

Middle East

20. The situation in the Middle East

During the period under review, the Security Council held 39 meetings in relation to the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. Consistent with prior practice, most meetings held under this item took the form of briefings.⁷⁹¹ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the tables below. Under this item, Council members considered a variety of topics, principally, the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic; the conflict in Yemen; the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF); and the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In 2022, the Council also held three closed meetings with countries contributing troops and police to UNDOF and UNIFIL.⁷⁹² In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole to discuss this item.⁷⁹³

In 2022, the Council adopted a total of six resolutions in connection with this item. The Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), on 13 July 2022 for one year until 14 July 2023.⁷⁹⁴ On 28 February 2022, the Council renewed the sanctions measures in relation to the situation in Yemen until 28 February 2023 and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for 13 months until 28 March 2023.⁷⁹⁵ The Council also renewed twice the mandate of UNDOF for periods of six months each,⁷⁹⁶ and extended the mandate of UNIFIL once for a period of 12 months until 31 August 2023.⁷⁹⁷

⁷⁹¹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

⁷⁹² Held in connection with the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop-and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”. For UNDOF, see [S/PV.9060](#) and [S/PV.9212](#); for UNIFIL, see [S/PV.9111](#). See also [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 2B.

⁷⁹³ See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 2.B..

⁷⁹⁴ Resolution [2643 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

⁷⁹⁵ Resolution [2624 \(2022\)](#), paras. 4 and 15.

⁷⁹⁶ Resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and [2671 \(2022\)](#), para. 15.

⁷⁹⁷ Resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

During the period under review, the meetings in relation to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to focus on three main aspects: the implementation of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process to end the conflict; the humanitarian situation in the country, including the issues of the protection of civilians, the worsening economic crisis and humanitarian access; and the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. Briefings concerning the political process and the humanitarian situation in Syria were often addressed jointly during the same meeting, whereas the proliferation and use of chemical weapons was addressed separately in dedicated meetings.⁷⁹⁸

Regarding the political process, Council members heard regular monthly briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria on the efforts to reach a political solution to the conflict. In this connection, in 2022, the briefings and discussions continued to focus on the progress of the Constitutional Committee in drafting a constitutional text and on the necessary elements for the implementation of resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#), such as a lasting nationwide ceasefire, the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons, the engagement with civil society representatives and women's groups, especially the Women's Advisory Board, for their meaningful participation in the political process, and step-by-step confidence-building. In March 2022, the Special Envoy noted that, there were significant differences between the parties, despite that the seventh session of the Small Body of the Syrian Constitutional Committee took place.⁷⁹⁹ Furthermore, the Special Envoy continued to call for a nationwide ceasefire and a focus on supporting the political process.⁸⁰⁰ In August, he also expressed concerns about troubling signs of a military escalation and mounting challenges in implementing resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#).⁸⁰¹ He also reported on the developments and status on the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons.⁸⁰² In this regard, he stated that his team continued to receive reports of arbitrary arrests throughout the country, while there was nothing new to report six months after the presidential amnesty decree, despite the continued engagement.⁸⁰³ On 25 October, while

⁷⁹⁸ For more information on the format of meetings in relation to this item, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2018 and 2019*, part II, sect. I and *Supplements 2020 and 2021*, part II.

⁷⁹⁹ See [S/PV.9003](#).

⁸⁰⁰ See [S/PV.9083](#), [S/PV.9117](#) and [S/PV.9130](#).

⁸⁰¹ See [S/PV.9117](#).

⁸⁰² See [S/PV.9130](#).

