



SUPPLEMENT 2019

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council



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Supplement 2019



Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

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of the Security Council**

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Note

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Introduction

The present publication constitutes the twenty-second supplement to the *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 1946–1951*, which was issued in 1954. It covers the proceedings of the Security Council from the 8440th meeting, held on 3 January 2019, to the 8697th meeting, held on 20 December 2019. The original *Repertoire* and previous supplements may be consulted online on the Security Council website (www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/structure).

The *Repertoire* was mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 686 (VII), entitled “Ways and means for making the evidence of customary international law more readily available”. It is a guide to the proceedings of the Council and sets forth in a readily accessible form the practices and procedures to which the Council has had recourse. The *Repertoire* is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Council, which constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

The categories employed to arrange the material are not intended to suggest the existence of procedures or practices that have not been clearly or demonstrably established by the Council itself. The Council is at all times, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, its own provisional rules of procedure, and practice established through notes by the President of the Council, master of its own procedure. For ease of reference, this introduction contains a table indicating the membership of the Council during the period under review.

In recording the Council’s practice, the headings under which the practices and procedures of the Council were presented in the original volume issued in 1954 have been largely retained. Where necessary, however, adjustments have been made to better reflect the Council’s practice. For example, the studies contained in part I of the present publication are organized according to region or thematic issues in chronological order.

The *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council* covers four primary areas: the application of the provisional rules of procedure, the application of Articles of the Charter of the United Nations, the subsidiary organs of the Security Council, including peacekeeping operations and special political missions as well as sanctions committees and the associated panels and groups of experts, and an overview of Council activities for each item on its agenda. From 1946 to 2007, each Supplement to the *Repertoire*, generally covering a period of two to four years, comprised 12 chapters; from 2008 to 2017, each Supplement to the *Repertoire* covered a period of two years and comprised 10 parts. Since 2018, each Supplement to the *Repertoire*, covering a period of one year, has been organized in 10 parts.

From 1946 to 2007, the 12 chapters of each Supplement covered the following topics:

Chapter I	Provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council (Articles 28, 30, 98 of the Charter; rules 1–5, 13–36, 40–67 of the rules of procedure)
Chapter II	Agenda (rules 6–12)
Chapter III	Participation in the proceedings of the Security Council (Articles 31, 32, 35 (1); rules 37–39)
Chapter IV	Voting (Article 27; rule 40)

Chapter V	Subsidiary organs of the Security Council
Chapter VI	Relations with other United Nations organs
Chapter VI	Practice relative to recommendations to the General Assembly regarding membership in the United Nations
Chapter VIII	Consideration of questions under the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (overview by agenda item)
Chapter IX	Decisions taken by the Council in the exercise of its other functions and powers
Chapter X	Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter
Chapter XI	Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter
Chapter XII	Consideration of the provisions of other Articles (Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5), 2 (6), 2 (7), 24, 25, 52–54, 102, 103)

From 2008 onward, the 10 parts of each Supplement covered the following topics:

Part I	Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security
Part II	Provisional rules of procedure and related procedural developments
Part III	Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations
Part IV	Relations with other United Nations organs
Part V	Functions and powers of the Security Council (Chapter V of the Charter)
Part VI	Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter
Part VII	Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chapter VII of the Charter)
Part VIII	Regional arrangements (Chapter VIII of the Charter)
Part IX	Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: committees, tribunals and other bodies
Part X	Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

The *Repertoire* is based on published documents of the Security Council. Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of letters combined with figures. Security Council documents are indicated by a symbol that includes the year and a sequential number (e.g. [S/2019/1100](#)). References to the verbatim records of meetings of the Council are given in the form [S/PV.8697](#), meetings being numbered consecutively, starting with the first meeting in 1946. As in previous recent supplements, reference is made in this Supplement only to the provisional verbatim records of Security Council meetings, as the practice of publishing the meeting records in the *Official Records* has been discontinued.

The resolutions and other decisions adopted by the Security Council, including statements and notes issued by the President of the Council and relevant exchanges of letters between the President and the Secretary-General, are published in the yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. Resolutions are identified by a number followed by the year of adoption in parentheses, for example, resolution 2503 (2019). Since 1994, references to the statements by the President on behalf of the Council are given in the form S/PRST/2019/1, for example. Prior to that date, presidential statements, like other Council documents, were circulated under a symbol in the sequential series (e.g. S/25929).

Readers who wish to consult the full record of a meeting or the text of a Security Council document referred to in the *Repertoire* may do so on the official United Nations Documentation Centre website, www.un.org/en/documents/. Security Council documents can be accessed on the website by selecting “Official Document System (ODS)” or one of the direct links to specific categories of documents under the heading “Security Council”. The volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions* may be accessed by symbol (S/INF/74 for 2019).

Membership of the Security Council, 2019

Belgium

China

Côte d'Ivoire

Dominican Republic

Equatorial Guinea

France

Germany

Indonesia

Kuwait

Peru

Poland

Russian Federation

South Africa

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

United States of America

Part I

Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

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Introductory note

Part I of the present Supplement to the *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council* provides an overview of the proceedings of the Security Council in respect of the items on its agenda that relate to its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Part I gives the immediate political context in which consideration by the Council of these items evolved during the year 2019.¹ It also constitutes a framework within which the deliberations of the Council expressly related to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its provisional rules of procedures can be considered. Part I also examines the substantive aspects of the Council's practice that are not covered in other parts of the *Repertoire*.

For ease of reference, the items are grouped by region, with an additional category of thematic issues. Within each region, items are listed in the order in which they were first included in the list of matters of which the Council is seized.

Individual studies highlight significant developments in the Council's consideration of an item that are considered important for contextualizing the decisions taken by the Council.

Each section is followed by a table comprising all procedural information relating to the item, including meetings, sub-items, documents referred to and speakers, listed in chronological order. To illustrate the mainstreaming of thematic issues in items specific to a country or region, some sections are followed by an additional table setting out the relevant provisions of decisions of the Council.

¹ The *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council* covers formal meetings and documents of the Council. Some of the questions considered in part I were also discussed in informal consultations among the members of the Council.

Africa

1. The situation concerning Western Sahara

During 2019, the Council held two meetings and adopted two resolutions on the situation concerning Western Sahara. The two meetings under the item were convened to adopt resolutions [2468 \(2019\)](#) and [2494 \(2019\)](#), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).² In 2019, the Council also met twice with countries contributing police and troops to MINURSO.³ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition to those meetings, the Council held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the situation in Western Sahara.⁴

On 30 April 2019, the Council adopted resolution [2468 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of MINURSO for a period of six months, until 31 October 2019.⁵ The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions. In the resolution, the Council emphasized the need to achieve a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution to the question of Western Sahara and expressed its full support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to sustain the renewed negotiations process, noting the intention of the Personal Envoy to invite Morocco, the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, Algeria, and Mauritania to meet again in the same format.⁶ In that connection, the Council called upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments with a view to achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.⁷

After the vote,⁸ Council members reaffirmed their support for the efforts of the Personal Envoy and for the political process launched in Geneva in December 2018, in which the parties to the conflict were brought together for the first time since 2012. Regarding the mandate extension, some Council members⁹ were of the view that the mandate of MINURSO should have been renewed for a period of 12 months instead of 6 months. The representative of the United States expressed his disappointment regarding the abstention of some members despite sincere efforts to underscore the unity of the Council with regard to the ongoing political process. The representative of South Africa explained that his abstention had been due to his concerns that the adopted text did not provide “a true reflection of the efforts undertaken by the two parties” and stated that the mandate, as approved, tended to favour one party over the other, which was not conducive to a neutral political process. He stated that the Council must reaffirm its commitment to the right to self-determination for the people of Western Sahara in an unqualified manner. The representative of South Africa also expressed regret for the lack of a human rights monitoring mandate for MINURSO, despite the fact that such mechanisms had been proposed for other missions, and added that that lack of consistency undermined the Council’s credibility. Having also abstained in the voting, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret about the amendments that had been introduced in recent years into the resolutions extending the Mission’s mandate. In his view, those amendments undermined the Council’s impartial and objective approach to the issue of Western Sahara. He added that eroding previously approved parameters was unacceptable, as they defined the parties to the conflict and provided for ultimately reaching a mutually acceptable solution that would guarantee the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. He further stated that, just as his delegation had disagreed with the artificial modification of those parameters in prior years, it was unable to support such an approach with regard to resolution [2468 \(2019\)](#).

On 30 October 2019, the Council adopted resolution [2494 \(2019\)](#), again extending the mandate of MINURSO, but this time for one year, until 31 October

² For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

³ Held on 9 April and 8 October 2019, under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”; see [S/PV.8505](#) and [S/PV.8637](#).

⁴ See [S/2019/910](#) and [S/2020/29](#).

⁵ Resolution [2468 \(2019\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of MINURSO, see part X, sect. I.

⁶ Resolution [2468 \(2019\)](#), paras. 2–3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

⁸ See [S/PV.8518](#).

⁹ France, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait and Dominican Republic.

2020,¹⁰ in line with the practice prior to 2018. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions. In the resolution, the Council paid tribute to the former Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and commended his efforts in holding the round-table process, which had created new momentum in the political process, and reiterated the expression of its full support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General and his incoming Personal Envoy to sustain the renewed negotiations process in order to achieve a solution to the question of Western Sahara.¹¹

After the vote,¹² Council members¹³ paid tribute to the former Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, who had resigned, for having advanced the political process, and stressed the need for the Secretary-General to appoint a successor soon, in order to maintain the momentum and build on the progress achieved. Most speakers¹⁴ expressed support for the return to the 12-month mandate renewal cycle. The representative of

the Russian Federation explained that his delegation had abstained because it disagreed with the modifications that had been made to the resolutions extending the mandate of MINURSO. The representative of South Africa explained his country's abstention on several grounds. He took issue with some elements of the text of the resolution, indicating that his delegation considered that the text was not balanced and that the language used undermined the principle of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. He expressed his country's preference for a 6-month instead of a 12-month mandate renewal period, which would have allowed the Council to meet regularly to consider the progress made on the appointment of the Personal Envoy and the status of the political process. He welcomed the reference to human rights in the preambular paragraphs of the resolution, but reiterated that there was a need for a formal human rights mandate for MINURSO in order to strengthen the monitoring of possible human rights violations on all sides. He also raised serious concerns about the Council's working methods on the matter, questioning the delegation of responsibility to the Group of Friends of Western Sahara. With respect to the working methods of the Council, the representative of China expressed the hope that, in the future, consultations in the Council on draft resolutions to renew the mandate of MINURSO would be more conducive to arriving at a more balanced text and reaching a consensus.

¹⁰ Resolution 2494 (2019), para. 1.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, third preambular paragraph and para. 3. For further information on the mandate of MINURSO, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1989–1992 to Supplement 2018*.

¹² See S/PV.8651.

¹³ United States, United Kingdom, China, Peru, Indonesia, Germany and South Africa.

¹⁴ United Kingdom, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Kuwait, Indonesia, France, Germany and Poland.

Meetings: the situation concerning Western Sahara

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8518 30 April 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/2019/282)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/349)			12 Council members ^a	Resolution 2468 (2019) 13-0-2 ^b
S/PV.8651 30 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/2019/787)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/847)			14 Council members ^c	Resolution 2494 (2019) 13-0-2 ^d

^a China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States.

^b *For:* Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* none; *abstaining:* Russian Federation, South Africa.

^c China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States.

^d *For:* Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* none; *abstaining:* Russian Federation, South Africa.

2. The situation in Somalia

In 2019, the Council held nine meetings and adopted four resolutions on the situation in Somalia, three of which under Chapter VII of the Charter. Four meetings under the item were convened to adopt a decision; all others took the form of briefings.¹⁵ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition to those meetings, the Council held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the situation in Somalia.¹⁶

During the period under review, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSAM), the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In early January 2019, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was declared *persona non grata* by the Federal Government of Somalia.¹⁷ On 3 January,¹⁸ the Council heard his last briefing, in which he focused on the political and security situation in the country, while making reference to the humanitarian and human rights situation. He stated that the continuing political turbulence could throw off course the positive trajectory maintained by the country and noted that the stalemate between the Federal Government and the federal member states continued to impede concrete progress in defining the federal model and in building institutions of a State, as well as in the implementation of the national security architecture. He also noted that Al-Shabaab remained the biggest source of insecurity in Somalia and explained its shift from conventional attacks to the use of improvised explosive devices and targeted assassinations. On 22 May,¹⁹ the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Officer-in-Charge of UNSAM noted that UNSAM had been resetting its relations with the Federal Government of Somalia and making good progress with the implementation of its mandate following the expulsion of the former Special Representative. On

21 August,²⁰ during his first briefing to the Council, the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General underlined the importance of genuine cooperation among all parties in preparation for the national electoral cycle in 2020 and 2021. He also observed that the humanitarian crisis in Somalia remained among the most protracted in the world, with 2.2 million Somalis facing acute food insecurity and 2.6 million internally displaced, fleeing conflict and drought.²¹ During his final briefing of the year,²² the Special Representative spoke about the preparations for and challenges facing the 2020 election, underscoring the need for Somalis to forge a broad political consensus. He also acknowledged that insecurity remained a major challenge to making progress in Somalia, with Al-Shabaab continuing to execute deadly terrorist attacks against civilians and military targets. In his four briefings to the Council in 2019,²³ the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission focused on the progress made with regard to the AMISOM transition plan, reporting on the drawdown of 1,000 troops between February and April and noting that, in the light of the upcoming elections, the Mission had realigned itself to better support the national authorities during the electoral cycle. On 25 October,²⁴ the Council heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, who stressed the importance of streamlining the long-standing arms embargo first imposed in 1992 and simplifying and updating it to better reflect the current realities of the counter-insurgency in Somalia. In that regard, he noted the strengthened monitoring of certain chemical components and precursors, including commercial explosives, which could be used by Al-Shabaab for the construction of improvised explosive devices.²⁵

In 2019, the Council's discussions were focused on the political situation in Somalia in preparation for the 2020–2021 election cycle and on the deteriorating

¹⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

¹⁶ See [S/2019/744](#), [S/2019/910](#) and [S/2019/1015](#).

¹⁷ Informal consultations on the matter were held on 3 January and 7 February (see [S/2019/910](#) and [S/2019/1015](#)).

¹⁸ See [S/PV.8440](#).

¹⁹ See [S/PV.8533](#).

²⁰ See [S/PV.8601](#).

²¹ See also the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council on the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of UNSAM ([S/2019/435](#) and [S/2019/436](#)). For more information on special advisers, special envoys and special representatives, see part IX, sect. VI.

²² See [S/PV.8671](#).

²³ See [S/PV.8440](#), [S/PV.8533](#), [S/PV.8601](#) and [S/PV.8671](#).

²⁴ See [S/PV.8647](#).

²⁵ For more information on developments with regard to the sanctions measures concerning Somalia, see part VII, sect. III.

human rights, humanitarian and security situation in the country. Council members strongly condemned the terrorist attacks in the region by Al-Shabaab, posing a serious threat to the fragility of the country's security situation. Council members welcomed the progress made in the constitutional review process and in the Federal Government's reform agenda, while expressing concern about the deadlock between the Federal Government and the federal member states and regret that the political and governance reforms had not yet been finalized.²⁶ Council members also underlined the importance of the Federal Government's restoration of cooperation with the United Nations and the international community.²⁷ In that connection, some Council members expressed regret for the lack of full cooperation by the Federal Government of Somalia with the Panel of Experts and encouraged the Government to engage with the Panel.²⁸

The Council's deliberations in 2019 were also focused on the role of UNSOM, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and AMISOM and their respective mandates. Deliberations of the Council were focused on the conditions-based transfer of the security responsibilities of AMISOM to the national security forces of Somalia, in line with the Mission's drawdown plan and its eventual exit strategy. At the meeting on 22 May,²⁹ the representative of Poland underscored that the AMISOM drawdown plan should include specific steps and a realistic timetable for the transfer of responsibilities, and the representatives of Peru and Indonesia emphasized the humanitarian consequences and the impact on the protection of civilians. The representatives of South Africa and Germany called for a comprehensive approach to security, with joint planning by AMISOM, the Federal Government, UNSOM, UNSOS and international partners, while underlining the significance of the Government and the federal member states resolving their differences through sustained and inclusive dialogue. At the meeting on 21 August,³⁰ the representative of France emphasized the importance of observing the commitment to meeting the deadlines set out in resolution 2472 (2019), adopted on 31 May, including with regard to the reduction of the troop ceiling by 1,000 military

personnel by 28 February 2020. She noted that, while the reconfiguration of AMISOM had to take place gradually in the most stable areas of the country, it was "imperative" that the decisions of the Council be respected. At the same meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation maintained that AMISOM continued to play a key role in addressing security challenges in Somalia and that, therefore, its reconfiguration had to go hand in hand with the establishment of Somali military and law-enforcement structures. He noted that the reduction in the number of African peacekeepers would be not only counterproductive but also dangerous. Council members³¹ also reiterated the importance of providing stable, predictable and sustainable financial support for AMISOM to combat Al-Shabaab more effectively.

In 2019, the decisions of the Council were also focused on the issues outlined above and on renewing the mandates of UNSOM and AMISOM. On 27 March, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2461 (2019), by which it extended the mandate of UNSOM until 31 March 2020.³² The Council also urged the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to accelerate the Government-led inclusive political settlement and further urged the resumption of the dialogue between the Federal Government and "Somaliland".³³ The Council emphasized the need for reconciliation, including inter- and intraclan reconciliation, across the country as the basis of a long-term approach to stability.³⁴ The Council also urged the Federal Government and Parliament to finalize and adopt the electoral law by mid-2019 and to ensure that the upcoming elections of federal member states were conducted in accordance with the country's international obligations and commitments.³⁵

On 31 May 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2472 (2019), by which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it authorized the States members of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 31 May 2020, including a minimum of 1,040 AMISOM police personnel including five formed police units, and to reduce the level of uniformed AMISOM personnel by 1,000 to a maximum of 19,626, by 28 February 2020, in line with the transition plan and the handover to Somali security

²⁶ See [S/PV.8601](#) (United Kingdom, United States, Equatorial Guinea, Dominican Republic, France, Peru and Belgium); and [S/PV.8671](#) (France, Belgium, China, Poland, Germany and Indonesia).

²⁷ See [S/PV.8533](#) (United Kingdom and Indonesia).

²⁸ See [S/PV.8647](#) (United Kingdom, Germany and United States); and [S/PV.8533](#) (United States).

²⁹ See [S/PV.8533](#).

³⁰ See [S/PV.8601](#).

³¹ China, Indonesia and Russian Federation.

³² Resolution 2461 (2019), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNSOM, see part X, sect. II.

³³ Resolution 2461 (2019), paras. 5–6.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

forces.³⁶ By the same resolution, the Council also urged the Federal Government of Somalia to focus on the generation of able, accountable, acceptable and affordable Somali forces, which would allow for the progressive transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security institutions and create critical security for elections in 2020 and 2021.³⁷ The Council underlined that the threat of Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups would not be defeated by military means alone and, in that regard, called on the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states, AMISOM, the United Nations and Member States to work together to take a comprehensive approach to security; it also called for increased coordination and collaboration at all levels, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum and the comprehensive approach to security mechanism.³⁸ By its resolution, the Council further requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide AMISOM with a logistical support package in full compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on the basis set out in paragraph 2 of resolution [2245 \(2015\)](#).³⁹

On 15 November 2019, the Council adopted resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter, with the abstentions of China, Equatorial Guinea and the Russian Federation. By that resolution, the Council reaffirmed the arms embargo and renewed for one year, until 15 November 2020, the exemptions on deliveries of weapons and military equipment, and on the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance or training related to military activities intended solely for the development of the Somali national security forces and Somali security sector institutions.⁴⁰ The Council also recalled previous decisions regarding the targeted sanctions and the ban on charcoal.⁴¹ By the same resolution, the Council decided to impose a ban on components of improvised explosive devices, calling on Member States to take appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that were involved in the sale, supply or transfer of explosive precursors and

materials to Somalia that might be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices.⁴² In addition, the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia until 15 December 2020.⁴³

In explaining their abstentions after the vote,⁴⁴ the representatives of the Russian Federation, China and Equatorial Guinea expressed regret about the negotiation process. The representative of the Russian Federation, pointing out the artificially created time pressure in the drafting process, emphasized that the state of the relations between Eritrea and Djibouti did not pose a threat to international peace and security and that the issues in question did not come under the direct purview of either the Security Council or the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia. Echoing similar concerns, the representative of China noted the efforts of the penholder and the improvements made to the text, but indicated that some of the proposals made had not been adopted and that his delegation had been compelled to abstain in the vote. He added that the Council was not the appropriate forum in which to discuss human rights issues and expressed the hope that it would conduct extensive consultations on draft resolutions in the future and avoid hastily putting them to a vote in order to achieve maximum consensus. The representative of Equatorial Guinea said that the purpose of his delegation's request had been to achieve a balanced text that reflected the various proposals and was in line with the political situation in the Horn of Africa and that his delegation would have preferred if issues not directly related to the resolution had not been mentioned in it.

On 4 December, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2500 \(2019\)](#), by which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it renewed for a further 12 months the authorizations, set out in paragraph 14 of resolution [2442 \(2018\)](#), granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.⁴⁵

³⁶ Resolution [2472 \(2019\)](#), para. 7. For more information on the mandate of AMISOM, see part VIII, sect. IV.

³⁷ Resolution [2472 \(2019\)](#), para. 6.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 2 and 4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 19.

⁴⁰ Resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), paras. 6–8 and 9–18.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, paras. 20–22 and 23–25.

⁴² *Ibid.*, paras. 26–28.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, para. 29. For information on the mandate of the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia and its Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8665](#).

⁴⁵ Resolution [2500 \(2019\)](#), para. 14. See also resolutions [1846 \(2008\)](#), para. 10, and [2246 \(2015\)](#), para. 14.

Meetings: the situation in Somalia

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8440 3 January 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2018/1149)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia	All invitees ^a	
S/PV.8494 27 March 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/266)	Somalia		One Council member (United States), invitee	Resolution 2461 (2019) 15-0-0
S/PV.8533 22 May 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2019/393)		Somalia	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Officer-in-Charge of UNSOM, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees ^b	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8537 31 May 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/444)	Somalia		Five Council members (Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, South Africa, United Kingdom), invitee	Resolution 2472 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8601 21 August 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2019/661)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission; Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict; Executive Director of the Somali Women Development Centre	All Council members, all invitees ^c	
S/PV.8647 25 October 2019					Six Council members ^d	
S/PV.8665 15 November 2019	Letter dated 1 November 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/858 and S/2019/858/Corr.1)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/880)	Somalia		Five Council members (Belgium, China, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Russian Federation), invitee	Resolution 2498 (2019) 12-0-3 ^e (adopted under Chapter VII)

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2019

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8671 21 November 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2019/884)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Chair of the National Independent Electoral Commission of Somalia, Executive Director of the Somalia Youth Development Network	13 Council members, ^f all invitees ^g	
S/PV.8678 4 December 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia (S/2019/867)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/916)	Somalia		Two Council members (China, Russian Federation), invitee	Resolution 2500 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission participated in the meeting by videoconference from Dar es Salaam.

^b The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission participated in the meeting by videoconference from Mogadishu.

^c The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Executive Director of the Somali Women Development Centre participated in the meeting by videoconference from Mogadishu.

^d Belgium, Germany, France, Kuwait, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of Belgium spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia.

^e *For:* Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* none; *abstaining:* China, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation.

^f Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa (also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea), United Kingdom and United States.

^g The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Executive Director of the Somalia Youth Development Network participated in the meeting by videoconference from Mogadishu.

3. The situation in Burundi

During the period under review, the Council held three meetings in connection with the situation in Burundi. All meetings took the form of briefings.⁴⁶ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition to those meetings, the Council held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the situation in Burundi.⁴⁷

In 2019, briefings under this item were delivered by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi, the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union and the Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. Invitations to those meetings under rule 37 were limited to Burundi.⁴⁸ The briefings during this period were focused on the political developments before the holding of general elections in 2020, the human rights and humanitarian situations in the country and the status of the inter-Burundian dialogue process led by the East African Community.

During his briefings in 2019,⁴⁹ the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi focused on the activities carried out on behalf of the Secretary-General, including efforts to resolve the political crisis before the holding of presidential elections in 2020. He reiterated that an inclusive inter-Burundian dialogue remained the only viable option for a lasting political settlement for the country's future and noted the lack of progress, which he attributed to the lack of political will on the part of the parties or a firm commitment by States in the subregion. In both briefings, the Special Envoy expressed concern about the humanitarian situation and the deteriorating socioeconomic situation in the country. While acknowledging that the security situation had improved, he mentioned that abuses and other human rights violations continued to be reported. At all three meetings,⁵⁰ the Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission reiterated that the Commission would continue to focus on elections and the persistent socioeconomic challenges facing Burundi. During his briefing in February, in reference to the Government's request for

the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to terminate its activities in the country and withdraw its staff, the Chair of the Burundi configuration emphasized that human rights were an important element of peacebuilding and encouraged the building of capacity for the protection of human rights. During his briefing on 14 June,⁵¹ the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support also mentioned that the human rights situation remained worrying in view of many violations of fundamental civic and political freedoms against the backdrop of the country's election plans. In their briefings,⁵² the Permanent Observer and the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union shared their assessments of the political, humanitarian, human rights situation and socioeconomic situations in the country, reiterating the commitment of the African Union to continue its support for all efforts aimed at finding a lasting, peaceful and consensual solution to the situation in Burundi.

Council deliberations following the briefings were focused on the need to find a consensus-based and inclusive road map in preparation for general elections in 2020 and the need to uphold the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. Council members held divergent views on the approach to the elections. While most Council members encouraged the Burundian authorities to continue the inter-Burundian political dialogue led by the East African Community and engage with the relevant partners, China and the Russian Federation affirmed the sovereignty of Burundi, emphasizing the Government's prerogative to take charge of managing the country's domestic affairs, cautioned against outside interference and hoped for assistance to the Government, as needed.⁵³

Divergent views were also expressed with respect to the continuation of the situation of Burundi as an item on the agenda of the Council. While some Council members called on the Council to seriously consider removing Burundi from its agenda, arguing that the situation in the country was generally calm and normal and did not pose a threat to international or regional

⁴⁶ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁴⁷ See [S/2019/744](#) and [S/2019/1015](#).

⁴⁸ For more information on participation in meetings of the Council, see part II, sect. VII.

⁴⁹ See [S/PV.8465](#) and [S/PV.8652](#).

⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8465](#), [S/PV.8550](#) and [S/PV.8652](#).

⁵¹ See [S/PV.8550](#).

⁵² See [S/PV.8465](#) (Permanent Observer); and [S/PV.8550](#) (Commissioner for Peace and Security).

⁵³ See [S/PV.8465](#) (Russian Federation and China); [S/PV.8550](#) (China and Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8652](#) (Russian Federation and China).

peace and security,⁵⁴ others considered that Burundi needed to remain on the Council's agenda owing to the ongoing human rights and humanitarian crisis amid an unresolved domestic political crisis and regional tensions with the impending elections in 2020.⁵⁵

Concerning the human rights situation, some Council members expressed concern and called on the Government to fully cooperate with the United Nations human rights protection mechanisms.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See [S/PV.8465](#) (Equatorial Guinea); and [S/PV.8550](#) (Equatorial Guinea, China and Russian Federation).

⁵⁵ See [S/PV.8465](#) (United States and United Kingdom); and [S/PV.8550](#) (Germany).

⁵⁶ See [S/PV.8465](#) (France and Poland); and [S/PV.8550](#) (Poland).

Meetings: the situation in Burundi

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8465 19 February 2019			Burundi	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8550 14 June 2019			Burundi	Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support; Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, ^a Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8652 30 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi (S/2019/837)		Burundi	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission	All Council members, ^b all invitees	

^a The Commissioner for Peace and Security participated in the meeting by videoconference from Montreal, Canada.

^b South Africa (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister of International Relations and Cooperation.

4. The situation in the Great Lakes region

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings on the situation in Great Lakes region, both in the form of briefings.⁵⁷ The Council did not adopt any decisions on this item in 2019. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

In 2019, the briefings under the item were delivered by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, in connection with the two reports of the Secretary-General.⁵⁸ In both briefings to the Council, the Special Envoy focused on the activities of the office in supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, including the facilitation of the voluntary repatriation, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants and security cooperation aimed at neutralizing negative forces.

In 2019, the Secretary-General appointed a new Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region.⁵⁹ On 26 March 2019,⁶⁰ the outgoing Special Envoy delivered his final briefing and emphasized the importance of political will among regional leaders in addressing protracted challenges in security and humanitarian challenges in the Great Lakes region. He also noted his office's close cooperation with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in operationalizing the security and confidence-building mechanisms and developing a regional strategy and action plan for the refugee situation. He explained that, during his tenure, he had focused on key priority areas to support the signatory countries in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. One of those priorities was the strengthening of regional ownership of the implementation process, which he had sought to achieve by, among other strategies, reinvigorating the Regional Oversight Mechanism. He also made reference to maintaining a regional and international focus on the need to strengthen cooperation with regard to countering negative forces and building confidence among all countries; promoting regional cohesion and international attention with regard to the situations in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of

the Congo; and promoting the participation of women in political and peace processes in the region. In closing, he addressed the issues of encouraging political conversation on ways to transform natural resources into vehicles of shared prosperity and the promotion of the rule of law and respect for human rights.

On 3 October 2019,⁶¹ the Council heard a briefing by the new Special Envoy who, at the outset, noted the significant steps taken in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, owing in particular to the peaceful transfer of power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the restated willingness of the region's leaders to jointly face the challenges that hindered its development. During his briefing, he also addressed his office's latest initiatives to support the implementation of the Framework, such as undertaking consultations with the countries concerned on the issue of non-military measures to complement military operations. He also highlighted the importance of implementing cross-border development projects to create employment opportunities for young people and noted that regional cooperation and integration was being revitalized. He added that the office had been supporting the preparation of the Great Lakes Investment and Trade Conference, to be held in Kigali in March 2020, and called on the Council members to support the initiative.

During their discussions, Council members welcomed recent political developments, in particular in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the continuing efforts of regional leaders to achieve political stability in the Great Lakes region. Council members reaffirmed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework as the cornerstone mechanism to address regional challenges.⁶² Some Council members expressed concern over the continued violence in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Ebola outbreak, the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the forced displacement of populations.⁶³ Council members also highlighted the importance of regional cooperation through such regional arrangements as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union and

⁵⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁵⁸ [S/2019/229](#) and [S/2019/783](#).

⁵⁹ See [S/2019/67](#) and [S/2019/68](#). For more information on special advisers, envoys and representatives, see part IX, sect. VI.

⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8491](#).

⁶¹ See [S/PV.8630](#).

⁶² See [S/PV.8491](#) (Russian Federation, United States and Poland).

⁶³ See [S/PV.8630](#) (Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Russian Federation and South Africa).

urged further cooperation in addressing protracted problems of armed groups, the humanitarian situation, including Ebola, and socioeconomic development.⁶⁴ With respect to Burundi, at the meeting in March,⁶⁵ the representative of the United Kingdom called on international partners to continue supporting the East African Community in its efforts to end the political crisis in Burundi and preserve the Arusha Peace and

Reconciliation Agreement. He also encouraged all stakeholders to consider whether the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework could play an enhanced role in promoting dialogue in Burundi. At the meeting in October,⁶⁶ the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom expressed concern about the restrictions on freedom of assembly and expression; they also emphasized the importance of good governance, a point that was echoed by Germany.

⁶⁴ See [S/PV.8491](#) (Russian Federation and Kuwait); and [S/PV.8630](#) (China, Indonesia and Russian Federation).

⁶⁵ See [S/PV.8491](#).

⁶⁶ See [S/PV.8630](#).

Meetings: the situation in the Great Lakes region

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8491 26 March 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (S/2019/229)		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8630 3 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region (S/2019/783)		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General	All Council members, all invitees	

5. The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

During the period under review, the Council held seven meetings and adopted three resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter in relation to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Three meetings were convened to adopt a decision of

the Council and four took the form of briefings.⁶⁷ The Council also met twice with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of

⁶⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II., sect. I.

the Congo (MONUSCO), pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).⁶⁸ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

The Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO. In her four briefings to the Council, the Special Representative outlined the ongoing democratic process, including the progress made with regard to the reform agendas of the President, Félix Tshilombo Tshisekedi, and the remaining security challenges, in particular in the country's eastern region, which was also affected by the Ebola epidemic.⁶⁹ Other briefers included the President of the Independent National Electoral Commission, the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, the President of the Conférence épiscopale nationale du Congo and the Executive Director of a civil society organization, Afia Mama. In addition, the Council heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In 2019, the briefings and deliberations of the Council were focused mainly on the progress of the Government's democratic process following the presidential election held in December 2018, the transition strategy of MONUSCO in the context of the volatile security and humanitarian situations and the efforts of the regional organizations to strengthen the cooperation among the countries of the Great Lakes region.

Concerning the democratic process following the election, Council members welcomed the smooth transition of power and President Tshisekedi's pledges to build democracy and the rule of law, while also expressing concern over the ongoing violence, the Ebola outbreak and the precarious humanitarian situation in the country. During the meetings on 11 January and 18 March, Council members also noted

the postponement of elections in Beni, Butembo and Yumbi and called for the successful facilitation of the holding of the remaining elections in those areas, which had been scheduled to be held at the end March 2019.⁷⁰

On the security situation, Council members expressed concerns regarding the continuing violence and attacks against civilians and MONUSCO and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Allied Democratic Forces, while strongly condemning the attacks by armed groups on Ebola response teams.⁷¹ In that context, Council members discussed the adjustment of the configuration of MONUSCO and its activities in line with the Mission's priority mandates in the protection of civilians; Council members also encouraged the strengthening of the implementation of the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁷² In particular, the representative of the United States encouraged the transition to a civilian life for fighters rather than simply absorbing them into the armed forces, and the representative of Poland emphasized that the process had to be at the centre of the stabilization of the security situation in the country.⁷³

On the efforts of the regional organizations to strengthen cooperation among the countries of the Great Lakes region, Council members expressed support for the work done by the observation missions dispatched by such regional organizations as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union to monitor the elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Speakers also recognized the mediation efforts undertaken by regional organizations in support of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region.

In addition, in 2019, the Council focused on the work of the Committee pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#). On 7 June 2019, the members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted, for the Council's attention, the final report

⁶⁸ Held on 14 March and 3 December 2019, under the item entitled "Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police- contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B"; see [S/PV.8483](#) and [S/PV.8677](#).

⁶⁹ The humanitarian situation caused by renewed cases of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was also considered by the Council under the item entitled "Peace and security in Africa", under which the Council issued a presidential statement on 2 August, in which it expressed concern and emphasized the need for continued cooperation and coordination to address the Ebola outbreak ([S/PRST/2019/6](#), first and fourth paragraphs). For more information on that item, see part I, sect. 11.

⁷⁰ See [S/PV.8443](#) (Belgium, United States and Peru); and [S/PV.8486](#) (Belgium, Poland, Dominican Republic and Peru).

⁷¹ See [S/PV.8584](#) (France, Belgium, Poland, South Africa and United Kingdom).

⁷² See [S/PV.8486](#) (Dominican Republic); and [S/PV.8584](#) (United States, Poland and Côte d'Ivoire).

⁷³ See [S/PV.8584](#).

of the Group,⁷⁴ in which it concluded that, despite the relatively peaceful transfer of power and the growing number of armed groups willing to surrender, numerous local and foreign armed groups, in particular the Allied Democratic Forces, continued to pose a serious security threat. On 26 June 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2478 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended the sanctions measures until 1 July 2020 and the mandate of the Group of Experts until 1 August 2020.⁷⁵ On 24 July 2019,⁷⁶ the Council heard the briefing of the Chair of the Committee, in which he focused on the Committee's activities over the previous 12 months and on his visit to the country from 27 April to 6 May 2019. He also highlighted the positive public statements made by the incoming President on the work of MONUSCO and the international community. The Chair stated that he planned to "capitalize on the momentum" of his visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by continuing to build channels of communication with relevant States and promoting a better understanding of the Committee's work.

Concerning MONUSCO, the Council unanimously adopted two resolutions, by each of which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it extended the mandate of the Mission. On 29 March 2019, in resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO and the Intervention Brigade for nine months, until 20 December 2019, and expressed its intention to further adjust the mandate of MONUSCO following the publication of an independent strategic review of the Mission, aimed at assessing the continued challenges to peace and security in the country and articulating a phased, progressive and comprehensive exit strategy.⁷⁷ The Council decided that the strategic priorities of MONUSCO were to contribute to: (a) the protection of civilians and (b) support for the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and key governance and

security reforms.⁷⁸ The Council authorized MONUSCO, in pursuit of its mandated tasks, to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate and requested the Secretary-General to immediately inform the Council should MONUSCO fail to do so.⁷⁹ The Council also emphasized the importance of maintaining international support and engagement to bring the Ebola outbreak successfully to an end, and requested all relevant parts of the United Nations system to continue their work in response to the outbreak, noting the positive role of MONUSCO in that regard.⁸⁰ On 19 December, in resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), the Council again extended the mandate of MONUSCO and the Intervention Brigade for one year, maintaining the same strategic priorities.⁸¹ In the resolution, the Council also stressed the importance of a comprehensive dialogue between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO on the progress of the political and security reform agenda, requested the Secretary-General to engage with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to articulate a joint strategy and identify a set of measurable benchmarks, to be proposed to the Council no later than 20 October 2020, that would allow for a progressive transfer of the Mission's tasks to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations country team and other stakeholders.⁸² The Council also took note of the assessment stemming from the independent strategic review that an "absolute minimum" transition period of three years was required before the Mission's exit, adding that the tentative timeline would have to remain flexible and take into account the security situation.⁸³

⁷⁴ See [S/2019/469](#).

⁷⁵ Resolution [2478 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1 and 3.

⁷⁶ See [S/PV.8584](#).

⁷⁷ Resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), paras. 21 and 45.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 23. For more information concerning the current mandate of MONUSCO, see part X, sect. I. For information on past mandates of MONUSCO, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2010–2011, Supplement 2012–2013, Supplement 2014–2015, Supplement 2016–2017 and Supplement 2018*.

⁷⁹ Resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), para. 28. For more information concerning the decisions of the Council relating to Article 42 of the Charter during the period under review, see part VII, sect. IV.A.

⁸⁰ Resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), para. 38.

⁸¹ Resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), paras. 22 and 24.

⁸² *Ibid.*, para. 49.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, para. 46.

Meetings: the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8443 11 January 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (S/2019/6)		Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MONUSCO, President of the Independent National Electoral Commission, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, President of the Conférence épiscopale nationale du Congo	All Council Members, all invitees ^{a,b}	
S/PV.8486 18 March 2019	Letter dated 15 February 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/159) Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2019/218)		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of Afia Mama	All Council Members, all invitees ^c	
S/PV.8498 29 March 2019	Letter dated 15 February 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/159) Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2019/218)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2019/263)	Democratic Republic of the Congo		Seven Council members, ^d invitee	Resolution 2463 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2019

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8563 26 June 2019	Letter dated 6 June 2019 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/469)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2019/522)				Resolution 2478 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8584 24 July 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2019/575)		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All Council members, ^e all invitees ^f	
S/PV.8638 9 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2019/776)		Democratic Republic of the Congo	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Seven Council members, ^g all invitees ^h	
S/PV.8692 19 December 2019	Letter dated 24 October 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/842) Report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO (S/2019/905)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2019/957)	Democratic Republic of the Congo		Six Council members, ⁱ invitee	Resolution 2502 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a Zambia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, who participated in the meeting by videoconference from Johannesburg.

^b The Special Representative, the President of the Independent National Electoral Commission and the President of the Conférence épiscopale nationale du Congo participated in the meeting by videoconference from Kinshasa.

^c The representative of Afia Mama participated in the meeting by videoconference from Kinshasa.

^d Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Indonesia, South Africa and United States. Côte d'Ivoire was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; France (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs; and South Africa was represented by its Minister of Defence and Military Veterans.

^e The representative of Kuwait spoke twice, once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and once in his national capacity.

^f The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Kinshasa.

^g China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Peru, South Africa and United States.

^h The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Wilton Park, United Kingdom.

ⁱ China, France, Indonesia, Poland, South Africa (also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea) and the United States.

6. The situation in the Central African Republic

During the period under review, the Council held seven meetings, adopted three resolutions, all under Chapter VII of the Charter, and issued one presidential statement in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic.⁸⁴ Four meetings were convened to adopt a decision of the Council and three took the form of briefings.⁸⁵ The Council also held one meeting with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001).⁸⁶ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2019, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA, consistent with the four-month reporting schedule established by resolution 2387 (2017).⁸⁷ The Council also heard briefings by the Chair of the Central African Republic configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, the African Union Special Representative and Head of the African Union Office in the Central African Republic and the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, as well as the Managing Director for Africa and the Director for Integrated Approach for Security and Peace of the European External Action Service.

The briefings were focused on the political, security and humanitarian situation in the country, emphasizing the developments that arose after the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic on 6 February 2019.⁸⁸ In his first briefing to the Council

in February,⁸⁹ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General declared that the Peace Agreement could mark a turning point in the history of the Central African Republic. He stressed that the current agreement differed from previous agreements, in that it reaffirmed from the outset the commitment of the Government and the armed groups to fundamental principles, especially those derived from the country's Constitution, and in that it was sought and signed by a legitimate Government. He also underlined that the implementation of those commitments would be supervised by inclusive monitoring mechanisms, including civil society, political parties, parliamentarians, women's organizations and young people. He nonetheless cautioned that, while the Agreement was an important political advance in the Central African Republic, the real test would be in its full and good faith implementation and that the unified political support of the Council, the countries of the region and the international community remained critical.

Later in the year, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General gave two additional briefings to the Council on the developments on the ground and the implementation of the mandate of MINUSCA.⁹⁰ In his briefings, he addressed, among other issues, the awareness-raising campaign carried out to inform local actors about the Peace Agreement and solicit their cooperation in its implementation, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations conducted and the joint missions by the Government of the Central African Republic, the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States and MINUSCA. He also addressed the national consultations on the creation of a truth, justice, reparations and reconciliation commission and the efforts to restore State authority, as well as the challenges that continued to hamper the stabilization of the Central African Republic, including the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and the risk of violence associated with population movements and the radicalization of the political discourse.

In his first briefing in February,⁹¹ the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union said that the Peace Agreement of 6 February was the perfect expression of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union. He noted that the commitment of the regional States, including

⁸⁴ In addition to the decisions adopted in 2019, on 13 February, the President of the Security Council issued a press statement welcoming the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic by the national authorities and 14 armed groups in Bangui on 6 February 2019 (SC/13701).

⁸⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁸⁶ Held on 7 November 2019, under the item entitled "Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B"; see S/PV.8662.

⁸⁷ Resolution 2387 (2017), para. 67.

⁸⁸ On 7 February 2019, the Council held informal consultations of the whole to hear the briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations on the agreement signed on 6 February by the Government of the Central African Republic and 14 armed groups for the cessation of hostilities (see S/2019/1015).

⁸⁹ See S/PV.8467.

⁹⁰ See S/PV.8558 and S/PV.8646.

⁹¹ See S/PV.8467.

those who had expressed readiness to re-establish bilateral mixed commissions with the Central African Republic, made the new Agreement different from previous ones. He underscored that the Agreement was the successful result of multilateralism and the renewed resolve of the leadership of the United Nations and African Union to weigh in together and in solidarity to silence the guns and foster dialogue and reconciliation. In his briefing in October,⁹² he reported on the joint visits to Bangui by the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union and emphasized the importance of the timely conduct of the 2020 and 2021 elections and the need for sustained attention to the humanitarian situation by the international community. At the briefing in June,⁹³ the African Union Special Representative provided an update on the implementation of the Agreement and recommended, among other things, that the Council appeal to the international community to mobilize the necessary resources for the reconstruction of the Central African Republic and the implementation of labour-intensive development projects and that it lead the call for the strengthening of humanitarian assistance in the fight against malnutrition and the reintegration of displaced persons and refugees.

In his briefing in February,⁹⁴ the Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service expressed the support of the European Union for the Peace Agreement, stated that the priority was to put follow-up mechanisms in place and called for inclusiveness at the national and local levels to ensure the success of the Agreement. In his briefing in June,⁹⁵ he said that the European Union remained fully committed to addressing the humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic and that governance, justice, the rule of law and support for democratic institutions would remain the core considerations of the actions and engagement of the European Union in the country. At the briefing in October,⁹⁶ the Director for Integrated Approach for Security and Peace of the Action Service reported on the efforts of the European Union to support the implementation of the Agreement, including the activities of the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic and the funding of humanitarian programmes. He expressed the readiness of the European Union to support the conduct of peaceful, inclusive and transparent elections in 2020 and 2021 and requested that the mandate of

MINUSCA include support for the electoral process in terms of security and logistics.

At its meeting on 21 February 2019,⁹⁷ the Council also heard a briefing by the Chair of the Central African Republic configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission on its work and initiatives in support of the Government of the Central African Republic, including a report on his visit to Bangui, conducted jointly with the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support from 13 to 15 February 2019, immediately after the signing of the Peace Agreement. At the same meeting, the representative of the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) highlighted the concerns raised by the Government of the Central African Republic with regard to the arms embargo and noted the difficulties faced by the relevant actors in the country with regard to ensuring the proper management of arms and ammunition. He also noted the Chair's intention to visit the country again in 2019, so as to continue his engagement with the relevant parties and other key stakeholders.

In 2019, discussions in the Council were focused on the critical factors for the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement, including the political support of the Council, regional States and the international community. Council members also discussed the role of sanctions, in particular the establishment of key benchmarks to serve as a road map that could lead to the easing of the arms embargo, and the support provided by MINUSCA. With regard to the mandate of MINUSCA, while Council members emphasized that the Mission's priority task was the protection of civilians, they also highlighted its role in supporting the country's security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration efforts, the restoration of State authority and preparations for and holding of elections in 2020 and 2021.

On 31 January 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2454 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended for a period of one year, until 31 January 2020, the sanctions measures in place in connection with the Central African Republic, namely, the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban imposed against individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#).⁹⁸ The Council also expressed its intent to establish, no later than 30 April, clear and well-identified key benchmarks regarding the reform of the security sector, the disarmament,

⁹² See [S/PV.8646](#).

⁹³ See [S/PV.8558](#).

⁹⁴ See [S/PV.8467](#).

⁹⁵ See [S/PV.8558](#).

⁹⁶ See [S/PV.8646](#).

⁹⁷ See [S/PV.8467](#).

⁹⁸ Resolution [2454 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1–2.

demobilization, reintegration and repatriation process and the management of weapons and ammunition, so as to guide the Council's review of the arms embargo measures with regard to the Government of the Central African Republic. To that end, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment on the progress achieved on those key benchmarks and expressed its intention to review the arms embargo measures on the Government of the Central African Republic in the light of that assessment.⁹⁹ In the same resolution, the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), until 29 February 2020.¹⁰⁰

On 9 April 2019, the Council issued a presidential statement, in which it welcomed the significant efforts made by the authorities of the Central African Republic, in coordination with their international partners, to advance the reform of the security sector and acknowledged the urgent need for the national authorities to train and equip their defence and security forces to be able to respond proportionately to security threats in the Central African Republic.¹⁰¹ The Council also welcomed the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic by the national authorities and 14 armed groups in Bangui on 6 February 2019, as well as the consensus reached by the signatory parties to the Peace Agreement regarding the formation of an inclusive government, and urged stakeholders to implement the Agreement in good faith and without delay.¹⁰² The Council expressed its readiness to review the arms embargo measures on the Government of the Central African Republic in the light of progress achieved on five key benchmarks, including the effective implementation of the national programme for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation; the establishment of a planning document detailing the needs of the authorities in terms of weapons and ammunition storage facilities; and the establishment of a protocol for the collection and destruction or transfer, to the armed forces and internal security forces, of surplus, unregistered or illicitly held weapons and ammunition seized by the national authorities.¹⁰³

On 12 September 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2488 (2019), by which it decided to review and adjust the arms embargo measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 2399 (2018) by, among other things, exempting supplies of certain arms, weapons and ammunition and other related components and equipment meant for the security forces of the Central African Republic and modifying the exemptions process for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, pursuant to the letter dated 26 July from the Secretary-General, in which he assessed the progress achieved on the key benchmarks established by the Council on the arms embargo measures in the Central African Republic.¹⁰⁴ Consistent with the adjustment of the measures, the Council decided that the authorities of the Central African Republic would update the Committee by 31 December on the progress achieved in the security sector reform process, the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation process and the management of weapons and ammunition and requested the Secretary-General to update the Council, no later than 31 December 2019, on the progress achieved by the authorities on the key benchmarks established in its presidential statement of 9 April 2019.¹⁰⁵

On 15 November 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2499 (2019), by which it extended the mandate of MINUSCA for one year, until 15 November 2020.¹⁰⁶ In the resolution, the Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA would include five priority tasks, including the protection of civilians; the provision of good offices and support for the peace process, including the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed on 6 February; the provision and coordination of assistance in the preparation and delivery of peaceful elections in 2020 and 2021; the facilitation of the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and the protection of United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods.¹⁰⁷ In the same resolution, the Council urged the authorities of the Central African Republic and the signatory armed groups to implement the Agreement in good faith and without delay, in order to meet the aspirations expressed by the people of the Central African Region for peace, security, justice, reconciliation, inclusivity and development, and called

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 9–10.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 3. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

¹⁰¹ S/PRST/2019/3, second paragraph.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, third paragraph.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, seventh paragraph. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic, see part VII, sect. III.

¹⁰⁴ Resolution 2488 (2019), para. 2. See also S/2019/609.

¹⁰⁵ Resolution 2488 (2019), paras. 6–7. On 31 December, the Secretary-General provided another progress update pursuant to paragraph 7 of the resolution (see S/2019/1008).

¹⁰⁶ Resolution 2499 (2019), para. 27.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 32. For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.

on neighbouring States, regional organizations and all international partners to support the peace process, including the implementation of the Agreement.¹⁰⁸ The Council also urged the national authorities to urgently implement a genuine and inclusive process to support reconciliation in the country by addressing the root causes of the conflict, and to ensure the preparation of inclusive, free, fair, transparent, credible, peaceful and timely presidential, legislative and local elections in 2020 and 2021.¹⁰⁹ In the same resolution, the Council called on the national authorities to take concrete steps to strengthen justice institutions and to continue efforts to restore the effective authority of the State over the whole territory of the country, stressing in this context

the valuable role of the Peacebuilding Commission.¹¹⁰ The Council also reiterated the urgent need to hold accountable all those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and urged all parties to armed conflict in the Central African Republic, including armed groups, to end sexual and gender-based violence and violations and abuses committed against children.¹¹¹

In 2019, the Council also took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a new Special Representative for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Resolution 2499 (2019), paras. 2 and 6.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., paras. 9–10.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., paras. 15–17.

¹¹¹ Ibid., paras. 21 and 24–25.

¹¹² See S/2019/75 and S/2019/76.

Meetings: the situation in the Central African Republic

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8455 31 January 2019	Letter dated 14 December 2018 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2399 (2018) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1119)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2019/90)	Central African Republic		Three Council members (Côte d'Ivoire, France, Russian Federation)	Resolution 2454 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8467 21 February 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic (S/2019/147)		Central African Republic	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, Commissioner for Peace and	All Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
				Security of the African Union, Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service, Chair of the Central African Republic configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission		
S/PV.8503 9 April 2019						S/PRST/2019/3
S/PV.8558 20 June 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic (S/2019/498)		Central African Republic	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, African Union Special Representative and Head of the African Union Office in the Central African Republic, Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service	All Council members, all invitees ^c	
S/PV.8617 12 September 2019		Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2019/729)	Central African Republic		11 Council members, ^d all invitees	Resolution 2488 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8646 25 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic (S/2019/822)		Central African Republic	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, Director for Integrated Approach for Security and Peace of the European External Action Service	Two Council members (Côte d'Ivoire, ^e United States), all rule 39 invitees ^f	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8666 15 November 2019		Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2019/877)	Central African Republic		Three Council members (Côte d'Ivoire, ^e France, Indonesia), invitee	Resolution 2499 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a The representative of Côte d'Ivoire spoke twice, once on behalf of the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic and once in his national capacity.

^b The Central African Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Central Africans Abroad. The Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service participated in the meeting by videoconference from Brussels.

^c The African Union Special Representative and the Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service participated in the meeting by videoconference from Bangui and Brussels, respectively.

^d Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire (also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa), France, Germany, Indonesia, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^e The representative of Côte d'Ivoire spoke also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa.

^f The Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union and the Director for Integrated Approach for Security and Peace of the European External Action Service participated in the meeting by videoconference from Addis Ababa and Brussels, respectively.

7. The situation in Guinea-Bissau

During the period under review, the Council held three meetings, adopted one resolution and issued one presidential statement in connection with the situation in Guinea-Bissau. One meeting was convened for the adoption of a decision, while one meeting took the form of a briefing.¹¹³ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition, the Council conducted a mission to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau from 13 to 17 February 2019.¹¹⁴

On 10 September,¹¹⁵ the Council heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa on the evolving political situation in Guinea-Bissau. She commended the Government for its efforts in that regard, including its preparations for the presidential election, its unprecedented achievement of gender parity and its appointment of young candidates to the Cabinet, but noted persisting challenges and appealed to the international community to continue to provide the Government with the necessary financial and technical support. She also noted that 2019 was a pivotal year for Guinea-Bissau in terms of seizing the opportunity to end the recurring cycle of instability that had hampered its socioeconomic development for decades. She cautioned

that the risk of further instability in the period leading up to the presidential election was high and appealed to national actors to be mindful of their duties towards the people of Guinea-Bissau and of the need to transcend narrow individual and party interests. In that regard, she said that efforts must be made to ensure the timely holding of an inclusive, credible and peaceful presidential election. She also highlighted new developments ahead of the planned December 2020 drawdown of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS).

At the same meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. He reiterated the Commission's support the international community and the Government in efforts to strengthen national institutional capacity to deliver on peacebuilding and development objectives. He also reiterated the Commission's support for the reconfiguration exercise and its readiness to provide timely and specific advice to the Council in that regard. He stated that he would visit the country in October and subsequently report on his observations to the Council. During the briefing, several Council members¹¹⁶ echoed their support for the continued national reconciliation process through the Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the Economic Community for West African States

¹¹³ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

¹¹⁴ For more information on the Council's mission to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, see part I, sect. 33.

¹¹⁵ See S/PV.8614.

¹¹⁶ Côte d'Ivoire, France, Belgium, South Africa, China, United Kingdom, Kuwait and Peru.

(ECOWAS) Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau and the ECOWAS road map itself.

Those issues were also addressed by the Council in the two decisions taken in 2019 on the situation in Guinea-Bissau. On 28 February, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2458 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNIOGBIS for 12 months, until 28 February 2020.¹¹⁷ In the resolution, the Council endorsed the reconfiguration of UNIOGBIS and the reprioritization of its tasks in three phases: the electoral phase; the post-electoral phase; and the transition and exit phase.¹¹⁸ In that regard, the Council requested that the reconfiguration take place after the completion of the electoral cycle in 2019, allowing the electoral process to remain the priority.¹¹⁹

In the same resolution, the Council also stressed the need for all national stakeholders and international bilateral and multilateral partners to remain committed to enforcing the Conakry Agreement and, in that context, encouraged ECOWAS to continue close its coordination with the United Nations, the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries and the European Union, aimed at the implementation of the Conakry Agreement.¹²⁰ The Council also decided to review the sanctions measures established pursuant to resolution [2048 \(2012\)](#) seven months following the adoption of resolution [2458 \(2019\)](#), in particular in light of the conduct of the

electoral process.¹²¹ The Council also welcomed the joint efforts undertaken by international partners, assisted by the Peacebuilding Commission, to enhance cooperation and support on the long-term peacebuilding priorities of Guinea-Bissau, in accordance with the priority structural reforms established by the Government.¹²²

In reference to the informal consultations held in October 2019,¹²³ on 4 November, the Council issued a presidential statement, in which it condemned the recent violence and urged the political actors of Guinea-Bissau to show the utmost restraint, to refrain from all forms of violence or incitement to hatred and to consider dialogue as the only means of resolving their differences and preserving peace and stability in the country. The Council also welcomed that the defence and security forces of Guinea-Bissau were maintaining strict neutrality and avoiding interference in the political arena and reminded all actors that the Council's possible reconsideration of the existing sanctions regime would depend on their orderly conduct and on that of other political actors. The Council reiterated its strong support for and commitment to the process of consolidating peace and stability and the development of Guinea-Bissau, in collaboration with regional actors and international partners, including the Guinea-Bissau Group of Five (the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations).¹²⁴

¹¹⁷ Resolution [2458 \(2019\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNIOGBIS, see part X, sect. II.

¹¹⁸ Resolution [2458 \(2019\)](#), para. 2.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 30.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, para. 32.

¹²² *Ibid.*, para. 21.

¹²³ For more information on the consultations held, see [S/2020/192](#).

¹²⁴ [S/PRST/2019/13](#), fourth, fifth and ninth to last paragraphs.

Meetings: the situation in Guinea-Bissau

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8474 28 February 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) (S/2019/115)	Draft resolution submitted by Côte d'Ivoire (S/2019/187)	Guinea-Bissau		One Council member (Côte d'Ivoire), invitee ^a	Resolution 2458 (2019) 15-0-0

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8614 10 September 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of UNIOGBIS (S/2019/664) Report of the Secretary-General on the progress made with regard to the stabilization and restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau (S/2019/696)		Guinea-Bissau	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8656 4 November 2019						S/PRST/2019/13

^a Guinea-Bissau was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Communities.

8. Central African region

In 2019, the Council held three meetings and issued one presidential statement concerning the item entitled “Central African region”. One meeting was held for the adoption of a decision; the other two meetings took the form of briefings.¹²⁵ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

During its meetings held under the item in 2019, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) with regard to the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa.¹²⁶ In his briefings,¹²⁷ the Special Representative apprised the Council on the activities of UNOCA, its continued cooperation with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and its activities as secretariat for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. At the meeting on 6 December,¹²⁸ the Special Representative expressed appreciation for the Council’s support for UNOCA and stated that the Regional Office was working to ensure the full implementation of the recommendations in the strategic review of its activities.

At the same meeting, the Council also heard a briefing by the Deputy Director of Policy of the Enough Project, who recommended that the Council and UNOCA strategically focus on the financial aspect of crises in Central Africa in order to address and prevent violent conflict in the region. He suggested enhancing engagement with key international partners on transparency reforms that could help prevent conflict; refocusing sanctions to target networks of spoilers to peace processes; and engaging with banks and other financial institutions to combat money-

¹²⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

¹²⁶ [S/2019/430](#) and [S/2019/913](#).

¹²⁷ See [S/PV.8538](#) and [S/PV.8679](#).

¹²⁸ See [S/PV.8679](#).

laundering and conflict financing and address issues associated with sanctions implementation.

In 2019, the Council's deliberations were focused on major political and security developments, as well as on the humanitarian, socioeconomic and human rights challenges affecting the Central African region. On the political front, Council members specifically addressed the signing and implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic¹²⁹ and the peaceful elections and transition of power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the elections in several Central African countries, including Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Chad.¹³⁰ Concerning the security situation, deliberations were focused on the continued security threats posed by Boko Haram and the Lord's Resistance Army to the Central African region and beyond,¹³¹ the tensions caused by the illicit exploitation and trafficking of natural resources in the region¹³² and the maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea.¹³³ With respect to humanitarian, socioeconomic and human rights challenges, speakers highlighted the need to address the issue of pastoralism and transhumance¹³⁴ and the impact of climate change on the population of Central Africa and the region's geopolitical situation.¹³⁵

In addition, in 2019, the Council's discussions under this item also addressed the crisis in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon.¹³⁶ Council members expressed concern about the ongoing security, human rights and humanitarian situation in the country and the impact of the conflict on the entire Central African region.¹³⁷ While some supported the role of UNOCA, the African Union, ECCAS and other regional and subregional organizations in resolving the conflict and addressing the humanitarian and human rights situation in the country,¹³⁸ others emphasized that the issues in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon were not on the Council's agenda and that the international community should respect the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.¹³⁹

The issues outlined above were also addressed in the only decision of the Council in connection with the item in 2019. On 12 September, the Council issued a presidential statement, in which it welcomed the role of UNOCA in such non-mission settings as Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe.¹⁴⁰ Taking note of the Secretary-General's strategic review of UNOCA,¹⁴¹ the Council acknowledged that the mandate of the Regional Office remained valid and reaffirmed that enhancing its work in the following areas should be a key priority for the remainder of its mandate: early warning and analysis with a gender perspective; good offices in non-mission settings, in particular in the lead-up to the upcoming electoral cycle in the region; support for and strengthening the capacity of ECCAS; and building partnerships with civil society and supporting subregional civil society networks.¹⁴²

In the same statement, the Council encouraged further enhanced cooperation between UNOCA and other regional entities to address cross-border threats

¹²⁹ See [S/PV.8538](#) (United Kingdom, France, Côte d'Ivoire, Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, South Africa, Germany, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Russian Federation and Kuwait); and [S/PV.8679](#) (United Kingdom, Equatorial Guinea, Dominican Republic, Russian Federation, Indonesia and United States).

¹³⁰ See [S/PV.8538](#) (Côte d'Ivoire, China, Dominican Republic, South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia and Kuwait); and [S/PV.8679](#) (United Kingdom, Belgium and Kuwait).

¹³¹ See [S/PV.8538](#) (United Kingdom, Poland, France, Côte d'Ivoire, Belgium, Dominican Republic, South Africa, Peru, Indonesia, Russian Federation and Kuwait); and [S/PV.8679](#) (United Kingdom, Equatorial Guinea, Dominican Republic, Belgium, Russian Federation, Kuwait, Poland, Peru, Indonesia, China and Germany).

¹³² See [S/PV.8538](#) (Côte d'Ivoire, Belgium, South Africa, Peru, Indonesia and Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8679](#) (Belgium, Russian Federation, Peru and Indonesia).

¹³³ See [S/PV.8538](#) (China, South Africa, Peru and Russian Federation); and [S/PV.8679](#) (Russian Federation).

¹³⁴ See [S/PV.8538](#) (France, Belgium, Dominican Republic, South Africa, Peru and Kuwait); and [S/PV.8679](#), (Dominican Republic).

¹³⁵ See [S/PV.8538](#) (Poland, Dominican Republic, Germany, Equatorial Guinea and Kuwait); and [S/PV.8679](#), (Equatorial Guinea, Dominican Republic, Kuwait and Germany).

¹³⁶ See [S/PV.8538](#) (United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Dominican Republic, Peru, United States and Kuwait) and [S/PV.8679](#) (United Kingdom, Equatorial Guinea, Dominican Republic, Belgium, Russian Federation, Kuwait, Poland and United States).

¹³⁷ See [S/PV.8538](#) (United Kingdom, Poland, Côte d'Ivoire, Belgium, Peru, Equatorial Guinea, United States and Kuwait); and [S/PV.8679](#) (United Kingdom, Dominican Republic, Belgium, Poland, Peru and United States).

¹³⁸ See [S/PV.8538](#) (United Kingdom, Dominican Republic, Peru, United States and Kuwait); and [S/PV.8679](#), (United Kingdom, Dominican Republic, Peru, Germany and United States).

¹³⁹ See [S/PV.8538](#).

¹⁴⁰ [S/PRST/2019/10](#), second paragraph.

¹⁴¹ See [S/2019/625](#).

¹⁴² [S/PRST/2019/10](#), fourth paragraph. For more information regarding the mandate of UNOCA, see part X, sect. II.

and interregional issues, such as the Lake Chad basin crisis, transhumance, forced displacement and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The Council also encouraged UNOCA to take into consideration climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors affecting the stability of

the Central African Region, and requested that information from risk assessments be taken into consideration by UNOCA in its activities.¹⁴³

¹⁴³ [S/PRST/2019/10](#), fifth paragraph.

Meetings: Central African region

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8538 4 June 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) (S/2019/430)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and Head of UNOCA	All Council members, invitee	
S/PV.8618 12 September 2019						S/PRST/2019/10
S/PV.8679 6 December 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Central Africa and the activities of UNOCA (S/2019/913)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Deputy Director of Policy of the Enough Project	12 Council members, ^a all invitees	

^a Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea (also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa), Germany, Kuwait, Indonesia, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

9. Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

During the period under review, the Council held 28 meetings, adopted nine resolutions, including seven under Chapter VII of the Charter, and issued one presidential statement under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”. Of those meetings, 18 took the form of briefings and 10 were convened for the adoption of a decision.¹⁴⁴ In addition, the Council held two private

(closed) meetings with countries contributing troops and police to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).¹⁴⁵ More

¹⁴⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

¹⁴⁵ Held under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”. For UNMISS, see [S/PV.8478](#) (5 March 2019); for UNAMID, see [S/PV.8545](#) (11 June 2019).

information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes is given in the tables below. The Council also conducted a mission to Ethiopia and South Sudan from 19 to 23 October 2019.¹⁴⁶

Consistent with prior practice, in the context of those meetings, the Council considered several distinct topics, principally: the situation in Darfur and the mandate of UNAMID; the relations between South Sudan and the Sudan, the situation in the Abyei Area and the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA); and the situation in South Sudan and the mandate of UNMISS. The Council also considered the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan and their respective Panels of Experts,¹⁴⁷ as well as the implementation of resolution 1593 (2005), by which the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

In relation to the situation in Darfur, the Council focused on the national-level events surrounding the overthrow of the President, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, including demonstrations, attacks against civilians and the establishment of a transitional government, and the impact of those events on Darfur. Council members also discussed progress made and future plans for the drawdown, reconfiguration and eventual exit of UNAMID.

The Council heard regular briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Head of UNAMID and the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa. The Council also heard statements by the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights.

On 25 February 2019,¹⁴⁸ the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa informed the Council that, in the context of ongoing demonstrations in the Sudan against economic and political conditions, President al-Bashir had declared a state of emergency throughout the country for a period of one year. Regarding Darfur, she highlighted the intermittent clashes in Jebel Marra between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan

Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid faction and the increase in sexual violence. Citing the progress made in the drawdown and reconfiguration of UNAMID, she drew attention to the resource-related challenges faced in the transition from the Mission to the United Nations country team and the Government of the Sudan.

On 17 April 2019,¹⁴⁹ the Joint Special Representative for Darfur updated the Council on the events surrounding the removal of President al-Bashir from power on 11 April 2019, followed by the establishment of the Transitional Military Council and the initiation of dialogue with the opposition on the political transition. He noted that, on 15 April 2019, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union had issued a communiqué calling on the Transitional Military Council to install a transitional civilian authority within 15 days, failing which the Sudan would be suspended from all African Union activities. The Joint Special Representative also reported that protests continued across the Sudan, with demands for the immediate transfer of power to a civilian authority, and that violence continued in many locations in Darfur.

In his briefing to the Council on 26 August 2019,¹⁵⁰ the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations reported on the signing of agreements, on 17 August 2019, between the Transitional Military Council and the Forces for Freedom and Change on transitional arrangements for the forthcoming 39-month period in the Sudan, including the establishment of the Sovereign Council and the appointment of the Prime Minister. At the meeting on 17 October 2019,¹⁵¹ he highlighted the signing, on 11 September, of the Juba Declaration for Confidence-building Procedures and the Preparation for Negotiation between the Sovereign Council and a number of armed groups, providing a road map and trust-building agreement for the peace process, which was also consistent with the transitional arrangements. Regarding the situation in Darfur, in his briefing on 14 June 2019,¹⁵² the Under-Secretary-General cautioned that the uncertainty of the negotiations at the national level could have repercussions well beyond Khartoum and lead to an escalation of violence. He expressed concern regarding the looting of the UNAMID super camp in El Geneina and the decision of the Transitional Military Council, in which it requested that the Mission hand over all of its camps to

¹⁴⁶ For more information on the Council's mission to Ethiopia and South Sudan, see part I, sect. 33.

¹⁴⁷ For more information on the Committees and their respective Panels of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

¹⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8468](#).

¹⁴⁹ See [S/PV.8513](#).

¹⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8603](#).

¹⁵¹ See [S/PV.8643](#).

¹⁵² See [S/PV.8549](#).

the Rapid Support Forces. On 17 October 2019,¹⁵³ the Under-Secretary-General presented the findings of the joint African Union-United Nations strategic review of UNAMID pursuant to resolution 2429 (2018) and the assessment of the situation on the ground and the options for a follow-on presence pursuant to resolution 2495 (2019), including the recommendation to align the UNAMID transition with the pace of peace talks between the Government and the armed groups in Juba.

In his remarks,¹⁵⁴ the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union described the overall security situation in Darfur as volatile, with continued fighting in Jebel Marra and intercommunal conflict. He also stated that the inadequate footprint and capacity of the rule of law institutions outside the main urban centres continued to have an adverse impact on the security situation and in terms of ensuring accountability for serious crimes and human rights violations. Regarding the peace talks at the national level, he underscored that it was important that the international community took a coordinated approach to support the process to ensure inclusivity and a successful outcome. The Commissioner added that the United Nations and the African Union would continue joint efforts to help all stakeholders seize the unique opportunity for ending the armed conflict in the Sudan as a whole.

In her briefing to the Council,¹⁵⁵ the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs drew attention to the continued food insecurity across the Sudan and in Darfur. She noted that greater support for development activities was needed as well as scaled up Government investment in crucial services such as social protection. She also called on the Government to take further measures to improve the operating environment for humanitarian organizations. In his briefing on 14 June,¹⁵⁶ the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights reported that the political developments in Khartoum had had some ripple effects in Darfur, with demonstrations in major towns and a rise in the number of documented human rights violations. He underlined that the human rights mandate of UNAMID was of paramount significance, including through continued monitoring and reporting in the whole of Darfur and reinforcing the capacity of national institutions to protect and promote human rights through the State liaison functions.

¹⁵³ See S/PV.8643.

¹⁵⁴ See S/PV.8603.

¹⁵⁵ See S/PV.8513.

¹⁵⁶ See S/PV.8549.

In 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions 2479 (2019) and 2495 (2019), by which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it extended the mandate of UNAMID until 31 October 2019 and 31 October 2020, respectively.¹⁵⁷ While the Mission's authorized troop ceiling remained the same, its mandate priorities were adjusted in resolution 2495 (2019).¹⁵⁸ Also in resolution 2495 (2019), the Council also welcomed the signing of the constitutional declaration on 17 August 2019 and commended the launch of peace negotiations on 14 October.¹⁵⁹

Consistent with established practice pursuant to resolution 1593 (2005), to the Council heard two briefings in relation to Darfur by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in 2019.¹⁶⁰ Noting the dramatic change in circumstances in the Sudan, the Prosecutor stated that the country remained under a legal obligation to transfer to the Court the five suspects against whom arrest warrants had been issued in relation to the Darfur situation, unless it could demonstrate that it was genuinely willing and able to prosecute them for the same cases. She expressed the readiness of her office to engage with the new transitional Government for that purpose. The Prosecutor also condemned the continued violence in parts of Darfur and the attacks carried out against civilian protestors in Khartoum on 3 June 2019.

In addition to the regular briefings on Darfur and the briefings by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the Council heard five briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan,¹⁶¹ in which she provided updates on the recommendations of the final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan on its work for 2018,¹⁶² including for the Council to urge Libyan warring factions to stop cooperating with Darfuri armed groups. The Chair also provided an overview of the activities of the Committee during the reporting period and of her visit to Khartoum and Darfur from 11 to 14 November 2019. By its resolution 2455 (2019), adopted unanimously on 7 February 2019 under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts, extending its mandate for a period of one year until 12 March

¹⁵⁷ Resolutions 2479 (2019), para. 1, and 2495 (2019), para. 1.

¹⁵⁸ Resolution 2495 (2019), para. 3. For more information on the mandate of UNAMID, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁵⁹ Resolution 2495 (2019), fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs.

¹⁶⁰ See S/PV.8554 and S/PV.8691.

¹⁶¹ See S/PV.8446, S/PV.8490, S/PV.8565, S/PV.8632 and S/PV.8684.

¹⁶² See S/2019/34.

2020.¹⁶³ In the resolution, the Council also expressed its intention to establish clear, well-identified and measurable key benchmarks that could serve in guiding the Council to review measures on the Government of the Sudan.¹⁶⁴

With respect to the Abyei Area and relations between South Sudan and the Sudan, the Council heard two briefings each by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa.¹⁶⁵ The Under-Secretary-General observed an improvement in relations between South Sudan and the Sudan and a reaffirmation of their commitments under the cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 2012. He pointed out a lack of progress in the resolution of the final status of Abyei and in the establishment of joint governance institutions. He also provided information on the operational challenges faced by UNISFA and presented the recommendations of the Secretary-General for the reconfiguration of the mission, allowing for a postponement of the reduction in troops and the strengthening of its civilian personnel. The Special Envoy highlighted the support that South Sudan and the Sudan had provided to each other's peace processes, beyond the increase in bilateral discussions between the two countries. He also referred to the situation in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, in particular the declaration of indefinite ceasefires by the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North and the lack of further progress in peace talks on the region.

Concerning UNISFA, the Council unanimously adopted resolutions [2465 \(2019\)](#), [2469 \(2019\)](#) and [2497 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of the mission to support the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the mandate in connection with the Abyei Area.¹⁶⁶ In its resolutions [2469 \(2019\)](#) and [2497 \(2019\)](#), the Council reiterated its request to the two countries to demonstrate measurable progress on border demarcation, including with respect to facilitating the Mechanism and withdrawing their

forces from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone.¹⁶⁷ On Abyei, the Council expressed disappointment that the parties had obstructed the full implementation of the mandate of UNISFA and had taken few steps to implement the 2011 agreement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Area, and requested the Secretary-General to consult with the parties and the African Union on specific steps that could be taken in that regard.¹⁶⁸

In its meetings regarding South Sudan, the Council focused on the delays in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (Revitalized Peace Agreement) signed on September 2018 and on the efforts made to address the main outstanding issues of the pre-transitional phase of the Agreement. The Council heard quarterly briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS. In addition, the Council heard one briefing each by the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, the founder of the non-governmental organization Hope Restoration South Sudan and a representative of the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission. The Council also heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#).

