

7. Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

During the period under review, the Security Council held 22 meetings and adopted six resolutions under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”. Sixteen of the meetings took the form of briefings and six were convened for the adoption of a resolution.²¹⁸ More information on the meetings, including on participants and outcomes, is provided in the tables below. Besides meetings, Council members also held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.²¹⁹ In addition, the Council held two private (closed) meetings with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).²²⁰

Consistent with prior practice, the Council considered several topics under this item, namely, the situation in the Sudan and the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, the situation in the Abyei Area and the mandate of UNISFA, and the situation in South Sudan and the mandate of UNMISS.²²¹ The Council also discussed the work of the Committees and Panels of Experts concerning the Sudan and South Sudan and the implementation of resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), by which the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

In relation to the Sudan, the Council was briefed four times by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of UNITAMS further to the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the country and the activities of the Mission.²²² The Council also heard one briefing by a civil society representative.²²³ The Special Representative focused his statements on the impact of the 25 October 2021 military takeover of the

²¹⁸ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

²¹⁹ See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap 26.

²²⁰ The private meetings were held under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”. See [S/PV.8985](#) and [S/PV.9186](#).

²²¹ For more information on the mandates of UNISFA, UNMISS and UNITAMS, see part X.

²²² See [S/PV.9006](#), [S/PV.9041](#), [S/PV.9129](#) and [S/PV.9211](#).

²²³ See [S/PV.9129](#).

Government on the political, economic, humanitarian and security situation in the Sudan. He also updated the Council on the work of the African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and United Nations in support of the Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led political dialogue to restore the political transition.

At the meeting held on 28 March 2022, the Special Representative noted that the Sudan remained without a functioning Government since the coup d'état.²²⁴ Furthermore, protests against the coup d'état and the violent repression against them continued, and the economic, humanitarian and security situations in the country were deteriorating. In terms of economic developments, the Special Representative reported on the 45 per cent fall of the Sudanese pound against the United States dollar, a dramatic price increase for basic goods and services, the absence of foreign investment, and dwindling of exports. He added that the combined effects of the conflict, economic crisis and poor harvests would likely double the number of people facing acute hunger to approximately 18 million by the end of 2022. The Special Representative stated that, in the absence of a political solution to the crisis, the security situation had worsened across the country. In Darfur, crime and lawlessness were on the rise and inter-communal conflict had intensified. He welcomed steps taken by the Government of the Sudan and the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement to begin the training for and standing up of the joint security-keeping force. He further expressed support for the Government's request for international support to implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures. The Special Representative noted that, meanwhile, frequent protests against military rule continued in Khartoum and elsewhere, with protestors continuing to be killed, injured, arrested and subject to criminal charges. He added that it was of particular concern that women were targeted and subjected to violence and intimidation by members of the security forces, mentioning that as of 22 March 2022, 16 women had reportedly been raped during protests in Khartoum.

The Special Representative announced that the United Nations, African Union and IGAD had agreed to join efforts in supporting the Sudan through the next phase of the political process by facilitating an inclusive Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led political process with the full and meaningful participation of women. According to the Special Representative, in order to have a

²²⁴ See [S/PV.9006](#).

chance of succeeding, the political talks required favorable conditions which entailed an end to the violence and the establishment of the right to hold peaceful demonstrations, the release of political detainees, and a firm commitment to phase out the emergency status in the country.

On 13 September 2022, the Special Representative noted the announcement on 4 July 2022 by the President of the Sovereign Council, General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, of the military's intention to withdraw from politics, which generated momentum among civilian forces, resulting in several major initiatives aimed at reaching a common civilian vision.²²⁵ One such initiative was a draft constitutional framework presented by the Sudanese Bar Association which gathered a broad spectrum of civilian stakeholders. The Special Representative emphasized that, while important differences about the institutional division of powers and particularly the role of the military remained, there was nevertheless a wide-ranging consensus on, among other things, the need for a civilian head of State, an independent prime minister and cabinet composed of experts and technocrats, and that transitional justice should be high on the list of priorities. With regard to the security situation, he noted the particularly worrying surge of violence in Darfur and Blue Nile, with UNITAMS documenting 40 incidents of inter-communal violence resulting in the death of more than 300 civilians from 24 May to 28 August 2022 and urged all communities to refrain from hate speech and the authorities to urgently address protection gaps. As a positive step in the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, the Special Representative referred to the graduation of the first batch of 2,000 fighters for the joint security-keeping force in Darfur, while also urging the authorities to begin their deployment. He informed Council members that humanitarian needs were at record levels owing to a combination of ongoing political instability, economic crises, a rise in inter-communal violence, poor harvests and floods. Some 11.7 million people were facing acute hunger and the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan was only 32 per cent funded.

At the meeting held on 7 December 2022, the Special Representative informed the Council that, on 5 December 2022, the military leadership and a broad range of civilian actors signed a political framework agreement to lay the ground for a final political accord and the

²²⁵ See [S/PV.9129](#).

formation of a new civilian Government, leading the country towards recovery and democratic elections over a two-year transitional phase.²²⁶ The agreement followed negotiations, facilitated by the trilateral mechanism, based on the draft constitutional document prepared under the auspices of the Sudanese Bar Association. While the signing of the framework agreement was an important breakthrough, critical contentious issues such as security sector reform and the merger of forces, transitional justice, the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, the status of the dismantling committee and the situation in eastern Sudan still needed to be addressed. He underlined the importance of a sufficiently inclusive process in the lead up to a final political agreement in order to safeguard against the influence of those who did not see their interests advanced by a political settlement. He also cautioned that as the Sudan got closer to reaching a final political agreement, those who did not see their interests advanced by a political settlement could escalate attempts to undermine the process.