⁸⁰³ See [S/PV.9163](#).

pushing all stakeholders to engage in step-for-step confidence-building measures to help advance the implementation of resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#), the Special Envoy reported that he sought to work with the parties and the Co-Chairs of the Constitutional Committee to unblock obstacles to reconvene the Committee so that there would be the political will to engage in a spirit of compromise and at a faster pace, with better working methods and more substance.⁸⁰⁴ At the end of 2022, the Special Envoy cautioned against an increase in mutual strikes and violence across northern Syria and reiterated the call by the Secretary-General for all parties to exercise maximum restraint and avoid escalation. Calling for all actors to engage in serious efforts to move towards a nationwide ceasefire, he expressed concern that the Syrian Constitutional committee had not met for six months and underlined the need for all parties to resume and make more substantive the meetings in Geneva.⁸⁰⁵ Noting that 2022 saw no tangible progress in the political process, the Special Envoy appealed for all members to get behind the agenda as Syria needed sustained international attention starting with unity in the Council.⁸⁰⁶

In relation to the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, Council members also heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the Director for Operations and Advocacy at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The briefings focused on the findings of the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of relevant resolutions, including resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#) and [2642 \(2022\)](#) which authorized cross-border humanitarian operations.⁸⁰⁷ The briefers provided regular updates on the humanitarian conditions in different parts of the country, particularly Idlib in northwestern Syria and the Rukban and Al-Hol refugee camps, and on the efforts of the cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance. During the year, the briefers also reported on the continued economic crisis affecting access to basic services such as water, sanitation, health and education, and the need for funding for early recovery and resilience programs. Furthermore, they also reported to the Council on the status of

⁸⁰⁴ See [S/PV.9163](#).

⁸⁰⁵ See [S/PV.9204](#) and [S/PV.9230](#).

⁸⁰⁶ See [S/PV.9230](#).

⁸⁰⁷ Resolution [2165 \(2014\)](#).

the cross-border and crossline humanitarian deliveries in northwestern Syria and highlighted that cross-border assistance remained the central part of the humanitarian response.

Ahead of the expiration of the humanitarian aid delivery mechanism on 10 July,⁸⁰⁸ at a meeting held on 20 June, the Secretary-General emphasized that the United Nations cross-border operation in Syria was one of the most heavily scrutinized and monitored aid operations in the world, and the importance of maintaining and expanding access to aid, including through cross-line and cross-border operations in order to save lives.⁸⁰⁹

With respect to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Council members were regularly briefed by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs on the progress in the implementation of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program. Except for the months of May and August, the Council heard monthly briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, following the practice followed in 2021.⁸¹⁰ In her briefings, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs reported on the activities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and informed the Council about the work undertaken by the Declaration Assessment Team, Fact-Finding Mission and Investigation and Identification Team. The OPCW Technical Secretariat had been unable to conduct a planned deployment of the Assessment Team to the Syrian Arab Republic, and it continued to assess that Syria's declaration was not accurate and complete.⁸¹¹ In this regard, she reiterated the importance of resolving the remaining outstanding issues of the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic. On 29 April, the High Representative noted that while the Chemical Weapons Convention had achieved significant progress towards the elimination of chemical weapons over the past 25 years the Treaty had been challenged by the use of chemical weapons in Syria, despite Syria's accession to the Convention.⁸¹² In this context, the High Representative noted that efforts to clarify the outstanding issues with Syria's initial declaration and subsequent declarations had not progressed, and that the Syrian Arab Republic

⁸⁰⁸ Resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#).

⁸⁰⁹ See [S/PV.9068](#).

⁸¹⁰ For the practice in 2021, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2021*, part I, sect. 19.

⁸¹¹ See [S/PV.8943](#), [S/PV.8982](#), [S/PV.8990](#), [S/PV.9026](#), [S/PV.9097](#), [S/PV.9141](#), [S/PV.9164](#), [S/PV.9184](#) and [S/PV.9207](#).

⁸¹² [S/PV.9026](#).

continued to place conditions on the OPCW's efforts, violating its obligations under the Convention.⁸¹³ Reiterating the continued gaps and inconsistencies and the lack of sufficient technical information, the High Representative called on the Syrian Arab Republic to respond to the Technical Secretariat's request with urgency.⁸¹⁴

In 2022, in addition to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), the Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and seven civil society representatives provided briefings to the Council members concerning the political and humanitarian situation in the country, specifically on the topics of detainees, abductees and missing persons, the participation of women in the political process, the growing humanitarian needs and the voices of the Syrian people including women, and on restoring the sovereignty in the Syrian Arab Republic.⁸¹⁵ On 27 January, the Under-Secretary-General of UNOCT reported on the attack by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) on Al-Sina'a prison in Hasakah city in north-east Syria and the ongoing fighting which had also affected the civilian population.⁸¹⁶ On 24 March, the Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, briefing the Council against the backdrop of the eleventh year anniversary of the Syrian crisis, announced and elaborated on the decision adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States of 9 March, forming the basis for the Arab position on the humanitarian crisis in the country.⁸¹⁷ He expressed the League's genuine concern about the consequences of the war in Ukraine on the Syrian crisis and the hope that the humanitarian aid mechanism would continue to function across borders to Syria and that it would be renewed in July free from any politicization of the issue.