In his briefings,¹⁶⁹ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported that the Revitalized Peace Agreement continued to hold and had resulted in a significant reduction in political violence. He nonetheless expressed regret regarding the repeated extension of the deadline for the formation of a revitalized transitional Government of national unity and the lack of progress in the reunification of security forces, the resolution of the state boundary issue and the drafting of the transitional constitution. He called on the parties to demonstrate political will to address those issues and commended the good offices support of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union, UNMISS, South Africa and Uganda. In terms of positive developments, the Special Representative praised the holding of local-level meetings and rapprochements between Government and opposition representatives and the face-to-face meetings in Juba between the President, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and the opposition leader, Riek Machar Teny. Insofar as it concerned UNMISS, the

¹⁶³ Resolution [2455 \(2019\)](#), para. 2.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

¹⁶⁵ See [S/PV.8519](#) and [S/PV.8644](#).

¹⁶⁶ Resolutions [2465 \(2019\)](#), para. 1, [2469 \(2019\)](#), para. 1, and [2497 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1–2. By its resolution [2492 \(2019\)](#) of 15 October 2019, the Council also provided for a one-month technical roll-over of the mission's mandate with regard to the Mechanism until 15 November 2019 (resolution [2492 \(2019\)](#), para. 1). For more information on the mandate of UNISFA, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁶⁷ Resolutions [2469 \(2019\)](#), para. 11, and [2497 \(2019\)](#), para. 3.

¹⁶⁸ Resolutions [2469 \(2019\)](#), para. 8, and [2497 \(2019\)](#), para. 9.

¹⁶⁹ [S/PV.8480](#), [S/PV.8560](#), [S/PV.8621](#) and [S/PV.8689](#).

Special Representative informed the Council that peacekeepers were moving away from a static type of deployment protection at the protection of civilians sites to increase confidence-building patrols in areas of return, in line with the report of the Secretary-General on future planning for the protection of civilians sites in South Sudan.¹⁷⁰ He also underlined that, despite some improvements in the humanitarian situation since the signing of the Agreement, the majority of the population remained food-insecure and lacked basic services.¹⁷¹

At the meeting on 25 June 2019,¹⁷² the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights stated that there had been a significant and welcome decrease in human rights violations and abuses since September 2018. Nevertheless, he also noted the continued prevalence of sexual violence, an increase in politically motivated intercommunal violence and the restriction of the political and civic space. He gave an overview of UNMISS support for the State to deliver justice at the local level and of its engagement with the authorities. At the same meeting, the representative of the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board focused her remarks on the impact of the conflict on women and girls. She called for the strengthening of the participation of women in decision-making processes and the importance of consulting with civil society and women-led organizations during the political process. At the meeting on 8 March,¹⁷³ the founder of Hope Restoration South Sudan stressed the need to fill the 35 per cent quota reserved for women under the Revitalized Peace Agreement and urged the Council to request that international donors and humanitarian actors work with local South Sudanese non-governmental organizations.

With regard to decisions on UNMISS and South Sudan, on 15 March 2019, the Council adopted resolution 2459 (2019), by which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it extended the mandate of UNMISS for a period of one year and introduced some modifications to its tasks, while maintaining its overall composition.¹⁷⁴ The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour and 1 abstention. At the meeting on 15 March,¹⁷⁵ in explanation of his delegation's decision to abstain in the vote, the representative of the Russian

Federation expressed disappointment with the reluctance of some Council members to welcome the Revitalized Peace Agreement and concern at the listing of UNMISS tasks related to gender and human rights before the provision of support for the Agreement. The representative of China stated that, despite his delegation's vote in favour of the draft resolution, the text still needed improvement. He said that the Council needed to fully acknowledge the importance and positive significance of the Agreement and that UNMISS should focus on facilitating its implementation in order to help to sustain the positive momentum in South Sudan. With regard to the issue of improving the Mission's performance, he noted the need for the Secretariat and the military, police and civilian components of UNMISS to work together and the need to include the full participation of troop-contributing countries, with a view to enabling the Mission to carry out its functions better.

On 8 October 2019, the Council issued a presidential statement, in which it described the Revitalized Peace Agreement as an important step forward in the peace process.¹⁷⁶ The Council also welcomed some of the positive developments resulting from the agreement, including the reduction in political violence, the return of some representatives of the opposition to Juba, the formation of certain institutions and mechanisms provided under the Agreement, joint peacebuilding activities at the local level and an improved humanitarian environment in many areas.¹⁷⁷ The Council called for the senior leadership of the parties to resolve outstanding issues in order to allow for the peaceful formation of the transitional Government and urged them to expedite the implementation of security arrangements and to continue consultations on the number and boundaries of states, with a view to finding a common solution.¹⁷⁸

In addition to the regular briefings relating to South Sudan and UNMISS, on 17 December 2019,¹⁷⁹ the Council heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) on her visit to South Sudan, Uganda, the Sudan and Ethiopia conducted from 6 to 15 October 2019, as well as on the recommendations contained in the interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan¹⁸⁰ and on the Committee's work in 2019.

On 30 May 2019, the Council adopted resolution 2471 (2019), by which, acting under Chapter VII of the

¹⁷⁰ S/2019/741.

¹⁷¹ See S/PV.8480, S/PV.8560, S/PV.8621 and S/PV.8689.

¹⁷² S/PV.8560.

¹⁷³ S/PV.8480.

¹⁷⁴ Resolution 2459 (2019), paras. 5–7. For more information on the mandate of UNMISS, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁷⁵ S/PV.8484.

¹⁷⁶ S/PRST/2019/11, first paragraph.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, first and third paragraphs.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, second and fourth paragraphs.

¹⁷⁹ See S/PV.8689.

¹⁸⁰ See S/2019/897.

Charter, it renewed the travel ban, asset freeze and arms embargo on South Sudan until 31 May 2020 and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 30 June 2020.¹⁸¹ The resolution was adopted with 10 votes in favour and 5 abstentions. At the meeting on 30 May,¹⁸² abstaining Council members¹⁸³ said that the extension of the sanctions without modification would not support the positive political momentum on the ground or the mediation efforts of the African Union

and IGAD. Other Council members,¹⁸⁴ who had voted in favour of the draft resolution, noted the importance of extending the sanctions measures in order to maintain pressure on the parties and to stop the flow of arms and further acts of violence.

For the purposes of facilitating the coverage of this item, the meetings are set out below under three separate headings, namely: (a) Darfur; (b) the relations between the Sudan and South Sudan and the situation in Abyei; and (c) South Sudan.

¹⁸¹ Resolution 2471 (2019), paras. 1–3.

¹⁸² See S/PV.8536.

¹⁸³ South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Russian Federation, China and Equatorial Guinea.

¹⁸⁴ United States, Poland, Belgium, Germany, France and United Kingdom.

Meetings: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – Darfur

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8446 17 January 2019			Sudan		All Council members, ^a invitee	
S/PV.8458 7 February 2019	Letter dated 10 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/34)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/114)	Sudan		Sudan	Resolution 2455 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8468 25 February 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (S/2019/44)		Sudan	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8490 26 March 2019			Sudan		One Council member (Poland), ^b invitee	
S/PV.8513 17 April 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID (S/2019/305)		Sudan	African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Head of UNAMID,	All Council members, ^c all invitees ^d	

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2019

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
				Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator		
S/PV.8549 14 June 2019	Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of UNAMID (S/2019/445)		Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8554 19 June 2019			Sudan	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8565 26 June 2019					One Council member (Poland) ^b	
S/PV.8566 27 June 2019	Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic assessment of UNAMID (S/2019/445)	Draft resolution submitted by Germany, United Kingdom (S/2019/525)	Sudan		11 Council members, ^e invitee	Resolution 2479 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8603 26 August 2019			Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union	All Council members, all invitees ^f	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8632 3 October 2019					One Council member (Poland) ^b	
S/PV.8643 17 October 2019	Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on UNAMID (S/2019/816)		Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations	13 Council members, ^g all invitees	
S/PV.8654 31 October 2019	Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on UNAMID (S/2019/816)	Draft resolution submitted by Germany, United Kingdom (S/2019/849)	Sudan		Four Council members (France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States), invitee	Resolution 2495 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8684 12 December 2019			Sudan		One Council member (Poland), ^b invitee	
S/PV.8691 18 December 2019			Sudan	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees	

^a The representative of Poland spoke twice, once in her capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan and once in her national capacity.

^b The representative of Poland gave a briefing in her capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#).

^c Germany (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office.

^d The Joint Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Khartoum.

^e China, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa (also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea), United Kingdom, United States.

^f The Under-Secretary-General and the Commissioner participated in the meeting by videoconference from Paris and Tokyo, respectively.

^g Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea (also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa), France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States.

Meetings: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – the Sudan, South Sudan and Abyei

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8509 12 April 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/307)	Sudan, South Sudan		All invitees	Resolution 2465 (2019) 15-0-0
S/PV.8519 30 April 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2019/319)		Sudan, South Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8524 14 May 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/381)	Sudan, South Sudan		Three Council members (China, Russian Federation, United States), all invitees	Resolution 2469 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8640 15 October 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/807)				Resolution 2492 (2019) 15-0-0
S/PV.8644 24 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2019/817)		Sudan, South Sudan	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8663 14 November 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/879)	Sudan		Two Council members (Indonesia, United States), invitee	Resolution 2497 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a The Special Envoy participated in the meeting by videoconference from Addis Ababa.

Meetings: reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan – South Sudan

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8480 8 March 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 1 December 2018 to 26 February 2019) (S/2019/191)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, founder of Hope Restoration South Sudan	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8484 15 March 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 1 December 2018 to 26 February 2019) (S/2019/191)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/225)	South Sudan		Four Council members (China, Kuwait, Russian Federation, United States), invitee	Resolution 2459 (2019) 14-0-1 ^a (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8536 30 May 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/441)			14 Council members ^b	Resolution 2471 (2019) 10-0-5 ^c (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8560 25 June 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2019/491)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, representative of the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission	All Council members, all invitees ^d	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8621 18 September 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in South Sudan (S/2019/722) Report of the Secretary-General on future planning for the protection of civilian sites in South Sudan (S/2019/741)		South Sudan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8634 8 October 2019						S/PRST/2019/11
S/PV.8689 17 December 2019				Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members, ^e invitee ^f	

^a *For*: Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: Russian Federation.

^b Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States.

^c *For*: Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa.

^d The representative of the Strategic Defence and Security Review Board participated in the meeting by videoconference from Juba.

^e Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa (also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea), United Kingdom and United States. The representative of Poland spoke twice, once in her capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan and once in her national capacity.

^f The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Auckland, New Zealand.

10. Peace consolidation in West Africa

During the period under review, the Council held three meetings and issued one presidential statement under the agenda item "Peace consolidation in West Africa". Two of the meetings took the form of briefings and one meeting was convened for the adoption of a decision of the Council.¹⁸⁵ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, are noted in the table below. In addition, the

Council conducted a mission to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau from 13 to 17 February 2019.¹⁸⁶

During its meetings under this agenda item, the Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), during which he presented the succeeding reports of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office.

¹⁸⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

¹⁸⁶ For more information on the Council's mission to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, see part I, sect. 33.

In his first briefing, on 10 January 2019,¹⁸⁷ the Special Representative focused on the progress being made in the democratic consolidation process in West Africa and the Sahel, despite persisting and complex security challenges, including the expansion of terrorist activities undertaken by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad basin and continued violent clashes between farmers and herders in the region. He also commended the continued and successful partnership between UNOWAS and regional partners, including the Economic Community of West African States, the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, including within the framework of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. He mentioned the promising progress made in the implementation of resolution 2349 (2017) to support a regional response to the crisis in the Lake Chad basin and highlighted the adoption of a regional strategy for the stabilization, recovery and resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad basin by the Council of Ministers of the Lake Chad Basin Commission on 30 August 2018. He spoke about the successful elections held in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania and Togo and emphasized the need to continue efforts to prevent and mitigate election-related violence. He also spoke of the allegations of human rights violations by security forces and the re-emergence of self-defence groups fuelling intercommunal tensions in some countries. He noted that, during the annual review of progress made in West Africa and the Sahel concerning the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), the discrimination against and marginalization of women in political processes had been highlighted once again, with women accounting for less than 15 per cent of parliamentarians. In that regard, he affirmed that his Office would continue to work with all regional actors to strengthen the role of women in the region.

After the briefing, the discussion among Council members was focused on building resilience and an environment favourable to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as on the threat posed by non-State actors, including terrorist groups striving to exploit intercommunal tension between herders and farmers. Some Council members¹⁸⁸ highlighted the link between climate change and security in the Sahel leading to tension over resources. Some members¹⁸⁹ mentioned the importance of UNOWAS for the upcoming elections and made reference to the Office's role in providing support for security sector reforms, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

processes. Some Council members¹⁹⁰ also expressed concern about the situation of women in the region, and some¹⁹¹ called for further action by Governments and the international community to see more women in positions of responsibility and decision-making.

In his second briefing, on 24 July 2019,¹⁹² the Special Representative noted that further progress had been made in democratic consolidation in West Africa and the Sahel, but that it had not been linear or without complications. He highlighted the gains made in the Gambia regarding justice and reconciliation and in Togo with regard to gender parity. Despite those gains, he noted that pre- and post-electoral periods continued to be characterized by antagonistic contests and disputes. He noted that addressing such potential sources of conflict remained a major priority ahead of the upcoming cycle of high-stakes presidential elections in West Africa, namely, in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, the Niger and Togo. He mentioned that democratic progress had been delayed and complicated and, on occasion, almost negated by a rapid expansion of violent extremism in the region. In that regard, he stated that the security situation remained volatile in the entire Sahel region, where escalating violence and insecurity had sparked an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. In that connection, he urged all Governments and partners to define a concerted approach to preventing a further expansion of terrorist activities and fostering support for medium- and long-term stabilization measures that aligned with the integrated strategy for the region.

In their deliberations at the same meeting, Council members focused on the deteriorating security situation affecting the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin. Many members¹⁹³ highlighted the importance of the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel in combating terrorism in the region. Council members¹⁹⁴ also highlighted the need to address the root causes of the situation surrounding terrorism, conflicts, insecurity and instability. Council members¹⁹⁵ addressed the challenges posed by climate change and its impact on conflict in the region, welcoming the Council's focus and the work of UNOWAS in that respect. Also at the

¹⁹⁰ Germany, United States, Poland, United Kingdom and Dominican Republic.

¹⁹¹ Germany, France, Poland and Dominican Republic.

¹⁹² See [S/PV.8585](#).

¹⁹³ France, Poland, Russian Federation, United States, Kuwait, China and Indonesia.

¹⁹⁴ Côte d'Ivoire, Poland, United States, Kuwait, Dominican Republic, Indonesia and United Kingdom.

¹⁹⁵ Côte d'Ivoire, Belgium, France, Poland, Germany, Dominican Republic, United Kingdom and Peru.

¹⁸⁷ [S/PV.8442](#).

¹⁸⁸ Germany, France, United States, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, Indonesia, Belgium and Dominican Republic.

¹⁸⁹ Peru and Dominican Republic.

same meeting, Council members¹⁹⁶ acknowledged the progress achieved in the adoption and implementation of gender-parity legislation in several countries in the region and called on national authorities to enhance the participation of women at all levels.

Most of the issues outlined in the paragraphs above were also addressed in a presidential statement issued on 7 August 2019. In the statement, the Council welcomed the decision of the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of the mandate of UNOWAS and its activities and invited him to present to the Council, by 15 November 2019, the recommendations stemming from that review and his observations on potential areas for improvement, including on counter-terrorism and the effects of climate change on security and intercommunal violence, in order to inform the Council's discussion on the renewal of the Office's mandate, which would be expiring on 31 December 2019.¹⁹⁷

In the statement, the Council expressed its deep concern about the continued deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the Sahel region and called for continued regional and international engagement to help countries in the region to address the peace and security challenges they faced.¹⁹⁸ The Council welcomed the leadership demonstrated by countries in West Africa and the Sahel in spearheading initiatives to address security challenges in the region and commended their efforts, as well as those of the African Union and ECOWAS, to strengthen security; it also underscored the need for security efforts to be aligned with political objectives and encouraged ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel to identify areas of

complementarity in preventing conflict and sustaining peace in the region.¹⁹⁹

Also in the statement, the Council encouraged the consolidation of political reforms in the region to prevent violence and instability and underlined the need for the United Nations to sustain support, including in non-mission settings, welcoming the role of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund in sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts.²⁰⁰ The Council emphasized the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, in peacebuilding and in post-conflict situations and stressed the importance of their full, equal and meaningful participation and involvement in all efforts towards the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and reiterated the need for an integrated gender perspective in the design and implementation of comprehensive strategies to address root causes of the crisis.²⁰¹ The Council reiterated its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all countries in West Africa and the Sahel, while underlining the need for a more integrated, cross-pillar approach across the development, humanitarian, human rights and peace and security nexus, including to address root causes of crises.²⁰² The Council also recognized the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and stressed the need for long-term strategies, based on risk assessments, by Governments and the United Nations, to support stabilization and build resilience; it encouraged UNOWAS to continue to integrate that information in its activities.²⁰³

¹⁹⁶ Côte d'Ivoire, France, Poland, Germany, Dominican Republic and Peru.

¹⁹⁷ [S/PRST/2019/7](#), fifth paragraph. For more information on the mandate of UNOWAS, see part X, sect. II.

¹⁹⁸ [S/PRST/2019/7](#), tenth paragraph.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, nineteenth paragraph.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, fourteenth paragraph.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, sixteenth and seventeenth paragraphs.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, sixth and twenty-seventh paragraphs.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, twenty-fifth paragraph.

Meetings: peace consolidation in West Africa

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8442 10 January 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) (S/2018/1175)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOWAS	All Council members, invitee	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8585 24 July 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of UNOWAS (S/2019/549)			Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members, ^a invitee	
S/PV.8592 7 August 2019						S/PRST/2019/7

^a Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire (also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa), Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Indonesia, Poland, Peru, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States.

11. Peace and security in Africa

During the period under review, the Council held nine meetings and issued two presidential statements under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”. Five of the meetings took the form of briefings, two were debates and two were convened for the adoption of decisions of the Council.²⁰⁴ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. In addition, the Council conducted a mission to Ethiopia and South Sudan from 19 to 23 October 2019.²⁰⁵

In 2019, the Council held two meetings on the activities of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, in connection with the relevant reports of the Secretary-General.²⁰⁶ In addition, the Council held four meetings focused on the following themes: partnership to strengthen regional peace and security; mobilizing youth towards silencing the guns in Africa by 2020; preventative diplomacy and conflict prevention; and intercommunal violence and terrorism in West Africa. The Council also heard a briefing on the joint mission by the United Nations and the African Union to Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia in October 2019.

The Council heard briefings on the activities of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel in May and November 2019. On 16 May 2019,²⁰⁷ the Council heard briefings by the High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Burkina Faso, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, the European

Union Special Representative for the Sahel and the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The Assistant Secretary-General described the situation in Mali and the Sahel as extremely worrisome, stating that the region faced serious problems, ranging from climate change and drought to growing insecurity, violent extremism and illicit trafficking in persons, weapons and drugs, as terrorist groups continued to spread beyond borders. She added that, while the resumption of the operations of the Joint Force in January 2019 after the terrorist attack on its headquarters was encouraging, it was essential to maintain the momentum; she therefore urged the States members of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) to urgently accelerate the full operationalization of the Joint Force to reach its full operational capacity. Speaking on behalf of the States members of the G5 Sahel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Burkina Faso reported on the composition of the Joint Force and requested the Council to accede to the Group’s request to establish a new United Nations approach to support the Force with the goal of equipping the it to better respond to security challenges. The High Representative of the African Union described the security situation in the Sahelo-Saharan subregion and reported that, at its meeting on 9 April 2019, the Peace and Security Council had renewed the mandate of the Joint Force, while also noting the progress that had been made, the operations that had been conducted and the support that countries continued to provide to the Force. He emphasized that the operationalization of the Joint Force had now become an absolute and urgent necessity. The European Union Special Representative and the Executive Director of UNODC outlined the cooperation of their respective organizations with the Joint Force. During

²⁰⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

²⁰⁵ For more information on the Council’s mission to Ethiopia and South Sudan, see part I, sect. 33.

²⁰⁶ [S/2019/371](#) and [S/2019/868](#).

²⁰⁷ See [S/PV.8526](#).

the discussion, some Council members²⁰⁸ reiterated the requests made by the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel for the Council to approve a mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter to provide additional political legitimacy for and accelerate the establishment of the Joint Force trust fund, which would enable direct and predictable financing through assessed contributions. Some Council members²⁰⁹ expressed concerns about the excessive militarization of the region, noting that the Joint Force could not operate solely based on a security-driven approach, and some²¹⁰ added that it required instead a holistic approach that addressed root causes and encompassed poverty reduction, good governance, development, humanitarian assistance and security.

On 20 November 2019,²¹¹ the Council heard additional briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso, the latter again on behalf of the G5 Sahel. Both emphasized the worrisome security situation in the region and the importance of resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), adopted in connection with the situation in Mali, in facilitating the provision of support to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel through the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations stressed that the support of the countries in the region, as well as that of the African Union, the United Nations and the entire international community, was an absolute priority for winning the fight against terrorism in the region. The Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service focused on the contribution to and support for the Joint Force by the European Union, including through MINUSMA, and stated that, in order to achieve the dual objective of empowering partners and mobilizing regional and international actors, the support and leverage of the Security Council were more essential than ever. The Council also heard a briefing by the President of the Association of African Women for Research and Development, who focused on the following three key issues: access to justice for survivors of gender-based violence; the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of peace and security; and ensuring that MINUSMA and the Joint Force were able to respond to the security needs of the communities. She concluded her briefing by stating that the solution

to the complex dynamics of the conflict in Mali would not be found on the battlefield, but would emerge from dialogue and genuine regard for the concerns of ordinary people, and urged Council members to use their power to make that happen. During the discussion, Council members expressed support for the Secretary-General's recommendation to the Council to lift the geographical restrictions so as to provide support through MINUSMA to all battalions operating within the framework of the Joint Force. Council members also commended the decision by the Economic Community of West African States to mobilize \$1 billion to tackle terrorism.

On 26 September 2019, at the initiative of the Russian Federation, which held the presidency for the month,²¹² the Council held a ministerial-level debate on partnership to strengthen regional peace and security.²¹³ At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, who highlighted the successful and intensifying cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and the various subregional organizations. She noted that the Peace Fund of the African Union was at its highest-ever level of assessed contributions, while stressing the importance of ensuring predictable and sustainable financing for African-led peace support operations. The Council also heard a briefing by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, who made reference to the funding proposal for African peacekeeping operations and stated that the overarching duty of Africa was to bear responsibility for a significant part of that funding. He added that that could not, however, in any way relieve the Council, the sole organ truly responsible for peace in the world, of its obligations to provide funding for those operations from the appropriate resources of the United Nations. He considered that issue to be at the heart of peace and security concerns in Africa. During the discussion, Council members addressed the need for predictable and sustainable funding for African-led initiatives, as well as dedicated sources of funding for peace support operations. Cooperation among the United Nations, the African Union and various subregional organizations, including for the African Union initiative *Silencing the Guns by 2020*, was also highlighted during deliberations.

²⁰⁸ Côte d'Ivoire, United States of America, Equatorial Guinea and Belgium.

²⁰⁹ Equatorial Guinea and Russian Federation.

²¹⁰ France, China, United States of America, Russian Federation, Germany, Peru, South Africa, Kuwait and Indonesia.

²¹¹ See [S/PV.8670](#).

²¹² The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 13 September 2019 from the representatives of Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, the Russian Federation and South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General ([S/2019/743](#)).

²¹³ See [S/PV.8627](#).

On 2 October 2019, at the initiative of South Africa, which held the presidency for the month,²¹⁴ the Council held a debate on the question of mobilizing youth towards silencing the guns by 2020,²¹⁵ attended by African youth leaders, the Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Africa and the Permanent Observer of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to the United Nations, among other stakeholders. The briefings were focused on the need to create more opportunities for youth in the decision-making process and to improve livelihoods to prevent conflict. The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa pointed out that Africa was one of the world's youngest continents and that urgent efforts were needed to combat threats to peace and security, especially radicalization, violent extremism, sexual violence, xenophobia and forced migration. She called for enhanced support from the United Nations, regional groups and the private sector and drew attention to Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want and the African Union Master Road Map of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020. Youth activists shared their personal experiences during the debate, highlighting the effects of terrorism, war, unemployment and climate change on young people and spotlighting youth uprisings in Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia, among other countries. Council members²¹⁶ discussed the crucial role played by the Council in drawing attention to resolutions [2250 \(2015\)](#) and [2419 \(2018\)](#) in support of youth engagement in international peace and security. Council members²¹⁷ also recognized the specific challenges faced by young people in conflict situations and called for more investment in youth employment and education to prevent their radicalization and participation in organized crime.

On 7 October, also at the initiative of South Africa,²¹⁸ the Council held a debate on preventative diplomacy and conflict prevention.²¹⁹ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, a visiting scholar and the Associate Director of the Institute for African Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, the Programme Manager of South African Women in

Dialogue, the Programme Manager of the Zanele Mbeki Development, the Permanent Observer of the African Union and the Permanent Observer of ECCAS. The briefings were focused on the work of the United Nations and its regional partners in Africa in addressing the root causes of conflict. Briefers differed in their proposals to address root causes of conflict. While the two Permanent Observers called for a proactive and regionally engaged approach by the Council, the two Programme Managers called for a community-driven approach, specifically one that supported locally owned and women-led peace efforts.

In his briefing, the Secretary-General noted the progress made by the United Nations, together with its partners in many parts of Africa, such as Cameroon, the Gambia and Madagascar. He stated that the spread and continued threat of terrorism across the continent was more than just a regional issue, it was a danger to global peace and security. He noted that sustainable inclusive development was an end in itself and the most effective way to address the underlying causes of conflict, extremism and terrorism. In her briefing, the Associate Director of the Institute for African Studies at George Washington University stated that the complexity of the issues involved in the cyclical violence required a regional framework and approach for any meaningful attempt to address issues of peace and security in the region and on the African continent. She stated that women should be seen as agents of preventive diplomacy and catalysts for peacebuilding. The Programme Manager of South African Women in Dialogue described how her organization had facilitated partnerships between women and national and international bodies in order to shape community, provincial, national and continental agendas, thereby creating a space conducive to socioeconomic development and the eradication of poverty. The Programme Manager of the Zanele Mbeki Development Trust sought the support of the Council for the African Women in Dialogue platform, as it presented an opportunity for the involvement of African women as active players in conflict prevention and preventative diplomacy. She also appealed to Council members for help in strengthening the dialogue at all levels so as to enable communities to drive their own peace processes. The Permanent Observer of ECCAS, stated that the Community would continue to work with the African Union and the United Nations, through the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, on building the capacity of women and young people, to ensure their equal participation in promoting peace and security and in playing a central role in leadership and decision-making. The Permanent Observer of the African Union

²¹⁴ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 30 September 2019 ([S/2019/779](#)).

²¹⁵ See [S/PV.8629](#).

²¹⁶ Poland, United States, Belgium, France, Kuwait, United Kingdom, Peru, Dominican Republic and South Africa.

²¹⁷ Poland, Côte d'Ivoire, Kuwait, Peru and Russian Federation.

²¹⁸ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 October 2019 ([S/2019/786](#)).

²¹⁹ See [S/PV.8633](#).

stressed the importance of continued collective and concerted efforts to respond to existing and emerging threats, the relevance of partnerships and collaboration among Governments, civil society organizations and the private sector and the sustained engagement of all stakeholders, including women and young people, in decision-making processes. During the discussion, Council members²²⁰ welcomed the progressively deepening alliances between the United Nations and the African Union, including through the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, signed in 2017.

On 4 November 2019,²²¹ the Council heard a briefing by the Deputy Secretary-General on her joint mission, together with the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security, to Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia, as well as on her separate visit to the Sudan. The Deputy Secretary-General reported that those missions had provided an opportunity to strengthen the implementation of the shared United Nations-African Union frameworks on peace and security. She stated that each country was moving at its own pace through a process of reform and transformation. She drew special attention to the “new dawn” currently taking shape in the Sudan and urged the Council to stand ready to provide support. She reported that countries in the region were headed in the right direction, adding that the Council should seize this opportunity to invest in and support peace. She also emphasized the importance of increasing the percentage of women in peacekeeping forces, noting that women continued to make up less than four per cent of United Nations peacekeepers. In her briefing at the same meeting, the Permanent Observer of the African Union stated that, during the joint African Union-United Nations mission, they had been able to witness first-hand that peace, security and development had little chance of standing without the full and effective participation of women and young people, who were on the front lines, addressing climate insecurity, radicalization and violent extremism. She pointed out, however, that they had also witnessed the creativity and innovation of women in the political and socioeconomic spheres of their societies and emphasized the need to bolster their laudable and courageous initiatives. She also emphasized the need to prioritize substantive support for women’s organizations and projects and continued engagement with Member States to create a conducive environment for women to participate in decision-making, at all

²²⁰ Côte d’Ivoire, Russian Federation, Dominican Republic, Germany, France, Poland and Indonesia.

²²¹ See [S/PV.8657](#).

levels. After the briefings, Council members²²² echoed the calls to bolster the deployment of female peacekeepers, with some members²²³ citing the Council’s resolutions on women and peace and security agenda, including the recent adoption of resolution [2493 \(2019\)](#), in which it urged States to recommit themselves to that agenda.²²⁴

On 16 December 2019, at the initiative of the United States, which held the presidency for the month, and Côte d’Ivoire, the Council held a meeting to address the issue of intercommunal violence and terrorism in West Africa.²²⁵ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union. The Special Representative stated that poor management of natural resources, inequalities, marginalization, corruption and gaps in security and justice had resulted in an upsurge of intercommunal violence, with relentless attacks by extremist groups on civilians and security forces. He called on the Council to support the implementation of the Bamako Declaration of 29 November 2019 on access to natural resources and conflict between communities, as regional organizations, he said, were best positioned to provide a framework for the prevention and resolution of local conflicts. The Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union called on the Council to consider a “reset”, including a rethink of the manner in which military support was provided to countries of the region, and the implementation of a holistic approach to strengthening the presence of States, including through the rule of law, education, infrastructure and strong environmental policies to address climate change. He recommended that the African Union and the United Nations co-chair a coordinating mechanism. During the discussion, several Council members²²⁶ endorsed a need for a holistic security response as part of a greater strategy to counter violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel.

In 2019, the Council issued two presidential statements under the item. On 2 August 2019, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it took note that the World Health Organization had declared the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo a public health emergency of international

²²² United States, Indonesia and South Africa.

²²³ France, Equatorial Guinea and South Africa.

²²⁴ For more information on the women and peace and security agenda, see part I, sect. 30.

²²⁵ See [S/PV.8685](#).

²²⁶ United States of America, China, Poland, Germany and Indonesia.

concern.²²⁷ The Council highlighted the urgency of the Ebola response, because the disease could spread rapidly, including to neighbouring countries, possibly having serious humanitarian consequences and affecting regional stability.²²⁸ The Council emphasized the need for continued cooperation and coordination with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as with other States in the region, as appropriate, to address the outbreak, and the importance of strengthening international support and engagement, including full and timely financial contributions, for response efforts, technical assistance, scientific cooperation and human resources to bring the disease permanently and successfully under control.²²⁹ On 12 December 2019, in connection with the debate held

on 2 October, the Council issued a second presidential statement under the item, in which it encouraged Member States to take a series of youth-oriented measures, in addition to the steps already being taken to mobilize youth towards silencing the guns in Africa by 2020, including to create opportunities for inclusive representation, to promote inclusive development and to encourage their meaningful participation in the reconstruction of areas devastated by conflict.²³⁰ The Council also encouraged Member States to support initiatives and mechanisms adopted by regional organizations aimed at improving the participation of young people, including young women, in peacebuilding, conflict mediation and conflict resolution, including countering violent extremism.²³¹

²²⁷ S/PRST/2019/6, first paragraph.

²²⁸ Ibid., second paragraph.

²²⁹ Ibid., fourth and final paragraphs.

²³⁰ S/PRST/2019/15, seventh paragraph.

²³¹ Ibid., tenth paragraph.

Meetings: peace and security in Africa

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8526 16 May 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (S/2019/371)		Burkina Faso	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel, Special Representative of the European Union for the Sahel, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	All Council members, all invitees ^{a,b}	
S/PV.8590 2 August 2019	Ebola					S/PRST/2019/6
S/PV.8627 26 September 2019	Partnership to strengthen regional peace and security Letter dated 13 September 2019 from the Permanent Representatives of Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, the Russian Federation and South Africa to the United Nations Secretary-General (S/2019/743)		Egypt	Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Deputy Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Political Director of the European External Action Service	All Council members, ^c all invitees ^{d,e}	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8629 2 October 2019	Mobilizing youth towards silencing the guns by 2020 Letter dated 30 September 2019 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/779)			Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Africa, Special Envoy on Youth of the African Union, co-founder and Chairperson of Naweza, youth activist, Permanent Observer of the Economic Community of Central African States to the United Nations (ECCAS)	All Council members, all invitees ^f	
S/PV.8633 7 October 2019	The centrality of preventative diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution Letter dated 2 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/786)		Ethiopia, Namibia	Visiting scholar and Associate Director of the Institute for African Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Programme Manager of South African Women in Dialogue, Programme Manager of the Zanele Mbeki Development Trust, Permanent Observer of the African Union, Permanent Observer of ECCAS	Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8657 4 November 2019				Permanent Observer of the African Union	Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members, invitee	
S/PV.8670 20 November 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (S/2019/868)		Burkina Faso	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Permanent Observer of the African Union, Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service, President of the Association of African Women for Research and Development	13 Council members, ^g all invitees ^{b,h}	
S/PV.8683 12 December 2019						S/PRST/2019/15

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8685 16 December 2019	Intercommunal violence and terrorism in West Africa			Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union	13 Council members, ^g all invitees ⁱ	

^a The High Representative of the African Union, the European Union Special Representative and the Executive Director of UNODC participated in the meeting by videoconference from Bamako, Luxembourg and Vienna, respectively.

^b Burkina Faso was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

^c Belgium was represented by its Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; China was represented by its State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Côte d'Ivoire was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Equatorial Guinea was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; France was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs; Germany was represented by its Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office; Indonesia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Peru was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Poland was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; the Russian Federation (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; and South Africa was represented by its Minister for International Relations and Cooperation.

^d Egypt was represented by its Vice-Minister for Multilateral Affairs.

^e The Deputy Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Political Director of the European External Action Service spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine. Since 2019, "North Macedonia" has replaced "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" as the short name used at the United Nations.

^f The co-founder and Chairperson of Naweza and the youth activist participated in the meeting by videoconference from Nairobi and Kampala, respectively.

^g The representative of Côte d'Ivoire spoke also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa.

^h The Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service and the President of the Association of African Women for Research and Development participated in the meeting by videoconference from Brussels and Bamako, respectively.

ⁱ The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union participated in the meeting by videoconference from Dakar and Addis Ababa, respectively.

12. The situation in Libya

During the period under review, the Council held 11 meetings and adopted 2 resolutions, including one under Chapter VII of the Charter. Two meetings were devoted to the adoption of decisions of the Council; all other meetings held under the item took the form of briefings.²³² In 2019, the Council decided to extend for 12 months, until 10 June 2020, the authorization to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya in implementation of the arms embargo and to extend the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 15 September 2020.²³³ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2019, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for

Libya and Head of UNSMIL. Other briefers under the item included the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, the Head of Advocacy and Outreach at Lawyers for Justice in Libya, and the co-founder and Director of Together We Build It. In 2019, invitations under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure were limited to Libya.

In his six briefings to the Council in 2019,²³⁴ the Special Representative reported on the continuing humanitarian, political, security and social challenges affecting Libya. The Special Representative provided regular updates on the activities of and terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

²³² For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

²³³ Resolutions 2473 (2019), para. 1, and 2486 (2019), para. 1.

²³⁴ See S/PV.8448, S/PV.8488, S/PV.8530, S/PV.8588, S/PV.8611 and S/PV.8667.

(ISIL, also known as Da'esh) in Libya.²³⁵ He also drew attention to the utilization of media platforms to incite violence and spread invective and false information, further dividing the population.²³⁶ In his briefing in May,²³⁷ the Special Representative reported on the devastating effects of the offensive by the Libyan National Army, led by General Khalifa Haftar, to seize control of Tripoli on 4 April 2019. He mentioned that the offensive had been launched during the visit of the Secretary-General's visit to the country and 10 days before the planned national conference in Ghadamis, to which Libyans from across the country would have gathered to decide how the nation would have proceeded to end the transition period and usher in a new period of stability and security. He warned that the security vacuum created by the withdrawal of many of General Haftar's troops from the south, coupled with the focus of the western forces on the defence of the Libyan capital, was already being exploited by ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida. At the meeting in July,²³⁸ the Special Representative proposed a three-part immediate action plan to stop the conflict, consisting of: (a) a truce for the period of Eid Al-Adha, accompanied by measures aimed at building confidence between the parties; (b) a high-level meeting of concerned countries to cement the cessation of hostilities; and (c) a Libyan meeting of leading and influential personalities from all over the country to agree on comprehensive elements for the way forward. In two briefings following the attack of 10 August on the United Nations in Benghazi,²³⁹ the Special Representative provided the Council with updates on the internal inquiry by the United Nations into the incident and its requests to Libyan authorities to cooperate in the investigation and to swiftly bring the perpetrators to justice. On 18 November, the Council heard the Special Representative's last briefing of 2019,²⁴⁰ in which he reported on the progress made in preparing for the second step of his three-part immediate action plan: an international summit of concerned countries committed to ending the conflict in Libya and supporting a Libyan-led political process.

During the period under review, the Council also heard regular briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya. In his five briefings to the Council in 2019,²⁴¹ the Chair highlighted the violations of the

sanctions regime, in particular the arms embargo, in addition to reporting on the activities and developments relating to the work of the Committee and its Panel of Experts.

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court provided briefings to the Council twice in 2019,²⁴² to report on the progress and challenges relating to the Court's ongoing investigations regarding the situation in Libya, including on the status of the Court's efforts to arrest three Libyan suspects who remained at large. She also reported on the feasibility of bringing cases to the Court in relation to crimes against migrants and the efforts to support national investigations and prosecutions in Libya. The Prosecutor also provided updates to the Council on Saif Al-Islam Qadhafi's challenge to the admissibility of his case before the Court. In addition, she reported on her Office's investigation into the decision by the General Command of the Libyan National Army to promote one of the three Libyan suspects at large from the rank of Major to Lieutenant Colonel, which signalled a lack of intention to genuinely prosecute him for the crimes alleged against him in the Court's arrest warrants. She called on the Council and on States to cooperate with and lend support for the arrest and transfer of suspects, stressing that securing such cooperation from States remained one of the greatest challenges faced by the Court.

The Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union provided one briefing to the Council, on 21 May 2019,²⁴³ in which he described the engagement of the African Union to promote a durable solution to the situation in Libya. He reported on his visit to the country with the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to closely coordinate the activities of the African Union and the United Nations in managing the political and security situation in Libya.

The Assistant Secretary-General for Africa provided one briefing, on 10 August 2019,²⁴⁴ on the attack that had occurred against the United Nations that same day in Libya. She informed the Council about the positive responses received from the Prime Minister of Libya, Faiez Serraj, and from General Haftar regarding the Special Representative's call for a truce during the Eid Al-Adha period. The Assistant Secretary-General drew attention to the Council's press statement, issued on 11 August regarding the matter,²⁴⁵ highlighting that

²³⁵ See [S/PV.8448](#), [S/PV.8530](#) and [S/PV.8588](#).

²³⁶ See [S/PV.8488](#) and [S/PV.8588](#).

²³⁷ See [S/PV.8530](#).

²³⁸ See [S/PV.8588](#).

²³⁹ See [S/PV.8611](#) and [S/PV.8667](#).

²⁴⁰ See [S/PV.8667](#).

²⁴¹ See [S/PV.8448](#), [S/PV.8488](#), [S/PV.8530](#), [S/PV.8588](#) and [S/PV.8611](#).

²⁴² See [S/PV.8523](#) and [S/PV.8660](#).

²⁴³ See [S/PV.8530](#).

²⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8595](#).

²⁴⁵ SC/13916.

the call for a truce had been an important element in demonstrating the renewed unity of the international community.

In 2019, two civil society representatives provided briefings to the Council. At its meeting on 4 September,²⁴⁶ the Council heard a briefing by the Head of Advocacy and Outreach at Lawyers for Justice in Libya on the organization's work to promote human rights, the rule of law and access to justice in Libya. She noted that, since the 2011 uprising, Libyans had experienced a profound sense of belonging and ownership over their collective future and civil society had flourished. Nevertheless, she stressed that increased intimidation and violence, including the assassination of women's rights advocate Salwa Bugaighis in 2014 and the disappearance of parliamentarian Siham Sergewa in July 2019, had disrupted that movement, emboldening perpetrators owing to complete impunity. She warned that the proliferation of weapons, despite the United Nations arms embargo, the breakdown of State institutions and the general state of lawlessness had had a disproportional impact on the security and freedom of movement of Libyan women. At the meeting on 18 November,²⁴⁷ the co-founder and Director of Together We Build It, a non-profit organization advocating for an inter-generational gender approach to peacebuilding, provided a briefing to the Council, in which she emphasized the major role that women and young people played in "the power of the people". She called for UNSMIL and the international community to be more creative and innovative on how to facilitate and lead an inclusive political process.

In their deliberations in 2019, Council members expressed support for the UNSMIL-facilitated national conference, emphasizing in particular the need for the full and effective participation of women. In response to the escalating violence, Council members called for an immediate ceasefire and expressed concern about the increase in terrorism and the growing number of subversive operations by terrorist groups, including ISIL (Da'esh). Council members welcomed and expressed full support for the Special Representative's three-point action plan. Concerning the sanctions regime, particularly the arms embargo, Council members called on all parties to fully respect, strictly implement and comply with the obligations established by the arms embargo. On the International Criminal Court, Council members called on all parties to cooperate with the Court and faithfully carry out their obligations to execute the outstanding arrest warrants. They also welcomed the assessment of the Court's jurisdiction regarding crimes against migrants.

During the period under review, the Council adopted two resolutions in relation to the situation in Libya. On 10 June 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2473 (2019), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. In the resolution, the Council decided to extend for 12 months the authorizations, as set out in resolutions 2292 (2016), 2357 (2017) and 2420 (2018), to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to inspect vessels that they had reasonable grounds to believe were carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya and to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections.²⁴⁸ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the implementation of the resolution within 11 months of its adoption.²⁴⁹ In response to the adoption of resolution 2473 (2019), members of the Council²⁵⁰ highlighted the important role of the European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean in helping to curtail illicit arms trafficking and expressed concern regarding the inadequate naval resources available to the operation.

On 12 September 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2486 (2019), by which it extended the mandate of UNSMIL until 15 September 2020 and expanded the mandate to support a possible ceasefire in Libya.²⁵¹ The Council also requested UNSMIL to fully take into account a gender perspective throughout its mandate and to assist the Government of National Accord in ensuring the full and effective participation of women in the democratic transition, reconciliation efforts, the security sector and national institutions, as well as in the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, in line with resolution 1325 (2000).²⁵²

Developments in Libya were also considered under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security".²⁵³

²⁴⁸ Resolution 2473 (2019), para. 1. See also resolution 2292 (2016), paras. 3–4.

²⁴⁹ Resolution 2473 (2019), para. 2.

²⁵⁰ See S/PV.8540 (France, Côte d'Ivoire and Germany).

²⁵¹ Resolution 2486 (2019), para. 1. On 4 September 2019, the Special Representative had encouraged the Council to consider adding a provision to the Mission's mandate to enable scalable ceasefire support for whatever form of further truce or cessation of hostilities would be agreed between the parties (see S/PV.8611). For more information on the mandate of UNSMIL, see part X, sect. II.

²⁵² Resolution 2486 (2019), para. 5.

²⁵³ See part I, sect. 38.

²⁴⁶ See S/PV.8611.

²⁴⁷ See S/PV.8667.

Meetings: the situation in Libya

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8448 18 January 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) (S/2019/19)		Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL	All Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8488 20 March 2019			Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Three Council members (Equatorial Guinea, Germany, ^c South Africa), all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8523 8 May 2019			Libya	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8530 21 May 2019			Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Commissioner for Peace and Security for the African Union	All Council members, ^a all invitees ^d	
S/PV.8540 10 June 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2420 (2018) (S/2019/380)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/470)			Seven Council members ^e	Resolution 2473 (2019) 15-0-0
S/PV.8588 29 July 2019			Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8595 10 August 2019			Libya	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8611 4 September 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL (S/2019/682)		Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Head of Advocacy and Outreach of Lawyers for Justice in Libya	Eight Council members, ^{a,f} all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8615 12 September 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL (S/2019/682)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/724)	Libya			Resolution 2486 (2019) 15-0-0
S/PV.8660 6 November 2019			Libya	Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court	All Council members, all invitees	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8667 18 November 2019			Libya	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, co-founder and Director of Together We Build It	Nine Council members, ^g all invitees ^h	

^a The representative of Germany spoke twice, once in his capacity as the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) concerning Libya and once in his national capacity.

^b The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Tripoli.

^c The representative of Germany gave a briefing to the Council in his capacity as the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#).

^d The Commissioner for Peace and Security participated in the meeting by videoconference from Addis Ababa.

^e Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Germany, Indonesia, South Africa and United Kingdom.

^f China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Germany, Kuwait, Indonesia Peru and South Africa.

^g Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru and Poland.

^h The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Tunis. Libya was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

13. The situation in Mali

During the period under review, the Council held seven meetings, including one high-level meeting, adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter and issued one presidential statement in connection with the situation in Mali. Four meetings of the Council under the item took the form of briefings, and three were convened for the adoption of a decision.²⁵⁴ The Council also met once with countries contributing troops and police to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).²⁵⁵ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. The Council also conducted a mission to Mali and Burkina Faso from 21 to 25 March 2019.²⁵⁶

Of the four briefings held in 2019, one was delivered by the Secretary-General, two were delivered by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of MINUSMA and one by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa. Briefings were conducted in connection with the quarterly reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali.²⁵⁷ The Council also heard one briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374](#)

([2017](#)) concerning Mali.²⁵⁸ Discussions in the Council were focused on the challenges to, and progress made in, the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali signed in 2015 between the Government, the Plateforme coalition of armed groups and the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad coalition of armed groups. Speakers addressed the implementation of key provisions on constitutional reform, decentralization, the redeployment of the reconstituted Malian Defence and Security Forces and the meaningful participation of women. Speakers also addressed the deterioration of the security and humanitarian conditions in central Mali due to terrorist attacks and to a surge in intercommunal violence, as well as the efforts of the Government and security forces to reinstate State authority with the support of MINUSMA. In that regard, speakers discussed the adjustments made to the mandate of MINUSMA, the safety and security of peacekeepers and the Mission's work in support of the operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) in order to tackle cross-border threats of terrorism and transnational organized crime.²⁵⁹

At the meeting on 16 January 2019,²⁶⁰ the Assistant Secretary-General shared her observations with the Council following her visit to Mali in December 2018 to assess the progress made in the implementation of the Agreement of 2015. She

²⁵⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

²⁵⁵ Held on 10 June 2019, under the item entitled "Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B"; see [S/PV.8542](#).

²⁵⁶ For more information on the Council's mission to Mali and Burkina Faso, see part I, sect. 34.

²⁵⁷ [S/2018/1174](#), [S/2019/262](#), [S/2019/454](#) and [S/2019/782](#).

²⁵⁸ See [S/PV.8636](#).

²⁵⁹ For more information on the Joint Force, see part I, sects. 10 and 11, and part VIII, sect. III.

²⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8445](#).

highlighted the launching of an accelerated disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and integration process, the holding of consultations on administrative restructuring and the postponement of discussions on national reconciliation in the National Assembly in order to allow for more consultations. Noting the polarized political landscape in Mali since the presidential election, the Assistant Secretary-General called for constructive and inclusive dialogue among political stakeholders, including civil society, women and young people. She expressed grave concern regarding the security situation and made reference to the efforts by MINUSMA to enhance its security assistance to the Government. She also called on the States members of the G5 Sahel to take steps to resume the operations of the Joint Force in the context of complex cross-border dynamics and on international partners to provide the necessary support.

On 29 March 2019, the Council held a high-level meeting,²⁶¹ at which the Secretary-General expressed shock at the surge in violence in central Mali, in particular the killing of at least 160 civilians in the village of Ogossogou in Mopti region. He warned that, if not addressed, the expansion of extremist movements, which had exacerbated intercommunal tensions, could lead to the commission of atrocity crimes. While noting that 18 peacekeepers had been killed in the past 18 months, the Secretary-General informed the Council that MINUSMA had enhanced its capacity to respond to such attacks in coordination with the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the French Operation Barkhane. He underscored that the entire Sahel region faced severe transnational challenges, from climate change and drought to growing insecurity, violent extremism and the smuggling of people, weapons and drugs, and called on all national, regional and international actors to step up efforts to tackle those threats. The Secretary-General also called on the Government of Mali, the political opposition and the signatory movements to the Agreement of 2015 to redouble their efforts to overcome the challenges the country faced.

In his briefings to the Council on 12 June and 8 October 2019,²⁶² the Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported on the progress achieved in the implementation of the Agreement of 2015, with the signing of a political agreement on governance between the presidential majority and the main opposition party, the official launch of the inclusive national dialogue by the newly appointed Prime

Minister of Mali and the passing of legislation for the creation of the Northern Development Zone. He also noted that the redeployment of the reconstituted and reformed Malian Defence and Security Forces was making encouraging headway and that, thanks to the Government's efforts to remedy the situation in the centre of the country, combined with the support of MINUSMA, a significant decrease in the number of attacks against civilians had been achieved by October. He elaborated on the mounting of Operation Oryx by MINUSMA in central Mali to increase physical protection, combat impunity, coordinate with humanitarian and development partners, mediate local conflicts and engage with local communities. The Special Representative reported that the humanitarian situation in the centre of Mali continued to deteriorate, with the number of displaced reaching approximately 171,000 people, the highest since 2015.

In his remarks to the Council on October 2019,²⁶³ the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) updated the Council on the Committee's activities in 2019 and highlighted the briefing given to the Committee by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

In its decisions adopted in 2019, the Council also addressed the issues outlined above. On 3 April 2019, the Council issued a presidential statement, in which it recalled the provisions of resolution [2423 \(2018\)](#) wherein it had urged the Government of Mali and the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups to take immediate and concrete action to implement key provisions of the Agreement of 2015 referenced in the road map adopted on 22 March 2018, and urged them to continue to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement, through significant, meaningful and irreversible measures.²⁶⁴ In that regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General, as part of his regular reporting on MINUSMA, to include in his next quarterly report recommendations on concrete measures for a revised road map to be fulfilled by the Malian parties with respect to three priority areas, namely, the completion of constitutional reform following an inclusive and collaborative process, the adoption of a comprehensive plan for the redeployment of the reconstituted and reformed Malian Defence and Security Forces to northern Mali and the establishment of the Northern Development Zone.²⁶⁵ In addition, while expressing increased concerns about the security situation in central Mali, the Council encouraged the

²⁶¹ See [S/PV.8497](#).

²⁶² See [S/PV.8547](#) and [S/PV.8636](#).

²⁶³ See [S/PV.8636](#).

²⁶⁴ [S/PRST/2019/2](#), first and seventh paragraphs.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, seventh and eighth paragraphs.

Malian authorities to make further efforts to re-establish State presence in the area and requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations for MINUSMA to enhance its support for such efforts.²⁶⁶

On 28 June 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#). Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June 2020 and decided that the Mission's primary strategic priority would remain to support the implementation of the 2015 Agreement and that its second strategic priority would be to facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive and politically led Malian strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish State authority, State presence and basic social services in Central Mali.²⁶⁷ In the same resolution, the Council urged the Malian parties to take immediate and concrete action to fulfil priority measures before the end of the Mission's current mandate, including to ensure the completion of constitutional reform; resolve outstanding issues related to the concept of reconstituted and reformed Malian Defence and Security Forces; create the Northern Development Zone through the adoption of requisite legislation; and hold a high-level workshop to identify concrete recommendations to ensure the full, effective and

meaningful participation of women in the mechanisms established under the Agreement.²⁶⁸ The Council requested the Secretary-General, in his regular reporting on MINUSMA, to assess progress achieved and encouraged the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) on Mali to identify parties responsible for the potential lack of implementation of the priorities.²⁶⁹ The Council also reauthorized the French forces deployed in Mali to use all necessary means, until the end of the Mission's mandate, to intervene in support of the elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat, upon request of the Secretary-General.²⁷⁰

On 29 August 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2484 \(2019\)](#), by which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it renewed, until 31 August 2020, the asset freeze and travel ban imposed under resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#).²⁷¹ The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Mali until 30 September 2020.²⁷²

²⁶⁶ Ibid., ninth paragraph.

²⁶⁷ Resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), paras. 17 and 20. For more information on the mandate and composition of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

²⁶⁸ Resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), para. 4.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., para. 6.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., para. 42. For more information concerning decisions of the Council relating to Article 42 of the Charter during the period under review, see part VII, sect. IV.A.

²⁷¹ Resolution [2484 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

²⁷² Ibid., para. 3. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, see part IX, sect. I.

Meetings: the situation in Mali

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8445 16 January 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2018/1174)		Mali	Assistant Secretary-General for Africa	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8497 29 March 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2423 (2018) (S/2019/207) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2019/262)		Mali		Secretary-General, all Council members, ^b invitee ^c	
S/PV.8501 3 April 2019						S/PRST/2019/2

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8547 12 June 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2019/454)		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8568 28 June 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2019/454)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2019/532)	Mali		13 Council members, ^d invitee	Resolution 2480 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8607 29 August 2019	Letter dated 6 August 2019 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/636)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2019/687)				Resolution 2484 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8636 8 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2019/782)		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	Seven Council members, ^e all invitees ^f	

^a Mali was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

^b Côte d'Ivoire was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; France (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Germany was represented by its Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs; the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the United Nations; and the United States was represented by its Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

^c Mali was represented by its Prime Minister.

^d Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire (also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa), Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^e China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, South Africa and United States. The representative of the Dominican Republic spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali.

^f The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Bamako.

Americas

14. The question concerning Haiti

During the period under review, the Council held four meetings and adopted two resolutions, one of them under Chapter VII of the Charter, on the question concerning Haiti. Two of the meetings took the form of debates and two were convened for the adoption of a

decision.²⁷³ With the adoption of resolution [2466 \(2019\)](#), the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) for

²⁷³ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

a final period of six months until 15 October 2019.²⁷⁴ By resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) beginning on 16 October 2019.²⁷⁵ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2019, the Council heard briefings at each of the two debates by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and, at the debate on 12 April, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Executive Director of Zanmi Lasante, a Haitian non-governmental health-care organization. In addition, for the first time since 2009, the President of the Economic and Social Council was invited to a meeting under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, attending on 15 October 2019.²⁷⁶ In their deliberations, Council members expressed concern regarding the situation in Haiti, noting in particular the political and constitutional crisis in the country, the widespread violence and worsening socioeconomic and humanitarian conditions, as well as corruption and impunity for human rights abuses. They called for inclusive and peaceful dialogue among all stakeholders to address the root causes of the situation. With the end of the United Nations peacekeeping presence in Haiti, Council members noted the importance of the Government of Haiti's national ownership in ensuring peace and stability and promoting economic development in the country. In that context, Council members underscored the need for a seamless transition between MINUJUSTH and BINUH, welcomed the submission of benchmarks and indicators for BINUH and underlined the need for them to be nationally owned.

On 3 April 2019,²⁷⁷ the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations highlighted the tumultuous and uncertain political situation in Haiti following 10 days of unrest in February, which had resulted in 41 deaths and 100 injuries and the collapse of the Government on 18 March. While noting the establishment by the President of a facilitation committee for an intra-Haitian dialogue, the Under-Secretary-General underscored that stronger efforts were required from all key actors to ensure the success of the committee's

work and the crafting of a national vision for economic reform, social protection, improving the rule of law, fighting corruption and organizing timely legislative elections in accordance with international standards. On the expected drawdown of MINUJUSTH, he drew attention to the progress made by Haiti in strengthening its institutions, in particular the Haitian National Police, and noted the recommendations made by the Secretary-General,²⁷⁸ to support the priorities of the Haitian leadership in the final six months of deployment and for the United Nations to continue supporting the country through a small strategic presence with good offices, human rights and advisory capacities. At the same meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the High Commissioner for Human Rights on outstanding human rights challenges in Haiti, namely difficult socioeconomic conditions, corruption, poverty and criminal activity, impunity for serious human rights violations, a weak judicial system and prolonged pre-trial detention.²⁷⁹ She commended the appointment of the Minister for Human Rights and the Fight against Extreme Poverty of Haiti, the efforts by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Human Rights to develop a national action plan, the continued functioning of the Office of the National Human Rights Ombudsperson and the engagement of civil society organizations. The High Commissioner encouraged the Council to support Haiti in strengthening its institutions, fighting impunity and promoting and protecting human rights. In her remarks, the Executive Director of Zanmi Lasante drew the attention of Council members to the situation of women and girls in Haiti, underscoring the need to address inequality and sexual and gender-based violence and to ensure the political participation of women. She called on MINUJUSTH and the Council to support, among other things, the building of local capacities for gender-sensitive services for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.

On 12 April 2019, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution [2466 \(2019\)](#), with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions. By the resolution, the Council extended the mandate of MINUJUSTH for a final period of six months until 15 October 2019 and requested the Secretary-General to initiate the necessary planning for an appropriate integrated United Nations system presence in Haiti, including a special political mission.²⁸⁰ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council within 30 days of the adoption of the

²⁷⁴ Resolution [2466 \(2019\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate and composition of MINUJUSTH, see part X, sect. I.

²⁷⁵ Resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of BINUH, see part X, sect. II.

²⁷⁶ For more information on the meeting held on 6 April 2009, see [S/PV.6101](#) and *Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009*, part I, sect. 18.

²⁷⁷ See [S/PV.8502](#).

²⁷⁸ See [S/2019/198](#).

²⁷⁹ See [S/PV.8502](#).

²⁸⁰ Resolution [2466 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1–2.

resolution regarding the operational details of the proposed mission, for the Council's consideration and subsequent authorization.²⁸¹ After the vote,²⁸² in explanation of his delegation's decision to abstain, the representative of the Russian Federation criticized the adoption of the text under Chapter VII, noting that the human rights situation in Haiti did not constitute a threat to international peace and security and that the comprehensive and integrated policy framework had been applied to MINUJUSTH without being first finalized and then discussed by Member States. Despite having voted in favour, the representative of China noted that MINUJUSTH should be focused on helping Haiti to deal with peace and security issues and should not be too involved in the country's domestic human rights issues. Having also abstained in the vote, the representative of the Dominican Republic noted that MINUJUSTH would complete its mandate at the same time that elections were expected to be held in Haiti, which should be taken into account when making way for any work by the United Nations in the post-MINUJUSTH period.

On 25 June 2019, the Council adopted resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#), with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions, in which it requested the Secretary-General to establish BINUH, beginning on 16 October 2019 and for an initial period of 12 months, headed by a special representative of the Secretary-General, with the mandate to, inter alia, advise and assist the Government in promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including with regard to the rule of law, planning elections and addressing human rights abuses and violations.²⁸³ The Council also underscored the need for the activities of BINUH and the United Nations country team in Haiti to be fully integrated.²⁸⁴ After the vote,²⁸⁵ the representative of China, in explaining its decision to abstain, underscored that the mandate of BINUH had to be clear and concise if it were to assist Haiti in responding to peace and security issues and noted that the text had failed to fully reflect his delegation's concerns. The representative of the Dominican Republic expressed the view that the mandate of the successor mission to MINUJUSTH had to be broad-based and include support for strengthening the political and electoral systems and the rule of law and helping to tackle social

inequality, governance and the adverse effects of climate change and natural disasters. The representatives of France and Germany expressed disappointment that the resolution did not address the impact of climate change on the security situation in Haiti. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Haiti underscored that his country would have liked to see a special political mission commensurate with the challenges, requiring, inter alia, the mobilization of adequate financial resources. He remained hopeful, however, that the mission would have adequate financial means to be able to provide concrete assistance to the Haitian authorities in overcoming the multidimensional crisis.

In a letter dated 11 October 2019,²⁸⁶ the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a special representative for Haiti and Head of BINUH.

During the second debate under the item, on 15 October 2019,²⁸⁷ the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations drew attention to the fourth failed attempt at the confirmation of a Government in Parliament, which had resulted in a possible institutional vacuum and a stalled national dialogue process, leading, in turn, to demonstrations by opposition leaders, at least 30 deaths, and worsening humanitarian conditions. Despite the context, he highlighted the achievements of MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH in supporting improvements in the country in the areas of rule of law, good offices and human rights institutions. The Under-Secretary-General reminded the Council that BINUH would focus on promoting political solutions, while the United Nations country team would take over programme and technical support activities. He added that the United Nations would continue to work on eliminating cholera in Haiti and the outstanding sexual exploitation and paternity cases. Speaking after Council members, the President of the Economic and Social Council highlighted the work of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti, which had been established in 1999 pursuant to a request by the Security Council under Article 65 of the Charter, to provide recommendations on the country's long-term development. She stated that the Organization should redouble its efforts to support the people of Haiti and to put in place conditions for long-term sustainable development and stability and noted the need for continued collaboration between the two Councils.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 3. See also [S/2019/387](#) and [S/2019/387/Corr.1](#).

²⁸² See [S/PV.8510](#).

²⁸³ Resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

²⁸⁵ [S/PV.8559](#).

²⁸⁶ [S/2019/812](#).

²⁸⁷ [S/PV.8641](#).

Meetings: the question concerning Haiti

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8502 3 April 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) (S/2019/198)		Argentina, Canada, Haiti	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Executive Director of Zanmi Lasante, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8510 12 April 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on MINUJUSTH (S/2019/198)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/311)			Seven Council members ^b	Resolution 2466 (2019) 13-0-2 ^c (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8559 25 June 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/519)	Haiti		Seven Council members, ^d Haiti	Resolution 2476 (2019) 13-0-2 ^e
S/PV.8641 15 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on MINUJUSTH (S/2019/805)		Haiti	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, President of the Economic and Social Council, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union	All Council members, ^f all invitees ^g	

^a Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Turkey.

^b China, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Peru, Russian Federation and United States.

^c *For*: Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: Dominican Republic, Russian Federation.

^d China, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Peru, Russian Federation and United States.

^e *For*: Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: China, Dominican Republic.

^f Peru was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^g The Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.

**15. Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the
Permanent Representative of Colombia to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the
President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)**

During the period under review, the Council held five meetings, including one high-level meeting, and adopted one resolution under the agenda item entitled, "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the

Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)". Four of the meetings took the form of briefings and one was

convened for the adoption of a decision.²⁸⁸ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below. The Council also conducted a mission to Colombia from 11 to 14 July 2019.²⁸⁹

In 2019, the Council heard quarterly briefings under the item by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, and one briefing by the Executive Director of the civil society organization, *Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y Económica*. In his briefings to the Council,²⁹⁰ the Special Representative underscored that sustainable peace in Colombia required parallel progress in all components of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, signed in 2016 between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), including comprehensive rural reform, the substitution of illicit crops, security guarantees, the reintegration of former combatants and justice and reparations for victims. He commended the commitment of the Government and FARC-EP to the peace process, despite the decision announced in August 2019 by several former commanders of FARC-EP that they planned to take up arms again, and highlighted the expected participation of the People’s Alternative Revolutionary Force (*Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común*) party in regional and local elections in October 2019 and the need to ensure the security of the process. The Special Representative expressed grave concern regarding the security of former combatants and the killing of community leaders and human rights defenders by illegal armed groups. He called on the National Commission on Security Guarantees to take concrete action in that regard and on the Government to ensure an effective and integrated State presence in former conflict areas, including through the implementation of the “Peace with legality” plan.

While noting the approval of and disbursements for additional productive projects by the National Reintegration Council for the economic reintegration of former combatants, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General encouraged the Government to accelerate and increase the number of projects, utilizing a gender-sensitive approach, and to provide the necessary technical assistance and access to

markets and land. Regarding transitional justice, the Special Representative noted the inauguration of the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition as an important milestone and the progress made by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace in examining significant human rights violations and abuses. He called for constructive and inclusive dialogue in any further discussions on constitutional reforms related to the provisions of the Final Agreement and for such reforms to have only future application, recalling the Secretary-General’s statement that the principle of non-retroactivity was critical in preserving confidence in the process going forward.

In her remarks to the Council,²⁹¹ the Executive Director of *Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y Económica* stated that the Final Agreement provided a comprehensive approach to peace and that its greatest asset lay in its interconnected approach and in the way it placed victims at its centre. In that regard, she underscored the importance of the economic and social reintegration of former combatants, including women, support for democratic institutions and the division of powers, legal access for victims of sexual violence and ensuring the security of women human rights defenders. She added that a gender-centred approach in the peace process had the potential to accelerate the benefits of peace for society as a whole.

During their deliberations under the item in 2019, Council members recognized the progress made in the implementation of the Final Agreement and noted the challenges still outstanding. In that regard, speakers underscored the need to accelerate efforts made towards the full political, legal and socioeconomic reintegration of former FARC-EP members; security in and the stabilization of former conflict areas, including comprehensive rural reform and development projects; respect for the independence and autonomy of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace; support for the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition. Most Council members expressed serious concern regarding the continued killing of former combatants, human rights defenders and community leaders, as well as of political party candidates ahead of the local and regional elections in October 2019. Some emphasized the importance of implementing the gender provisions of the Final Agreement and engaging with young people with regard to its implementation. Most speakers described the Council mission to Colombia in July 2019 as a good opportunity to express solidarity and support for the Colombian peace process.

²⁸⁸ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

²⁸⁹ For more information on the Council’s mission to Colombia, see part I, sect. 33.

²⁹⁰ See [S/PV.8450](#), [S/PV.8511](#), [S/PV.8581](#) and [S/PV.8639](#).

²⁹¹ See [S/PV.8511](#).

On 12 September 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2487 \(2019\)](#), in which it welcomed the progress made towards peace since the adoption of the Final Agreement and urged the parties to work together to sustain progress and address challenges through its comprehensive implementation.²⁹² Acknowledging the request from the President of

Colombia in that regard, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia for a period of one year, until 25 September 2020.²⁹³

²⁹² Resolution [2487 \(2019\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, sixth preambular paragraph and para. 1. For more information on the mandate of the Mission, see part X, sect. II.

Meetings: identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8450 23 January 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2018/1159)		Colombia, Cuba	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	All Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8511 12 April 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2019/265)		Colombia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y Económica	All Council members, all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8581 19 July 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2019/530)		Colombia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All Council members, ^c all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8616 12 September 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/725)				Resolution 2487 (2019) 15-0-0
S/PV.8639 10 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (S/2019/780)		Colombia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All Council members, all invitees ^b	

^a The Dominican Republic (President of the Council) and Indonesia were represented by their respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

^b Colombia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^c Peru (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

16. The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

During the period under review, the Council held four meetings, including one high-level meeting, under the newly added item entitled, “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”. Two of the meetings took the form of briefings, one took the form of a debate and one was convened for the adoption of a decision.²⁹⁴ The Council failed to adopt two draft resolutions, owing to the negative vote of one or more permanent members in one case and the lack of the required number of votes in the other. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

The first meeting under the item was held on 26 January 2019,²⁹⁵ at the request of the United States and in the form of a debate, pursuant to the adoption by the Organization of American States of resolutions on the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.²⁹⁶ At the outset of the meeting, the provisional agenda was adopted following a procedural vote.²⁹⁷ In statements made before the vote and during the discussion, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed his delegation’s objection to the holding of the meeting, noting that the internal situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela did not represent a threat to international peace and security.²⁹⁸ Similar views were expressed by China and Equatorial Guinea. The representative of China added that his country was opposed to adding the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the Council’s agenda and that Venezuelan affairs needed to be handled and dealt with by the Venezuelans themselves. Other Council members²⁹⁹ underscored the responsibility of the Council to consider potential threats to international peace and security, such as the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Explaining his country’s abstention in the procedural vote, the representative of Indonesia affirmed his delegation’s belief that the meeting should have taken place under a different item, namely, under the item “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”. He stated, however, that the humanitarian situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela required proper attention. He added that the inclusion of the item to the Council’s

agenda needed to reflect a commitment to supporting the realization of sustained peace and stability in the country.³⁰⁰

At the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the protracted crisis in the country, which had had a grave impact on the population, with high levels of political polarization, growing humanitarian needs and serious human rights concerns. She described the economic situation as dire and highlighted hyperinflation, shortages of food, medicine and basic supplies, and a deterioration in health services and basic infrastructure, which had resulted in more than 3 million Venezuelans leaving the country. The Under-Secretary-General informed the Council that, following the inauguration on 10 January 2019 of Nicolás Maduro Moros as President for a second six-year term, large-scale opposition protests culminated with the President of the opposition-led National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, announcing on 23 January that he did not recognize President Maduro or his Government, proclaiming himself interim President and pledging to form a transitional Government and call for elections. The Under-Secretary-General indicated that, in a statement issued on 24 January, the Secretary-General had offered his good offices to help resolve the crisis. After the briefing, Council members expressed differing views regarding the situation in the country. While some members called for new elections, others denounced foreign interference and called instead for a national dialogue process. Speakers from the region, including the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, also intervened and discussed the legitimacy of the Government of President Maduro and that of the transitional Government proclaimed by Juan Guaidó, offering contrasting views on the situation of the country and the way forward.

On 26 February 2019, the Council held a second meeting on the item,³⁰¹ at which it again heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The briefing was focused on the escalation of tensions in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela following attempts by the self-proclaimed interim Government to transport humanitarian aid into the country across the borders with Brazil and Colombia on 23 February, the temporary closure on 22 February of international bridges on the border with Colombia and of border crossings with Brazil by the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

²⁹⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

²⁹⁵ See [S/PV.8452](#).

²⁹⁶ [S/2019/80](#), annexes I and II.

²⁹⁷ See [S/PV.8452](#). For more information on decision-making and voting, see part II, sect. VIII.

²⁹⁸ See [S/PV.8452](#).

²⁹⁹ Peru, Kuwait, Germany, Poland, Belgium and Argentina.

³⁰⁰ For more information on the discussion, see part V, sect. I.B.

³⁰¹ See [S/PV.8472](#).

and the violence surrounding those events. The Under-Secretary-General recalled the statement made on 23 February by the Secretary-General, in which he reiterated his appeal to the Government that lethal force should not be used and called for all actors to lower tensions and prevent further escalation. After the briefing, speakers focused on the political, security, economic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the country and its regional consequences, calling on the Government and the opposition to exercise restraint, refrain from the use of force and engage in dialogue for the peaceful resolution of the crisis, while expressing support for regional and international initiatives for that purpose.

The Council held another meeting two days later, on 28 February 2019,³⁰² at which members voted on two draft resolutions, one proposed by the United States and one proposed by the Russian Federation. The Council failed to adopt the draft resolution submitted by the United States,³⁰³ which was voted on first, owing to the negative votes of two permanent members of the Council, namely, China and the Russian Federation. Under the draft resolution, the Council would have, *inter alia*, noted the constitutional authority of the democratically elected National Assembly, expressed its deep concern that the presidential elections held in May 2018 had been neither free nor fair and called for the start of a peaceful political process leading to free, fair and credible elections, with international electoral observation, in conformity with the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation³⁰⁴ was voted on second and was also not adopted, owing to the failure to obtain the required number of votes. Under that draft resolution, the Council would have expressed concern over threats to use force and attempts to intervene in the internal matters of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, urged the settlement of the situation in the country through peaceful means, within the framework of its Constitution and in full respect of its sovereignty, expressed support for initiatives aimed at reaching a political solution through a national dialogue, reaffirmed the primary role of the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in the initiation, organization, coordination and implementation of international assistance efforts and initiatives within its national territory and recalled that international assistance should be provided with its consent.

³⁰² See [S/PV.8476](#).

³⁰³ [S/2019/186](#).

³⁰⁴ [S/2019/190](#).

At the same meeting,³⁰⁵ in statements made before and after the votes, the representatives of China and the Russian Federation criticized the draft resolution submitted by the United States for not being consistent with international law. The representative of South Africa described the text of the draft resolution proposed by the United States as lacking impartiality and expressed concern regarding the lack of sufficient time provided for its consideration by Council members. He expressed the view that the draft submitted by the Russian Federation provided an assessment of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and reinforcement for the founding principles of the United Nations based on the sovereign equality of all its Members States. The representative of Indonesia affirmed that neither draft resolution was complete, because neither was comprehensive enough and both had been overpoliticized, and therefore would not be useful or helpful in ensuring the interests of the people of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the draft resolution proposed by his delegation could have helped Venezuelans solve their own problems without intervention from outside. Several other Council members³⁰⁶ expressed support for the text submitted by the United States, emphasizing the gravity of the situation in the country and the need for a political solution to the crisis, including through the organization of free, fair and credible elections. Some Council members³⁰⁷ objected to the draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation on the basis that it did not provide a solution to the crisis and that it failed to include recognition of the humanitarian situation in the country. Several speakers³⁰⁸ expressed regret about the lack of unity in the Council regarding the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela affirmed that, if there were any threats to the peace in his country, they came from abroad, and demanding from the Council a clear statement condemning and prohibiting the use of military force against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.³⁰⁹

In a letter dated 28 February addressed to the President of the Council, the Permanent Representative of Colombia protested the President's decision "not to allow" him to take the floor during the meeting held on that date in order to respond to the claims

³⁰⁵ See [S/PV.8476](#).

³⁰⁶ Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany and France.

³⁰⁷ United Kingdom, Germany and Poland.

³⁰⁸ Peru, South Africa and Indonesia.

³⁰⁹ For more information on the discussion, see part II, sect. II.B.

directed against Colombia by the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.³¹⁰

On 10 April, the Council held a meeting,³¹¹ attended by the Secretary-General and the Vice-President of the United States, at which it heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator on the worsening humanitarian situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. During his briefing, the Under-Secretary-General affirmed that there was a very real humanitarian problem in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, noting the recurrent widespread power outages affecting the entire country, including hospitals, and the continued economic decline, rendering food even less affordable to its population. He outlined the priority humanitarian needs, estimating that 7 million people needed humanitarian assistance, and mentioned recent United Nations efforts to expand such assistance. He sought the collective support of the Council for greater respect for principled humanitarian action, affirming the need to distinguish between political and humanitarian objectives. The Under-Secretary-General requested the Council's support for an enabling operating environment, including sustained and regular access to people in need. Lastly, he asked for additional financial resources to support the expansion of humanitarian programmes.