Reflecting on the challenges during the 13 months since the coup d'état, the Special Representative recalled that over 900 people had reportedly been killed and many more injured in violent conflict and that the resurgence of large-scale violence demonstrated the increasing fragility at the State level, exacerbated by the continued Government vacuum. In that regard, he noted that the situation in Blue Nile remained precarious despite the imposition of a state of emergency, while inter-communal violence in Lagawa locality, West Kordofan, in mid-October 2022 resulted in the killing of at least 19 and displacement of 65,000 people. Furthermore, there was intense fighting in Central Darfur between the Sudan Liberation Army led by Abdul Wahid Al-Nur and the Rapid Support Forces. Across the Sudan, 260,000 people had been displaced since the beginning of 2022 as a result of the conflict. Humanitarian partners estimated that about 15.8 million people, one third of the population, would need humanitarian assistance in 2023, which was an increase of 1.5 million compared to 2022. He concluded by noting that the framework agreement offered a path for realizing the aspirations of the Sudan's young people, women and men and that working together with the United Nations, Council members and the larger international community in support of those efforts could help them move forward on their chosen path.

²²⁶ See [S/PV.9211](#).

In his statement to the Council on 13 September 2022, the President of the Sudan Social Development Organization (SUDO) discussed the efforts of civil society under the Sudanese Bar Association initiative to reach an agreement on a civilian Government.²²⁷ He underscored that a civilian Government could not be established without a unified army and State authority and that such a government was necessary to stabilize the economic situation, reform the civil service, begin constitutional reform, resolve the issue of transitional justice, and address insecurity in Darfur. The President of SUDO highlighted the lack of progress on ensuring the meaningful representation of women during the transition period and noted that, at the initiative of the Bar Association, civilian stakeholders agreed that 50 per cent of the cabinet and Sovereign Council and more than 40 per cent of the Transitional Legislative Council had to be represented by women.

In their discussions in 2022, most Council members expressed concern and disappointment with the negative impact of the 25 October 2021 military takeover on the political transition, as well as socioeconomic, humanitarian and security conditions in the Sudan. Council members welcomed and expressed support for the African Union-IGAD-United Nations trilateral mechanism and urged all stakeholders to negotiate in good faith with a view to restoring the political transition. Multiple Council members stressed that the transition process had to be inclusive and to consider the concerns of all stakeholders, particularly women, youth and other marginalized groups.²²⁸ Council members welcomed the signing of the 5 December political framework agreement, describing it as a good step towards ending the political crisis in the country, with a number of speakers calling upon the parties to work towards a final agreement and the restoration of a civilian Government.²²⁹ Some speakers further called on other political stakeholders that had not done so to sign the framework agreement.²³⁰

²²⁷ See [S/PV.9129](#).

²²⁸ See [S/PV.9006](#), India, Ireland, Albania, Norway and Mexico; [S/PV.9041](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United Arab Emirates, Albania, Brazil, Russian Federation, Norway, Mexico, Ireland and United States; [S/PV.9129](#), Ireland, Norway, Brazil, India, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya) and Albania; and [S/PV.9211](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Mexico and France.

²²⁹ See [S/PV.9211](#), United Kingdom, Norway, United States, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, France and India.

²³⁰ Russian Federation, China and Mexico.

Council members condemned the violence and human rights violations against protesters against the military takeover, including acts of sexual violence, and called on the military authorities to create the necessary conditions for political dialogue by lifting the state of emergency, allowing peaceful protests and freedom of expression, and releasing all political detainees.²³¹ With respect to insecurity and violence in Darfur, Blue Nile and Western Kordofan, some speakers urged the Government to ensure the full implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and the national plan for the protection of civilians.²³² Several delegations stressed the need for the international community to ensure continued support to the Government to ensure the full implementation of the peace agreement and the national plan.²³³

With respect to the economic and humanitarian situation, several delegations expressed concern with the decision of international financial institutions and donors to suspend aid to the Sudan following the military takeover, particularly noting the impact of such measures on the civilian population and objected to linking such support to progress in the political process.²³⁴ In this regard, the representative of the Russian federation noted that the politicization of the provision of economic and financial assistance had already led to divisions in society, as well as a loss of civic trust in the transitional authorities, which in turn had led to general instability and new separatist trends in the country.²³⁵ The representatives of Gabon and Kenya, speaking on behalf of the three African members of the Council, echoed the appeal of the Secretary-General for the creation of exceptional modalities to ensure continued international assistance for the Sudan and called on the international community to reconsider the temporary suspension of

²³¹ See [S/PV.9006](#), United Kingdom, France, United States, Ireland, Albania and Mexico; [S/PV.9041](#), United Kingdom, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, Norway, France, Mexico, Ireland and United States; [S/PV.9129](#), United Kingdom; and [S/PV.9211](#), United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland, Ghana (speaking also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United States and France.

²³² See [S/PV.9006](#), United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Ireland, Albania, Norway and Mexico; [S/PV.9041](#) Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Norway, France, Mexico and Ireland ; [S/PV.9129](#), Ireland, France; and [S/PV.9211](#), United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United States, Albania, Brazil and Mexico.

²³³ See [S/PV.9041](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); [S/PV.9129](#), United Arab Emirates, China; and [S/PV.9211](#), United Arab Emirates.

²³⁴ See [S/PV.9006](#), India, China and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9129](#), United Arab Emirates, India, and China; and [S/PV.9211](#), India.