⁸¹³ [S/PV.9097](#) and [S/PV.9141](#).

⁸¹⁴ [S/PV.9164](#), [S/PV.9184](#) and [S/PV.9207](#).

⁸¹⁵ The following representatives provided briefings to the Council: Director of the Release Me project in northern Syria, on 26 January 2022 ([S/PV.8955](#)); Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council on 27 January 2022 ([S/PV.8957](#)); Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism on 27 January 2022 ([S/PV.8958](#)); Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States on 24 March 2022 ([S/PV.9003](#)); Director for the Middle East and North Africa of CARE International on 26 April 2022 ([S/PV.9022](#)); an OB/GYN, Syrian American Medical Society on 20 May 2022 ([S/PV.9038](#)); NGO Forum Coordinator of North West Syria NGO Forum, Türkiye/Gaziantep on 20 June 2022 ([S/PV.9068](#)); Syrian Emergency Task Force on 29 June 2022 ([S/PV.9083](#)); and the Director of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression on 14 September 2022 ([S/PV.9130](#)).

⁸¹⁶ See [S/PV.8958](#).

⁸¹⁷ See [S/PV.9003](#).

In 2022, in addition to the Syrian conflict, the Council continued to focus on three distinct areas in connection with the conflict in Yemen, namely, the nation-wide ceasefire and political process to find a solution to the conflict, the humanitarian situation in the country, and the sanctions measures in place against individuals and entities designated as engaging in or providing support for acts that threatened the peace, security and stability in Yemen.

Regarding the political process, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen.⁸¹⁸ The briefings focused on updating the Council on the ceasefire introduced and its extensions, as well as the status of the Hodeidah Agreement towards an inclusive political settlement and the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement, including the outcomes of consultations between the parties. In January 2022, the Special Envoy emphasized that the military escalation had accelerated as the parties had doubled-down on military options. He added that seven years down the road of war, the prevailing belief of all warring sides seemed to be that inflicting sufficient harm on the other would force them into submission. He clarified that there was no sustainable long-term solution to be found on the battlefield and stressed that the warring parties should talk, even if they were not ready to put down their arms.⁸¹⁹ During the subsequent briefing in February, the Special Envoy highlighted that the attacks on the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, indicated how the conflict in Yemen risked spiraling out of control unless serious efforts were urgently made by the Yemeni parties, the region and the international community to end the conflict.⁸²⁰ He also reported on his continuous engagement with the parties on possible mutually agreeable compromises, and noted the establishment of a multitrack process that could produce durable solutions to the conflict, whilst seeking opportunities for de-escalation. In April, he announced that the parties had agreed to a United Nations initiative for a two-month, nationwide, renewable truce, which was the first nationwide truce in six years.⁸²¹ After the start of the truce, the Special Envoy discussed obstacles faced in its implementation and outlined a way forward including extending, consolidating and expanding the truce to reach a political settlement.⁸²² He also reported that there had been a significant

⁸¹⁸ See [S/PV.8946](#), [S/PV.8966](#), [S/PV.8995](#), [S/PV.9017](#), [S/PV.9063](#), [S/PV.9110](#), [S/PV.9152](#) and [S/PV.9199](#).

⁸¹⁹ See [S/PV.8946](#).

⁸²⁰ See [S/PV.8966](#).

⁸²¹ See [S/PV.9017](#).