Following the briefing by the Under-Secretary-General, the Council heard a briefing by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/International Organization for Migration Joint Special Representative for Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the region. The joint special representative informed the Council that an estimated 3.7 million Venezuelans had left the country, approximately 80 per cent of whom had done so since 2015, and projected that, by the end of

2019, that number could exceed 5 million. He called for more support for Member States that were employing open-door policies to receive, assist and host Venezuelan outflows, as well as for the host communities receiving Venezuelans in need of assistance. He also called for stronger international cooperation in the form of greater financial support. At the same meeting, a researcher from Johns Hopkins University presented findings from a report published jointly by Human Rights Watch and the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, in which it was concluded that the combination of severe shortages of medicine, health supplies and food in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, together with the spread of epidemics within and across the country's borders, had resulted in a breakdown of the country's health system. She noted that the situation in the country was a complex humanitarian emergency and recommended that the Secretary-General declare it as such and that it lead a full-scale United Nations-led response that was neutral, independent and impartial. She advised the Council to meet regularly to address both the humanitarian crisis and its regional impact. Following the briefings, Council members continued to express differing views on the situation in the country and on possible solutions to the crisis. The representative of Peru, emphasizing that the other members of the Lima Group, namely Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Paraguay, aligned themselves with his statement, asked the international community and the members of the Council to support them in their efforts to help to restore constitutional order in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The representative of the Dominican Republic noted that humanitarian assistance alone would not be enough to solve the crisis and that it was urgent to find the conditions to conduct concrete negotiations that would lead to a solution to the crisis, through a fair, free and competitive electoral process, and called for that to be a solution led by the Venezuelans themselves and achieved in a peaceful manner.

³¹⁰ [S/2019/197](#). For more information on participation in meetings of the Council, see part II, sect. VII.

³¹¹ [S/PV.8506](#).

Meetings: the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8452 26 January 2019			22 Member States ^a	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, ^b all invitees ^c	Procedural vote (rule 9) 9-4-2 ^d

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8472 26 February 2019			23 Member States ^e	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees ^f	
S/PV.8476 28 February 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/186) Draft resolution submitted by Russian Federation (S/2019/190)	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)		12 Council members, ^g invitee	Draft resolution S/2019/186 not adopted 9-3-3 ^h Draft resolution S/2019/190 not adopted 4-7-4 ⁱ
S/PV.8506 10 April 2019			Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/ International Organization for Migration Joint Special Representative for Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the region, researcher at Johns Hopkins University	All Council members, ^j all invitees ^{k, l}	

^a Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

^b The Dominican Republic (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for Europe and the Americas; and the United States was represented by its Secretary of State.

^c Colombia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Cuba was represented by its Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Nicaragua was represented by its Minister Adviser to the President; and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was represented by its Minister of the People's Power for Foreign Affairs.

^d *For*: Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: China, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa; *abstaining*: Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia.

^e Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

^f The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was represented by its Minister of the People's Power for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Suriname spoke also on behalf of Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago.

^g Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States. Germany was represented by its State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office.

^h *For*: Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: China, Russian Federation, South Africa; *abstaining*: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia.

ⁱ *For*: China, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa; *against*: Belgium, France, Germany, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *abstaining*: Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Kuwait.

^j The United States was represented by its Vice-President.

^k The Joint Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Panama City.

^l The Secretary-General attended the meeting but did not brief the Council.

Asia

17. The situation in Afghanistan

During the period under review, the Council held seven meetings and adopted two resolutions concerning the situation in Afghanistan. The Council held three meetings in the form of briefings, two as debates and two were convened to adopt decisions of the Council.³¹² In 2019, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) twice, the first time for 6 months, until 17 September 2019 and subsequently for 12 months, until 17 September 2020.³¹³ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2019, as in previous periods, the Council heard quarterly briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.³¹⁴ Two of those briefings were conducted during Council debates with the participation of interested Member States. In addition, the Council heard briefings by the Deputy Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Afghan youth representative to the United Nations. The Council also

heard briefings by two civil society representatives in two separate meetings.

In his briefings, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General discussed the developments in the peace process, the conduct of presidential elections, and the security and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan.

With respect to the peace process, the Special Representative emphasized that the best way to secure a sustainable peace agreement was an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process that allowed for the meaningful participation of all those affected by the conflict, including women, young people, victims and business and religious leaders.³¹⁵ He also said that it was imperative that the Taliban talk directly with the Government of Afghanistan and that the dialogues in Moscow needed to be directed towards the start of formal negotiations between the two parties.³¹⁶ He noted that peace in Afghanistan would have wide-ranging implications on both regional stability and international efforts to counter terrorist groups, including Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province, and would create opportunities for accelerated development and enhanced connectivity of the region.³¹⁷

On the presidential elections scheduled for 28 September 2019, the Special Representative reported on the preparations undertaken and the challenges faced by the Government of Afghanistan, with the support of the United Nations and international partners, for the conduct of transparent, inclusive, credible and timely

³¹² For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

³¹³ Resolutions 2460 (2019), para. 4, and 2489 (2019), para. 4.

³¹⁴ S/2019/193, S/2019/493, S/2019/703 and S/2019/935.

³¹⁵ See S/PV.8481, S/PV.8555 and S/PV.8687.

³¹⁶ See S/PV.8481 and S/PV.8555.

³¹⁷ See S/PV.8687.

elections.³¹⁸ At his briefing to the Council on 16 December, he reported that, while the presidential elections held on 28 September had improved considerably on prior elections, voter turnout had been dampened by security threats and the results had been delayed to ensure that the electoral process was as transparent and credible as possible, adding that the results had to be accepted by all stakeholders in order for Afghanistan to move forward.³¹⁹

On the security situation, the Special Representative said that the impact of conflict on children was alarming owing to the high number of child deaths and injuries and their vulnerability to recruitment and use by parties to the conflict.³²⁰ He noted that violence had intensified following attacks by insurgents in Kunduz, Baghlan and Farah, as well as multiple attacks in Kabul,³²¹ and reported that the third quarter of 2019 had seen the highest number of civilian casualties since UNAMA had begun systematic recording in 2009.³²²

On the humanitarian front, the Special Representative reminded the Council that the majority of the Afghan population lived below the poverty line, with millions of people struggling with food insecurity needing the support of external donors, both for its immediate humanitarian needs and to support longer-term economic development.³²³ In that regard, he expressed the hope that the Security Council would call on the international community to boost funding for the United Nations humanitarian response plan.³²⁴

At its meeting on 19 June 2019,³²⁵ the Council heard a briefing by the Chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, who reported on the results of the national inquiry on women and peace and security conducted by the Commission, as well as on the situation of justice, accountability, the rule of law and anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan. She called on the Council to step up efforts to safeguard peace and human rights norms in the country by engaging women, young people and victims in the planning, negotiation and implementation of a peace plan for Afghanistan.

At its meeting on 26 July 2019,³²⁶ the Council heard briefings by the Deputy Secretary-General and

the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on their visit to Afghanistan from 20 to 21 July, together with the Executive Directors of the United Nations Population Fund and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, to assess and build on progress made since the Secretary-General's visit in 2017 and to explore United Nations support for the women and peace and security agenda. The Deputy Secretary-General reported, *inter alia*, on the progress made to improve access for Afghan women to education, economic empowerment and political representation, as well as the ongoing work to address conflict-related and gender-based violence. The Under-Secretary-General updated the Council on developments in the country's peace process and electoral preparations. Both briefers stressed the importance of an inclusive peace process and the conduct of credible elections. In briefings delivered in March and July,³²⁷ civil society representatives focused on the importance of the participation of women in peace negotiations and conflict resolution efforts and the inclusion of gender-awareness provisions in any final peace accord. They also discussed the human rights situation in Afghanistan, including sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls and acts of violence against, *inter alia*, women's rights activists, women human rights defenders and journalists.

In his briefing delivered on 10 September 2019,³²⁸ the Executive Director of UNODC focused on the work done by the Office to support Afghanistan in promoting peace, security, the rule of law and sustainable development, including the support provided to the Government of Afghanistan for countering money laundering and disrupting the financing networks of terrorists and organized crime groups. In his briefing to the Council at the same meeting, the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) covered the work and mandate of both the Committee and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team,³²⁹ including the facilitation of conditions to promote dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan Government.

At the meeting in December 2019,³³⁰ the Afghan youth representative to the United Nations noted that the conflict in her country had greatly affected Afghan children and young people, who made up a majority of the population, and added that the key to ensuring

³¹⁸ See [S/PV.8481](#), [S/PV.8555](#) and [S/PV.8613](#).

³¹⁹ See [S/PV.8687](#).

³²⁰ See [S/PV.8481](#).

³²¹ See [S/PV.8613](#).

³²² See [S/PV.8687](#).

³²³ See [S/PV.8481](#) and [S/PV.8555](#).

³²⁴ See [S/PV.8481](#) and [S/PV.8687](#).

³²⁵ See [S/PV.8555](#).

³²⁶ See [S/PV.8587](#).

³²⁷ See [S/PV.8481](#) and [S/PV.8587](#).

³²⁸ See [S/PV.8613](#).

³²⁹ For more information on the mandate of the Monitoring Team, see part IX, sect. I.

³³⁰ See [S/PV.8687](#).

sustainable reconciliation was to ensure that the voices of Afghan youth from both sides of the conflict were considered in the peace process. To that end, she called on the Council to guarantee the rights and achievements of the young people of Afghanistan in any future peace agreement.

The Council discussions in 2019 were focused primarily on the peace process, the presidential elections and the challenges presented by the security and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan. Council members emphasized the need for an inclusive Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process³³¹ and stressed that any agreement reached should preserve and protect the achievements made in the area of human rights, in particular women's rights.³³² They called on the Taliban to engage in direct talks with the Government of Afghanistan³³³ and noted the role of the international community³³⁴ and UNAMA³³⁵ in facilitating regional and intra-Afghan dialogue, the activities undertaken by UNAMA to support the conduct of presidential elections³³⁶ and the importance of the increased and meaningful participation of Afghan women in the electoral and political spheres.³³⁷ Council members expressed concerns about the high number of civilian casualties, especially women and children, and about the attacks against humanitarian actors, and urged parties to the conflict to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law.³³⁸ Some Council members also expressed concern about the ongoing security threat posed by Islamic State in

Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh)³³⁹ and about the linkages between drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan and the financing of terrorist groups.³⁴⁰

The issues outlined above were also addressed in the two Council resolutions adopted in 2019, by which it extended the mandate of UNAMA. On 15 March 2019, by its resolution [2460 \(2019\)](#), the Council proceeded to a technical rollover, extending the mandate of UNAMA for 6 months instead of 12, until 17 September 2019.³⁴¹ Although the resolution was adopted unanimously, in its discussion following the vote at the same meeting,³⁴² Council members expressed differing views over its content. The representative of Germany explained that resolution [2460 \(2019\)](#) was not the kind of resolution that his delegation had worked towards as co-penholder, and it was not the kind of UNAMA resolution that had been passed for the past 17 years. He expressed regret that such topics as the upcoming elections, the participation of women in the Afghan peace process, the situation of children in armed conflict and the nexus between climate change and security were no longer reflected in the resolution and noted that the text did not satisfy any of the members. The representative of Indonesia, as co-penholder, emphasized that, with regard to the text of the resolution, unity had been the priority. He affirmed that there would be an opportunity to further develop the resolution, according to the conditions and priorities of Afghanistan. He underscored that the resolution adopted was a good basis for doing that sort of work, namely, to chart positive development in Afghanistan and monitor the areas where the Government and the people of Afghanistan needed the support of the international community. Several Council members³⁴³ expressed regret that the Council was not able to reach consensus on a more detailed resolution. The representative of the United States accused China of derailing negotiations on the text owing to its demand that the resolution highlight its Belt and Road Initiative and of using Council resolutions as a platform for inappropriately promoting self-serving initiatives. In response, the representative of China elaborated on the Initiative and stated that the Council had failed to reach an agreement on the

³³¹ See [S/PV.8481](#) (Indonesia and Germany); [S/PV.8587](#) (Belgium); [S/PV.8613](#) (Indonesia); and [S/PV.8687](#) (Poland).

³³² See [S/PV.8481](#) (Poland, United Kingdom and France); [S/PV.8485](#) (United Kingdom); [S/PV.8555](#) (Germany and Poland); [S/PV.8587](#) (Belgium); and [S/PV.8613](#) (Germany).

³³³ See [S/PV.8481](#) (France); [S/PV.8555](#) (France, Belgium and Peru); [S/PV.8613](#) (United Kingdom); and [S/PV.8687](#) (United States).

³³⁴ See [S/PV.8481](#) (Germany, Russian Federation, Belgium, Poland and United Kingdom); [S/PV.8587](#) (France and United Kingdom); [S/PV.8613](#) (China and Dominican Republic); and [S/PV.8687](#) (Russian Federation and Equatorial Guinea).

³³⁵ See [S/PV.8481](#) (United States); [S/PV.8555](#) (Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire); and [S/PV.8620](#) (Dominican Republic).

³³⁶ See [S/PV.8687](#) (Indonesia, United Kingdom, Kuwait, Belgium and South Africa).

³³⁷ See [S/PV.8481](#) (South Africa, Peru and France); [S/PV.8555](#) (Indonesia and Côte d'Ivoire); and [S/PV.8587](#) (Indonesia, United Kingdom and Peru).

³³⁸ See [S/PV.8481](#) (Equatorial Guinea, Belgium and France); [S/PV.8555](#) (Côte d'Ivoire); [S/PV.8587](#) (Belgium); and [S/PV.8687](#) (Indonesia, Equatorial Guinea and France).

³³⁹ See [S/PV.8481](#) (Indonesia and China); [S/PV.8587](#), (Russian Federation); [S/PV.8613](#) (Kuwait and Equatorial Guinea); and [S/PV.8687](#) (Russian Federation and China).

³⁴⁰ See [S/PV.8481](#) (South Africa and Peru); [S/PV.8555](#) (Russian Federation, Côte d'Ivoire and Peru); [S/PV.8587](#) (Russian Federation); [S/PV.8613](#) (Peru and France); and [S/PV.8687](#) (Russian Federation and China).

³⁴¹ Resolution [2460 \(2019\)](#), para. 4.

³⁴² See [S/PV.8485](#).

³⁴³ Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Belgium and France.

extension of the substantive content of the resolution because of persisting differences, one of which being that one member in particular had repeatedly refused to accept the consensus of the Council for many years and the constructive opinions put forward by others.

On 17 September 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2489 \(2019\)](#), extending the mandate of UNAMA for 12 months, until 17 September 2020.³⁴⁴ At the meeting,³⁴⁵ before the vote, the representative of Germany introduced an oral amendment, requested by Afghanistan, to the text of the draft resolution. The President of the Council ruled that if delegations consented to the inclusion of the oral revision to the draft resolution, and there were no objections, then the

vote would proceed on the resolution as orally revised.³⁴⁶ No objections were raised and the vote proceeded, on the basis of the instruction to include the oral revision in the text of the resolution.³⁴⁷ After the vote, the representatives of Germany and Indonesia, as co-penholders of the resolution, thanked all Council members for their engagement in the negotiations, and specifically the delegation of China for its constructive approach.

Developments in Afghanistan were also considered under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁴ Resolution [2489 \(2019\)](#), para. 4. For more information on the mandate of UNAMA, see part X, sect. II.

³⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8620](#).

³⁴⁶ For more information on the conduct of meetings, see part II, sect. VI.

³⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8620](#).

³⁴⁸ See part I, sect. 31.

Meetings: the situation in Afghanistan

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8481 11 March 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (S/2019/193)		Afghanistan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Deputy Executive Director of the Afghan Women’s Network	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8485 15 March 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (S/2019/193)	Draft resolution submitted by Germany and Indonesia (S/2019/223)	Afghanistan		Nine Council members, ^b invitee	Resolution 2460 (2019) 15-0-0

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2019

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8555 19 June 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (S/2019/493)		13 Member States ^c	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	All Council members, all invitees ^d	
S/PV.8587 26 July 2019			Afghanistan	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, President of the Afghanistan section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom	Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members, all invitees ^e	
S/PV.8613 10 September 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (S/2019/703)		12 Member States ^f	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union	All Council members, ^g all invitees ^h	
S/PV.8620 17 September 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (S/2019/703)	Draft resolution submitted by Germany and Indonesia (S/2019/749)	Afghanistan		13 Council members, ⁱ invitee	Resolution 2489 (2019) 15-0-0

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8687 16 December 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (S/2019/935)		Afghanistan	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Afghan youth representative to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees	

^a The Deputy Executive Director of the Afghan Women’s Network participated in the meeting by videoconference from Kabul. Afghanistan was represented by its National Security Adviser.

^b Belgium, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^c Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan.

^d The Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.

^e The President of the Afghanistan section of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom participated in the meeting by videoconference from Kabul.

^f Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan.

^g The representative of Indonesia spoke twice, once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and once in his national capacity.

^h The Executive Director of UNODC participated in the meeting by videoconference from Vienna. The Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.

ⁱ Belgium, China, Côte d’Ivoire (also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa), Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

18. The situation in Myanmar

During the period under review, the Council held one meeting in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”. The only meeting held in 2019 took the form of a briefing.³⁴⁹ No decisions were adopted by the Council under the item in 2019. More information on the meeting, including its participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

On 28 February 2019,³⁵⁰ the Council heard a briefing by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar concerning her visits to Myanmar, Bangladesh and other areas in the region, as well as the installation of her office in Myanmar. The Special Envoy noted that, in the broader context of the country’s democratic transition, military and civilian tensions persisted ahead of the general elections to be held in 2020, and the peace process remained fragile. She underscored the need to end the violence in

Rakhine State, expressed concern that heavy fighting with the Arakan Army would further affect efforts towards the dignified, voluntary and safe return of refugees and stated that the country’s strategy for the closure of internally displaced persons camps should address, among other things, the question of citizenship and of restoring freedom of movement. She outlined challenges that required international support, such as increasing the level of access by relevant United Nations entities in order to support the creation of conditions for the return of refugees and to address the fragility of all communities in Rakhine State. She also noted the importance of accountability in combating impunity and fostering genuine reconciliation.

During the discussion that followed the briefing, most Council members³⁵¹ stressed that a voluntary, safe and dignified return should be the guiding

³⁴⁹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.A.

³⁵⁰ See S/PV.8477.

³⁵¹ United Kingdom, Indonesia, France, Dominican Republic, Belgium, Poland, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, Germany, Peru, United States and Equatorial Guinea.

principle in the repatriation of refugees. Some members³⁵² added that the Rohingya who remained in Rakhine, including internally displaced persons, should be allowed freedom of movement and basic services. Other Council members³⁵³ encouraged the Government of Myanmar to fully implement the memorandum of understanding, signed on 6 June 2018 with the United Nations Development Programme and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to address the humanitarian crisis and to ensure safe, full and unhindered access to Rakhine State for United Nations and other humanitarian actors. Many Council members³⁵⁴ also emphasized that implementing the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, including those on citizenship and equal rights for the Rohingya, was critical in fostering conditions for voluntary repatriation and providing a solution to the crisis.

In a letter dated 22 August 2019 addressed to the President of the Council,³⁵⁵ the Permanent Representative of Myanmar expressed concern regarding

³⁵² Indonesia, France, Belgium, Poland, South Africa and Peru.

³⁵³ Dominican Republic, Belgium, Poland, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, Peru and United States.

³⁵⁴ United Kingdom, Indonesia, France, Dominican Republic, Poland and Russian Federation.

³⁵⁵ [S/2019/676](#).

the Arria-formula meeting announced for the next day, entitled “Mass atrocity crimes in Myanmar: where do we stand on accountability?”, to be co-hosted by Germany, Peru and Kuwait.³⁵⁶ In his letter, the Permanent Representative stated that the title and the purpose of the meeting were grossly misleading and conveyed the erroneous message that “mass atrocity crimes” had actually been committed in Myanmar. Concerning the choice of briefers, he added that it indicated a serious imbalance, as the individuals chosen included those who advocated the “prejudicial and foregone conclusion” that the alleged atrocities had been committed by the Myanmar security forces. On the basis of those and other reasons, the Permanent Representative explained that Myanmar would not participate in the meeting, but would continue its constructive engagement with the members of the Council for the resolution of the complex issue of Rakhine State.

The situation of children in Myanmar was also considered in connection with the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”, pursuant to the conclusions adopted by the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict established under Council resolution [1612 \(2005\)](#).³⁵⁷

³⁵⁶ For more information on Arria-formula meetings in 2019, see part II, sect. I.C.

³⁵⁷ See [S/2019/719](#). For more information, see part I, sect. 28.

Meetings: the situation in Myanmar

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8477 28 February 2019			Bangladesh, Myanmar	Special Envoy of the Secretary- General on Myanmar	All Council members, all invitees ^a	

^a Bangladesh was represented by its Foreign Secretary.

Europe

19. The situation in Cyprus

During 2019, the Council held two meetings and adopted two resolutions concerning the situation in Cyprus, by which it extended the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes is given in the table below. The Council also held two private (closed) meetings with countries contributing troops and police

to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#).³⁵⁸ In

³⁵⁸ Held on 17 January and 15 July 2019, under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#), annex II, sections A and B”; see [S/PV.8447](#) and [S/PV.8574](#).

addition to those meetings, in 2019, the Council held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the situation in Cyprus.³⁵⁹

On 30 January 2019, in connection with the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus,³⁶⁰ the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2453 \(2019\)](#), in which it extended the mandate of UNFICYP for a period of six months, until 31 July 2019.³⁶¹ In the resolution, the Council expressed regret at the lack of progress towards a settlement since the conclusion of the Conference on Cyprus held in 2017 and urged the sides and all involved participants to seize the important opportunity presented by the consultations of the United Nations consultant on a way forward, by engaging actively and constructively in those consultations.³⁶² The Council called upon the sides to explore ways to establish mechanisms and to enhance existing initiatives, with UNFICYP as facilitator through its liaison role, for effectively alleviating tensions and to help address island-wide matters that affected all Cypriots.³⁶³ In that regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit, by 15 April 2019, a report on his good offices and on progress towards reaching a consensus starting point for meaningful results-oriented negotiations and, by 10 July 2019, a report on the implementation of the resolution, including on how United Nations activities on Cyprus could be best configured to advance political progress while preserving stability.³⁶⁴ The Council also welcomed the initiatives undertaken by the Secretary-General to standardize a culture of performance in United Nations peacekeeping and called on him to apply a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework to UNFICYP.³⁶⁵

On 25 July 2019, in connection with the subsequent report of the Secretary-General on the operation in Cyprus,³⁶⁶ the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2483 \(2019\)](#), in which it extended the mandate

of UNFICYP for a further period of six months, until 31 January 2020.³⁶⁷ In the resolution, the Council called for a reduction of tensions in the eastern Mediterranean and called upon the leaders of the two Cypriot communities to refrain from any actions and rhetoric that might damage the chances of success.³⁶⁸ The Council made reference to the meeting held on 26 February between the two leaders and to their agreement with respect to confidence-building measures and to achieving a mine-free Cyprus.³⁶⁹ The Council also expressed serious concern about the increased number of violations of the military status quo along the ceasefire lines and called upon the sides to intensify their efforts to establish a mechanism for direct contacts at the military level and to continue to explore ways to enhance existing initiatives for effectively alleviating tensions.³⁷⁰

After the vote,³⁷¹ the representative of the United States thanked the United Kingdom for its efforts in reaching consensus and for producing a more concise resolution. He expressed disappointment at the lack of progress made in the two years since the Conference on Cyprus and affirmed that the resolution was the unanimous expression of the Council's support for the leaders to take the political risks necessary to engage meaningfully and with a sense of urgency. The representative of the Russian Federation explained that his delegation supported the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP in an unchanged form, adding that the mission played a key role in strengthening stability. He cautioned, however, that the mission should not be used as an instrument to exert political pressure on Cypriots. He noted that the current system of guarantees, with the participation of three foreign States, did not help the Cypriots to arrive at an independent settlement for themselves and affirmed that the most effective way to ensure the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of a united Cyprus would be guarantees from the Security Council. He also urged those who may be tempted to draw Cyprus into "geopolitical games in an attempt to push out traditional players from the eastern Mediterranean" to refrain from doing so.

³⁵⁹ See [S/2019/840](#) and [S/2020/192](#).

³⁶⁰ [S/2019/37](#).

³⁶¹ Resolution [2453 \(2019\)](#), para. 13. For more information regarding the mandate of UNFICYP, see part X, sect. I.

³⁶² Resolution [2453 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 20.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 18.

³⁶⁶ [S/2019/562](#).

³⁶⁷ Resolution [2483 \(2019\)](#), para. 8.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 6 and 11.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 5 and 9.

³⁷¹ [S/PV.8586](#).

Meetings: the situation in Cyprus

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8453 30 January 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/2019/37)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/89)			Four Council members (China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States)	Resolution 2453 (2019) 15-0-0
S/PV.8586 25 July 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/2019/562)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/595)			Two Council members (Russian Federation, United States)	Resolution 2483 (2019) 15-0-0

20. Items relating to the situation in the former Yugoslavia

A. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In 2019, the Council held two meetings and adopted one resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter in connection with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council continued the consideration of the item in the context of semi-annual briefings by the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁷² More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes is given in the table below.

In his briefings to the Council in 2019, the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina provided updates on developments in connection with his two reports for the year.³⁷³ At the meeting on 8 May 2019,³⁷⁴ the High Representative reported that seven months after the general elections, the process of building coalitions and appointing governments continued to dominate the political dynamic in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that, while the Republika Srpska and some cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had moved swiftly to form governments, there had been no appointment of a State-level council of Ministers or of a Federation government. He also underlined that the continuation of divisive and destabilizing rhetoric from some of the political

leadership posed a serious challenge to Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the positive consensus on the need for further integration with the European Union. In that regard, he implored the country's leaders to abandon such rhetoric and to take strides to keep the country moving forward on the path to the European Union. He said that political leaders continued to shirk their obligations with respect to the rule of law, particularly and persistently failing to respect binding decisions of the State judiciary, and that there had been efforts to curb freedom of expression and dissent.

During the discussion that followed the briefing of 8 May, most Council members welcomed the efforts of Bosnia and Herzegovina to promote national reconciliation and socioeconomic development and its continued engagement in the process of integration with the European Union. Speakers expressed concern about the delays in the formation of the Federation government and of the State Council of Ministers six months after the elections and urged political representatives to engage constructively and to refrain from using divisive rhetoric to create favourable conditions for the reconciliation process. In addition, most members of the Council reiterated their calls on the competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the steps required to implement the "5+2" agenda, necessary for the closure of the Office of the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the report of the High Representative was far from an impartial assessment of the situation in the country and

³⁷² For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

³⁷³ See [S/2019/364](#) and [S/2019/843](#).

³⁷⁴ See [S/PV.8522](#).

expressed disagreement with specific aspects of the report, including on the relationship between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He added that it was vital to continue reducing the budget and staffing of the Office of the High Representative, as it had become an impediment to the country's future democratic progress.

In his second briefing to the Council, on 5 November 2019,³⁷⁵ following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2496 (2019), the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed regret that, more than a year after the general elections in October 2018, no governments had yet been formed at the State or Federation levels. He also expressed regret for the continued slow pace in implementing urgent electoral reforms and strengthening the rule of law, as well as for the continuation of divisive rhetoric. At the same meeting, the Council also heard a briefing by the head of the Bosnia and Herzegovina programme of TRIAL International, a non-governmental organization supporting victims of international crimes. She regretted that, despite some positive developments, progress in bringing war criminals to justice had been slow. In that regard, she requested that the Council and the international community demand that victims see their right to justice, truth and reparations fully implemented and that the Council support the initiatives aimed at delivering justice and reconciliation.

Prior to the briefing, the Council adopted resolution 2496 (2019), by which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it renewed the authorization of the multinational stabilization force, operation Althea of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea), and the continued presence of the

³⁷⁵ See [S/PV.8658](#).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the country for a period of 12 months starting from the date of the adoption of the resolution.³⁷⁶ In the resolution, the Council also urged the parties to proceed with the formation of governments at all levels and to prioritize the implementation of comprehensive reforms; it also called on the parties to refrain from any polarizing and unconstructive policy, action and rhetoric.³⁷⁷

At the same meeting, during the debate that followed the briefing,³⁷⁸ most Council members welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution 2496 (2019) and commended the High Representative for his efforts to promote the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) and EUFOR-Althea for its contributions to preserving stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The representative of the Russian Federation again said that the report of the High Representative did not provide an objective and balanced picture of what was happening in the country and criticized the continuing bias against Bosnian Serbs and Croats. He added that, given the mention in the report of the serious differences in views between Bosnians, Serbs and Croats on the way forward in developing the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the High Representative should focus on promoting a culture of dialogue and provide, if necessary, good offices to resolve disputes among Bosnians. He also called on the Council and the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina to step up efforts to close the Office of the High Representative.

³⁷⁶ Resolution 2496 (2019) paras. 3–4. For more information on EUFOR-Althea, see part VIII, sect. III.

³⁷⁷ Resolution 2496 (2019), para. 8.

³⁷⁸ See [S/PV.8658](#).

Meetings: the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8522 8 May 2019	Letter dated 1 May 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/364)		Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia	High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees ^a	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8658 5 November 2019	Letter dated 25 October 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/843)	Draft resolution submitted by Germany (S/2019/859)	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia	High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Head of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Programme of TRIAL International, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union	All Council members, all invitees ^b	Resolution 2496 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a The Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine.

^b The Head of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Programme of TRIAL International participated in the meeting by videoconference from Sarajevo. The Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Montenegro, Turkey and Ukraine.

B. Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)

During the period under review, the Council held three meetings in connection with the item entitled “Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)”. All meetings took the form of briefings,³⁷⁹ and no decisions were adopted by the Council under the item in 2019. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

In a note by the President of the Council dated 7 February 2019,³⁸⁰ the Council expressed its intent to hold briefings on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) three times in 2019 and, as from 2020, to hold briefings twice a year, in April and October. Consistent with the note, in 2019, the Council heard three briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMIK, in February, June and October,³⁸¹ in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#). In 2019, the Council

also heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel.³⁸²

The briefings of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General were focused on the continued tensions and impediments to the resumption of the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,³⁸³ the changes in Kosovo’s political landscape following the conduct of elections in Serb-majority municipalities and early general elections³⁸⁴ and the security incident of 28 May 2019, which resulted in the arrest of UNMIK personnel.³⁸⁵ In his briefing, on 10 June 2019,³⁸⁶ the United Nations Legal Counsel focused on the legal regime of immunity for United Nations staff members in Kosovo as an element of the response to the events of 28 May and the follow-up to those events. He explained that the Department of Safety and Security had undertaken an internal investigation to gather all available information regarding the circumstances surrounding the arrest and detention of two UNMIK staff members in order to look into the allegations made by the Kosovo authorities regarding their conduct.

In 2019, Council members addressed the agreement reached on reducing the cycle of meetings and reporting on the item.³⁸⁷ While some Council

³⁷⁹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

³⁸⁰ [S/2019/120](#).

³⁸¹ See [S/PV.8459](#), [S/PV.8541](#) and [S/PV.8655](#).

³⁸² See [S/PV.8541](#).

³⁸³ See [S/PV.8459](#), [S/PV.8541](#) and [S/PV.8655](#).

³⁸⁴ See [S/PV.8541](#) and [S/PV.8655](#).

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁶ See [S/PV.8541](#).

³⁸⁷ See [S/2019/120](#).

members expressed support for the agreement,³⁸⁸ the representative of the Russian Federation expressed a different view, affirming that the situation in Kosovo was unstable and that it must remain firmly under the Council's control and be considered on the basis of the established practice of holding open briefings.³⁸⁹

Some Council members welcomed the successful holding of legislative elections in Kosovo on 6 October 2019 and expressed the hope that it would be an opportunity to encourage dialogue and reform.³⁹⁰ Council members expressed concern at the rising tensions between Belgrade and Pristina, called on both Serbia and Kosovo to tone down the confrontational rhetoric and discussed options to facilitate the resumption of dialogue between the parties.³⁹¹ The representative of China stated that the parties concerned should reach a mutually acceptable solution on the issue of Kosovo through dialogue within the framework of relevant Council resolutions.³⁹² Other Council members urged the resumption of the dialogue facilitated by the European Union³⁹³ and, in that context, called for the lifting of tariffs imposed by the Government of Kosovo on goods imported from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the cessation of the call by the Government of Serbia for other countries to withdraw their recognition of Kosovo.³⁹⁴ The representative of the Russian Federation reminded the Council that it had been, and continued to be, the main platform for international dialogue on Kosovo, in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999).³⁹⁵ He also said that the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina under the auspices of the

European Union seemed to be “comatose”, with nothing having been done in that format for a very long time.³⁹⁶

On the question of Kosovo's independence, the representative of the Russian Federation highlighted the attempts by Kosovo authorities, with the support of a number of States, to join various international organizations and averred that Pristina could participate in multilateral structures only through UNMIK and that anything else would be a serious contravention of the provisions of resolution 1244 (1999).³⁹⁷ Other Council members held a different view, recognizing the independence of Kosovo.³⁹⁸

In relation to the work of UNMIK, Council members considered the possibility of conducting a strategic review of the Mission's mandate. Some members held the view that it was necessary to conduct a review of the Mission given the drastic change of conditions in Kosovo since the beginning of its mandate and the need to assess the Mission's withdrawal.³⁹⁹ The representative of the Russian Federation did not support the proposed review, contending that the problems in Kosovo were not yet resolved, and called on the Secretariat to carefully monitor the situation.⁴⁰⁰

Regarding the incident of 28 May, Council members expressed concern about the detention of UNMIK personnel in the course of a police operation conducted by authorities in northern Kosovo.⁴⁰¹ In that connection, the representative of the Russian Federation demanded that those responsible be prosecuted and punished.⁴⁰² They welcomed the report on the Mission's internal investigation into the matter and reaffirmed that the privileges, immunities, safety and security of United Nations personnel should be fully respected.⁴⁰³

³⁸⁸ See [S/PV.8459](#) (United Kingdom, Germany, United States, Belgium and Poland); and [S/PV.8541](#) (United States).

³⁸⁹ See [S/PV.8459](#) and [S/PV.8541](#).

³⁹⁰ See [S/PV.8655](#) (United Kingdom, France, Poland, Kuwait, Côte d'Ivoire and Peru).

³⁹¹ See [S/PV.8459](#) (Germany, United States, Russian Federation, China and Indonesia); [S/PV.8541](#) (United States, Germany, Indonesia and Poland); and [S/PV.8655](#) (United Kingdom, Germany, United States, China, Côte d'Ivoire and Peru).

³⁹² See [S/PV.8459](#), [S/PV.8541](#) and [S/PV.8655](#).

³⁹³ See [S/PV.8459](#) (United Kingdom, Germany, United States, France, Belgium, Peru, Indonesia, Kuwait, South Africa and Equatorial Guinea); [S/PV.8541](#) (South Africa, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Indonesia, Côte d'Ivoire, Belgium, Poland, Peru and Kuwait); and [S/PV.8655](#) (France, Germany, Poland, Indonesia, Kuwait, Côte d'Ivoire, Belgium, Equatorial Guinea and Peru).

³⁹⁴ See [S/PV.8459](#) (Germany, United States and Indonesia); [S/PV.8541](#) (Côte d'Ivoire and Poland); and [S/PV.8655](#) (Germany, Côte d'Ivoire and Peru).

³⁹⁵ [S/PV.8459](#).

³⁹⁶ [S/PV.8655](#).

³⁹⁷ See [S/PV.8459](#).

³⁹⁸ See [S/PV.8459](#) (United Kingdom and Germany); [S/PV.8541](#) (United States); and [S/PV.8655](#) (United States).

³⁹⁹ See [S/PV.8459](#) (United Kingdom, United States and Poland); [S/PV.8541](#) (United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Poland); and [S/PV.8655](#) (United States and Poland). For more information on the mandate of UNMIK, see part X, sect. I.

⁴⁰⁰ See [S/PV.8655](#).

⁴⁰¹ See [S/PV.8541](#) (China, South Africa, United States, Equatorial Guinea, Peru, Russian Federation and Kuwait); and [S/PV.8655](#) (United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Dominican Republic, United States, China, Indonesia, Peru and South Africa).

⁴⁰² See [S/PV.8655](#).

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*, (United Kingdom, Russian Federation, United States, China, Indonesia, Belgium and Peru).

Meetings: Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8459 7 February 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (S/2019/102)		Serbia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo and Head UNMIK, Vlora Çitaku	All Council members, all invitees ^{a,b}	
S/PV.8541 10 June 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK (S/2019/461)		Serbia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, Vlora Çitaku	All Council members, all invitees ^{a,b}	
S/PV.8655 31 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK (S/2019/797)		Serbia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Vlora Çitaku	All Council members, all invitees ^a	

^a Serbia was represented by its First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^b The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Pristina.

21. Items relating to Ukraine

A. Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))

During the period under review, the Council held one meeting, in the form of a briefing,⁴⁰⁴ in connection with the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))”. More information on

the meeting, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

On 25 April 2019,⁴⁰⁵ the Council heard briefings under the item by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group. Against the backdrop of presidential elections held on 21 April 2019 in Ukraine

⁴⁰⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁴⁰⁵ See [S/PV.8516](#).

and the issuance of a Russian presidential decree on 24 April that made it possible for Ukrainians to obtain Russian citizenship under a simplified procedure, the briefers focused on the importance of the full implementation of the Minsk agreements and on the need to avoid the politicization of humanitarian assistance to address the situation in the eastern part of the country, including the need to raise funds and to urgently carry out humanitarian demining. They expressed concern at the worsening security situation, which had affected freedom of movement in the country and the ability of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to fulfil its mandated tasks.

In the discussion during the meeting, Council members⁴⁰⁶ focused primarily on the decision by the Russian Federation to expedite the granting of Russian nationality to Ukrainian citizens residing in the

⁴⁰⁶ France, United States, Belgium, Poland, Peru, United Kingdom and Russian Federation.

Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the impact of that decision on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and the Minsk agreements. Council members also discussed the security situation in eastern Ukraine, with some⁴⁰⁷ focusing in particular on the de-escalation of conflict and others⁴⁰⁸ on its impact on the humanitarian conditions on the ground and on the provision of humanitarian assistance.

In 2019, the Council also considered the situation in Ukraine under the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)”,⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁷ France, United States, South Africa, Kuwait and Indonesia.

⁴⁰⁸ France, South Africa, Belgium, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Côte d’Ivoire, Peru and United Kingdom.

⁴⁰⁹ See part I, sect. 21.B.

Meetings: letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8516 25 April 2019			Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Special Representative of the OSCE	All Council members, all invitees ^a	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
					Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group	

^a The Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office participated in the meeting by videoconference from Kyiv.

B. Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings in connection with the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)”.⁴¹⁰ Both meetings took the form of briefings.⁴¹¹ More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

During the two meetings held under this item on 12 February and 16 July 2019, the Council heard briefings by a variety of speakers. At the meeting on 12 February,⁴¹² the Council heard briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas, the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group. In their statements, briefers focused on the overall security situation in eastern Ukraine and the continued challenges to the implementation of the Minsk agreements. They called for the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure through, among other things,

the full withdrawal of heavy weapons, the disengagement of forces and the scaling up of humanitarian mine action. They also called for improving the access of humanitarian actors and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission.

These topics were also discussed by Council members. Also at the meeting on 12 February, the representative of the Russian Federation explained that the meeting was being held at the initiative of his delegation in order to discuss the implementation of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements signed four years earlier, on 12 February 2015. Most Council members called for the full implementation of resolution 2202 (2015), by which the Council had endorsed the Package of Measures, and of the presidential statement of 6 June 2018,⁴¹³ in which, *inter alia*, the Council reiterated the importance of implementing the Minsk agreements and called for the United Nations to address the humanitarian crisis in eastern Ukraine. Council members expressed differing views about the origins of the conflict and the parties responsible for the situation.⁴¹⁴

On 16 July 2019,⁴¹⁵ the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. The briefings were focused on the law establishing Ukrainian as the sole State language in Ukraine, which entered into force on 16 July 2019, and on the views and recommendations of the relevant office of the United Nations and OSCE. While acknowledging the right of Ukraine to promote its national language, the briefers expressed the need to respect the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the country and called for sufficient legal guarantees for the protection of the linguistic rights of persons belonging to national minorities. At the same

⁴¹⁰ In addition to the two meetings held, the provisional agenda for the 8529th meeting was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes (S/PV.8529). For more information on the adoption of the agenda, see part II, sect. II.A.

⁴¹¹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁴¹² See S/PV.8461.

⁴¹³ S/PRST/2018/12.

⁴¹⁴ See S/PV.8461 (Russian Federation, Germany, Poland, United States, France, United Kingdom and Belgium).

⁴¹⁵ See S/PV.8575.

meeting, Council members discussed the country's language law in the context of the ongoing crisis in eastern Ukraine and reiterated the need for the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. In that connection, they called for the continuation of the dialogue between the parties in the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group and progress in terms of prisoner exchanges, the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructures and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Some Council members⁴¹⁶ referred to the law enacted in April 2019 by the Russian Federation, to provide expedited Russian

⁴¹⁶ France, United Kingdom and Poland.

citizenship to Ukrainian citizens living in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. Council members⁴¹⁷ also recalled the fifth anniversary of the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17.

In 2019, the Council also considered the situation in Ukraine under the item entitled "Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)".⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁷ United States, France, United Kingdom, Poland, Belgium and Germany.

⁴¹⁸ See part I, sect. 21.A.

Meetings: letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8461 12 February 2019			Ukraine	Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group	All Council members, all invitees ^a	Procedural vote (rule 9) 5-6-4 ^b
S/PV.8529 20 May 2019 (agenda not adopted)						

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8575 16 July 2019			Ukraine	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities	All Council members, all invitees	

^a The Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office participated in the meeting by videoconference from Minsk.

^b *For*: China, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa; *against*: Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *abstaining*: Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru.

Middle East

22. The situation in the Middle East

During the period under review, the Council held 42 public meetings in relation to the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”. Consistent with past practice, in 2019, most meetings held under the item took the form of briefings. In the context of those meetings, the Council considered a variety of topics, principally, the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic; the conflict in Yemen; the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF); and the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Following established practice, the Council also held two private (closed) meetings with countries contributing troops and police to UNDOF and UNIFIL.⁴¹⁹ In addition, in a departure from previous practice, the Council held one private (closed) meeting under the item, on 5 November 2019,⁴²⁰ to hear briefings by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

In connection with this item, the Council adopted a total of six resolutions and issued two presidential statements. On 16 January 2019, the Council established the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) for an initial period of six months, to oversee the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement;⁴²¹ on 15 July 2019, it extended the mandate of UNMHA for a further period of six months.⁴²² On 26 February 2019, the Council renewed the sanctions measures in relation to the situation in Yemen until 26 February 2020 and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for 13 months until 28 March 2020.⁴²³ The Council also renewed the mandate of UNDOF twice, for periods of 6 months each,⁴²⁴ and extended the mandate of UNIFIL once, for a period of 12 months.⁴²⁵ The Council failed to adopt four draft resolutions in relation to the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. As outlined below, two draft resolutions were not adopted owing to the negative vote of one or more permanent members, and two draft resolutions were not adopted owing to the failure to obtain the required number of votes.

⁴¹⁹ Held under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”. For UNDOF, see S/PV.8544 (11 June 2019); for UNIFIL see S/PV.8594 (8 August 2019).

⁴²⁰ See S/PV.8659.

⁴²¹ Resolution 2452 (2019), para. 1.

⁴²² Resolution 2481 (2019), para. 1.

⁴²³ Resolution 2456 (2019), paras. 2 and 5.

⁴²⁴ Resolutions 2477 (2019), para. 13, and 2503 (2019), para. 14.

⁴²⁵ Resolution 2485 (2019), para. 1.

More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the tables below.

During the period under review, Council meetings in relation to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to be focused on three main aspects: (a) the political process to end the conflict; (b) the humanitarian situation in the country; and (c) the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. Unlike in previous years,⁴²⁶ in 2019, the briefings concerning the political process and the humanitarian situation were often given during the same meeting, whereas those on the proliferation and use of chemical weapons were given separately, in dedicated meetings.

Regarding the political process, the Council held regular monthly briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on efforts to reach a political solution to the conflict. In that connection, in 2019, the briefings and discussions of the Council were focused on the formation of the Constitutional Committee to undertake constitutional reform, as agreed in the final statement of the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue held in Sochi, Russian Federation, on 30 January 2018, including on the composition of the Committee.⁴²⁷ In his briefings to the Council, the Special Envoy for Syria elaborated on his five-point plan to facilitate the peace process, including the formation of the Committee,⁴²⁸ and on his intention to convene the first meeting of the Committee on 30 October 2019 in Geneva, pursuant to the agreement on its terms of reference and core rules of procedure.⁴²⁹ On 8 October 2019, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it welcomed the announcement by the Secretary-General with regard to the agreement between the parties for a credible, balanced and inclusive Constitutional Committee facilitated by the United Nations in Geneva.⁴³⁰ Following the first meeting of the Committee, held on 30 October, the Council heard briefings by both the Special Envoy and by a board member of the Syrian Women's League and founding member of the Syrian League for Citizenship.⁴³¹ In his last briefing of 2019

to the Council, the Special Envoy reported on the second meeting of the Committee, held on 25 November 2019, at which no consensus had been reached on basic aspects, such as the Committee's agenda.⁴³² The briefings by the Special Envoy for Syria and the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs were also focused on the release of detainees and abductees and on the human rights abuses documented by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on detentions in the Syrian Arab Republic, mandated by the Human Rights Council.⁴³³ Representatives of civil society also gave briefings on that topic.⁴³⁴

In relation to the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, as well as by the Director for Operations and Advocacy and the Director of the Coordination Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on the findings of the reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of relevant resolutions, including resolution 2165 (2014), by which cross-border humanitarian operations were authorized.⁴³⁵ The briefers provided regular updates on the humanitarian conditions in different parts of the country, in particular Idlib, in the north-western part of the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Rukban and Hawl refugee camps, and on the efforts made to provide cross-border humanitarian assistance.

On 20 December 2019, against the backdrop of the approaching expiration of the authorization for the cross-border operations mechanism, on 10 January 2020,⁴³⁶ the Council voted on two competing draft resolutions to renew the mechanism.⁴³⁷ Under the draft submitted by the co-penholders, Belgium, Germany and Kuwait, the Council would have renewed the authorization of humanitarian agencies to use three of the four border crossings authorized in resolution 2165 (2014) to deliver humanitarian assistance for a period of six months, followed by an additional period of

⁴²⁶ See *Repertoire, Supplement 2014–2015 to Supplement 2018*.

⁴²⁷ According to the statement, a constitutional committee would be formed to draft constitutional reform as a contribution to the political settlement under United Nations auspices in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015). For more information, see S/2018/121, annex.

⁴²⁸ See S/PV.8475.

⁴²⁹ See S/PV.8628. See also S/2019/775.

⁴³⁰ S/PRST/2019/12, first and second paragraphs.

⁴³¹ See S/PV.8674.

⁴³² See S/PV.8696.

⁴³³ See S/PV.8475, S/PV.8493, S/PV.8520 and S/PV.8609.

⁴³⁴ See S/PV.8593 (representative of Syria Bright Future and representative of Families for Freedom); S/PV.8674 (member of the Women's Advisory Board and founding member of the Syrian League for Citizenship); and S/PV.8696 (co-founder and Co-Director of the Center for Civil Society and Democracy).

⁴³⁵ Resolution 2165 (2014), para. 2.

⁴³⁶ Resolution 2449 (2018), para. 3.

⁴³⁷ See S/PV.8697.

six months, unless the Council decided otherwise.⁴³⁸ Under the competing draft, submitted by the Russian Federation, the Council would have renewed the authorizations at two border crossings only, for a fixed period of six months.⁴³⁹ The Council failed to adopt the draft submitted by the co-penholders, owing to the negative vote of two permanent members, namely, China and the Russian Federation.⁴⁴⁰ At the outset of that meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation indicated that he would vote against the draft submitted by the co-penholders, stressing that it failed to take into account the changes that had occurred in the Syrian Arab Republic since 2014, rendering cross-border assistance unnecessary. Following the vote, similar remarks were made by the representative of China, who stated that the mechanism had been adopted under specific circumstances and needed to be evaluated and adjusted in the light of the developments on the ground. Several Council members⁴⁴¹ expressed regret about the Council's failure to adopt the draft resolution submitted by the co-penholders. The representative of the United States added that the consequences of the vetoes by China and the Russian Federation would be disastrous. The Council then voted on the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation, which was not adopted, owing to the failure to obtain the required number of votes. The representative of Belgium argued that the draft presented by the co-penholders accurately reflected the situation on the ground in the Syrian Arab Republic. The representatives of Germany and the United States criticized the take-it-or-leave-it approach of the Russian Federation with regard to the negotiation on the draft resolutions, and the representatives of the United Kingdom, Poland and Indonesia recalled that, in its draft resolution, the Russian Federation failed to address the needs of the Syrian people. The representatives of the Germany, South Africa and the United Kingdom also underscored the need to continue the consultations in order to ensure the renewal of the cross-border assistance mandate before its expiration on 10 January 2020.

In addition to the briefings it heard on the cross-border humanitarian operation, the Council also heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs on the impact of military operations throughout the country, including those carried out by terrorist organizations, and on the

efforts made to restore the demilitarization agreement of 17 September 2018 between the Russian Federation and Turkey.⁴⁴² Throughout the second quarter of the year, the Council often discussed the problem of increasing attacks against medical facilities in the country.⁴⁴³ The Council also heard briefings by the Head of the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and Refugee Migration Monitoring in the Syrian Arab Republic and by the Executive Director of the Syrian American Medical Society on the assistance provided to medical facilities throughout the country.⁴⁴⁴

In connection with the agreement between the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Turkey on ways to stabilize the situation in Idlib, discussed at the meeting on 29 August 2019,⁴⁴⁵ the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs reported to the Council, on 19 September,⁴⁴⁶ about the unilateral ceasefire in Idlib announced by the Russian Federation on 30 August and the establishment by the Secretary-General, on 13 September, of an internal and independent United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry to investigate a series of incidents that had occurred in the north-western part of the Syrian Arab Republic.⁴⁴⁷ At its subsequent meeting, held on the same day,⁴⁴⁸ the Council voted on two competing draft resolutions, in which it would have addressed "the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Idlib Governorate".⁴⁴⁹ One draft resolution was submitted by the co-penholders, and the other by China and the Russian Federation. Under the draft resolution submitted by the co-penholders, the Council would have introduced a ceasefire, beginning on 21 September 2019, demanded that all Member States ensure that counter-terrorist activities complied with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and reiterated its demand on all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to immediately halt any indiscriminate aerial bombardments and minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects, including medical facilities.⁴⁵⁰ Under the draft resolution submitted by China and the Russian Federation, the

⁴³⁸ S/2019/961, para. 3.

⁴³⁹ S/2019/962, para. 2.

⁴⁴⁰ See S/PV.8697.

⁴⁴¹ Kuwait, Dominican Republic, France, Poland, Peru and United States.

⁴⁴² S/2018/852, annex.

⁴⁴³ See S/PV.8493, S/PV.8515, S/PV.8527, S/PV.8535, S/PV.8553, S/PV.8561 and S/PV.8589.

⁴⁴⁴ See S/PV.8561.

⁴⁴⁵ See S/PV.8609.

⁴⁴⁶ See S/PV.8622.

⁴⁴⁷ On 14 November, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs told the Council that the Board of Inquiry had commenced its investigations (see S/PV.8664).

⁴⁴⁸ See S/PV.8623.

⁴⁴⁹ S/2019/756, para. 1; and S/2019/757, para. 1.

⁴⁵⁰ S/2019/756, paras. 1–3.

Council would have taken note of the memorandum of understanding agreed between the Russian Federation and Turkey on 17 September 2018, decided that the parties must maintain the ceasefire of 31 August 2019 and reaffirmed that the cessation of hostilities would not apply to military operations against terrorist groups.⁴⁵¹ At the same meeting,⁴⁵² in explanation of their votes, the representatives of China and the Russian Federation mentioned that the failure to address the impact of the activities of terrorist organizations in the draft submitted by the three co-penholders was the reason for their votes against it. The representative of China added that to “steamroll” a draft resolution that had major controversies towards a vote was not constructive. While the Council failed to adopt the draft submitted by the three co-penholders owing to the negative vote of two permanent members, the draft submitted by China and the Russian Federation was not adopted owing to the failure to obtain the required number of votes.

On 24 October 2019,⁴⁵³ the Council heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific concerning the military activities conducted by Turkey in October 2019 as part of Operation Peace Spring in the north-eastern part of the Syrian Arab Republic,⁴⁵⁴ as well as on the subsequent agreement with the United States and the memorandum of understanding with the Russian Federation, respectively, concerning various aspects of that operation.

With respect to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council heard regular briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs on the progress made in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme in the context of informal consultations of the whole.⁴⁵⁵ On 5 November 2019,⁴⁵⁶ however, the Council held a private (closed)

meeting, at which it heard briefings by the High Representative and the Director General of OPCW.⁴⁵⁷

With regard to the conflict in Yemen, on 16 January 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2452 (2019), by which it established a special political mission, the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), for an initial period of six months, to support the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra’s Isa.⁴⁵⁸ The Council mandated the new Mission to support the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement through, inter alia, leading and supporting the functioning of the Redeployment Coordination Committee to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire and the redeployment of forces by the parties from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra’s Isa and monitoring the parties’ compliance with the ceasefire and the mutual redeployments.⁴⁵⁹ The Council also approved the proposals of the Secretary-General with regard to the composition and operational aspects of the Mission.⁴⁶⁰ On 15 July 2019, by its resolution 2481 (2019), the Council extended the

⁴⁵¹ S/2019/757, penultimate preambular paragraph and paras. 1–2.

⁴⁵² See S/PV.8623.

⁴⁵³ See S/PV.8645.

⁴⁵⁴ See S/2019/804.

⁴⁵⁵ See S/2019/744, S/2019/840, S/2019/910, S/2019/1015, S/2020/29, S/2020/171 and S/2020/192.

⁴⁵⁶ See S/PV.8659.

⁴⁵⁷ On 1 March 2019, OPCW published the final report of its fact-finding mission regarding the chemical weapons attack allegedly carried out in Duma on 7 April 2018 (see S/2019/208). On 22 November 2019, the Council issued a presidential statement under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, in which it welcomed the attendance of and briefing by the Director General of OPCW, reaffirmed that the proliferation, means of delivery and any use of chemical weapons was a threat to international peace and security, emphasized the need for accountability for their use and expressed support for the efforts made by OPCW to achieve the object and purpose of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and to ensure the full implementation of its provisions, including those for the international verification of compliance (S/PRST/2019/14, first, second and fifth to seventh paragraphs). For more information, see part I, sect. 38.

⁴⁵⁸ Resolution 2452 (2019), para. 1. For more information on the Stockholm Agreement of 13 December 2018, of which the Hudaydah Agreement forms a part, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2018*, part I, sect. 23.

⁴⁵⁹ Resolution 2452 (2019), para. 2 (a)–(b). For more information on the mandate of UNMHA, see part X, sect. II.

⁴⁶⁰ Resolution 2452 (2019), para. 3. For the Secretary-General’s proposals on the role of and support provided by the United Nations in the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement, see S/2019/28. During the reporting period, the Head of UNMHA and Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee changed twice (see exchanges of letters S/2019/95 and S/2019/96; and S/2019/734 and S/2019/735).

mandate of UNMHA for a further period of six months, until 15 January 2020.⁴⁶¹

In its meetings in 2019, the Council continued to focus on three distinct areas in relation to the conflict in Yemen, namely: (a) the political process to find a solution to the conflict; (b) the humanitarian situation in the country; and (c) the sanctions measures in place against individuals and entities designated as engaging in or providing support for acts that threatened the peace, security or stability of Yemen.

Regarding the political process, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen on the progress in the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement. During his briefings, he updated the Council on the status of the Hudaydah Agreement, including the outcomes of consultations between the parties. The Special Envoy also addressed the prisoner exchange mechanism and the formation of a joint committee to address the situation in the city of Taiz, as well as the situation in the southern part of Yemen.⁴⁶² At the meeting on 16 September 2019,⁴⁶³ the Council addressed the attack of 14 September on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and heard a briefing by the Special Envoy, who informed the Council that Ansar Allah had claimed responsibility for the attack. At the same meeting, the Special Envoy also notified the Council of the establishment of the tripartite ceasefire and the de-escalation mechanism to allow for greater communication between the parties in order to prevent military escalation.

On 29 August 2019, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it expressed deep concern about the escalation of violence in the south of Yemen.⁴⁶⁴ In the statement, the Council called on all involved parties to show restraint and to preserve the territorial integrity of Yemen, while welcoming and fully supporting the efforts by Saudi Arabia to convene a dialogue in Jeddah to resolve the situation.⁴⁶⁵ The Council also expressed its full support for the efforts of the Special Envoy for Yemen to work with the parties to pave the way for the resumption of comprehensive negotiations, without delay, on the security and political arrangements necessary to end the conflict and resume a peaceful transition.⁴⁶⁶

On 22 November 2019,⁴⁶⁷ following the signing of the Riyadh Agreement between the Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council on 5 November 2019, the Special Envoy for Yemen gave a briefing to the Council, in which he highlighted the momentum to reach a political settlement in Yemen and noted that the parties were working together, with the support of Saudi Arabia, regional powers, the international community and the United Nations, to achieve a compromise on a range of issues.

Regarding the humanitarian situation in Yemen, the Council heard briefings by either the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator or his Deputy, each time in conjunction with the Special Envoy for Yemen. The briefers reported to the Council that, despite the political momentum, the humanitarian situation in the country remained dire. They focused their briefings on, *inter alia*, the continued economic instability, public health concerns and the displacement resulting from the escalation of the conflict in various parts of the country. They also raised the need for broader inclusion of women in the peace process and the disproportionate impact of the war on women and children. In that regard, on 15 April 2019,⁴⁶⁸ the Council also heard briefings by the Chairman of the Yemeni non-governmental organization, Food for Humanity, who criticized the exclusion of women from the Stockholm Agreement, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, who focused on the grave human rights violations against children in Yemen, including their widespread recruitment and maiming. The Council also heard two briefings by the Executive Director of the World Food Programme,⁴⁶⁹ who reported on the challenges the country faced with regard to food assistance.

Regarding the sanctions measures imposed in connection with the conflict in Yemen, on 26 February 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2456 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended the sanctions measures for 12 months, until 26 February 2020, and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Yemen for 13 months, until 28 March 2020.⁴⁷⁰ On 15 May 2019,⁴⁷¹ the representative of Peru, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#), gave a briefing to the Council on his visits to Amman, Riyadh, Muscat

⁴⁶¹ Resolution [2481 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

⁴⁶² See, for example, [S/PV.8598](#), [S/PV.8619](#) and [S/PV.8672](#).

⁴⁶³ See [S/PV.8619](#).

⁴⁶⁴ [S/PRST/2019/9](#), second paragraph.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, third paragraph.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

⁴⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8672](#).

⁴⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8512](#).

⁴⁶⁹ See [S/PV.8551](#) and [S/PV.8578](#).

⁴⁷⁰ Resolution [2456 \(2019\)](#), paras. 2 and 5.

⁴⁷¹ See [S/PV.8525](#).

and Tehran between 30 March and 5 April, to raise awareness of the purpose of sanctions and to obtain first-hand information on their implementation.

In 2019, the mandate of UNDOF was renewed twice by the Council, in resolutions [2477 \(2019\)](#) and [2503 \(2019\)](#), for periods of six months each, until 31 December 2019 and 30 June 2020, respectively.⁴⁷² At the request of the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council held a public meeting on 27 March 2019,⁴⁷³ following the decision of the United States to recognize the occupied Syrian Golan as Israeli territory. At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations. In her briefing, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs reiterated the Secretary-General's statement that the United Nations position on the Golan was known and clear and was reflected in the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, notably Council resolutions [242 \(1967\)](#) and [497 \(1981\)](#).⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷² Resolutions [2477 \(2019\)](#), para. 13, and [2503 \(2019\)](#), para. 14.

⁴⁷³ See [S/PV.8495](#).

⁴⁷⁴ For more information on the discussion, see part II,

In connection with Lebanon, on 29 August 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2485 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of UNIFIL for a period of one year.⁴⁷⁵ In the resolution, the Council welcomed the progress made regarding the formation of the new Government in January 2019 and encouraged all Lebanese parties to resume discussions towards a consensus on a national defence strategy.⁴⁷⁶ The Council also reiterated the need to respect the Blue Line in its entirety and noted with concern that UNIFIL had still not been able to access the locations related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).⁴⁷⁷

For the purposes of facilitating coverage of this item, information on the meetings is set out below under four separate headings, namely: (a) Syrian Arab Republic; (b) Yemen; (c) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; and (d) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

sect. I.D.

⁴⁷⁵ Resolution [2485 \(2019\)](#), para. 1. See also [S/2019/619](#). For more information on the mandate of UNIFIL, see part X, sect. I.

⁴⁷⁶ Resolution [2485 \(2019\)](#), second and sixteenth preambular paragraphs.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, twelfth preambular paragraph and para. 11.

Meetings: the situation in the Middle East – Syrian Arab Republic

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8454 30 January 2019			Syrian Arab Republic	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.8471 26 February 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions_2139		Syrian Arab Republic	Director for Operations and Advocacy of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	13 Council members, ^b all invitees	
	(2014) , 2165 (2014) , 2191 (2014) , 2258 (2015) , 2332 (2016) , 2393 (2017) , 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018) (S/2019/157)					

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8475 28 February 2019			Syrian Arab Republic	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8493 27 March 2019			Syrian Arab Republic	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Director of the Coordination Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	All Council members, ^c all invitees	
S/PV.8515 24 April 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions_2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018) (S/2019/321)		Syrian Arab Republic	Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Nujeen Mustapha, civil society representative	14 Council members, ^d all invitees	
S/PV.8520 30 April 2019				Special Envoy of the Secretary-General	All Council members, invitee	
S/PV.8527 17 May 2019			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, ^e all invitees	
S/PV.8535 28 May 2019			Syrian Arab Republic	Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	14 Council members, ^{f,g} all invitees	
S/PV.8553 18 June 2019			Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Under-Secretary-General for Peacebuilding and Political Affairs, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	13 Council members, ^h all invitees	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8561 25 June 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018) (S/2019/508)		Syrian Arab Republic	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Head of the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and Refugee Migration Monitoring in the Syrian Arab Republic, Executive Director of the Syrian American Medical Society	13 Council members, ^h all invitees ⁱ	
S/PV.8567 27 June 2019			Syrian Arab Republic	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General	All Council members, all invitees ^j	
S/PV.8589 30 July 2019				Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Director of International Policy and Partnerships at Physicians for Human Rights	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.8593 7 August 2019			Syrian Arab Republic	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Dr. Hala of Syria Bright Future, Amina Khoulyani of Families for Freedom	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8609 29 August 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018) (S/2019/674)		Syrian Arab Republic	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General	All Council members, ^e all invitees	
S/PV.8622 19 September 2019			Syrian Arab Republic	Assistant-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	12 Council members, ^k all invitees	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8623 19 September 2019		Draft resolution submitted by Belgium, Germany, Kuwait (S/2019/756) Draft resolution submitted by China, Russian Federation (S/2019/757)	Syrian Arab Republic		All Council members, invitee	Draft resolution S/2019/756 not adopted 12-2-1 ^l Draft resolution S/2019/757 not adopted 2-9-4 ^m
S/PV.8628 30 September 2019			Six Member States ⁿ	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General	All Council members, ^f all invitees ^o	
S/PV.8635 8 October 2019						S/PRST/2019/12
S/PV.8645 24 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions_2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018) (S/2019/820)		Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Director of the Mine Action Service	14 Council members, ^d all invitees	
S/PV.8659 5 November 2019 (closed)			40 Member States ^p	High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), representative of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, representative of the Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations	All Council members, three invitees (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Director General of OPCW, Syrian Arab Republic)	
S/PV.8664 14 November 2019			Syrian Arab Republic	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	14 Council members, ^q all invitees	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8674 22 November 2019			Syrian Arab Republic	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, board member of the Syrian Women's League	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8694 19 December 2019	Report of the Secretary- General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018) (S/2019/949)		Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	14 Council members, ^r all invitees	
S/PV.8696 20 December 2019			Syrian Arab Republic	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, co-founder and Co-Director of the Center for Civil Society and Democracy	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8697 20 December 2019		Draft resolution submitted by Belgium, Germany, Kuwait (S/2019/961) Draft resolution submitted by Russian Federation (S/2019/962)	Syrian Arab Republic		13 Council members, ^s invitee	Draft resolution S/2019/961 not adopted 13-2-0 ^t Draft resolution S/2019/962 not adopted 5-6-4 ^u

^a The representatives of Belgium and Germany did not make statements. The representative of Kuwait spoke also on behalf of Belgium and Germany, the other co-penholders on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic.

^b The representatives of Germany and Kuwait did not make statements. The representative of Belgium, as co-penholder, spoke also on behalf of Germany and Kuwait.

^c The representative of Germany, as co-penholder, spoke also on behalf of Belgium and Kuwait.

^d The representative of Belgium did not make a statement. The representative of Kuwait, as co-penholder, spoke also on behalf of Belgium and Germany.

^e The representative of Belgium, as co-penholder, spoke also on behalf of Germany and Kuwait.

^f The Russian Federation was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^g The representative of Kuwait did not make a statement. The representative of Belgium, as co-penholder, spoke also on behalf of Germany and Kuwait. The representative of Germany also made a statement as co-penholder, also on behalf of Belgium and Kuwait.

^h The representatives of Belgium and Kuwait did not make statements. The representative of Germany, as co-penholder, spoke also on behalf of Belgium and Kuwait.

- ⁱ The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Head of the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and Refugee Migration Monitoring participated in the meeting via videoconference from Rome and Damascus, respectively.
- ^j The Special Envoy participated in the meeting by videoconference from Geneva.
- ^k The representatives of Belgium, Kuwait and the Russian Federation did not make statements. The representative of Germany, as co-penholder, spoke also on behalf of Belgium and Kuwait.
- ^l *For*: Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: China, Russian Federation; *abstaining*: Equatorial Guinea.
- ^m *For*: China, Russian Federation; *against*: Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *abstaining*: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, South Africa.
- ⁿ Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey.
- ^o The Islamic Republic of Iran was represented by its Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs; and Turkey was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- ^p Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Niger, North Macedonia, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey and Viet Nam.
- ^q The representative of Kuwait did not make a statement. The representative of Belgium, as co-penholder, spoke also on behalf of Germany and Kuwait.
- ^r The representative of Belgium did not make a statement. The representative of Germany, as co-penholder, spoke also on behalf of Belgium and Kuwait. Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- ^s The representatives of Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea did not make statements. The representative of Germany, as co-penholder, spoke also on behalf of Belgium and Kuwait.
- ^t *For*: Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: China, Russian Federation; *abstaining*: none.
- ^u *For*: China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa; *against*: Dominican Republic, France, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *abstaining*: Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait.

Meetings: the situation in the Middle East – Yemen

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8441 9 January 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on status of implementation of Security Council resolution 2451 (2018) (S/2018/1173) Report of the Secretary-General on status of implementation of Security Council resolution 2451 (2018) (S/2019/11)		Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8444 16 January 2019	Letter dated 31 December 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/28)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/46)	Yemen		Invitee	Resolution 2452 (2019) 15-0-0

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8464 19 February 2019			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary- General, Under- Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8469 26 February 2019	Letter dated 25 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/83)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/173)				Resolution 2456 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8512 15 April 2019			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary- General, Under- Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Special Representative of the Secretary- General for Children and Armed Conflict, Chairperson of Food for Humanity	All Council members, all invitees ^{a,b}	
S/PV.8525 15 May 2019			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary- General, Under- Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund	All Council members, ^c all invitees	
S/PV.8551 17 June 2019	Letter dated 10 June 2019 from the Secretary- General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/485)		Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary- General, Under- Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP)	All Council members, all invitees ^a	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8572 15 July 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/558)				Resolution 2481 (2019) 15-0-0
S.PV.8578 18 July 2019			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Executive Director of WFP	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8598 20 August 2019			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	Seven Council members, ^d all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8608 29 August 2019						S/PRST/2019/9
S/PV.8619 16 September 2019			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees ^e	
S/PV.8642 17 October 2019			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees ^f	
S/PV.8672 22 November 2019			Yemen	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	All Council members, all invitees ^a	

^a The Special Envoy participated in the meeting by videoconference from Amman.

^b The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator participated in the meeting by videoconference from London.

^c The representative of Peru spoke twice, once in his national capacity and once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014).

^d China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Peru, South Africa and United States.

^e The Special Envoy participated in the meeting by videoconference from Geneva.

^f The Special Envoy participated in the meeting by videoconference from Riyadh.

Meetings: the situation in the Middle East – United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8495 27 March 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (S/2019/248)		Israel, Syrian Arab Republic	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8562 26 June 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on UNDOF (S/2019/467)	Draft resolution submitted by Russian Federation, United States (S/2019/521)				Resolution 2477 (2019) 15-0-0
S/PV.8693 19 December 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on UNDOF (S/2019/923)	Draft resolution submitted by Russian Federation, United States (S/2019/956)			Three Council members (Indonesia, Kuwait, United States)	Resolution 2503 (2019) 15-0-0

Meetings: the situation in the Middle East – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8610 29 August 2019	Letter dated 1 August 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/619)	Draft resolution submitted by France (S/2019/690)	Israel, Lebanon		Eight Council members ^a	Resolution 2485 (2019) 15-0-0

^a China, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, United Kingdom and United States.

23. The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

During the period under review, the Council held one meeting in relation to the item entitled “The situation between Iraq and Kuwait” and adopted one presidential statement under this item. The meeting took the form of an adoption⁴⁷⁸ and was the first meeting held by the

Council under the item since June 2013.⁴⁷⁹ More information on the meeting, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

⁴⁷⁸ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁴⁷⁹ For more information on prior meetings on the item, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2012–2013*, part I, sect. 24.

On 19 February 2019, the Council issued a presidential statement, in which it recalled its resolution 2107 (2013) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait and all its previous resolutions and presidential statements addressing the issues of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and the return of Kuwaiti property, including the national archives.⁴⁸⁰ The Council commended the United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and its senior leadership for their ongoing efforts in implementing resolution 2107 (2013) and for their efforts to resolve outstanding issues related to Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and to the return of Kuwaiti property.⁴⁸¹ The Council welcomed the strong bilateral relations between Iraq and Kuwait, commended the Government of Kuwait for its continued support for Iraq in its efforts to achieve stability and welcomed efforts by Iraq to fulfil all remaining obligations in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions.⁴⁸² It also welcomed the ongoing cooperation between the two countries in the search of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and encouraged the international community to provide to Iraqi authorities the advanced and innovative technical equipment necessary to assist in identifying burial locations in accordance with best practices.⁴⁸³ While expressing strong support for the perseverance of the members of the tripartite mechanism and its Chair, the International Committee of the Red Cross, in their efforts to locate the remains of the missing persons, the Council noted with regret that there remained 369 cases of missing Kuwaiti and third-

country nationals still unresolved and that no human remains had been exhumed since 2004.⁴⁸⁴

At the meeting,⁴⁸⁵ following the reading of the statement, the representative of Kuwait said that the adoption of the presidential statement came as an assurance that the issues of detainees, missing nationals and the repatriation of property were pending and remaining commitments under relevant Council resolutions. While acknowledging that those issues had nothing to do with international peace and security, he asserted that they were humanitarian issues in nature and were reminders of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in 1990. Kuwait noted that, in its statement, the Council stressed that those issues, namely, the detainees, the missing nationals and the Kuwaiti property, were at the heart of the mandate of UNAMI, pursuant to resolution 2107 (2013). He added that the presidential statement sent an important message to Iraq, namely, that the Council appreciated and valued the efforts made by that country's Government to search for detainees and missing nationals so as to know their fate, and an important message to Kuwait, specifically to the families of the missing nationals who did not know the fate of their loved ones, that the Council was interested in the issue and that it followed up on it, as it remained on the agenda of the Council.

In 2019, the Council also considered the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals under the item entitled "The situation concerning Iraq" and the issue of missing persons generally under the item entitled "Protection of civilians in armed conflict".⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸⁰ S/PRST/2019/1, first paragraph.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid., second paragraph.

⁴⁸² Ibid., third paragraph.

⁴⁸³ Ibid., fourth paragraph.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., sixth and seventh paragraphs.

⁴⁸⁵ See S/PV.8463.

⁴⁸⁶ For more details, see part I, sects. 25 and 29.

Meetings: the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8463 19 February 2019					One Council member (Kuwait)	S/PRST/2019/1

24. The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

During the period under review, the Council held 12 meetings in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question". Consistent with prior practice, the Council continued to hear monthly briefings and hold quarterly

open debates to consider the item.⁴⁸⁷ In 2019, however, the Council did not adopt any decisions under the item. Under this item, the Council also considered developments in Iran (Islamic Republic of), Lebanon,

⁴⁸⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen and the overall political situation in the Middle East.⁴⁸⁸ More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

At most of the meetings held under the item in 2019, the Council heard briefings by the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General. The Council also heard two briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs,⁴⁸⁹ one by the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)⁴⁹⁰ and one by the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator,⁴⁹¹ which was the first time since November 2016 that the Council heard a briefing on the item by a representative of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.⁴⁹² The Council also heard briefings by four representatives of civil society. The Co-Directors of EcoPeace Middle East described the activities they had undertaken in the region and called on the Council to urge the Governments of Israel, the State of Palestine and Jordan to advance cooperation on water and the environment.⁴⁹³ The Executive Director of the organization Gisha: Legal Center for Freedom of Movement denounced the situation in Gaza and encouraged Council members to note that, in addition to the Israeli settlements, the isolation of Gaza was also a primary obstacle to peace.⁴⁹⁴ Adele Raemer, representing the residents of the Eshkol region in Israel, spoke about her personal experiences living in Kibbutz Nirim, on the border with the Gaza Strip, since 1975.⁴⁹⁵

In his monthly briefings, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process focused on the continued stalemate of the peace process, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, the continued lack of progress on intra-Palestinian reconciliation, the continued construction of settlements and the violence

in the West Bank. He also focused on the decision by Israel to withhold Palestinian tax revenue transfers, the dwindling international financial assistance to UNRWA and the decision by Israel, on 28 January, not to renew the mandate of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron. Throughout the period, he warned the Council about the risk of escalation and described the eruption of violence in April and May 2019 as the worst since 2014, with hundreds of rockets fired into Israel from Gaza and multiple deaths and injuries of both Palestinians and Israelis. In response to the announcement made on 18 November by the United States that it no longer viewed settlements as inconsistent with international law, the Special Coordinator reaffirmed the position of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 2334 (2016), namely, that Israeli settlement activities constituted a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution.⁴⁹⁶ In his briefings, the Special Coordinator also addressed topics other than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as the situations in Lebanon, including the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), and the situation in the occupied Golan.

