

³⁵⁷ See footnote 311 above.

³⁵⁸ See footnote 307, 308 above.

³⁵⁹ See footnote 336 above.

³⁶⁰ See footnote 339 above.

³⁶¹ 1360th meeting (PV), pp. 28-30.

³⁶² 1360th meeting (PV), p. 32.

³⁶³ See footnote 336 above.

³⁶⁴ 1360th meeting (PV), p. 72.

³⁴⁶ S/7979, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967*, p. 248.

³⁴⁷ 1358th meeting (PV), p. 2. The agenda read as that adopted at the 1354th meeting on 10 June 1967.

³⁴⁸ S/7951/Rev.1, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for Apr.-June 1967*, p. 161.

³⁴⁹ 1358th meeting (PV), pp. 3-5.

³⁵⁰ S/7951/Rev.1; see foot-note 107 above.

³⁵¹ 1358th meeting (PV), pp. 16, 21-25.

³⁵² S/7952, see footnote 307 above.

submitted by Canada and Denmark (S/7905) dated 24 May 1967 be withdrawn. The draft resolution submitted by Canada (S/7941) dated 4 June 1967 would be maintained for the consideration of the Council.³⁶⁵

The President stated that in addition to the draft resolutions he had mentioned previously, two more draft resolutions were before the Council: a draft resolution (S/7905) submitted by Canada and Denmark, which as indicated by the representative of Canada should be withdrawn. The second draft resolution had been submitted by the United States in document (S/7916/Rev.1). The President stated further that the representative of Canada would not object to the Council's voting on the draft resolution (S/7951/Rev.2) submitted by the USSR.³⁶⁶

The representative of the United States said that he would not press to the vote draft resolutions (S/7916/Rev.1) and (S/7971). Concerning draft resolution (S/7952/Rev.2), its third revision had been submitted; however, the United States delegation would not ask for a vote at this meeting.³⁶⁷

The President stated that the Security Council would proceed to vote on the draft resolution (S/7951/Rev.2) submitted by the USSR. It was the wish of the representative of Nigeria that a separate vote be taken on each of the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution.

At the 1360th meeting on 14 June 1967, the first operative paragraph of the USSR draft resolution was not adopted, the result of the vote being 4 votes in favour, none against, and 11 abstentions; the second operative paragraph was not adopted, the result of the vote being 6 votes in favour, none against, and 9 abstentions.³⁶⁸

The President stated that the representative of the USSR did not insist on the vote on the draft resolution as a whole. Therefore the draft resolution submitted by the USSR had not been adopted.³⁶⁹

Decision of 14 June 1967 (1361st meeting):

- (i) *Calling upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of inhabitants of the areas where military operations took place;*
- (ii) *Recommending to the Governments concerned the respect for the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of the prisoners of war*

At the 1361st meeting on 14 June 1967, the representative of Argentina introduced³⁷⁰ a draft resolution (S/7968/Rev.2) sponsored jointly with Brazil and Ethiopia, and stated that the sponsors accepted the amendment proposed by Mali reading: "3. *Requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of this resolution and to report to the Council thereon.*"³⁷¹

The representative of Mali pointed out that his amendment included the word "effective" before the word "implementation".³⁷²

The President (Denmark) stated that the Security Council would proceed to the vote on the three-Power

draft resolution, as amended by the representative of Mali (S/7968/Rev.3).³⁷³

The three-Power draft resolution was adopted unanimously³⁷⁴ as resolution 237 (1967). The resolution read:

"The Security Council,

"Considering the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings,

"Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,

"Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict,

"1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

"2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council."