⁸²² See [S/PV.9063](#).

decline in civilian casualties, with the first week of August seeing the lowest civilian casualty count since the beginning of the war.⁸²³ While the truce in Yemen expired in October 2022, the Special Envoy welcomed the parties' restraint since the expiration of the truce on 2 October, with only sporadic exchanges of artillery and small arms fire in front-line areas in Taiz, Ma'rib, Al-Hudaydah and Dhale.⁸²⁴ He also emphasized that the parties needed to demonstrate the leadership, compromise and flexibility required to urgently reach an agreement on the renewal and expansion of the truce. In November, he noted that despite incidents of concern and the expiration of the truce, there had not been a return to full-fledged war.⁸²⁵ Nonetheless, the risk of military and economic escalation, undermining current mediation efforts, attacks on civilian infrastructure continued.

Regarding the humanitarian situation in Yemen, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, his Deputy and the Director and the Acting Director of the Operations and Advocacy of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, often in conjunction with the Special Envoy. The briefers focused on the devastating consequences of the conflict for civilians and civilian infrastructure, food insecurity, and the declining economy, all resulting in the deepening humanitarian crisis in the country. They also focused on the impact of the conflict in Ukraine given that one third of the wheat consumed in Yemen originated in the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Briefers also emphasized the need for safe and unimpeded humanitarian access, including the safety and security of humanitarian workers, and efforts to find a just, lasting end to the conflict. Regarding the FSO SAFER tanker, the representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported on the work of the United Nations in finding a pragmatic and workable solution to the grave danger posed by the tanker.⁸²⁶

In addition to the Special Envoy, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, his Deputy and the Director and the Acting Director of the Operations and Advocacy of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in 2022, the Council also heard briefings by two civil society representatives who spoke on various aspects of the peace

⁸²³ See [S/PV.9110](#).

⁸²⁴ See [S/PV.9152](#).

⁸²⁵ See [S/PV.9199](#).

⁸²⁶ See [S/PV.8946](#) and [S/PV.9063](#).

talks and the humanitarian situation in the country and made concrete proposals to the Council with a view to ensuring the participation of women, young people and civil society and ameliorating the humanitarian crisis.⁸²⁷

In 2022, Council members also heard one briefing by the representative of Albania, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) in connection with the activities of the Committee and the Panel of Experts.⁸²⁸

In its decisions in 2022, the Council also addressed the issues outlined above concerning the conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen as well as the mandates of UNDOF and UNIFIL.

In connection with the Syrian Arab Republic and against the backdrop of the expiration of the authorization for the cross-border operations mechanism which had been last renewed on 9 July 2021 by resolution [2585 \(2021\)](#), the Council held a meeting to consider two competing draft resolutions submitted by Ireland and Norway, on the one hand, and by the Russian Federation, on the other.⁸²⁹ At the meeting, held on 8 July 2022, the Council failed to adopt either one of the two drafts presented. The draft resolution submitted by Ireland and Norway, and voted on first, failed to be adopted due to the negative vote of a permanent member, the Russian Federation, while the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation was not adopted having failed to obtain the required number of votes.⁸³⁰ By contrast, four days later, on 12 July, a new draft resolution submitted by Ireland and Norway was adopted as resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#) with the abstentions of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.⁸³¹ By this resolution, the Council extended the authorizations of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Security Council resolution [2165 \(2014\)](#), for a period of six months, until 10 January 2023, but restricted to the border crossing at Bab al-Hawa. The resolution also provided for an additional extension of six months, until 10

⁸²⁷ The Chief Executive Officer of the Sheba Youth Foundation for Development provided a briefing to the Council on 12 January 2022 ([S/PV.8946](#)). The Protection and Advocacy Officer from Peace Track Initiative provided a briefing to the Council on 14 June 2022 ([S/PV.9063](#)).

⁸²⁸ See [S/PV.8966](#). For further information on the Committee and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect.I.B.1, and for further information on the sanctions in Yemen, see part VII, sect. III.

⁸²⁹ See [S/PV.9087](#). For the draft resolution, see [S/2022/538](#) and [S/2022/541](#).

⁸³⁰ Further to the veto cast at the meeting, pursuant to GA resolution [76/262](#), the Security Council transmitted a special report to the Assembly ([A/76/905](#)). For further details, see part IV, sect. I. F.