On a quarterly basis, the monthly briefings were used to report on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016). During the briefings that took place in March, June, September and December,⁴⁹⁷ the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process continued to report on the lack of progress on the implementation of the main provisions of the resolution, namely, those relating to: Israeli settlement activities; violence against civilians, including acts of terror, incitement, provocation and inflammatory rhetoric; steps and efforts to advance the peace process; and actions by all States to distinguish in their relevant dealings between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967. In March and December 2019, respectively, the ninth and twelfth quarterly reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016)⁴⁹⁸ were submitted in writing. This notwithstanding, during several meetings of the Council in 2019, Council members reiterated the importance of reports being submitted in writing.⁴⁹⁹ Most Council members at those meetings expressed concern about the lack of progress made with respect to the implementation of the resolution and reaffirmed their

⁴⁸⁸ For more information, see part I, sect. 22.

⁴⁸⁹ See [S/PV.8517](#) and [S/PV.8583](#). In addition to her regular briefings, Council members also heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General, in informal consultations of the whole, on the decision of Israel to end the Temporary International Presence in Hebron in January 2019 (see [S/2019/1015](#)).

⁴⁹⁰ See [S/PV.8532](#).

⁴⁹¹ See [S/PV.8466](#).

⁴⁹² For more information on that briefing, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*, part I, sect. 25.

⁴⁹³ See [S/PV.8517](#).

⁴⁹⁴ See [S/PV.8669](#).

⁴⁹⁵ See [S/PV.8690](#).

⁴⁹⁶ See [S/PV.8669](#).

⁴⁹⁷ See [S/PV.8489](#), [S/PV.8557](#), [S/PV.8625](#) and [S/PV.8690](#).

⁴⁹⁸ [S/2019/251](#) and [S/2019/938](#).

⁴⁹⁹ See, for example, [S/PV.8466](#) (Kuwait, South Africa and Indonesia); [S/PV.8557](#) (Belgium and Kuwait); [S/PV.8604](#) (Kuwait, China, Peru and South Africa); [S/PV.8648](#) (South Africa); [S/PV.8669](#) (Belgium and South Africa).

commitment to a two-State solution. During the last briefing of the year, on 18 December 2019,⁵⁰⁰ the representative of the United States affirmed that the Trump Administration strongly opposed resolution 2334 (2016), which was deemed “one-sided and unfairly critical of Israel”. At the same meeting, other Council members⁵⁰¹ expressed a different view and mentioned that Israeli actions were in violation of international law, including resolution 2334 (2016).⁵⁰²

In 2019, the Council held open debates every quarter, in January, April, July and October.⁵⁰³ At those meetings, Council members and Members States focused on the lack of progress of the peace process and the continued deterioration of the situation in Gaza. Discussions during the debates were held against the backdrop of a series of developments, including the decision by Israel in January 2019 not to renew the mandate of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron; the ministerial meeting to promote a future of peace and security in the Middle East, co-hosted by Poland and the United States and held in Warsaw in February 2019; the decision by the United States, in March 2019, to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights; the third high-level Conference on Cooperation among East Asian Countries for Palestinian Development in Bangkok and the Peace to Prosperity workshop in Bahrain, both held in June 2019; and the semi-annual meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of International Assistance to Palestinians, held in New York in September 2019. The Council heard briefings by the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process in two of the above-

mentioned open debates and by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs in the other two. In their briefings, they updated the Council on the latest developments concerning Israeli settlements, demolitions and seizures of Palestinian-owned structures, the violence in Gaza and the West Bank, the overall situation in Gaza and the status of Palestinian reconciliation. They reported on the growing risk of unilateral actions and the loss of hope that peace could be achieved through negotiations, warning that, without the prospect of viable negotiations on the horizon, facts on the ground continued to undermine the possibility of achieving a two-State solution. They also covered developments on the situations in Lebanon, including with regard to resolution 1701 (2006), and in the Golan. In 2019, Council members addressed, in those open debates, the question of international consensus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the role of international law and the binding nature of Council resolutions.⁵⁰⁴ During the open debates, Council members expressed concern about the situation and called for a resumption of the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. Concerning UNRWA, many Council members welcomed the renewal of its mandate until 2023 underscoring the importance of its mandate. Speakers also addressed other conflicts and situations, including the situations in Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya and Yemen, as well as in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf region. Also during the open debates, reference was made to the mandate of the Secretary-General, in accordance with resolution 598 (1987), to examine measures for the security of the region in consultation with the parties in the region.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰⁰ See [S/PV.8690](#).

⁵⁰¹ Indonesia, Dominican Republic and Belgium.

⁵⁰² For more information on that discussion and others concerning the binding nature of resolutions, see part V, sect. II.

⁵⁰³ See [S/PV.8449](#), [S/PV.8517](#), [S/PV.8583](#) and [S/PV.8648](#).

⁵⁰⁴ For more details on those discussions, see part V, sect. II.

⁵⁰⁵ See, for example, [S/PV.8517](#) (Russian Federation) and [S/PV.8648](#) (Russian Federation).

Meetings: the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8449 22 January 2019			29 Member States ^a	Six invitees ^b	All Council members, ^c all invitees ^d	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8466 20 February 2019				Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	Five Council members (Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kuwait, South Africa), all invitees ^e	
S/PV.8489 26 March 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2334 (2016) (S/2019/251)		Israel	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations	All Council members, ^f all invitees	
S/PV.8517 29 April 2019			31 Member States ^g	Seven invitees ^h	All Council members, all invitees ⁱ	
S/PV.8532 22 May 2019			Israel	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, observer for the State of Palestine	All Council members, ^c all invitees ^j	
S/PV.8557 20 June 2019				Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	All Council members, invitee	
S/PV.8583 23 July 2019			28 Member States ^k	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, representative of the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees ^l	

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2019

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8604 27 August 2019				Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	All Council members, ^m invitee ^e	
S/PV.8625 20 September 2019			Israel, Jordan	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, observer for the State of Palestine	All Council members, all invitees ⁿ	
S/PV.8648 28 October 2019			28 Member States ^o	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States, Permanent Observer of the Holy See	All Council members, ^p 31 invitees ^{e,q}	
S/PV.8669 20 November 2019			Israel	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine, Executive Director of Gisha: Legal Center for Freedom of Movement	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8690 18 December 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2334 (2016) (S/2019/938)		Israel	Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine, Adele Raemer (resident of Eshkol, Israel)	All Council members, all invitees ^f	

^a Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Namibia, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

^b Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General; Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People; Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine; Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States; and Permanent Observer of the Holy See.

^c Indonesia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^d The Special Coordinator participated in the meeting by videoconference from Geneva. The representative of Bangladesh spoke on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; the representative of Libya spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States; and the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. The representative of Cuba spoke twice, once in her capacity as Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and once in her national capacity.

^e The Special Coordinator participated in the meeting by videoconference from Jerusalem.

^f Indonesia was represented by its Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

- ^g Bangladesh, Bahrain, Botswana, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Namibia, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.
- ^h Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People; Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine; Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States; Permanent Observer of the Holy See; and two Co-Directors of EcoPeace Middle East.
- ⁱ The representative of Finland spoke also on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom; the representative of the United Arab Emirates spoke on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; and the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Japan was represented by its Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Holy See was represented by the First Counsellor of its Observer Mission.
- ^j The Special Coordinator and the Commissioner-General participated in the meeting by videoconference from Jerusalem and Gaza City, respectively.
- ^k Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Namibia, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
- ^l The representative of Croatia spoke also on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom; the representative of Saudi Arabia spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States; the representative of Uganda spoke on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; and the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.
- ^m Poland (President of the Council) was represented by the Secretary of State of the Chancellery of its President.
- ⁿ Jordan was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates; and the State of Palestine was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- ^o Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Viet Nam.
- ^p Germany was represented by its State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office; and South Africa (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for International Relations and Cooperation.
- ^q The representative of Lebanon did not make a statement. The representative of Azerbaijan spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement; the representative of Croatia spoke also on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom; the representative of Tunisia spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States; and the representative of United Arab Emirates spoke on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The representative of Namibia spoke both in his capacity as Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and in his national capacity.
- ^r Ms. Raemer participated in the meeting by videoconference from Tel Aviv.

25. The situation concerning Iraq

In 2019, the Council held four meetings and adopted one resolution in connection with the situation concerning Iraq. On 21 May 2019, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) until 31 May 2020, through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2470 (2019). All meetings under the item during the period under review took the form of briefings.⁵⁰⁶ For more information on the meetings, including participants, speakers and outcomes, please see the table below. In addition, the Council conducted a mission to Iraq and Kuwait from 27 to 30 June 2019.⁵⁰⁷

During the period under review, the Council heard regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of UNAMI on the situation concerning Iraq. In her four briefings,⁵⁰⁸ she reported on the progress made towards the formation of a Government and on senior appointments to the federal Cabinet and parliamentary committees. She also reported on the progress made regarding the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, including the national archives.

In a briefing given to the Council at the beginning of 2019,⁵⁰⁹ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported on the Turkish military

⁵⁰⁶ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁵⁰⁷ For more information on the Council's mission to Iraq and Kuwait, see part I, sect. 33.

⁵⁰⁸ See [S/PV.8462](#), [S/PV.8531](#), [S/PV.8606](#) and [S/PV.8676](#).

⁵⁰⁹ See [S/PV.8462](#).

airstrikes in northern Iraq, near the border between Iraq and Turkey. The airstrikes had been condemned by the authorities of Iraq as violations of its sovereignty, while Turkey maintained that they had been made against targets linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party. The Special Representative expressed regret about the loss of civilian lives and livelihoods and stated that it was important that the Governments of both countries accelerate efforts to resolve the issue through bilateral dialogue.

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General covered other topics affecting the situation in Iraq, including the agreement on the formation of the new Kurdistan Regional Government and the establishment of a high-level joint committee between Baghdad and Erbil. Despite the positive development, she expressed concern regarding the agreement not materializing in the form of tangible breakthroughs on the ground.⁵¹⁰ The Special Representative also reported to the Council on the support provided by UNAMI to the Independent High Electoral Commission and on the amendments passed in July 2019 to the electoral law on governorate councils. In regard to the latter, she stressed that certain provisions were of great concern, as they could potentially disenfranchise many otherwise eligible voters. She cautioned that the transparency and accountability of electoral institutions and processes were not sufficiently guaranteed for the elections expected to be held in April 2020.⁵¹¹

In her briefing to the Council on 3 December,⁵¹² against the backdrop of protests and civil unrest in early October 2019 and the subsequent resignation of the Prime Minister in early December, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General noted that, from the beginning of the demonstrations, authorities had resorted to excessive use of force and that, although the Government had announced various reform packages addressing such issues as housing, unemployment, financial support and education, those packages were often perceived as unrealistic. She also mentioned that, although the Government's investigation into the violence of early October was a positive step, it was seen as incomplete. She emphasized the collective responsibility of the political class as a whole to advance real solutions.

In another briefing, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General commended the Iraqi security forces for their bravery in continuing to hunt down the remaining fighters of Islamic State in Iraq and the

Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) in the aftermath of its territorial defeat. She also expressed concerns regarding returning fighters and refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, from a security and capacity perspective, as well as from the perspective of human rights and humanitarian protection. Reporting on humanitarian efforts, she expressed concerns regarding the continued underfunding of both the Funding Facility for Stabilization of the United Nations Development Programme and the 2019 humanitarian response plan. She added that, although houses, roads, bridges and power lines had been rebuilt, and 4.3 million people had returned home thanks to many donor contributions, about 1.6 million internally displaced persons were still desperately waiting to return to their homes in safety and dignity.⁵¹³

Regarding accountability for human rights violations, the Special Representative stressed that promoting more consistent adherence to international standards of due process and fair trial was of the greatest importance, as an impartial and transparent process of judicial accountability for the gross violations of human rights committed by ISIL (Da'esh) would prove crucial in rebuilding peaceful coexistence and social cohesion.⁵¹⁴

On 3 December 2019,⁵¹⁵ the Council heard a briefing by the Permanent Observer and Head of the Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the United Nations on the work of the Tripartite Commission, chaired by ICRC, and on the progress made in repatriating missing persons from the 1991 Gulf War, including the recovery of Kuwaiti remains for the first time in 14 years. At the same meeting, the Archbishop of Erbil gave a briefing on the protests held since October 2019, stating that they demonstrated the rejection of the post-2003 structure and Government of the country by the majority of the Iraqi people.

At meetings on the item in 2019, Council members welcomed the progress made on Government formation and overall reconstruction efforts.⁵¹⁶ Members also commended the central Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government for their cooperation and dialogue⁵¹⁷ and the appointment of senior positions in the federal Cabinet and

⁵¹⁰ See [S/PV.8531](#), [S/PV.8606](#) and [S/PV.8676](#).

⁵¹¹ See [S/PV.8462](#) and [S/PV.8606](#).

⁵¹² See [S/PV.8676](#).

⁵¹³ See [S/PV.8606](#).

⁵¹⁴ See [S/PV.8462](#).

⁵¹⁵ See [S/PV.8676](#).

⁵¹⁶ See [S/PV.8462](#) (Indonesia, China and South Africa); [S/PV.8531](#) (Peru); and [S/PV.8606](#) (United States, Germany, Belgium, Peru, Russian Federation and Poland).

⁵¹⁷ See [S/PV.8531](#) (South Africa and China).

parliamentary committees,⁵¹⁸ although several expressed concern over the absence of women in those positions.⁵¹⁹ Numerous Council members expressed support for UNAMI and the Government of Iraq in having addressed, among other issues, the continued threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) and the humanitarian issues pertaining to internally displaced persons.⁵²⁰ In addition, several members reiterated their support for the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD), as it continued to carry out its vital work to ensure justice for survivors in accordance with the country's international human rights obligations.⁵²¹ Council members also expressed support for the Iraqi people's legitimate right to peaceful protest, while some condemned the acts of violence against demonstrators and called on all actors to exercise maximum restraint.⁵²²

On 21 May 2019, the Council extended the mandate of UNAMI until 31 May 2020, through the unanimous adoption of resolution [2470 \(2019\)](#).⁵²³ In the resolution, the Council welcomed the efforts by the

Government of Iraq to address corruption and strengthen viable and responsive State institutions through its national government programme for 2018–2020.⁵²⁴ The Council decided that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and UNAMI, taking into account the request from the Government of Iraq, should prioritize the provision of advice, support and assistance to the Government and people of Iraq on advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation.⁵²⁵ The Council also decided that the Special Representative and UNAMI should further advise, support and assist the Government of Iraq with regard to, inter alia, election processes, constitutional reviews, security sector reform, regional dialogue and cooperation, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction efforts, the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform, while approaching gender mainstreaming as a crosscutting issue throughout its mandate and assisting in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels, as well as in strengthening child protection.⁵²⁶

In connection with Iraq, developments in 2019 relating to the question of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals were considered under the item entitled “The situation between Iraq and Kuwait”, and those relating to UNITAD were considered under the agenda item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”.⁵²⁷

⁵¹⁸ Ibid., (Indonesia); and [S/PV.8606](#) (United States and Poland).

⁵¹⁹ See [S/PV.8606](#) (United States, Germany, Dominican Republic, Belgium and United Kingdom).

⁵²⁰ Ibid., (United States, Germany, Kuwait, Côte d'Ivoire, Belgium, France, China, United Kingdom, Indonesia, South Africa and Russian Federation).

⁵²¹ See [S/PV.8531](#) (Germany, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, United Kingdom and China); and [S/PV.8606](#) (Germany, Côte d'Ivoire, Peru, France and Indonesia).

⁵²² See [S/PV.8676](#) (United States, United Kingdom, Peru, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, France, Belgium, Poland and Germany).

⁵²³ Resolution [2470 \(2019\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of UNAMI, see part X, sect. II.

⁵²⁴ Resolution [2470 \(2019\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph.

⁵²⁵ Ibid., para. 2 (a). See also [S/2019/414](#).

⁵²⁶ Resolution [2470 \(2019\)](#), para. 2 (b)–(f).

⁵²⁷ For more information, see part I, sects. 24 and 37.

Meetings: the situation concerning Iraq

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8462 13 February 2019	Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) (S/2019/78) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) (S/2019/101)		Iraq	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	Six Council members, ^a all invitees	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8531 21 May 2019	Twenty-second report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) (S/2019/352) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2421 (2018) (S/2019/365)	Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/416)	Iraq	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All Council members, all invitees	Resolution 2470 (2019) 15-0-0
S/PV.8606 28 August 2019	Twenty-third report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) (S/2019/632) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) (S/2019/660)		Iraq	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	All Council members, all invitees ^b	
S/PV.8676 3 December 2019	Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) (S/2019/865) Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2470 (2019) (S/2019/903)		Iraq	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Permanent Observer and Head of the Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations, Archbishop of Erbil	All Council members, all invitees ^c	

^a China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Kuwait and South Africa.

^b The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from The Hague.

^c The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference from Baghdad.

Thematic issues

26. United Nations peacekeeping operations

During the period under review, the Council held six meetings and issued one presidential statement in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”. The Council convened two meetings in the form of briefings, two as debates and two as open debates under this item.⁵²⁸ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcome, is given in the table below.

In 2019, the Council heard two briefings by the Secretary-General and four by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations. The Council also heard briefings by the senior leadership of six peacekeeping operations, as well as by representatives of civil society, non-governmental organizations and local government. The focus of discussions in the Council was the progress made in the implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative to strengthen peacekeeping and its Declaration of Shared Commitments, launched by the Secretary-General in 2018. Special focus was placed on how to increase the participation of women in peacekeeping, the safety and security and training of peacekeepers, triangular cooperation between the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries, and the role of police components.

On 11 April 2019, at the initiative of Germany, which held the Presidency for the month,⁵²⁹ the Council held an open debate under the sub-item entitled “Women in peacekeeping”, chaired by the Federal Minister of Defence of Germany.⁵³⁰ At the meeting, the Secretary-General reported that, with the launch of the system-wide strategy on gender parity in 2017, the United Nations had embarked upon a system-wide effort to enhance women’s representation at all levels and in all areas, a key priority of which was peacekeeping.⁵³¹ Recalling the Council’s call in resolution 2242 (2015) for the doubling of the number of women in peacekeeping operations by 2020, and with the United Nations approaching the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), he highlighted the efforts of the Secretariat to ensure

the full, equal and meaningful participation of women at all stages of peace processes and to promote the involvement of women in operations, as well as the roll-out of the uniformed gender parity strategy, which defined new targets for 2028. In her remarks at the meeting, the Head of Mission and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization provided examples of her efforts to increase the numbers of women in missions, promote mindfulness of gender issues and reach out to the local community. The Secretary-General of the South Sudan Democratic Engagement Monitoring and Observation Programme, a national civil society organization in South Sudan, who was also the women’s representative to the National Constitutional Amendment Committee, appealed to the Council to improve working conditions for female peacekeepers, enable women and youth organizations to participate in the design and implementation of peacekeeping operations, and not to lose track of justice and accountability for sexual and gender-based violence committed by peacekeeping personnel. In the subsequent discussion, speakers pointed to the need for all peacekeeping stakeholders to work together on removing the barriers to the participation of women in peacekeeping, improving national recruitment efforts, training and capacity-building, addressing sexual exploitation and abuse and improving the conditions of service.

On 7 May 2019, at the initiative of Indonesia, which held the Presidency for the month,⁵³² the Council held an open debate under the sub-item entitled “Investing in peace: improving safety and performance of United Nations peacekeepers”, chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia.⁵³³ At the start of the meeting, the President of the Council delivered a statement on behalf of the Council, in which it welcomed efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General to mobilize all partners and stakeholders in support of more effective United Nations peacekeeping through his Action for Peacekeeping initiative and recognized the added value that the Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations had in relation to training and capacity-building.⁵³⁴ The Council also welcomed the United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference, as well

⁵²⁸ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁵²⁹ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 4 April 2019 (S/2019/293).

⁵³⁰ See S/PV.8508.

⁵³¹ See letter dated 27 March 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/275).

⁵³² The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 30 April 2019 (S/2019/359).

⁵³³ See S/PV.8521.

⁵³⁴ S/PRST/2019/4, fourth paragraph.

as other meetings, to strengthen support to peacekeeping operations, including in the area of training and capacity-building, and underscored the importance of fulfilling the pledges made by a number of Member States at the Conference.⁵³⁵

Following the presidential statement, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General in which he updated Council members on the Secretariat's progress in fulfilling its commitment to training and capacity-building of peacekeeping personnel, specifically highlighting the action plan to improve the security of peacekeepers, through training support and assessment visits, as well as other measures. Despite the notable progress made, the Secretary-General pointed to training gaps in critical areas such as weapons handling, first aid, human rights and protection issues, and urged Member States to consider increased funding, in-kind contributions and the provision of trainers.

In his remarks, the Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) provided an overview of the comprehensive approach taken by the Mission in order to fulfil its mandate and noted that training was both an essential pillar to ensure the desired performance of peacekeepers and a continuous process that had to be tailored to each mission's operational environment. The Director of the Challenges Forum International Secretariat, a partnership of 49 civilian, military and police departments and organizations, shared several recommendations with the Council on how to improve the safety and security and performance of peacekeepers, particularly through the use of scenario-based training and the deployment of women in operational and outward-facing roles. In the ensuing discussion, speakers underscored that enhancing training and capacity-building were shared commitments of all peacekeeping partners and called for investment in women personnel, continued assessments and accountability, and partnerships with regional organizations.

On 18 June 2019, the Council held the annual briefing with selected force commanders of United Nations peacekeeping operations.⁵³⁶ In his briefing to the Council, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations underscored that cooperation with host States was key for ensuring the effectiveness of peace operations. The Force Commander of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) described cooperation with host States as crucial for the successful implementation of mandates, while the Force Commander of the United Nations

Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) said that the impartial execution of the Force's mandate allowed him and the military component to effectively maintain the status quo, prevent tensions and ensure calm and stability. The two force commanders also responded to questions and comments from Council members on the situation in the Sudan and Cyprus, relations with the host States and the measures to enhance the safety and security and performance of peacekeeping operations.

On 10 July 2019, at the initiative of Peru, which held the Presidency for the month,⁵³⁷ the Council held an open debate under the sub-item entitled "Strengthening triangular cooperation".⁵³⁸ In his briefing to the Council, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations stated that strong triangular cooperation between the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries was crucial to enhancing peacekeeping operations, including with respect to improving safety and security and making mandates more focused, adaptable and achievable. In terms of how triangular cooperation could be strengthened, the Under-Secretary-General shared some thoughts regarding the creation of a more institutionalized system of formal and informal exchanges among the Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries, the holding of Council meetings on cross-cutting peacekeeping issues, Council visits to missions and the activities of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. He added that in many contexts, peacekeeping missions were likely to benefit from closer engagement between the Council and the host Government, as well as from partnerships with regional organizations. With respect to African Union operations authorized by the Council, he noted the existence of a form of quadrilateral cooperation among the Council, troop-contributing countries, the Secretariat and the African Union, including its Peace and Security Council and the Commission.

The Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) stated that triangular cooperation was key in order to set the conditions for effective mandate implementation, emphasized that troop-contributing countries had to deliver on their mandates and rules of engagement, and added that the United Nations should continue to increase and revise its mechanisms for evaluating units and ensuring accountability. In her remarks, the Senior Fellow at the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute made several proposals in connection with the institutionalization of regular informal meetings among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, fifth paragraph.

⁵³⁶ See [S/PV.8552](#).

⁵³⁷ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 27 June 2019 ([S/2019/538](#)).

⁵³⁸ See [S/PV.8570](#).

contributing countries, noting that such cooperation would allow the Council to consider matters on the ground from a closer perspective and build consensus on how to carry out operations. Concurring that triangular cooperation was essential to the effective performance of missions, speakers in the open debate discussed the need for transparent, inclusive, substantive and timely triangular consultations and the involvement of financial contributors and host States.

On 9 September, the Council held the annual briefing on peacekeeping reform further to paragraph 10 of resolution 2378 (2017).⁵³⁹ At the meeting, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations highlighted the progress made in the implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative in order to strengthen peacekeeping operations, including the promotion of political solutions as a prerequisite to sustainable peace, partnerships with regional organizations and across the United Nations system, reductions in the number of fatalities, strengthened performance and increased numbers of women peacekeepers. He urged Member States to ensure that new mandate priorities were consistent with resources and to provide united political engagement with regard to the conflicts where operations were based, and underscored the need to adapt mission footprints and strengthen capacity to ensure a more mobile, robust, aware and integrated operational approach.

On 6 November, the Council held its annual briefing of police commissioners.⁵⁴⁰ At the meeting, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations stated that United Nations police were particularly well placed to respond to such challenges as dealing with high concentrations of people, organized crime and international terrorism, and building the national capacities of States, particularly in the area of the rule of

law. Within the framework of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, he cited the efforts of the Secretariat to enhance peacekeeping performance, including by rolling out the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System in five missions, implementing a training curriculum for police components, increasing the number of women peacekeepers and addressing sexual exploitation and abuse.

In her remarks, the adviser to the Mayor of the third arrondissement of Bangui informed the Council that significant security improvements had been made in that sensitive part of the city through the efforts of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), with the signing of a non-aggression pact in 2015, communication and awareness-raising on violence against women and sexual exploitation, and support for community policing. The police commissioners of MONUSCO, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and MINUSMA addressed the work of their respective missions on dealing with organized crime, strengthening national rule of law capacities, supporting community protection initiatives, supporting the development of security forces in the area of civilian protection and the restoration of State authority, and strengthening the participation of women. In their remarks, Council members discussed and posed questions to the Under-Secretary-General and the police commissioners on the adequacy of police officers' training and equipment, efforts to increase the number of women police officers, engagement with local communities, partnerships with regional organizations and the protection of civilians and efforts to ensure their safety and security. Speakers further underscored the importance of United Nations police components across the conflict spectrum, particularly in the context of conflict prevention and the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

⁵³⁹ See [S/PV.8612](#). For more information, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*, part I, sect. 27.

⁵⁴⁰ See [S/PV.8661](#).

Meetings: United Nations peacekeeping operations

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8508 11 April 2019	Women in peacekeeping Letter dated 27 March 2019 from the Secretary- General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/275)		43 Member States ^a	Head of Mission and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, Secretary-General of the South Sudan Democratic Engagement Monitoring and	Secretary- General, 13 Council members, ^b all invitees ^c	

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2019

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Letter dated 4 April 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/293)			Observation Programme and women's representative to the National Constitutional Amendment Committee, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations		
S/PV.8521 7 May 2019	Investing in peace: improving safety and performance of United Nations peacekeepers Letter dated 30 April 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/359)		40 Member States ^d	Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Director of the Challenges of the International Secretariat, Head of the Delegation of the European Union, Permanent Observer of the African Union	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^e 39 invitees under rule 37, ^f all other invitees ^g	S/PRST/2019/4
S/PV.8552 18 June 2019				Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Force Commander of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Force Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8570 10 July 2019	Strengthening triangular cooperation Letter dated 27 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/538)		Six Member States ^h	Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Senior Fellow at the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute	13 Council members, ⁱ all invitees	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8612 9 September 2019			14 Member States ^j	Under-Secretary- General for Peace Operations	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8661 6 November 2019	Police Commissioners			Under-Secretary- General for Peace Operations, Adviser to the Mayor of the third arrondissement of Bangui, Police Commissioner of MONUSCO, Police Commissioner of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, Police Commissioner of MINUSMA	All Council members, all invitees ^k	

^a Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

^b The representative of Côte d'Ivoire spoke also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa. Germany was represented by its Federal Minister of Defence.

^c The Secretary-General of the South Sudan Democratic Engagement Monitoring and Observation Programme participated in the meeting by videoconference from Juba. Hungary was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade; and Viet Nam was represented by its Vice-Foreign Minister. The representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security; the representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; and the representative of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.

^d Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guatemala, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

^e Indonesia (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^f The representative of Rwanda did not make a statement. Ukraine was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Denmark spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement; and the representative of Thailand spoke on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

^g The Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

^h Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Rwanda and Uruguay.

ⁱ The representative of Côte d'Ivoire spoke also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa.

^j Bangladesh, Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, Italy, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone and United Republic of Tanzania.

^k The adviser to the Mayor of the third arrondissement of Bangui participated in the meeting by videoconference from Bangui.

27. International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

In 2019, the Council held two meetings related to the work of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.⁵⁴¹ The two meetings took the form of debates and no decisions were adopted by the Council under this item in 2019.⁵⁴² More information on the meetings, including participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

On 17 July 2019, the Council heard the first semi-annual briefing by the President of the Mechanism and by its Prosecutor,⁵⁴³ at which they presented their progress report on the work of the Mechanism, submitted pursuant to paragraph 16 of Council resolution 1966 (2010).⁵⁴⁴ At the meeting, both the President of the Mechanism and the Prosecutor highlighted the positive developments in the *Karadžić* and *Mladić* cases and emphasized their commitment to the efficient and timely conclusion of the judicial proceedings at the two branches of the Mechanism, in Arusha and The Hague. The President also reflected on his role in the management of post-conviction matters, such as the enforcement of sentences and the safeguarding of the rights of detainees, to which, as he noted, less attention was paid. The Prosecutor highlighted the challenges faced by his office in terms of State cooperation, including the search for transnational fugitives. He also expressed concern about the continued trends in genocide denial and the glorification of war criminals. The Council discussed the progress achieved by the Mechanism during the

reporting period. Several speakers highlighted the conclusion of the *Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić* case in The Hague on 20 March 2019.⁵⁴⁵ Some Council members also expressed support for the commitment of the President of the Mechanism and its Prosecutor to better examine requests for the early release of persons convicted, in accordance with the recommendation contained in paragraph 10 of resolution 2422 (2018).⁵⁴⁶ With regard to the challenges to the implementation of the mandate of the Mechanism, most Council members urged States to intensify cooperation with the Mechanism, particularly in relation to the remaining eight fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and suspected to be at large, as outlined in paragraph 10 of resolution 1966 (2010) and in paragraph 4 of resolution 2422 (2018).⁵⁴⁷ Echoing the Prosecutor, some Council members expressed their concerns regarding the continued denial of war crimes and genocide and the glorification of war criminals.⁵⁴⁸

On 11 December 2019, the Council heard the second semi-annual briefing by the President of the Mechanism and its Prosecutor.⁵⁴⁹ At the meeting, the President and the Prosecutor provided an update of the main developments regarding the judicial activity in Arusha and The Hague and reiterated their commitment to meeting the deadlines in order to complete most of the Mechanism's judicial caseload by the end of 2020. They also focused on the need for greater cooperation from Member States regarding the enforcement of sentences, the search for and arrest of the eight remaining fugitives indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, a permanent solution for the nine persons acquitted or released by the Tribunal, and support for the Mechanism's budgetary requirements. Council members welcomed the efforts displayed by the Mechanism in meeting the deadlines and the overall progress that the Mechanism had achieved in terms of best practices during the reporting period. More specifically, Council members commended the efforts of the President to harmonize practices and procedures across the two branches, as previously recommended by the Office of Internal Oversight Services⁵⁵⁰ and

⁵⁴¹ In a note by the President of the Council dated 2 February 2018 (S/2018/90), the Council agreed that issues pertaining to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, which was established by resolution 1966 (2010), would be considered under an item entitled "International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals", under which the Council would also henceforth consider issues pertaining to the items entitled "International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991" and "International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994". For more information on the mandate of the tribunals, see part IX, sect. IV.

⁵⁴² For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁵⁴³ See S/PV.8576.

⁵⁴⁴ See S/2019/417, annex.

⁵⁴⁵ See S/PV.8576 (France, Kuwait, United States, Belgium, United Kingdom, Dominican Republic and Croatia).

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, (Peru, Côte d'Ivoire, France, Poland, Kuwait, United States, Belgium, China and Equatorial Guinea).

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, (Côte d'Ivoire, France, Indonesia, Poland, Germany, Kuwait, United States, Belgium, United Kingdom, Dominican Republic and Equatorial Guinea).

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, (France, Germany, Belgium and United Kingdom).

⁵⁴⁹ See S/PV.8681.

⁵⁵⁰ See S/2018/206.

reiterated in paragraph 8 of resolution 2422 (2018), so as to further enhance the efficiency and transparency of the Mechanism's working methods. Some Council members continued to welcome the changes in the practice followed by the President to decide on requests for early release of the persons convicted, as well as the updating of the Practice Direction on the procedure for the determination of applications for pardon, commutation of sentence and early release of persons convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or the Mechanism.⁵⁵¹ The representative of the Dominican Republic expressed concern about the fact that specific regulations in that regard had not yet been put in place to allow for the participation of victims and affected States or communities. Most Council members continued to call for improved cooperation and assistance by Member States with the Mechanism, including adequate financing and political support to ensure its success.

⁵⁵¹ See [S/PV.8681](#) (China, France, Belgium, Cote d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea).

Some speakers specifically called for improvements in judicial cooperation among the States of the former Yugoslavia in the search for and arrest of perpetrators of war crimes and in the processing of cases by national courts.⁵⁵² In that context, speakers continued to regret the resurgence in the denial of war crimes and historical revisionism both in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.⁵⁵³

In addition, during the period under review, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the nominated judges to fill the vacancies resulting from the resignation of two judges of the Mechanism.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, (Poland, Belgium, United Kingdom and Cote d'Ivoire).

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*, (Poland, France, Belgium, United Kingdom and United States).

⁵⁵⁴ See [S/2019/107](#), [S/2019/108](#), [S/2019/999](#) and [S/2019/1000](#). For more information on actions of the Council concerning judges of the Mechanism, see part IV, sect. I.D, and part IX, sect. IV.

Meetings: International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8576 17 July 2019	Letter dated 20 May 2019 from the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/417)		Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Rwanda, Serbia	President of the Mechanism, Prosecutor of the Mechanism	All Council members, all invitees ^a	
S/PV.8681 11 December 2019	Note by the Secretary-General on the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (S/2019/622) Letter dated 18 November 2019 from the President of Mechanism addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/888)		Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia	President of the Mechanism, Prosecutor of the Mechanism	All Council members, all invitees ^b	

^a Croatia was represented by its State Secretary for Political Affairs; and Serbia was represented by its Minister of Justice.

^b Serbia was represented by its Assistant Minister of Justice.

28. Children and armed conflict

In 2019, the Council held one meeting in connection with the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”, which took the form of an open debate.⁵⁵⁵ The Council did not adopt any decisions under this item during the period under review. More information on the meeting, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

On 2 August 2019, the Council held an open debate at the initiative of Poland, which held the Presidency for the month.⁵⁵⁶ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Executive Director of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UNICEF Canada Ambassador and a child protection professional.⁵⁵⁷

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General gave a briefing to the Council further to the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict for 2018.⁵⁵⁸ The Special Representative recalled that 20 years had passed since the Council had adopted resolution 1261 (1999), the first resolution on children and armed conflict, and 10 years since the adoption of resolution 1882 (2009), by which it had decided to increase the focus of the children and armed conflict mandate on killing, maiming and rape and other forms of sexual violence. She provided an overview of her engagement with the parties to conflict, the most tangible outcome of which had been three new action plans signed with non-State actors. The Special Representative informed the Council that although there were fewer violations against children across four of the six categories of violations in 2018, there was an increase in killing and maiming, with approximately 40 per cent of incidents caused by unexploded ordnance, and similar levels of sexual violence. In terms of positive developments, she highlighted the record number of children who had benefited from reintegration assistance and had been separated from parties to conflict thanks to the engagement of protection actors as part of the implementation of action plans or as result of emerging peace processes. The Special Representative requested the Council’s support to engage with parties to conflict in order to end and prevent violations and ensure that there existed the requisite child protection capacity to give children affected by conflict the support they needed.

The Executive Director of UNICEF noted that, as presented in the report of the Secretary-General, there had been 24,000 documented violations against children in 2018, up from 21,000 in 2017, half of which involved killing or maiming. She gave an overview of the support provided by UNICEF, including emergency education in humanitarian crises, psychosocial support and sustainable and evidence-based reintegration programmes, and called on Member States to reintegrate children associated with armed groups into society and to support holistic reintegration programming. In her remarks, the UNICEF Canada Ambassador recalled her experience as a child victim of the conflict in Sierra Leone, as well as her experience of working with UNICEF. She underscored the need for the Council to do more to protect children, including by supporting training, education, counselling and other reintegration tools for children and by specifically addressing the needs of children disabled in conflict. The child protection professional described his experience as a child soldier during the Sudanese civil war and called on the Governments represented in the Security Council Chamber to promote the right to mental health and psychological well-being in international and national forums and to invest in child protection systems and services. He also encouraged Governments to ensure that United Nations peace operations had the necessary resources to advance the children and armed conflict agenda and urged them to take action to address the ongoing violations of children’s rights, including by calling on all countries to endorse the relevant international instruments, to end and prevent grave violations against children and to prioritize justice for crimes against children.

During the subsequent discussion, speakers expressed regret that, 10 years after the adoption of resolution 1882 (2009), violations against children persisted and had in fact increased in 2018. They condemned the killing and maiming of children and sexual violence committed against children, and called on parties to conflict to uphold the rights of children in accordance with international law. Speakers welcomed the increase in the number of children released into reintegration programmes and underscored the importance of such programmes being comprehensive and providing educational, health-care, vocational, psychosocial and other forms of support. They reiterated the need for children associated with armed groups to be treated as victims. Many speakers noted the connection between conflict prevention and addressing the root causes of conflict and the child protection agenda and called for accountability for violations and access to justice for victims. Speakers

⁵⁵⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁵⁵⁶ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 30 July 2019 (S/2019/605).

⁵⁵⁷ See S/PV.8591.

⁵⁵⁸ A/73/907-S/2019/509.

drew attention to the many tools at the disposal of the Council and the United Nations for child protection, including the deployment of Child Protection Advisers and the strengthening of child protection mandates in peacekeeping operations, the listing of parties in the annexes to the reports of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, and the conclusion of action plans with parties to conflict. The representative of Belgium said that as Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Belgium had helped to build consensus on two sets of conclusions regarding serious violations of children's rights in the Syrian Arab Republic and Myanmar, and had engaged with the sanctions committees to follow up on previous conclusions. She proposed that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict regularly address the Council on national situations, as had already been the case for Yemen and the Central African Republic.

Speakers underlined that the primary responsibility for the protection of children lay with Member States and called on those States that had not already done so to sign and ratify the relevant international instruments. The representative of China stated that the international community should fully respect the leadership of the countries concerned, enhance dialogue and communication and provide effective support and assistance. The representative of

the Russian Federation added that the Council should not duplicate the work of other United Nations entities in the consideration of issues related to the rights of children in a context outside the maintenance of international peace and security.

In 2019, the Council addressed the children and armed conflict agenda in a number of its country- and region-specific decisions and in decisions relating to thematic items. Selected provisions of decisions in which the Council explicitly referenced actions or measures in relation to the children and armed conflict agenda during 2019 are listed in table 2. Implicit references or mere reiterations of actions or measures that may have been undertaken in previous years are not featured in table 2. In this regard, in 2019, the Council, among other things: (a) condemned and demanded the cessation of and accountability for violations and abuses against children and compliance with international instruments; (b) called for the implementation of action plans and programmes on children and armed conflict; (c) underscored the importance of taking into account child protection concerns in demobilization, disarmament and reintegration processes and security sector reform; (d) requested monitoring, analysis and reporting on child protection concerns; and (e) called for the introduction of protection of children as a cross-cutting issue in the United Nations system.

Table 1
Meetings: children and armed conflict

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8591 2 August 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2019/509) Letter dated 30 July 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations addressed to the Security Council (S/2019/605)		61 Member States ^a	Eight invitees ^b	All Council members, ^c all invitees ^d	

^a Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Yemen.

^b Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict; Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); UNICEF Canada Ambassador; Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security; Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations; and child protection professional.

^c Poland (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^d The representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict; the representative of Estonia spoke also on behalf of Latvia and Lithuania; the representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; the representative of Viet Nam spoke on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine.

Table 2

Selection of provisions relevant to children and armed conflict, by theme and agenda item

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Condemnation of and demands for cessation of and accountability for violations and abuses against children and compliance with international instruments			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	24, 25
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	10, 11
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	6, 11, 12, 13, 50 (c)
	The situation in Guinea-Bissau	Resolution 2458 (2019)	19
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2019/7	twenty-second paragraph
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	7, 55, 57
	The situation in the Middle East	S/PRST/2019/9	second paragraph
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2461 (2019)	15, 17
		Resolution 2472 (2019)	15, 29
		Resolution 2500 (2019)	20
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan		Resolution 2459 (2019)	27, 35
	Resolution 2469 (2019)	26	
	Resolution 2497 (2019)	26	
	S/PRST/2019/11	twelfth paragraph	
Thematic	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Resolution 2457 (2019)	17
	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2474 (2019)	4
	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	5, 15, 18, 25, 32

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	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Action plans and programmes on children and armed conflict			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2489 (2019)	5 (g)
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	24
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	9, 18, 29 (i) (b), 30 (i) (a) and (d), 31
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	11, 29 (ii) (k)
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2470 (2019)	2 (f)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	57
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2461 (2019)	15, 17
		Resolution 2472 (2019)	29
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	27, 28
	Thematic	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2475 (2019)
Women and peace and security		Resolution 2467 (2019)	25, 28
Child protection in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and security sector reform			
Country and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	12, 33 (c) (i), 43
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	18, 30 (i) (a) and (c), 30 (ii) (b), 31
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	17, 19, 29 (ii) (g) and (i), 31
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2470 (2019)	2 (f)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	28 (a) (ii), 57
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	27, 28
Thematic	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Resolution 2457 (2019)	17
	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	16 (c)
Monitoring, analysis and report on violations and abuses against children			
Country and region-specific	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2489 (2019)	5 (g)
	This situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	33 (d) (ii)
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	29 (i) (b), 46 (ii)
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	31
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	28 (e) (ii)

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2498 (2019)	21
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	7 (c) (ii)
		Resolution 2469 (2019)	27
		Resolution 2495 (2019)	3 (iii)
		Resolution 2497 (2019)	27
Thematic	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	5, 7, 18, 32
Introduction of child protection as a cross-cutting issue in the United Nations system, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisers in United Nations peace operations			
Country and region-specific	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2489 (2019)	5 (f) and (g)
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	32 (a) (iii), 33 (c) (i), 43
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	30 (i) (a), (c) and (d), 30 (ii) (b), 31
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	11, 17, 29 (i) (c), (ii) (g), (i) and (k), 31
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2470 (2019)	2 (f)
	The situation in Libya	Resolution 2486 (2019)	5
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	28 (a) (ii), (c) (iii), 55, 57
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	7 (a) (i), (vi) and (vii), 18, 28
		Resolution 2469 (2019)	27
		Resolution 2497 (2019)	28
Thematic	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	7, 12, 18, 25

29. Protection of civilians in armed conflict

In 2019, the Council held three meetings to consider the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including one high-level meeting, which took the form of an open debate.⁵⁵⁹ The Council adopted two resolutions under this item. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1 below.

On 23 May 2019, the Council held a ministerial-level open debate⁵⁶⁰ at the initiative of Indonesia, which held the Presidency for the month,⁵⁶¹ to mark the twentieth anniversary of the inclusion of the item on the agenda of the Council.⁵⁶² At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the

⁵⁵⁹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁵⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8534](#).

⁵⁶¹ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 8 May 2019 ([S/2019/385](#)).

⁵⁶² See [S/PV.3977](#).

President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Executive Director of the Center for Civilians in Conflict.

Presenting his latest report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,⁵⁶³ the Secretary-General recalled the progress made and said that a culture of protection had taken root in the Council and across the United Nations in the past 20 years. Despite those advances, grave human suffering was still being caused by armed conflicts and a lack of accountability. In that context, he emphasized that progress was needed most at the national level, in accordance with the three main recommendations of his report. The Secretary-General added that the Council could do much to enhance compliance with the laws of war and could be more consistent in how it addressed protection concerns within and across different conflicts. The President of ICRC recalled that political and military decisions made in the Security Council Chamber had an impact on the human conditions in battlefields around the world. The absence of decisions by the Council also took its toll on civilians. While he understood that political consensus was difficult, he asked the Council to be clearer in its support for respect for international humanitarian law. He outlined a series of measures that the Council could take to influence behaviour and protect populations exposed to war and violence, and asked Council members at the very least not to hinder the efforts of people in need to protect themselves. He described the specific efforts of ICRC to ensure that community-based protection approaches were integrated more systematically into its response, while noting that those activities could never be considered a substitute for the protection responsibilities of authorities. The Executive Director of the Center for Civilians in Conflict also emphasized that there was no substitute for high-level and public political commitment to civilian protection and called on all Member States, including Council members, to adopt national policies on the protection of civilians. He also elaborated on the ways Member States could help peacekeeping operations to overcome the challenge of protecting civilians, namely by providing political support, adequate financial resources and the right capabilities.

During the subsequent discussion, Member States shared their views on the main priorities and possible practical measures for ensuring the protection of civilians in armed conflict.⁵⁶⁴ Speakers expressed concern that 20 years after the adoption of the landmark resolution [1265 \(1999\)](#) and 70 years since

the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, the normative and conceptual progress on the framework for the protection of civilians had not been translated into concrete measures on the ground and that civilians continued to account for the vast majority of victims of armed conflict. Member States emphasized that vulnerable groups such as women, children, refugees and internally displaced persons were among those most affected by armed conflict. A number of speakers highlighted that persons with disabilities were also disproportionately affected by armed conflict.⁵⁶⁵ In that context, many speakers called for compliance with international law and accountability to combat impunity. Several speakers also called for the implementation of resolution [2286 \(2016\)](#) with regard to the protection of humanitarian and medical personnel and health facilities.⁵⁶⁶ Several speakers stressed that early warning mechanisms were needed in order to prevent the escalation of violence against civilians.⁵⁶⁷

On 11 June 2019, at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the Presidency for the month,⁵⁶⁸ the Council held a meeting under the sub-item “Missing persons in armed conflict”.⁵⁶⁹ At the meeting, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2474 \(2019\)](#), addressing for the first time the issue of missing persons as a result of armed conflict. In paragraph 2 of that resolution, the Council called upon parties to armed conflict to take all appropriate measures to actively search for persons reported missing, to enable the return of their remains, to account for persons reported missing without adverse distinction and to put in place appropriate channels enabling response and communication with families on the search process. More specifically, the Council urged parties to armed conflict to search for and recover the dead as a result of armed conflict, to identify them, to respect the remains of the dead and to return them, whenever possible, to their relatives, consistent with applicable obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.⁵⁷⁰ The Council also urged parties to establish

⁵⁶³ [S/2019/373](#).

⁵⁶⁴ See [S/2019/840](#), p. 9.

⁵⁶⁵ See [S/PV.8534](#) (Dominican Republic, Poland, Switzerland, Mexico, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, European Union, Slovenia, Ireland, San Marino, Norway (on behalf of the Nordic countries) and Ecuador).

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, (South Africa, Canada, Turkey, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Uruguay, San Marino, Kenya, Viet Nam and Norway).

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, (Indonesia, Germany, Belgium, Argentina, Portugal, Morocco, Bangladesh, Costa Rica and Armenia).

⁵⁶⁸ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 3 June 2019 ([S/2019/458](#)).

⁵⁶⁹ See [S/PV.8543](#).

⁵⁷⁰ [S/RES/2474 \(2019\)](#), para. 8.

national information bureaus or other mechanisms upon the outbreak of a conflict in order to exchange information on detainees and civilians belonging to an adverse party and to open enquiries regarding those persons.⁵⁷¹ Lastly, the Council requested the Secretary-General to include as a sub-item in the reports on the protection of civilians the issue of missing persons as a result of armed conflict and to brief the Council every 12 months on the implementation of the resolution, during the annual briefing on the protection of civilians.⁵⁷²

After the vote, the Council heard briefings by the Operations Director of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and by the President of ICRC. Recalling the latest report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,⁵⁷³ the OCHA representative stressed that parties to conflict needed to ensure respect for international humanitarian law as it related to missing persons, taking all feasible measures to account for those reported missing as a result of armed conflict. She added that the law enshrined the right of the families of the missing to receive information on their fate and whereabouts, which entailed putting in place appropriate domestic laws and policies, including mechanisms to search for the missing and respond to the needs of their relatives. In his briefing, the President of ICRC welcomed the adoption of resolution 2474 (2019), the first resolution fully dedicated to the issue of missing persons in conflict, and commended the Council's commitment to the issue. He outlined the specific activities and innovations of ICRC in the area, noting that the way in which the issue of missing persons was addressed during and after conflict could determine the scale of the problem, its repercussions on communities and future relations between parties to the conflict. In that connection, he urged Member States to ensure that international humanitarian law was respected in their operations; to put in place preventative measures and take early action; to view the issue of the missing first and foremost as humanitarian and not part of political agendas and accountability processes; and to support professional, neutral and impartial humanitarian action on the issue of the missing.

After the briefings, Council members welcomed the adoption of resolution 2474 (2019), expressing appreciation to Kuwait for the initiative and for its efforts to convene a public meeting of the Council on the issue. The representative of the United Kingdom

stated that given the scale of the global missing persons phenomenon, the resolution provided an important opportunity to review and strengthen international cooperation on the issue. Other members also emphasized the importance of international cooperation in addressing the issue of missing persons.⁵⁷⁴ The representative of Germany noted that resolving the issue of missing persons was very important for reconciliation, while having a policy of preventing disappearance was important for conflict prevention. In that connection, a number of other Council members stressed the importance of concrete preventive measures and early action, as highlighted in resolution 2474 (2019).⁵⁷⁵ With regard to the specific issue of enforced disappearance, the representative of Germany regretted that there was no reference in the resolution to international criminal mechanisms, such as the Rome Statute, which clearly referred to enforced disappearance as a crime against humanity. The representative of France also emphasized the role of the International Criminal Court and the investigative mechanisms whose job it was to collect the evidence of such crimes. In that context, he regretted that the text of the resolution did not explicitly mention the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Both he and the representative of Belgium called on all States to ratify the Convention.

On 20 June 2019, the Council held a meeting at which it unanimously adopted resolution 2475 (2019), the first stand-alone resolution on the issue of protecting persons with disabilities during armed conflict.⁵⁷⁶ In the resolution, the Council, expressing concern regarding the disproportionate impact that armed conflict had on persons with disabilities, urged States to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination and marginalization of persons on the basis of disability in situations of armed conflict, particularly those who faced multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination.⁵⁷⁷ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to include information and related recommendations on issues of relevance to persons with disabilities in the context of armed conflict in thematic and geographic reports and regular briefings to the Council, and to include data disaggregated by disability within existing mandates

⁵⁷¹ Ibid., para. 9.

⁵⁷² Ibid., para. 19.

⁵⁷³ S/2019/373.

⁵⁷⁴ See S/PV.8543 (Kuwait, Indonesia, South Africa and Belgium).

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid., (Kuwait, United Kingdom, Côte d'Ivoire, China, France, Indonesia, Peru, Belgium, Dominican Republic and Poland).

⁵⁷⁶ See S/PV.8556.

⁵⁷⁷ Resolution 2475 (2019), second preambular paragraph and para. 8.

and existing resources.⁵⁷⁸ Moreover, the Council expressed its intention to invite persons with disabilities, including their representative organizations, to brief the Council in relevant thematic and geographic areas and to consider including interactive meetings with local persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the field during Council missions.⁵⁷⁹

After the vote, Council members expressed their support for the unanimous adoption of the resolution and the initiative of Poland and the United Kingdom in bringing the issue to the attention of the Council for the first time. The representative of Poland outlined the three goals her delegation had wanted to achieve since beginning work on the resolution, namely, strengthening data collection and reporting on persons with disabilities, building capacity and knowledge on the needs and rights of persons with disabilities and raising awareness among peacekeepers and peacebuilders, and empowering and engaging persons with disabilities in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution, reconciliation, reconstruction and peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring that persons with disabilities and their organizations were partners in the discussions of the Council. The representative of the United States welcomed in particular the paragraphs in the resolution on data collection, capacity-building and the meaningful participation and leadership of persons with disabilities during every stage of a conflict, and looked forward to more regular briefings by persons with disabilities and their representative organizations. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed support for the resolution's humanitarian principles and its aims to improve support and protection for persons with disabilities in areas of conflict, but pointed out that a number of its provisions went beyond the mandate of the Council. In his delegation's view, the call in paragraph 11 of the resolution for State parties to comply with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities pertained only to article 11 of the Convention, which related to situations within the Council's purview. Similarly, he stated that activities for the protection of vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities, had to be carried out strictly in line with the tried-and-tested principle of the so-called division of labour in the United Nations system, and that genuinely constructive efforts to protect persons with disabilities were possible only when each body dealt with the issue in a way that was fully consistent with the mandate

entrusted to it. In addition, he noted that the Russian Federation assumed that paragraph 10 of the resolution would be applied without detriment to the Council's working methods and in accordance with its provisional rules of procedure. He expressed strong support for the position that all groups in society should receive equal protection during armed conflicts, as laid down in international law, and that the consideration of one category of people should not be at the expense of any other group. The representative of China stated that the Council should not replicate or replace the work of human rights agencies or social welfare agencies dedicated to those with disabilities and that the issue was a sub-item under the agenda for the protection of civilians in armed conflict and should be addressed in full observance of all Council resolutions and agreements on that agenda. The representative of the United Kingdom, as the co-penholder of resolution 2475 (2019), thanked the Russian Federation and China for voting in favour of the resolution despite the doubts they had expressed. He agreed with the representative of the Russian Federation that the Council should not be creating new legal obligations, and said that they had been careful not to do so. He also agreed that all citizens and civilians should be protected and that that should not just be declaratory but also through concrete actions, as reflected in the resolution.

Throughout 2019, the Council continued the practice of hearing briefings by OCHA concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict under country- and region-specific items.⁵⁸⁰ The Council also included protection-related provisions in most of its resolutions and presidential statements in relation to both country- or region-specific and thematic items.⁵⁸¹

The Council focused on multiple aspects and used a variety of language formulas to address the protection of civilians in its decisions; selected provisions of those decisions are listed in table 2. In particular, the Council: (a) condemned all forms of attacks against civilians, especially against women and children, including attacks against schools, hospitals and medical facilities; (b) called upon all parties to conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law and called for accountability measures

⁵⁷⁸ Ibid., para. 9.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid., para. 10.

⁵⁸⁰ In 2019, the Council heard briefings by OCHA 32 times at public meetings and 24 times in consultations, for a total of 56 briefings. For more information on briefings on those items prior to 2019, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2018*, part I, sect. 29.

⁵⁸¹ For information on other cross-cutting issues before the Council, see part I, sect. 29 and sect. 31.

against perpetrators of such crimes; (c) demanded that all parties to armed conflict ensure unhindered access for delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need and ensure the safety of humanitarian and medical personnel; (d) emphasized the primary responsibility of States to comply with their relevant obligations to protect civilians; (e) requested additional monitoring mechanisms and reporting arrangements in order to improve the protection of civilians in armed conflict; and (f) adopted or expressed its intention to adopt targeted measures, such as sanctions, against perpetrators. In addition, the Council's practice of strengthening the mandates of United Nations peace operations with a view to protecting civilians

continued to evolve. During the reporting period, the Council continued to request several missions to take the protection of civilians under threat of physical violence as specific priorities and benchmarks of their mandates, with a particular focus on, but not limited to, women, children and internally displaced persons, including by creating a secure environment for the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, strengthening local community engagement and empowerment, and through early warning and information-sharing mechanisms.⁵⁸²

⁵⁸² For more information on mandates and decisions relevant to peacekeeping and political missions, see part X.

Table 1
Meetings: protection of civilians in armed conflict

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8534 23 May 2019	Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/2019/373) Letter dated 8 May 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/385)		63 Member States ^a	Eight invitees ^b	Secretary-General, 13 Council members, ^c all invitees ^d	
S/PV.8543 11 June 2019	Missing persons in armed conflict Letter dated 3 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/458)	Draft resolution submitted by 68 Member States ^e (S/2019/475)	55 Member States ^f	Operations Director of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	All Council members, ^g all invitees under rule 39 ^h	Resolution 2474 (2019) 15-0-0

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8556 20 June 2019		Draft resolution submitted by 68 Member States ⁱ (S/2019/503)	55 Member States ^j		Seven Council members ^k	Resolution 2475 (2019) 15-0-0

^a Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

^b President of ICRC; Executive Director of the Center for Civilians in Conflict; Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations; North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security; Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations; and Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations.

^c Germany was represented by its Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office; and Indonesia (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The representative of South Africa spoke also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea.

^d Cambodia was represented by its Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; Canada was represented by its Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the Netherlands and Romania were represented by their respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; the representative of Switzerland spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of the protection of civilians in armed conflict; the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement; and the representative of Viet Nam spoke on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

^e Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States and Uruguay.

^f Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Palau, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay.

^g Kuwait (President of the Council) was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^h The President of ICRC participated in the meeting by videoconference from Geneva.

ⁱ Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

^j Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.

^k China, Dominican Republic (also on behalf of Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait and Peru), France, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

Table 2
 Selection of provisions relevant to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, by theme and agenda item

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Condemnation of and demands for the cessation of attacks and acts of violence against civilians and civilian facilities and abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law			
Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2019/6	eighth, ninth
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	4, 24
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	7, 10, 11
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	12
	The situation in Mali	S/PRST/2019/2	ninth
	The situation in the Middle East	S/PRST/2019/9	fifth
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	25, 26
		Resolution 2469 (2019)	26
		Resolution 2497 (2019)	26
	Thematic	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2474 (2019)
Women and peace and security		Resolution 2467 (2019)	1
Calls for compliance with and accountability under applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law and relevant Security Council resolutions by all parties			
Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2019/15	eighth
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	21, 23
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	4, 5, 6, 35
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	6, 8, 34, 50 (b) and (c)
	The situation in Guinea-Bissau	Resolution 2458 (2019)	19
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	15, 35, 36, 53
	The situation in the Middle East	S/PRST/2019/9	second
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2461 (2019)	16
		Resolution 2498 (2019)	4
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	34, 35
Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2019/7	twenty-seventh	

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	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>	
Thematic	The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security	S/PRST/2019/8	second, third	
	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2475 (2019)	1, 2	
	Threats to international peace and security	Resolution 2482 (2019)	16	
	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	17, 21	
Demands for humanitarian access and safety of humanitarian and medical personnel and facilities				
Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2019/6	ninth	
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	32 (d), 49	
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	36	
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	35	
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	54	
	The situation in the Middle East	S/PRST/2019/9	ninth	
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2461 (2019)	18	
		Resolution 2472 (2019)	31	
		Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	2
	Thematic	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2469 (2019)	25
Resolution 2497 (2019)			23	
Resolution 2474 (2019)			12	
Thematic	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2475 (2019)	3	
		Affirmation of primary responsibility of States and parties to conflict to protect civilians		
		Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2019/15
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2499 (2019)		fourth preambular paragraph	
	Resolution 2463 (2019)		sixth preambular paragraph, 17	
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2502 (2019)		fourth preambular paragraph	
		Resolution 2480 (2019)	second preambular, 55	

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	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Thematic	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2474 (2019)	twelfth preambular paragraph
		Resolution 2475 (2019)	fifth preambular paragraph
	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	sixth preambular paragraph
Requests for specific monitoring and analysis of and reporting on protection of civilians			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	54
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2502 (2019)	51
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2472 (2019)	16, 32
		Resolution 2498 (2019)	34
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	36, 38
Resolution 2469 (2019)		27, 35	
Thematic	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Resolution 2474 (2019)	9, 19
	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	2, 22, 27, 32
Imposition of targeted measures against perpetrators of violations against civilians in armed conflict			
Country- and region-specific	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	fifteenth and twenty-fourth preambular paragraphs
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	5
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2498 (2019)	21
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	tenth preambular paragraph, 3
Inclusion of mission-specific protection mandates and benchmarks^a			
Country- and region-specific	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	32 (a) (i)–(iv), (b) (vii), 33 (d) (i)–(iii), 33 (e) (i), (iv) and (vii)
		Resolution 2463 (2019)	23 (a), 24, 29 (i) (a)–(g), 29 (ii) (c), 37
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2502 (2019)	25, 29 (i) (a)–(g), 29 (ii) (e), 36, 42, 47
		Resolution 2466 (2019)	10

<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	16, 20, 28 (b) (iii), 28 (c) (i)–(iii), 28 (f)
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	7 (a) (i)–(viii), 7 (b) (i), 7 (c) (i) and (iv), 10, 14, 17, 18
	Resolution 2469 (2019)	12
	Resolution 2495 (2019)	3 (iii)
	Resolution 2497 (2019)	13

^a For additional information on mandates and decisions relevant to peacekeeping and political missions, see part X.

30. Women and peace and security

In 2019, the Council held two high-level meetings and adopted two resolutions⁵⁸³ in relation to the item entitled “Women and peace and security”. Both meetings took the form of open debates.⁵⁸⁴ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1.

On 23 April 2019, at the initiative of Germany, which held the Presidency for the month,⁵⁸⁵ the Council held an open debate under the sub-item “Sexual violence in conflict”.⁵⁸⁶ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize laureates and two civil society representatives. In his briefing to the Council, the Secretary-General noted that the recommendations contained in his 2019 report on conflict-related sexual violence were focused mainly on strengthening prevention in the context of the Council’s actions on country-specific resolutions, the mandates of peace operations, sanctions regimes and peacemaking efforts, and stressed the need to strengthen justice and accountability, including by increasing support to national authorities in their justice reform efforts and ensuring support for survivors and their families.⁵⁸⁷ The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict echoed the Secretary-General’s recommendations, in particular the need for a survivor-

centred approach, and urged the Council to consider additional targeted measures to apply pressure on parties to conflict that had been repeatedly identified as credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of conflict-related sexual violence. One of the Nobel Peace Prize laureates, Denis Mukwege, expressed support for the Secretary-General’s recommendations and the work of his Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and welcomed the draft resolution introduced at the meeting for its focus on children born of rape, the importance of a survivor-centred approach and the need to impose sanctions, ensure justice and accountability and provide reparations. Recalling the crimes of sexual violence committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) against Yazidi women in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, the other Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Nadia Murad, from Iraq, called for serious action to bring the perpetrators to justice and expressed the hope that the Council would continue to support the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, established in 2018. The legal counsel to Nadia Murad and other Yazidi women and girls, Amal Clooney, reported on the milestones achieved in national legal proceedings against ISIL (Da’esh) but noted that they did not come close to full accountability, and thus proposed that the Council consider options to address international accountability. Inas Miloud, an indigenous woman from Libya who spoke on behalf of the Tamazight Women’s Movement and the non-governmental organization Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, highlighted the stories of Libyan survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, in particular the

⁵⁸³ Resolutions [2467 \(2019\)](#) and [2493 \(2019\)](#).

⁵⁸⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁵⁸⁵ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 11 April 2019 ([S/2019/313](#)).

⁵⁸⁶ See [S/PV.8514](#).

⁵⁸⁷ See [S/2019/280](#).

experiences of indigenous women targeted due to their ethnicity, men and boys in Libyan detention centres and prisons, and women human rights defenders who suffered for their activism.

At the same meeting, Council members and other Member States addressed a variety of issues, including the importance of and the means to strengthen accountability in the fight against conflict-related sexual violence, the need for holistic support for survivors of sexual violence and children born of rape, and the protection of women human rights defenders. Speakers expressed concern and condemnation over the use of sexual violence in conflict as a weapon of war. Some speakers explicitly stated that conflict-related sexual violence was a threat to international peace and security.⁵⁸⁸ Participants stressed the importance of the meaningful participation of women in peace and security processes in order to address the issue of sexual violence and outlined national and regional efforts in that regard.

Also at the same meeting, the Council adopted resolution 2467 (2019), with the abstentions of two permanent members, namely the Russian Federation and China. Explaining his country's vote, the representative of the Russian Federation said that at the last minute, Council members had succeeded in agreeing to exclude the provisions in the draft resolution that were wholly unacceptable, and protested that there had been no explanation of the attempts to use a thematic resolution to intrusively expand the mandates of various United Nations mechanisms and bodies by directing them to tackle the issue of combating sexual violence. He added that, together with China, his delegation had drafted an alternative text on the subject of sexual violence in conflict, which corresponded much more accurately to the objectives of the meeting. Explaining his country's abstention, the representative of China said that his country's propositions and concerns had not been fully reflected. The Council should address sexual violence in conflict in line with its mandate, instead of going too far to address what should have been entrusted to other bodies. With regard to the establishment of special mechanisms, it was important to have extensive discussions well in advance and it was vital to fully respect the sovereignty of host countries and support their Governments in playing a leading role. Lastly, he said that any related sanctions measures should comply strictly with the Council's mandates and be subject to case-by-case deliberations. The representative of the United Kingdom expressed regret that the language on

⁵⁸⁸ See [S/PV.8514](#) (Peru, Kuwait, Albania, Slovenia, Mexico, Morocco and United Arab Emirates).

services for survivors of sexual violence did not meet with the support of all Council members, given the acute need for such services, including comprehensive reproductive and sexual health care and safe termination of pregnancies.

In resolution 2467 (2019), the Council reiterated its demand for the complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence and its call for those parties to make and implement specific time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence, and encouraged Member States to strengthen legislation to foster accountability for sexual violence.⁵⁸⁹ The Council also encouraged the continued strengthening of efforts to monitor and document sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and called for a more systematic, reliable and rigorous approach to gathering accurate, reliable, timely and sex-disaggregated information on sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, in such a way that would not put survivors at risk.⁵⁹⁰ Within the scope of the relevant criteria for designation, and consistent with relevant resolutions, the Council urged existing sanctions committees to apply targeted sanctions against those who perpetrated and directed sexual violence in conflict.⁵⁹¹ The Council also called upon Member States to enhance investigation and prosecution of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations and encouraged them to adopt a survivor-centred approach, including by ensuring that prevention of and response to sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations respected the rights and prioritized the needs of survivors and ensured the full and meaningful participation of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.⁵⁹² The Council further called upon Member States to make effective remedy and assistance available to victims of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, and encouraged Member States and other relevant actors to give due consideration to the establishment of a survivors' fund.⁵⁹³

On 29 October 2019, at the initiative of South Africa, which held the Presidency for the month,⁵⁹⁴ the Council held an open debate under the sub-item entitled "Towards the successful implementation of the women and peace and security agenda: moving from commitments to accomplishments in preparation for

⁵⁸⁹ Resolution 2467 (2019), paras. 1 and 3.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 10.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, paras. 14 and 16.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid.*, para. 17.

⁵⁹⁴ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 8 October 2019 ([S/2019/801](#)).

the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)". The meeting was resumed twice and held over a period of two days, on 29 October and 4 November, straddling the presidencies of South Africa and the United Kingdom.⁵⁹⁵

At the outset of the meeting, on 29 October, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2493 (2019), in which it recognized the opportunity presented by the number of significant anniversaries in 2020, in particular the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), and called on all Member States to commit to the promotion of women and girls' empowerment in peace and security processes and to use those anniversaries to intensify their national efforts and international cooperation.⁵⁹⁶ In that context, the Council urged Member States to commit to implementing the women and peace and security agenda and its priorities by ensuring and promoting the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all stages of peace processes.⁵⁹⁷ The Council also urged Member States supporting peace processes to facilitate the full, equal and meaningful inclusion and participation of women in peace talks from the outset, both in negotiating parties' delegations and in the mechanisms set up to implement and monitor agreements.⁵⁹⁸ The Council urged Member States to increase their funding on women and peace and security, including through more aid in conflict and post-conflict situations for programmes that further gender equality and the economic empowerment and security of women.⁵⁹⁹ The Council requested the Secretary-General to include the following in his next annual report on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and its subsequent resolutions: (a) more information on progress made and the remaining challenges in the women and peace and security agenda, as well as recommendations to address new and emerging challenges; (b) the implementation of the appointment of gender advisers and/or women protection advisers and provisions to facilitate the full and effective participation and protection of women; and (c) an assessment of the progress and commitments made on dedicated gender expertise in expert groups and monitoring teams in sanctions committees and how this commitment was met.⁶⁰⁰ Following the vote, a number of Council members made statements. The

representative of the United States said that the resolution referred to previous documents that included references to sexual and reproductive health, and noted that her country could not accept references to sexual and reproductive health or any references to safe termination of pregnancy or language that would promote abortion or suggest a right to abortion. She regretted that the resolution fell short of putting the full weight and support of the Council behind the women who were putting their lives on the line every day to build peace and also left out key aspects of the Action for Peacekeeping Declaration of Shared Commitments on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The representative of the United Kingdom, addressing the implementation gap regarding relevant resolutions, indicated that full implementation needed to include sexual and reproductive health services. She recognized that not all Member States agreed with that, but said that from the perspective of the United Kingdom, sexual and reproductive health services were a vital part of public services for women in all countries and a vital part of ensuring that women could play a truly equal role in the building of their countries. She expressed disappointment that the resolution was not more ambitious in scope and noted that it would have broken new ground if it had included explicit language on women human rights defenders and their protection and security. She also regretted that it did not include broader recognition of civil society's role in implementation. The latter point was also raised by the representatives of Belgium and France.

At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, the Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security and two civil society representatives. The Secretary-General stated that while the women and peace and security agenda was a top priority for the United Nations as a whole, the commitments made during Council meetings on that agenda item were not translating into real change around the world far or fast enough and that the pace was too slow for the women and girls whose lives depended on it and for the effectiveness of efforts to maintain international peace and security. Despite some progress, women still faced exclusion from many peace and political processes, attacks against women human rights defenders had continued to increase, and women and girls had continued to suffer the consequences of conflict in general and gender-based and sexual violence in particular. He outlined Secretariat initiatives to implement new and

⁵⁹⁵ See S/PV.8649, S/PV.8649 (Resumption 1) and S/PV.8649 (Resumption 2).

⁵⁹⁶ Resolution 2493 (2019), eleventh preambular paragraph.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 10.

stronger policies, including the inclusion of the agenda as one of the eight priority pillars of his Action for Peacekeeping initiative. The Executive Director of UN-Women also highlighted the stark contrast between the expressed support from Member States and regional and international organizations for the women and peace and security agenda, and reality. She discussed the results of the independent assessment conducted by UN-Women on progress in the implementation of the gender-related recommendations of the three peace and security reviews conducted by the United Nations in 2015, including areas of progress, such as the stronger integration of gender considerations in preventing violent extremism and the increase in the number of countries that had adopted a national action plan on women and peace and security. However, she also highlighted the decrease of gender-related provisions in peace agreements and asked the Council to address the issue of participation and inclusion of women in peace processes. The Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security noted that while Africa continued to lead in the adoption of national actions plans on women and peace and security, their implementation continued to lag in areas such as inclusion of women in political and peace processes and curbing violence against women. She emphasized, *inter alia*, that national action plans should have a clear accountability framework, that support for women's organizations was crucial in addressing the gaps identified and that young people should have a bigger role and be allowed to take the lead on women and peace and security. Lina Ekomo, speaking on behalf of the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (Femwise-Africa) and the African Women Leaders Network, recalled the efforts of women in the Central African Republic to be included in their country's peace process, their lack of access to the negotiations that resulted in the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the substantial difficulties they faced in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement. Alaa Salah, speaking on behalf of the non-governmental organization Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, discussed the role of Sudanese women in historical and recent political struggles, the need to protect women's rights, and the lack of accountability and justice for human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence, in the Sudan. She called for the Council and the international community to, *inter alia*, support accountability and end impunity, support greater representation of women in the country's peace processes and ensure that women human rights

defenders could carry out their work without fear of reprisals.

Participants emphasized the need for meaningful participation of women in all aspects of peace and security, including at the decision-making level of peace processes, expressed appreciation for the strategy for achieving gender parity in United Nations peace operations, and stressed the important role of civil society in the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, including through briefings to the Council. Noting the forthcoming twentieth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), speakers said that serious gaps remained between commitment to the agenda and its actual implementation, and saw the lead-up to the anniversary as a period for stocktaking and review and an opportunity to mobilize resources and support for tangible actions. Concerning the Secretary-General's reporting on increased political violence against women, speakers expressed concern over the safety and protection of women human rights defenders.

During the period under review, the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security continued to be convened in accordance with resolution 2242 (2015).⁶⁰¹ In resolution 2467 (2019), the Council expressed its intention to consider the information, analysis and recommendations of the Informal Expert Group, acknowledging the important role of UN-Women in that regard, and emphasized that sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations and all other aspects of the women and peace and security agenda should continue to be addressed in that forum.⁶⁰²

The Council referred to issues related to women and peace and security under multiple items of its agenda in 2019. As summarized in table 2 below, the Council addressed in its decisions a wide variety of measures in connection with the women and peace and security agenda and, in particular: (a) demanded the representation and participation of women in conflict prevention and resolution and in public affairs and governance; (b) called for the participation of women in peacekeeping operations, including through the appointment of women's protection and gender advisers; (c) called for gender mainstreaming to be taken into account as a cross-cutting issue; and (d) called for measures to combat sexual violence, including monitoring, analysing and reporting on

⁶⁰¹ See S/2019/232, S/2019/253, S/2019/296 and S/2019/591.

⁶⁰² Resolution 2467 (2019), para. 4. See also resolution 2493 (2019), para. 7.

conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence, as well as the prosecution of perpetrators of sexual violence. The Council also called for Member States to adopt a survivor-centred approach in preventing and responding to sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations. In addition, the

Council referred to the funding of women, peace and security-related national programmes, the economic empowerment of women and the role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism in various women, peace and security-related provisions.