²³⁵ See [S/PV.9006](#).

aid.²³⁶ Other Council members opined that an inclusive political settlement and the establishment of a civilian Government was the best way to improve socioeconomic and humanitarian conditions in the country.²³⁷ In his remarks at Council meetings, the representative of the Sudan appealed to the international community for financial support for the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, particularly the provisions of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the resumption of development assistance to mitigate the impact of necessary economic reforms.²³⁸

By resolution [2636 \(2022\)](#) of 3 June 2022, the Council unanimously extended the existing mandate of UNITAMS as contained in resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#) for a period of one year, until 3 June 2023.²³⁹ After the adoption, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that, as penholder, his delegation's preference would have been for the Council to adopt a substantive resolution that voiced support for the vital efforts of UNITAMS in facilitating a Sudanese-led process to restore a civilian-led transition toward democracy.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, he added that a substantive resolution would also have enabled the priorities of the Mission to be updated to reflect the request of the Sudan for additional support on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, transition justice and civilian protection. A preference for a substantive resolution reflecting the realities on the ground was also expressed by the representatives of Albania, Ireland, Mexico and Norway. The representative of the Russian Federation urged all external players, including UNITAMS, to play a constructive role and recalled that the Mission was deployed at the invitation of the Government to support national efforts in strengthening peace, fulfilling the terms of the Juba Peace Agreement, dealing with issues relating to internally displaced persons and mobilizing assistance for economic development. The representative of China stated that the international community should maintain the patience necessary to create space for the resolution of differences among parties, avoid choosing sides, aggravating tensions and exerting excessive pressure. He recalled that UNITAMS was a political mission established

²³⁶ See [S/PV.9006](#), Ghana; [S/PV.9041](#), Kenya; and [S/PV.9211](#), Ghana.

²³⁷ See [S/PV.9041](#), Albania, Norway and United States; and [S/PV.9129](#), United Kingdom.

²³⁸ See [S/PV.9006](#); [p. S/PV.9041](#); [S/PV.9129](#); and [S/PV.9211](#).

²³⁹ Resolution [2636 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

²⁴⁰ See [S/PV.9054](#).

at the request of the Sudan under Chapter VI of the Charter, that it had to abide by the mandate of the Council and respect the Sudan's sovereignty, and called on it to strengthen its mandate on mobilizing international development assistance.

Council members also heard four briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) on the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts.²⁴¹ The Chair informed Council members that the Panel submitted its final report to the Committee in December 2021, after which the Committee reiterated some of the Panel's recommendations to the Permanent Representatives of the Sudan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt and Libya on 1 March 2022.²⁴² By resolution [2620 \(2022\)](#) of 15 February 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for a period of 13 months until 12 March 2023.²⁴³ The Council took note of the Secretary-General's report of 31 July 2021, as requested in resolution [2562 \(2021\)](#), providing a review of the situation in Darfur and recommending benchmarks to assess the sanctions measures. The Council further expressed its intention to consider by 31 August 2022 adjusting the measures to respond to the situation in Darfur establishing clear, well-identified, and realistic key benchmarks.²⁴⁴ In Council discussions during the reporting period, several Council members, as well as the representative of the Sudan, consistently stressed that the sanctions measures no longer corresponded to the situation in Darfur and impeded the implementation of Juba Peace Agreement and the Government's ability to maintain security and protect civilians.²⁴⁵ The representative of China expressed regret that the Council was not able to define benchmarks by 31 August 2022 and noted that such benchmarks had to be clear, well-defined and realistic.²⁴⁶

In addition to the above, pursuant to resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), the Prosecutor of the International Court briefed the Council twice in 2022 in relation to Darfur.²⁴⁷ On 17 January

²⁴¹ See [S/PV.9005](#), [S/PV.9070](#), [S/PV.9128](#) and [S/PV.9210](#).

²⁴² See [S/PV.9005](#). See also [S/2022/48](#).

²⁴³ Resolution [2620 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 5. For the report of the Secretary-General, see [S/2021/696](#). The Council did not establish benchmarks to assess the measures in 2022.

²⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8964](#), China and Russian Federation; [S/PV.9005](#), Sudan; [S/PV.9006](#), Russian Federation and China ; [S/PV.9041](#), China; [S/PV.9070](#), Russian Federation, China and Gabon; [S/PV.9129](#), China and Russian Federation; and [S/PV.9211](#), Russian Federation, China and Sudan.

²⁴⁶ See [S/PV.9129](#). For further detail on the discussion, see part II, sect. VIII.

²⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8948](#) and [S/PV.9113](#).

2022, the Prosecutor expressed concern with the suspension of investigative activities in the Sudan by his office following the military takeover and stressed the need for safe and secure access to the country and the archives.²⁴⁸ On 23 August 2022, the Prosecutor briefed the Council by videoconference from Khartoum and reported on his first visit to Darfur and the interaction with Sudanese authorities and internally displaced persons.²⁴⁹ In terms of procedural developments, he reported that the case against Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), the senior Janjaweed militia leader and sole suspect in the Court’s custody in relation to the situation in Darfur, had started in April 2022 on 31 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, he stated that the Government’s cooperation with his office had taken a step backwards in recent months and underlined the need for the issuance of multiple entry visa to help the establishment of an office in Khartoum, the collection of evidence and building relationships with the Sudanese authorities and the victims.

With respect to the Abyei Area and the situation between the Sudan and South Sudan, Council members were briefed twice by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa and once by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations.²⁵⁰ At the meeting held on 21 April 2022, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations stated that, while the overall security situation in Abyei remained calm, the trust deficit between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities remained of great concern.²⁵¹ He noted several incidents of inter-communal violence since October 2021 in Noong/Annam, Kolom, Leu/Al Luo and the Amiet common market/Faydelzaraf areas that resulted in the killing of 29 people, including two women, and 30 injured from both communities. He underlined that it was first and foremost for the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to renew their engagement on the final status of Abyei and called upon them to use the next meeting of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee to move forward on the issue. He mentioned that significant progress was made in the development of the Abyei joint programme, through consultations

²⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8948](#).

²⁴⁹ See [S/PV.9113](#).

²⁵⁰ See [S/PV.9020](#) and [S/PV.9170](#).