The President stated³⁷⁵ that the following draft resolutions were pending before the Council: draft resolution (S/7941) submitted by Canada; draft resolutions (S/7916/Rev.1, S/7952/Rev.3 and S/7971) submitted by the United States; and the draft resolution³⁷⁶ (S/7919) submitted by the United Arab Republic.³⁷⁷

Decision of 9 July 1967 (1366th meeting): *Statement by the President:*

Requesting that the Secretary-General should order the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine to work out with the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel the necessary arrangements to station United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector under the Chief of Staff of UNTSO

By letter³⁷⁸ dated 8 July 1967, the permanent representative of the United Arab Republic informed the Council that at 1015 on the morning of 8 July, Israel armed forces had violated the cease-fire by launching an attack, including heavy shelling by artillery, against Port Fouad on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Israel had furthermore carried out aerial raids against various control stations in the Suez Canal area and destroyed them. At the same time, the Israel Air Force had indiscriminately bombed the east bank causing several human casualties and property damage. This latest violation of the cease-fire by Israel was one of a premeditated series

³⁶⁵ 1360th meeting (PV), p. 78.

³⁶⁶ 1360th meeting (PV), p. 81.

³⁶⁷ 1360th meeting (PV), pp. 81-82.

³⁶⁸ 1360th meeting (PV), pp. 84-85, 87.

³⁶⁹ 1360th meeting (PV), p. 87.

³⁷⁰ 1361st meeting (PV), pp. 3, 6.

³⁷¹ 1361st meeting (PV), p. 6.

³⁷² 1361st meeting (PV), p. 6.

³⁷³ 1361st meeting (PV), p. 42.

³⁷⁴ 1361st meeting (PV), p. 42.

³⁷⁵ 1361st meeting (PV), pp. 66, 67.

³⁷⁶ See foot-note 282.

³⁷⁷ No action was taken by the Security Council on these draft resolutions.

³⁷⁸ S/8043, OR, 22nd yr., Suppl. for July-Sept. 1967, pp. 69-70.

of violations carried out since the Security Council adopted its resolutions 233 (1967), 234 (1967), 235 (1967) and 236 (1967) on the cease-fire. The Security Council must act urgently in order to avoid any further deterioration of a situation which was already endangering not only the peace and security in the Middle East but also international peace and security in the whole world. In view of this situation, he requested that an emergency meeting of the Council be convened as soon as possible.

By letter ³⁷⁹ dated 8 July 1967, the permanent representative of Israel stated that the armed forces of the United Arab Republic had committed a further very serious breach of the cease-fire. At 0925 hours on 8 July, the United Arab forces opened fire on Israel troops stationed in the area of Ras El'Ish, some fifteen kilometres south of Port Said. Fire was returned, and its exchange continued until 1130 hours. At 1130 hours, the United Arab forces directed fire on Israel troops at El Kantara. Following that, its armoured column moved southward and opened fire on Israel troops on the east bank of the Canal. In order to repel these continuing attacks, a limited number of Israel planes had taken action against those gun positions from where the fire had been directed against the Israel troops. Since then, Egyptian fire continued intermittently in the areas of Ras El'Ish and El Kantara. These aggressive actions proved beyond doubt that it remained the policy of the Government of the United Arab Republic to maintain a continued state of belligerence against Israel. In the light of this situation, the representative requested that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be convened "to discuss the Israel complaint of serious violations by the United Arab Republic of the cease-fire".

At the 1365th meeting on 8 July 1967, the provisional agenda contained four items which were included in the agenda at the 1354th meeting on 10 June 1967.³⁸⁰

The President (Ethiopia) stated that the letters from the representative of the United Arab Republic and from the representative of Israel were distributed in documents S/8043 and S/8044.³⁸¹

Following a discussion on the adoption of the agenda,³⁸² the two letters were included in the agenda.

The Secretary-General stated that he was in no position to provide the Security Council with verified information regarding reports on a new outbreak of hostilities in the Suez area, since no United Nations military observers were stationed there.³⁸³

The representative of the United Arab Republic* stated that the Security Council could not and should not condone Israel violations of its decisions and was duty bound to call upon its authorities to refrain from those unlawful acts. The Security Council should not adjourn before coming to a conclusive decision dealing once and for all with the repeated violations by Israel of the various resolutions of the Security Council on the

cease-fire, and in particular Security Council resolution 236.³⁸⁴

The representative of Israel* stated that the latest action by the United Arab Republic and the incidents which preceded it gave Israel reason to believe that the United Arab Republic had not changed its policy of belligerency and was still carrying it out by initiating armed action despite its acceptance of the cease-fire. The Israel Government was anxious to see the cease-fire faithfully maintained and strictly observed. It hoped that the United Arab Republic had similar intentions.³⁸⁵

