

2. The situation in Somalia

In 2022, the Security Council held 12 meetings and adopted six decisions on the situation in Somalia, four of which were under Chapter VII of the Charter. Six meetings took the form of a briefing, while the remaining six were convened to adopt decisions.¹⁴ More details about the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, are provided in the table below. Council members also held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the situation in Somalia.¹⁵

During the period under review, the Council endorsed the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to reconfigure the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS),¹⁶ and renamed the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia to the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab.¹⁷ For the first time since their introduction in 2008,¹⁸ the Council did not renew authorizations set out in resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#) in connection with the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, which had expired in March 2022.¹⁹ More information about these and other developments is provided below.

Further to the reports by the Secretary-General,²⁰ the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and Head of ATMIS, as well as his deputy.²¹ The Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution [751](#)

¹⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

¹⁵ For more information, see [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 6.

¹⁶ Resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#). For more information about ATMIS, see part VIII, sect. III.

¹⁷ Resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#). For more information about the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#), see part IX, sect. I.

¹⁸ Resolution [1816 \(2008\)](#). For more information, see 2008-2009 Supplement, part I.

¹⁹ For more information about the authorizations in connection with the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, see part VII of the previous supplements covering the period from 2008 to 2021.

²⁰ See [S/2022/101](#), [S/2022/392](#) and [S/2022/665](#).

²¹ Prior to the adoption of resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) on 31 March, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission provided a briefing to the Council in his capacity as the Head of AMISOM.

(1992) concerning Al-Shabaab also provided briefings to the Council.²² In addition, the Council heard briefings by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union and by the Special Representative of the European Union for the Horn of Africa.

In his briefings in 2022, the Special Representative provided updates to the Council concerning the political developments, including the conclusion of the electoral process in May 2022, the worsening humanitarian conditions and the volatile security situation with a focus on the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and the reconfiguration of AMISOM into ATMIS.

Regarding the political developments, in February, the Special Representative stated that national elections in Somalia were more than one year behind the constitutionally prescribed schedule.²³ In his briefing in May, the Special Representative welcomed the conclusion of Somalia's electoral process as a major milestone for the country.²⁴ On 15 May, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected President in a joint session of Parliament that had been peaceful, orderly and respectful of the rules of procedure. The Special Representative, nevertheless, noted that contrary to Somalia's provisional Constitution, the Somali people had not had the opportunity to vote in a one-person, one-vote election, while women were elected to just 21 per cent of parliamentary seats. Many irregularities in the selection of members of Parliament had been noted throughout the process, which had been repeatedly marred by violence. In September, the Special Representative reported that the political climate in Somalia was more conducive to addressing key national priorities following the conclusion of its contentious electoral process.²⁵ In June, the Parliament had unanimously endorsed the nominee for Prime Minister, Hamza Abdi Barre, and in August, confirmed his Cabinet. The Special Representative noted that only 13 per cent of Cabinet members were women and called again on Somali leaders to take further measures to ensure the meaningful participation of women across institutions of Government, as well as the inclusion of youth and historically marginalized groups. Further, the Special

²² Pursuant to resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), in November 2022, the Council modified the name of the Committee to "Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab" previously known as "Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia" (see resolution [2662\(2022\)](#), para. 24). For more information, see part VII, sect. III.A and part IX, sect. I.B.1(a).

²³ See [S/PV.8965](#).

²⁴ See [S/PV.9040](#).

²⁵ See [S/PV.9125](#).

Representative commended President Mohamud's efforts on improving relations between the central Government and the federal member states to advance national priorities, as well as his outreach to neighbouring countries.

As for the humanitarian situation, it remained extremely dire with 7.7 million Somalis requiring assistance in 2022.²⁶ In May, the Special Representative reported that the conditions were worsening following the failure of a fourth consecutive rainy season and noted that the number of people affected by the drought had risen to 6.1 million, with the country facing a heightened risk of localized famine in six communities.²⁷ Later in the year, he noted that nearly half of the country's estimated population was impacted by the worst drought in at least four decades, exacerbated by climate factors.²⁸ The Special Representative underscored that the ongoing humanitarian crisis had especially contributed to the vulnerability of displaced women and children.