⁸³¹ *For*: Albania, Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates; *abstaining*: France, United Kingdom, United States. See [S/PV.9089](#).

July 2023, subject to the requirement of a separate resolution confirming the extension. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide a special report on the humanitarian needs in Syria no later than 10 December 2022.⁸³² By the same resolution, the Council also encouraged the convening of a Security Council Informal Interactive Dialogue every two months with participation of donors, interested regional parties and representatives of the international humanitarian agencies operating in Syria in order to regularly review and follow-up on the implementation of this resolution, including progress in early-recovery projects.⁸³³

Prior to the adoption of the resolution, the representative of Ireland took the floor also speaking on behalf Norway, as co-penholders, noting that the resolution represented a delicate balance between the different positions of the members of the Council as the primary focus was for the Council to keep the cross-border mechanism open and operating.⁸³⁴ Speaking on behalf of the 10 elected members, the representative of Kenya stated that while they supported a 12-month renewal, which would give humanitarian organizations more certainty in their operations, their fundamental interest was for the Council to meet the grave needs of the Syrian people and supported the resolution. After the adoption of the resolution, a majority of the Council members took the floor on the adoption of resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#) reauthorizing the Syria cross-border humanitarian mechanism. Abstaining from voting, the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States said that resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#) fell short of providing the operational certainty for the provision of humanitarian aid particularly during the winter and did not heed the call by the Secretary-General and the humanitarian community to renew the mechanism for 12 months. Nonetheless, they reiterated their commitment to working with partners to ensure the Council met the needs of the people at the time of the renewal. Having voted in favour of the resolution, the representative of the Russian Federation explained that the informal interactive dialogues offered opportunities to monitor progress in implementing the resolution to decide on the ultimate fate of the cross-border mechanism.⁸³⁵ The representative of India reiterated his country's call for enhanced and effective humanitarian assistance without

⁸³² Resolution [2642 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

⁸³³ *Ibid.*, para. 6. In 2022, informal interactive dialogues were held pursuant to this resolution on 26 September, 21 November and 16 December, see [A/77/2](#).

⁸³⁴ See [S/PV.9089](#).

⁸³⁵ *Ibid.*

discrimination, politicization or preconditions and noted that cross-border operations could not exist in perpetuity.

With regard to the conflict in Yemen, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2643 \(2022\)](#) of 13 July 2022 concerning the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA). The Council extended the mandate of the Mission once, for a period of 12 months until 14 July 2023.⁸³⁶ Despite having voted in favour of the resolution, the representative of Ireland stated that his country wished to put on record its view that Security Council resolutions should remain grounded in evidence-based reporting available to all Security Council members. He said that the language in the resolution that “expresses concern at accounts of the military use of the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa” was based on assessments that they did not all have access to, and therefore strayed from usual precedent and practice at the Security Council. He also said that it would also have been Ireland’s preference for the text to remain fully aligned with that of the original Hodeidah Agreement, on which the Mission’s capacity and focus remained.⁸³⁷

Regarding the sanctions measures imposed in connection with the conflict in Yemen, on 28 February 2022, the Council adopted resolution [2624 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with the abstentions of Brazil, Ireland, Mexico and Norway. By resolution [2624 \(2022\)](#), the Council renewed the sanctions measures in place until 28 February 2023, and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for 13 months, until 28 March 2023.⁸³⁸ In their explanations of votes, the representatives of the United Arab Emirates, India, China and Albania welcomed the renewal of sanctions and condemned Ansar Allah for its attacks on the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.⁸³⁹ Abstaining from voting, the representatives of Ireland, Mexico, Brazil and Norway, explained that despite condemning the actions of Ansar Allah leadership and welcoming the implementation of the arms embargo, impediments to humanitarian aid reaching people in need had to be avoided and expressed concern that designation may result in unintended negative humanitarian and political consequences. The representatives of Ireland,

⁸³⁶ Resolution [2643 \(2022\)](#), para. 1). For more information on the mandate of UNMHA, see part X, sect. II.

⁸³⁷ See [S/PV.9091](#).