At the 1366th meeting of the Security Council on 9 July 1967, the representative of the USSR maintained that the Security Council must call upon Israel immediately and fully to carry out its decisions and refrain from any military operations. Under Article 25 of the Charter, Israel must strictly fulfil the decision of the Security Council with regard to the cease-fire. Accordingly, should Israel further ignore the decisions and requests of the Security Council, it would be essential to apply sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter against Israel as an aggressor.³⁸⁶

The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the first action of the Council when the conflict started was to call for and establish a cease-fire. It must see that that cease-fire was observed. It must condemn any and every breach of it. The Secretary-General should be authorized to send observers to Sinai and to the Canal area to expedite the implementation of the cease-fire arrangements, and to send his Special Representative to the area to make progress in dealing with all aspects of the situation, including disengagement and withdrawal.³⁸⁷

The representative of the United States said that it would be most useful to the Council and to the implementation of the cease-fire if the United Nations observers could be sent to the area to report to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the Security Council on the implementation of the cease fire and compliance therewith by the parties. The presence of such observers would also have a calming effect on the situation in the area and would make further incidents of the sort being considered by the Council less likely. However, scrupulous observance of the cease-fire by all the States concerned was necessary for the solution of all the complex problems facing the Middle East.³⁸⁸

The representative of India observed that the Secretary-General should be requested to take steps to strengthen the United Nations machinery in the area, with a view to arresting deterioration of the situation, securing the withdrawal of Israel forces, and ensuring strict observance of the General Armistice Agreements by all the parties concerned. The Secretary-General should also designate a special representative to go to the area for those purposes and to help bring about reduction in tensions and restoration of peaceful conditions, and to report to the Security Council. The discussions in the Council and in the emergency special session of the General Assembly had shown that the overwhelming majority of Member

³⁷⁹ S/8044, *O.R.*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for July-Sept. 1967*, pp. 70-71.

³⁸⁰ See foot-note 324 above.

³⁸¹ 1365th meeting (PV), pp. 2-5.

³⁸² For the discussion and the decision on the agenda, see in chapter II, Case 10.

³⁸³ 1365th meeting (PV), pp. 36-37. For the statement of the Secretary-General, see in chapter I, Case 27.

³⁸⁴ 1365th meeting (PV), pp. 51-55.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-55.

³⁸⁶ 1366th meeting (PV), p. 17.

³⁸⁷ 1366th meeting (PV), pp. 21, 23-25.

³⁸⁸ 1366th meeting (PV), pp. 27, 31.

States agreed that no dispute should be settled by the use of force and that the Member States had an obligation to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other States. It was on the basis of these two principles that the Security Council should proceed to give urgent consideration to the problems before it and seek solutions within the framework of the sovereignty of the States concerned.³⁸⁹

The Secretary-General stated that he had been informed by the Chief of Staff that for the Suez sector, his estimated need would be for an additional twenty-five observers.³⁹⁰

At the same meeting, the President (Ethiopia) read the following statement³⁹¹ which he considered to be a consensus of the views of the members of the Council:

"Recalling Security Council resolutions 233, 234, 235 and 236, and emphasizing the need for all parties to observe scrupulously the provisions of these resolutions, having heard the statements made by the Secretary-General and the suggestions he had addressed to the parties concerned, I believe that I am reflecting the view of the Council that the Secretary-General should proceed, as he has suggested in his statements before the Council on 8 and 9 July 1967, to request the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, General Odd Bull, to work out with the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel, as speedily as possible, the necessary arrangements to station United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector under the Chief of Staff of UNTSO."