According to the Special Representative, the security conditions remained volatile in 2022, with Al-Shabaab continuing to pose a major security threat by exploiting local political and security tensions and extensively using improvised explosive devices,²⁹ with its attacks focused on Mogadishu, South-West state and Hirshabelle.³⁰ In that context, the Special Representative commended the Somali security forces and ATMIS, who safeguarded the electoral process and bore the brunt of Al-Shabaab's attacks.³¹ On the reconfiguration of the African Union-led Mission, on 15 February, the Special Representative reported on the progress made with the development of the joint African Union-Federal Government of Somalia concept of operations; the joint African Union-United Nations proposal on a reconfigured Mission; and the United Nations logistical options in support of a reconfigured Mission and the Somali security forces going forward, as requested under resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#).³² The Special Representative underscored that progress in the implementation of the Somali transition plan was

²⁶ See [S/PV.8965](#).

²⁷ See [S/PV.9040](#).

²⁸ See [S/PV.9125](#).

²⁹ See [S/PV.8965](#).

³⁰ See [S/PV.9040](#).

³¹ See [S/PV.9040](#) and [S/PV.9125](#).

³² See [S/PV.8965](#).

key for both the reconfiguration of AMISOM and to determine the pace of the transfer of responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces. In his final briefing of the year, the Special Representative reported that the implementation of the transition tasks mandated by resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) was advancing, including the request for the Federal Government of Somalia, the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations to identify relevant, clear and realistic benchmarks for progress.³³

In his briefings, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and head of ATMIS informed the Council about the electoral assistance and the security support that the Mission had provided to the Somali authorities, including through joint operations targeting Al-Shabaab.³⁴ Following the reconfiguration of AMISOM into ATMIS earlier in the year, the Special Representative and Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia noted that force generation and adequate and predictable funding and equipment attuned to force activity and mobility were key to degrading Al-Shabaab and ensuring the success of the transition. It was vital to scale up air strategic support with transport and attack helicopters, as well as adequate offensive weapons in all sectors, for both ATMIS and the Somali security forces.³⁵ Addressing the Council later in the year, the Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Acting Head of ATMIS noted that the upcoming drawdown of 2,000 troops by December 2022 would ultimately depend on the Federal Government's ability to generate forces to fill the gaps left by the reduction of ATMIS force.³⁶ A key requirement in that regard was the availability of sustainable, predictable and adequate levels of funding. Given the reluctance to consider a special United Nations meeting on financing for ATMIS and the Somali security forces, she appealed to the Council and all partners to ensure sustainable, predictable and adequate funding for the Mission for the duration of its mandate.

In connection with the above, in her briefing to the Council in September, the Special Representative of the European Union for the Horn of Africa asserted that Al-Shabaab had

³³ See [S/PV.9125](#).

³⁴ See [S/PV.8965](#), [S/PV.9040](#) and [S/PV.9125](#).

³⁵ See [S/PV.9040](#).

³⁶ See [S/PV.9125](#).

grown to become the richest and strongest global franchise of Al-Qaida, threatening peace and security, as well as humanitarian efforts, in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.³⁷ She recalled that the European Union was committed to supporting ATMIS, but that there was no support for more of the same. She urged the Somali Government to provide clarity on the Somali Transition Plan and the national security architecture and noted that the only exit strategy for ATMIS was to support the Somali security sector.

Regarding the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia, in his briefing in February, the Head of Delegation of the European Union expressed hope that the Council would be able to agree on a revised resolution that better reflected Somali priorities, while also renewing the legal provisions necessary for the continuation of the European Union Naval Force Operation Atalanta for at least the remainder of the year.³⁸ If the resolution was not extended beyond 3 March, Operation Atalanta would not have the authorization to fight piracy and to protect the deliveries of the World Food Programme and other vulnerable vessels in the Somali territorial waters. At the same meeting, some Council members expressed support for finding a solution for the renewal of the resolution on maritime security off the coast of Somalia.³⁹ The representative of Somalia, however, reiterated that the Federal Government of Somalia would no longer request any renewal or modification of resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#), since it had successfully achieved its intended objectives after nearly 15 years.⁴⁰

During the period under review, Council members' discussions centred on political developments, including the conduct of elections, the deteriorating humanitarian conditions, the continued threat posed by Al-Shabaab, as well as the reconfiguration of AMISOM into ATMIS.

On the political developments in 2022, Council members welcomed the conclusion of the electoral process and the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud,⁴¹ and took note of the

³⁷ See [S/PV.9125](#).