²⁵¹ See [S/PV.9020](#).

between a team of representatives from the Department of Peace Operations, the Development Coordination Office and the United Nations country teams in the Sudan and South Sudan with women, youth, elders and other community members. The Under-Secretary-General informed the Council that the humanitarian situation had deteriorated largely owing to the inter-communal violence between the Twic Dinka and Ngok Dinka communities near Agok in February and March 2022. With respect to the other mandated area of UNISFA, he reported an absence of progress on re-operationalizing the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism team sites 11 and 12 and the headquarters of Sector 1 in Gok Machar after UNISFA was forced to relocate in 2021. Given the three direct attacks against their patrols in the past two months, the Under-Secretary-General concluded his remarks by strongly emphasizing the need to ensure the safety and security of UNISFA peacekeepers and called on the relevant authorities to investigate those incidents as a matter of priority.

In her statement at the same meeting, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa stated that, with the removal of the civilian Government in Khartoum, the momentum towards the resolution of outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan was suddenly stopped. Specifically, the meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism which was scheduled to take place in January 2022 was not held and no action was taken on the decisions reached at the previous meeting, including the withdrawal of Sudanese and South Sudanese forces from the safe demilitarized border zone and South Sudan's commitment to mediate between communities in Aweil towards the reactivation of the three locations of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. The Special Envoy nevertheless highlighted multiple engagements between the two countries in support of each other's peace processes. For example, in March 2022, General Al-Burhan visited Juba to address tensions between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and First Vice-President Riek Machar over the sharing of senior leadership positions in the future national army. South Sudanese officials, meanwhile, continued to shuttle between Juba and Khartoum to facilitate a solution between the military and civilian components of the transitional Government of the Sudan, as well as to exert efforts to convince Abdul Wahid Al-Nur and his faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army to join the peace process and to secure the resumption of negotiations between the Government and the

Al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North. General Al-Burhan and President Kiir also agreed to focus on cooperation along their common border, starting with the development of unitized oil fields, including in the Abyei Area.

At the meeting held on 27 October 2022, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa highlighted the renewed engagement of the Sudan and South Sudan to address the final status of Abyei and border issues.²⁵² She welcomed their agreement to enhance cooperation on issues related to Abyei and its final status, as well as their willingness to resume the meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee which had not met since 2017. Regarding the security situation, the Assistant Secretary-General noted a shift in the conflict dynamics over previous years, with a decrease in inter-communal violence between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities in 2022. However, since February 2022, a new conflict emerged between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities in southern Abyei with loss of lives and displacement on both sides. In coordination with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), UNISFA maintained close contact with the Government of South Sudan to support mediation efforts and, in particular, plans for a Government-facilitated peace conference in South Sudan. She expressed concern that, amid the tensions between the two communities, seven attacks on peacekeepers were recorded, including on 16 October 2022 when local community members threatened UNISFA personnel and demanded the removal of Twic Dinka employees and some international staff members from the Mission's headquarters. Finally, the Assistant Secretary-General reported that the reconfiguration of UNISFA into a multinational peacekeeping force was near completion, with 2,567 military personnel out of the authorized 3,250 personnel in place. She expressed the view that, with the Ngok Dinka-Twic Dinka conflict creating new protection needs in the south, the new force had to be better equipped to cover a wider area.

In her remarks, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa noted that, at the meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism on 24 May 2022, the two countries agreed to re-establish the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, activate river transport, immediately open border crossings, and recommit to withdrawing forces from the safe demilitarized border zone. Since May 2022, working with the Chairperson of the African Union

²⁵² See [S/PV.9170](#).

High-Level Implementation Panel, the Special Envoy had held separate consultations with the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities to find a way out of the stalemate on the final status of Abyei. She added that, on 24 October 2022, the Sudan and South Sudan agreed to jointly expedite the provision of services to the citizens of Abyei and to activate joint mechanisms to provide humanitarian services. She concluded by stating that, notwithstanding the improved bilateral relations, a renewed commitment regarding the implementation of transitional arrangements, as well as the dispute resolution over Abyei's final status, could not be set apart from the fragile internal situations in both countries.

In their discussions on Abyei and the border during the reporting period, Council members welcomed the improvement in the relations between the Sudan and South Sudan and stressed the importance of using that as an impetus to make progress on the final status of the territory. Council members reiterated their calls for the implementation of the Agreement of 20 June 2011, particularly through the establishment of the joint institutions provided thereunder, and the regular holding of meetings of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism. Most Council members expressed serious concern regarding persistent inter-communal violence in Abyei, including the conflict between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities. In that regard, a number of speakers highlighted the importance of UNISFA's role in supporting inter-communal peace initiatives and dialogue.²⁵³ Regarding the operations of UNISFA, many delegations called on the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to ensure the Mission's freedom of movement including the ability of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism to fully implement its mandate and return to its sector headquarters in Gok Machar.²⁵⁴ Finally, several Council members reiterated their calls on the Government of the Sudan to expedite the issuance of visas for the Mission's staff, including police personnel.²⁵⁵

²⁵³ See [S/PV.9020](#), United States, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, China, Mexico and Norway; and [S/PV.9170](#), United States, United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation and Ireland.

²⁵⁴ See [S/PV.9020](#), United States, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, United Arab Emirates, France, Ireland, China, Mexico, Albania and United Kingdom; and [S/PV.9170](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Albania, France, United Kingdom, Brazil, India, Mexico and Ireland.

²⁵⁵ See [S/PV.9020](#), United States, India, Ireland and Albania and Norway; and [S/PV.9170](#), United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Albania, Norway, India, Mexico and Ireland.

By resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) of 12 May 2022 and [2660 \(2022\)](#) of 14 November 2022, both adopted unanimously, the Council twice extended the mandate of UNISFA to support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Mission's mandate in the Abyei Area.²⁵⁶ While resolution [2630 \(2022\)](#) extended the mandate for 6 months, until 14 November 2022, resolution [2660 \(2022\)](#) did so for one year, until 15 November 2023. By virtue of both resolutions, the Council urged the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to provide full support for UNISFA in the implementation of its mandate and deployment of its personnel.²⁵⁷ In resolution [2630 \(2022\)](#), the Council further reiterated that the Abyei Area should be demilitarized from any forces, as well as armed elements of the local communities, and urged the two Governments and the local communities to take all necessary steps in that regard.²⁵⁸

In connection with the situation in South Sudan, the Council was briefed four times by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of UNMISS further to the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in the country.²⁵⁹ The Council was also briefed by the Interim Chairperson of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC),²⁶⁰ a representative of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,²⁶¹ and three civil society briefers.²⁶² In his briefings to the Council in 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General focused on the status of the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic in South Sudan as the two-year transitional period drew to a close. He also updated Council members on increasing levels of inter-communal violence and humanitarian needs in the country and the role of UNMISS in the protection of civilians and supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement.

²⁵⁶ Resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) and [2660 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

²⁵⁷ Resolutions [2630 \(2022\)](#) and [2660 \(2022\)](#), para. 4.

²⁵⁸ Resolution [2630 \(2022\)](#), para. 6.

²⁵⁹ See [S/PV.8987](#), [S/PV.9067](#), [S/PV.9134](#) and [S/PV.9219](#). See also [S/2022/156](#), [S/2022/468](#), [S/2022/689](#) and [S/2022/918](#).

²⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8987](#) and [S/PV.9219](#).

²⁶¹ See [S/PV.9067](#).

²⁶² See [S/PV.8987](#), [S/PV.9067](#) and [S/PV.9134](#).

In his first briefing of the year on 7 March 2022, the Special Representative stated that the ceasefire in South Sudan continued to largely hold, with civilian casualties significantly reduced over the past year.²⁶³ On the progress in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, he noted the conclusion of executive appointments at the national and state levels and the reconstitution of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and Council of State and state parliaments. He was concerned, however, that as the remaining 12 months of the transitional period commenced, an accumulation of unfulfilled commitments remained with limited time to address them. Key pending benchmarks related to the necessary conducive political and civic space, as well as technical and logistical prerequisites and an agreed timetable for free and fair elections. He also recalled that the constitution-making bill was still pending and that the graduation of unified forces was yet to commence, with no agreement on the command structure.

The Special Representative stressed that the slow implementation of the Revitalized Agreement came with a cost and that peace dividends for South Sudanese remained elusive. Nowhere was this more clearly reflected than in the frustration of marginalized youth, many of whom had joined tribal militias or channeled their anger at humanitarians and peacekeepers. He noted that subnational violence, which was fueled by national and local political competition, continued to spread. The conflicts involved the non-signatory armed groups, clashes between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in opposition, as well as community disputes over land and resources, including those induced by climate change. He added that humanitarian needs were projected to continue growing with the third consecutive year of floods, exacerbated by insecurity and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, while the appetite of donors to furnish additional resources was trending in reverse. With regard to the efforts of UNMISS, the Special Representative stated that the Mission had established 125 temporary operating bases to prevent and respond to conflict hotspots and enhanced its capabilities by moving away from static security tasks and maximizing the mobility of the force, which contributed to a 42 per cent decline in the number of civilian casualties over the past year. He

²⁶³ See [S/PV.8987](#).

also stated that UNMISS stood ready to provide technical advice on constitutional and electoral matters which were ultimately sovereign choices for the South Sudanese to make.

In his remarks on 20 June 2022, the Special Representative noted that, after the opposition's withdrawal from the transitional security mechanisms amid a tense security situation at the end of March, on 3 April 2022, the parties reached a breakthrough agreement on a single joint command structure for the necessary unified forces.²⁶⁴ It was now expected, according to the Special Representative, for the parties to agree on a roadmap recommitting themselves to the Revitalized Agreement, as jointly called for by the African Union, IGAD, the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the United Nations. He stated that more than 80 per cent of civilian casualties in 2022 had been attributed to inter-communal violence and community-based militias and particularly noted the spread of conflict in Eastern and Central Equatoria, Unity, Warrap and Jonglei states, as well as in the Abyei Area.

At the meeting held on 16 September 2022, the Special Representative informed Council members that on 4 August 2022 the signatory parties agreed on the roadmap for the remaining tasks which included revised benchmarks and timelines providing for an extension of the transition period for 24 months and the holding of elections in December 2024.²⁶⁵ He added that, while the roadmap was a welcome development, the extension of the transitional period had met with mixed reactions by many South Sudanese who raised concerns about the inclusivity of the process and called for greater clarity around the Government's commitment to implement the agreement on time.

On 13 December 2022, the Special Representative stated that notable progress had been made in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement in the past several months with the adoption of essential bills by the national legislature, including the constitution-making bill, as well as the ratification of the roadmap of 4 August.²⁶⁶ He noted that the graduation of the first phase of the necessary unified forces was largely complete and that the second phase required urgent financial, logistical and political support from the Government. While citing some progress in the preparation of the National Elections Act, he expressed concern that the deadlines

²⁶⁴ See [S/PV.9067](#).

²⁶⁵ See [S/PV.9134](#).

²⁶⁶ See [S/PV.9219](#).

relating to the Political Parties Act, the Political Parties Council, the reconstituted National Constitution Review Commission and the establishment of the Constitution Drafting Commission had been missed thereby causing a “domino effect” on subsequent key benchmarks in the roadmap. He reiterated the position of UNMISS that the first of the two phases recommended by the 2021 electoral needs assessment mission,²⁶⁷ namely fulfilling the legal requirements and preparing the grounds and environment for the conduct of elections, had to be completed before material assistance for their actual conduct would be contemplated.