Table 1
Meetings: women and peace and security

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8514 23 April 2019	Sexual violence in conflict Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence (S/2019/280) Letter dated 11 April 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/313)	Draft resolution submitted by Germany (S/2019/328)	64 Member States ^a	11 invitees ^b	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^c 61 invitees under rule 37, ^d all other invitees ^e	Resolution 2467 (2019) 13-0-2 ^f
S/PV.8649 S/PV.8649 (Resumption 1) 29 October 2019 S/PV.8649 (Resumption 2) 4 November 2019	Towards the successful implementation of the women and peace and security agenda: moving from commitments to accomplishments in preparation for the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security (S/2019/800) Letter dated 8 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative of	Draft resolution submitted by 22 Member States ^g (S/2019/841)	77 Member States ^h	10 invitees ⁱ	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^j 70 invitees under rule 37, ^k all other invitees ^l	Resolution 2493 (2019) 15-0-0

South Africa to the
United Nations
addressed to the
Secretary-General
(S/2019/801)

- ^a Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Viet Nam.
- ^b Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict; Permanent Observer and Head of Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations; Principal Adviser on Gender and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security of the European External Action Service; North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security; Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the Economic Community of Central African States to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations; Denis Mukwege, Nobel Peace Prize laureate; Nadia Murad, Nobel Peace Prize laureate; Amal Clooney, barrister; and Inas Miloud, Tamazight Women's Movement.
- ^c Equatorial Guinea was represented by its Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Germany (President of the Council) was represented by its Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the United Nations.
- ^d The representatives of Cyprus, Guatemala and Latvia did not make statements. Finland was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Hungary was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade; the Republic of Korea was represented by its Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Serbia was represented by its Assistant Minister for Construction, Transport and Infrastructure. The representative of Estonia spoke on behalf of Latvia and Lithuania; the representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; and the representative of Qatar spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Responsibility to Protect.
- ^e The Principal Adviser on Gender and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security of the European External Action Service spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine.
- ^f *For:* Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* none; *abstaining:* China, Russian Federation.
- ^g Armenia, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Georgia, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Liberia, Morocco, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, San Marino, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay.
- ^h Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Viet Nam.
- ⁱ Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women); Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Women, Peace and Security; North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security; Principal Adviser on Gender and the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women and Peace and Security of the European External Action Service; Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations; Senior Adviser on Gender Issues of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Permanent Observer of the Holy See; Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations; Lina Ekomo, on behalf of the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation and the African Women Leaders Network; and Alaa Salah, civil society activist and community leader.
- ^j Germany was represented by its Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office; and South Africa (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for International Relations and Cooperation.
- ^k The representatives of Bulgaria, Denmark, Ghana, Maldives, Myanmar, North Macedonia and San Marino did not make statements. Guatemala was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Liberia was represented by its Minister of Gender, Children and Social Protection; Norway was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, who spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; the Republic of Korea was represented its Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Sweden was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Canada spoke on behalf of 56 Member States representing all five regional groups of the United Nations; and the representative of the Philippines spoke on behalf of the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

¹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security did not make a statement. The Principal Adviser on Gender and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security of the European External Action Service spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. The Holy See was represented by the Second Secretary of its Observer Mission; and the State of Palestine was represented by its Deputy Permanent Observer to the United Nations.

Table 2
Selection of provisions relevant to women and peace and security, by theme and agenda item

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Representation and participation of women in political processes at all levels, including decision-making			
Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2019/15	seventh
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2019/7	fifteenth
	The question concerning Haiti	Resolution 2466 (2019)	12
		Resolution 2476 (2019)	3
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2470 (2019)	2 (e)
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	32
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	2
	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2489 (2019)	5 (f)
	The situation in Guinea-Bissau	Resolution 2458 (2019)	6 (d)
	The situation in Mali	S/PRST/2019/2	third
		Resolution 2480 (2019)	5, 56
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2461 (2019)	9
		Resolution 2472 (2019)	27
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	10, 44
The situation in the Middle East	S/PRST/2019/9	twelfth	
	Resolution 2485 (2019)	25	
Thematic	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	23
		Resolution 2493 (2019)	6, 10 (b)
Participation of women in peacebuilding and in conflict prevention and resolution			
Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2019/15	seventh, tenth
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2019/7	sixteenth
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	4, 8, 38
		Resolution 2469 (2019)	18, 19
		Resolution 2497 (2019)	18, 19
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	32	

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	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	The situation in Afghanistan	Resolution 2489 (2019)	5 (f)
	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2453 (2019)	10
		Resolution 2483 (2019)	4 (e)
	The situation in Mali	S/PRST/2019/2	seventh
		Resolution 2480 (2019)	4
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2461 (2019)	9
		Resolution 2472 (2019)	27
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	8, 32 (b) (iii)–(v)
Thematic	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	20, 23
		Resolution 2493 (2019)	2, 3, 4, 9 (a), 10 (b)
Economic empowerment of women and funding of national programmes			
Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2019/15	seventh
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2019/7	twenty-third
Thematic	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	16 (c), 28, 35
		Resolution 2493 (2019)	5
Conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence			
Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2019/15	seventh
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2019/7	twenty-third
	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	4, 7 (a) (i), 7 (c), 26, 29, 35
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	4, 7, 8, 29 (i) (b), 30 (i) (d), 33, 39, 46 (ii) and (vi)
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 29 (i) (c), 29 (ii) (k), 33, 34, 50 (c)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	9, 28 (c) (iii), 28 (e) (ii), 53, 57, 58
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2461 (2019)	16, 17, 20
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	24, 25, 32 (a) (iii), 33 (d) (ii), 33 (e) (vii)
Thematic	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	6, 8, 15, 16 (a) and (d), 22, 24, 28, 31, 32
	Threats to international peace and security	Resolution 2482 (2019)	

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
Gender mainstreaming, gender expertise and gender-sensitive responses			
Country- and region-specific	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	7 (a) (vi), 17
		Resolution 2497 (2019)	28
	The question concerning Haiti	Resolution 2466 (2019)	12
		Resolution 2476 (2019)	3
	The situation concerning Iraq	Resolution 2470 (2019)	2 (e)
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2502 (2019)	32
	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2453 (2019)	10
	The situation in Libya	Resolution 2486 (2019)	5
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2498 (2019)	29
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	32 (a) (iii), 33 (c) (i) and (ii)
Thematic	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	11, 36
		Resolution 2493 (2019)	10 (c)
Women's protection and women's protection advisers			
Country- and region-specific	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	7 (a) (i), 17
		Resolution 2469 (2019)	29
	The question concerning Haiti	Resolution 2476 (2019)	2
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019)	32, 33
		Resolution 2502 (2019)	32, 33
	The situation in Guinea-Bissau	Resolution 2458 (2019)	6 (d)
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	28 (c) (iii)
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	32 (a) (iii), 44
Thematic	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	22, 23
		Resolution 2493 (2019)	10 (b)
Role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism			
Country- and region-specific	Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2019/15	tenth
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2019/7	seventeenth
Thematic	Threats to international peace and security	Resolution 2482 (2019)	17
Participation of women in peacekeeping operations			
Country- and region-specific	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019)	17
		Resolution 2469 (2019)	28
		Resolution 2497 (2019)	28

	<i>Agenda item</i>	<i>Decision</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>
	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2502 (2019)	41
	The situation concerning Western Sahara	Resolution 2468 (2019)	11
	The situation in Cyprus	Resolution 2453 (2019)	14
		Resolution 2483 (2019)	12
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	46
	The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2472 (2019)	18
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	38
	The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2477 (2019)	11
		Resolution 2485 (2019)	24
		Resolution 2503 (2019)	12
Thematic	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2493 (2019)	2
Participation of women in the security sector and in security sector reform			
Country- and region-specific	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2502 (2019)	20, 29 (ii) (f), 32
	The situation in Libya	Resolution 2486 (2019)	5
	The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019)	56
	The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019)	13, 44
Thematic	Women and peace and security	Resolution 2467 (2019)	23, 26
		Resolution 2493 (2019)	10 (b)

31. Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

During the period under review, the Council held four meetings under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” and adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter. Two of the meetings took the form of briefings,⁶⁰³ one was held as an open debate⁶⁰⁴ and one was convened for the adoption of a decision.⁶⁰⁵ The Council unanimously adopted two resolutions: resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#), on the financing of terrorism,

and resolution [2501 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for a period of 12 months, until December 2020. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2019, the Council continued to focus under this agenda item on the threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) and the sanctions measures against it, as well as on several other issues, such as the threat posed by returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters. The Council also addressed the issue of preventing and combating the

⁶⁰³ See [S/PV.8460](#) and [S/PV.8605](#). For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁶⁰⁴ See [S/PV.8496](#).

⁶⁰⁵ See [S/PV.8686](#).

financing of terrorism, in connection with which it unanimously adopted resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#). The greatest number of briefings were delivered by the Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism. In addition, the Council heard two briefings by the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, one briefing by the President of the Financial Action Task Force and one briefing by an expert in anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

On 11 February 2019, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism on the eighth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.⁶⁰⁶ He explained that the report had been prepared by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. He noted that ISIL (Da'esh) remained a threat as a global organization with a centralized leadership, despite the decrease in the number of international attacks and plots in 2018, adding that the threat was further increased by returning, relocating or released foreign terrorist fighters. In terms of its financial strength, he said that despite some loss of revenue due to territorial setbacks, ISIL (Da'esh) was able to sustain its operations through criminal activities and accessible reserves, in cash or investment in businesses. The Council then heard a briefing by the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, who stressed that ISIL (Da'esh) continued to present the international community with many complex challenges despite its dwindling controlled territory, and warned that of all international terrorist organizations, ISIL (Da'esh) remained the most likely to carry out a large-scale, complex attack.

On 28 March 2019, at the initiative of France, which held the Presidency for the month,⁶⁰⁷ the Council held a high-level open debate on preventing and combating the financing of terrorism, which was presided over by the Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France.⁶⁰⁸ At the outset of the meeting, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter. In that resolution, the Council reaffirmed resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) and in particular its decisions that all States should prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support to entities or

persons involved in terrorist acts.⁶⁰⁹ The Council also decided that all States should, in a manner consistent with their obligations under international law, ensure that their domestic laws established serious criminal offences sufficient to prosecute the wilful provision or collection of funds, financial assets or economic resources with the intention that such funds be used for the benefit of terrorist organizations or individual terrorists for any purpose, including but not limited to recruitment, training or travel, even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act.⁶¹⁰ The Council also called upon Member States to conduct financial investigations in terrorism related cases and to seek ways to address the challenges in obtaining evidence to secure terrorist financing convictions.⁶¹¹ It also called upon Member States to more effectively investigate and prosecute cases of terrorist financing and to apply effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions to individuals and entities convicted of terrorist financing activity, as well as to intensify the timely exchange of information, enhance the traceability and transparency of financial transactions, and strengthen international cooperation to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism.⁶¹²

Following the adoption of resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#), the Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism stressed that the adoption of the resolution came at a critical time as recent terrorist attacks around the world had demonstrated that financial flows continued to reach terrorist groups from both illegal and legal means. He further noted that while several Council resolutions had been focused on countering the financing of terrorism, resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#) helped to consolidate the various requirements into a single document and expanded the focus to key emerging issues, including innovative terrorist financing typologies.

At the same meeting, the President of the Financial Action Task Force stressed that terrorist groups continued to obtain funding from a wide range of sources to conduct terrorist attacks and to maintain and grow their terrorist organizations, and that therefore combating all those aspects of terrorist financing was a top priority shared by the Council and the Financial Action Task Force. He also underlined that fewer than one fifth of the countries around the world that the Financial Action Task Force had assessed to date were effectively applying the targeted financial sanctions and prosecutions that were necessary in line with resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#). In her briefing, the expert in anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism noted that new

⁶⁰⁶ [S/2019/103](#). See also [S/PV.8460](#).

⁶⁰⁷ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 14 March 2019 ([S/2019/239](#)).

⁶⁰⁸ See [S/PV.8496](#).

⁶⁰⁹ Resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

⁶¹² *Ibid.*, paras. 8, 19–20 and 28.

technologies, such as mobile money transfer services, were arguably the single most effective contributor to global financial inclusion initiatives, facilitating access to cheap and reliable financial services for an ever increasing formerly unbanked population segment, particularly in developing countries. While innovative financial technologies could offer significant economic opportunities, they also presented a risk of being misused by criminals for money laundering and other criminal activity, including terrorist financing. She hoped that the Council would take cognizance of the need for Member States to put in place the necessary measures to combat the financing of terrorism and money laundering without stifling financial inclusion, in order to promote sustainable development in developing countries.

Following the briefings, speakers at the meeting emphasized the need for States to fully implement the relevant Council resolutions and the importance of fostering international cooperation and coordination in the fight against terrorism.

During his second briefing, on 27 August 2019, the Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism presented the ninth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.⁶¹³ He reiterated that challenges remained regarding foreign terrorist fighters, returnees and relocators. He stressed that Member States faced significant and multifaceted challenges relating to the repatriation of their nationals, including women and children, from territories previously controlled by ISIL (Da'esh) and that Member States had the primary

⁶¹³ S/2019/612. See also S/PV.8605.

responsibility for their own nationals, adding that policies and actions that led to statelessness should be avoided. The lull in attacks directed by ISIL (Da'esh) might be temporary and the international community needed to remain vigilant to mitigate the risk posed by the evolution of ISIL (Da'esh) and its affiliates, deny it new recruits and prevent its resurgence. In her briefing to the Council, the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate addressed the gender dimensions of terrorism and violent extremism. She noted that significant knowledge gaps remained regarding the number and profiles of women who had travelled to and returned from territory held by ISIL (Da'esh) and stressed that women tended to receive limited rehabilitation and reintegration support, thereby potentially putting them at greater risk of marginalization and recidivism.

On 16 December 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2501 (2019), by which it extended the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, established pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1526 (2004), for a period of 12 months, until December 2020.⁶¹⁴ In the resolution, the Council welcomed efforts to initiate inclusive intra-Afghan negotiations aimed at securing a durable peace settlement that ended the conflict in Afghanistan and ensured that Afghanistan was never again a safe haven for international terrorism.⁶¹⁵

⁶¹⁴ Resolution 2501 (2019), para. 2. For more information on the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, see part IX, sect. I.

⁶¹⁵ Resolution 2501 (2019), eighth preambular paragraph. For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 17.

Meetings: threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8460 11 February 2019	Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2019/103)				Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, Executive Director of the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	All Council members, all invitees

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8496 28 March 2019	Preventing and combating the financing of terrorism Letter dated 14 March 2019 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/239)	Draft resolution submitted by 68 Member States ^a (S/2019/268)	72 Member States ^b	Eight invitees ^c	All Council members, ^d 47 invitees under rule 37, ^e all other invitees ^f	Resolution 2462 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8605 27 August 2019	Ninth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/2019/612)			Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, Executive Director of the Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8686 16 December 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/945)				Resolution 2501 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Iraq, Ireland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.

^c Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism; President of the Financial Action Task Force; Permanent Observer and Head of Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations; Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; Special Representative of the International Criminal Police Organization to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations; and Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations; and expert in anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

- ^d France (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs; Indonesia was represented by its Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs; and South Africa was represented by its Minister of Defence and Military Veterans.
- ^e Afghanistan, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Iraq, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam. Canada was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Estonia was represented by its Minister of Defence; Georgia was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; Ireland was represented by its Minister of Defence; the Philippines was represented by its Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Romania was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Slovenia was represented by its State Secretary and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Tajikistan was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; and the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.
- ^f The Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism participated in the meeting by videoconference from Rome; and Mercy Buku, an expert in anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, participated in the meeting by videoconference from Nairobi. The Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States; Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine also aligned themselves with the statement.

32. Briefings

During the period under review, the Council held six meetings in the form of briefings that were not explicitly connected to any specific item before it.⁶¹⁶ More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the tables below.

In 2019, two of the meetings were held under the item “Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”. On 20 May 2019, the Council held a joint briefing of the three committees related to counter-terrorism, namely, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).⁶¹⁷ The briefing covered the work of the three committees, including their ongoing cooperation and that of their groups of experts in implementing counter-terrorism measures in the areas of sanctions, terrorism financing, border management and non-proliferation. Briefers and Council members discussed the evolving threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al-Qaida and its affiliates and by returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters, as well as the means of addressing such threats, including through the implementation of the addendum to the Madrid Guiding Principles, in order to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, and resolution 2462 (2019), adopted on 28 March 2019, in order to counter the

financing of terrorism. Participants also discussed the nexus between international terrorism and transnational organized crime; preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials to non-State actors and their use for terrorist purposes; the surge in violent extremism motivated by racism, intolerance, misogyny, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; and the upcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In addition, on 17 December 2019, the Council held the customary end-of-year briefing by the outgoing Chairs of the various subsidiary bodies.⁶¹⁸

Consistent with prior practice, the Council held one meeting under the item “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”.⁶¹⁹ The Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gave a briefing to the Council on the situation concerning Ukraine, including on his January trip to the country, as well as the work of OSCE towards conflict resolution and mediation in Transnistria, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. He emphasized that preventing and resolving conflicts and mitigating their impact on people was one of the top priorities of the Slovak chairmanship of OSCE. Another priority was working towards a safer future through a comprehensive approach that included preventive action to tackle terrorism and violent extremism and enhanced cooperation within the women and peace and security and the youth and peace and security agendas. In addition, he underscored the importance of effective multilateralism as a

⁶¹⁶ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁶¹⁷ See [S/PV.8528](#).

⁶¹⁸ See [S/PV.8688](#).

⁶¹⁹ See [S/PV.8479](#).

fundamental problem-solving and war-preventing tool in international relations. In elaborating on those priorities, the Chairperson-in-Office highlighted areas of opportunity for stronger cooperation between OSCE and the United Nations.

Following established practice, the Council heard one briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice at a private (closed) meeting.⁶²⁰ In addition, the Council heard a briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the first time

since November 2017.⁶²¹ He focused his briefing on three areas, namely, working together to solve peace and security crises, particularly the recent military escalation in Libya; supporting countries hosting large numbers of refugees, specifically in regard to the Venezuelan refugees being received by neighbouring countries; and removing obstacles to solutions to forced displacement and ensuring dignified, secure and safe returns in the cases of refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic and Myanmar.

⁶²⁰ See [S/PV.8653](#).

⁶²¹ See [S/PV.8504](#). For more information on the previous briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Council, see [S/PV.8083](#). See also *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*, part I, sect. 35.

Meetings: briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8528 20 May 2019					Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) , 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) , ^a Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, all other Council members	
S/PV.8688 17 December 2019					Seven Committee Chairs ^b	

^a Before his briefings as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), the representative of Indonesia delivered a joint statement, on behalf of those two Committees and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) concerning counter-terrorism, on the continuing cooperation among the three committees and their respective expert groups. The representative of Indonesia spoke a fourth time in his national capacity.

^b Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2127 \(2013\)](#) concerning the Central African Republic, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) concerning counter-terrorism, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) and of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals; Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1518 \(2003\)](#); Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan and of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan; Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions; and Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2048 \(2012\)](#) concerning Guinea-Bissau.

Meetings: briefings by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8479 7 March 2019				Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia	All Council Members, invitee	

Meetings: briefings by the President of the International Court of Justice

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8653 31 October 2019 (closed)				President of the International Court of Justice	Council members, President of the International Court of Justice	

Meetings: briefings by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decisions and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8504 9 April 2019				United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	13 Council members, ^a invitee	

^a The representative of Equatorial Guinea spoke also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa.

33. Security Council mission

During the period under review, the Security Council dispatched five missions to the field: (a) West Africa (Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau); (b) the Sahel (Mali and Burkina Faso); (c) Iraq and Kuwait; (d) Colombia; and (e) South Sudan and Ethiopia. The missions were composed of representatives of all members of the Council. Following the missions, the Council held four meetings under the item entitled "Security Council mission", at which it heard briefings by the representatives of the Council members leading or co-leading the missions. The Council did not convene a meeting or issue a report on its mission to

South Sudan. More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.⁶²²

During the missions, as reported during the briefings, Council members met with Government

⁶²² For more information on the composition and reports of the missions, see part VI, sect. II.A.

officials,⁶²³ members of parliament,⁶²⁴ representatives of political parties,⁶²⁵ including, in some cases, the political opposition,⁶²⁶ and civil society organizations,⁶²⁷ including women's non-governmental organizations.⁶²⁸ In addition, during the mission to West Africa, Council members met with representatives of the partner organizations involved in the peacebuilding process in Guinea-Bissau, the diplomatic corps and the group of five regional and international partners, which was composed of the African Union, the European Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries and the United Nations.⁶²⁹ During the mission to the Sahel, Council members held a working session with the Permanent Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Force Commander of the Joint Force on the security aspects of the activities of the Group of Five for the

Sahel.⁶³⁰ During its mission to Colombia, Council members met with representatives of the private sector and academia.⁶³¹ During the briefing on the mission to Iraq and Kuwait, both co-leads of the mission drew attention to the fact that it was the first time that the members of the Council had visited Iraq.⁶³² At the same meeting, the representatives of the Russian Federation and Iraq also made statements in regard to the situation in Iraq.

During its mission to South Sudan, the Council met with the signatories to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, including the Government of South Sudan, representatives of opposition political parties and key stakeholder groups.⁶³³ During the second part of the mission, to Ethiopia, Council members participated in the thirteenth annual joint consultative meeting with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on developments related to the situations in Libya, South Sudan and the Central African Republic, as well as the Sahel region. Council members and members of the Peace and Security Council also met in the context of the fourth informal seminar to engage and exchange views on topical issues relevant to the work and mandates of both institutions.⁶³⁴

⁶²³ See [S/PV.8470](#) (West Africa: Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau); [S/PV.8492](#) (Sahel: Mali and Burkina Faso); [S/PV.8571](#) (Iraq and Kuwait); [S/PV.8580](#) (Colombia); and [S/2020/192](#) (South Sudan).

⁶²⁴ See [S/PV.8470](#) (Guinea-Bissau) and [S/PV.8571](#) (Iraq).

⁶²⁵ See [S/PV.8470](#) (Guinea-Bissau); [S/PV.8492](#) (Mali); [S/PV.8580](#) (Colombia); and [S/2020/192](#) (South Sudan).

⁶²⁶ See [S/PV.8492](#) (Mali); [S/PV.8580](#) (Colombia); and [S/2020/192](#) (South Sudan).

⁶²⁷ See [S/PV.8470](#) (Guinea-Bissau); [S/PV.8492](#) (Sahel: Mali and Burkina Faso); [S/PV.8571](#) (Iraq); [S/PV.8580](#) (Colombia); and [S/2020/192](#) (South Sudan).

⁶²⁸ See [S/PV.8470](#) (Guinea-Bissau); [S/PV.8492](#) (Mali); [S/PV.8580](#) (Colombia); and [S/2020/192](#) (South Sudan).

⁶²⁹ See [S/PV.8470](#) (West Africa: Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau).

⁶³⁰ See [S/PV.8492](#) (Sahel: Mali and Burkina Faso).

⁶³¹ See [S/PV.8580](#) (Colombia).

⁶³² See [S/PV.8571](#) (Kuwait and United States).

⁶³³ See [S/2019/825](#) and [S/2020/192](#).

⁶³⁴ See [S/2020/192](#).

Meetings: Security Council mission

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>
S/PV.8470 26 February 2019	Briefing by Security Council mission to West Africa (13 to 17 February 2019)	Letter dated 8 February 2019 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/123) Report of the Security Council mission to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau (S/2019/303)		Two Council members (Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea)
S/PV.8492 27 March 2019	Briefing by Security Council mission to the Sahel (21 to 25 March 2019)	Letter dated 20 March 2019 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/252) (No report issued)		Four Council members (Côte d'Ivoire, France, Germany, Russian Federation)

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>
S/PV.8571 11 July 2019	Briefing by Security Council mission to Iraq and Kuwait (27 to 30 June 2019)	Letter dated 27 June 2019 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/533) (No report issued)	Iraq	Three Council members (Kuwait, Russian Federation, United States), invitee
S/PV.8580 19 July 2019	Briefing by Security Council mission to Colombia (11 to 14 July 2019)	Letter dated 10 July 2019 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/557) Report of the Security Council mission to the Republic of Colombia, 11–14 July 2019 (S/2019/827)		Two Council members (Peru, United Kingdom)
S/2019/825	Security Council mission to Ethiopia and South Sudan (19 to 23 October 2019)	(No meeting was held and no report issued)		

34. The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security

During the period under review, the Council held three meetings, including two high-level meetings, and issued one presidential statement in connection with the item entitled “The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security”. Two of the meetings took the form of briefings under the sub-item entitled “International humanitarian law”, while the third meeting was convened for the adoption of a decision.⁶³⁵ More information about the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

Deliberations in the Council in 2019 under this item were focused on the connection between the implementation of international humanitarian law and the safeguarding of the humanitarian space in conflict situations, as well as on how to ensure the implementation of and respect for international humanitarian law in contemporary protracted and complex conflicts, on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. In that regard, Council members emphasized the role of the Council in ensuring compliance with and preventing violations of international humanitarian law, the need to strengthen the law to address the challenges in modern conflict,

and the importance of building capacity and awareness among State and non-State actors to ensure implementation and accountability. With respect to humanitarian action, speakers noted the need to avoid the politicization of assistance and its delivery in accordance with humanitarian principles and respect for national sovereignty.

On 1 April 2019, the Council held its first meeting under the item since 21 February 2014 and heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross and a Professor of Practice at Harvard Law School.⁶³⁶ The Under-Secretary-General stated that ensuring greater respect for international humanitarian law was one of the most effective ways to safeguard the humanitarian space and called for the promotion of policies and practices to strengthen adherence to the law and ensure the broadening and deepening of understanding and acceptance of existing rules. He noted that Council members and Member States should enable humanitarian and medical activities through coordination and advocacy for humanitarian access, the protection of medical care, and by minimizing the

⁶³⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁶³⁶ See [S/PV.8499](#). For more information on the meetings held in 2014, see [S/PV.7113](#); [S/PV.7115](#); and *Repertoire, Supplement 2014–2015*, part I, sect. 36.

impact of sanctions and counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian action. The Under-Secretary-General added that States needed to do much better in terms of holding individuals to account for serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross indicated that the space for impartial humanitarian action was under threat due to the disregard for human dignity, the questioning of the applicability of the law and the politicization of humanitarian aid for political gain or the control of populations. He referred to complex challenges in modern conflict such as terrorism, and sanctions regimes and counter-terrorism measures which were hindering the delivery of neutral and impartial humanitarian action. He called on States to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law and for hostilities to be conducted in a manner that protected civilians, with respect for the basic principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality. The Professor of Practice at Harvard Law School focused on the importance of ensuring that counter-terrorism measures, including measures adopted by the Council, did not inhibit the principled humanitarian action foreseen in, or required by, international humanitarian law, and on the steps that the Council could take to further safeguard humanitarian action and strengthen compliance with international humanitarian law. In that regard, she urged the Council to guard against overly broad and vague notions of what constituted unlawful support to terrorism, to ensure that none of the activities underlying principled humanitarian action formed part or all of the basis for subjecting individuals or entities to sanctions, to urgently consider comprehensive exemptions for principled humanitarian action, and to uphold respect for legal protections for principled humanitarian action.

On 13 August 2019, at the initiative of Poland, which held the Presidency for the month,⁶³⁷ the Council held a briefing on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Conventions and heard statements by the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross and a representative of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.⁶³⁸ In his remarks, the Under-Secretary-General noted that the Council played a crucial role in ensuring respect for international

humanitarian law and that the United Nations, including its peacekeepers, were both obligated to respect and were protected under international humanitarian law. In that connection, he appealed to the Council and Member States to further reflect on ways to ensure that attacks against peacekeepers were properly investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted.

The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross acknowledged that international humanitarian law remained a key tool for States to deal with contemporary challenges of conflict, including counter-terrorism operations in armed conflict, and offered concrete examples of its positive impact. That notwithstanding, he stated that efforts to ensure respect for international humanitarian law were inadequate and called on States to watch over their legal responsibilities and take practical steps for ambitious and thorough interpretation of the law, underscoring the need to constantly reflect on the meaning and development of the law to meet the challenges of warfare today and in the future. The representative of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights called for the mainstreaming of international humanitarian law and the finding of new ways to ensure its implementation. She also underscored the importance of non-State actors' ownership of humanitarian norms and the benefits of peer pressure among States to ensure the implementation of such norms.

On 20 August 2019, the Council issued a presidential statement reaffirming the fundamental importance of the Geneva Conventions for the protection of those affected by armed conflict, on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of their signing.⁶³⁹ The Council recalled its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the need to promote respect for the rules and principles of international humanitarian law.⁶⁴⁰ The Council encouraged States to comply with their international humanitarian law obligations and reaffirmed its strong condemnation of violations in that regard.⁶⁴¹ In particular, the Council expressed serious concern and condemned violations such as indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians and civilian objects such as schools, the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, the unlawful denial of access to humanitarian assistance and humanitarian personnel, and attacks on medical and humanitarian

⁶³⁷ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 5 August 2019 (S/2019/629).

⁶³⁸ See S/PV.8596.

⁶³⁹ S/PRST/2019/8, first paragraph.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid., second and third paragraphs.

personnel and medical facilities.⁶⁴² The Council recalled that States parties to the Geneva Conventions had an obligation to try persons alleged to have committed a grave breach of the Conventions before

⁶⁴² Ibid., third paragraph.

their own courts or, if that State party preferred, to hand them over for trial to another State party concerned.⁶⁴³

⁶⁴³ Ibid., fourth paragraph.

Meetings: the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8499 1 April 2019	International humanitarian law			Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Professor of Practice at Harvard Law School	All Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.8596 13 August 2019	International humanitarian law Letter dated 5 August 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/629)			Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, President of ICRC, representative of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights	13 Council members, ^b all invitees ^c	
S/PV.8599 20 August 2019						S/PRST/2019/8

^a France was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs; Germany (President of the Council) was represented by its Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs; Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Poland was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^b Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, the Russian Federation, South Africa (also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea), United Kingdom and United States. Germany was represented by its Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Poland (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^c The President of ICRC participated in the meeting by videoconference from Geneva.

35. Items relating to non-proliferation

A. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

During the period under review, the Council held one meeting in relation to the item entitled “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”. The meeting took the form of a briefing.⁶⁴⁴ More information on the meeting, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

On 19 March 2019, the Council heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).⁶⁴⁵ The Chair focused on the progress made by Member States in implementing resolution 1540 (2004) and the outcome of the 2016 comprehensive review, including resolution 2325 (2016). He stressed that since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), significant progress had been made towards its implementation. Nevertheless, he noted that the Council, in its resolution 2325 (2016), had recognized that the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) was a long-term task that would require continuous efforts at the national, regional and international levels. As at 19 March 2019, 182 countries had submitted initial reports providing the Committee with information on the measures they had taken, or planned to take, to comply with their obligations under the resolution. He informed the Council that he had sent letters to non-reporting States seeking their first reports, as well as notes verbales to reporting States requesting up-to-date information to assist the Committee in its preparations for the next comprehensive review.

He emphasized the importance of taking practical steps at the national level to implement the resolution

by continuing to develop national implementation action plans, as encouraged in paragraph 5 of resolution 2325 (2016), and of exchanging information among Member States and establishing national points of contact. He recalled that, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 1977 (2011), the Council had decided to conduct a comprehensive review of the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) prior to the expiry of the Committee’s mandate in April 2021. In that regard, the Committee had been mandated to include, if necessary, recommendations on adjustments to its mandate and to submit to the Council a report on the conclusions of the review. He informed the Council that the Committee had begun its preparatory work for the upcoming comprehensive review. The Chair also expressed concern over the ongoing financial challenges affecting the United Nations and stressed that if the situation was not remedied before the end of April 2019, the Committee would face serious challenges in meeting its obligations to the Council and realizing the activities agreed upon under its current programme of work. After the briefing, Council members emphasized the importance of implementing resolution 1540 (2004), expressed support for the comprehensive review and underlined the significance of the Committee’s role in assisting States to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their access by non-State actors.

In 2019, the Council also heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) under a separate item of the agenda, entitled “Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”.⁶⁴⁶

⁶⁴⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁶⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8487](#).

⁶⁴⁶ See [S/PV.8528](#). For more details, see part I, sect. 32.

Meetings: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8487 19 March 2019					All Council members ^a	

^a The representative of Indonesia spoke twice, once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and once in his national capacity.

B. Non-proliferation

In 2019, the Council held three meetings, including one high-level meeting, under the item entitled “Non-proliferation” and did not adopt any decisions. All meetings took the form of briefings.⁶⁴⁷ More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is given in the table below.

Under this item, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations.

On 2 April 2019, the Council held a high-level meeting under the sub-item entitled “Supporting the Non-Proliferation Treaty ahead of the 2020 Review Conference”.⁶⁴⁸ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Director General of IAEA. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs stressed that the potential consequences of a nuclear war would be global and affect all Member States and that it was therefore entirely appropriate that the Council discussed measures related to preventing such a catastrophic outcome, in particular the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was the one instrument that had perhaps played the greatest role in doing so. She further noted that there were four key elements to the success of the Treaty: the inclusion of verifiable non-proliferation obligations through safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities; the inclusion of legally binding disarmament commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament; the establishment of a strategic balance across the three pillars of the Treaty, namely, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and access to the peaceful uses of

nuclear energy; and the Treaty’s near universality, which provided clear authority and ensured almost global subscription to its normative framework. She cautioned that the durability of the Treaty should not be taken for granted in an international environment defined by competition over cooperation and in which the acquisition of arms was prioritized over the pursuit of diplomacy. She encouraged all States to view the Review Conference as a golden opportunity to make the practical gains that would ensure the Treaty’s continued viability. The Director General of IAEA provided an overview of the activities of the Agency, including the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements with States parties to the Treaty, under which they must declare all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities. Despite encouraging developments in implementing the additional protocols to the Treaty, the Agency was faced with challenges, such as the steady increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, along with continuing pressure on its regular budget. He also reported on the nuclear programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which remained at the top of the Agency’s agenda. IAEA continued to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran of its comprehensive safeguards agreement, the additional protocol and additional transparency measures under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action amounted to the most robust verification system in existence anywhere in the world. With regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, despite the lack of direct access, the Agency had continued to monitor the country’s nuclear programme and evaluate all safeguards information available to it, including open-source information and satellite imagery. He expressed hope that the ongoing international developments would lead to an agreement and to the implementation of concrete denuclearization measures, but stressed that any agreement on denuclearization must be accompanied by an effective and sustainable verification mechanism.

⁶⁴⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁶⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8500](#).

On the Middle East, he recalled the previous work of the Agency concerning modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs provided briefings to the Council twice, on 26 June and 19 December 2019, in relation to the seventh and eighth reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).⁶⁴⁹ At both meetings, the representative of Belgium gave a briefing to the Council in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on the implementation of the resolution.⁶⁵⁰

At the briefing in June 2019, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs said that the Secretary-General regretted the decision of the United States not to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran and not to fully renew waivers for non-proliferation projects in the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, since that could impede the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran and other Member States to implement certain provisions of the Plan.⁶⁵¹ The Secretary-General also regretted the announcement made by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 8 May that it would not commit itself to respecting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action limits on its enriched uranium stockpile and heavy water reserves, should other participants not fulfil its demands, especially in the areas of banking and oil. The Secretary-General encouraged the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue to implement all its nuclear-related commitments despite the considerable challenges it faced and to carefully consider and address the concerns expressed by Member States about its activities in relation to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Head of the Delegation of the European Union, speaking on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, stated that the European Union was resolutely committed to the Plan and remained committed to providing tangible results and economic dividends to the Iranian people. While the Plan addressed nuclear non-proliferation aspects, a series of events outside the nuclear domain were increasingly worrying. The European Union had repeatedly urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to refrain

from activities that could deepen mistrust, such as ballistic missile tests, which were inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Following the briefings, most Council members spoke in support of the Plan. The representative of the United States stated that although the United States had made clear its willingness to engage in dialogue to negotiate a deal that would better serve international peace and security, it intended to do everything in its power to curb malign Iranian behaviour, including through updates to the sanctions regime established pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that, in the year since the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan, his country had exercised its policy of strategic patience in order to preserve the Plan, but the goodwill and maximum restraint of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the repeated promises by other participants to seek practical solutions, had yielded no concrete results.

At the briefing in December 2019, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs reported to the Council that since July 2019, under the monitoring of IAEA, the Islamic Republic of Iran had surpassed uranium enrichment level limits stipulated in the Plan, as well as limits on its stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium.⁶⁵² She welcomed the initiatives of the other participants in the Plan that might contribute to the goals of facilitating legitimate business with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the preservation of the Plan, and reiterated the call for the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider and address the concerns expressed by Member States about its activities in relation to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). She expressed concern over the escalating tensions in the region, stating that the Secretary-General continued to call on Member States to exercise maximum restraint and prevent further escalation amid heightened tensions. The Head of the Delegation of the European Union stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had decided to embark on a worrisome path of decreasing its nuclear-related commitments, which the European Union deeply regretted. The European Union strongly urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to change its course of action.

Following the briefings, Council members expressed concern over steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. Against the backdrop of the attack of 14 September on Aramco oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, the representative of the United States reiterated her country's position, while also affirming that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to defy the

⁶⁴⁹ [S/2019/492](#) and [S/2019/934](#).

⁶⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8564](#) and [S/PV.8695](#).

⁶⁵¹ See [S/PV.8564](#).

⁶⁵² See [S/PV.8695](#).

Council's call in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran affirmed that his country continued to be committed to the implementation of the Plan. However, after exercising strategic patience for a year, in the face of apparent continued inaction by the European participants in the Plan, and after witnessing that the promises made to his country had not been honoured, the Islamic Republic of Iran had been left with no other option

than to act and take the necessary measures to rectify the imbalance created in the Plan. Recalling paragraphs 26 and 36 of the Plan, he stated that his country had ceased implementing only some voluntary measures which were not inconsistent with the safeguards-related obligations.⁶⁵³ He added that as soon as the full implementation of the Plan by other participants was guaranteed, the Islamic Republic of Iran would immediately reverse all its measures.

⁶⁵³ See resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), annex A, paras. 26 and 36.

Meetings: non-proliferation

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8500 2 April 2019	Supporting the Non-proliferation Treaty ahead of the 2020 Review Conference			Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency	All Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.8564 26 June 2019	Letter dated 13 June 2019 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/488) Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2019/492) Letter dated 21 June 2019 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/514)		Islamic Republic of Iran	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, ^b all invitees ^c	
S/PV.8695 19 December 2019	Letter dated 4 December 2019 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/925) Eighth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2019/934)		Islamic Republic of Iran	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Head of the Delegation of the European Union	All Council members, ^d all invitees ^e	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for- against- abstaining)</i>
	Letter dated 16 December 2019 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/952/Rev.1)					

^a France was represented by its Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs; Germany (President of the Council) was represented by its Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs; Indonesia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Poland was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the United States was represented by its Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.

^b The representative of Belgium gave a briefing in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

^c The Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

^d The representative of Belgium gave a briefing in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^e The Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

C. Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings under this item. One meeting was convened to adopt a decision and the second meeting took the form of a briefing.⁶⁵⁴ The Council adopted a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts in support of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#). More information on the meetings, including speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

On 10 April 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2464 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) for a period of 12 months, until 24 April 2020.⁶⁵⁵ Following the adoption of the resolution, Council members made statements. While some expressed concerns about the continued evasion of sanctions measures and the need for the full implementation of existing measures,⁶⁵⁶ others raised concerns about the humanitarian impact of sanctions

on civilians.⁶⁵⁷ The representative of the United Kingdom said that the inadequate provision of humanitarian assistance was due to the government policies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, not to sanctions, and called for the continuous monitoring of the effectiveness of the humanitarian exemptions process. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom underlined the critical role of the Panel in reporting and investigating sanctions violations, while others raised the need for the Panel to be guided by the principles of impartiality and objectivity and operate solely through the use of verified information on the basis of respectful cooperation with all Member States.⁶⁵⁸

On 11 December 2019, the Council heard a briefing by the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific on the troubling developments in recent months related to the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.⁶⁵⁹ The Assistant Secretary-General stated that the country had conducted over 10 missile launches to date, most recently on 7 December 2019. Meanwhile, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had suspended its diplomatic engagement, including working-level talks with the United States and intra-Korean contacts. He recalled the Secretary-General's call for the parties

⁶⁵⁴ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁶⁵⁵ Resolution [2464 \(2019\)](#), para. 1. For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

⁶⁵⁶ See [S/PV.8507](#) (United States, France and United Kingdom).

⁶⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, (Russian Federation, Equatorial Guinea and China).

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁹ See [S/PV.8682](#).

to resume dialogue and for the international community to support the parties in such endeavours. He pointed out that international humanitarian operations remained critical to the livelihood of over 10 million people and that the human rights and humanitarian situation would only be improved through resumed diplomacy. Following the briefing, speakers reiterated the importance of strict and full implementation of relevant Council resolutions and, in that regard, some advocated the modification of the

sanctions measures in line with the political progress, pointing out that the political settlement was another important but under-stressed component of the relevant resolutions. In that connection, speakers underlined the importance of a united Council.⁶⁶⁰

⁶⁶⁰ For further details on the discussion, see part VII, sect. III.B.

Meetings: non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8507 10 April 2019		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2019/302)			Six Council members ^a	Resolution 2464 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8682 11 December 2019			Japan, Republic of Korea	Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific	All Council members, all invitees	

^a China, Equatorial Guinea, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

36. Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

In 2019, the Council held two meetings, one of which was a high-level meeting, under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”. One meeting took the form of a briefing and the other was an open debate.⁶⁶¹ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

The Council heard briefings from a variety of speakers, including the Secretary-General, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, representatives from other international and regional organizations such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank, and experts from civil society and non-governmental organizations.

On 18 July 2019, at the initiative of Peru, which held the Presidency for the month,⁶⁶² the Council convened a briefing under the sub-item entitled

“Strengthening partnerships for successful nationally-owned transitions”.⁶⁶³ The Secretary-General stated that managing nationally owned and forward-looking transitions was a priority for the entire United Nations system, adding that the Organization’s role in transition processes had to be comprehensive and coherent and work in an integrated way to address the interlinked and often stubborn drivers of conflict. He highlighted the need for strong partnerships between the United Nations and other organizations, including regional and subregional organizations and international financial institutions, and noted the convening power and advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission. Following the briefing by the Secretary-General, the Senior Director of the Fragility, Conflict and Violence Group of the World Bank and the Director of the Transition States Coordination Office of the African Development Bank focused on the importance of partnerships to address the challenges posed by fragility and conflict in countries around the world. The Minister

⁶⁶¹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁶⁶² The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 27 June 2019 ([S/2019/540](#)).

⁶⁶³ See [S/PV.8579](#).

for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, speaking in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, gave the Council a briefing on the principal purposes of the Commission, which included filling the vacuum of institutional and structural capacity and supporting countries in transition in the light of the growing risk of the resumption of conflict. He said that the Commission's sessions had become opportunities to gain a better understanding of the multidimensional challenges being faced in peace operations, offering a more holistic approach to the challenges faced by countries affected by conflict extending beyond the imperatives of peace and security. In that regard, he noted that the Council could take advantage of the capacity of the Commission as a platform for promoting coherence between the peacebuilding efforts of the United Nations and other organizations.

In the ensuing discussion, Council members commended the role of the Peacebuilding Commission and its increased engagement with the Council. The majority of Council members emphasized the importance of transition planning and management, with the representatives of the United Kingdom and Indonesia proposing changes to the content of the reports of the Secretary-General in mission contexts. In addition, Council members spoke in favour of partnerships to support countries affected by conflict, while taking into account their particular circumstances, needs and priorities. They also emphasized the importance of national ownership. The representative of the Russian Federation cautioned that the provision of assistance to States in the area of peacebuilding and peacekeeping in the United Nations system required both proper coordination of efforts and appropriate division of labour, adding that specialized United Nations bodies and international mechanisms already existed to meet those objectives. After most Council members had spoken, the representative of Côte d'Ivoire (a Council member), as well as the representatives of Haiti and Timor-Leste, invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, spoke to share their countries' experiences in regard to nationally owned transitions.

On 19 November 2019, at the initiative of the United Kingdom, which held the Presidency for the month,⁶⁶⁴ the Council convened an open debate under the sub-item entitled "The role of reconciliation in maintaining international peace and security".⁶⁶⁵ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General and representatives of academia, civil society and a regional organization, invited under rule 39 of the

provisional rules of procedure.⁶⁶⁶ The Secretary-General affirmed that successful reconciliation contributed to preventing a recurrence of conflict and to building more peaceful, resilient and prosperous societies. He made reference to the wave of protests around the world and urged Governments to respond to those protests with respect for freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and to address people's grievances through dialogue and reconciliation to counter deep polarization. He indicated that the United Nations was working to integrate reconciliation frameworks into peacemaking and peacebuilding activities in countries throughout the world and noted that successful reconciliation was both a goal and a process. The Dean of the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University focused on the importance of reconciliation for achieving lasting peace. Echoing the Secretary-General, he said that reconciliation was not only an outcome but a tailor-made process, agile enough to adapt to changing socioeconomic and political post-conflict dynamics. He affirmed that reconciliation needed to happen all the time and everywhere – sometimes even as the first option to achieve peace – and that designing effective reconciliation required the involvement of relevant local actors, in particular women and young people. The representative of the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre in Somalia focused on the experience of her country, which was a State that had collapsed devastatingly in 1991 and remained trapped in a spiral of prolonged violent anarchy and warfare. She said that successful strategies for peacebuilding and national reconciliation needed to involve as many sectors of the population as possible. In that regard, she denounced the fact that women-led civil society groups all over the world that were able to speak to the underlying drivers of violence and significantly influence the reconciliation process were systematically excluded, and urged the Council to utilize resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) to advance the inclusion of women in adjusting the challenges to reconciliation and to mandate inclusive gender decision-making in the design, implementation and monitoring of reconciliation strategies. She also called on the Council to work with the existing mechanisms of the United Nations family, including the Peacebuilding Fund.

During the discussion, several Council members shared the experience of their countries' national reconciliation processes,⁶⁶⁷ while others agreed on the importance of national ownership and the involvement

⁶⁶⁴ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 11 November 2019 ([S/2019/871](#)).

⁶⁶⁵ See [S/PV.8668](#).

⁶⁶⁶ For more information on participation in meetings of the Council, see part II, sect. VII.

⁶⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8668](#) (South Africa, Belgium and Côte d'Ivoire).

of women and young people throughout the reconciliation process.⁶⁶⁸ Council members also highlighted the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in providing advice and integrated strategic recommendations for peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery, in particular in the case of country-specific configurations.⁶⁶⁹ Speakers focused on the importance

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid., (Dominican Republic, Germany, Belgium, France, Indonesia, Equatorial Guinea, United States and Poland).

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid., (Kuwait, Germany, Indonesia and Equatorial Guinea).

of reconciliation for lasting peace, the close association between reconciliation and transitional justice, and the need to ensure that reconciliation processes were inclusive of women, young people and religious leaders. Speakers also addressed the need for the Council to focus on transitions from conflict to post-conflict situations to achieve sustainable peace and security, including by considering the use of special political missions.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁷⁰ For further details on the discussion, see part VI, sect. IV.

Meetings: peacebuilding and sustaining peace

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8579 18 July 2019	Strengthening partnerships for successful nationally-owned transitions Letter dated 27 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/540)		Haiti and Timor-Leste ^a	Senior Director of the Fragility, Conflict and Violence Group of the World Bank, Director of the Transition States Coordination Office of the African Development Bank, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia (Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission)	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^b all invitees	
S/PV.8668 S/PV.8668 (Resumption 1) 19 November 2019	The role of reconciliation in maintaining international peace and security Letter dated 11 November 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/871)		39 Member States ^c	Dean of the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, Director of Programmes and Development at the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^d all invitees	

^a Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship; and Timor-Leste was represented by its Minister for Legal Reforms and Parliamentary Affairs.

^b Peru was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^c Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Viet Nam.

^d The United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for the Commonwealth, the United Nations and South Asia.

37. Threats to international peace and security

During the period under review, the Council held seven meetings, including one high-level meeting, and adopted two resolutions in connection with the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”. One meeting was held as a debate, one was held as an open debate, two were convened to adopt decisions of the Council and three took the form of briefings.⁶⁷¹ The Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD), established pursuant to resolution 2379 (2017), until 21 September 2020.⁶⁷² More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2019, the Council held two thematic discussions under this item on mercenary activities as a source of insecurity and destabilization in Africa and on the linkages between international terrorism and organized crime. In connection with the latter, the Council adopted resolution 2482 (2019). The Council also held three meetings under this item to discuss the progress of the work of UNITAD. In addition, the Council held a dedicated briefing to discuss the issue of the acquisition, proliferation, deployment and use of missiles, including ballistic missiles, in armed conflict, against the backdrop of heightened tensions relating to the United States’ withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and subsequent medium-range missile testing.

On 4 February 2019, at the initiative of Equatorial Guinea, which held the Presidency for the month,⁶⁷³ the Council held a high-level debate under the sub-item entitled “Mercenary activities as a source of insecurity and destabilization in Africa”.⁶⁷⁴ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. In his briefing, the Secretary-General focused on the use of mercenaries and other foreign fighters and the negative impact of their activities in worsening conflict and threatening stability. He called for the bolstering of legal regimes to combat mercenary activities, globally and nationally, for increased bilateral, regional and international cooperation, particularly in border management and

building the capacity of national institutions responsible for justice, security and human rights, and for enhanced efforts to create opportunities for young people in order to reduce the lure of mercenaries and the threat of radicalization. He also said that the gender dimensions of mercenary activity must be addressed. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission focused his briefing on the historical link between mercenary activities and destabilization in Africa, as well as on its consequences. He also expressed concern about the emergence of private security companies that transact with Governments in the region. He called for the strengthening of international instruments related to the phenomenon of mercenarism and the provision of increased capacity assistance to States to address that scourge, and underscored that the fight against it must be part of the overall context of promoting peace and security on the continent. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Rwanda, speaking on behalf of the President of Rwanda in his capacity as Chairperson of the African Union, indicated that, in addition to being involved in active combat, mercenary groups were also increasingly engaging in cyberattacks and industrial espionage. He called for collective, coordinated efforts at the regional and international level focused on disrupting financial networks and cross-border recruitment for mercenary activities. In the ensuing discussion, Council members and invitees agreed that the phenomenon of mercenarism constituted a threat to peace and security in Africa and elaborated on its root causes and impact on the continent, with a focus on the Central African region. They called for international, regional and subregional cooperation to find solutions for the prevention of mercenarism, support States in the region to strengthen the rule of law, and address the gaps in the international legal framework for ending impunity in the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries and foreign fighters. Speakers also discussed the need to improve oversight and regulation of private military companies active in the region.

On 9 July 2019, at the initiative of Peru, which held the Presidency for the month,⁶⁷⁵ the Council held an open debate under the sub-item entitled “Linkages between international terrorism and organized crime”.⁶⁷⁶ During the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the

⁶⁷¹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁶⁷² See resolution 2490 (2019), para. 2.

⁶⁷³ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 31 January 2019 (S/2019/97).

⁶⁷⁴ See S/PV.8456.

⁶⁷⁵ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 27 June 2019 (S/2019/537).

⁶⁷⁶ See S/PV.8569.

Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and an international consultant at the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. The Executive Director of UNODC highlighted four priorities for addressing the linkages between transnational organized crime and terrorism: effective implementation of international commitments; provision of technical assistance to build up specialized expertise and capacities, including training for law enforcement agents; reinforcement of investment mechanisms for inter-agency, regional and international cooperation, including information- and intelligence-sharing; and integration of action against terrorism and crime across the pillars of the United Nations. He also gave the Council a briefing on the activities of UNODC to address trafficking in persons and firearms, prevent radicalization and recruitment in prisons, and combat corruption and illicit financing of criminal and terrorist activities. The Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate gave the Council a briefing on the activities of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and discussed the need to intensify and accelerate the exchange of financial intelligence in order to identify potential linkages between terrorism and organized crime, strengthen the role of financial intelligence units, overcome inter-institutional barriers to information-sharing at the investigative and prosecutorial levels, and conduct terrorism financing national risk assessments. The international consultant at the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute summarized her research findings on the crime-terrorism nexus, concluding that there was no doubt that linkages between organized crime and terrorism existed, and warned that expanded linkages could increase vulnerability to terrorism by groups with enhanced criminal capacities while also increasing vulnerability to criminal groups with a heightened propensity towards the use of indiscriminate violence. Following the briefings, speakers discussed the relationship between organized crime and terrorism as a threat to international peace and security and the response at the national, regional and international levels in order to dismantle criminal networks and combat terrorism.

Following the open debate, on 19 July 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2482 \(2019\)](#). In the resolution, the Council called on Member States to enhance the coordination of efforts in the global response to linkages between international terrorism and organized crime, and requested the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to integrate those issues into its country assessments and

analyses.⁶⁷⁷ The Council also called upon Member States to strengthen efforts to counter illicit activities that could contribute to the financing of terrorism, such as illegal production of and trafficking in drugs and weapons and trafficking in persons, and other crimes such as the illicit exploitation and trafficking of natural resources, metals and minerals. The Council also underlined the importance of border management cooperation and regional and subregional coordination to combat illicit activities across borders.⁶⁷⁸ It further urged Member States to strengthen the capacity of criminal justice systems to combat the linkages between international terrorism and organized crime, called upon them to enhance the exchange of information between public authorities and relevant private sector entities, and encouraged them to explore ways to prevent radicalization to violence within their prison systems and impede the transfer of skills and knowledge between terrorists and other criminals.⁶⁷⁹

With regard to the work of UNITAD, the Council heard briefings by the Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team twice in 2019,⁶⁸⁰ following his first briefing to the Council on 4 December 2018.⁶⁸¹ After presenting his second and third reports,⁶⁸² he explained that the Investigative Team had made significant progress in the collection, gathering and analysis of digital, testimonial and forensic evidence with respect to the three core areas identified, namely, crimes in Mosul, Sinjar and Speicher. He informed the Council that the Investigative Team had further expanded the scope of investigations to cover diverse communities, regardless of race, religion, tribe or ethnic origin. He also reported that the Investigative Team had received three formal requests from States with respect to its role in supporting domestic prosecutions in relation to crimes committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh), in addition to inquiries from other States. Most Council members expressed support for the work of the Investigative Team, while some reiterated the need for the Investigative Team to fully respect the national sovereignty of Iraq and its jurisdiction over crimes committed on Iraqi territory.⁶⁸³ Following the

⁶⁷⁷ Resolution [2482 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1 and 23.

⁶⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 4, 7, 13 and 15.

⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 15 and 19–20.

⁶⁸⁰ See [S/PV.8573](#) and [S/PV.8675](#).

⁶⁸¹ For more information on UNITAD, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2018*, part VI, sect. II, and part IX, sect. III.

⁶⁸² [S/2019/407](#) and [S/2019/878](#).

⁶⁸³ See [S/PV.8573](#) (Kuwait, Indonesia, Russian Federation, China and Dominican Republic) and [S/PV.8675](#) (Kuwait, Indonesia, China, Equatorial Guinea, Dominican Republic and Russian Federation).

briefings, on 20 September 2019, at the request of the Government of Iraq,⁶⁸⁴ the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2490 (2019), by which it extended the mandate of the Special Adviser and the Investigative Team until 21 September 2020.⁶⁸⁵

In addition to the above activity of the Council in connection with this item, on 22 August 2019, at the request of the Russian Federation, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.⁶⁸⁶ During her briefing, she indicated that the recent collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty had removed one of the few constraints on the development and deployment of destabilizing and dangerous classes of missiles, and underscored that preventing the spread and emergence of destabilizing weapons remained a vital unfinished task for the international community in its shared endeavour to preserve international peace, security and stability. At the meeting, Council members discussed the issue of the acquisition, proliferation, deployment and use of missiles, including ballistic missiles, in armed conflict. Most Council members lamented the termination of the Treaty due to alleged violations of the Treaty, warned against the threat to international peace and security posed by nuclear proliferation and called for enhanced arms control arrangements and nuclear disarmament. The representative of the Russian Federation said that following the United States' withdrawal from the

Treaty on 2 August 2019, the United States had carried out a test launch of a medium-range missile using an MK-41 launch system on 18 August 2019, underscoring that since August, there had been no restrictions on the development and deployment of such systems. The representative of the United States noted that his country's decision to withdraw from the Treaty was in response to the non-compliance of the Russian Federation with its own obligations, noting that the Russian Federation had pursued a missile system with a range prohibited by the Treaty and had developed, produced, tested and fielded multiple battalions of its non-compliant 9M729 missile system over the previous several years. The representative of the United States further indicated that his country's recent flight test did not violate the United States' obligations. He added that China possessed approximately 2,000 missiles that would have been prohibited had China been part of the Treaty and that China had deployed thousands of intermediate-range missiles, posing a risk to the United States and its allies. The representative of the United States also noted that since the Treaty no longer existed, his country was taking the steps necessary to address the threat posed by the intermediate-range missiles being deployed by both China and the Russian Federation. In response, the representative of China said that it was unacceptable for the United States to use China as an excuse to withdraw from the Treaty and underlined that his country's land-based intermediate-range missiles were all deployed within Chinese territory, were for defence purposes only and posed no threat to any other country.

⁶⁸⁴ See [S/2019/760](#).

⁶⁸⁵ Resolution 2490 (2019), para. 2.

⁶⁸⁶ See [S/PV.8602](#).

Meetings: threats to international peace and security

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8456 4 February 2019	Mercenary activities as a source of insecurity and destabilization in Africa		Eight Member States ^a	Chairperson of the African Union Commission	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^b all invitees ^c	
	Letter dated 31 January 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/97)					

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8569 9 July 2019	Linkages between international terrorism and organized crime Letter dated 27 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/537)		39 Member States ^d	Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, international consultant at the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Permanent Observer and Head of the Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees ^e	
S/PV.8573 15 July 2019	Letter dated 17 May 2019 from the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/407)		Iraq	Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.8582 19 July 2019		Draft resolution submitted by 46 Member States ^f (S/2019/580)	37 Member States ^g		Two Council members (Russian Federation, Peru) ^h	Resolution 2482 (2019) (15-0-0)
S/PV.8602 22 August 2019				Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs	All Council members, invitee	

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8624 20 September 2019	Letter dated 19 September 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/760)	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom (S/2019/761)				Resolution 2490 (2019) (15-0-0)
S/PV.8675 26 November 2019	Letter dated 13 November 2019 from the Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/878)		Iraq	Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD, civil society briefer	All Council members, all invitees ⁱ	

^a Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Congo, Rwanda and Sudan.

^b Equatorial Guinea (President of the Council) was represented by its President. Cote d'Ivoire was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. The representative of China spoke in his capacity as Special Representative of its President.

^c The Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Rwanda participated in the meeting on behalf of the President of Rwanda in his capacity as Chairperson of the African Union. Gabon was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Regional Integration. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission participated in the meeting by videoconference from Addis Ababa.

^d Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Guatemala, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Netherlands, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay and Viet Nam.

^e The Executive Director of UNODC participated in the meeting by videoconference from Vienna. The representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Ukraine.

^f Angola, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Guinea, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^g Angola, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, Guinea, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Portugal, Qatar, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.

^h Peru (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ⁱ The civil society briefer participated in the meeting by videoconference from Iraq.

38. Maintenance of international peace and security

During the period under review, the Council held seven meetings, including two high-level meetings, under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security". The Council adopted one resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter and issued one presidential statement. Of the seven meetings, two

were briefings to the Council, two were debates, one was an open debate and two were convened to adopt decisions.⁶⁸⁷ More information on the meetings,

⁶⁸⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

In 2019, as in previous periods, the Council held meetings under a broad range of sub-items of both a thematic and a regional nature.⁶⁸⁸ The thematic sub-items included: (a) addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security; (b) conflict prevention and mediation; and (c) implementation of the youth and peace and security agenda. Region-specific sub-items included: (a) challenges to peace and security in the Middle East; and (b) transnational organized crime at sea as a threat to international peace and security. During the review period, one high-level meeting was devoted to the thematic issue of addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security, while a second was devoted to the challenges to peace and security in the Middle East.⁶⁸⁹ In addition, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General in connection with the topic of conflict prevention and mediation.⁶⁹⁰ Following the Secretary-General's briefing, the Council heard briefings by both the Chair of The Elders and the Deputy Chair, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon.

Most of the themes addressed in 2019 under the thematic sub-items listed above had been considered in the past in relation to the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security", with the exception of the issue of transnational organized crime at sea as a threat to international peace and security. On 5 February 2019, at the initiative of Equatorial Guinea, which held the Presidency for the month,⁶⁹¹ the Council held an open debate on the topic.⁶⁹² At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. The Executive Director of UNODC called for the Council's continued engagement with the topic, including by encouraging discussion to identify options for enhancing coordination, as well as recommendations to better prevent and counter transnational maritime crime. The Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission proposed a three-pronged approach at the national, regional and international levels to reduce the threat of

transnational organized crime at sea to international peace and security in the Gulf of Guinea region. During the ensuing debate, Council members agreed on the importance of tackling transnational organized crime at sea through greater international cooperation and highlighted in that context the existing legal framework, including relevant Council resolutions. Council members also noted the complexity of the issue and the need to address the root causes.

In 2019, the decisions of the Council addressed some of the themes outlined above. By resolution [2491 \(2019\)](#), adopted on 3 October 2019 under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council renewed for 12 months the authorizations set out in paragraphs 7–10 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#) for Member States to take action to address the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Libya.⁶⁹³ The authorizations included the inspection of vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected of being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya, the seizing of vessels confirmed as being used for those purposes and the use of all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers while inspecting or seizing vessels.⁶⁹⁴

In addition, in a presidential statement issued on 22 November 2019, the Council welcomed the briefing given by the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to the Council on 5 November 2019 under the agenda item entitled "The situation in the Middle East".⁶⁹⁵ In the presidential statement, the Council recalled its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirmed that the proliferation of chemical weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constituted a threat to international peace and security.⁶⁹⁶ The Council reaffirmed its strong support for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, underlined that the objectives of the Convention would not be fully realized as long as there remained States not party to the Convention that could possess or acquire chemical weapons, and reaffirmed that the use of such weapons constituted a violation of international

⁶⁸⁸ For more information on new sub-items, see part II, sect. II.A.

⁶⁸⁹ See [S/PV.8451](#) and [S/PV.8600](#).

⁶⁹⁰ See [S/PV.8546](#).

⁶⁹¹ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 31 January 2019 ([S/2019/98](#)).

⁶⁹² See [S/PV.8457](#).

⁶⁹³ The resolution was adopted further to the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2437 \(2018\)](#) ([S/2019/711](#)).

⁶⁹⁴ Resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), paras. 7–8 and 10.

⁶⁹⁵ [S/PRST/2019/14](#), first paragraph. See also [S/PV.8659](#).

For more information, see part I, sect. 22.

⁶⁹⁶ [S/PRST/2019/14](#), second paragraph.

law and a threat to international peace and security.⁶⁹⁷ Expressing its strong conviction that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons should be held accountable, the Council further noted its strong

support for the efforts of OPCW to ensure the implementation of the Convention's provisions, including those for international verification of compliance.⁶⁹⁸

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid., third, fourth and fifth paragraphs.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid., sixth and seventh paragraphs.

Meetings: maintenance of international peace and security

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8451 25 January 2019	Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security Letter dated 2 January 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/1)		61 Member States ^a	Eight invitees ^b	All Council members, ^c 59 rule 37 invitees, ^d all other invitees ^e	
S/PV.8457 5 February 2019	Transnational organized crime at sea as a threat to international peace and security Letter dated 31 January 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/98)		Seven Member States ^f	Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission	All Council members, ^g all invitees ^h	
S/PV.8546 12 June 2019	Conflict prevention and mediation Letter dated 31 May 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/456)			Chair of the Elders, Deputy Chair of the Elders and former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon	Secretary-General, all Council members, ⁱ all invitees	

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<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8577 17 July 2019	Implementation of the youth and peace and security agenda Letter dated 27 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/539)			Envoy of the Secretary-General on Youth, Programme Coordinator of HAKI Africa, Executive Director of Afghans for Progressive Thinking	13 Council members, ^j all invitees	
S/PV.8600 20 August 2019	Challenges to peace and security in the Middle East Letter dated 6 August 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/643)		12 Member States ^k	Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations	All Council members, ^l all invitees ^m	
S/PV.8631 3 October 2019	Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 2437 (2018) (S/2019/711)	Draft resolution submitted by 28 Member States ⁿ (S/2019/788)	23 Member States ^o		Eight Council members ^p	Resolution 2491 (2019) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8673 22 November 2019					Three Council members (France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom)	S/PRST/2019/14

^a Algeria, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, India, Iraq, Ireland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Morocco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Qatar, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Somalia, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

^b Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme; Chief Scientist of the World Meteorological Organization; research assistant at the Environmental Security Program of the Stimson Center; Minister Counsellor of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations; and Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations.

- ^c Belgium was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence; the Dominican Republic (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Germany was represented by its Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs; Indonesia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Poland was represented by its Secretary of State in the Ministry of Environment; and the United Kingdom was represented by its Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the United Nations.
- ^d The representatives of the Federated States of Micronesia and Somalia did not make statements. Canada was represented by its Minister of Environment and Climate Change; Estonia was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; Fiji was represented by its Attorney General and Minister for Economy, Civil Service, Communications and Climate Change; Guatemala was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign and Religious Affairs; Hungary was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade; Maldives was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; Nicaragua was represented by its Minister Adviser to the President; Norway was represented by its Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the Philippines was represented by its Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Belize spoke on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States; the representative of Nauru spoke on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum; the representative of Tuvalu spoke on behalf of the Pacific small island developing States; and the Minister Counsellor of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro and Ukraine.
- ^e The Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme participated in the meeting by videoconference from Davos, Switzerland.
- ^f Italy, Japan, Norway, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Trinidad and Tobago.
- ^g Equatorial Guinea (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.
- ^h The Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission participated in the meeting by videoconference from Vienna and Luanda, respectively.
- ⁱ Kuwait (President of the Council) was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- ^j The representative of Equatorial Guinea spoke also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa.
- ^k Bahrain, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.
- ^l Germany was represented by its State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office; Poland (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the United States was represented by its Secretary of State.
- ^m The representative of the United Arab Emirates spoke on behalf of the Arab Group, except for Iraq; and the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia.
- ⁿ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
- ^o Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
- ^p China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Kuwait, Russian Federation and United Kingdom.

39. Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

In 2019, the Council held five meetings, including three high-level meetings, in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”. Of the five meetings, two took the form of briefings, one was held as a debate and two took the form of open debates.⁶⁹⁹ In 2019, the Council adopted one resolution⁷⁰⁰ and issued one presidential statement in connection with this item.⁷⁰¹ Two meetings were focused on the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union on peace and security issues in

2019.⁷⁰² In addition, the Council conducted a mission to Addis Ababa to hold the thirteenth annual joint consultative meeting with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 21 and 22 October.⁷⁰³ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in the table below.

On 27 February 2019, at the initiative of Equatorial Guinea, which held the Presidency for the month,⁷⁰⁴ the Council held a high-level open debate to consider the partnership between the United Nations and the African

⁶⁹⁹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

⁷⁰⁰ Resolution 2457 (2019).

⁷⁰¹ See S/PRST/2019/5.

⁷⁰² See S/PV.8473 and S/PV.8650.

⁷⁰³ For more information on the mission, see part I, sect. 34.

⁷⁰⁴ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 13 February 2019 (S/2019/169).

Union on silencing the guns in Africa.⁷⁰⁵ At the outset of the meeting, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2457 \(2019\)](#), in which it welcomed the African Union's determination to achieve its goal of silencing the guns in Africa by 2020 and encouraged the United Nations and the African Union to strengthen their efforts to coordinate their engagement in a mutually supportive manner, across the range of possible responses to conflict.⁷⁰⁶ The Council also heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the African Union High Representative for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020 and the Executive Director of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes on the collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union and the means to achieve a conflict-free Africa through the Silencing the Guns by 2020 initiative. The Under-Secretary-General stated that the strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union had become a cornerstone of United Nations peace and security initiatives in Africa. She highlighted the work of the two organizations in the Central African Republic, the Sudan and Somalia. She further underlined that it was vital that the international community lend its support to Africa in achieving the silencing of the guns. The African Union High Representative noted the impressive progress made in consolidating the strategic partnership between the African Union and the United Nations, including the 2017 Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, while also recognizing that issues of governance and leadership continued to be a major source of instability and conflict in Africa. It was important for the Council to respond positively to the African Union's calls concerning access to United Nations assessed contributions to fund African Union peace support operations. African Union-led operations were responding to threats on behalf of the United Nations and, in particular, the Council, which bore the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Executive Director of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes cautioned that an initiative such as Silencing the Guns by 2020 was merely a mitigation tool that, in the absence of good governance and the urgent transformation of the structural drivers of conflicts, would be meaningless. He added that many parts of Africa were reaching a dangerous tipping point and called on Council members to take collective action. Council members acknowledged the ambitious nature of building a conflict-free Africa and focused on the importance of addressing the factors contributing to violence on the continent, such as poor governance, corruption and underdevelopment. In that regard, Council

⁷⁰⁵ See [S/PV.8473](#).

⁷⁰⁶ Resolution [2457 \(2019\)](#).

members called for greater cooperation and emphasized their respective contributions to it. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Equatorial Guinea, presiding over the meeting, spoke in his national capacity and called on the Council to continue to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa. The representative of South Africa stated that the African Peace and Security Architecture should be the central framework of the Council's Chapter VIII engagement with the African Union on peace and security matters. The representative of Kuwait, commending the exceptional cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union under Chapter VIII of the Charter, noted that robust Council mandates and sustainable and predictable funding were required for the preservation of the positive developments between the two organizations. Speakers also emphasized the importance of sustainable and predictable funding of African peace support operations through United Nations assessed contributions,⁷⁰⁷ as well as strong regional architecture through regional economic communities and regional mechanisms such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.⁷⁰⁸

On 12 March 2019, the Council heard a briefing by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the European Union's support to the United Nations and its commitment to multilateralism.⁷⁰⁹ The High Representative highlighted the cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations, particularly in the peacekeeping missions in Africa, conflict resolution, reconciliation, support for global priorities including climate change, non-proliferation and disarmament. Council members acknowledged the commitment and contribution of the European Union to multilateralism and expressed appreciation for its cooperation with the United Nations. Several Council members underscored the importance of trilateral cooperation among the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union with regard to issues in Africa.⁷¹⁰ In addition, the representative of Kuwait suggested that tripartite cooperation among the United Nations, the European Union and the League of Arab States was an effective way of reaching effective solutions to existing conflicts in his region. The representative of the Russian Federation said that his

⁷⁰⁷ See [S/PV.8473](#) (Indonesia, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, China, Kuwait, Japan, Norway, Egypt, European Union, Italy and Canada).

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, (Equatorial Guinea, Germany, Dominican Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, United Kingdom, Kazakhstan, Djibouti, Slovakia and Republic of Korea).

⁷⁰⁹ See [S/PV.8482](#).

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.*, (Germany, Côte d'Ivoire, Belgium, South Africa, Equatorial Guinea and France).

delegation shared the European Union's determined focus on strengthening global multilateralism with the United Nations taking a leading role, but suggested that the European Union could not manage to define its own independent political direction. He expressed concern about the use of restrictive measures and sanctions as a key foreign policy instrument, noting that the effect of such unilateral steps was highly questionable and further weakened developing States. The representative of China focused on three areas of cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations, namely, upholding multilateralism, upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter by respecting the sovereignty of States, and promoting sustainable development.

On 13 June 2019, at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the Presidency for the month,⁷¹¹ the Council held a meeting to address cooperation between the Council and the League of Arab States.⁷¹² During the meeting, a presidential statement was issued, encouraging the holding of an annual briefing by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, as well as an annual informal meeting between the Security Council members and the members of the Council of the League of Arab States.⁷¹³ In the presidential statement, the Council also emphasized the importance of trilateral cooperation and coordination among the United Nations, the African Union and the League of Arab States and welcomed the opening of the United Nations liaison office at the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo in June 2019. During the meeting, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States commended the initiative to elevate the level of partnership between the League of Arab States and the Security Council within the general framework governed by Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Noting the internal political dynamics in the Security Council, as well as the complications and tensions in the Arab system that curtailed its ability to respond collectively, he expressed the conviction that advancing the cooperative partnership with the United Nations was an indispensable means of enabling both the Security Council and the League of Arab States to assume their inherent responsibilities and better discharge their duties in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security in the region. In the ensuing discussion, Council members focused on the impact and benefits of increased cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States for advancing progress towards a

peaceful Middle East, which was experiencing active conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya and Yemen, as well as instability in the Sudan and Iraq. Speaking in his national capacity, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait stated that the meeting had been convened to consolidate the principle established in Chapter VIII, Article 52, of the Charter and could be considered as the beginning of a new stage in cooperation between the two organizations.⁷¹⁴ Many Council members agreed on the importance of effective partnership between the two organizations in conflict prevention and mediation.⁷¹⁵

On 25 September 2019, at the initiative of the Russian Federation, which held the Presidency for the month,⁷¹⁶ the Council held a ministerial debate on the contribution of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in countering terrorist threats.⁷¹⁷ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General, as well as by the Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Acting Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In their briefings, they described their respective frameworks developed to counter terrorism and transnational crime in Central Asia and Afghanistan and emphasized the importance of cooperation. Following the briefings, Council members focused on the importance of cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in countering terrorism. Council members, as well as other speakers, made reference to a wide variety of organizations and their initiatives to counter terrorism in different parts of the world, including the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Community of West African States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Organization of American States. Some Council members also stressed the need to fully respect obligations under international law and international human rights law in combating terrorism and violent extremism.⁷¹⁸

⁷¹¹ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 31 May 2019 (S/2019/455).

⁷¹² See S/PV.8548.

⁷¹³ S/PRST/2019/5.

⁷¹⁴ For more information on the discussion, see part VIII, sect. I.

⁷¹⁵ See S/PV.8548 (Poland, France, Indonesia, Russian Federation, Peru, Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea).

⁷¹⁶ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 13 September 2019 (S/2019/742).

⁷¹⁷ See S/PV.8626.

⁷¹⁸ *Ibid.*, (Belgium, Dominican Republic, United Kingdom and United States).

On 30 October 2019, the Council heard a briefing on regional cooperation with the African Union, in particular on the growing strategic partnership between the two organizations based on a host of mechanisms, including the 2017 Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security.⁷¹⁹ Following briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union and the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations, Council members welcomed the growing collaboration between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in the areas of crisis response and conflict prevention, and spoke about the annual meeting of the two Councils held in Addis Ababa on 21 and 22 October. Council members also focused on the issue of financing African Union peace operations authorized by the Security Council through assessed contributions, underlining the importance of increasing the predictability, sustainability

⁷¹⁹ See [S/PV.8650](#).

and flexibility of funding and support for African-led peace operations.⁷²⁰ Speaking also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea, the Minister for Defence and Military Veterans of South Africa emphasized that the key principles that should direct and shape the partnership and cooperation between the two organizations going forward were meaningful and inclusive collaboration, shared and common approaches and effective consultative mechanisms, specifically between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council. In that regard, and further to the meeting in Addis Ababa, she emphasized the need to translate and elevate some of the commitments made by both Councils into tangible outcomes and to move away from generalities about partnership and cooperation towards decisive and practical steps that the Security Council, in particular, and the United Nations and the African Union, in general, could take to realize the full implementation of the strategic partnership.

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*, (United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, China, Peru, Dominican Republic, Kuwait and Belgium).