³⁸ See [S/PV.8965](#).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, United Kingdom, United States, France and Ireland.

⁴⁰ See [S/PV.8965](#). See also letter dated 26 February 2022 from the Permanent Representative of Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2022/162](#)). See also report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in which he stated that the international naval operations within the territorial sea of Somalia had ceased following the expiration on 3 March of the relevant authorizations set out in resolution [2608 \(2021\) \(S/2022/819\)](#).

⁴¹ See [S/PV.9040](#).

formation of a new government led by Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre.⁴² Concerning women's representation, while several Council members noted that it fell short of the 30 per cent quota, they also congratulated Sadia Yasin Haji Samatar on being the first Somali woman elected Deputy Speaker.⁴³ Throughout the year, several Council members also called for meaningful participation of women in political processes, including in decision-making.⁴⁴ In this regard, the representatives of India and Brazil took note of the increase in the participation of women following the appointment of the Cabinet, while the representative of Ireland held the view that the number of women appointed to the new Cabinet fell short of Somalia's own commitments.⁴⁵ Council members also discussed the constitutional reform process,⁴⁶ and national reconciliation efforts among the Federal Government and the federal member states of Somalia.⁴⁷

Concerning the humanitarian situation, Council members discussed the deteriorating conditions resulting in acute food insecurity and displacement, exacerbated by an unprecedented drought. In that context, several Council members noted the growing need for humanitarian assistance,⁴⁸ with some also referring to the impact of climate change as a contributing factor to the dire humanitarian conditions.⁴⁹ Later in the year, Council members warned about the risk of famine in Somalia and called for scaling up the efforts to avert such a scenario.⁵⁰

On the security front, the discussions in the Council focused on the persistent threat posed by Al-Shabaab, with members condemning the group's terrorist attacks, which continued

⁴² See [S/PV.9125](#), Ireland, India, United Arab Emirates, Albania, Mexico and Brazil,

⁴³ See [S/PV.9040](#), United Kingdom, Norway, France, Albania, Ireland, Mexico and United States.

⁴⁴ See [S/PV.9040](#), Albania, Ireland and Mexico; [S/PV.9071](#), Gabon; [S/PV.9125](#), Ireland, Norway and Albania.

⁴⁵ See [S/PV.9125](#).

⁴⁶ See [S/PV.8965](#), United Kingdom; [S/PV.9040](#), United Kingdom, Norway, France, Ireland, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and India; [S/PV.9125](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, Albania and United States.

⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8965](#), Norway; [S/PV.9040](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and United States; [S/PV.9125](#), United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, China, United States and Brazil.

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8965](#), United Kingdom, India, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United States, Norway, Ireland, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, China and Albania; [S/PV.9040](#), France and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9125](#), India, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Albania and France.

⁴⁹ See [S/PV.8965](#), United Kingdom, France, Norway, Ireland, Mexico, United Arab Emirates and Albania; [S/PV.9040](#), Norway, Albania, Ireland, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and Mexico; [S/PV.9071](#), Ghana; [S/PV.9125](#), Ireland, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, Mexico and France.

⁵⁰ See [S/PV.9040](#), United Kingdom, Norway, China, Albania, Ireland, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Mexico, United Arab Emirates, India and United States; [S/PV.9125](#), United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, United Arab Emirates, Mexico, China, United States and Brazil.

in 2022. In connection with the reconfiguration of the African Union-led Mission, Council members paid tribute to the efforts of troop- and police-contributing countries that had served in AMISOM and welcomed the establishment of the successor Mission.⁵¹ Noting that it was rare that the Council got the opportunity to help shape the transition of a mission, the representative of the United States stated that the mandate of ATMIS provided the opportunity to adapt and reinvigorate the African-led international effort against Al-Shabaab. Several Council members underscored the importance of ensuring sustainable and predictable financing for ATMIS to be effective in fulfilling its mandate.⁵² The representative of France held the view that no new funding for ATMIS, regardless of the amount, would suffice without Somali efforts to generate armed forces, together with the federal states, or without strong support from ATMIS to help Somali forces and conduct offensive operations with them.⁵³ The representative of the United Kingdom, noting that her country provided funding to ATMIS, encouraged other Member States to join in that endeavour so that Somali forces could develop the capacity and capabilities they needed to end the threat posed by Al-Shabaab.⁵⁴

In 2022, the decisions of the Council were also focused on the issues outlined above, and specifically on the reconfiguration of AMISOM and the review of the mandate of UNSOM.