With regard to the security situation, he reported that the year-long fracturing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Army in opposition and the Kit-Gwang splinter group had taken on an ethnic dimension in the Nile River corridor of Upper Nile state, and condemned the resulting human rights violations and abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence. He stated that UNMISS was coordinating with humanitarian partners to accommodate fleeing civilians and engaging politically at the state and national levels to bring the needed attention to the conflict and encourage a resolution. Moreover, as tensions continued to simmer and intensify as the electoral date drew closer, the Special Representative underscored that UNMISS was prioritizing the protection of civilians in all aspects of its mandated tasks. He deemed that those efforts would go a long way to support an expansion of civic and political space and a culture of non-violent debate and dispute resolution. With 9.4 million people projected to need humanitarian and protection assistance in 2023, he urged partners to continue to respond generously to the humanitarian response plan. Finally, the Special Representative concluded his remarks by stating that the new roadmap was a “second mortgage” on the Revitalized Agreement and that, as moral guarantors and partners of that agreement, it was the collective task of the international community to ensure that the parties had the best possible international support to fulfil their commitments to the people of South Sudan.

In his statements to the Council, the Interim Chairperson of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission focused on the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement including the development and progress of the roadmap of 4 August 2022. On 7 March 2022, he observed that the most critical tasks for the conduct of free, fair and credible

²⁶⁷ See [S/2021/661](#).

elections and the fulfillment of the Revitalized Agreement were the unification of forces and their deployment, the enactment of a permanent constitution, the review of the political parties and electoral-related laws, and the constitution of the Political Parties Council and the National Election Commission.²⁶⁸ Concerning the recurring challenges, he cited the lack of sufficient resources, the insufficient political will and commitment from some actors, trust deficits among the parties and capacity gaps, subnational violence and activities of holdout groups, the military defections from one signatory party to another, seasonal flooding and the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the challenges and the timelines provided under the Revitalized Agreement, he noted that the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission had tasked the Government of South Sudan to develop a clear roadmap and strategy on how to implement the outstanding critical tasks. On 13 December 2022, the Interim Chairperson provided an update on the implementation of the roadmap, particularly with respect to governance, permanent ceasefire and transitional security arrangements, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, resource, economic and financial management, and the making of the permanent constitution.²⁶⁹ In that context, he recommended to the Council to increase its engagement with the Government to adhere to the roadmap timelines and prioritize their implementation through the provision of predictable, timely and adequate funding for all tasks. He further recommended for the Council to encourage the Government to ensure that civic and political space were guaranteed and protected, to urgently address the root causes of inter-communal violence and insecurity particularly in Upper Nile and Jonglei states, and for the Council to remain seized of the peace process and consider undertaking regular visits to South Sudan as a show of solidarity.

In her remarks on 20 June 2022, the Acting Director in the Operations and Advocacy Division of Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs informed Council members that, against a backdrop of profound macroeconomic challenges in South Sudan, the drivers of conflict and climate shocks had resulted in a dire humanitarian situation.²⁷⁰ She noted that 8.3 million people were likely to experience severe insecurity during the lean season, of which 2.9 million would likely face emergency levels of hunger and 87,000 would face catastrophic and

²⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8987](#).

²⁶⁹ See [S/PV.9219](#).

²⁷⁰ See [S/PV.9067](#).

famine-like levels of insecurity. Furthermore, South Sudan was facing a fourth year of above-average rainfall which had disrupted the agricultural season and constrained food production. The Acting Director noted that more than two million people remained internally displaced and that more than 2.3 million were refugees. While underlining the commitment of humanitarian partners to stay and deliver in South Sudan, she reported that four humanitarian workers were killed in 2022 up to that point. She concluded her briefing with three messages to the Council. First, she stressed that the international response needed humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts working together to address the root causes of the crisis. Secondly, the Government and all parties to the conflict needed to ensure the safety of aid workers and assets. Lastly, with only 26 per cent of the 2022 humanitarian response plan funded, unearmarked and early funding at scale was urgently required to address the growing humanitarian needs, including to prevent a dangerous deterioration in the food security situation.

In their briefings on South Sudan, civil society participants discussed the impact of the delays in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, particularly increased levels of inter-communal and local conflicts and sexual and gender-based violence. In her remarks on 7 March 2022, Ms. Riya Williams Yuyada, a women's human rights and peace activist working with the Crown The Woman, a feminist non-governmental organization in South Sudan, addressed the limited progress made in the implementation of the agreement and the increased violence at the local level driven by the exclusionary nature of political and peace efforts.²⁷¹ She noted that the denial of protection and justice to survivors of gender-based violence resulting from near total impunity continued to be raised to her organization. In that regard, she urged the Council to follow-up on its previous call on the Government to improve the judicial system and establish the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, as well as to swiftly implement the joint action plan for the armed forces on addressing conflict-related sexual violence. On 20 June 2022, Ms. Lorna Merekaje, a South Sudanese human rights defender, civil rights activist and peace advocate, expressed similar views to Ms. Yuyada regarding the implementation of the peace agreement and violence and human rights violations against civilians.²⁷² She stated that the people of South

²⁷¹ See [S/PV.8987](#).

²⁷² See [S/PV.9067](#).

Sudan wanted to be given an opportunity to choose their leaders and participate in the design of a progressive agenda for the country, but that required strengthening the capacity of the institutions and personnel required to conduct a credible election, creating an environment conducive to the operation of free media and civic engagement without intimidation and reprisals, and strengthening the necessary legal framework. Furthermore, in order to enhance the contribution of civil society in South Sudan, she recommended the establishment of periodic forums in which civil society could engage with UNMISS in order to facilitate better in-country interaction and analysis and for the Council to authorize the Mission to facilitate or host periodic engagement with the Government and civil society. In her statement on 16 September 2022, the President of the South Sudan Women's Empowerment Network called on the region and the international community to support a broad-based process to ensure inclusivity in South Sudan's transition to peace, democracy and development, and in that regard, expressed support for the initiative of Fordham University to convene an inclusive political dialogue to help South Sudanese reach a broad consensus on a roadmap for a new transitional programme.²⁷³

During their discussions on South Sudan, Council members expressed concern with the delays in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement. They called upon the parties to fully implement the roadmap of 4 August in accordance with the timelines established therein and commended the facilitation efforts of IGAD and the African Union in that context. The representative of the United States expressed disappointment with the decision of the parties to extend the transitional period for another two years, despite failing to fully deliver on commitments made in the Revitalized Agreement in 2018.²⁷⁴ Many speakers underscored the importance of an inclusive transition process with the engagement of civil society, women, youth, persons with disabilities and other marginalized groups and called on the Government to address the continued shrinking of the civic space and create the conditions necessary for the holding of future elections. Council members condemned the subnational and inter-communal violence over the past year, including acts of sexual and gender-based violence, with many of them recalling the primary responsibility of the Government of South Sudan to protect civilians

²⁷³ See [S/PV.9134](#).