Meetings: cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8473 27 February 2019	Silencing the guns in Africa Letter dated 13 February 2019 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Equatorial Guinea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/169)	Draft resolution S/2019/179 submitted by 52 Member States ^a	56 Member States ^b	Seven invitees ^c	All Council members, ^d all invitees ^e	Resolution 2457 (2019) 15-0-0
S/PV.8482 12 March 2019	European Union			High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy	All Council members, invitee ^f	
S/PV.8548 13 June 2019	Cooperation between the Security Council and the League of Arab States			Secretary-General of the League of Arab States	Secretary-General, all Council members, ^g invitee	S/PRST/2019/5

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against- abstaining)</i>
	Letter dated 31 May 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/455)					
S/PV.8626 25 September 2019	The contribution of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in countering terrorist threats		13 Member States ^h	Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Acting Secretary- General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States, European Union Special Representative for Central Asia	All Council members, ⁱ 11 invitees under rule 37, ^j all other invitees	
	Letter dated 13 September 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/742)					
S/PV.8650 30 October 2019	African Union Report of the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union (S/2019/759)			Special Representative of the Secretary- General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations ^j	13 Council members, ^k all invitees ^l	

^a Algeria, Angola, Belgium, Canada, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia and Ukraine.

- ^b Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey and Ukraine.
- ^c Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; African Union High Representative for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020; Executive Director of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes; Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations; Permanent Observer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations; and Under-Secretary for Relations with States of the Holy See.
- ^d Equatorial Guinea (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; and Germany was represented by its State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office.
- ^e Guatemala was represented by its Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. The representative of Benin spoke on behalf of the Group of African States; the representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries; the representative of Lebanon spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States; and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations spoke on behalf of the European Union and its member States, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine.
- ^f Nicaragua was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- ^g Kuwait (President of the Council) was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Poland was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- ^h Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
- ⁱ Belgium was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Development Cooperation; China was represented by its State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Equatorial Guinea was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; France was represented by its Minister of State attached to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs; Germany was represented by its Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office; Kuwait was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Poland was represented by its Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Russian Federation (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; and South Africa was represented by its Minister for International Relations and Cooperation.
- ^j The representatives of Afghanistan and Turkmenistan did not make statements. All speakers invited under rule 37 were represented at the ministerial level.
- ^k Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa (also on behalf of Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea), United Kingdom and United States. South Africa (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister of Defence and Military Veterans.
- ^l The Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the African Union and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union and the Permanent Observer of the African Union participated in the meeting by videoconference from Djibouti.

Part II
**Provisional rules of procedure and related
procedural developments**

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Introductory note

Part II of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Security Council in relation to its provisional rules of procedure and relevant Articles of the Charter of the United Nations. Since the provisional rules of procedure are routinely applied by the Council at its formal meetings, the focus of part II is on special applications of the rules in the proceedings of the Council, rather than on the standard applications of the rules.

Part II is divided into 10 sections, in the order of the relevant chapters of the provisional rules of procedure, as follows: section I, meetings and records (Article 28 of the Charter and rules 1–5 and 48–57); section II, agenda (rules 6–12); section III, representation and credentials (rules 13–17); section IV, presidency (rules 18–20); section V, Secretariat (rules 21–26); section VI, conduct of business (rules 27, 29–30 and 33); section VII, participation (Articles 31–32 of the Charter and rules 37 and 39); section VIII, decision-making and voting (Article 27 of the Charter and rules 31–32, 34–36, 38 and 40); section IX, languages (rules 41–47); and section X, provisional status of the rules of procedure (Article 30 of the Charter).

The remaining rules are covered in other parts of the present Supplement, as follows: rule 28, concerning subsidiary organs of the Council, in parts IX and X, and concerning Council missions, in part VI; and rule 61, concerning relations with other United Nations organs, in part IV.

During the period under review, there were no instances of the application of rules 58 to 60, concerning the admission of new Members, and therefore the present Supplement contains no material relating to those rules.

* * *

During the period under review, the Council held a total of 258 meetings. Most of the meetings were public, with a total of 243 public meetings and 15 private meetings held in 2019. The Council held a total of 135 informal consultations of the whole in 2019, and Council members continued to meet in the framework of informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings, following past practice. During the period under review, the Council continued to expand the practice of holding informal “wrap-up” sessions at the end of the month, except for the months of January and February, when no wrap-up sessions were held. For the months of March and April, France and Germany held a joint informal wrap-up session at the end of April.

In 2019, the Council was seized of 69 agenda items. The Council added the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela” to the list of matters of which it was seized. While being seized of 69 items, the Council considered 49 items at its meetings in 2019. Of the 49 items considered by the Council in 2019, 27 concerned country-specific and regional situations and 22 dealt with thematic and other issues.

During the period under review, the Council adopted 52 resolutions and issued 15 statements by the President. The Council also issued 18 notes by the President and 32 letters from the President. Three draft resolutions were not adopted for lack of the required nine affirmative votes and three draft resolutions were not adopted because of the negative vote of a permanent member. In 2019, objections to the adoption of the agenda led to procedural votes on two occasions.

Aspects relating to the working methods of the Council continued to be raised and discussed in Council meetings, in particular in the context of the open debate on working methods under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” held on 6 June 2019 (see cases 1, 6, 7 and 8).¹ Speakers exchanged views on aspects relating to the format of Council meetings and on the participation in Council meetings. The discussion was focused also on cooperation and communication between the Council and the Secretariat, as well as on issues pertaining to the decision-making process and initiatives to restrain the use of the veto, penholdership and the drafting of outcome documents of the Council.

At the end of the year, on 27 December 2019, the Council issued eight notes by the President, covering a wide variety of aspects of the working methods of the Council, including the planning and conduct of Council missions, the informal process for the selection of Chairs of subsidiary bodies, the inclusion of an unofficial addendum to the provisional programme of work, the early participation of newly elected members, the conduct and publicity of wrap-up sessions, the circulation of reports of the Secretary-General, the use of the male pronoun in the provisional rules of procedure, and the process of elaboration and adoption of the annual report to the General Assembly.²

¹ See S/PV.8539. The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 29 May 2019 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2019/450).

² See S/2019/990, S/2019/991, S/2019/992, S/2019/993, S/2019/994, S/2019/995, S/2019/996 and S/2019/997.

I. Meetings and records

Note

Section I covers the practice of the Council concerning meetings, publicity and the records of the Council, in relation to Article 28 of the Charter of the United Nations and rules 1 to 5 and 48 to 57 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

Article 28

1. *The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.*

2. *The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.*

3. *The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.*

Rule 1

Meetings of the Security Council shall, with the exception of the periodic meetings referred to in rule 4, be held at the call of the President at any time he deems necessary, but the interval between meetings shall not exceed fourteen days.

Rule 2

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council.

Rule 3

The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council if a dispute or situation is brought to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 or under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, or if the General Assembly makes recommendations or refers any question to the Security Council under Article 11 (2), or if the Secretary-General brings to the attention of the Security Council any matter under Article 99.

Rule 4

Periodic meetings of the Security Council called for in Article 28 (2) of the Charter shall be held twice a year, at such times as the Security Council may decide.

Rule 5

Meetings of the Security Council shall normally be held at the seat of the United Nations.

Any member of the Security Council or the Secretary-General may propose that the Security Council should meet at another place. Should the Security Council accept any such proposal, it shall decide upon the place and the period during which the Council shall meet at such place.

Rule 48

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.

Rule 49

Subject to the provisions of rule 51, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available to the representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10 a.m. of the first working day following the meeting.

Rule 50

The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in rule 49, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record.

Rule 51

The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in a single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.

Rule 52

Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives on the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence of objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested.

Rule 53

The verbatim record referred to in rule 49 or the record referred to in rule 51, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by rules 50 and 51, respectively, or which has been corrected in accordance with the provisions of rule 52, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council.

Rule 54

The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official languages as soon as possible.

Rule 55

At the close of each private meeting the Security Council shall issue a communiqué through the Secretary-General.

Rule 56

The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations.

Rule 57

The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered

confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.

This section comprises five subsections, namely: A. Meetings, concerning the convening of meetings pursuant to rules 1 to 5 as well as rule 48; B. Informal consultations of the whole; C. Other informal meetings of the members of the Security Council; D. Discussions concerning meetings; and E. Records, which are maintained pursuant to rules 49 to 57.


During the period under review, the Council held 258 meetings, of which 243 were public meetings and 15 were private meetings. In addition, in 2019, the Council held a total of 135 informal consultations of the whole (also known as consultations or informal consultations).

During the period under review, the Council continued to expand the practice of holding informal wrap-up sessions at the end of the month, except for the months of January and February, when no wrap-up sessions were held. For the months of March and April, a joint informal wrap-up session was held by France and Germany at the end of April.

During the period under review, Council members also continued to hold informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings. A total of seven informal interactive dialogues and 22 Arria-formula meetings were held during the year. Figure I shows the total number of meetings and informal consultations of the whole held during the period from 2010 to 2019.

In 2019, the question of the format of meetings was raised during an open debate concerning the working methods of the Council (see case 1).

Figure I
Number of meetings and consultations, 2010–2019



A. Meetings

Application of rules relating to meetings

During the period under review, there were no intervals exceeding 14 days between meetings of the Council, as provided for under rule 1 of the provisional rules of procedure. The Council continued to convene more than one meeting a day, on certain occasions.

In 2019, the Council did not hold any periodic meetings pursuant to rule 4 or any meetings away from Headquarters in accordance with rule 5.

During the reporting period, there was one communication from a Member State requesting the Council to “investigate the recent threats against Venezuela”, in which Article 34 of the Charter was cited explicitly as the basis for the request.³ Some

³ See letter dated 6 August 2019 from the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the President of the Council (S/2019/641).

Council members made explicit references to rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure at the 8529th meeting, held on 20 May 2019, convened by the Russian Federation under the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)”. At the meeting, the Council held a procedural vote concerning the adoption of the provisional agenda. After the procedural vote, which resulted in the rejection of the request of the Russian Federation by six votes to five, with four abstentions,⁴ the representative of South Africa explained her support for the holding of the meeting, based on the fact that Ukraine was on the agenda of the Council and

⁴ *In favour*: China, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa; *against*: Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *abstaining*: Côte d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru. For more information on the adoption of the agenda, see sect. II.

on rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure.⁵ Having abstained, the representative of Indonesia, which held the presidency for the month, explained that the request of the Russian delegation had been addressed in accordance with rule 2. However, he expressed his strong belief that the discussion could only be effective and productive if all members of the Council were united in the decision to proceed with the discussion.

⁵ See [S/PV.8529](#). For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 21.B.

No requests for a meeting were received explicitly citing rule 3 of the provisional rules of procedure. During the period under review, there was, however, one request to convene a meeting in which either rule 2 or 3 was cited implicitly. Table 1 lists the case in which an urgent or emergency meeting of the Council was requested without explicit reference to rule 2 or 3 and/or Articles 34 or 35 of the Charter.

Table 1

Letters in which Member States requested an urgent or emergency meeting without explicit reference to any provision of the Charter or the provisional rules of procedure, 2019

<i>Letter addressed to the President of the Council</i>	<i>Summary</i>	<i>Meeting convened (date and agenda item)</i>
Letter dated 13 August 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/654)	Request for an urgent meeting under the item entitled “The India-Pakistan question” to consider the situation arising from the recent aggressive actions by India, which pose a threat to international peace and security	16 August 2019 The Council held consultations on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir ^a

^a See [A/74/2](#), para. 72.

Complaints raised by Member States concerning the application of rule 3

During the period under review, no complaints were raised concerning the application of rule 3.

Format

Public meetings

The Council continued to convene meetings in public as provided for in rule 48 of the provisional rules of procedure, mainly for the purposes of (a) receiving briefings on country-specific or regional situations, or thematic issues, under its consideration; (b) holding debates on particular items; and (c) adopting decisions.⁶ In 2019, the Council held a total of 243 public meetings, compared with 275 public meetings in 2018 and 282 in 2017. In 2019, the Council met in public 94.2 per cent of the time (243 out of a total 258 Council meetings were held in public).

During the review period, the Council held 18 high-level meetings at which two or more Council members were represented at the ministerial or higher levels, of which 12 were on thematic items and 6 were on regional and country-specific items. In 2019, the Council held three meetings at which more than half of

the Council members were represented at the ministerial or higher levels. Those meetings were held in connection with the items entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” and “Peace and security in Africa”. On 26 September 2019, the Council held its 8627th meeting, under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, which focused on African-led efforts, including the African Union initiative Silencing the Guns by 2020.⁷ A total of 12 Council members were represented at the ministerial level, the largest number of Council members represented at a high level at a Council meeting in 2019. In addition, the Council held one meeting at which a Council member was represented at the level of Head of State or Government. On 4 February 2019, the President of Equatorial Guinea presided over the 8456th meeting of the Council, held under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, focusing on mercenary activities in Africa.⁸

Table 2 lists all high-level meetings held in 2019 at which two or more Council members were represented at the ministerial or higher levels.

⁶ For more information on the formats for public meetings, see the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 ([S/2017/507](#), annex, sect. I.C.1).

⁷ See [S/PV.8627](#). For more information on the meeting, see part I, sect 11.

⁸ See [S/PV.8456](#). For more information on the meeting, see part I, sect. 37.

Table 2
High-level meetings, 2019

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>High-level participation</i>
S/PV.8450 23 January 2019	Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)	Ministerial level (2) Dominican Republic (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Indonesia (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/PV.8451 25 January 2019	Maintenance of international peace and security	Ministerial level (7) Belgium (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Dominican Republic (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Germany (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Indonesia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Poland (Secretary of State in the Ministry of Environment), United Kingdom (Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the United Nations)
S/PV.8452 26 January 2019	The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	Ministerial level (2) United Kingdom (Minister of State for Europe and the Americas), United States (Secretary of State)
S/PV.8456 4 February 2019	Threats to international peace and security	Heads of State or Government (1) Equatorial Guinea (President) Ministerial level (2) China (Special Representative of the President), Côte d'Ivoire (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/PV.8473 27 February 2019	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Ministerial level (2) Equatorial Guinea (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Germany (State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office)
S/PV.8496 28 March 2019	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Ministerial level (3) France (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), Indonesia (Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs), South Africa (Minister of Defence and Military Veterans)
S/PV.8497 29 March 2019	The situation in Mali	Ministerial level (5) Côte d'Ivoire (Minister for Foreign Affairs), France (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), Germany (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs), United Kingdom (Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the United Nations), United States (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs)
S/PV.8498 29 March 2019	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Ministerial level (3) Côte d'Ivoire (Minister for Foreign Affairs), France (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), South Africa (Minister of Defence and Military Veterans)

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>High-level participation</i>
S/PV.8500 2 April 2019	Non-proliferation	Ministerial level (5) France (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), Germany (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs), Indonesia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Poland (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/PV.8514 23 April 2019	Women and peace and security	Ministerial level (3) Germany (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs), United Kingdom (Minister of State for the Commonwealth and the United Nations), Equatorial Guinea (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)
S/PV.8534 23 May 2019	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Ministerial level (2) Germany (Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office), Indonesia (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/PV.8548 13 June 2019	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Ministerial level (2) Poland (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/PV.8596 13 August 2019	The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security	Ministerial level (2) Germany (Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs), Poland (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/PV.8600 20 August 2019	Maintenance of international peace and security	Ministerial level (3) United States (Secretary of State), Germany (State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office), Poland (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
S/PV.8626 25 September 2019	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Ministerial level (11) Belgium (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Development Cooperation), China (State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Dominican Republic (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Equatorial Guinea (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), France (Minister of State attached to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), Germany (Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office), Indonesia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Poland (Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Minister for Foreign Affairs), South Africa (Minister for International Relations and Cooperation)
S/PV.8627 26 September 2019	Peace and security in Africa	Ministerial level (12) Belgium (Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), China (State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Côte d'Ivoire (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Equatorial Guinea (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), France (Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs), Germany (Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office), Indonesia (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Kuwait (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs), Peru (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Poland (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Russian Federation (Minister for Foreign Affairs), South Africa (Minister for International Relations and Cooperation)
S/PV.8648 28 October 2019	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Ministerial level (2) Germany (State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office), South Africa (Minister for International Relations and Cooperation)

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>High-level participation</i>
S/PV.8649 29 October 2019	Women and peace and security	Ministerial level (2) Germany (Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office), South Africa (Minister for International Relations and Cooperation)

Private meetings

During the period under review, the Council continued to hold some meetings in private, in accordance with rule 48 of the provisional rules of procedure. Private meetings continued to constitute a small percentage of all Council meetings; only 15, or 5.8 per cent, of a total 258 meetings held in 2019 were private.⁹

Of the 15 private meetings held in 2019, 13 (86.7 per cent) were meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries held under the item entitled “Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and

police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B”. Of the two remaining meetings (13.3 per cent), one was devoted to the annual briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice, following the Council’s established practice in that regard, while the second was held under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, to hear briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Figure II shows the percentage of public and private meetings held during the period under review, as well as the breakdown of private meetings by type, as described above. Table 3 provides information on all private meetings held by the Council during the period under review, by item and in chronological order.

⁹ For more information on the formats for private meetings, see the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 (S/2017/507, annex, sect. I.C.2).

Figure II
Public and private meetings, 2019




Table 3
Private meetings, 2019

<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>
Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B (13 meetings)	S/PV.8447, 17 January 2019; S/PV.8478, 5 March 2019; S/PV.8483, 14 March 2019; S/PV.8505, 9 April 2019; S/PV.8542, 10 June 2019; S/PV.8544, 11 June 2019; S/PV.8545, 11 June 2019; S/PV.8574, 15 July 2019; S/PV.8594, 8 August 2019; S/PV.8637, 8 October 2018; S/PV.8662, 7 November 2019; S/PV.8677, 3 December 2019; S/PV.8680, 10 December 2019

Item	Meeting record and date
Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice (1 meeting)	S/PV.8653, 31 October 2019
The situation in the Middle East (1 meeting)	S/PV.8659, 5 November 2019

B. Informal consultations of the whole

Informal consultations of the whole are not official meetings of the Council. The members gather in private for the purpose of holding discussions and receiving briefings from the Secretariat and representatives of the Secretary-General. These meetings are normally held in the Consultations Room, adjacent to the Security Council Chamber.

During the period under review, members of the Council continued to meet often in informal consultations of the whole; they met in that capacity a total of 135 times in 2019 (see figure I). Frequently, informal consultations of the whole were held immediately after public meetings of the Council.

Pursuant to the Council's established practice, no official records of informal consultations were issued, and non-members were not invited. On several occasions, however, statements to the press were issued or elements to the press were read out by the President of the Council following informal consultations.¹⁰ As provided for in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the members of the Council encouraged the President of the Council to make efforts, whenever appropriate, to suggest, at the end of consultations, general lines or elements to be used when providing briefings to the press, in order to make consultations result-oriented and increase the transparency of the work of the Council while securing confidentiality.¹¹

C. Other informal meetings of the members of the Security Council

During the period under review, the Council continued to hold informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings.¹² Informal interactive

dialogues and Arria-formula meetings are convened at the initiative of one or more Council members. In practice, informal interactive dialogues are normally convened with the participation of all Council members, while Arria-formula meetings are convened with the participation of all or some Council members. While informal interactive dialogues are presided over by the President of the Council for the month, Arria-formula meetings are not. Frequently, the Council member or members convening the Arria-formula meeting also chair the meeting. Neither of the two types of meeting is considered a formal meeting of the Council. Neither type of meeting is announced in the *Journal of the United Nations* or in the Council's programme of work and no official records are prepared. Invitees to informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings include Member States, relevant organizations and individuals. In past practice, Arria-formula meetings were closed to the public; in recent practice, these meetings have been open to the public or even broadcast.¹³ Informal interactive dialogues are not open to the public or broadcast.

Informal interactive dialogues

During the reporting period, the Council held seven informal interactive dialogues.¹⁴ As provided for in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the Council may, when it deems appropriate, utilize informal dialogues to seek the views of Member States that are parties to a conflict and/or other interested and affected parties.¹⁵ All the informal interactive dialogues held in 2019 concerned country-specific or regional situations, as shown in table 4.

¹⁰ Not all statements to the press were issued as a result of informal consultations.

¹¹ S/2017/507, annex, para. 54.

¹² For more information on informal interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings, see S/2017/507, annex, paras. 92, 95 and 97–99.

¹³ Of the 22 Arria-formula meetings held in 2019, 17 were broadcast.

¹⁴ For information on the evolution of informal interactive dialogues, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009, Supplement 2010–2011, Supplement 2012–2013, Supplement 2014–2015, Supplement 2016–2017* and *Supplement 2018*, part II, sect. I.C.

¹⁵ S/2017/507, annex, para. 92.

Table 4
Informal interactive dialogues, 2019

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Participants (including non-members of the Council)</i>
21 January 2019	The situation in the Central African Republic	All Council members; Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations
20 March 2019	Peace and security in Africa (activity of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office in the Sahel)	All Council members; Colombia (as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission); Egypt and Romania (as Vice-Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission), Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support; Burkina Faso; Mali
21 March 2019	The situation in the Middle East (fostering dialogue and cooperation as a response to conflicts and common challenges in the Middle East and North Africa)	All Council members; Program Director for the Middle East and North Africa of the International Crisis Group; Professor at Montreal University; Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Arab States, United Nations Development Programme; Senior Political Affairs Officer, Middle East Team, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs/Department of Peace Operations
7 June 2019	The situation in Libya	All Council members; Deputy Secretary General for Common Security and Defence Policy and crisis response of the European External Action Service
31 July 2019	Peace and security in Africa (Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)	All Council members; African Union Commissioner for Social Affairs; Ebola Emergency Response Coordinator; Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator; Executive Director of the Health Emergencies Programme of the World Health Organization; Democratic Republic of the Congo
28 August 2019	The situation in Burundi	All Council members; Director of the Central and Southern Africa Division, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs/Department of Peace Operations; Switzerland (as Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission)
27 November 2019	Peace consolidation in West Africa (United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel)	All Council members; former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs/Department of Peace Operations; Colombia (as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission)

Arria-formula meetings

As provided for in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, Arria-formula meetings are utilized by the members of the Council as a flexible and informal forum for enhancing their deliberations and their contact with civil society and non-governmental organizations.¹⁶

According to that note, Council members may invite, on an informal basis, any Member State, relevant organization or individual to participate in Arria-formula meetings. During the period under review, the Council held a total of 22 such meetings. They are listed in table 5.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 98.

Table 5
Arria-formula meetings, 2019

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Organizer(s)</i>
24 January 2019	What's next for women and peace and security in the Middle East and North Africa: the potential of national action plans	Germany
31 January 2019	Preventing and countering the financing of terrorism	France
8 February 2019	Accountability for conflict-related sexual violence as a central pillar for prevention	Germany
12 February 2019	Protecting boys and girls in a shrinking humanitarian space	Belgium
11 March 2019	Human rights, accountability and justice: contributions to international peace and security	France, Peru
13 March 2019	Women's participation in political processes, with a focus on the Sahel	France, Germany
15 March 2019	A symbolic date: the fifth anniversary of the beginning of Russia's occupation of Crimea: a blatant violation of international law	Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, United Kingdom, United States
1 April 2019	Protecting humanitarian and medical personnel	France, Germany
8 April 2019	The Western Balkans road map for the control of small arms and light weapons as a model for effective regional arms control	Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany
12 April 2019	Explosive ordnance threat mitigation: for the implementation of a coherent and comprehensive response	Belgium and Poland, in collaboration with Germany
17 April 2019	Human rights components in peace operations	Côte d'Ivoire, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru
9 May 2019	Israeli settlements and settlers: core of the occupation, protection crisis and obstruction of peace	Indonesia, Kuwait, South Africa
13 May 2019	The humanitarian crisis in Cameroon	Dominican Republic, Germany, United Kingdom, United States
24 May 2019	Peacekeeping impact on peacebuilding and sustaining peace	Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia
7 June 2019	Transnational organized crime and drug trafficking in the Caribbean region as a threat to international stability	Dominican Republic
24 June 2019	Responding effectively to the needs of refugees, displaced persons and returnees: the role of the Security Council and its members	Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, South Africa
22 August 2019	Advancing the safety and security of persons belonging to religious minorities in armed conflict	Brazil, Canada, Jordan, Poland, United Kingdom, United States
23 August 2019	Mass atrocity crimes in Myanmar: where do we stand on accountability?	Germany, Kuwait, Peru
25 October 2019	Trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation in (post-) conflict situations: integrating a comprehensive approach to trafficking in persons into the women and peace and security agenda of the Security Council	Belgium, Niger, Peru, United Kingdom, Viet Nam, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
12 November 2019	Challenges of radicalization in prisons	Belgium, Indonesia

<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Organizer(s)</i>
26 November 2019	Reintegration of children associated with armed forces and armed groups: bridging the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, including by taking into account children's views in designing and implementing reintegration programmes	Belgium, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom
9 December 2019	Protection of the environment during armed conflict	Kuwait

Other informal meetings

Following the practice started in 2007, the Council met with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in 2019.¹⁷ In this connection, and in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the members of the Council acknowledged the importance of annual joint consultative meetings and informal dialogues with the members of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, to exchange views on ways to strengthen cooperation and partnership.¹⁸ In 2019, the Council commenced the holding of monthly informal discussions at the level of permanent representatives to encourage a frank exchange among ambassadors on developing threats to peace and security.¹⁹ These meetings have become known as “sofa talks”.

D. Discussions concerning meetings

During the period under review, questions pertaining to the meetings of the Council and to other forms of informal gatherings of members of the

Council were discussed during the open debate on the working methods of the Council held on 6 June 2019, under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)” (see case 1).

Case 1 Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At the 8539th meeting, held on 6 June 2019 at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for the month, the Council held an open debate on its working methods.²⁰ The focus of the open debate was the Council's working methods since the issuance of the note by the President of the Council (S/2017/507), including the identification of implementation gaps and practical proposals that could contribute to enhancing the efficiency of the Council's working methods. Several speakers welcomed the practice of holding briefings at the beginning of the month on the provisional programme of work, as well as wrap-up sessions with the wider membership at the end of the monthly presidency of the Council.²¹ Speakers highlighted how such practices enhanced the transparency and accountability of the Council by increasing interactivity among members of the Council and the wider membership of the United Nations.²² The representative of Switzerland, speaking on behalf of the members of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, noted that wrap-up sessions were an important vehicle for transparency and accountability and that the main purpose of such meetings should be interaction with the wider membership. Given the benefits of such meetings, the representatives of Singapore, Slovenia, Liechtenstein and Ukraine added that the State holding the monthly presidency should announce the schedule of such sessions in the provisional programme of work well in

¹⁷ The members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held their thirteenth annual joint consultative meeting in Addis Ababa on 21 October 2019 (see S/2019/825 and S/2020/192). Previously, they had met on 19 July 2018 in New York (see S/2018/736). For information on prior practice concerning the informal joint meetings of the two Councils, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2008–2009, Supplement 2010–2011, Supplement 2012–2013, Supplement 2014–2015, Supplement 2016–2017 and Supplement 2018*, part II, sect. I.C.

¹⁸ See S/2017/507, annex, para. 97. In the note, the members of the Security Council also underscored the importance of increased coordination, cooperation and interaction with other relevant bodies including regional organizations, among them the African Union (para. 93), and agreed to consider joint missions of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to conflict situations in Africa (para. 122). For more information on the cooperation of the Council with regional and subregional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter, see part VIII.

¹⁹ See S/PV.8539 (United Kingdom).

²⁰ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 29 May 2019 (S/2019/450).

²¹ See S/PV.8539 (Switzerland, Singapore, Slovenia, Liechtenstein and Ukraine).

²² *Ibid.*, (Switzerland, Singapore, Slovenia and Liechtenstein).

advance and that the Council should endeavour to institutionalize such meetings as a standard practice.

Regarding briefings, the representative of New Zealand said that in order to better deliver on the Council's conflict prevention role, the Council should invite briefers who could deliver insights to add value to the Council's deliberations. Speakers encouraged the practice of inviting members of civil society to brief the Council so that it might broaden its understanding of the issues on the agenda through useful first-hand information from the ground. The representatives of Canada, Italy, Slovenia and Costa Rica highlighted the value of inviting civil society briefers to Council meetings and commended the efforts made in that regard. The representative of Canada argued that the perspectives of women civil society briefers needed to be heard. The representative of Slovenia underlined that women could provide useful first-hand information from the ground and the representative of Italy stated that the participation of women civil society briefers allowed Council members to hear different voices and points of view before deliberating. The representative of Costa Rica added that the participation of civil society must be guaranteed, especially that of women representatives, who could provide insight based on their experiences and understanding of their rights.

Regarding public meetings, the representative of France called on the Council to avoid excessive public meetings to the detriment of the work on Council decisions and warned about the trend of Council members spending more and more time in the Chamber presenting their respective positions and less and less time in the consultation room deciding on joint action. He cited the five-year trend of the Council, which spent three times more time in public meetings than in consultations, while it negotiated and adopted fewer texts. While highlighting the importance of public meetings, he pointed out that public meetings tended to polarize positions at the expense of the consensus and that therefore the Council had to seek the right balance. The representative of Cuba, while acknowledging the increase in the number of public meetings in recent years, said that the Council continued to work primarily in closed formats, to take decisions without heeding the concerns of Member States and to force decisions on draft resolutions even when there were significant differences over their content. The representatives of Cuba and Ukraine said that the Council should conduct its work in the open as much as practically possible and stressed that closed consultations should be the exception rather than the rule. In a similar vein, the representative of Guatemala affirmed the importance of public meetings and said that continuing the practice of open debates, promoting greater participation of

non-members of the Council and holding Arria-formula meetings had enabled the Council to obtain accurate information so as to be more effective in fulfilling its responsibility to maintain international peace and security. The representative of Egypt stated that the frequency of public meetings, whether of the Council or its subsidiary organs and sanctions committees, should be increased, underlining that the meetings and work of the Council must not be kept from the wider membership, unless they concerned matters related to the national security of a State and the State had made a request to that end. The representative of Bahrain also noted that the convening of more public meetings could lead to improving the working methods of the Council. The representative of Colombia said that increasing the number of open-format Council meetings and keeping to a minimum the number of closed or private meetings, in the understanding that the latter should be the exception and not the rule, was an option that should be taken into account for the definitive rules of procedure of the Council.

A number of speakers highlighted the informative role and inclusive nature of Arria-formula meetings and/or informal interactive dialogues.²³ The representative of France said that interactive dialogues and Arria-formula meetings contributed significantly to informing the Council on important issues and preparing the work on future texts. The representative of Singapore underlined that the Council's greater use of formats such as Arria-formula meetings allowed it to engage more interactively with the General Assembly. The representative of Mexico noted that Arria-formula meetings and informal interactive dialogues enabled the Council to listen to all States involved and civil society, especially in cases that directly concerned them.

The representative of the Russian Federation said that while his delegation supported the notion of expanding the Council's coordination with a wide range of Member States and those that could provide important information for decision-making through appropriate mechanisms, including interactive dialogues and informal Arria-formula meetings, such formats were not official meetings of the Council and should only be used to raise Council members' awareness of issues on its agenda. It was unacceptable to use those platforms for propaganda performances or for individual delegations' controversial unilateral approaches. He pointed out that the costs of such events, including the use of the premises at Headquarters, conference services and, in some cases, translators, were covered by the Organization's regular budget.

²³ Ibid., (France, Singapore and Mexico).

Regarding open debates, speakers highlighted their positive role in making the Council's decision-making process more transparent, accountable, inclusive and legitimate and made recommendations for further improvements. The representative of Singapore regarded the increased number of open debates and the fact that more meetings were being webcast as an indication of progress on transparency and accountability. Noting that open debates enhanced the inclusivity and legitimacy of the work of the Council, the representative of Liechtenstein suggested separating the debate from the moment at which a decision was adopted. The representative of Colombia added that convening an open debate before the adoption of the respective Council decision would allow the necessary time to reflect upon the points of view presented by the Council members.

Lastly, on closed consultations, speakers reflected on the positive functions of such meetings but urged caution regarding their overuse and recommended

ways to enhance transparency. The representative of the United States noted that closed consultations could serve as important forums for the exchange of views and encouraged greater interactivity during such consultations. The representative of Singapore noted the value of transparency and requested that some form of summary records or decision points be shared with the wider membership.

E. Records

During the period under review, verbatim records were issued following each public meeting of the Council, in accordance with rule 49 of the provisional rules of procedure, and communiqués were issued following private meetings, in accordance with rule 55. No questions were raised at Council meetings regarding the application of rules 49 to 57 in connection with the preparation, access to and issuance of verbatim records, communiqués or other documents.

II. Agenda

Note

Section II deals with the practice of the Council concerning the agenda, in relation to rules 6 to 12 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

Rule 6

The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or the Secretary-General concerning any matter for the consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

Rule 7

The provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved by the President of the Security Council.

Only items which have been brought to the attention of the representatives on the Security Council in accordance with rule 6, items covered by rule 10, or matters which the Security Council had previously decided to defer, may be included in the provisional agenda.

Rule 8

The provisional agenda for a meeting shall be communicated by the Secretary-General to the representatives on the Security Council at least three days before the meeting, but in urgent circumstances it may be communicated simultaneously with the notice of the meeting.

Rule 9

The first item of the provisional agenda for each meeting of the Security Council shall be the adoption of the agenda.

Rule 10

Any item on the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council, consideration of which has not been completed at that meeting, shall, unless the Security Council otherwise decides, automatically be included in the agenda of the next meeting.

Rule 11

The Secretary-General shall communicate each week to the representatives on the Security Council a summary statement of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.

Rule 12

The provisional agenda for each periodic meeting shall be circulated to the members of the Security Council at least twenty-one days before the opening of the meeting. Any subsequent change in or addition to the provisional agenda shall be brought to the notice of the members at least five days before the meeting. The Security Council may, however, in urgent circumstances, make additions to the Agenda at any time during a periodic meeting.

The provisions of rule 7, paragraph 1, and of rule 9, shall apply also to periodic meetings.

During the period under review, the Secretary-General continued the practice of distributing communications from States, from organs of the United Nations or from himself concerning any matter for the consideration of the Council, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and pursuant to rule 6 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. The Secretary-General also continued to draw up a provisional agenda for each meeting of the Council and to communicate the provisional agenda to the representatives on the Council, in accordance with rules 7 and 8. The practice relating to the circulation of communications or the preparation of the provisional agenda was not discussed or questioned during the period under review. No periodic meetings were held in 2019; therefore, rule 12 was not applied. This section is therefore focused on the practice and discussion regarding rules 9 to 11, organized under the following three main headings: A. Adoption of the agenda (rule 9); B. Matters of which the Security Council is seized (rules 10 and 11); and C. Discussions concerning the agenda.

A. Adoption of the agenda (rule 9)

In accordance with rule 9 of the provisional rules of procedure, the first item of the agenda for each meeting of the Council is the adoption of the agenda.

Voting on the adoption of the agenda

During the period under review, objections were raised two times to the adoption of the agenda. In both cases, the objections led to a procedural vote. At the 8452nd meeting of the Council, held on 26 January 2019 under the item entitled "The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela", despite the objections raised, the procedural vote resulted in the adoption of the provisional agenda as a newly introduced item.²⁴ At the 8529th meeting, held on 20 May 2019 under the item entitled "Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)", the Council failed to adopt the provisional agenda for the meeting for lack of the required number of affirmative votes.²⁵

Newly introduced agenda items

During the period under review, the Council included the item entitled "The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela" in the list of matters of which it was seized. The item was considered for the first time at the 8452nd meeting of the Council, on 26 January 2019.²⁶ The Council held a total of four meetings under this item in 2019.²⁷

From 1999 to 2007, the Council added between 8 and 23 new items to its agenda every year. Since 2008, however, the number of new items introduced each year has decreased significantly. Figure III provides information on the number of newly introduced agenda items per year since 1999.


²⁴ See S/PV.8452. For further details on the discussion, see part I, sect. 16.

²⁵ See S/PV.8529. For further details on the discussion, see part I, sect. 21.B.

²⁶ See S/PV.8452. For more information on this item, see part I, sect. 16.

²⁷ See S/PV.8452, S/PV.8472, S/PV.8476 and S/PV.8506.

Figure III
Number of newly introduced agenda items per year, 1999–2019



Consideration of country-specific situations under existing items of a regional nature

During the period under review, the Council continued the practice of using existing items of a regional nature for the consideration of evolving country-specific situations. For example, the Council continued to consider the situations in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen under the items entitled “The situation in the Middle East” and “The situation concerning the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.²⁸ In 2019, the Council also deliberated on region-specific sub-items under thematic items of its agenda. For example, the Council addressed the situations in the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, and Israel and Palestine at a meeting held under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Challenges to peace and security in the Middle East”.²⁹ In addition, the Council deliberated on the African Union initiative Silencing the Guns by 2020 under two different items, namely “Cooperation between the United Nations and

regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” and “Peace and security in Africa”, and under two different sub-items respectively, namely “Silencing the guns in Africa” and “Mobilizing youth towards silencing the guns by 2020”.³⁰

Inclusion of new sub-items under existing items

During the period under review, the Council continued its practice of adding new sub-items to existing items, for the consideration of evolving general and cross-border threats to international peace and security. Table 6 contains a selection of sub-items introduced in 2019, in chronological order of their introduction.³¹

²⁸ For more information on these items, see part I, sects. 22 and 24, respectively.

²⁹ See S/PV. 8600. For more information, see part I, sect. 38.

³⁰ See S/PV.8473 and S/PV.8629. For more information, see part I, sects. 11 and 39.

³¹ The table does not include routine sub-items relating to briefings by Security Council missions, briefings by the Chairs of Security Council committees, letters addressed to the President of the Security Council, reports of the Secretary-General and meetings of the Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B.

Table 6
New sub-items added to existing items, 2019

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>New sub-item</i>
S/PV.8451 25 January 2019	Maintenance of international peace and security	Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security
S/PV.8456 4 February 2019	Threats to international peace and security	Mercenary activities as a source of insecurity and destabilization in Africa
S/PV.8457 5 February 2019	Maintenance of international peace and security	Transnational organized crime at sea as a threat to international peace and security
S/PV.8473 27 February 2019	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Silencing the guns in Africa
S/PV.8496 28 March 2019	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Preventing and combating the financing of terrorism
S/PV.8499 1 April 2019	The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security	International humanitarian law
S/PV.8500 2 April 2019	Non-proliferation	Supporting the Non-proliferation Treaty ahead of the 2020 Review Conference
S/PV.8521 7 May 2019	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Investing in peace: improving safety and performance of United Nations peacekeepers
S/PV.8543 11 June 2019	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Missing persons in armed conflict
S/PV.8546 12 June 2019	Maintenance of international peace and security	Conflict prevention and mediation
S/PV.8548 13 June 2019	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Cooperation between the Security Council and the League of Arab States
S/PV.8569 9 July 2019	Threats to international peace and security	Linkages between international terrorism and organized crime
S/PV.8570 10 July 2019	United Nations peacekeeping operations	Strengthening triangular cooperation
S/PV.8577 17 July 2019	Maintenance of international peace and security	Implementation of the youth, peace and security agenda
S/PV.8579 18 July 2019	Peacebuilding and sustaining peace	Strengthening partnerships for successful nationally-owned transitions
S/PV.8590 2 August 2019	Peace and security in Africa	Ebola
S/PV.8600 20 August 2019	Maintenance of international peace and security	Challenges to peace and security in the Middle East
S/PV.8626 25 September 2019	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	The contribution of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in countering terrorist threats

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>New sub-item</i>
S/PV.8627 26 September 2019	Peace and security in Africa	Partnership to strengthen regional peace and security
S/PV.8629 2 October 2019	Peace and security in Africa	Mobilizing youth towards silencing the guns by 2020
S/PV.8633 7 October 2019	Peace and security in Africa	The centrality of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution
S/PV.8649 29 October 2019	Women and peace and security	Towards the successful implementation of the women and peace and security agenda: moving from commitments to accomplishments in preparation for the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)
S/PV.8668 19 November 2019	Peacebuilding and sustaining peace	The role of reconciliation in maintaining international peace and security
S/PV.8685 16 December 2019	Peace and security in Africa	Intercommunal violence and terrorism in West Africa

B. Matters of which the Security Council is seized (rules 10 and 11)

During the period under review, pursuant to rule 11 of the provisional rules of procedure and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017,³² the Secretary-General continued to communicate each week to the representatives on the Council a summary statement of matters of which the Council was seized and of the stage reached in their consideration.³³ The practice of including an item in the summary statement upon its adoption at a formal meeting of the Council remained unchanged.

On 26 January 2019, at its 8452nd meeting, the Council considered one new item, entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”, which was subsequently included in the summary statement.³⁴

According to the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the preliminary annual summary statement issued in January each year by the Secretary-

General of matters of which the Council is seized identifies the items that have not been considered by the Council during the preceding three calendar years and that are therefore subject to deletion. An item is deleted unless a Member State notifies the President of the Council, by the end of February, of its request that the item be retained on the list, in which case the item will remain on the list for an additional year. If no Member State requests the item’s retention on the list, the first summary statement issued in March of that year reflects its deletion.³⁵

During the period under review, in accordance with rule 11 and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the Council continued the practice of reviewing the summary statement at the beginning of each year in order to determine whether the Council had concluded its consideration of any items.³⁶ In 2019, of 15 items identified for deletion in January, none was deleted and all items were retained for one additional year at the request of Member States (see table 7).³⁷

³² [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 13 and 14.

³³ See, for example, [S/2019/10/Add.1](#) and [S/2019/10/Add.2](#).

³⁴ See [S/2019/10/Add.4](#).

³⁵ [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 15 and 16.

³⁶ [S/2019/10](#).

³⁷ See [S/2019/10/Add.9](#).

Table 7
Items proposed for deletion from the summary statement, 2019

<i>Item</i>	<i>Date of first and last consideration</i>	<i>Proposed for deletion in 2019</i>	<i>Status in March 2019</i>
The India-Pakistan question	6 January 1948; 5 November 1965	•	Retained
The Hyderabad question	16 September 1948; 24 May 1949	•	Retained
Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General	21 February 1958; 21 February 1958	•	Retained
Letter dated 11 July 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	18 July 1960; 5 January 1961	•	Retained
Letter dated 31 December 1960 from the Minister for External Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	4 January 1961; 5 January 1961	•	Retained
The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent	4 December 1971; 27 December 1971	•	Retained
Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	9 December 1971; 9 December 1971	•	Retained
Complaint by Cuba	17 September 1973; 18 September 1973	•	Retained
The situation between Iran and Iraq	26 September 1980; 31 January 1991	•	Retained
Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	2 October 1985; 4 October 1985)	•	Retained
Letter dated 19 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	21 April 1988; 25 April 1988	•	Retained
Letter dated 2 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	9 February 1990; 9 February 1990	•	Retained
The situation between Iraq and Kuwait	2 August 1990; 27 June 2013	•	Retained considered in 2019 (S/PV.8463)
The situation in Georgia	8 October 1992; 15 June 2009	•	Retained
The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security	24 September 2003; 21 February 2014	•	Retained considered in 2019 (S/PV.8499, S/PV.8596 and S/PV.8599)

Items considered at Security Council meetings

While it remained seized of 69 items during the review period, the Council considered 49 items at its meetings in 2019. Of the 49 items considered in 2019 at meetings of the Council, 27 concerned country-specific

and regional situations and 22 concerned thematic and other issues. Table 8 provides an overview of the items on the agenda of the Council and those items that were considered at formal meetings of the Council during the period under review.

Table 8

Items on the agenda of the Council and their consideration at formal meetings, 2019

<i>Item</i>	<i>Considered at a formal meeting</i>
Country-specific and regional situations	
Africa	
Central African region	Yes
Letter dated 20 February 1958 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General	No
Letter dated 1 October 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	No
Letter dated 19 April 1988 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	No
Peace and security in Africa	Yes
Peace consolidation in West Africa	Yes
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Yes
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Yes
The situation concerning Western Sahara	Yes
The situation in Burundi	Yes
The situation in Côte d'Ivoire	No
The situation in the Great Lakes region	Yes
The situation in Guinea-Bissau	Yes
The situation in Liberia	No
The situation in Libya	Yes
The situation in Mali	Yes
The situation in Somalia	Yes
The situation in the Central African Republic	Yes
Americas	
Letter dated 11 July 1960 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	No
Letter dated 31 December 1960 from the Minister for External Affairs of Cuba addressed to the President of the Security Council	No
Complaint by Cuba	No

<i>Item</i>	<i>Considered at a formal meeting</i>
Letter dated 2 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council	No
Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)	Yes
The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	Yes
The question concerning Haiti	Yes
Asia	
The situation in Afghanistan	Yes
The situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	No
The Hyderabad question	No
The India-Pakistan question	No
The situation in the India/Pakistan subcontinent	No
The situation in Myanmar	Yes
Europe	
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yes
The situation in Cyprus	Yes
The situation in Georgia	No
Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)	Yes
Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)	Yes
Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998) , 1199 (1998) , 1203 (1998) , 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)	Yes
Letter dated 13 March 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/218)	No
Middle East	
Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10409)	No
The situation between Iran and Iraq	No
The situation concerning Iraq	Yes
The situation between Iraq and Kuwait	Yes
The situation in the Middle East	Yes
The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Yes
<hr/>	
Total, country-specific and regional situations	27 items
<hr/>	
Thematic and other issues	
Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	Yes
Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council	Yes

<i>Item</i>	<i>Considered at a formal meeting</i>
Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice	Yes
Briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator	No
Briefing by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Yes
Children and armed conflict	Yes
Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly	Yes
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Yes
General issues relating to sanctions	No
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)	Yes
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	Yes
Maintenance of international peace and security	Yes
Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and police-contributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001) , annex II, sections A and B	Yes
Non-proliferation	Yes
Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Yes
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Yes
Peacebuilding and sustaining peace	Yes
The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security	Yes
Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Yes
Security Council mission	Yes
Small arms	No
Threats to international peace and security	Yes
Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	Yes
United Nations peacekeeping operations	Yes
Women and peace and security	Yes
Total, thematic and other issues	22 items
Total number of items on the agenda	69 items
Total number of items discussed	49 items

C. Discussions concerning the agenda

During the period under review, members of the Council discussed the agenda and the matters of which the Council was seized during the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President

of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))".³⁸ In addition, discussions on the agenda of the Council occurred in connection with country- or region-specific items and related to procedural votes concerning the adoption of the agenda (see cases 2 and 3), and during an open debate under the item entitled "Maintenance of

³⁸ See [S/PV.8539](#).

international peace and security”, focusing on the nexus between climate change and security (see case 4). In 2019, the Council also discussed whether the situation in Burundi should remain on its agenda (see case 5).

Case 2 The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

At the 8452nd meeting, held on 26 January 2019, the Council met to discuss the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.³⁹ Council members expressed differing views about the holding of the meeting and objections to the adoption of the provisional agenda led to a procedural vote in the Council. Prior to the vote on the provisional agenda, the representative of the Russian Federation opposed the adoption of the agenda item and stated that the internal situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was not an item on the agenda of the Council and that he saw no external threats arising from what was taking place in that country. He argued that it would be more appropriate to conduct a discussion under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, in the light of the violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, and called on others to support his delegation’s position. The Secretary of State of the United States said that the capacity of regional countries to adequately address the urgent humanitarian needs had been overwhelmed. He also mentioned the letter from the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States specifically describing the destabilizing impact of the crisis on the region, and argued that the Council could not delay the critical conversation, which had the world’s attention.

Immediately thereafter, the provisional agenda was put to a vote and adopted, receiving nine votes in favour and four against, with two abstentions.⁴⁰ Speaking after the vote, the representative of Peru said that it important that the Council discussed the

situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations, which authorized it to address any situation that was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the commitment to the preventive diplomacy efforts that the Council must undertake. He further noted that the rupture of constitutional order in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had given way to a serious political, economic and humanitarian crisis, which represented a threat to regional peace and security. The representative of France stated that the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela went beyond the borders of the country and that it was perfectly legitimate for the Council to address the issue as part of its role in conflict prevention. Similarly, the representative of Kuwait said that the Council had a fundamental role to play in implementing preventive diplomacy in order to prevent conflicts and address crises at an early stage, should there be any early signs of a situation leading to a threat to international peace and security, in accordance with Chapter VI, Article 34, of the Charter. In addition, the representative of Germany argued that, given the massive violations of human rights and the threats to international peace and security, it was right that the Council discussed the issue. Moreover, the representative of Belgium said that it was clear that the Council had a responsibility to address the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which constituted a threat to international peace and security: the threat to the stability of the region was evident when three million people fled their country because of its economic and political collapse.

By contrast, the representative of Equatorial Guinea argued that the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was an internal matter and said that it did not pose a threat to international peace and security. The representative of China argued against adding the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the Council’s agenda because the situation in the country was a domestic matter and did not constitute a threat to international peace and security. The representative of Indonesia, explaining his delegation’s abstention, said that the briefing should be considered under a different agenda item, namely “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.

³⁹ See [S/PV.8452](#).

⁴⁰ *In favour*: Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: China, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa; *abstaining*: Côte d’Ivoire, Indonesia.

Case 3

Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)

At the 8529th meeting, held on 20 May 2019 at the request of the Russian Federation, the Council convened to discuss the situation in Ukraine.⁴¹ Objections to the adoption of the provisional agenda led to a procedural vote in the Council. Prior to the vote, the representative of France stated that he opposed the adoption of the provisional agenda because the request to hold an open meeting on the law on the use of Ukrainian as the national language on the day of the inauguration of the new President of Ukraine, who had been democratically elected in a transparent electoral process, was not intended to contribute to resolving the crisis between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The representative of Germany expressed support for the statement made by the representative of France and said that his delegation also opposed the adoption of the provisional agenda. The representative of the United States also made a statement opposing the adoption of the provisional agenda, stating that the request for the meeting was an attempt to distract from the peaceful, democratic transfer of power happening on that day in Ukraine. On the other hand, the representative of the Russian Federation argued that it was essential for the Council to pre-emptively give its opinion of the law establishing the status of Ukrainian as the country's national language before the law came into force in mid-July because the law was a direct violation of the spirit and letter of the package of measures for fulfilling the Minsk agreements, which the Council had approved and supported through its adoption of resolution 2202 (2015) and its presidential statement of June 2018.⁴² The representative of Poland, however, said that the request to hold a meeting on Ukraine on 20 May 2019 was surprising; the delegation of Poland believed that Russian aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine was a direct threat to international peace and security, while the fact that the legitimate authorities of Ukraine had signed a bill into law was not.

The provisional agenda for the meeting was put to a vote and failed to be adopted for lack of the

required number of affirmative votes.⁴³ After the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret at the result of the vote and deplored the fact that some Council members had displayed double standards with regard to the discussion of the issue of Ukraine. He also stated that he could not accept the argument that delegations needed more time to study the law, as the text of the Ukrainian law existed and had been publicly available since late 2018. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Council had voted on whether to have a meeting on the subject and that the representative of the Russian Federation showed disrespect for the Council by giving a substantive intervention on a meeting that was not happening, instead of an explanation of vote. The representative of Belgium stated that he had called several times for the meeting to be postponed for a few days without success. His delegation had voted against the adoption of the provisional agenda because there was a lack of information on the law in question and because it did not feel that holding a briefing on the very day that the new President of Ukraine took office created an environment conducive to resuming dialogue. By contrast, the representative of China explained that he had voted in favour of the provisional agenda because, among other things, the Council should play a constructive role by creating an external environment conducive to the proper resolution of the relevant issues, promoting peace, stability and development in Ukraine, and achieving harmonious coexistence among the various ethnic groups of Ukraine, as well as peaceful coexistence between Ukraine and other countries in the region. The representative of South Africa stated that she had supported the request for the meeting on the basis of consistency, having acceded to requests from other delegations for briefings on matters that they regarded as urgent and important, and based on the fact that Ukraine was on the agenda of the Council and on rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure, which provided for such a meeting. The representative of Indonesia noted that he had abstained in the voting on the provisional agenda because, while the request from the Russian delegation had been addressed to the Council in accordance with rule 2 of the provisional rules of procedure, he believed that the discussion in the Council could be efficient and effective only if all Council members had enough time to consider all

⁴¹ See S/PV.8529.

⁴² S/PRST/2018/12.

⁴³ *In favour*: China, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa; *against*: Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *abstaining*: Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru.

developments in the field and were united in the decision to proceed with the discussion.

Case 4 Maintenance of international peace and security

At the 8451st meeting, held on 25 January 2019, under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, discussions centred on addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security, the sub-item for the meeting, and in particular on the role of the Council in addressing climate-related risks.⁴⁴ The meeting was held at the initiative of the Dominican Republic, which held the presidency of the Council for the month.⁴⁵ Council members and Member States exchanged views on the role of the Council in responding to climate-related security threats. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium said that it was high time for climate-related risks to be reflected in the Council’s regular work. His delegation attached great importance to the integration of climate risks into country or regional discussions, including with regard to the renewal of peacekeeping mandates. He added that taking climate risks into account was no longer an option but a necessity, if the Council was to assume its full responsibility and strengthen its capacity to prevent conflicts. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia called on the Council to consolidate efforts to better respond to the security impacts of climate change and build upon past accomplishments. She suggested that one concrete step that the Council could take was to better equip its peacekeepers with the capacity to carry out not only peacekeeping operations but also climate peace missions.

The representative of Norway reiterated the primary responsibility of the Council for maintaining international peace and security and affirmed that the climate-security nexus merited a place on the Council’s agenda, expressing support for the initiative to appoint a United Nations special representative for climate and security. The representative of Switzerland called on the Council to systematically integrate climate risks into the regional and country situations already on its agenda and take full advantage of the existing information and resources available within the United Nations system. The representative of Ireland believed that a global response was the only way to address the

threat of climate-related disasters; therefore, climate and security concerns should be considered across all country-specific situations on the Council’s agenda. The representative of France called on the Council to fully implement the request put forward by the Council in its presidential statement of July 2011,⁴⁶ adopted at the initiative of Germany, that the reports of the Secretary-General on the conflicts on the Council’s agenda should include contextual information with regard to the impact of climate change on those conflicts. She said that through such an approach, the Council could anticipate and implement appropriate responses to the threats to peace and security that already existed in some regions, such as the Sahel or island States, but also in Southern Africa, Central America or South-East Asia, which might be less immediate but could in due course have an equally disastrous impact on security.

The representative of the Russian Federation reiterated his country’s position with regard to the security impacts of climate change and said that his delegation deemed it excessive, and even counterproductive, to consider climate change in the Council, whose aim under the Charter of the United Nations was to swiftly respond to serious challenges to international peace and security. He said that climate change was not a universal challenge in the context of international security and noted that a generalized linking of the topic of climate change with peace could lead to the false assumption that the problems of the environment were unavoidable and always led to conflict. In that regard, he accepted that climate risks must be taken into consideration, not in a generic way but in the context of discussing specific and real situations on the Council’s agenda – if they existed and if they were real. The representative of Brazil said that environmental issues did not fall squarely under the authority of the Council, the primary organ charged with maintaining international peace and security under the Charter. There was no direct cause-and-effect relationship between a natural disaster and the outbreak of conflict; linking security issues to the environmental agenda risked mistakenly assuming that any environmental stress or natural disaster would automatically lead to social unrest, armed conflict and, eventually, to a threat to international peace and security. The representative of India, highlighting the complex and contested nexus between climate change and security, cautioned against securitizing climate change, as a securitized approach risked pitting States into a competition. He said that thinking in security terms engendered overly militarized solutions to

⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8451](#).

⁴⁵ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 January 2019 ([S/2019/1](#)). For more information on the meeting and participation, see part I, sect. 38.

⁴⁶ [S/PRST/2011/15](#).

problems that inherently required non-military responses to resolve them.

The representative of Mexico, emphasizing the importance of improving the mechanisms and methods for managing the risk of extreme climate events, noted with satisfaction that such analyses had begun to be included in the mandates of some peacekeeping operations that recognized the effects of climate change as risk factors. The application of such an approach would be welcome in reviewing various conflicts on the Council's agenda. Nonetheless, he emphasized that a clear division of labour within the United Nations system was the best way forward to address the impact of climate change on international peace and security. As one of the principal organs of the Organization, the Council should reaffirm its role as a contributor to the harmonized efforts of the entire system, not as a body that dealt with the climate-security nexus alone or in isolation. The representative of Algeria pointed out that the Council had numerous issues on its agenda and that a great deal was expected of it in terms of preventing and resolving conflicts; therefore, it would be natural for the Council to focus on such issues rather than on opening new, undefined territories for consideration.

Case 5 The situation in Burundi

At the 8465th meeting, held on 19 February 2019, the Council met to discuss the situation in Burundi.⁴⁷ Speakers held divergent views on whether the item should remain on the Council's agenda. Although he understood the objection of the Government of Burundi to being included on the Council's agenda, the representative of the United States affirmed that his country was deeply concerned by rising regional tensions, the increasing diplomatic isolation of Burundi and deep domestic political divides. He said that it would be irresponsible for the Council to disengage before 2020 and urged the Council members and the Burundian counterparts to put their collective effort into increasing productive dialogue and reducing the likelihood of violence in Burundi. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the run-up to the 2020 elections was a critical time. While he welcomed the current stability in Burundi, he cautioned that failure to address alleged human rights violations and the ongoing humanitarian crisis would threaten that stability. His delegation believed that it was crucial that the region and the international community remained seized of the

⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8465](#).

situation and that Burundi should remain on the Council's agenda.

In contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation was of the view that the situation in Burundi did not pose any threats to international peace and security and questioned whether it made sense to keep Burundi as an item on the Council's overburdened agenda. Keeping the Council's attention focused on Burundi was becoming counterproductive and served as a convenient excuse for the unreconciled opposition to complicate the country's internal political processes. The representative of China, noting that the Government of Burundi had time and again stated that the situation in Burundi was not a threat to regional peace and security and that the issue should not remain on the Council's agenda, called on the Council to heed the sentiments of the representatives of Burundi. The representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that his country was greatly encouraged by the situation in Burundi and that the peace and calm prevailing in the country should lead the Council to seriously consider removing Burundi from its agenda. The representative of Burundi reiterated his appeal to the Council to remove the issue of Burundi from its agenda, as the current political and security situation in the country in no way constituted a threat to international peace and security that could justify it being arbitrarily maintained on the Council's agenda. He noted that the series of meetings on Burundi could become yet another factor of destabilization instead of promoting peace and calm.

At the 8550th meeting, held on 14 June 2019, the Council convened again to discuss the situation in Burundi.⁴⁸ The representative of Equatorial Guinea said that there was a return to normalcy in Burundi after the attempts at destabilization that had followed the 2015 elections. Burundi had democratically elected institutions across the nation, which would be renewed in the same way in the 2020 elections. She also noted other positive developments, including the election of Burundi as a member of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which was a reflection of the situation in the country, and reiterated the need for the Security Council to remove Burundi from its agenda, since the situation in the country no longer represented any threat to international peace and security. The representative of China said that since elections were the internal affairs of any country, the international community should fully respect the ownership and leadership of Burundi and provide assistance in accordance with the needs of the Government. He recalled that the Government of

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8550](#).

Burundi had said many times that the situation did not pose a threat to regional peace and security and that the Burundi issue should not remain on the Council's agenda. The representative of the Russian Federation reaffirmed that the situation in Burundi did not pose a threat to international peace and security and stated that the Council's continued attention had long been counterproductive, with its discussions doing nothing but making the country's internal political processes more difficult. He said that it was essential that the Council take Burundi off its already overburdened agenda.

By contrast, the representative of Germany said that it was timely that the issue was back on the agenda as it still represented a threat to peace and security. While acknowledging the position of the representative of Burundi, the representative of Germany noted that the domestic political crisis of Burundi was unresolved, with a volatile security situation and rising tensions in neighbouring areas. He said that the

Council had heard very clearly how everyone in the region and from the United Nations was ready to help and he was encouraged by the activities of the East African Community, the African Union, the United Nations, the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund in relation to the situation in Burundi. The representative of Burundi emphasized that Burundi was on the Council's agenda for political reasons and external interests that had no relevance to the welfare of the Burundian people. He maintained that the continued series of meetings on Burundi was a destabilizing factor rather than one that promoted peace and tranquillity. He added that such unnecessary meetings indirectly encouraged the 2015 putschists who had fled the country and were being pursued by Burundian justice. Reiterating his call for Burundi to be taken off the Council's agenda, he noted that the place of Burundi was with the United Nations agencies and programmes that addressed socioeconomic development.

III. Representation and credentials

Note

Section III covers the practice of the Council concerning representation and the credentials of its members, in relation to rules 13 to 17 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Rule 13

Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative on the Security Council shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before he takes his seat on the Security Council. The credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or of the Government concerned or by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Head of Government or Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member of the Security Council shall be entitled to sit on the Security Council without submitting credentials.

Rule 14

Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-

General not less than twenty-four hours before the first meeting which he is invited to attend.

Rule 15

The credentials of representatives on the Security Council and of any representative appointed in accordance with rule 14 shall be examined by the Secretary-General who shall submit a report to the Security Council for approval.

Rule 16

Pending the approval of the credentials of a representative on the Security Council in accordance with rule 15, such representative shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives.

Rule 17

Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter.

During the period under review, in accordance with rule 13 of the provisional rules of procedure, the credentials of the representatives of the members of the Council were communicated to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General subsequently submitted his

report to the Council pursuant to rule 15. Such reports were transmitted to the Council when there were changes in the representation of members of the Council,⁴⁹ as well as when representatives of the newly elected members of the Council were designated prior

⁴⁹ See, for example, [S/2019/12](#), [S/2019/552](#) and [S/2019/772](#).

to the beginning of each term.⁵⁰ No discussions regarding the interpretation and application of rules 13 to 17 arose during the period under review.

⁵⁰ For the report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representatives and deputies and alternate representatives of members of the Security Council elected for the period 2019 to 2020, see [S/2018/1161](#).

IV. Presidency

Note

Section IV covers the practice of the Council concerning the monthly rotation of the presidency, the role of the President and the temporary cession of the chair by the President during the consideration of a particular question with which the Member State he or she represents is directly connected, in relation to rules 18 to 20 of the provisional rules of procedure.

Rule 18

The presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President shall hold office for one calendar month.

Rule 19

The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations.

Rule 20

Whenever the President of the Security Council deems that for the proper fulfilment of the responsibilities of the presidency he should not preside over the Council during the consideration of a particular question with which the member he represents is directly connected, he shall indicate his decision to the Council. The presidential chair shall then devolve, for the purpose of the consideration of that question, on the representative of the member next in English alphabetical order, it being understood that the provisions of this rule shall apply to the representatives on the Security Council called upon successively to preside. This rule shall not affect the representative capacity of the President as stated in rule 19, or his duties under rule 7.

This section comprises two subsections, namely:
A. The role of the President of the Security Council

(rules 18 and 19); and B. Discussions concerning the presidency of the Security Council.

In 2019, there were no instances of the application of rule 20.

A. Role of the President of the Security Council (rules 18 and 19)

In accordance with rule 18 of the provisional rules of procedure, the presidency of the Council was held in turn for one calendar month by the members of the Council in the English alphabetical order. In addition to presiding over meetings of the Council, informal consultations of the whole and informal interactive dialogues, the President of the Council continued to perform several functions under the authority of the Council, in accordance with rule 19. These functions included (a) briefing non-members of the Council and the media on the monthly programme of work of the Council at the beginning of the month; (b) representing the Council and delivering statements on its behalf, including the presentation of the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly,⁵¹ and (c) delivering statements or elements to the press, following informal consultations of the whole or whenever Council members reached an agreement on a text. The Presidents of the Council continued to maintain the practice of holding monthly meetings with the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly.⁵² Representatives of Council members continued to submit, in their national capacities, assessments providing information on the main aspects

⁵¹ At its 8597th meeting, on 20 August 2019 (see [S/PV.8597](#)), the Council adopted its report to the General Assembly ([A/73/2](#)). The report was introduced to the Assembly at the 105th plenary meeting of its seventy-third session on 10 September 2019 by the President of the Council for the month of September (Russian Federation). See also part IV, sect. I.F.

⁵² See General Assembly resolution [72/313](#), para. 91. See also General Assembly resolution [73/341](#), para. 10.

of the work of the Council during the month of their respective presidencies.⁵³

Following previous practice, and in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the introduction to the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly for 2018 was prepared under the coordination of the President of the Council for the month of August 2018 (United Kingdom),⁵⁴ who continued the practice of convening informal meetings with Member States to exchange views on the annual report, a practice initiated in 2008.⁵⁵ On 27 December 2019, the Council issued a note by the President further to the measures contained in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017,⁵⁶ in particular the relevant measures relating to the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly.⁵⁷ In the note, the members of the Council recalled that the introduction to the report should be completed no later than 31 January so as to allow the Secretariat enough time for translation. In addition, the note provided that the Secretariat should submit the draft report, including the introduction to the report, to the members of the Council no later than 15 March following the period covered by the report, so that it could be discussed and thereafter adopted by the Council no later than 30 May, in time for its consideration by the Assembly immediately thereafter.

⁵³ See, for example, [S/2019/744](#), [S/2019/910](#) and [S/2019/1015](#). A list of the monthly assessments is provided in the annual reports of the Council to the General Assembly and is also available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/monthly-assessments.

⁵⁴ [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 127.

⁵⁵ See [S/PV.8597](#).

⁵⁶ [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 125–139.

⁵⁷ [S/2019/997](#).

The members of the Council further agreed that those provisions would be applicable to the report to be presented to the Assembly at its seventy-fifth session, in 2021, covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2020.

In 2019, during their respective presidencies, Council members continued to take the initiative of bringing to the attention of the Council emerging general and cross-border threats to international peace and security, at times adding new sub-items to existing thematic items with a view to informing the deliberations.⁵⁸ In several such instances, to frame the discussion, a concept paper prepared by the State holding the monthly presidency was circulated prior to the meeting.⁵⁹ A number of Council members continued also the practice of circulating summaries of the meetings they had organized during their presidencies. Table 9 lists all national summaries published in 2019 of open debates by delegations holding the monthly presidency.

⁵⁸ For more information on referrals by Member States pursuant to Article 35 of the Charter, see part VI, sect. I.A.

⁵⁹ For example, at its 8451st meeting, held on 25 January 2019, the Council had before it a concept note on the theme “Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security”, annexed to a letter dated 2 January 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Dominican Republic addressed to the Secretary-General ([S/2019/1](#)) (see [S/PV.8451](#)); at its 8569th meeting, held on 9 July 2019, the Council had before it a concept note on the theme “Linkages between international terrorism and organized crime”, annexed to a letter dated 27 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Peru addressed to the Secretary-General ([S/2019/537](#)) ([S/PV.8569](#)).

Table 9
National summaries of open debates by delegations holding the monthly presidency, 2019

<i>Presidency</i>	<i>Communication</i>	<i>Theme</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>
Dominican Republic	Letter dated 4 February 2019 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/113)	Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security	S/PV.8451 25 January 2019
Indonesia	Letter dated 10 July 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/576)	Investing in peace: improving safety and performance of United Nations peacekeepers	S/PV.8521 7 May 2019

<i>Presidency</i>	<i>Communication</i>	<i>Theme</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>
Indonesia	Letter dated 5 July 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/586)	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	S/PV.8534 23 May 2019
Peru	Letter dated 8 October 2019 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/803)	Strengthening triangular cooperation	S/PV.8570 10 July 2019

In the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the incoming presidencies were encouraged to discuss the provisional monthly programme of work with other members of the Council well in advance of their respective presidencies.⁶⁰ The note also provided that Council members, during their respective presidencies, should ordinarily plan no more than four days per week of Council business, Fridays normally being allocated to facilitate the work of the Council's subsidiary bodies.⁶¹

On 27 December 2019, the Council issued a note by the President establishing that, in an effort to enhance the efficiency and transparency of the Council's work, it had been agreed that all activities not listed in the Council's monthly provisional programme of work would be listed in an unofficial addendum document prepared by, and at the discretion of, the President of the Council.⁶²

The note by the President dated 30 August 2017 encouraged the President of the Council to hold informal or formal wrap-up sessions with the wider membership on the work of the Council, as appropriate.⁶³ On 27 December 2019, a new note by the President was issued regarding wrap-up sessions, encouraging Council members, during their respective presidencies, to utilize the "Toledo-style" format during informal briefing sessions with the wider membership and to forgo detailed summaries of the Council's activities in favour of a more analytical discussion with non-Council members and to utilize more time to hear their feedback.⁶⁴ The note also indicated that the President of the Council could invite the lead or co-leads of a Council visiting mission that was held during that month to actively contribute to the wrap-up session. The President was also encouraged to

announce the date of the wrap-up session with sufficient time to allow for adequate preparation by all participants and to request the inclusion of the wrap-up session in the Council's monthly programme of work and the *Journal of the United Nations*.

During the period under review, the role of the presidency was discussed in communications to the Council. In a letter dated 28 February 2019 addressed to the President of the Council, the Permanent Representative of Colombia protested "in the strongest terms" against the decision of the President of the Council not to allow Colombia to take the floor at the meeting held on 28 February on the item entitled "The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela".⁶⁵ He stated that the denial of his delegation's right to respond in a national capacity to the "false and reckless claims" directed specifically against Colombia, which were categorically rejected by his Government, had led to the dissemination of biased information to the members of the Council and to the public around the world. In a note verbale dated 30 April 2019 addressed to the President of the Council, the Permanent Mission of Germany transmitted a letter from the President of the Human Rights Council concerning his breakfast with the members of the Security Council on 10 April 2019.⁶⁶ The President of the Human Rights Council said that the event had proven to be a valuable opportunity to establish an "informal channel of dialogue" between the Human Rights Council and the Security Council and to strengthen the Geneva-New York relationship. Recalling the discussion during the breakfast about a proposal to seek opportunities to "organize some form of informal discussion in Geneva between the members of the Human Rights Council and the President of the Security Council for the month", the President of the Human Rights Council noted an existing practice whereby informal conversations between high-level

⁶⁰ S/2017/507, annex, para. 2.

⁶¹ Ibid., annex, para. 1.

⁶² S/2019/992.

⁶³ S/2017/507, annex, para. 7.

⁶⁴ S/2019/994.

⁶⁵ S/2019/197.

⁶⁶ S/2019/356.

United Nations representatives and members and observers of the Human Rights Council were convened in an ad hoc manner. He added that should there be an opportunity for the President of the Security Council to travel to Geneva, he would find it very constructive for such an informal conversation to be organized. In a letter dated 30 May 2019 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representatives of China and the Russian Federation indicated that they did not consider the informal breakfast held on 10 April 2019 as the establishment of an “informal channel of dialogue” between the Security Council and the Human Rights Council.⁶⁷ They recalled that China and the Russian Federation had not expressed their support for the proposal to convene an informal discussion of any kind in Geneva and added that they had not been provided with reasonable arguments proving that unofficial interaction between the President of the Security Council and the members of the Human Rights Council would contribute to the more effective fulfilment of the Council’s mandate. They noted that the Human Rights Council, as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, was not authorized to interact with the Security Council, and drew attention to the fact that any contacts between the President of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council should be considered and agreed upon by the members of the Security Council in accordance with the established procedure. They added that all possible trips of the President of the Security Council to Geneva for an informal dialogue with the members of the Human Rights Council would be considered as “unapproved initiatives” and that the President of the Security Council would not be representing the Council in that capacity.

B. Discussions concerning the presidency of the Security Council

In 2019, aspects of the presidency of the Security Council were discussed during Council meetings. At the 8502nd meeting of the Council, held on 3 April 2019 under the item entitled “The question concerning Haiti”, the representative of Germany highlighted some of the activities undertaken during the German-French twin presidencies for the months of March and April, including being co-leads, together with Côte d’Ivoire, of the Security Council mission to the Sahel.⁶⁸ The representative of France noted that the aim of the twin presidencies was to improve not just the customs and

methods of the Council but also the results on the ground. The representative of Germany also noted two innovations of their twin presidencies, namely opening the curtains of the Security Council Chamber and using an hourglass timer set to five and half minutes. The representatives of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa welcomed the innovations, with the latter expressing the hope that drawing open the curtains and shedding light on the Council would lead to greater transparency in its work and perhaps ultimately to the reform of the Council demanded by most Member States, especially the African States. At the 8508th meeting of the Council, held on 11 April 2019 under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the representative of the Netherlands thanked the German presidency for bringing more light and transparency to the gathering by opening the curtains and for its tremendous efforts to ensure better timekeeping.⁶⁹ At the 8517th meeting of the Council, held on 29 April 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the representative of Maldives congratulated France and Germany for the successful joint presidency and said that it was an example of how collaborative partnerships could help to strengthen multilateralism. He expressed his appreciation for the positive changes introduced in recent months to improve the transparency of the workings of the Council and thereby help to increase the legitimacy of its decisions.⁷⁰

Case 6 Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At its 8539th meeting, held on 6 June 2019 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”, the Council held its annual open debate, under the presidency of Kuwait, to discuss the working methods of the Council.⁷¹ Council Members and Member States shared views on the practice of monthly wrap-up sessions and the role of the presidency of the Council in increasing interactivity and transparency.

The representatives of Singapore, Switzerland, Slovenia and Liechtenstein encouraged each presidency to plan for an interactive wrap-up session and to include it in the programme of work. Speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, the representative of Switzerland said that wrap-up sessions constituted an important vehicle for transparency and accountability regarding the Council’s work, and called for the holding of such

⁶⁷ S/2019/449.

⁶⁸ See S/PV.8502. For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 33.

⁶⁹ See S/PV.8508.

⁷⁰ See S/PV.8517.

⁷¹ See S/PV.8539.

sessions at the end of every month, preferably in the Toledo format so as to enhance interaction with the wider membership. The representative of Switzerland added that sessions should be announced in the monthly programme of work, or at least with sufficient advance notice to ensure wide participation and substantive discussions.

In a similar vein, the representative of Singapore said that his delegation was encouraged by the greater use of Toledo-format dialogues and the regularization of introductory and wrap-up meetings with the wider membership by each month's President and hoped that such meetings would continue as standard practice. He suggested that the date and time of the meetings should be fixed well in advance and communicated to all members with ample notice to ensure that all could come prepared to participate. The representative of Slovenia, aligning her statement with that delivered by the representative of Switzerland on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, said that wrap-up sessions were very valuable to the wider membership as they provided Member States not only with useful information but also with the unique perspectives of individual Council members. The representative of Liechtenstein also highlighted the importance of wrap-up sessions and said that his delegation participated actively and regularly in such sessions whenever they were organized at the end of a Council presidency as they were important opportunities for the wider membership to voice opinions and ask questions and for the Council to hear from its constituency. He looked forward to seeing further improvements in the format of the meetings and hoped that they would be institutionalized to take place at the end of every month. The representative of Mexico commended Council delegations that held Toledo-format meetings at the end of their presidencies, as such meetings represented a good opportunity to have more fluid exchanges with the

wider membership. The representative of Guatemala also noted the importance of continuing to hold wrap-up meetings. The representative of Ukraine expressed his support for the practice of holding formal monthly wrap-up sessions of the Council as an important element of the proper implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), and said that it was necessary to find a way to seek the input of Member States on issues that they would like Council members to reflect on during the wrap-up sessions.