⁸³⁸ Resolution [2624 \(2022\)](#), paras. 15 and 16. For more information on the sanctions measures, see part VII, sect. III and for more information on the Committee and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

⁸³⁹ See [S/PV.8981](#).

Mexico, Brazil and Norway also stated that there was no internationally agreed definition of the terms “terrorism” or “terrorist group”, expressing concern about the fact that the use of those terms in a Council resolution dealing with sanctions on Yemen may have had unintended negative consequences for the Yemeni people living under Ansar Allah control. The representative of Kenya continued on to state that sanctions would be necessary to impede the capacity of Ansar Allah to carry out indiscriminate attacks and signal no political legitimacy may be achieved while carrying out such acts. The representative of Mexico also expressed concern about the implications of the designation for the United Nations-facilitated political process, as well as for the efforts to resolve the critical situation regarding *FSO SAFER* and did not consider it appropriate that the mechanism for the designation of terrorist groups should pass through resolutions relating to sanctions regimes. The representatives of Ghana and the Russian Federation stated that the sanctions regime should not result in exacerbating the critical humanitarian situation.

In 2022, the mandate of UNDOF was renewed twice by resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and resolution [2671 \(2022\)](#) for periods of six months each, until 31 December 2022 and 30 June 2023, respectively.⁸⁴⁰ Both resolutions were adopted unanimously.

In connection with Lebanon, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), extending the mandate of UNIFIL for one year until 31 August 2023.⁸⁴¹

For the purposes of facilitating the coverage of this item, information on meetings is set out below under four separate tables, namely: (a) Syrian Arab Republic, (b) Yemen, (c) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, and (d) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

⁸⁴⁰ Resolutions [2639 \(2022\)](#) and [2671 \(2022\)](#), para.15. For more information on the mandate of UNDOF, see part X, sect. I.

⁸⁴¹ Resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNIFIL, see part X, sect. I.

Table 1
Meetings: The situation in the Middle East – Syrian Arab Republic

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8943 5 January 2022	Letter dated 28 December 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/1103)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8955 26 January 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Director of the Release Me project in northern Syria	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8957 27 January 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council	14 Council members ^a , all invitees	
S/PV.8958 27 January 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Under-Secretary-General, United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8978 25 February 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020), and 2585 (2021) (S/2022/135)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	13 Council members ^b , all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8982 28 February 2022	Letter dated 31 January 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/76)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members ^c , all invitees	
S/PV.8990 10 March 2022	Letter dated 4 March 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/181)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members ^c , all invitees	
S/PV.9003 24 March 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States	13 Council members ^b , all invitees	
S/PV.9022 26 April 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020), and 2585 (2021) (S/2022/330)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa, CARE International	13 Council members ^d , all invitees	
S/PV.9026 29 April 2022	Letter dated 30 March 2022 from the Secretary-		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	12 Council members ^e , all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/281)					
S/PV.9038 20 May 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, OB/GYN, Syrian American Medical Society	12 Council members ^f , all invitees	
S/PV.9068 20 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) , 2165 (2014) , 2191 (2014) , 2258 (2015) , 2332 (2016) , 2393 (2017) , 2401 (2018) , 2449 (2018) , 2504 (2020) , 2533 (2020) , and 2585 (2021) (S/2022/492)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, NGO Forum Coordinator, North West Syria NGO Forum, Türkiye/Gaziantep	Secretary-General, Council members ^g , all invitees ^h	
S/PV.9083 29 June 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Syrian Emergency Task Force	13 Council members ^e , all invitees	
S/PV.9087 8 July 2022		Draft resolution submitted by Ireland and Norway (S/2022/538), Draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2022/541)	Syrian Arab Republic		13 Council members ⁱ , invitee	Draft resolution (S/2022/538) not adopted 13-1-1 ^j Draft resolution (S/2022/541) not adopted 2-3-10 ^k