Concerning the reconfiguration of AMISOM, on 31 March, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#). By this resolution, the Council endorsed the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to reconfigure AMISOM into ATMIS and authorized, for an initial period of 12 months, the Member States of the African Union to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, support the capacity building of the integrated Somali security and police forces, conduct a phased handover of security responsibilities to Somalia and support peace and reconciliation efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states in support of the development of a stable, federal, sovereign and united Somalia.⁵⁵ The Council

⁵¹ See [S/PV.9009](#).

⁵² See [S/PV.9040](#), China, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Russian Federation and India; [S/PV.9125](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China.

⁵³ See [S/PV.9040](#).

⁵⁴ See [S/PV.9125](#).

⁵⁵ Resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#), para. 22.

further decided that the strategic objectives of ATMIS would include, inter alia, conducting jointly planned and targeted operations with Somali security forces to degrade Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), supporting Somali security forces by, inter alia, jointly holding priority population centres and providing protection for the local communities, United Nations personnel and installations, assisting the Federal Government in the implementation of stabilization efforts for all recovered areas, as well as supporting the capacity development of the Somali security forces.⁵⁶ By the same resolution, the Council maintained the number of authorized uniformed personnel to 19,626, inclusive of a minimum of 1,040 police personnel including five Formed Police Units, the same as it was for AMISOM, until 31 December 2022 and endorsed the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council to draw down 2,000 personnel by that date.⁵⁷ Paragraph 27 of the resolution further authorized the Member States of the African Union, between 1 January 2023 and 31 March 2023, to deploy up to 17,626 uniformed personnel, inclusive of a minimum of 1,040 police personnel including five Formed Police Units.⁵⁸

On 21 December, acting under Chapter VII, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), in which it noted the African Union request to extend Phase 1 of ATMIS for the drawdown of 2,000 ATMIS personnel until 30 June 2023 and exceptionally extended its authorizations and affirmed that paragraph 27 of resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) was annulled.⁵⁹

With regard to UNSOM, on 26 May, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2632 \(2022\)](#), extending the mandate of the Mission for a period of five months until 31 October 2022.⁶⁰ In the same resolution, the Council welcomed the conclusion of the electoral process, resulting in the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, allowing for the peaceful transition of power, and underscored that the swift formation of an inclusive federal government, with the full, equal and meaningful participation of women, would help to progress critical national priorities, promote national reconciliation, security, and support transition from

⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 23.

⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 26.

⁵⁸ Ibid., para. 27.

⁵⁹ Resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), second preambular paragraph and para. 1(a).

⁶⁰ Resolution [2632 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For additional details about the mandate of UNSOM, see part X, sect. II.

international security support.⁶¹ The Council also underscored that the mandate of UNSOM was complementary to the mandates of ATMIS, United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), the United Nations country team, and the support provided by the African Union and international partners.⁶² Furthermore, the Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a strategic review of UNSOM to include recommendations for clearly defined, measurable and realistic benchmarks to track the timely execution and achievement of its mandate and to report to the Council by 30 September 2022.⁶³

On 31 October, the Council adopted with one abstention resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#),⁶⁴ endorsing the proposed benchmarks and recommendations set out in the strategic review and extending the mandate and tasks of UNSOM, for one additional year until 31 October 2023.⁶⁵ It requested UNSOM to maintain and strengthen its presence across Somalia and to continue to strengthen its cooperation with Somalia and ATMIS.⁶⁶ Recognizing the renewed operations against Al-Shabaab, the Council encouraged UNSOM to support Somalia to (a) ensure that plans were in place to protect civilians and communities in areas which were the focus of military operations, prior to, during and after engagements; (b) accelerate implementation of the national stabilization strategy and state-level stabilization plans; (c) support Somali civilian leadership, ownership and oversight in the planning and coordination of stabilization efforts; (d) promote expansion of a governance and service delivery to areas and districts where fragility persisted; and (e) ensure timely, balanced support to areas newly, or recently recovered from Al-Shabaab.⁶⁷ In explaining the vote, the representative of the United States stated that his country was encouraged by the fact that resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#) had incorporated recommendations from the strategic review of UNSOM, including further coordination between ATMIS, UNSOS, the United Nations country team and other multilateral and bilateral partners.⁶⁸ The representative of

⁶¹ Resolution [2632 \(2022\)](#), third preambular paragraph.