The representative of the United States pointed out that while informal Council consultations could serve as important forums for the exchange of views, speakers at such consultations too often read from prepared remarks. In that connection, he commended the efforts of several recent Council presidencies to encourage greater interactivity during informal consultations and emphasized the importance of maintaining the informal nature of informal consultations. Commending the innovation and cooperation between consecutive presidencies, including those of France and Germany, he noted that closer collaboration among the Presidents for the previous, current and following months enhanced the continuity and leadership of the Council and made it stronger as a whole. The representative of France added that the joint presidency of Germany and France had strived to be exemplary by presenting the programmes and outcome documents to all Member States, involving civil society stakeholders, particularly women, in meetings, and encouraging speakers and Council members to be more concise, focused and interactive in their statements. The representative of China said that his delegation supported the enhanced interaction between the Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other bodies, in order to make the work of the Council more transparent.

V. Secretariat

Note

Section V covers the practice of the Security Council concerning the functions and powers of the Secretary-General in connection with meetings of the Council, in relation to rules 21 to 26 of its provisional rules of procedure.⁷²

Rule 21

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Security Council. The Secretary-General may authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council.

⁷² For specific instances in which the Secretary-General was requested or authorized to carry out other functions in accordance with Article 98, see part IV.

Rule 22

The Secretary-General, or his deputy acting on his behalf, may make either oral or written statements to the Security Council concerning any question under consideration by it.

Rule 23

The Secretary-General may be appointed by the Security Council, in accordance with rule 28, as rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 24

The Secretary-General shall provide the staff required by the Security Council. This staff shall form a part of the Secretariat.

Rule 25

The Secretary-General shall give to representatives on the Security Council notice of meetings of the Security Council and of its commissions and committees.

Rule 26

The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the preparation of documents required by the Security Council and shall, except in urgent circumstances, distribute them at least forty-eight hours in advance of the meeting at which they are to be considered.

During the period under review, and in accordance with previous practice, the Secretary-General and senior officials of the Secretariat continued to attend Council meetings and to provide briefings to the Council, as requested. The Council also continued to request briefings by senior officials from the Secretariat.

Some Council members noted possible issues for the Secretariat's action or attention. At a meeting held on 25 January 2019, under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security" and the sub-item entitled "Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security", the representative of Belgium said that within the Secretariat or through a format involving Member States, there could be an institutional focal point that would respond to the urgent need to provide the Council with adequate risk analysis and management strategies for relevant countries and regions.⁷³ The representative of Maldives called for the briefings of the Secretariat to the Council to include

⁷³ See [S/PV.8451](#).

expert analyses of climate-related risks and how such risks were driving conflicts. The representative of New Zealand encouraged the Secretariat to enable the Council to comprehensively address threats by including relevant analysis and risk assessments on the impact of climate change in all reports submitted to the Council.

At a meeting held on 5 February 2019, also under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security", the representative of Indonesia suggested that the Council could consider asking the Secretariat to prepare a report identifying options to enhance cooperation and coordination and to make recommendations to better prevent and counter transnational organized crimes at sea, within the applicable legal framework, and to report regularly to the Council thereafter.⁷⁴ At a meeting held on 6 June 2019, under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)", the representative of Estonia suggested that the Secretariat could play an important role in providing information and highlighting the developments that could lead to instability, in order to strengthen the Council's capacity to prevent conflict and its situational awareness.⁷⁵ The representative of Canada noted that through regular horizon-scan briefings from the Secretariat, the Council could do more with regard to conflict prevention. The representative of Norway also highlighted the need for the Council to improve its ability to address problems at all stages of a conflict cycle and said that more attention should be given to the prevention of conflict. In that connection, she suggested that the informal situational awareness briefings by the Secretariat should be fully utilized. At a meeting held on 20 September 2019, under the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question", the representative of France thanked the Secretariat for granting the request for regular written reports in relation to resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#) and noted that the reports were essential tools for documenting the issue of colonization, as well as that of violence, and for guiding the work of the Council.⁷⁶ At a meeting held on 19 December 2019, under the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East", the representative of China noted that terrorist forces still occupied a large part of Idlib, threatening the safety of civilians, destroying infrastructure and worsening the humanitarian situation. He expressed the hope that the Secretariat would provide detailed information and

⁷⁴ See [S/PV.8457](#).

⁷⁵ See [S/PV.8539](#).

⁷⁶ See [S/PV.8625](#).

analyses in that regard and said that the Secretariat should remain seized of the issue and gather information on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters, which was a common challenge to peace and security in the Middle East and the world over.⁷⁷

In accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the Council invited the Secretariat to provide all relevant communications of the Council to the newly elected members as from 1 October immediately preceding their term of membership.⁷⁸ On 27 December 2019, the Council issued a note by the President inviting the Secretariat to provide all communications of the Council to the newly elected members for a period of five months, as from 1 August immediately preceding their term of membership, instead of the three-month period stated

in paragraph 140 of the note by the President of 30 August 2017.⁷⁹

In addition, on 27 December 2019, the Council issued a note by the President slightly amending the language of the note by the President of 30 August 2017 concerning the circulation of reports of the Secretary-General.⁸⁰ According to the new note, reports of the Secretary-General should be circulated to relevant participants in Council meetings at which those reports would be discussed at least four working days before the Council was scheduled to consider them, including the distribution of the reports on peacekeeping missions to all participants in meetings of troop- and police-contributing countries, essentially applying the same rule as for Council members.⁸¹

⁷⁷ See S/PV.8694.

⁷⁸ S/2017/507, annex, para. 140.

⁷⁹ S/2019/993.

⁸⁰ S/2017/507, annex, para. 64.

⁸¹ S/2019/995.

VI. Conduct of business

Note

Section VI covers the practice of the Council concerning the conduct of business at its meetings, in relation to rules 27, 29, 30 and 33 of its provisional rules of procedure.

Rule 27

The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

Rule 29

The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council.

The Chairman of a commission or committee, or the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

Rule 30

If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

Rule 33

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

- 1. To suspend the meeting;*
- 2. To adjourn the meeting;*
- 3. To adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;*
- 4. To refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;*
- 5. To postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or*
- 6. To introduce an amendment.*

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

In 2019, no explicit reference was made to rules 27, 29 and 30. During the period under review, the President of the Council routinely requested speakers to limit their statements to four minutes, or to five minutes in accordance with the note by the President of 30 August 2017.⁸² Frequently, the President also requested delegations with lengthy statements to circulate their texts in writing and to deliver a

⁸² S/2017/507, annex, para. 22.

condensed version when speaking in the Chamber.⁸³ Pursuant to such requests, delegations frequently delivered a shortened version of the statement and subsequently circulated the full text in writing or made it available online.⁸⁴ Following an established practice, during the period under review, joint statements were delivered by both Council members and non-Council members who had been invited to participate in Council meetings.⁸⁵

Regarding the speaking order, according to the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the speaking order for meetings of the Council is established, as a general practice, by means of a draw. In addition, the President of the Council delivers his or her national statement last of all Council members.⁸⁶ However, in certain cases, the speaking order is established by the use of a sign-up sheet, and the President of the Council may make his or her national statement before the other members take the floor.⁸⁷ In certain cases, the President of the Council may adjust the list of speakers and inscribe first the delegation(s) responsible for the drafting process, in order to allow it or them to make an introductory or explanatory

presentation.⁸⁸ When an unscheduled or emergency meeting is convened, the President may adjust the list of speakers so that the delegation having requested the meeting can speak before other Council members in order to present the rationale for convening the meeting.⁸⁹ The President of the Council may inscribe first the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies of the Council when they present their work, as occurred on several occasions during the period under review.⁹⁰ According to established practice, the list of speakers was adjusted according to protocol when high-level officials were representing Council members at a meeting.⁹¹ In 2019, non-members of the Council having a direct interest in the matter under consideration spoke on occasion before Council

⁸³ See, for example, [S/PV.8496](#), [S/PV.8591](#) and [S/PV.8648](#).

⁸⁴ See, for example, [S/PV.8591](#) (European Union) and [S/PV.8649 \(Resumption 2\)](#) (El Salvador, Fiji, Panama, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Sierra Leone).

⁸⁵ For example, at the 8451st meeting, held on 25 January 2019 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the representative of Belize delivered a statement on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States ([S/PV.8451](#)). At the 8517th meeting, held on 29 April 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the representative of the United Arab Emirates delivered a statement on behalf of the member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation ([S/PV.8517](#)). At the 8679th meeting, held on 6 December 2019 under the item entitled “Central African region”, the representative of Equatorial Guinea delivered a statement also on behalf of Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa ([S/PV.8679](#)). For more information and examples of statements delivered by Member States on behalf of regional or international organizations or groups of States, see sect. VII.A.

⁸⁶ [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 24 and 25.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* For example, at the 8682nd meeting, held on 11 December 2019 under the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, the representative of the United States and President of the Council for the month took the floor after the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, and delivered her national statement before the other members took the floor ([S/PV.8682](#)).

⁸⁸ [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 26. For example, at the 8692nd meeting, held on 19 December 2019 under the item entitled “The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, the representative of France, who was the penholder of resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), took the floor after the vote to provide explanatory remarks ([S/PV.8692](#)).

⁸⁹ [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 26. For example, at the 8461st meeting, held on 12 February 2019 under the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/264](#))”, the representative of the Russian Federation, who had requested an urgent meeting of the Council, delivered a statement before other Council members ([S/PV.8461](#)).

⁹⁰ [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 27. For example, at the 8446th meeting, held on 17 January 2019 under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the representative of Poland spoke before other Council members and briefed the Council in her capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan ([S/PV.8446](#)).

⁹¹ [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 29–30. For example, at the 8534th meeting, held on 23 May 2019 under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, Indonesia (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Germany was represented by its Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office. Both representatives took the floor after the briefers but before other Council members ([S/PV.8534](#)). At the 8600th meeting, held on 20 August 2019 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, Poland (President of the Council) was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Germany was represented by its State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office and the United States was represented by its Secretary of State. All three representatives took the floor after the briefer but before other Council members ([S/PV.8600](#)). For more information on high-level meetings, see sect. I.

members, consistent with prior practice and the note by the President dated 30 August 2017.⁹²

In the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the Council expressed its commitment to continue to take steps to improve the focus and interactivity of its open debates.⁹³ In particular, the note reflected the understanding that open debates could benefit from the contributions of both Council members and the wider membership, and the acknowledgement by Council members of the usefulness of concept notes to help focus the discussion.⁹⁴ During the period under review, Council members continued the practice of circulating concept notes prior to open debates. The concept notes were frequently annexed to letters addressed to the

Secretary-General or the President of the Council.⁹⁵ On occasion, concept notes were also submitted by more than one Council member.⁹⁶

The Council continued to use videoconferencing at its meetings, a practice that has become common in recent years,⁹⁷ resulting in an average of more than 61 briefings held via videoconferencing per year. In 2019, the Council was briefed via videoconferencing 115 times, from different locations, including Bangui, Jerusalem and Kinshasa.⁹⁸

⁹² S/2017/507, annex, para. 33. For example, at the 8449th meeting, held on 22 January 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, the representative of Israel, who was invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, and the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations, who was invited in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and previous practice, both took the floor before Council members, following established practice (S/PV.8449). At the 8481st meeting, held on 11 March 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”, the representative of Afghanistan spoke before Council members, following established practice (S/PV.8481). For more information concerning participation in Council meetings, see sect. VII.

⁹³ S/2017/507, para. 43.

⁹⁴ Ibid., paras. 38 and 40.

⁹⁵ For example, at its 8473rd meeting, held on 27 February 2019, the Council had before it a concept note on the topic “Silencing the guns in Africa: cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations”, annexed to the letter dated 13 February 2019 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Equatorial Guinea to the Secretary-General (S/2019/169) (see S/PV.8473); at its 8649th meeting, held on 29 October 2019, the Council had before it a concept note on the topic “Towards the successful implementation of the women and peace and security agenda: moving from commitments to accomplishments in preparation for the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)”, annexed to the letter dated 8 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the Secretary-General (S/2019/801) (see S/PV.8649).

⁹⁶ See the letter dated 13 September 2019 from the Permanent Representatives of Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, the Russian Federation and South Africa to the Secretary-General (S/2019/743).

⁹⁷ S/2017/507, annex, para. 60.

⁹⁸ For more information on participation in Council meetings via videoconferencing, see sect. VII.B.

VII. Participation

Note

Section VII covers the practice of the Council concerning the extension of invitations to non-members of the Council to participate in meetings of the Council. Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter of the United Nations and rules 37 and 39 of the provisional rules of procedure describe circumstances in which invitations can be extended to non-members of the Council to participate, without vote, when the Council so decides.

Article 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought

before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

Rule 37

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

Rule 39

The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

During the period under review, the Council continued to invite non-members to participate in its meetings. The invitations were extended by the President at the beginning of or during Council meetings, either under the “relevant provisions” of the Charter without an explicit reference to a specific Article or rule, or under rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. Specifically, Member States continued to be invited under rule 37, while representatives of the Secretariat, other United Nations organs, specialized agencies, funds and programmes, regional and other intergovernmental organizations, or other invitees, including representatives of non-governmental organizations, were invited under rule 39. While Member States requested invitations in letters addressed to the President of the Council, in most cases these were not circulated as documents of the Council.

In accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, the Council invited newly elected members to observe all meetings of the Council as from 1 October, for the three months immediately preceding their term of membership.⁹⁹ On 27 December 2019, the Council issued a note by the President providing that the Council could invite the newly elected members of the Council to observe informal consultations – as appropriate, and strictly without participation and with full respect for the confidentiality of the deliberations – on Council outcome documents for a period of three months, as from 1 October immediately preceding their term of membership, in addition to observing all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies and the informal consultations of the whole, as already stated in paragraph 140 of the note by the President of 30 August 2017.¹⁰⁰ The note also indicated that,

notwithstanding the foregoing measure, the Council would not invite the newly elected members to a specific private meeting of the Council or to specific informal negotiations of the whole if a request to that effect was made by a member of the Council where exceptional circumstances existed.

This section is divided into four subsections, namely: A. Invitations extended under rule 37; B. Invitations extended under rule 39; C. Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39; and D. Discussions relating to participation.

A. Invitations extended under rule 37

In accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure, all States, whether Members of the United Nations or not, can be invited to participate in Council meetings when (a) the interests of a Member State are “specially affected” (Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37); (b) a Member State or a non-Member State is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Council (Article 32 of the Charter); and (c) a Member State brings a matter to the attention of the Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter (rule 37).¹⁰¹

During the period under review, there were no changes to the procedure for extending invitations to Member States to participate in the proceedings of the Council. Member States invited under rule 37, in accordance with previous practice, continued to speak occasionally in other capacities, for example on behalf of international or regional organizations, or groups of States, by delivering joint statements.¹⁰² There was, further, no instance in 2019 of a request from a Member State to participate in a Council meeting being put to a vote at a public meeting. In a letter dated

¹⁰¹ For more details on the referral of a dispute or situation to the Council by States, see part II, sect. I.A, and part VI, sect. I.A.

¹⁰² For example, at the 8443rd meeting, held on 11 January 2019, the representative of Zambia spoke on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (see [S/PV.8443](#)). At the 8449th meeting, held on 22 January 2019, the representative of Bangladesh spoke on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the representative of Libya spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States and the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela spoke on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see [S/PV.8449](#)). At the 8591st meeting, held on 2 August 2019, the representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries, the representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict, the representative of Estonia spoke also on behalf of Latvia and Lithuania, and the representative of Viet Nam spoke on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (see [S/PV.8591](#)).

⁹⁹ [S/2017/507](#), para. 140.

¹⁰⁰ [S/2019/993](#).

28 February 2019 to the President of the Council, the representative of Colombia protested “in the strongest terms” against the decision not to allow him to take the floor at the meeting held on the same day under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”, in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.¹⁰³ The representative of Colombia noted that the decision of the President of the Council to deny his delegation the right to respond to the false and reckless claims directed against Colombia during the meeting had led to the dissemination of biased information to the members of the Council and to the public around the world.

B. Invitations extended under rule 39

In accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, members of the Secretariat or other persons may be invited to supply the Council with information or give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

Following previous practice, an invitation under rule 39 was extended to a representative of a Member

¹⁰³ S/2019/197. See also S/PV.8476.


State, on an exceptional basis, only if his or her participation was in a role other than that of representative of a State, for example, as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission¹⁰⁴ or one of its country-specific configurations.¹⁰⁵

In 2019, a total of 387 invitations were extended under rule 39 (see figure IV).

¹⁰⁴ For example, at the 8579th meeting, held on 18 July 2019, the representative of Colombia was invited under rule 39 in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (see S/PV.8579).

¹⁰⁵ For example, the following representatives were invited under rule 39 in their capacities as Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission: at the 8465th meeting, held on 19 February 2019, the representative of Switzerland in his capacity as Chair of the Burundi configuration (see S/PV.8465); at the 8467th meeting, held on 21 February 2019, the representative of Morocco in his capacity as Chair of the Central African Republic configuration (see S/PV.8467); at the 8614th meeting, held on 10 September 2019, the representative of Brazil in his capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration (see S/PV.8614); and at the 8652nd meeting, held on 30 October 2019, the representative of Switzerland in his capacity as Chair of the Burundi configuration (see S/PV.8652).


Figure IV
Invitations under rule 39, 2010–2019



Of the 387 invitees under rule 39 in 2019, 237 were men and 150 were women. As shown in figure V, in recent years prior to 2019, the number of male speakers invited to Council meetings under rule 39 has been 2 to 4 times higher than the number of female

speakers invited under the same rule. This notwithstanding, the percentage of women invited under rule 39 increased during the period under review, from 29.7 per cent in 2018 to 38.7 per cent in 2019.

Figure V
Invitations under rule 39, 2010–2019



For the purposes of this part of the *Repertoire*, invitations extended under rule 39 are classified according to four main categories, namely:¹⁰⁶ (a) officials of the United Nations system;¹⁰⁷ (b) invitees from international organizations other than the United Nations;¹⁰⁸ (c) officials representing

regional intergovernmental organizations;¹⁰⁹ and (d) representatives of other entities such as non-governmental organizations.¹¹⁰ During the period under review, invitations under rule 39 were most often extended to officials of the United Nations system; representatives of other entities, such as non-governmental organizations, were invited less frequently, as shown in figure VI.

¹⁰⁶ In previous Supplements, separate categories were used for invitees representing the Secretariat and Security Council subsidiary bodies and those representing other United Nations organs, subsidiary bodies or agencies. For the sake of simplicity, the two categories have now been subsumed under the category “United Nations system”, which includes officials of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.


¹⁰⁷ For example, at the 8441st meeting, held on 9 January 2019, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen was invited under rule 39 (see [S/PV.8441](#)).

¹⁰⁸ For example, at the 8659th meeting, held on 6 November 2019, the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was invited under rule 39 (see [S/PV.8659](#)).

¹⁰⁹ For example, at the 8443rd meeting, held on 11 January 2019, the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations was invited under rule 39 (see [S/PV.8443](#)).

¹¹⁰ For example, at the 8668th meeting, held on 19 November 2019, the Director of Programs and Development of the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre was invited under rule 39 (see [S/PV.8668](#)).

Figure VI
Breakdown of invitations under rule 39, by category, 2010–2019



Videoconferencing

The Council continued to use videoconferencing for meetings and consultations, a prevalent practice since its introduction in 2009, resulting in an average of more than 61 videoconferences per year.¹¹¹ In 2019, the Council was briefed via videoconferencing 115 times, from various locations, including Bangui, Jerusalem and Kinshasa. In the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, Council members reiterated their intention to resort more often to the use of videoconferencing for briefing the Council, where

appropriate, while preserving a balanced approach between videoconferencing and briefings in person, including during open meetings.¹¹²

C. Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39

During the period under review, the Council extended several invitations not expressly under rule 37 or rule 39 (see table 10).

Invitations to representatives of the Holy See and the State of Palestine to participate in meetings of the Council were routinely extended “in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and the previous practice in this regard”, without specification of any rule.

¹¹¹ For example, at the 8685th meeting, held on 16 December 2019, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African Union briefed the Council via videoconference from Dakar and Addis Ababa, respectively (see [S/PV.8685](#)). For more information on videoconferencing, see sect. VI.

¹¹² [S/2017/507](#), annex, para. 60.

Table 10
Invitations not expressly extended under rule 37 or rule 39, 2019

<i>Invitee</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>	
State of Palestine	S/PV.8449 , 22 January 2019	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	
	S/PV.8489 , 26 March 2019		
	S/PV.8517 , 29 April 2019		
	S/PV.8532 , 22 May 2019		
	S/PV.8583 , 23 July 2019		
	S/PV.8625 , 20 September 2019		
	S/PV.8648 , 28 October 2019		
	S/PV.8669 , 20 November 2019		
	S/PV.8690 , 18 December 2019		
	S/PV.8600 , 20 August 2019		Maintenance of international peace and security
S/PV.8534 , 23 May 2019	Protection of civilians in armed conflict		
S/PV.8591 , 2 August 2019	Children and armed conflict		
Holy See	S/PV.8449 , 22 January 2019	The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	
	S/PV.8517 , 29 April 2019		
	S/PV.8583 , 23 July 2019		
	S/PV.8648 , 28 October 2019	Maintenance of international peace and security	
	S/PV.8451 , 25 January 2019		
	S/PV.8496 , 28 March 2019		Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
	S/PV.8508 , 11 April 2019		United Nations peacekeeping operations
	S/PV.8514 , 23 April 2019		Women and peace and security
	S/PV.8649 , 29 October 2019		Protection of civilians in armed conflict
	S/PV.8534 , 23 May 2019		
	S/PV.8591 , 2 August 2019		
	S/PV.8659 , 5 November 2019 [closed meeting]		The situation in the Middle East
	S/PV.8668 , 19 November 2019		Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

D. Discussions relating to participation

During the period under review, when non-members of the Council were invited to participate in a meeting, Council members generally spoke before Member States invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure and before those not expressly invited under any rule, except on some occasions when parties directly involved in the matter under consideration took the floor before Council members.¹¹³ The practice of the Council with regard to

persons invited under rule 39 was less consistent and the order of speaking depended on whether or not they were participating in the meeting to brief the Council.

In 2019, issues concerning participation in Council meetings were raised on a number of occasions. At the 8480th meeting, held on 8 March 2019 under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the representative of France said that her delegation was pleased that the Council had been able to hear from the founder of Hope Restoration South Sudan, whose testimony from the field and exceptional personal

¹¹³ For example, at the 8555th meeting, held on 19 June 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”, following established practice in connection with this item, the representative of Afghanistan, who was invited under rule 37, spoke after the briefers invited under rule 39, namely the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan

and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, but before the Council members (see [S/PV.8555](#)). For more information on the order of speaking, see sect. VI.

commitment were extremely valuable. She added that her briefing was particularly relevant on the occasion of International Women's Day.¹¹⁴ At the 8511th meeting, held on 12 April 2019 under the item entitled "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)", the representative of the United Kingdom noted that the briefing delivered by the Executive Director of the Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y Económica was an important reminder of the role that women's organizations had played in the peace process.¹¹⁵ At the 8514th meeting, held on 23 April 2019 under the item entitled "Women and peace and security", the representative of Germany, in his capacity as President of the Council, thanked the co-founder and Director of the Tamazight Women's Movement for her briefing and said that the impressive statements delivered by all the briefers underlined why the Council was meeting. He added that the Council needed to stand with the survivors.¹¹⁶ The representative of France expressed his delegation's full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and said that the Council should invite the Special Representative to brief the Council more regularly. At the 8556th meeting, held on 20 June 2019 under the item entitled "Protection of civilians in armed conflict", the representative of the United States, commending the unanimous adoption of resolution 2475 (2019), which was the Council's first-ever resolution calling upon Member States and parties to armed conflict to protect persons with disabilities, said that her delegation looked forward to more regular briefings by persons with disabilities and their representative organizations, as well as humanitarian organizations and other stakeholders.¹¹⁷ She hoped that such a practice would become a regular part of the Council's work in the way that it addressed other related issues. At the 8584th meeting, held on 24 July 2019 under the item entitled "The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo", the representative of the Russian Federation said that, with regard to the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council should maintain the practice of considering different aspects of the Congolese sanctions regime in the meetings and inviting the representatives of Kinshasa to participate in the discussion.¹¹⁸ He welcomed the visit of the Chair

¹¹⁴ See S/PV.8480.

¹¹⁵ See S/PV.8511.

¹¹⁶ See S/PV.8514.

¹¹⁷ See S/PV.8556.

¹¹⁸ See S/PV.8584.

of the Committee to the region in late April and early May 2019 and supported the continuation of such contacts with regional actors in the future.

At the 8593rd meeting, held on 7 August 2019 under the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East," the representative of France stated that the testimonies of representatives of civil society organizations such as Syria Bright Future and Families for Freedom illustrated the Syrian regime's use of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention and enforced disappearances.¹¹⁹ She emphasized that the Council must remain seized of the issue and continue to hear regular briefings on it. At the 8674th meeting, held on 22 November 2019 under the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East", the representative of the Dominican Republic thanked the President for inviting a member of the Syrian Women's League to brief the Council, from whom the Council could learn about the views and aspirations of civil society and of women in particular, as they sought to build a new future for the Syrian Arab Republic.¹²⁰ The representative of the United Kingdom also welcomed the opportunity to hear the views of the member of the Syrian Women's League and said that her delegation was grateful for the reminder that the political process went a long way beyond the Constitution. Recognizing the tireless efforts of the briefer and other women to overcome the barriers to being heard, the representative of the United Kingdom emphasized the importance of genuinely including their voices and the voices of civil society in the political process. Participation in Council meetings was discussed in more detail during the open debate at the 8539th meeting, held on 6 June 2019 under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)",¹²¹ as described in case 7.

Case 7 Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At its 8539th meeting, held on 6 June 2019 under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)",¹²² the Council held its annual open debate, under the presidency of Kuwait, to discuss the working methods of the Council.¹²³ Emphasizing the conflict prevention role of the Council, the representative of New Zealand called on the Council to invite briefers who could deliver insights to add value to the Council's

¹¹⁹ See S/PV.8593.

¹²⁰ See S/PV.8674.

¹²¹ See S/PV.8539.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 29 May 2019 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2019/450).

deliberations and demanded appropriate briefings, including maps and graphics, from Secretariat briefers to better support discussions. The representative of Canada commended the efforts of the Council to increase the number of women civil society briefers speaking to the Council on both geographic and thematic agenda items, noting that their perspectives needed to be heard in the Chamber. He also commended efforts led by Kuwait to increase the use of gender-neutral pronouns and other such language in United Nations documentation and welcomed the creation of the Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security. The representatives of Italy and Slovenia echoed the perspectives of the representative of Canada, expressing their support for the invitation of briefers from civil society, in particular women, to

Council meetings. The representative of Italy noted that the participation of women and greater gender inclusivity and equality allowed Council members to hear different voices and points of view before deliberating. The representative of Slovenia highlighted the importance of interaction with civil society, in particular women's groups, and called for the inclusion of more such briefers as they could provide useful first-hand information from the ground while also receiving guidance from Council members. The representative of Norway, who spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries, called on the Council to be open to voices from outside the Chamber and to maintain the practice of inviting civil society briefers in order for the Council to broaden its understanding of the issues on the agenda.

VIII. Decision-making and voting

Note

Section VIII covers the practice of the Council with regard to decision-making, including voting. Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 40 of the provisional rules of procedure govern the voting in the Council. They provide that decisions on procedural matters require an affirmative vote of 9 of the 15 Council members, while decisions on substantive matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine Council members, including all of the permanent members.

This section also covers rules 31, 32, 34 to 36 and 38 of the provisional rules of procedure, which govern the conduct of business with regard to voting on draft resolutions, amendments and substantive motions.

Article 27

1. *Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.*
2. *Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.*
3. *Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.*

Rule 31

Proposed resolutions, amendments and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing.

Rule 32

Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission.

Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

Rule 34

It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

Rule 35

A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

If the motion or draft resolution has been seconded, the representative on the Security Council who has seconded it may require that it be put to the vote as his motion or draft resolution with the same right of precedence as if the original mover had not withdrawn it.

Rule 36

If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds to or deletes from

the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 38

Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule, or in application of Article 32 of the Charter, to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council.

Rule 40

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

This section comprises five subsections, namely: A. Decisions of the Council; B. Penholdership and sponsorship in accordance with rule 38; C. Decision-making by voting; D. Decision-making without a vote; and E. Discussions concerning the decision-making process.

In 2019, rule 31 of the provisional rules of procedure was routinely applied in Council meetings. There were no instances of motions or amendments requiring voting, withdrawal of draft resolutions or requests for separate voting on parts of a draft resolution; consequently, there were no instances of

explicit invocation of rules 32, 35 and 36. Nonetheless, at one meeting of the Council, an oral amendment to a draft resolution was proposed and adopted without a vote.¹²⁴ In addition, there were various instances of the submission of competing draft resolutions, which were voted upon in their order of submission pursuant to rule 32, as described in section A below. This notwithstanding, there were no instances of explicit invocation of rules 32 and 34.


A. Decisions of the Council

During the period under review, the Council continued to adopt, at its meetings, resolutions and statements by the President, in addition to taking procedural decisions. Decisions of the Council also took the form of notes by or letters from the President, which were seldom adopted at meetings and, in most cases, were issued as documents of the Council.

In 2019, the Council adopted a total of 52 resolutions and issued 15 presidential statements. The Council also issued 19 notes by the President and 32 letters from the President. Figure VII shows the total number of resolutions adopted and statements and notes by, and letters from, the President issued during the past decade (2010 to 2019).

¹²⁴ For more information on the matter, see part II, sect. VIII.D.

Figure VII
Resolutions adopted and statements and notes by and letters from the President issued, 2010–2019



Multiple decisions in one meeting

During 2019, the Council continued the standard practice of adopting a single decision at a meeting. There were, however, three instances when more than one draft resolution was put to a vote at a single meeting. At the 8476th meeting, held on 28 February 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”, the Council failed to adopt a draft resolution submitted by the United States (S/2019/186) owing to the negative vote of two permanent members of the Council, and did not adopt a draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2019/190) for lack of the required number of votes.¹²⁵ At the 8623rd meeting, held on 19 September 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, in connection with the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council failed to adopt the draft resolution submitted by Belgium, Germany and Kuwait (S/2019/756) owing to the negative vote of two permanent members of the Council, and did not adopt a draft resolution submitted by China and the Russian Federation (S/2019/757) for lack of the required number of votes.¹²⁶ At the 8697th meeting, held on 20 December 2019 under the same agenda item and in connection with the same issue, the Council failed to adopt a draft resolution submitted by Belgium, Germany and Kuwait (S/2019/961) owing to the negative vote of two permanent members of the Council, and did not adopt a draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2019/962) for lack of the required number of votes.¹²⁷

B. Penholdership and sponsorship in accordance with rule 38

A draft resolution may be submitted by any member of the Council. The note by the President dated 30 August 2017 contains the stipulation that the members of the Council support, where appropriate, the informal arrangement whereby one or more Council members, as penholder(s), initiate and chair

the informal drafting process.¹²⁸ According to the note, any member of the Council may be a penholder, and more than one Council member may act as co-penholder, when it is deemed to add value, taking into account as appropriate the expertise and/or contributions of Council members on the subjects.¹²⁹ In the note, the Council members reaffirmed that all members of the Council should be allowed to participate fully in the preparation of, inter alia, the resolutions, presidential statements and press statements of the Council and that the drafting of all documents such as resolutions, presidential statements and press statements should be carried out in an inclusive manner that would allow participation of all members of the Council.¹³⁰ The members of the Council also encouraged the penholder or co-penholders, depending on the subject and the urgency of the situation on the ground, to provide a reasonably sufficient time for consideration by all Council members when draft resolutions, presidential statements and press statements of the Council were placed under a silence procedure.¹³¹

According to rule 38 of the provisional rules of procedure, any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with rule 37 or in application of Article 32 of the Charter to participate in the discussions of the Council may also submit a proposal, but a proposal may be put to a vote only at the request of a Council member. Those Member States that submit a draft resolution become sponsors of the draft resolution. A draft resolution is described as a presidential text if all the Council members agree to be co-sponsors. In 2019, no presidential text was tabled, compared with one in 2018.¹³²

During the period under review, the Council considered a total of 58 draft resolutions, seven of which were sponsored by non-members of the Council, as shown in table 11.

¹²⁵ See S/PV.8476.

¹²⁶ See S/PV.8623.

¹²⁷ See S/PV.8697.

¹²⁸ S/2017/507, annex, para. 78.

¹²⁹ Ibid., para. 79.

¹³⁰ Ibid., para. 80.

¹³¹ Ibid., para. 82.

¹³² For more information on past practice concerning presidential texts, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017* and *Supplement 2018*, part II, sect. VIII.B.

Table 11
Draft resolutions sponsored by non-members of the Council, 2019

<i>Draft resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Council member sponsors</i>	<i>Non-member co-sponsors</i>
S/2019/179	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining peace and security	S/PV.8473 27 February 2019	Resolution 2457 (2019)	11 Council members (Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa)	66 Member States ^a
S/2019/268	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	S/PV.8496 28 March 2019	Resolution 2642 (2019)	10 Council members (Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Germany, Indonesia, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States)	57 Member States ^b
S/2019/475	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	S/PV.8543 11 June 2019	Resolution 2474 (2019)	12 Council members (Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United States)	56 Member States ^c
S/2019/503	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	S/PV.8556 20 June 2019	Resolution 2475 (2019)	12 Council members (Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States)	56 Member States ^d
S/2019/580	Threats to international peace and security	S/PV.8582 19 July 2019	Resolution 2482 (2019)	Nine Council members (Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States)	38 Member States ^e
S/2019/788	Maintenance of international peace and security	S/PV.8631 3 October 2019	Resolution 2491 (2019)	Five Council members (Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, United Kingdom)	23 Member States ^f
S/2019/841	Women and peace and security	S/PV.8649 29 October 2019	Resolution 2493 (2019)	Two Council members (Indonesia, South Africa)	20 Member States ^g

^a Algeria, Angola, Austria, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and United Republic of Tanzania.

- ^b Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates.
- ^c Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Palau, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay.
- ^d Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.
- ^e Angola, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, Guinea, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.
- ^f Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
- ^g Armenia, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Georgia, Ireland, Jordan, Liberia, Morocco, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay.

C. Decision-making by voting

According to Article 27 (2) and (3) of the Charter, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine Council members. On all other matters, that is, substantive or non-procedural matters, an affirmative vote of nine Council members is required, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. The result of a vote in the Council often does not in itself indicate whether the Council considers the matter voted upon to be procedural or substantive. For example, whether a vote is procedural or not cannot be determined when a proposal is: (a) adopted by a unanimous vote; (b) adopted by an affirmative vote of all permanent members; or (c) not adopted, having failed to obtain the nine affirmative votes required. When a proposal is adopted, having obtained nine or more affirmative votes, with one or more permanent members casting a negative vote, that indicates that the vote is considered

procedural. Conversely, if the proposal is not adopted, the matter voted upon is considered to be substantive. On certain occasions, in its early years, the Council found it necessary to decide, by vote, the question whether the matter under consideration was procedural within the meaning of Article 27 (2). This procedure is known as the “preliminary question”, after the language used in the San Francisco Statement on Voting Procedure. In recent years, including during the period under review, however, there have been no instances of the Council deciding to examine the preliminary question. Furthermore, procedural motions, such as the adoption of the agenda, the extension of invitations, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting, have generally been decided upon by the Council without a vote. When such motions were voted upon, the vote was considered procedural. In 2019, the Council voted on procedural matters on two occasions (see table 12).

Table 12
Cases in which the vote indicated the procedural character of the matter, 2019

<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Subject of proposal</i>	<i>Vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>	<i>Permanent members casting negative vote</i>
The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	S/PV.8452 26 January 2019	Adoption of the agenda ^a	9-4-2	China, Russian Federation
Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian	S/PV.8529 20 May 2019	Adoption of the agenda	5-6-4	France, United Kingdom, United States

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<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Subject of proposal</i>	<i>Vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>	<i>Permanent members casting negative vote</i>
Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)				

^a For more information on the adoption of the agenda, see sect. II.A.

Adoption of resolutions

During the period under review, the majority of resolutions adopted by the Council (44 of 52) were

adopted unanimously. Eight resolutions were adopted without a unanimous vote (see table 13).

Table 13
Resolutions adopted without a unanimous vote, 2019

<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstention</i>
2459 (2019)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan ^a	S/PV.8484 15 March 2019	14 (Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States)	None	1 (Russian Federation)
2466 (2019)	The question concerning Haiti ^b	S/PV.8510 12 April 2019	13 (Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States)	None	2 (Dominican Republic, Russian Federation)
2467 (2019)	Women and peace and security ^c	S/PV.8514 23 April 2019	13 (Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States)	None	2 (China, Russian Federation)
2468 (2019)	The situation concerning Western Sahara ^d	S/PV.8518 30 April 2019	13 (Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States)	None	2 (Russian Federation, South Africa)
2471 (2019)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan ^a	S/PV.8536 30 May 2019	10 (Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States)	None	5 (China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa)
2476 (2019)	The question concerning Haiti ^b	S/PV.8559 25 June 2019	13 (Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait,	None	2 (China, Dominican Republic)

<i>Resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstention</i>
			Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States)		
2494 (2019)	The situation concerning Western Sahara ^d	S/PV.8651 30 October 2019	13 (Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States)	None	2 (Russian Federation, South Africa)
2498 (2019)	The situation in Somalia ^e	S/PV.8665 15 November 2019	12 (Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States)	None	3 (China, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation)

- ^a For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 9.
^b For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 14.
^c For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 30.
^d For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 1.
^e For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 2.

Draft resolutions not adopted

According to Article 27 (3) of the Charter, a draft resolution on non-procedural matters is not adopted when it fails to obtain the nine affirmative votes required, or when a negative vote is cast by a

permanent member. During the period under review, there were three instances in which a draft resolution was not adopted because it failed to obtain the nine affirmative votes required, and three occasions when a draft resolution was not adopted owing to a negative vote cast by a permanent member (see table 14).

Table 14
Draft resolutions not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member or for lack of the requisite number of votes, 2019

<i>Draft resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
S/2019/186	The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela ^a	S/PV.8476 28 February 2019	9 (Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States)	3 (China, Russian Federation, South Africa)	3 (Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia)
S/2019/190	The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela ^a	S/PV.8476 28 February 2019	4 (China, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa)	7 (Belgium, France, Germany, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States)	4 (Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Kuwait)
S/2019/756	The situation in the Middle East ^b	S/PV.8623 19 September 2019	12 (Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland,	2 (China and Russian Federation)	1 (Equatorial Guinea)

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<i>Draft resolution</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Votes in favour</i>	<i>Votes against</i>	<i>Abstentions</i>
			South Africa, United Kingdom, United States)		
S/2019/757	The situation in the Middle East ^b	S/PV.8623 19 September 2019	2 (China, Russian Federation)	9 (Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States)	4 (Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, South Africa)
S/2019/961	The situation in the Middle East ^b	S/PV.8697 20 December 2019	13 (Belgium, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States)	2 (China, Russian Federation)	
S/2019/962	The situation in the Middle East ^b	S/PV.8697 20 December 2019	5 (China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa)	6 (Dominican Republic, France, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States)	4 (Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait)

^a For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 16.

^b For more information on the discussion, see part I, sect. 22.

D. Decision-making without a vote

A procedural or substantive motion may be adopted in the Council without a vote or by consensus. In 2019, there were no instances of a resolution being adopted without a vote. All 52 resolutions were adopted by a show of hands. However, at a meeting of the Council held under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”,¹³³ the representative of Germany, as co-penholder, introduced an oral amendment to the draft resolution proposed¹³⁴ and clarified that the proposed revision was made at the request of Afghanistan. According to the President of the Council, if delegations consented to the inclusion of the oral revision to the draft resolution, and there were no objections, then Council members would vote on the resolution as orally revised. As no objections to the revision were raised, the President of the Council requested the Secretariat to inscribe the oral revision into the text and proceeded to the vote on the draft

resolution, which was adopted unanimously as resolution [2489 \(2019\)](#).

Statements by the President on behalf of the Council continued to be adopted by consensus. A total of 15 statements by the President were adopted during the period under review.¹³⁵

Following past practice, during the period under review, notes and letters by the President of the Council were adopted by consensus and issued as official documents of the Council. In 2019, the Council

¹³⁵ The complete list of statements by the President adopted during the review period is provided in part I, sect. II, of the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly at its seventy-third session ([A/74/2](#)).

¹³³ See [S/PV.8620](#).

¹³⁴ [S/2019/749](#).

issued 19 notes and 32 letters by the President.¹³⁶ Notes and letters by the President are rarely adopted during Council meetings. During the period under review, one note by the President, namely, the note concerning the adoption of the draft annual report of the Council to the General Assembly for the period from 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2018, was adopted during a meeting of the Council, in line with past practice.¹³⁷

E. Discussions concerning the decision-making process

During the period under review, Council members and the wider membership addressed issues pertaining to the exercise of the veto, penholdership and the negotiation process leading to the adoption of outcome documents, as reflected in case 8, in the context of the annual debate on the working methods of the Council.

Case 8 Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

On 6 June 2019, at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the presidency for the month, the Council held its annual open debate on the working methods of the Council.¹³⁸ At the meeting, a number of speakers expressed views on penholdership and other aspects pertaining to the negotiation and drafting of Council outcome documents. The representative of France underlined the importance of preserving the principle of freedom for any member of the Council to present a text at any time on any subject, in order to ensure responsiveness and promote consensus in the Council. He said that any *ex ante* or automatic allocation of penholders would be detrimental to the effectiveness of

the Council. The representative of South Africa, speaking on behalf of the 10 elected members of the Council, suggested that the Council consider promoting the role of the Chairs of subsidiary bodies as penholders and making their role as co-penholders on related dossiers automatic, should the Chairs choose to accept that role. The representative of Liechtenstein welcomed the suggestion that the delegation chairing the sanctions committee on a specific country situation should also have a joint leadership function with the traditional penholder in drafting resolutions. The representative of Brazil said that the Chairs of the subsidiary bodies were uniquely placed to be considered co-penholders on issues pertaining to their activities. He added that a fair and adequate distribution of penholderships should be seen not as an exception but as a common practice essential to fostering appropriate levels of transparency and accountability in the Council. In that connection, Brazil believed that elected members should be offered real opportunities to be penholders.

The representative of the United Kingdom highlighted the importance of keeping the practice of penholding informal and said that every Council member had an equal right to take up the pen on any issue. The representative of China agreed that penholderships should be allocated according to the principle of equity so that every Council member could have an opportunity to contribute to resolving hotspot issues. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the Council had to expand the circle of penholders, particularly in favour of non-permanent members. He added that individual Council members should not consider certain countries and even regions as their fiefdoms or act as mentors on certain issues. The representative of Switzerland, speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, said that enhancing the responsibilities of Council members for drafting Council products would facilitate greater participation by all members in decision-making by providing more opportunities for any member of the Council to be a penholder and for more than one member to act as a penholder on a single dossier. The representative of Ireland recalled that there was nothing in the Charter stating that only permanent members could draft resolutions and added that it made little sense not to share the burden of the increased work of the Council and utilize the skills and experience of elected members. The representative of Singapore said that he was heartened to see more elected Council members taking on penholder roles in the Council; a Council where members felt sidelined would not only be non-inclusive but also ineffective in representing the interests of the wider membership.

¹³⁶ The complete list of notes by the President of the Council issued in 2019 is provided in part I, sect. XIII, of the report of the Security Council to the General Assembly at its seventy-third session (A/74/2) or available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/notes-president-2019. The complete list of letters from the President of the Council issued in 2019 is provided in part I, sect. III, of the same report or available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/letters-exchanged-between-secretary-general-and-president-security-council-2019.

¹³⁷ S/2019/666, at the 8597th meeting (see S/PV.8597). For more information, see part IV, sect. I.F.

¹³⁸ See S/PV.8539. The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 29 May 2019 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General (S/2019/450).

The representatives of New Zealand, Portugal, Norway¹³⁹ and Italy also called for a more balanced and equitable distribution of roles in the Council that included penholdership and chairmanship of subsidiary bodies. The representative of Italy added that fair and equal distribution of duties was consistent with a more transparent, representative, accountable, democratic and efficient Council.

In connection with the decision-making process in the Council, several speakers highlighted the importance of inclusivity in the negotiation and decision-making processes. The representatives of France and the United Kingdom highlighted their commitment to consulting all relevant stakeholders during negotiation processes, including troop- and police-contributing countries, the Chairs of sanctions committees, the countries of the region and the Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission's country-specific configurations. The representatives of Turkey, Norway and Ukraine also suggested that the decision-making process should involve the States concerned. The representative of Turkey added that the penholders should engage in timely consultations with all relevant actors with openness and flexibility. In addition, the representative of Ukraine said that involving the countries concerned and the wider United Nations membership would contribute to maximizing the comprehensive implementation of the provisions of Council decisions by Member States. The representative of Colombia urged the Council to facilitate timely access on an equal footing by non-Council members to draft outcome documents and other documents issued by the Council. The representative of Canada underscored the importance of the full involvement of elected members in the decision-making process, noting that the elected members gave legitimacy, diversity of ideas and perspectives to the Council. In that connection, he emphasized that incoming elected members needed access to information and the ability to act on such information. The representative of Egypt suggested that draft outcome documents should be shared with the wider membership to allow them to express their views and proposals.

With regard to the drafting of outcome documents, the representative of the United Kingdom said that the Council's products should be concise and use clear and straightforward language, in order for them to have impact on the ground. The representative of the Russian Federation concurred with the representative of the United Kingdom that the

Council's final products should be short, clear, easy to understand and, above all, action-oriented. Many draft texts were received unreasonably late, which did not allow for the gathering of multiple expert assessments or the holding of comprehensive consultations. In addition, the wording of draft resolutions sometimes changed at the last minute, leaving the Council with documents that did not take the concerns of its members into account. The representative of France said that his delegation had always tried to allow enough negotiating time and find the necessary compromises to ensure the adoption of texts by the Council. The representative of China said that the Council should strive for as broad a consensus as possible by holding in-depth consultations and should fully accommodate the concerns of all parties by increasing communication and cooperation. He added that any attempts to railroad draft texts through in the face of stark differences of opinion must be discouraged with a view to enhancing the authority and effectiveness of the Council.

With regard to the use of the veto, several speakers voiced support for the code of conduct of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, which stated that Council members should refrain from voting against credible Council action aimed at stopping mass atrocities and crimes against humanity.¹⁴⁰ Speakers also expressed support for the proposal made by France and Mexico for the voluntary and collective suspension of the use of the veto of permanent members in cases involving mass atrocities.¹⁴¹ The representative of Kuwait said that refraining from the use of the veto on humanitarian issues would allow for assistance to reach civilians in urgent need, medical evacuations and humanitarian truce. The representative of Turkey said that better outcomes could be achieved and more humanitarian tragedies prevented if the Council's tools were utilized much earlier, without resorting to the veto as a tool to advance national interests. He added that the use or the threat of the use of the veto had been proven to hamper the most needed role that the Council had to play on behalf of the entire United Nations membership.

The representative of Singapore said that the veto privilege must be wielded with increased responsibilities to allow the Council to discharge its duties in the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Brazil encouraged

¹³⁹ The representative of Norway spoke on behalf of the Nordic countries.

¹⁴⁰ [S/PV.8539](#) (United Kingdom, Kuwait, Estonia, Switzerland, Singapore, Canada, Slovenia, Norway, Liechtenstein and Costa Rica).

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, (France, Kuwait, Singapore, Canada, Mexico, Norway and Costa Rica).

efforts to review the use of the veto in the Council, in view of the ample call of the wider membership for its abolition or restriction and its direct impact on the functioning of the Council. The representative of Liechtenstein said that his delegation viewed subscribing to the code of conduct of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group as a minimum standard for Council membership and a precondition for support in Council elections. The representative of Ukraine saw a clear lack of

implementation of Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter, both in spirit and letter. While he acknowledged that a veto-free Council was still a distant and uncertain reality, he believed that a Council member should refrain from using its veto power and abstain from voting when it was a party to a conflict under consideration in the Council; otherwise, it risked compromising the exercise of its responsibilities and privileges in an impartial manner.

IX. Languages

Note

Section IX covers rules 41 to 47 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, which relate to the official and working languages of the Council, interpretation and the languages of meeting records and published resolutions and decisions.

Rule 41

Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be both the official and the working languages of the Security Council.

Rule 42

Speeches made in any of the six languages of the Security Council shall be interpreted into the other five languages.

Rule 43

[Deleted]

Rule 44

Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the languages of the Security Council. In this case, he shall himself provide for interpretation into one of those languages. Interpretation into the other languages of the Security Council by the interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

Rule 45

Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the languages of the Council.

Rule 46

All resolutions and other documents shall be published in the languages of the Security Council.

Rule 47

Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides, be published in any language other than the languages of the Council.

In the note by the President dated 30 August 2017, Council members encouraged the Secretariat to maintain the translation of all United Nations sanctions lists into all official languages of the United Nations and to continue to ensure that the information on the websites of the subsidiary bodies of the Council, including the reports of sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, was accurate and updated in all official languages.¹⁴²

During the period under review, rules 41 to 47 were applied consistently. At three meetings, speakers delivered their statements in a language other than the six official languages of the United Nations, as provided in rule 44.¹⁴³ The matter of working languages was addressed in different contexts throughout the year during the regular work of the Council. For example, at the 8539th meeting of the Council, held on 6 June 2019 in connection with the working methods of the Security Council, the representative of Egypt stressed the importance of ensuring that documents and reports of the Council were made available to the wider membership and in all six official languages, unless they included information related to the national security of States

¹⁴² S/2017/507, annex, para. 110.

¹⁴³ At the 8459th meeting, held on 7 February 2019, the 8541st meeting, held on 10 June 2019, and the 8655th meeting, held on 31 October 2019, the representative of Serbia (First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs) spoke in Serbian; the interpretation was provided by the delegation (see S/PV.8459, S/PV.8541 and S/PV.8655).

that did not wish to make such information available to the public.¹⁴⁴ At the 8570th meeting, held on 10 July 2019 under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the representative of Belgium considered it essential that the interaction between the Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries proceeded in the direction of improved mutual understanding.¹⁴⁵ In that connection, he welcomed the fact that interpretation was provided at the majority of meetings between the troop- and police-contributing countries and the Council and at meetings of the

¹⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8539](#).

¹⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8570](#).

Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, thereby addressing multilingualism and accessibility concerns. In a letter dated 14 February 2019 addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Finland transmitted the report of the sixteenth annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Council, which had been held on 29 and 30 November 2018.¹⁴⁶ In the context of discussing the experience of chairing a sanctions committee, one participant, according to the report, stressed the need for enhanced interpretation services into all six official languages.

¹⁴⁶ [S/2019/144](#).

X. Provisional status of the rules of procedure

Note

Section X covers the deliberations of the Council concerning the provisional status of the rules of procedure of the Council, last amended in 1982.¹⁴⁷ Article 30 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Since their adoption by the Council at its first meeting, held on 17 January 1946, the rules of procedure have remained provisional. On 27 December 2019, the Council issued a note by the President providing that, in line with the efforts of the United Nations and its Member States to promote the advancement of women and greater gender inclusivity and equality in their policies and practices, the members of the Council confirmed, as a matter of existing Council practice, that any reference to a male person in the Council’s provisional rules of procedure was deemed not to be limited to male persons. Thus, any such reference also constituted a reference to a female person, unless the context clearly indicated otherwise.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ The provisional rules of procedure of the Council were amended 11 times between 1946 and 1982: five times during the Council’s first year, at its 31st, 41st, 42nd, 44th and 48th meetings, on 9 April, 16 and 17 May and 6 and 24 June 1946; twice in its second year, at the 138th and 222nd meetings, on 4 June and 9 December 1947; and at its 468th meeting, on 28 February 1950; 1463rd meeting, on 24 January 1969; 1761st meeting, on 17 January 1974; and 2410th meeting, on 21 December 1982. The initial version of the provisional rules was issued under the symbol [S/96](#) and [S/96/Add.1](#), the latest version under the symbol [S/96/Rev.7](#).

¹⁴⁸ [S/2019/996](#).

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

During the period under review, the question of the status of the provisional rules of procedure, including in connection with Article 30 of the Charter, was raised at the 8539th meeting, held on 6 June 2019 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”.¹⁴⁹ During the debate, some speakers stressed that the rules of procedure of the Council should cease to be provisional. The representative of Cuba noted that their adoption was essential in terms of transparency and accountability, while the representative of Singapore said that their adoption would enhance the Council’s legitimacy and credibility. The representative of Ireland expressed concern that the rules of procedure were used to block action, not to facilitate it, while the representative of Colombia suggested elements for consideration and possible inclusion in the definitive text of the rules of procedure.

¹⁴⁹ See [S/PV.8539](#).

Part III
**Purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations**

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Introductory note

Part III covers the consideration by the Security Council of Articles contained in Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, namely Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5) and 2 (7). Part III consists of four sections. Section I features material relating to the principle of self-determination of peoples under Article 1 (2) of the Charter. Section II covers material relevant to the prohibition of the use of force or the threat of the use of force as enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the Charter. Section III deals with the obligation of States to refrain from assisting a target of the Council's enforcement action as stipulated in Article 2 (5) of the Charter. Section IV highlights the Council's consideration of the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of States, as regulated by Article 2 (7) of the Charter.

In 2019, the Council deliberated on the principle of self-determination with regard to the situations in eastern Ukraine, the Sudan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Western Sahara, as well as in the context of the Palestinian question and mercenary activities in Africa. It also discussed the application of Article 2 (4) with regard to the situations in the Middle East and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The Council also discussed the obligation of States to refrain from providing assistance to any State against which the United Nations was taking preventive or enforcement action pursuant to Article 2 (5) in connection with the situations in Libya, South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen, as well as, more broadly, in the context of peace and security in Africa. The Council also reflected on the principles enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the Charter during its consideration of the situations in Burundi, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as during its discussion on peacebuilding and sustaining peace and on the importance of national ownership and respect for sovereignty in the context of reconciliation. No Council decisions adopted during the reporting period contained explicit references to any of these Articles. Nonetheless, this part includes Council decisions featuring language relating to the principles enshrined in Articles 1 (2), 2 (4), 2 (5) and 2 (7). This part also includes implicit invocations of Article 1 (2) and explicit invocations of Articles 2 (4) and 2 (7) found in the correspondence addressed to the Council during the period under review.

I. Principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples under Article 1, paragraph 2

Article 1, paragraph 2

[The Purposes of the United Nations are:]

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

Note

Section I concerns the practice of the Security Council regarding the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as enshrined in Article 1 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations. Subsection A features decisions relevant to the principle enshrined in Article 1 (2). Subsection B describes the references

made to the principle of self-determination in Council discussions during the reporting period. Subsection C sets out instances in which the principle of self-determination was invoked in communications addressed to the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 1 (2)

During the period under review, the Security Council did not explicitly invoke Article 1 (2) in its decisions. However, a few implicit references found in its decisions are of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 1 (2). Those implicit references were made in connection with the envisaged referendum in Western Sahara (see table 1).

Table 1
Decisions containing implicit references to Article 1 (2)

Decision and date	Provision
The situation concerning Western Sahara	
Resolution 2468 (2019) 30 April 2019	Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect (sixth preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolution 2494 (2019), sixth preambular paragraph.</i> Calls upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect (para. 4) <i>See also resolution 2494 (2019), (para. 4).</i>

B. Constitutional discussion relating to Article 1 (2)

During the period under review, Article 1 (2) was not explicitly invoked in the deliberations of the Security Council. Nevertheless, speakers made reference to the principle of self-determination in the context of both country-specific and thematic discussions, as elaborated below.

At the 8517th meeting, held on 29 April 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle

East, including the Palestinian question”,¹ the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine underscored that the Palestinian right to self-determination had long been recognized and supported globally, and asserted that the Palestinian people held steadfast to their legitimate national aspirations for independence. On the other hand, the representative of Israel indicated that Zionism was the realization of the right of the Jewish people to self-determination and

¹ See [S/PV.8517](#).

sovereignty in the land of Israel. He accused Palestinian leaders of refusing to acknowledge the right of the Jewish people to self-determination and underlined that one people's pursuit of self-determination could not undermine the safety and security of another nation. During the same meeting, several speakers² expressed support for the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, while the representative of the Dominican Republic acknowledged the right of all peoples to self-determination. Similar references to the principle of self-determination were made by speakers at other meetings held under the same item.³

In relation to the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", at the 8519th meeting, held on 30 April 2019,⁴ the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa indicated that one of the three key contentious issues that needed to be addressed by future negotiations between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-North) and the new Sudanese authorities was whether SPLM-North could claim the right to self-determination in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. He added that the readiness of the new authorities in Khartoum to depart from the position of

their predecessors regarding self-determination "[remained] to be seen".

In connection with the situation in eastern Ukraine, at the 8461st meeting, held on 12 February 2019 under the item entitled "Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)",⁵ several speakers⁶ rejected the validity of the referendum held on 16 March 2014 on the status of Crimea or referred to it as "illegal". At the 8529th meeting, held on 20 May 2019,⁷ the representative of the Russian Federation opined that the signing on 15 May by the President of Ukraine of a law establishing the status of the Ukrainian language as the country's national language constituted "a direct violation of the spirit and letter of the package of measures for fulfilling the Minsk agreements", which included the right of the inhabitants of various districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk areas to linguistic self-determination, and underlined that the language issue was "what triggered the centrifugal trends in Ukraine in 2014". In contrast, at the 8575th meeting, held on 16 July 2019,⁸ the representative of Poland accused the Russian Federation of using "a sham referendum to take over a part of a sovereign country" and underscored the right of Ukraine to promote its national language. At several meetings held under the item entitled "The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela", several speakers defended the right of the Venezuelan people to exercise their sovereignty and self-determination without external interference.⁹

In the context of the meetings held under the item entitled "The situation concerning Western Sahara", at the 8518th meeting, held on 30 April 2019,¹⁰ after the vote on resolution 2468 (2019), in which the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO),¹¹ the representative of South Africa opined that the text of the resolution was not balanced, warned the Council

² Kuwait, Dominican Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Turkey, Syrian Arab Republic, League of Arab States, Namibia, Pakistan, Tunisia, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Botswana, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and Viet Nam.

³ See, for example, S/PV.8449 (State of Palestine, Poland, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Syrian Arab Republic, Argentina, Namibia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Botswana, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement)); S/PV.8532 (Germany, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, State of Palestine and Israel); S/PV.8583 (State of Palestine, Côte d'Ivoire, Namibia, Syrian Arab Republic, Argentina, Pakistan, Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Turkey, Cuba, Maldives and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement)); S/PV.8648 (State of Palestine, Côte d'Ivoire, China, Dominican Republic, Syrian Arab Republic, Pakistan, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Viet Nam, Morocco, Azerbaijan (speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Tunisia (speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States), Malaysia, Cuba, Algeria, Bahrain and Nigeria). See also, under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security", S/PV.8600 (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, State of Palestine and Lebanon).

⁴ See S/PV.8519.

⁵ See S/PV.8461.

⁶ Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine.

⁷ See S/PV.8529.

⁸ See S/PV.8575.

⁹ See S/PV.8452 (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba and Plurinational State of Bolivia); S/PV.8472 (Plurinational State of Bolivia, Cuba and Belize). For more details on the discussions in the Council on non-interference in the internal affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see sect. II.B.

¹⁰ See S/PV.8518.

¹¹ For more information on the mandate of MINURSO, see part X, sect. I.

against diluting the principle of self-determination through “unclear and ambiguous terms and language” in its decisions and called upon the Council to reaffirm its commitment to the right to self-determination for the people of Western Sahara in an “unqualified manner”.¹² The representative of the Russian Federation likewise criticized recent amendments introduced to Council resolutions extending the mandate of MINURSO, indicating that, in his country’s view, such amendments undermined the Council’s impartial and objective approach to the issue of Western Sahara. In that connection, he regarded the “artificial modification” of previously agreed parameters as “unacceptable” and recalled that previously approved parameters had defined the parties to the conflict and provided for reaching a mutually acceptable solution that guaranteed the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Several speakers¹³ referred to the need for a lasting and mutually acceptable solution that provided for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

On 4 February 2019, at the 8456th meeting, held under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Mercenary activities as a source of insecurity and destabilization in Africa”,¹⁴ the representatives of Equatorial Guinea, the Dominican Republic, Kuwait and the Russian Federation all emphasized that mercenary activities undermined the self-determination of peoples. At the 8496th meeting, held on 28 March 2019 under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”,¹⁵ the representative of Pakistan called upon the international community to continue to focus its attention on foreign intervention, foreign occupation and the continuing denial of the right to self-determination to people living under foreign occupation and emphasized that “the brutalization and oppression of people struggling for the legitimate right to self-determination [constituted] State terrorism”.

¹² See [S/PV.8518](#).

¹³ United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and Germany.

¹⁴ See [S/PV.8456](#).

¹⁵ See [S/PV.8496](#).

C. Invocation of the principle enshrined in Article 1 (2) in communications

During the period under review, no explicit references to Article 1 (2) were made in the communications addressed to the Security Council. This notwithstanding, the annex to the letter dated 1 November 2019 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General,¹⁶ in which the Islamic Republic of Iran presented its initiative to hold a national referendum in the Palestinian territory, contained multiple references to the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including characterizing the right to self-determination as among the most fundamental principles recognized under international law that had been noted in Article 1 (2) of the Charter.

The principle of self-determination was invoked in numerous communications addressed to or brought to the attention of the Council, including communications from Member States relating to Western Sahara,¹⁷ the Middle East, including the Palestinian question,¹⁸ Nagorno-Karabakh,¹⁹ the India-Pakistan question,²⁰ the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela²¹ and the situation in eastern Ukraine.²² The reports of the Secretary-General to the Council regarding the peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine²³ and the situation concerning Western Sahara²⁴ also made references to the principle of self-determination.

¹⁶ [S/2019/862](#).

¹⁷ See, for example, [S/2019/23](#); [S/2019/63](#); [S/2019/271](#); [S/2019/298](#); [S/2019/348](#); [S/2019/350](#); [S/2019/424](#); [S/2019/590](#); [S/2019/746](#); [S/2019/795](#); [S/2019/824](#); and [S/2019/906](#).

¹⁸ See, for example, [S/2019/4](#); [S/2019/135](#); [S/2019/306](#); [S/2019/370](#); [S/2019/480](#); [S/2019/486](#); [S/2019/626](#); [S/2019/680](#); [S/2019/739](#); [S/2019/747](#); [S/2019/767](#); and [S/2019/937](#).

¹⁹ See, for example, [S/2019/215](#); [S/2019/709](#); [S/2019/762](#); and [S/2019/894](#).

²⁰ See, for example, [S/2019/172](#); [S/2019/310](#); [S/2019/623](#); [S/2019/635](#); [S/2019/654](#); [S/2019/679](#); [S/2019/766](#); [S/2019/814](#); and [S/2019/860](#).

²¹ See, for example, [S/2019/117](#); [S/2019/360](#); and [S/2019/765](#).

²² See, for example, [S/2019/163](#); [S/2019/422](#); and [S/2019/439](#).

²³ [S/2019/685](#), para. 5; and [S/2019/938](#), para. 66.

²⁴ [S/2019/282](#), paras. 16, 25, 73 and 83; and [S/2019/787](#), paras. 19, 77 and 78.

II. Prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2, paragraph 4

Article 2, paragraph 4

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Note

Section II covers the practice of the Council concerning the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force under Article 2 (4) of the Charter. Subsection A includes implicit references to Article 2 (4) in decisions adopted by the Council. Subsection B highlights constitutional discussions relating to the threat or use of force. Subsection C features explicit references to the principle enshrined in Article 2 (4) in communications to the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (4)

During the period under review, the Security Council did not adopt any decision containing explicit references to Article 2 (4). In a number of its decisions, however, the Council underlined the principles of Article 2 (4) by: (a) reaffirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations; (b) reiterating the importance of good-neighbourliness and non-interference by States in the internal affairs of others; (c) calling for the cessation of support by States to armed groups engaged in destabilizing national and regional peace and security; and (d) calling on parties to withdraw all military forces from a disputed area or occupied territories. The four themes are covered below.

Affirmation of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations

In 2019, the Council stressed the prohibition of the threat or use of force against other Member States through a few of its decisions, in particular those concerning the future status of Abyei and the situation in the Middle East (see table 2).

Table 2

Decisions affirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations

Decision and date

Provision

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

Resolution [2469 \(2019\)](#)
14 May 2019

Reiterating that the territorial boundaries of States shall not be altered by force and that any territorial disputes shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means, affirming the priority it attaches to the full and urgent implementation of all outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and underscoring that the future status of Abyei shall be resolved by negotiations between the parties in a manner consistent with the Agreement and not by the unilateral actions of either party (third preambular paragraph)

See also resolution [2497 \(2019\)](#), third preambular paragraph

The situation in the Middle East

Resolution [2477 \(2019\)](#)
26 June 2019

Stressing that both parties must abide by the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and scrupulously observe the ceasefire (third preambular paragraph)

See also resolution [2503 \(2019\)](#), third preambular paragraph

Stresses the obligation on both parties to scrupulously and fully respect the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, calls upon the parties to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation, encourages the parties to take full advantage of the liaison function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force regularly to address issues of mutual concern, as appropriate, and to maintain their liaison with

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
	<p>the Force to prevent any escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line, and underscores that there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation, including military operations by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces (para. 2)</p> <p><i>See also resolution 2503 (2019), para. 2</i></p>

Reiteration of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation among States

During the period under review, the Council reiterated in several of its decisions the principles enshrined in Article 2 (4) of good-neighbourliness,

non-interference and regional cooperation, in particular with regard to the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, and South Sudan and the Sudan. Furthermore, in many country-specific situations, the Council consistently reaffirmed its respect for or commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of States.

Table 3
Decisions affirming the principle of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation among States

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	
Resolution 2499 (2019) 15 November 2019	<p>Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Central African Republic, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)</p> <p><i>The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo</i></p>
Resolution 2463 (2019) 29 March 2019	<p>Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as all States in the region, and emphasizing the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (third preambular paragraph)</p> <p><i>See also resolution 2478 (2019), second preambular paragraph, and resolution 2502 (2019), third preambular paragraph</i></p> <p>Welcomes the renewed commitment of all the signatory States of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region towards its full implementation, reaffirms that the Framework remains an essential mechanism to achieve durable peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, and stresses in this regard the importance of the signatory States fully implementing their national and regional commitments under the Framework, including not interfering in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, neither tolerating nor providing assistance or support of any kind to armed groups, and neither harbouring nor providing protection of any kind to persons accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity or acts of genocide (para. 16)</p>
The situation in Libya	
Resolution 2486 (2019) 12 September 2019	<p>Recalls its decision that all Member States shall comply with the arms embargo, in line with resolution 2441 (2018) and all of its previous resolutions on the embargo, calls upon all Member States not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict, welcomes efforts by the Panel of Experts on Libya to investigate violations of the arms embargo, and notes its intention to hold those who violate the arms embargo accountable through its sanctions committee (para. 4)</p>

Decision and date

Provision

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

<p>Resolution 2459 (2019) 15 March 2019</p>	<p>Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of South Sudan, and recalling the importance of the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)</p> <p><i>See also resolution 2497 (2019), second preambular paragraph</i></p>
<p>Resolution 2469 (2019) 14 May 2019</p>	<p>Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Sudan and South Sudan, and to the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation (second preambular paragraph)</p>

Calls for the cessation of support by States to armed groups engaged in destabilizing national and regional peace and security

During the period under review, the Council adopted decisions in which it called upon States to refrain from or prevent the provision of any form of support or assistance to armed groups, including through the financing of their activities, in relation to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.²⁵

Calls upon parties to withdraw all military forces from a disputed area or occupied territories

During the period under review and consistent with past practice, the Council urged the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar, located on the border between Israel and Lebanon.²⁶

B. Constitutional discussion relating to Article 2 (4)

During the period under review, Article 2 (4) of the Charter was explicitly invoked 10 times at five Council meetings. In addition, Article 2 was broadly referred to once at one Council meeting, with an emphasis on the principles enshrined in Article 2 (4).

At the 8461st meeting, held on 12 February 2019 under the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)” in relation to the situation in Ukraine,²⁷ the representative

of South Africa noted that, having listened to remarks on the issue of Ukraine, he hoped that Council members would “walk the talk” also in the context of the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, including by respecting its territorial integrity and sovereignty, respecting Article 2 (4) of the Charter and refraining from military aggression against other Members of the United Nations.

At the 8539th meeting, held on 6 June 2019 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”,²⁸ the representative of Mexico expressed his country’s concern about “ongoing” invocations by some States of Article 51 of the Charter with regard to using military means to address threats to international peace and security, coupled with the “ambiguous language” of some recent Council resolutions, adding that such practice increased the risk of broadening in practice the exceptions to “the general prohibition on the use of force” in Article 2 (4) of the Charter.

At the 8567th meeting, held on 27 June 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”,²⁹ the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic indicated that “the only way” for the United Nations to avoid the same fate as the League of Nations was to ensure that countries abide by the resolutions of the Council and the provisions of the Charter, in particular paragraphs 1, 4 and 7 of Article 2.

Cases 1 to 4 below, which cover relevant deliberations of the Council under the items entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela” (case 1), “The situation in the Middle East” (case 2), “Maintenance of international peace and security” (case 3) and “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” (case 4),

²⁵ Resolutions 2463 (2019), para. 16, and 2502 (2019), para. 14.

²⁶ Resolution 2485 (2019), para. 17.

²⁷ See S/PV.8461.

²⁸ See S/PV.8539.

²⁹ See S/PV.8567.

feature the other eight explicit invocations of Article 2 (4). Reference was also made at various other Council meetings to language of relevance for the application and/or interpretation of Article 2 (4).³⁰

Case 1
The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

At its 8452nd meeting, held on 26 January 2019, the Security Council, at the request of the United States, held a debate under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”.³¹ Prior to the adoption of the agenda, the representative of the Russian Federation opposed the holding of the meeting on what he considered to be the internal situation of a country, accusing the United States of “engineering” a coup d’état in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and suggesting that “in the light of this violation” of Article 2 (4) of the Charter, it would be more appropriate to conduct a discussion under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”. The provisional agenda for the meeting was, however, adopted by a procedural vote.³² In discussing the situation in the country, many speakers³³

underlined that the crisis there should be resolved peacefully and while abiding by the principles of non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of the country.³⁴ The representative of Equatorial Guinea warned that external interference and violent and extreme positions would only aggravate the situation in the country. The representative of the Russian Federation, speaking again after the provisional agenda was adopted, accused the United States of using the meeting as a strategy to carry out regime change in the country and of flagrant interference, which violates Article 2 (4) of the Charter, against the political independence of the country. He added that United States leaders were hinting at the possibility of the use of force when referring to “all options being on the table” and requested the Secretary of State of the United States to clarify whether the United States was indeed ready to use military force against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in violation of the Charter. He further recalled that overthrowing unwanted regimes was in violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter and considered such actions unacceptable. The representative of the Russian Federation called for respect for legitimate authority, non-interference in the domestic affairs of the country and non-imposition of outside solutions on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. He further reiterated his call to stop all threats of the use of force against the country and requested that Venezuelans be given a chance to solve their own problems. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela accused the United States of spearheading the “coup d’état” in his country, of dictating orders to the Venezuelan opposition, as well as the “satellite” Governments in the region and in other parts of the world, and of “perpetual disregard” for international law, interference in the internal affairs of countries and g485invasions following coups d’état. He also accused Europe of imposing “deadlines or ultimatums on sovereign people” and called upon the European leaders to “mind [their] own business” and to respect the Charter and the self-determination of peoples. He asked whether the international community was imposing international relations based on the use of force.

In response to the statement by the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the representative of the United States emphasized that the discussion was not about foreign intervention or an attempt to impose a result on the Venezuelan people but rather about the right of the Venezuelan people to direct their own internal affairs and choose the future

³⁰ See, for example, under the item entitled “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”, [S/PV.8479](#); under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136)”, [S/PV.8516](#); under the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)”, [S/PV.8461](#) and [S/PV.8575](#); under the item entitled “Non-proliferation”, [S/PV.8695](#); under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, [S/PV.8668](#) and [S/PV.8668 \(Resumption 1\)](#); under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, [S/PV.8534](#); under the item entitled “The situation concerning Iraq”, [S/PV.8676](#); under the item entitled “The situation in Libya”, [S/PV.8588](#) and [S/PV.8611](#); under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, [S/PV.8567](#), [S/PV.8628](#) and [S/PV.8696](#); under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, [S/PV.8489](#), [S/PV.8517](#), [S/PV.8583](#) and [S/PV.8625](#); and, under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, [S/PV.8456](#) and [S/PV.8569](#).

³¹ See [S/PV.8452](#).

³² For more information on procedural votes, see part II, sect. VIII.C, on decision-making by voting.

³³ South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, China, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Cuba, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Suriname, Mexico, Barbados, Dominica, El Salvador and Antigua and Barbuda.

³⁴ See [S/PV.8452](#).

of their own country democratically. The representative of the United States also suggested that the foreign Power meddling in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was Cuba.

The representative of Nicaragua underscored that the request for the meeting was a clear interference in the internal affairs of States and a violation of the principles and purposes of the Charter and international law. More specifically, he noted that the United States interest in and insistence on including the issue of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on the Council's agenda was another form of interfering and intervening in a country's internal affairs with the clear objective of imposing a change of government through a coup d'état. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia considered absurd the attempt to bring the internal situation of a Member State to the Council and underlined that the real purpose of requesting the meeting had been to promote situations of instability and to use such situations to push for regime change and policies to control natural resources. He further emphasized that interference and threats of use of force were illegal. The representative of Cuba accused the United States of threatening the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela with particular "malice" and of seeking to exploit the Council in order to legitimize its international campaign against the constitutional Government presided by Nicolás Maduro. She further "vigorously" condemned what in her country's view was an attempt to impose, "through a coup d'état, a Government that [would] serve the interests of the United States" in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The representative of Cuba also accused the United States of threatening military action to achieve that goal. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stressed the need to "categorically" reject all attempts to aggravate dangerous situations or engender a change of democratically elected leaders through imposition, intervention and interference. The representative of Equatorial Guinea indicated that the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was an internal matter that did not pose a threat to international peace and security, and urged the Council and the international community to focus its role on supporting the country's efforts in promoting an inclusive intra-Venezuelan dialogue. He further urged neighbouring countries and the international community to "not pour fuel on the current fire" in the country.