²⁷⁴ See [S/PV.9134](#) and [S/PV.9219](#).

and undertake inter-communal dialogue and reconciliation.²⁷⁵ Many speakers also called on the Government to investigate and ensure accountability for such crimes.²⁷⁶ Council members welcomed the graduation of the necessary unified forces stressing the importance of their urgent deployment to stabilize the security situation. Multiple delegations called for the review and lifting of the arms embargo imposed on South Sudan and noted that the embargo was hampering the deployment of the necessary unified forces, disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization and security sector reform efforts.²⁷⁷

Council members expressed serious concern with the humanitarian conditions in South Sudan, with many of them calling on the Government to ensure access and the safety and security of humanitarian workers. Several speakers called on the international community to strengthen humanitarian support for South Sudan.²⁷⁸ Furthermore, some Council members made specific reference to the impact of climate change and floods on the situation in the country and underscored the need to define sustainable and long-term solutions to address the consequences of the phenomenon.²⁷⁹ In his remarks, the representative of South Sudan noted that the new roadmap and extension of the transitional period were inevitable given that much remained to be implemented in the agreement, but stressed that it was crucial that the parties were able to agree on the way forward on their own and peacefully.²⁸⁰ He also touched upon the need for continued international financial support and the lifting of the arms embargo for the implementation of the

²⁷⁵ See [S/PV.8987](#), United States, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Brazil, Albania; [S/PV.9067](#), United States, Mexico, Russian Federation, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and France; [S/PV.9134](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, United Kingdom; and [S/PV.9219](#), United States, United Kingdom, Mexico, Albania, and Norway.

²⁷⁶ See [S/PV.8987](#), United States, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, United Kingdom and Norway; [S/PV.9067](#), United States, Ireland, Norway, and France; [S/PV.9134](#), United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway, Ireland, Albania, Mexico, United Kingdom and France; and [S/PV.9219](#), Mexico, Albania, Norway) and Ireland.

²⁷⁷ See [S/PV.8987](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana); [S/PV.9067](#), Russian Federation and China; [S/PV.9134](#), China and Russian Federation; and [S/PV.9219](#), Russian Federation, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China.

²⁷⁸ See [S/PV.8987](#), Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), China, India and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9067](#), India, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and China; [S/PV.9134](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), United Arab Emirates, Brazil; and [S/PV.9219](#), China and India.

²⁷⁹ See [S/PV.8987](#), Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania, Norway and United Arab Emirates; [S/PV.9067](#), Mexico, United Arab Emirates, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya) and Albania; [S/PV.9134](#), Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), Norway and Ireland; and [S/PV.9219](#), Mexico, Albania, United Arab Emirates and Ireland.

²⁸⁰ See [S/PV.9134](#).

agreement, as well as for the international community to fulfil its humanitarian pledges particularly noting the severe impact of floods.²⁸¹

By resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#) of 15 March 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year until 15 March 2023 with some modifications, particularly concerning the Mission’s support for constitution-drafting, the electoral process, combating and reporting on sexual and gender-based violence and providing risk assessments on the adverse effects of climate change.²⁸² With respect to the political process, the Council expressed its deep concern about the delays in implementing the Revitalized Agreement and called upon the Government and all relevant actors to take action to fulfill several priority measures, including, among others, providing security to re-designated protection of civilians sites, initiating a permanent constitution-making process, making progress on key milestones in the preparations for free and fair elections, and the completion of graduation of necessary unified forces.²⁸³

Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#) was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions by China and the Russian Federation. In her statement after the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation asserted that the Council and UNMISS did not have the appropriate resources to fulfil the functions of human rights capacity-building, combating sexual violence, defending the rights of women and fighting corruption, which were the internal matters of the country.²⁸⁴ She added that, while the Mission could, at the request of the host country, provide technical and logistical assistance for the conduct of elections, its core function was to stabilize the security situation and assist the South Sudanese authorities in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement. The representative of China objected to the inclusion of human rights-related text in the draft resolution and the assignment of climate change-related mandates to peacekeeping operations without an in-depth analysis of its impact and a clear understanding of climate change as a driver of security risks. Furthermore, the representatives of China and Ghana criticized the use of the term “human rights defenders” in the draft text, which was not agreed

²⁸¹ See [S/PV.9134](#) and [S/PV.9219](#).

²⁸² Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 and 3. For further detail on the mandate of UNMISS, see part X, sect. I.

²⁸³ Resolution [2625 \(2022\)](#), paras. 6 and 9.

²⁸⁴ See [S/PV.8994](#).

language and not clearly defined. While voting in favour of the resolution, the representative of India also expressed reservations regarding what he described as attempts to “securitize” climate change and added that the place for such discussions was within the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. As penholder of the draft resolution, the representative of the United States thanked Council members for their efforts to strengthen the mandate of UNMISS and noted that the renewed mandate reinforced the Mission’s core tasks, strengthened its sexual- and gender-based violence prevention activities and authorized it to provide electoral assistance.