⁶² *Ibid.*, fourth preambular paragraph.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, para. 3. For more information about the report on the independent strategic review of UNSOM, see [S/2022/716](#).

⁶⁴ See [S/PV.9177](#). *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: China.

⁶⁵ Resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), paras. 2 and 4.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

⁶⁸ See [S/PV.9177](#). See also resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#), para. 3.

China noted that his country abstained in the voting as it considered that there was still need for improvement in resolution [2657 \(2022\)](#) on issues such as the protection of civilians, humanitarian access, climate change and the protection of children, and that the future direction of relevant efforts had to be clarified.⁶⁹ The representative of the Russian Federation said that her delegation voted in favour, but that it shared the view of China concerning the imbalanced nature of some of the wording of the resolution, including with respect to humanitarian issues, the protection of children in armed conflict and human rights. The representative of the Russian Federation also regretted that the resolution did not sufficiently reflect the recommendations of the strategic review of UNSOM and its mandate conducted by the Secretariat's independent team.

In 2022, the Council also heard three briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) and received updates about the Committee's activities in the reporting period. On 24 February, the Chair reported that Committee members welcomed the continued improvement in the relationship between the Panel of Experts and the Federal Government of Somalia, particularly as regards cooperation on the implementation of the charcoal ban.⁷⁰ On 21 June, the Chair noted, inter alia, that the members of the Committee had expressed the view that the successful conclusion of the presidential elections presented a renewed opportunity to cooperate and collaborate with the Federal Government on moving forward with important issues that fell under the Committee's remit.⁷¹ At the same meeting, the representative of Ghana underscored the need for cooperation and unified action within the Council, which was critical to ensuring strict compliance with all the sanctions measures and sustained pressure on all parties to end and prevent all grave violations against children. The representative of Gabon stated, inter alia, that his country supported the recommendation that encouraged the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners to make various efforts in order to dry up the finances of Al-Shabaab, including through restrictions and assets seizure, targeting in particular the money that Al-Shabaab considered essential for carrying out its operations. In his last briefing of the year, held on 19 October, the Chair informed the Council about the

⁶⁹ See [S/PV.9177](#).

⁷⁰ See [S/PV.8976](#).

⁷¹ See [S/PV.9071](#).

Committee's activities in the reporting period including on the thematic reports received from the Panel of Experts.⁷²

The Council also adopted two resolutions concerning the sanctions regime relating to Somalia. On 15 November, the Council adopted resolution [2661 \(2022\)](#) extending resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#) for two days until 17 November 2022.⁷³ On 17 November, acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted with four abstentions resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#).⁷⁴ By that resolution, the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 15 December 2023, and expanded the tasks referred to in paragraph 11 of resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#) to include those contained in paragraphs 32 and 35 of the resolution.⁷⁵ By the resolution, the Council also renewed the maritime interdiction of charcoal, weapons or military equipment and improvised explosive devices components until 15 November 2023,⁷⁶ and reaffirmed the ban on components of improvised explosive devices.⁷⁷ In addition, the Council reaffirmed the partial arms embargo and the exemptions on deliveries on weapons and military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities whose beneficiaries were the Somali security and police institutions or those listed in paragraph 21.⁷⁸ It further confirmed its commitment to working with Somalia to ensure that the notification procedures were lifted progressively, in light of the progress made against the benchmarks set out in the technical assessment ([S/2022/698](#)).⁷⁹ The Council also recalled previous decisions concerning the asset freeze, travel ban and charcoal ban measures, and renewed the humanitarian exemption to the assets freeze without specifying an expiry date.⁸⁰ By the same resolution, the Council decided that the name of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia was to be known as the "Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab".⁸¹

⁷² See [S/PV.9157](#).

⁷³ Resolution [2661 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

⁷⁴ See [S/PV.9196](#).

⁷⁵ Resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), para. 44. For more information on the mandate of the Panel, see part IX, sect. I.

⁷⁶ Resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), para. 41.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 37.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 10-11, 14-15, 18 and 21.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 13.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 26, 28 and 34.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 24. For more information on the mandate of the Committee, see part IX, sect. I.