The President stated further that since there were no objections, the consensus was accepted by the Council. In conclusion, the President appealed to the parties concerned to give to the Secretary-General their full support and wholehearted co-operation both in ensuring compliance with the Council's decisions and by extending, wherever necessary, such facilities as the Secretary-General or his personnel might require in the performance of their peace-keeping duties in the area.³⁹²

SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST (II)

Decision of 25 October 1967 (1371st meeting):

- (i) *Condemning the violation of the cease-fire;*
- (ii) *Demanding that Member States concerned cease immediately all prohibited military activities in the area and co-operate fully with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization*

By letter³⁹³ dated 24 October 1967 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the United Arab Republic complained that an Israeli force had earlier that day started, in violation of the cease-fire, a concentrated shelling of the city of Suez which resulted in extensive loss of human life and severe damage to the city and its inhabited areas, which were almost demolished. It was significant that that operation took place immediately after Israel's Cabinet held its

extraordinary meeting and that the targets chosen in the operation were civilian and industrial installations. As a result, the petroleum refineries in Suez, the Nasr plants for fertilizer and installations in the Suez harbour, and several other industrial complexes were completely or severely damaged. This "pre-planned aggression" by the Israeli Government and armed forces went far beyond a mere violation of the cease-fire resolution of the Security Council. It could not be justified as a retaliatory measure against the United Arab Republic for its sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in the United Arab Republic's territorial waters, since the operation was directed not against military targets but against civilian industrial installations. In view of these developments, an urgent meeting of the Council was requested to consider the situation resulting from Israel's act of aggression with a view to taking prompt action against it in accordance with the relevant Articles of the United Nations Charter.

By letter³⁹⁴ dated 24 October 1967 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Israel drew the attention of the Council to the fact that earlier that day, the armed forces of the United Arab Republic opened fire from the west bank of the Suez Canal against Israeli forces on the East Bank, north of Port Tawfiq. The fire was returned, and the United Nations observers were informed of the Egyptian action. One Israeli soldier was slightly wounded. Because the United Arab Republic's artillery was located in the vicinity of civilian installations of Port Ibrahim and Suez, some oil refineries were believed to have been hit. A proposal by United Nations observers for cease-fire to take effect at 1730 hours was agreed to by both parties and since that time, the area had remained quiet. The letter then recalled that the Council had earlier been informed³⁹⁵ of United Arab Republic's violations of the cease-fire culminating in the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat. An urgent meeting of the Council was requested to deal with the United Arab Republic's acts of aggression and violation of the cease-fire resolutions.

At the 1369th meeting on 24 October 1967, the two letters were included in the agenda under the heading "The situation in the Middle East".

Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Israel, Jordan and Syria to participate without vote in the discussion of the item which was considered at the 1369th to 1371st meetings, held between 24 and 25 October 1967.³⁹⁶

At the 1369th meeting on 24 October 1967, the representative of the United Arab Republic* stated that the act of war committed by Israel against the civilian and industrial complexes in the United Arab Republic and confirmed by the report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO was the most violent since its act of aggression on 5 June. Israel's policy seemed bent on the total destruction of civilian and industrial activities of the United Arab Republic. Moreover, its violation of the cease-fire had been marked by a dangerous escalation against these

³⁸⁹ 1366th meeting (PV), pp. 67-70.

³⁹⁰ 1366th meeting (PV), pp. 38-40. For the statement of the Secretary-General, see in chapter I, Case 28.

³⁹¹ 1366th meeting (PV), p. 71. See also in chapter I, Case 12.

³⁹² 1366th meeting (PV), pp. 71-72.

³⁹³ S/8207, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1967*, pp. 191, 192.

³⁹⁴ S/8208, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1967*, pp. 192, 193.

³⁹⁵ S/8145, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for July-Sept. 1967*, pp. 229, 232; S/8169, *ibid.*, pp. 311-313; S/8173, *ibid.*, pp. 314-316; S/8188, *OR*, 22nd yr., *Suppl. for Oct.-Dec. 1967*, pp. 171, 172; S/8203, *ibid.*, p. 188; S/8204, *ibid.*, pp. 188, 189.

³⁹⁶ 1369th meeting (PV), pp. 6-10.