In addition to the regular briefings relating to South Sudan and UNMISS, on 13 December 2022, Council members heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), providing a summary of the work of the Committee in 2022, including its discussions on the final report of the Panel of Experts and the granting of five exemptions with respect to the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze.²⁸⁵ By resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#) of 26 May 2022, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze on South Sudan until 31 May 2023, as well as the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 1 July 2023.²⁸⁶ The Council further requested the Secretary-General, in close consultations with UNMISS and the Panel of Experts, to conduct, no later than 15 April 2023, an assessment of progress achieved on the benchmarks established in resolution [2577 \(2021\)](#).²⁸⁷

Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#) was adopted with 10 votes in favour and five abstentions.²⁸⁸ In explaining their decision to abstain in the vote, the representatives of China, Gabon, India, Kenya and the Russian Federation expressed regret that the resolution did not take into account the improved situation in South Sudan and the views of the Government, IGAD and the African Union on the need to lift the arms embargo and targeted sanctions, noting that the measures were

²⁸⁵ See [S/PV.9219](#). For further information on the sanctions measures relating to South Sudan, see part VII, sect. III.

²⁸⁶ Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1, 12 and 18. For further information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.1.

²⁸⁷ Resolution [2633 \(2022\)](#), para. 5.

²⁸⁸ *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States; *Against*: none; *Abstained*: China, Gabon, India, Kenya, Russian Federation.

not effective in supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and hindered the strengthening of the armed forces.²⁸⁹ The representative of Kenya added that the resolution also fell short of the Council’s own commitment to progressively lift the measures. The representative of China recalled that his delegation put forward constructive amendments to the draft text, including on exempting training and non-lethal equipment, changing the application of exemption requests to reporting and adjusting the targeted sanctions which, had they been adopted, would have helped the country respond positively to the concerns of the African Union, enhance South Sudan’s security capacity and encourage the Government to take more substantive steps towards implementing the benchmarks.

For the purposes of facilitating the coverage of this item, information on meetings is set out below in three tables and under three headings, namely: (1) Sudan; (2) Sudan and South Sudan and Abyei; and (3) South Sudan.

Table 1
Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8948 17 January 2022			Sudan	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8964 15 February 2022	Letter dated 24 January 2022 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the President of the Council (S/2022/48)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/111)			Three Council members (China, Russian Federation, United States)	Resolution 2620 (2022) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII)
S/PV.9005 28 March 2022			Sudan		One Council member (Ghana) ^a , invitee	

²⁸⁹ See [S/PV.9045](#).

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9006 28 March 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (S/2022/172)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan	13 Council members ^b , all invitees	
S/PV.9041 24 May 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (S/2022/400)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members ^c , all invitees	
S/PV.9054 3 June 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2022/443)			Nine Council members ^d	Resolution 2636 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.9070 21 June 2022			Sudan		Five Council members ^e , Sudan	
S/PV.9113 23 August 2022			Sudan	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees ^f	
S/PV.9128 13 September 2022			Sudan		One Council member (Ghana) ^g , invitee	
S/PV.9129 13 September 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integration Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (S/2022/667)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President of Sudan Social Development Organization	13 Council members ^h , all invitees ⁱ	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9210 7 December 2022			Sudan		One Council member (Ghana) ^j , invitee	
S/PV.9211 7 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integration Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (S/2022/898)		Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All Council members ^k , All invitees ^l	

^a The representative of Ghana spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan.

^b Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^c Albania, Brazil, China, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^d Albania, China, France, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^e China, Gabon, Ghana, Russian Federation and United States. The representative of Ghana spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan.

^f The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court participated in the meeting via videoconference.

^g The representative of Ghana spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan.

^h Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya). India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

ⁱ The President of Sudan Social Development Organization participated in the meeting via videoconference.

^j The representative of Ghana spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan.

^k The representative of Ghana also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Kenya.

^l The Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference from Khartoum.

Table 2
Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan and South Sudan and Abyei

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9020 21 April 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2022/316)		Sudan, South Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	13 Council members ^a , all invitees ^b	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9031 12 May 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/387)			One Council member (Russian Federation)	Resolution 2630 (2022) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII)
S/PV.9170 27 October 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2022/760)		Sudan, South Sudan	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General	13 Council members ^c , all invitees ^d	
S/PV.9191 14 November 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/839)				Resolution 2660 (2022) 15-0-0 (Chapter VII)

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The Under-Secretary-General and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference.

^c Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^d The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General participated in the meeting via videoconference.

Table 3
Meetings: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – South Sudan

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8987 7 March 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2022/156)				Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, Ms. Riya Williams Yuyada (civil society briefer)	13 Council members ^a , all invitees ^b

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8894 15 March 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2022/156)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/219)	South Sudan		Five Council members (China, Ghana, India, Russian Federation and United States), invitee	Resolution 2625 (2022) 13-0-2 ^c (Chapter VII)
S/PV.9045 26 May 2022		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/417)	South Sudan		Six Council members (China, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya and Russian Federation), invitee	Resolution 2633 (2022) 10-0-5 ^d (Chapter VII)
S/PV.9067 20 June 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2022/468)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Acting Director in the Operations and Advocacy Division of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, South Sudanese human rights defender, civil rights activist and peace advocate	13 Council members ^e , all invitees ^f	
S/PV.9134 16 September 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2022/689)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, President of the South Sudan Women's Empowerment Network	13 Council members ^g , all invitees	
S/PV.9219 13 December 2022	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2022/918)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission	13 Council members ^h , all invitees ⁱ	

^a Albania, Brazil, China, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The Interim Chairperson of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and the civil society briefer participated in the meeting via videoconference.

^c *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. *Against*: None. *Abstaining*: China and Russian Federation.

^d *For*: Albania, Brazil, France, Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. *Against*: None. *Abstaining*: China, Gabon, India, Kenya and Russian Federation.

^e Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^f The South Sudanese human rights defender participated in the meeting via videoconference.

^g Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^h Albania, Brazil, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon, Ghana and Kenya), France, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of Gabon spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan.

ⁱ The Interim Chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission participated in the meeting via videoconference.