In the resolution, the Council emphasized that its objective was to establish a consolidated framework to strengthen state- and peace-building in Somalia, defeat Al-Shabaab and complement the mandates of UNSOM and ATMIS, including in particular through: (a) supporting weapons and ammunition management and security sector reform in Somalia (pillar 1); and (b) degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab (pillar 2).⁸² By the same resolution, the Council requested the Somali Government authorities to consider developing and submitting a proposal for consideration by the Committee, for the one-off, complete disposal of charcoal stockpiles to prevent Al-Shabaab from profiting from the sale.⁸³

In the explanation of their votes, several Council members presented their views on the sanctions regime relating to Somalia.⁸⁴ In addition, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed disagreement over several aspects of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), including references to questions relating to bilateral relations between Djibouti and Eritrea and the approach to Al-Shabaab.⁸⁵ He said that his delegation continued to be troubled by the ambivalent approach to Al-Shabaab, which blurred the focus of global counter-terrorism efforts. Despite this entity's dangerous nature and its affiliation with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaida, he added that for some reason it continued to be kept at a distance from the Committees established pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#), respectively. In this regard, the representative of the Russian Federation held the view that the resolution took another erroneous step by enshrining on paper the notion that Al-Shabaab would be dealt with by the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#), which was in charge of the Somalia sanctions regime. The representative of Kenya explained, on the other hand, that his country had voted in favour to demonstrate its backing for the resolution's tougher measures against the Al-Qaida affiliate in Somalia. He added that Kenya and the other African members of the Council were instrumental in ensuring that resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#) was framed in a way that clarified that the enemy was a terrorist group, Al-Shabaab. He also stated that they had increased pressure on the group by making it easier for the Federal Government to acquire more lethal weapons. The

⁸² Resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, para. 36(b).

⁸⁴ See [S/PV.9196](#). For more information about discussions relating to Article 41, see part VII, sect. III.

⁸⁵ See [S/PV.9196](#).

representative of the United Arab Emirates stressed that a critical aspect, which had to be part of any discussion on countering terrorism, was the importance of not linking terrorism to religion and welcomed the inclusion of a paragraph jointly put forward by the United Arab Emirates and the three African members of the Council that condemned terrorist groups' attempts to craft distorted narratives based on the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of religion.

Meetings: The situation in Somalia

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8965 15 February 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2022/101)		Somalia	Special Representative of the 13 Council Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Head of Delegation of the European Union	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.8976 24 February 2022					One Council member (Ireland) ^b	
S/PV.9009 31 March 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2022/277)	Somalia		Six Council members, ^c Somalia	Resolution 2628 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9040 23 May 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2022/392)		Somalia	Special Representative of the 13 Council Secretary-General and Head of UNSOM, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Transition Mission for Somalia (ATMIS)	13 Council members, ^d all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9044 26 May 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2022/392)	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2022/412)	Somalia		Somalia	Resolution 2632 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.9071 21 June 2022					Three Council members (Gabon, Ghana and Ireland ^e)	
S/PV.9125 7 September 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2022/665)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSOM, Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Acting Head of ATMIS, Special Representative of the European Union for the Horn of Africa	13 Council members, ^f all invitees	
S/PV.9157 19 October 2022	Letters dated 10 and 15 October 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/754 and S/2022/766)				One Council member (Ireland) ^g	
S/PV.9177 31 October 2022	Letter dated 26 September 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/716)	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2022/812)	Somalia		Six Council members, ^h invitee	Resolution 2657 (2022) 14-0-1 ⁱ

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Letter dated 15 October 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/766)					
S/PV.9193 15 November 2022	Letter dated 15 September 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/698)	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2022/855)				Resolution 2661 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9196 17 November 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2022/865)	Somalia		Eight Council members, ^f invitee	Resolution 2662 (2022) 11-0-4 ^h (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9232 21 December 2022		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2022/983)			Six Council members ^l	Resolution 2670 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The representative of Ireland spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#).

^c Albania, China, India, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^d Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^e The representative of Ireland spoke in her capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#).

^f Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^g The representative of Ireland spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#).

^h China, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

ⁱ For: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: China.

^j China, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^k *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States;
against: none; *abstaining*: China, Gabon, Ghana, Russian Federation.

^l China, France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom and United States.