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9089 12 July 2022		Draft resolution submitted by Ireland and Norway (S/2022/546)	Syrian Arab Republic		11 Council members ^f , invitee	Resolution 2642 (2022) 12-0-3 ^m
S/PV.9097 20 July 2022	Letter dated 30 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/530)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members ^e , all invitees	
S/PV.9117 29 August 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) , 2165 (2014) , 2191 (2014) , 2258 (2015) , 2332 (2016) , 2393 (2017) , 2401 (2018) , 2449 (2018) , 2504 (2020) , 2533 (2020) , 2585 (2021) , and 2642 (2022) (S/2022/635)		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	13 Council members ⁿ , all invitees	
S/PV.9130 14 September 2022			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Director of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression	13 Council members ^e all invitees ^o	
S/PV.9141 29 September 2022	Letter dated 30 August 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members ^e , all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Council (S/2022/658)					
S/PV.9163 25 October 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020), 2585 (2021), and 2642 (2022) (S/2022/775)	Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye		Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Director for Operations and Advocacy at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	13 Council members ^a , all invitees	
S/PV.9164 25 October 2022	Letter dated 30 September 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/727)	Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye		High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members ^a , all invitees	
S/PV.9184 7 November 2022	Letter dated 2 November 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/828)	Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Türkiye		High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members ^c , all invitees	
S/PV.9204 29 November 2022		Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye		Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	13 Council members ^b , all invitees	
S/PV.9207 5 December 2022	Letter dated 30 November 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the	Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye		High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	13 Council members ^c , all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	President of the Security Council (S/2022/897)					
S/PV.9230 21 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in the Syrian Arab Republic (S/2022/933)	Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, and Türkiye		Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	13 Council members ^a , all invitees	
	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020), 2533 (2020), 2585 (2021), and 2642 (2022) (S/2022/956)					

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway (also on behalf of Ireland, its co-penholder on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^c Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^d Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway (also on behalf of Ireland as co-penholder), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^e Albania, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States

^f Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway (also on behalf of Ireland, its co-penholder on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^g Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland (also on behalf of Norway, its co-penholder on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic), Mexico, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^h The Coordinator, North West Syria NGO Forum participated by videoconference.

ⁱ Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya (on behalf of the 10 elected members of the Security Council), Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^j *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: Russian Federation; *abstaining*: China.

^k *For*: China, Russian Federation; *against*: France, United Kingdom, United States; *abstaining*: Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates.

^l Albania, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (on behalf of the 10 elected members of the Security Council), Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^m *For*: Albania, Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates; *against*: none; *abstaining*: France, United Kingdom, United States.

ⁿ Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^o The Director of the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression participated by videoconference.

Table 2
Meetings: The situation in the Middle East – Yemen

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8946 12 January 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Acting Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, co-Founder and Chief Executive Officer of the Sheba Youth Foundation for Development	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8966 15 February 2022	Letter dated 25 January 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/50)		Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8981 28 February 2022	Letter dated 25 January 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/50)	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2022/158)			11 Council members ^a	Resolution 2624 (2022) 11-0-4 ^b (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8995 15 March 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.9017 14 April 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9063 14 June 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Acting Director, Operations and Advocacy Division of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection and Advocacy Officer from Peace Track Initiative	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.9088 11 July 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-general for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees ^c	
S/PV.9091 13 July 2022	Letter dated 13 June 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/484)	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2022/549)				Resolution 2643 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.9110 15 August 2022			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Acting Director, Operations and Advocacy Division, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	All Council members, all invitees ^c	
S/PV.9152 13 October 2022			Saudi Arabia, Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees ^d	
S/PV.9199 22 November 2022			Saudi Arabia, Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Director for Operations and Advocacy, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	

^a Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation, Norway and United Arab Emirates

^b For: Albania, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Norway.

^c The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen participated by videoconference.

^d The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator participated by videoconference.

Table 3
Meetings: The situation in the Middle East – United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9076 27 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/2022/447)	Draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation and the United States of America (S/2022/512)				Resolution 2639 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.9234 22 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/2022/887)	Draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation and the United States of America (S/2022/986)				Resolution 2671 (2022) 15-0-0

Table 4
Meetings: The situation in the Middle East – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9121 31 August 2022	Letter dated 9 August 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/607)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2022/654)			Four Council members ^a	Resolution 2650 (2022) 15-0-0

^a Brazil, India, United Arab Emirates and United States.