The representative of Indonesia, while reaffirming his country's commitment to the principles of non-interference, sovereignty and territorial

integrity of all countries, including the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in the country and indicated that the situation required "proper attention". The representative of Panama similarly indicated that concern about the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was genuine and could not be interpreted as interference in its internal affairs, given the "massive and continuous exodus of Venezuelans ... in search of refuge" in neighbouring countries. The representative of Barbados, reading a statement on behalf of the Heads of State and Government of a group of countries from the Caribbean region,³⁵ reaffirmed those countries' commitment to Article 2 (4) of the Charter, called upon external forces to refrain from doing anything to destabilize the situation and called upon all actors, internal and external, to avoid actions that would escalate the situation. The representative of Antigua and Barbuda emphasized that any unilateral declaration of support for one side or the other and undue and uninvited influence in the internal affairs of the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela would only undermine the peacebuilding process, and rejected any external force that interfered with the internal matters of the Government of the country. The representative of Uruguay affirmed that his country would "never, in no setting whatsoever, support an armed intervention in any country in the region as a supposed solution to an internal crisis".

At its 8472nd meeting, held on 26 February 2019,³⁶ the Council was briefed again on the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, following an escalation of tensions which occurred on 22 and 23 February 2019, when the President of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, who had declared himself interim President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, led efforts to transport food and medicine being stocked in Brazil and Colombia across the border to the country, clashing with the Venezuelan security forces and other pro-government armed elements, which were blocking the aid supplies from entering the country. The representative of the United States denied claims by the Government of Mr. Maduro that humanitarian assistance was a cover for military intervention, and accused the Government of Mr. Maduro of betraying the independence and sovereignty of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by "submitting to the influence

³⁵ Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.

³⁶ See [S/PV.8472](#).

of Cuban officers” and of using humanitarian aid as “both a political tool for social control and a resource for rampant corruption”. The representative of South Africa indicated that the Council was divided on the internal affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, “with some even threatening to use force against the territorial integrity and political independence” of the country, emphasizing that such actions were inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. He underscored that the threat of use of force set “a very bad precedent” and warned that “isolating and vilifying” one party to the conflict and calling for a specific, prescribed course of action that would preclude dialogue would only foment possible recourse to armed conflict. The representative of Indonesia, cognizant of the fact that the humanitarian situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was increasingly concerning and required proper attention, called for the delivery of all humanitarian aid for the people of the country through the proper channel in the United Nations and emphasized his country’s commitment to upholding the principles of non-interference, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries.

Invoking General Assembly resolution 46/182, the representative of the Russian Federation pointed out that the provision of humanitarian assistance should respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States and that such assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and on the basis of an appeal by that country. He demanded an end to the violations of relevant Assembly resolutions and respect for the borders, sovereignty and national unity of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. He urged all the States of the region to refrain from the threat or use of force and from “massively blatant” interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, adding that any solution to the country’s problems was the “exclusive right, remit and responsibility” of Venezuelans themselves. He also said that the “sole aim” of the United States was to achieve regime change and to threaten to do so by military intervention. The representative of China expressed opposition to foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, military intervention and using “so-called humanitarian assistance” for political purposes to destabilize or create “turbulence” within the country and the wider region. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela accused Colombia and the United States of organizing “aggression” against the sovereignty of his country and of threatening peace and security in the region, in violation of the Charter. He indicated that Venezuelans

could craft their own solution without intervention or interference from anyone, especially the United States. He called upon the Council to adopt a draft resolution rejecting the threat or use of force against his country. He requested the Council to ensure that the United States rules out the threat and use of force against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter.

The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, echoed by the representative of Belize, noted that the Latin America and the Caribbean region was committed to the pacific settlement of disputes in order to “forever banish” the use and threat of use of force in the region, as well as to strict compliance with its obligations not to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of any other State. The representative of Cuba accused the United States of staging a dangerous provocation that sought to violate the sovereignty of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela through the use of pressure and force “under the pretext” of delivering humanitarian assistance, in serious violation of international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter. She also called upon Council members not to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the internal affairs of any other State and to respect the principles of national sovereignty, equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The representative of Nicaragua reaffirmed his country’s commitment to the Charter and indicated that such commitment was reinforced by the “outrageous threats” that arose from interference and intervention in the affairs of States. He further called for the defence of peaceful, respectful relations and the right of every country to choose its political, economic and social model without interference, threats or coercive actions that contradicted the Charter and international law. The representative of Guatemala similarly reiterated his country’s rejection of any military solution or threat of use of force or any act of provocation that endangered peace and security in the region. The representative of Suriname, speaking on behalf of a number of Caribbean States³⁷ and explicitly invoking Article 2 (4) of the Charter, indicated that the group of countries on behalf of which she was speaking did not choose sides and remained steadfast in its view that economic strangulation and military intervention not only ran counter to those principles but also exacerbated the suffering of the people of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Speaking in her national capacity, the

³⁷ Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname.

representative of Suriname expressed alarm at the reports of humanitarian aid efforts aggressively being carried out at the Venezuelan border, underscoring that such actions undermined the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality, neutrality and consent, denouncing all acts of aggression that violated those principles and rejecting the politicization of humanitarian aid. The representative of Uruguay, echoed by the representative of Dominica, noted that his country would continue to adhere strictly to the principle of non-intervention in its international relations. The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also reaffirmed his country's unwavering commitment to upholding the "bedrock" principles of non-intervention and non-interference in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The representative of Ecuador said that his country did not support a military intervention in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The representative of Antigua and Barbuda, explicitly citing Article 2 (4) of the Charter, underscored that no State or group of States should interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign countries, adding that military intervention in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela would undermine the legitimacy of the United Nations in promoting peace and risked destabilizing the entire region. He noted that unilateral declarations of support for one side in the country over the other was "blatant interference and uninvited influence" in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. The representative of El Salvador called for full respect for the sovereignty of States, non-intervention in internal affairs and the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force. The representative of Costa Rica reiterated his country's firm rejection of any course of action that implied violence, the use of force or military intervention in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and asserted that not all options for finding a solution to the situation in the country were open. The representative of Peru pointed out that all the Latin American countries represented at the meeting had come out against any use of force. Several speakers³⁸ underlined that the crisis in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela should be resolved peacefully and while abiding by the principles of non-use of force and/or non-interference in its internal affairs.

At its 8476th meeting, held two days later on 28 February 2019,³⁹ the Council considered two competing draft resolutions on the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela submitted by the

³⁸ Peru, Germany, Colombia, Argentina, Paraguay, Belize and Panama.

³⁹ See [S/PV.8476](#).

United States and the Russian Federation.⁴⁰ At the outset of the meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation explained that his country's alternative draft resolution to the one prepared by the United States was designed not to encourage "political intrigue and regime change" but to provide Venezuelans with real help in their efforts to normalize the situation in their country.⁴¹ He criticized the United States approach to humanitarian assistance and referred to it as "humanitarian intervention", and emphasized that any international assistance should be based on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence and the consent of the country's legitimate Government. The draft resolution submitted by the United States was not adopted owing to the negative votes of two permanent members.⁴² In explaining his vote, the representative of China expressed opposition to external forces interfering in the internal affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as well as to military intervention in the country. The representative of South Africa, who also voted against the draft resolution, noted that while the draft resolution submitted by the United States called for a peaceful political process, it was prescriptive on the outcome of that process, thereby infringing on the sovereignty of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. On the other hand, the representative of Belgium, who voted in favour of the draft resolution, indicated that nothing in the text justified the use of force and that it advocated seeking a peaceful solution. Furthermore, the representative of the Dominican Republic, who also voted in favour, clarified that for his country the use of force was not an option.

The draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation was then voted upon but was not adopted.⁴³ The representative of the United Kingdom, who voted against the draft resolution, explained that she disagreed with the text of the draft because it implied the existence of threats of use of force against the territorial integrity

⁴⁰ [S/2019/186](#) and [S/2019/190](#), respectively.

⁴¹ See [S/PV.8476](#).

⁴² The draft resolution ([S/2019/186](#)) received 9 votes in favour (Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), 3 against (China, Russian Federation and South Africa) and 3 abstentions (Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Indonesia).

⁴³ The draft resolution ([S/2019/190](#)) received 4 votes in favour (China, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation and South Africa); 7 votes against (Belgium, France, Germany, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) and 4 abstentions (Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Indonesia and Kuwait).

and political independence of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and emphasized that there had been no such threats. She also pointed out that the draft focused on “alleged attempts” to intervene in the country’s domestic affairs and argued that the crisis had already spilled beyond the country’s borders and represented a “clear” threat to peace and security in the region. The representative of Germany, who also voted against the draft resolution, condemned the use of force and noted that efforts in the Council and by the international community did not constitute interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. The representative of France, who voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and against that submitted by the Russian Federation, said that the former was neither a legal basis for the use of force nor an attempt to undermine the sovereignty of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and reiterated his country’s repudiation of the use of force to resolve the Venezuelan crisis. The representative of Indonesia, who had abstained on both votes, underscored that the principles of non-interference, sovereignty and territorial integrity should be honoured in discussing any issues within the framework of the United Nations. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela rejected the use of his country’s Constitution to justify “a colonial intervention, while supporting a fictitious entity that does not exist in [the country’s] basic law”, and referred to the self-proclaimed Government as a dictatorship with no legal basis in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. He denounced an ongoing military threat against his country, demanded that the Council condemn and prohibit the use of military force in all its forms and manifestations against his country and called for the defence of the principles of the Charter, including the respect for non-interference in internal affairs.

On 10 April 2019, at its 8506th meeting,⁴⁴ the Council was briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Joint Special Representative for Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the region of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration, and a researcher from Johns Hopkins University on the worsening humanitarian situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. After the briefing, several speakers⁴⁵ underlined that the crisis in

the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela should be resolved peacefully and while abiding by the principles of non-use of force and non-interference. The representative of Kuwait explicitly referred to Article 2 in reiterating his country’s full commitment to the principles of the Charter, which called for respect for the sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs. The representative of the Russian Federation accused the United States of destabilizing the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by creating an artificial crisis around the country in order to replace its legitimately elected leader “with its own pawn”, and reiterated its call upon the United States to stop interfering in the internal affairs of other States. The representative of China reiterated his country’s opposition to any interference by external forces in the internal affairs in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, military intervention in the country and the politicization of the humanitarian issue. The representative of France, echoed by the representative of Germany, emphasized that the use of force and violence must be avoided in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The representative of South Africa warned against using humanitarian intervention in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as a pretext for increased tensions, including the possibility of military intervention, and emphasized the importance of respecting the principles of State sovereignty and coordinating with the country’s Government with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance. The representative of Indonesia similarly called for humanitarian assistance to be provided free from political objectives and in full respect for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela accused the United States of threatening his country with war by indicating that “all options [were] on the table” and blamed the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the “human actions that led to [the] situation” in his country, with the objective of bringing about a collapse that would allow for a foreign military intervention. He continued to accuse the United States of using the pretext of humanitarian assistance to carry out a “clandestine operation” without the consent of his country, violating its territorial integrity through the threat of use of force, and insisted that addressing the situation required ceasing threats of military intervention.

⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8506](#).

⁴⁵ Peru, Equatorial Guinea and Kuwait.

Case 2

The situation in the Middle East

At its 8495th meeting, held on 27 March 2019,⁴⁶ the Council met to discuss the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF),⁴⁷ in reaction to the proclamation by the United States on 25 March 2019 recognizing the sovereignty of Israel over the occupied Syrian Golan.

The representative of the United States indicated that the announcement neither affected the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement nor undermined the mandate of UNDOF, and underscored that the decision was of critical strategic and security importance to Israel, adding that the United States believed that it would contribute to stability by preventing the use of the Golan Heights as a launching ground for attacks on Israel. The representative of Germany, while stressing that security interests did not justify annexation, noted that the presence of troops of the Syrian regime and of Iranian-backed militias close to the border violated the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and constituted a threat to Israel and should end.

The representative of Kuwait stressed that the Golan was Syrian Arab land occupied by Israel and rejected occupation and annexation of land by force, indicating that such actions violated the Charter, principles of international law and the relevant Council resolutions. He expressed regret at the decision by the United States to recognize the sovereignty of Israel over the Golan and recalled that the Council always stressed its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. The representative of the United Kingdom indicated that her country did not recognize the annexation by Israel of the Golan Heights, emphasized that the annexation of territory by force was prohibited under international law, including the Charter, and underscored that, under the law of State responsibility, States were obligated not to recognize the annexation of territory as a result of the use of force. She indicated that the decision by the United States to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights was in contravention of resolution 497 (1981). The representative of Poland also indicated that the annexation of territory by force was illegal under international law, including the Charter, and stated that her country considered the Golan Heights to be a territory occupied by Israel. The representative of the

Russian Federation stressed his country's position that the Golan Heights were a territory of the Syrian Arab Republic illegally annexed by Israel, and asserted that the recognition by the United States of Israeli sovereignty over part of the occupied Syrian Golan was in violation of international norms and Council resolutions. The representative of Peru, echoed by the representative of the Dominican Republic, reaffirmed his country's position on the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force, in accordance with the Charter. The representative of Belgium stated that his country did not recognize the sovereignty of Israel over the territories occupied by it since 1967, including the Golan Heights, recalled that the acquisition of territory by force was illegal under international law, and stressed that any unilateral declaration of a change in the border was contrary to a rules-based international order and the Charter. He indicated that it was up to the Council to oppose unilateral acts that undermined not only the international legal order but also any prospect of peace.

The representative of South Africa expressed deep concern about the decision by the United States to recognize the sovereignty of Israel over the Syrian Golan, noting that such a decision was a "blatant violation" of international law and the relevant Council resolutions. Rejecting the decision by the United States, the representative of South Africa noted that unilateral action did not assist in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. The representative of China expressed opposition to any unilateral action or attempts to alter the recognition by the international community of the Golan Heights as occupied territory. The representative of Equatorial Guinea asserted the position that Israel did not have sovereignty over the territories that it had occupied since 1967. The representative of Indonesia rejected the recognition by the United States of the Golan Heights as part of Israel and recognized the Golan Heights as an "inalienable" part of the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the Charter as well as the relevant Council resolutions, which underlined that the acquisition of territory by force was prohibited. The representative of France, rejecting the position of the United States on the Golan Heights, stated that, in line with the position of the European Union, France did not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the occupied territory of the Golan and stressed that such recognition ran contrary to international law. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic also recalled that the relevant Council resolutions stipulated the illegality of seizing land by force. He warned that inaction by the United Nations in response to the

⁴⁶ See [S/PV.8495](#).

⁴⁷ [S/2019/248](#).

“dangerous” United States position would leave the countries and peoples under occupation with no choice but to restore by force “what was taken by force”. The representative of Israel indicated that “the Syrian regime maintained a policy of aggression with the goal of wiping Israel off the map”. He stressed that the sovereignty of Israel over the Golan Heights was “vital” for preventing future Syrian acts of aggression against Israel and for ensuring the safety, security and stability of the region. Taking the floor again, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic emphasized that annexing land by force was “wrong and illegal” and in violation of the Charter and Council resolutions.

Case 3

Maintenance of international peace and security

At the 8600th meeting, held on 20 August 2019, at the initiative of Poland, which held the presidency for the month,⁴⁸ the Council held a high-level debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Challenges to peace and security in the Middle East”.⁴⁹

The representative of China expressed firm opposition to the wilful use or the threat of use of force and to external intervention, power politics and “bullying” by external actors in addressing “the hotspot issues in the Middle East” and affirmed that the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the countries concerned should be respected. The representative of the Dominican Republic observed that the territorial integrity of countries such as Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen was under threat and that millions of people had been displaced. The representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that no unilateral action of any kind could resolve either the protracted or the new problems plaguing the region and that efforts by certain Member States to delegitimize other Member States and destabilize and overthrow regimes that certain Governments deemed undesirable had created “exceedingly dangerous” problems for the region. He added that “geopolitical engineering, interference in the internal affairs of others and the imposition of military solutions” had led to the collapse of States, tragic situations and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in the region and that many countries had been “taken hostage” by the opportunistic goals of external players and forced to wage proxy wars that had proved detrimental to their

national interests. The representative of Equatorial Guinea similarly expressed his concern about regime change policies, interventionism and interference in the internal affairs of other States. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic accused “some Member States” of the Council of obstructing the identification of the causes of occupation, aggression and destructive external intervention in the affairs of the countries of the region by aiming to forcibly overthrow systems of government and investing in terrorism over peace. He added that the United Nations had been founded on the principles of the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention in their internal affairs and refraining from the threat or use of force and underscored that respecting those principles called for compelling the United States and its allies, including Turkey, to cease their illegal military presence in Syrian territories and their “pro-terrorism aggression and crimes” against Syrians and civilian infrastructure. Claiming that he would not honour the “delusional” accusations by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, the representative of Turkey called upon the international community, first and foremost the Council, to play a more constructive and assertive role in resolving the conflicts in the Middle East through respect for the basic principles of international law enshrined in the Charter, including respect for political unity and territorial integrity and good-neighbourly relations. The representative of Bahrain opined that all countries should be committed to the principles of good-neighbourliness, mutual respect and non-intervention in the internal affairs of others in order to avoid long-term destabilization in the Middle East. The representative of Saudi Arabia considered it imperative to recognize the right of the people of the region to live in peace, free from interference in internal affairs and from exported revolutions through militias, and without being pitted against their own compatriots. He reaffirmed that calls for dialogue should go hand in hand with an end to threats and interference in internal affairs, such as attacks against, and the attempted assassination of, diplomats and representatives, cyberattacks against infrastructure, propaganda, sedition, and support for and sponsoring of militias and terrorist groups. The representative of Iraq stressed that the region needed stability based on a system of collective security, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and the rejection of violence and extremism. He reaffirmed that the best way to maintain regional security was peace and cooperation among the countries of the region and a joint stance against terrorism and extremism, with a view to achieving collective security in the region, while respecting the sovereignty of countries and

⁴⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 6 August 2019 (S/2019/643).

⁴⁹ See S/PV.8600.

rejecting any intervention or interference in the internal affairs of States. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that one of the main causes of instability and insecurity in the region was the military presence of the United States and clarified that, while the Islamic Republic of Iran was not seeking confrontation, it could not remain indifferent to the violation of its sovereignty. He added that, in order to secure its borders and interests, the Islamic Republic of Iran would vigorously exercise its inherent right to self-defence.

The representative of Egypt indicated that adherence to the principles of the Charter was necessary if security and stability in the Middle East were to be achieved, including ending foreign interference, respecting the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference in the internal affairs of countries and halting the provocation of sectarian tensions. He reiterated the need to take a “serious stand” against countries that provided financing to terrorism and training and safe haven to terrorists and used terrorists as a tool to interfere in the countries of the region. The representative of the United Arab Emirates, speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, called for protecting the region from foreign interference and ensuring that all States in the region respect the principles of good-neighbourliness and refrain from the use or threat of force and from violating the sovereignty of States.

Concerning the security situation in the Gulf, the representative of Kuwait recalled that his country, since its inception, had helped to open channels for regional dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on mutual respect, good-neighbourliness, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, respect for the sovereignty of all countries, the adoption of confidence-building measures and the avoidance of any unilateral action or measure that could exacerbate matters and undermine security. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran pointed out that, as the country with the longest coastlines in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, his country was determined to continue ensuring the safety and security of maritime navigation in the area, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz, and emphasized that the interference of foreign forces in that strategic waterway, under whatever pretext, was destabilizing and unacceptable.

Regarding Yemen, the observer for the European Union reaffirmed the full commitment of the European Union to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen. The representative of the United Arab Emirates, speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, stressed that the cooperation between

Arab States and the Islamic Republic of Iran must be based on the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the non-use or threat of use of force. He condemned the policy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its ongoing interference in Arab affairs, in particular its support for groups that fuelled religious and sectarian conflict, especially in Arab Gulf States. He demanded that the Islamic Republic of Iran stop supporting and financing militias and armed parties in Arab States, particularly in Yemen. The observer for the League of Arab States blamed Iranian interference in the affairs of the Arab region for increasing and prolonging crises and indicated that such interference was a direct violation of the basic principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

Case 4 **The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question**

At its 8648th meeting, held on 28 October 2019, the Council held a high-level quarterly debate under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.⁵⁰ At the meeting, speakers discussed the principles enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the Charter in the context of various regional conflicts.

With regard to the Palestinian question, the observer for the State of Palestine said that Israel had been led to believe that it could act as if it were “above the law”, going as far as threatening to annex Palestinian land “in flagrant breach of the universal prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force”. The Minister for International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa similarly condemned the violence directed at the people of Gaza and the West Bank “through occupation and aggression by Israel”. The representative of Kuwait recalled that the Charter was binding on Member States in terms of the illegality of the use of force against States, a principle of international relations, and expressed regret that the resolutions in which the Council called upon Israel to end its occupation of and violations committed in the occupied Palestinian territory had remained “ineffectual”, despite their binding nature for all countries. He accused Israel of attempting to alter the historical and demographic situation on the ground by resorting to military force and “expansionist” settlement policies and condemned all practices aimed at acquiring territory by force. The representative of Indonesia condemned the continued expansion of illegal Israeli settlements and the intended annexation

⁵⁰ See [S/PV.8648](#).

of the occupied Palestinian territory. The representative of Azerbaijan, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, stated that threats of annexation by Israeli officials must be “unequivocally” condemned. She stressed that any measures taken in that regard must be “forthwith rejected as null and void and without any legal effect” and must be met with firm measures of accountability for such grave breaches.

Several speakers⁵¹ expressed concern at recent announcements by Israel on its intention to annex certain areas of the West Bank. The representative of the United Kingdom reiterated his country’s position that annexation of any part of the West Bank would be destructive to peace efforts and could not pass unchallenged and recalled that annexation of territory by force was prohibited under international law. The representative of Namibia, speaking both in his national capacity and as Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, expressed concern regarding the intention of Israel to annex settlements and the Jordan Valley. He emphasized that annexation was “strictly prohibited” under international law and reiterated the Committee’s call upon Israel to abide by international standards with regard to the use of force. The representative of Pakistan underscored that the continued military occupation and expansion of settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, along with the “looming threat” of the annexation of the West Bank had undermined a two-State solution and imperilled peace and security in the Middle East and beyond. She also emphasized that the involvement of the international community in the Middle East must be based on an “unequivocal” commitment to multilateral solutions and political processes and that the threat of “kinetic actions” was a “throwback to imperial tactics”, while pointing out that the recent history of the region reaffirmed that unilateral measures had brought “only greater suffering and pain to its peoples”. The representative of the United Arab Emirates, speaking on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, deplored the annexation and confiscation of land in the occupied Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem.

The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic recalled that the founders of the United Nations sought to establish an organization based on the principles of international law, foremost of which was respect for the sovereignty and equality of States, non-interference

in the internal affairs of other States and rejection of aggression, occupation and hegemony. He added that the Israeli occupation of the occupied Arab territories in Palestine, the Syrian Golan and southern Lebanon continued to have grave repercussions after 70 years of conflict, and said that the United Nations, especially the Council, had been “incapable” of enforcing the relevant resolutions calling for an end to that occupation. He accused Israel of having repeatedly carried out attacks on Syrian territories, as well as the territories of other neighbouring Arab countries, in flagrant violation of international law and the Charter. The representative of Bangladesh expressed the view that the “widely expected meaningful and decisive” political and legal actions to end the “illegal, decades-long foreign occupation” of the Palestinian territory by Israel had been lacking from the Council. The representative of Cuba condemned the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and called for respect for multilateralism and an end to the use of double standards and interference in domestic affairs, foreign aggression, illicit arms trafficking and the sponsorship of terrorist groups in the region. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran accused Israel of invading all of its neighbours “without exception”, attacking other countries from the Middle East to Africa, occupying territories belonging to Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Palestine, and conducting invasions and aggressions against countries of the region, including periodic violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. He also accused Israel of continuing to pursue expansionist policies by building additional settlements and declaring its intention to illegally annex the Jordan Valley. In response, the representative of Israel accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of seeking to turn the Syrian Arab Republic into a platform for launching attacks on Israel and warned that the deployment of Iranian armed forces to Syrian territory posed a grave threat to regional and international security. The representative of the United Arab Emirates, speaking on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, called for the full withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Syrian Golan to the borders of 4 June 1967, in accordance with Council resolutions.

In connection with the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the representative of Israel noted that Turkey had invaded the northern Syrian Arab Republic and caused instability in the region. The representative of Croatia, speaking on behalf of States members of the European Union, recalled that the European Union had condemned the unilateral incursion of Turkey into the north-eastern Syrian Arab Republic in October 2019 and

⁵¹ France, Russian Federation, Dominican Republic, Norway, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia (on behalf of the Group of Arab States) and Cuba.

had called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. He added that the security concerns of Turkey in the north-eastern part of the country should be addressed through political and diplomatic means and in full accordance with international law and international humanitarian law. The representative of Saudi Arabia also condemned the Turkish military operations in the northern Syrian Arab Republic. The observer for the League of Arab States stated that, on 12 October 2019, the Council of the League adopted resolution 8454, condemning fully the Turkish act of military aggression and explicitly calling upon the Council to intervene to stop it. He reiterated the need to stop the military aggression by Turkey in the Syrian Arab Republic and the withdrawal of all Turkish aggressive forces from the Syrian Arab Republic. The representative of Bahrain stressed the need to safeguard the independence of the Syrian Arab Republic, while rejecting the occupation of any part of the Syrian Arab Republic by any foreign force.

Addressing the Iranian attacks on two Saudi ARAMCO oil facilities in September 2019, the representative of Israel blamed the Islamic Republic of Iran for “[getting] the Houthis to claim responsibility” and causing unrest in the region as well as economic instability in the world. The representative of Brazil condemned the attacks “in the strongest terms”, warned that the attacks had increased the risk that the Yemeni war could expand into a wider regional conflict, and called upon all parties to refrain from any actions that might lead to a further increase in hostilities. The representative of Cuba condemned the attacks on two oil facilities in Saudi Arabia while indicating that the military threat against the Islamic Republic of Iran had contributed to greater instability in the Middle East. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the attacks in September against Saudi ARAMCO oil facilities using Iranian weapons was an act of aggression in flagrant violation of international rules and norms and against international peace and security. He added that such attacks were in defiance of collective international counter-terrorism efforts and an attempt to intervene in the internal affairs of States in the region. He urged all countries that called for dialogue to abandon their policies of “exporting their revolutions and creating sectarian pockets in other countries” as a means of interfering in their internal affairs. The observer for the League of Arab States underscored that the “flagrant” interference of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the internal affairs of Arab countries continued, and accused the country of supporting terrorist organizations and cells that were opposed to the Governments of Arab countries. He stated that the League of Arab States condemned

Iranian interference in the domestic affairs of Arab States, in particular in the Arabian Gulf region and the military actions carried out and supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran against Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and in the Gulf of Oman. He also indicated that all countries of the League of Arab States stood in full solidarity with the States of the Arabian Gulf in countering threats and acts of aggression, and affirmed the commitment by Arab States to countering “flagrant” Iranian interference under international law, international legitimacy and the Charter of the United Nations. In response to the statement by the observer for the League of Arab States, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected all his claims as “fabrications”.

C. Invocation of the principle enshrined in Article 2 (4) in communications

The correspondence addressed to the Council during 2019 included seven explicit references to Article 2 (4) of the Charter and one implicit reference where Article 2 was broadly invoked with language relating to the principles enshrined in paragraph 4.

In identical letters dated 6 February 2019 to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,⁵² the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, with reference to the latest developments in the country “resulting from the campaign of aggression being waged against [his] country” by the United States and the United Kingdom, stressed that upholding Article 2 (4) of the Charter must be a priority for all States, since it guaranteed peaceful coexistence among nations.

In a letter dated 15 March 2019 to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,⁵³ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran indicated that a statement made by the Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Israel on 6 March 2019 at the Haifa navy base regarding the role of the Israeli navy in “efforts to block” Iranian petroleum shipping “by any means” constituted a threat to use force inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and a “blatant” violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter, which prohibited the threat or use of force.

In a letter dated 20 June 2019 to the Secretary-General,⁵⁴ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that a United States uncrewed aircraft system had conducted an overflight through the Strait

⁵² S/2019/117.

⁵³ S/2019/241.

⁵⁴ S/2019/512.

of Hormuz to Chabahar port in full stealth mode and that the aircraft had entered Iranian airspace. He indicated that, acting under Article 51 of the Charter, the Iranian air defence system had targeted the aircraft, and underscored that the United States action had been “a provocative act” in blatant violation of international law and the Charter, in particular Article 2 (4) thereof.

In a letter dated 6 August 2019 to the President of the Council,⁵⁵ the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela denounced several actions taken by the United States as dangerous actions that undermined the peace and security of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the region. He also accused the United States military aircraft of not complying with international regulations, with the intention of destabilizing the democratic institutions of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela which he described as a military invasion to impose a coup d'état in clear violation of the Charter, in particular Article 2 (4).

In a letter dated 19 August 2019 to the Secretary-General,⁵⁶ the representative of Azerbaijan accused Armenia of misleading the international community by circulating papers in the name of the “unlawful regime” that it had established in the occupied territory of Azerbaijan, and recalled that the Council had acknowledged in relevant resolutions that unlawful acts of military force incompatible with the prohibition of the use of armed force in international relations had been committed against Azerbaijan and that such acts constituted a violation of the sovereignty and territorial

integrity of Azerbaijan, specifically as they pertained to Article 2 (4) of the Charter.

In a letter dated 22 August 2019 to the President of the Council,⁵⁷ the representative of Afghanistan reported continued violations of the territory of Afghanistan by the military forces of the Government of Pakistan and reiterated her country's strong condemnation of the failure of Pakistan to adhere to its obligations under the principles of the Charter, including Article 2.

In a letter dated 20 September 2019 to the President of the Council,⁵⁸ the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela complained that the United States was threatening to use force to overthrow the constitutional Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in violation of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination of peoples enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the Charter.

In a letter dated 27 December 2019 to the Secretary-General,⁵⁹ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran brought to the attention of the Secretary-General “another wave of inflammatory statements” as well as threats to use force by Israel against his country. In the letter, he cited three recent statements by the Government of Israel, as well as others contained in letters from his country previously issued as Council documents, and claimed that such “hostile” expressions had constituted gross violations of Article 2 (4) of the Charter.

⁵⁵ S/2019/641.

⁵⁶ S/2019/669.

⁵⁷ S/2019/684.

⁵⁸ S/2019/765.

⁵⁹ S/2019/1003.

III. Obligation under Article 2, paragraph 5, to refrain from assisting the target of enforcement action

Article 2, paragraph 5

All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

Note

Section III covers the practice of the Security Council with regard to the principle enshrined in Article 2 (5) of the Charter, in particular the obligation

of Member States to refrain from providing assistance to a State against which the United Nations has taken preventive or enforcement action.⁶⁰ Subsection A highlights implicit references made to Article 2 (5) in the deliberations of the Council. The correspondence addressed to the Council in 2019 did not contain any material relating to Article 2 (5).

⁶⁰ For the practice of the Security Council relating to assistance by Member States to United Nations action in accordance with the Charter, see part V, sect. II (Article 25), and part VII, sects. V and VI (Articles 43, 45 and 48).

A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (5)

During the period under review, Article 2 (5) was not explicitly invoked in the decisions of the Council. The Council, however, included language of relevance to the interpretation of Article 2 (5) in decisions concerning the situations in the Central African Republic,⁶¹ Libya⁶² and Somalia,⁶³ as well as in connection with the prevention of the financing of terrorism.⁶⁴

B. Constitutional discussion relating to Article 2 (5)

Article 2 (5) was not explicitly invoked in the meetings of the Council during 2019. However, implicit references of relevance to the interpretation of Article 2 (5) were made in 10 meetings of the Security Council during the review period in relation to a variety of conflicts and situations, including the situation in Libya, covered in case 5 below.

At the 8536th meeting, held on 30 May 2019 under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”,⁶⁵ speaking after the adoption of a resolution renewing the South Sudan sanctions regime,⁶⁶ the representative of the United States welcomed the leadership of regional actors in encouraging and supporting peace in South Sudan and emphasized that his country was counting on the region to maintain pressure on the parties to implement the peace agreement and to uphold the United Nations arms embargo to prevent the flow of weapons into South Sudan, which would further destabilize the country and the region.

At the 8598th meeting, held on 20 August 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East” and with regard to the situation in Yemen,⁶⁷ the representative of Yemen called upon the United Arab Emirates to “immediately cease” providing support to rebellious militias of the Southern Transitional Council and condemned the “continued financial and military support” by the United Arab Emirates to the Southern Transitional Council forces.

At the 8619th meeting, held on 16 September 2019 under the same item,⁶⁸ the representative of Yemen accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of causing “a great deal of damage in Yemen and the region” and having played “a serious sabotaging role” by providing arms and funding to the Houthi militias. At the same meeting, the representative of the United States called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to stop providing lethal aid in defiance of the arms embargo outlined in resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#).

During the 8600th meeting, held on 20 August 2019 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”,⁶⁹ the representative of the United Arab Emirates, speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, stressed the need for the Islamic Republic of Iran to refrain from supporting the groups that fuelled conflicts in Arab Gulf States, and demanded that the Islamic Republic of Iran stop supporting the anti-government militias in Yemen and supplying them with weapons.

At the 8629th meeting, on 2 October 2019, under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”,⁷⁰ the representative of the United States stated that nations could improve security by adhering to sanctions regimes that supported peace and stability in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. She urged all States Members of the United Nations, in particular the countries of the region, to uphold resolutions [2254 \(2015\)](#) and [2471 \(2019\)](#) and stressed that preventing the illicit flow of weapons and restricting the travel of sanctioned individuals would promote long-term security.

At the 8647th meeting, on 25 October 2019, under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia”,⁷¹ the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the partial arms embargo had been designed not only to allow partners to support Somalia in its security sector reform but also to prevent Al-Shabaab and other armed groups from getting hold of weapons. Echoing this statement, the representative of France underscored that the arms embargo was vital, as it directly impaired the ability of terrorist groups, in particular Al-Shabaab, to acquire weapons and played a useful role in preventing trafficking in arms and ammunition, especially from Yemen. The representative of Kuwait recognized the vital role of the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia in

⁶¹ Resolution [2488 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

⁶² Resolution [2486 \(2019\)](#), thirteenth preambular paragraph and para. 4.

⁶³ Resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), para. 6.

⁶⁴ Resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1 and 2.

⁶⁵ See [S/PV.8536](#).

⁶⁶ Resolution [2471 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1 and 2. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning South Sudan, see part VII, sect. III.

⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8598](#).

⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8619](#).

⁶⁹ See [S/PV.8600](#).

⁷⁰ See [S/PV.8629](#).

⁷¹ See [S/PV.8647](#).

establishing security and stability in the country, particularly in the context of implementing the sanctions regime, insofar as this was an effective way to help the Federal Government of Somalia to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of Al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups, as well as to dry up sources of financing to those groups by imposing the embargo on Somali charcoal.

At the 8690th meeting, held on 18 December 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”,⁷² the representative of Israel accused the “Iranian regime” of funding Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and of helping them to use the funds “provided by some members of the Council” to build terror tunnels and rockets. He also accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of providing Hizbullah with kits to convert rockets into precision-guided missiles in Lebanon, as well as arms and training to the Houthis forces in Yemen. He said that the support by the “Iranian regime” of the Houthis was responsible for prolonging the crisis.

Case 5 **The situation in Libya**

At the 8530th meeting, held on 21 May 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in Libya”,⁷³ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported that many countries were providing weapons to all parties in the conflict and noted that, without a robust enforcement mechanism, the arms embargo on Libya would become “a cynical joke”. The representative of the Dominican Republic recalled that Member States had the responsibility to comply with provisions of the Libya sanctions regime and to refrain from supplying, selling or transferring any type of weaponry and munitions and their related materials, without exception. He encouraged States that produced and imported weapons, munitions and related materials to take measures to prevent zones of conflict from being the final destination of weapons. The representative of Poland called upon all parties to fully respect the arms embargo and to refrain from taking any action that could further undermine the United Nations-facilitated political dialogue.

At the 8595th meeting, held on 10 August 2019 under the same item,⁷⁴ the representative of Peru

addressed the issue of the illicit proliferation of weapons in Libya and stressed the importance of “[refraining] from taking steps, including with regard to the arms embargo on Libya”, that would undermine the process of establishing a political dialogue.

At the 8611th meeting, held on 4 September 2019 also under the same item,⁷⁵ the representative of Peru indicated that the first step to end the crisis in Libya was to ensure strict compliance with the arms embargo imposed by the Council and to refrain from taking measures that could exacerbate the situation. The representative of Germany urged all States to immediately take the measures necessary to ensure the full and strict implementation of the arms embargo, emphasized that non-compliance with the sanctions regime had grave consequences for Libya and urged all United Nations Member States to immediately halt any arms delivery.

At the 8667th meeting, on 18 November 2019, under the item entitled “The situation in Libya”,⁷⁶ the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of UNSMIL expressed concern about the dangers and direct consequences of foreign interference in the country, including the growing involvement of mercenaries. He opined that the insertion of those experienced fighters had naturally led to the intensification of the violence. He noted that violence had been facilitated by the plethora of Al-Qadhafi-era arms in Libya, as well as by continued shipments of war materiel brought into the country in breach of the arms embargo. The representative of Germany called upon all United Nations Member States to immediately halt any arms deliveries to Libya, stressing that the illicit flow of arms needed to stop. Similarly, the representative of Belgium emphasized that the arms embargo must be respected by all; the delivery of arms should stop, as should the recruitment of combatants, including foreign mercenaries and elements engaging in terrorist and criminal activities that were listed by the Council. The representative of Libya stated that many States had violated resolution 1970 (2011) by supplying the aggressor forces attacking the city of Tripoli with sophisticated weapons, such as fighter drones and offensive weapons that even some States did not possess.

⁷² See [S/PV.8690](#).

⁷³ See [S/PV.8530](#).

⁷⁴ See [S/PV.8595](#).

⁷⁵ See [S/PV.8611](#).

⁷⁶ See [S/PV.8667](#).

IV. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of States by the United Nations under Article 2, paragraph 7

Article 2, paragraph 7

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Security Council in relation to the principle of non-intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of States enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the Charter. Subsection A features references to that Article in the decisions of the Council. Subsection B covers the deliberations of the Council touching upon the principle enshrined in Article 2 (7). Subsection C features references to Article 2 (7) in the correspondence addressed to the Council.

A. Decisions relating to Article 2 (7)

In 2019, Article 2 (7) was not referred to in decisions of the Council. This notwithstanding, language used in some Council decisions under country-specific and thematic items was of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7).

Regarding country-specific items, in a resolution adopted under the item entitled “The situation in Afghanistan”, the Council decided that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, within their mandate and in a manner consistent with Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership, would continue to lead and coordinate the international civilian efforts, in full cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan.⁷⁷ Under the item entitled “The situation in Guinea-Bissau”, the Council adopted a resolution reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Guinea-Bissau, emphasizing that the Bissau-Guinean authorities had the primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the country and underscoring the importance of national ownership to implement inclusive political, peace and

⁷⁷ Resolution 2489 (2019), para. 5.

security related initiatives.⁷⁸ Under the item entitled “The situation in Mali”, the Council adopted a resolution reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali and emphasizing that the Malian authorities had primary responsibility for the provision of stability, security and protection of civilians throughout the territory of Mali.⁷⁹ In a resolution adopted under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, the Council called upon the Government of Lebanon to facilitate access by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon to the Blue Line in line with Council resolution 1701 (2006), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.⁸⁰ In a presidential statement issued under the same item, the Council determined that the launch of the Syrian-owned and Syrian-led Constitutional Committee should be the beginning of the political process to end the Syrian conflict in line with Council resolution 2254 (2015) and reaffirmed the Council’s strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic.⁸¹

Concerning thematic items, the Council adopted a resolution under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, reaffirming the full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States in accordance with the Charter.⁸² Under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, the Council adopted a resolution reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in accordance with the Charter, stressing that Member States had the primary responsibility in countering terrorist acts and violent extremism conducive to terrorism.⁸³

B. Constitutional discussion relating to Article 2 (7)

During the period under review, Article 2 (7) was explicitly invoked four times in the Council’s deliberations. At a meeting held on 10 April 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian

⁷⁸ Resolution 2458 (2019), third preambular paragraph.

⁷⁹ Resolution 2480 (2019), second preambular paragraph. See also resolution 2484 (2019), second preambular paragraph.

⁸⁰ Resolution 2485 (2019), para. 15.

⁸¹ S/PRST/2019/12, first, second and last paragraphs.

⁸² Resolution 2475 (2019), twelfth preambular paragraph.

⁸³ Resolution 2482 (2019), ninth preambular paragraph.

Republic of Venezuela”,⁸⁴ with reference to Article 2 (7), the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela questioned the legal basis for the United States to intervene in what were essentially matters having to do with his country’s domestic jurisdiction. At a meeting under the item entitled “The situation in Burundi” held on 14 June 2019,⁸⁵ the representative of Burundi, referring to the upcoming electoral process in the country in 2020, underscored that support for the elections could be provided only at the request of the Government of Burundi and that any attempt to create a new role or redefine an existing role in favour of the United Nations rather than Burundians in the country’s 2020 electoral process would encroach on national sovereignty and be a flagrant violation of the Charter, which stated in Article 2 that nothing contained in it should authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. The representative of Burundi specified that his country would remain opposed to any attempt at foreign interference at any time, anywhere and under any circumstances, whether by a State or a regional or international organization.

At a meeting under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, held on 27 June 2019,⁸⁶ the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic indicated that “the only way” for the United Nations to avoid the same fate as the League of Nations was to ensure that countries abide by the resolutions of the Council and the provisions of the Charter, in particular paragraphs 1, 4 and 7 of Article 2. At a meeting under the item entitled “Non-proliferation” held on 19 December 2019,⁸⁷ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran invoked Article 2 (7) explicitly. He said that raising his country’s internal affairs at that meeting was in gross violation of the very basic principles upon which the Organization was founded. He elaborated that Article 2 (7) of the Charter clearly prohibited the Organization’s intervention or interference in the internal affairs of States.

Beyond the explicit references outlined above, speakers at several other meetings of the Council engaged in relevant discussions for the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7), namely in the context of the crisis in the Sudan (case 6), in relation to the cross-border humanitarian operations in the context of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic (case 7) and in relation to reconciliation processes more generally (case 8). In addition, in 2019, Member States made

numerous statements of relevance to the interpretation and application of Article 2 (7) of the Charter without engaging in constitutional discussions.⁸⁸

Case 6 Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

At its 8549th meeting, held on 14 June 2019 under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”,⁸⁹ the Council was briefed on the situation in Darfur by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations and the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights. During the discussion following the briefings, several Council members expressed opposition to using the Council to discuss the political crisis in the Sudan, arguing that such action could amount to interference by the Council in the internal affairs of the country. Specifically, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed astonishment at the decision of some Council members to use a meeting not to discuss the parameters for withdrawing a peacekeeping operation but to voice their opinions of the domestic political situation in the Sudan, despite the Council’s appeal in its press statement of 11 June 2019 for refraining from external interference in the Sudan. He further emphasized his country’s position that the resolution of the internal crisis in the Sudan was a matter for the Sudanese people themselves, adding that outside pressure and interference were “unacceptable” and would only exacerbate the disagreements. The representative of South Africa, underlining the primacy of African-led initiatives in the quest for a lasting solution to the crisis in the Sudan, underscored that the Sudanese should chart their own path to peace, devoid of interference. The representative of Indonesia similarly reaffirmed the principle of non-interference and respect for the sovereignty of the Sudan and underlined the primacy of African-led initiatives in finding a solution to the crisis. The representative of Equatorial Guinea demanded that the international community refrain from interfering in the political

⁸⁴ See [S/PV.8506](#).

⁸⁵ See [S/PV.8550](#).

⁸⁶ See [S/PV.8567](#).

⁸⁷ See [S/PV.8695](#).

⁸⁸ See, for example, under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, [S/PV.8579](#); under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, [S/PV.8534](#); under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, [S/PV.8513](#); under the item entitled “The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security”, [S/PV.8499](#); under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”, [S/PV.8520](#) and [S/PV.8628](#); under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, [S/PV.8573](#); and under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, [S/PV.8508](#).

⁸⁹ See [S/PV.8549](#).

process in the Sudan and stressed that any action by third parties, including the Security Council, must be in line with the interests of the Sudanese people and within the parameters set by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The representative of Kuwait also stressed that the situation in the Sudan was “an internal affair” that did not merit interference, in accordance with the Charter, and called for the discussion to be restricted to the subject matter on the agenda for the meeting, including the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

Speaking after Council members, the representative of the Sudan criticized the decision by some Council members to discuss the internal political affairs of the Sudan during the meeting and emphasized that such action was in contravention of the procedures of the Council and the Charter, which, he recalled, specified “when the Security Council [could] and [could not] interfere in the internal affairs of a country”. He further clarified that the events in the Sudan since December 2018 remained an internal affair that neither the Council nor any of its members had any mandate or right to discuss, and expressed hope that the Council would not interfere with the mediation efforts of the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or in the political internal affairs of the Sudan.

Case 7 **The situation in the Middle East**

On 14 November 2019, at its 8664th meeting, held under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”,⁹⁰ the representative of China stressed that the cross-border humanitarian operations in the Syrian Arab Republic needed to fully respect the country’s sovereignty, take on board the views of the Government of the country, strictly follow the requirements of Council resolutions and prevent abuse of cross-border authorizations. He added that operations should be conducted in compliance with the United Nations guiding principles on humanitarian relief, the relevant provisions of international law and the principles of neutrality, impartiality and non-politicization.

The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, also in relation to the cross-border humanitarian operations mechanism mandated for the first time in resolution 2165 (2014), stressed that the attempts to renew that mandate reflected a sad reality in the Council, underscoring the need to put an end to promoting the violation of Syrian sovereignty through

⁹⁰ See [S/PV.8664](#).

useless cross-border operations and offices that were hostile to his country. The representative of the United Kingdom responded that the resolution was there precisely because of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Case 8 **Peacebuilding and sustaining peace**

At its 8668th meeting, held on 19 November 2019 under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, at the initiative of the United Kingdom, which held the presidency for the month,⁹¹ the Council considered, for the first time, the sub-item entitled “The role of reconciliation in maintaining international peace and security”.⁹² During the meeting, the representative of China stated that respect for national sovereignty was the primary prerequisite for reconciliation and that the support and assistance of the international community must be based on respect for national sovereignty and ownership, as well as independence, unity and territorial integrity.

Several speakers⁹³ recognized or emphasized the importance of national ownership in reconciliation processes. The representative of Indonesia added that, for reconciliation to work, it must be nationally driven and not imposed from the outside.⁹⁴ Similarly, the representative of Romania stressed that reconciliation should be nationally owned, since sustainable peace could not be imposed from the outside.⁹⁵ The representative of Brazil noted that national ownership was essential to ensuring that reconciliation processes relate to the unique circumstances of each country. He underscored that the Council had a responsibility to support nationally led reconciliation efforts and that it was paramount that the Council guarantee that the support of the United Nations for reconciliation efforts be fully aligned with nationally defined peacebuilding and development priorities.⁹⁶ The representative of Japan highlighted three qualities necessary for supporting a lasting reconciliation process, including sustainable frameworks allowing for the building of strong institutions with broad national ownership. The representative of the Russian Federation referred to the concept note for the meeting, recalling that it rightly pointed out that during post-conflict peacebuilding, it

⁹¹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 11 November 2019 ([S/2019/871](#)).

⁹² See [S/PV.8668](#).

⁹³ Kuwait and Indonesia (see [S/PV.8668](#)); and Rwanda, Egypt, Romania, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (see [S/PV.8668 \(Resumption 1\)](#)).

⁹⁴ See [S/PV.8668](#).

⁹⁵ See [S/PV.8668 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

⁹⁶ See [S/PV.8668](#).

was important that both the Government and society recognize their national ownership of lasting peace.

The representative of Kenya stressed that the role of the international community should be one of support, at the request of States Members of the United Nations, in order to build the capacities of national and grass-roots conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives. The representative of Morocco stated that, while it was important to draw on the broad pool of experiences and expertise in reconciliation, what ensured the success of any process, based on past events, was national ownership.⁹⁷ On a similar note, the representative of Canada stated that successful reconciliation processes relied first and foremost on national ownership and domestic leadership.

Noting that national sovereignty was discussed over and over in the Council, the representative of Germany opined that national sovereignty should be respected, but within the limits imposed by the Charter of the United Nations. National ownership could be guaranteed only by including everyone, especially

⁹⁷ See [S/PV.8668 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

marginalized groups and civil society, and by promoting and protecting the human rights of all.⁹⁸

C. Invocations of the principle enshrined in Article 2 (7) in communications

During the period under review, one explicit reference to Article 2 (7) was made in a communication brought to the attention of the Security Council: in a letter dated 4 December 2019 to the Secretary-General,⁹⁹ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran declared that resolution 8418, adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on 10 September 2019 on the “so-called Iranian interference in the internal affairs of Arab States”, was in fact a clear manifestation of interference in the internal affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the letter it was suggested that all decisions contained in that resolution ran counter to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and contradicted, in particular, Article 2 (7) of the Charter.

⁹⁸ See [S/PV.8668](#).

⁹⁹ [S/2019/927](#).

Part IV
Relations with other United Nations organs

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Introductory note

Part IV of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Security Council with regard to Articles 4–6, 10–12, 15 (1), 20, 23, 24 (3), 65, 93, 94, 96 and 97 of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the relations of the Council with other principal organs of the United Nations, namely, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice. Material relating to the relations of the Council with the Secretariat is featured in part II, section V, which deals with the administrative functions and powers of the Secretary-General in connection with meetings of the Council pursuant to rules 21 to 26 of its provisional rules of procedure. The Trusteeship Council continued to be inactive during the period under review.

During the period under review, the General Assembly continued to address recommendations to the Council regarding the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council and the Assembly, in parallel and within the limitations imposed by the Charter, considered the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and in the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, both organs collaborated on the election of judges to fill vacancies on the roster of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals consistent with the applicable provisions of the statute of the Mechanism, the provisional rules of procedure of the Council and the rules of procedure of the Assembly.

With regard to the selection of the Secretary-General, the General Assembly decided in September 2019 to consolidate the advances gained in relevant Assembly resolutions and explore possible steps to further improve the process, including collaboration between the Assembly and the Council, consistent with Article 97 of the Charter, as well as to explore the possibility for the incumbent Secretary-General to present a vision statement for the next term and to brief the Member States on its content.

In 2019, Council members continued to discuss the relations between the Council and subsidiary organs of the General Assembly, in particular the Human Rights Council and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. During the period under review, Council members explored informal meetings with the Human Rights Council as well as with its special procedures in connection with the conflict prevention work of the Security Council. In addition, during the review period, discussions in the Council focused on the importance of the development of synergies among the Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as with the competent bodies and agencies of the United Nations system, with a view to creating early warning systems for climate-related risks.

During 2019, the President of the Economic and Social Council participated in a meeting of the Security Council under the item entitled “The situation concerning Haiti”.² This was the first time that the President of the Economic and Social Council had participated in a meeting of the Council concerning this country since 2009. In addition, during the period under review, the President of the Economic and Social Council and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission informed the Security Council of a joint meeting held on the linkages between climate change and challenges to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Sahel, held on

¹ The Trusteeship Council completed its mandate under the Charter in 1994 and suspended its operations on 1 November 1994. For more information see *Repertoire, Supplement 1993–1995*, chap. VI, part III.

² See [S/PV.8641](#).

³ See [S/PV.6101](#).

13 November 2018, building on relevant Security Council meetings. In 2019, however, the Council did not address any requests for information or assistance to the Economic and Social Council, nor did it make recommendations or decide on measures with regard to the judgments rendered by the International Court of Justice or request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

I. Relations with the General Assembly

Note

Section I focuses on various aspects of the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly in accordance with Articles 4–6, 10–12, 15 (1), 20, 23, 24 (3), 93, 94, 96 and 97 of the Charter, rules 40,⁴ 60 and 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council and Articles 4, 8, 10–12 and 14 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Section I is divided into eight subsections. Subsection A deals with the election by the General Assembly of the non-permanent members of the Council, in accordance with Article 23 of the Charter. Subsections B and C concern the functions and powers of the Assembly vis-à-vis Articles 10 to 12, with a particular focus on the practice and authority of the Assembly to make recommendations to the Council. Subsection D covers instances in which a decision by the Council must be taken prior to that of the Assembly under Articles 4 to 6, 93 and 97, such as the admission of new Members or the appointment of judges to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. Subsection E examines the practices for the election of members of the International Court of Justice, requiring concurrent action by the Council and the Assembly. Subsection F covers the annual and special reports of the Council to the Assembly, in accordance with Articles 15 and 24 (3) of the Charter. Subsection G concerns Council relations with the subsidiary organs established by the Assembly that played a part in the work of the Council during 2019. Subsection H features other Council practice bearing on relations with the Assembly.

⁴ Rule 40 of the provisional rules of procedure is also covered in part II, sect. VIII, “Decision-making and voting”.

A. Election by the General Assembly of the non-permanent members of the Security Council

Article 23

1. *The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.*

2. *The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.*

3. *Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.*

During the period under review, at its seventy-third regular session, the General Assembly elected five non-permanent members to the Council in accordance with Article 23 of the Charter, to replace those whose terms of office were to expire on 31 December 2019 (see table 1).

Table 1
Election by the General Assembly of non-permanent members of the Security Council

<i>Term</i>	<i>General Assembly decision</i>	<i>Plenary meeting and date of election</i>	<i>Members elected for the term</i>
2020–2021	73/420	89th 7 June 2019	Estonia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, Viet Nam

B. Recommendations made by the General Assembly to the Security Council under Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

1. *The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.*

2. *The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.*

3. *The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.*

4. *The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.*

During the period under review, the General Assembly addressed recommendations to the Council regarding the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. Several of these recommendations concerned the powers and functions of the Council under Articles 10 and 11 (1) of the Charter. The relevant provisions of

the resolutions of the Assembly are set out in table 2. In Assembly resolution [73/341](#), adopted under the item entitled “Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly”, Member States welcomed the efforts of the President of the Assembly to reinforce synergy, coherence and complementarity between the agendas of the Assembly and its Committees, and the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies, and encouraged regular interaction between the Presidents of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council in this regard.⁵ In addition, in Assembly resolution [74/25](#), adopted under the item “Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace”, the Assembly reiterated its conviction that the participation of all permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee was important and would greatly facilitate the development of a mutually beneficial dialogue to advance peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region.⁶

In connection with Article 11 (2) of the Charter, the General Assembly made recommendations to the Council with regard to specific questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security or requesting action by the Council concerning those questions. In its recommendations, in reference to items already on the Council’s agenda, the Assembly called on the Council to ensure accountability, including through consideration of referral of the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court and to consider the further development of sanctions in order to effectively target those who appeared to be most responsible for human rights violations. The Assembly also called on the Council to ensure accountability of those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law or violations and abuses of human rights law in the Syrian Arab Republic. The relevant provisions of the resolutions of the Assembly are set out in table 3.

The General Assembly did not draw the attention of the Council to any situations under Article 11 (3) of the Charter.⁷

⁵ General Assembly resolution [73/341](#), para. 10.

⁶ General Assembly resolution [74/25](#), para. 2.

⁷ For information on other referrals to the Security Council, see part VI, sect. I.

Table 2

Recommendations to the Security Council in resolutions of the General Assembly regarding the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security

General Assembly resolution and date *Provisions*

Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa

[73/336](#)
10 September 2019

Recognizes the growing and emerging challenges and risks facing United Nations peacekeeping operations and political missions, and in this regard takes note of the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the report of the Secretary-General entitled “The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations”, as well as recommendations supported by Member States in the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in particular on prevention, mediation and stronger global regional partnerships, including between the United Nations and the African Union, and encourages the Security Council, as appropriate, to consult with relevant regional organizations, particularly the African Union, especially if transitioning from a regional to a United Nations peacekeeping operation (para. 35)

Report of the International Criminal Court

[74/6](#)
4 November 2019

Encourages further dialogue between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, and welcomes in this regard the increased interaction of the Security Council with the Court under various formats, including the holding of open debates on peace and justice and working methods, with a special focus on the role of the Court (para. 20)

Comprehensive review of special political missions

[74/91](#)
13 December 2019

Encouraging enhanced exchanges of information, in an appropriate manner, among the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat, making use of the advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission, when relevant, on overall policy matters pertaining to special political missions (eighth preambular paragraph)

Terrorism and human rights

[74/147](#)
18 December 2019

Encourages the Security Council, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to strengthen, within their mandates, the links, cooperation and dialogue with relevant human rights bodies, giving due regard to the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law in their ongoing work relating to counter-terrorism (para. 34)

Table 3

Recommendations to the Security Council in resolutions of the General Assembly with regard to specific questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security

General Assembly resolution and date *Provisions*

Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

[74/166](#)
18 December 2019

Encourages the Security Council to continue its consideration of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of the commission of inquiry and take appropriate action to ensure accountability, including through consideration of referral of the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court and consideration of further sanctions in order to target effectively those who appear to be most responsible for human rights violations that the commission has said may constitute crimes against humanity (para. 13)

Also encourages the Security Council to continue to discuss the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the country's human rights situation, in the light of the serious concerns expressed in the present resolution, and looks forward to its continued and more active engagement on this matter (para. 14)

Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic

74/169
18 December 2019

Emphasizes the need to ensure that all those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law or violations and abuses of human rights law are held to account through appropriate, fair and independent domestic or international criminal justice mechanisms, in accordance with the principle of complementarity, stresses the need to pursue practical steps towards this goal, and for that reason encourages the Security Council to take appropriate action to ensure accountability, noting the important role that the International Criminal Court can play in this regard (para. 35)

Concerning the deliberations in the Council, during the period under review, while Articles 11 (1), (2), (3) or (4) of the Charter were not explicitly referred to, Article 10 was explicitly referenced twice, as described below.

At the 8453rd meeting, held on 30 January 2019, under the item entitled "The situation in Cyprus",⁸ and concerning the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland emphasized his country's disagreement with the argument that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations had to approve, endorse or authorize any new developments in peacekeeping policy before the Secretariat could implement it, and noted that his country would not want to see the functions of the Special Committee exceeding the terms of the powers prescribed in Chapter IV, Article 10 of the Charter.

During the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council held under the Presidency of Kuwait on 6 June 2019,⁹ the representative of Brazil highlighted the importance of Article 10 of the Charter. He indicated that the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly should be dynamic and complementary, adding that an enhanced exchange between the two organs could contribute to mitigating the cases of encroachment on and erosion of the authority and mandate of the Assembly by the Council. He further called on the Council to hold more regular and substantive consultations with the Assembly, either to review work plans or to consult specific issues of mutual concern. At the same meeting, several speakers

commented on the interaction between the Council and the Assembly. The representative of Kuwait noted that communications between Council members and non-Council members and communications between the Council and other organs of the United Nations such as the Assembly had improved in the past 25 years. The representative of Turkey called for greater coordination and cooperation between the Council and other main bodies of the United Nations, adding that while the Council was the main organ for the maintenance of international peace and security, it was not the only one. He added that Council members should bear that in mind and make more conscious efforts to ensure better coordination with the Assembly and other organs of the United Nations. The representative of Bahrain also highlighted the importance of increased coordination, cooperation and interaction among the main organs of the United Nations, including the Council and the Assembly. The representative of Singapore welcomed the greater use by the Council of formats such as Arria-formula meetings and Toledo-formula dialogues to increase the interactivity in its engagement with the Assembly.

C. Practice in relation to Article 12 of the Charter

Article 12

1. *While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.*

2. *The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the*

⁸ See S/PV.8453. For more information on the relationship between the Council and the subsidiary organs of the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.G.

⁹ Ibid.

maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Subsection C covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 12 of the Charter. Article 12 (1) limits the authority of the General Assembly with regard to any dispute or situation in respect of which the Council is exercising its functions under the Charter.

During the period under review, no reference was made to Article 12 (1) in decisions of the Council, nor did the Council request the General Assembly to make a recommendation with regard to any dispute or situation. Nonetheless, during the annual open debate on the working methods of the Council held under the Presidency of Kuwait on 6 June 2019,¹⁰ the representative of Mexico recalled that the Council had an obligation to inform the Assembly about measures it had decided to adopt in the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and deplored that such reports “often [lacked] complete, rigorous and objective information”. He further emphasized that as the most representative organ of the United Nations, the Assembly must and could act with greater independence in matters that were still the exclusive domain of the Council, bearing in mind the powers related to international peace and security enshrined in the Charter, and indicated that the Assembly resolution 377 (V), better known as “Uniting for peace”, was a clear example of that possibility. The representative of Liechtenstein underscored that in situations when the Council failed to act, the wider membership should claim ownership and step in through action in the Assembly, and recalled the creation by the Assembly of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 as an example that such action could be effective. He added that in situations when vetoes were cast in the Council, the Assembly should be convened automatically to discuss vetoed decisions with the involvement of the entire membership, noting that such discussions would improve accountability.¹¹ The representative of

Liechtenstein made similar remarks at a meeting held on 23 May 2019 under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”,¹² noting that the people of the Syrian Arab Republic had been at the receiving end of the failure of the Council to act due to vetoes, which had prompted the Assembly to play a more active role in area of accountability by creating the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism. He added that that decision was a major step forward in ensuring that violations of international humanitarian law in the Syrian Arab Republic would not go unpunished and also a landmark decision for the accountability work of the United Nations.

In addition, at a meeting in connection with the Palestinian question,¹³ the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine criticized the “very selective approach” taken by Israel to United Nations resolutions. He stated that the claim that the United Nations adopted a disproportionate number of resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a distortion that disregarded relevant context, since any reference to the number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the Palestinian question must be seen in the context of the paralysis of the Council when it came to the conflict.

Under Article 12 (2), the Secretary-General is required to notify the General Assembly of the matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security being dealt with by the Council or with which the Council has ceased to deal. During the period under review, in accordance with that provision, the Secretary-General continued to notify the Assembly of the matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which were being dealt with by the Council or with which the Council had ceased to deal.¹⁴ The notification was based on the summary statements of matters of which the Council was seized and the stage reached in their consideration, which were circulated each week to the members of the Council in accordance with rule 11 of its provisional rules of procedure.¹⁵ The consent of the Council, required under Article 12 (2), is obtained through the circulation of the draft notification by the Secretary-General to the members of the Council. Following

¹² See [S/PV.8534](#).

¹³ See [S/PV.8690](#).

¹⁴ [A/74/300](#).

¹⁵ For more information, see part II, sect. II.B, “Matters of which the Council is seized (rules 10 and 11)”.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ See also [S/PV.8517](#). For more information on the establishment of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*, part IV, sect. I.C.

receipt of the notification, the Assembly formally takes note of it.¹⁶

D. Practice in relation to provisions of the Charter involving recommendations made by the Security Council to the General Assembly

Article 4

1. *Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.*

2. *The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.*

Article 5

A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 93, paragraph 2

A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Rule 60

The Security Council shall decide whether in its judgement the applicant is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter and, accordingly, whether to recommend the applicant State for membership.

If the Security Council recommends the applicant State for membership, it shall forward to the General Assembly the recommendation with a complete record of the discussion.

If the Security Council does not recommend the applicant State for membership or postpones the consideration of the application, it shall submit a special report to the General Assembly with a complete record of the discussion.

In order to ensure the consideration of its recommendation at the next session of the General Assembly following the receipt of the application, the Security Council shall make its recommendation not less than twenty-five days in advance of a regular session of the General Assembly, nor less than four days in advance of a special session...

The Charter provides for joint decision-making by the Council and the General Assembly in relation to a number of matters but requires a decision by the Council to be taken first. This is the case with respect to the admission, suspension or expulsion of Members (Articles 4, 5 and 6), the appointment of the Secretary-General (Article 97) and the conditions under which a State that is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Article 93 (2)).¹⁷ In addition, the statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals provides that the judges of the Mechanism

¹⁶ See General Assembly decision 73/560 of 10 September 2019, in which the Assembly took note of the notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12 (2), dated 1 September 2018 (A/73/300); see also *Repertoire, Supplement 2018*, part IV, sect. I.C. As at 31 December 2019, the Assembly had not taken note of the notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12 (2), dated 1 September 2019 (A/74/300).

¹⁷ Articles 4 (3) and 69 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provide for the Security Council to make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the conditions under which a State which is a party to the Statute but is not a Member of the United Nations may participate in electing members of the Court, and in making amendments to the Statute.

shall be elected by the Assembly from a list submitted by the Council.¹⁸

During the period under review, no questions arose concerning the conditions of accession to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. There was no reference to Articles 4, 5 or 6, no activity with regard to the admission of new Members or the suspension or expulsion of any Member State, and no action with regard to the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General. With regard to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, the Council and the General Assembly collaborated on the election of judges to fill vacancies on the roster of the Mechanism.

Membership in the United Nations: references to Articles 4 and 6

The admission of a State to membership in the United Nations and the suspension or expulsion of a Member State from the Organization are effected by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council (Articles 4 (2), 5 and 6 of the Charter). In accordance with rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure, the Council submits to the Assembly, within specified time limits, its recommendations concerning each application for membership, together with a record of its discussions in relation to the application.

During the period under review, the Council did not recommend the admission of any State for membership in the United Nations. It made no negative recommendations, which would have required the submission of a special report to the General Assembly. In addition, the Council did not recommend the suspension or expulsion of any Member State. Nonetheless, at the 8449th meeting, held on 22 January 2019, under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”,¹⁹ the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine called for support for the request by the State of Palestine for admission to United Nations membership, which, he noted, had been pending since 2011. At the same meeting, several speakers expressed support for the admission of the State of Palestine as a full Member of the Organization.²⁰

¹⁸ Article 10 of the statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (resolution 1966 (2010), annex 1).

¹⁹ See S/PV.8449.

²⁰ Indonesia, Kuwait, South Africa, Lebanon, Turkey, Bangladesh (on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), Cuba, Vice-Chair of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Libya and Islamic Republic of Iran. See also S/PV.8517 (Syrian Arab Republic, Ecuador, Bangladesh and Cuba); and S/PV.8648 (Syrian Arab Republic, Bangladesh, Tunisia (on behalf of the Group of Arab States) and Ecuador).

Procedure for the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General

In its resolution 73/341, adopted on 12 September 2019, the General Assembly emphasized that the process of the selection of the Secretary-General was guided by the principles of transparency and inclusiveness and reaffirmed its commitment to continue, in the Ad Hoc Working Group, in accordance with the provisions of Article 97 of the Charter, to examine innovative ways to improve the process of the selection and appointment of the Secretary-General.²¹ In the same resolution, the Assembly decided to further assess, during its seventy-fourth session, the selection and appointment process of the Secretary-General, consolidate the advances gained in the relevant Assembly resolutions and explore possible steps to further improve the process, including the collaboration between the Assembly and the Council, consistent with Article 97 of the Charter, as well as to explore the possibility for the incumbent Secretary-General to present a vision statement for the next term and to brief the Member States on its content.²²

Appointment of judges to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

By its resolution 1966 (2010) of 22 December 2010, the Council established the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to carry out residual functions of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.²³ According to the statute of the Mechanism, the judges of the Mechanism are elected by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Council. In the event of a vacancy in the roster of judges of the Mechanism, the Secretary-General appoints a judge, after consultation with the Presidents of the Council and of the Assembly, for the remainder of the term of office concerned.²⁴

During the period under review, at its sixty-sixth plenary meeting held on 15 January 2019 and pursuant

²¹ General Assembly resolution 73/341, paras. 40 and 41.

²² Ibid., para. 43.

²³ Resolution 1966 (2010), para. 1.

²⁴ Ibid., annex 1.

to article 10 of the Statute of the Mechanism, the General Assembly elected from the list of nominees transmitted by the Council the second of two judges of the Mechanism for a term of office until 30 June 2020.²⁵ In addition, following the passing of one and the resignation of two judges of the Mechanism, and

pursuant to article 10 (2) of the Statute of the Mechanism, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint judges nominated to fill the vacancies for the remainder of the respective terms of office.²⁶ For further details on the actions taken by the Secretary-General, the Council and the Assembly, see table 4.²⁷

²⁵ See General Assembly decision 73/415 B. See also, in connection with the election of the other judge, which took place in December 2018, *Repertoire, Supplement 2018*, part IV, sect. I.D.

²⁶ S/2018/1152, S/2019/108 and S/2019/1000.

²⁷ For more information, see part I, sect. 28.

Table 4
Actions taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning judges of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals in 2019^a

<i>Letter from the Secretary-General</i>	<i>Letter from the President of the Security Council</i>	<i>Security Council resolution and date</i>	<i>Transmittal to the General Assembly</i>	<i>General Assembly decision or resolution and date</i>
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals				
S/2018/963, transmitting information on the nominations for the two vacancies in the roster of judges of the Mechanism	S/2018/756, requesting the Secretary-General to invite Member States to submit nominations to fill two vacancies in the roster of judges of the Mechanism		A/73/578	73/415 B 15 January 2019
S/2018/1151, transmitting the nomination of a judge to fill one vacancy in the roster of judges of the Mechanism	S/2018/1152, taking note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judge nominated to fill the vacancy			
S/2019/84, transmitting a letter from the President of the General Assembly concurring with the appointment of the nominated judge				
S/2019/107, transmitting the nomination of a judge to fill one vacancy in the roster of judges of the Mechanism	S/2019/108, taking note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judge nominated to fill the vacancy			
S/2019/170, transmitting a letter from the President of the General Assembly concurring with the appointment of the nominated judge				
S/2019/999, transmitting the nomination of a judge to fill one vacancy in the roster of judges of the Mechanism	S/2019/1000, taking note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judge nominated to fill the vacancy			

^a Includes actions of the Security Council and the General Assembly in 2018 for the purposes of providing background information.

E. Election of members of the International Court of Justice

Rule 40

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

Rule 61

Any meeting of the Security Council held in pursuance of the Statute of the International Court of Justice for the purpose of the election of members of the Court shall continue until as many candidates as are required for all the seats to be filled have obtained in one or more ballots an absolute majority of votes.

The election of members of the International Court of Justice requires action by the Council in conjunction with the General Assembly, with the two organs proceeding independently of one another. The procedure for the election is set out in rules 40²⁸ and 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council; Articles 4, 8, 10 to 12, 14 and 15 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice;²⁹ and rules 150 and 151 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly.³⁰

During the period under review, the Council did not hold elections of members of the International Court of Justice.

²⁸ Rule 40 of the provisional rules of procedure is also covered in part II, sect. VIII, "Decision-making and voting".

²⁹ Articles 4, 10 to 12, 14 and 15 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice establish the procedures for the following: (a) the nomination of the judges by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration; (b) the majority necessary for the election of judges; (c) the number of meetings to be held for the purpose of the election of judges; (d) the holding of a joint conference in the event of more than three meetings of the Security Council and the General Assembly; (e) the filling of vacancies; and (f) the term of office applied to elected judges filling out a vacancy. Article 8 provides that the two organs shall proceed independently.

³⁰ Rules 150 and 151 of the General Assembly provide that the election of the members of the Court shall take place in accordance with the Statute of the Court and that any meeting of the General Assembly held in pursuance of the Statute of the Court for the purpose of electing members of the Court shall continue until as many candidates as are required for all the seats to be filled have obtained in one or more ballots an absolute majority of votes.

F. Annual and special reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly

Article 15, paragraph 1

The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

Article 24, paragraph 3

The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Rule 60, paragraph 3

If the Security Council does not recommend the applicant State for membership or postpones the consideration of the application, it shall submit a special report to the General Assembly with a complete record of the discussion.

During 2019, the Council maintained its practice of submitting annual reports to the General Assembly pursuant to Article 24 (3) of the Charter. The annual report was submitted to the Assembly covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2018.³¹ The note by the President of the Council dated 30 August 2017³² stipulates that the report shall consist of an introduction, containing an agreed concise summary prepared on behalf of the Council under the coordination of the President of the Council for the month of July. However, in the case of the presidency for the month of July ending its tenure on the Council that year, the task devolves on the member of the Council next in English alphabetical order and who will not be leaving the Council that calendar year. Given that Sweden, which held the presidency for the month of July 2018, ended its tenure on the Council at the end of 2018, the introduction of the annual report was prepared by the delegation of the United Kingdom, as President of the Council for the month of August 2018, in accordance with the note by the President dated 30 August 2017.

During the period under review and consistent with past practice, at its 8539th meeting, on 6 June 2019,³³ the Council addressed issues relating to the timely submission and the potential for improving the

³¹ [A/73/2](#).

³² [S/2017/507](#).

³³ See [S/PV.8539](#).

content of the annual report at the annual open debate on its working methods (see case 1).

In a letter dated 19 July 2019, addressed to the President of the Council,³⁴ the permanent representative of Switzerland, on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, indicated that the Group was “deeply troubled” by the delay in the submission of the 2018 annual report of the Council to the General Assembly for its consideration. He recalled that the submission of the report was an obligation of the Council vis-à-vis the Assembly under Article 24 (3) of the Charter and expressed regret that the end of the current session of the Assembly was approaching with no set date for the presentation of the report. He further emphasized that the situation undermined the ability of the wider membership to engage in an “adequate manner” in the process. He also called on the Council to expedite the adoption of the 2018 annual report, to take all steps necessary for its subsequent presentation to the Assembly during the first week of September 2019 and to explore ways of strengthening the process through rigorous adherence to the time frame agreed to by the Council in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017.

The Council considered and adopted, without a vote, the draft annual report³⁵ at its 8597th meeting, held on 20 August 2019.³⁶ During the meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom highlighted the importance of the report, as required by Article 24 of the Charter, as a mechanism for keeping the wider membership informed of the activities of the Council. He added that, in drafting the introduction to the report, the United Kingdom aimed to provide a brief description of the key activities and trends in the Council during the reporting period, and expressed hope that the draft report would offer a clear and readable account of the work of the Council in 2018.

The General Assembly considered the annual report of the Council at the 105th and 106th plenary meetings of its seventy-third session under the item entitled “Report of the Security Council”, held on 10 and 12 September 2019.³⁷ During the discussions in the Assembly, many Member States criticized the recent trend of late submission by the Council of its annual report to the Assembly for its consideration, arguing that such late submission was too close to the end of the Assembly session and did not allow Member States

enough time for a meaningful consideration of the work of the Council for the year under review.³⁸ Numerous Member States also called for future annual reports of the Council to be more analytical.³⁹ In addition, the Assembly, in its resolution [73/341](#), adopted under the item entitled “Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly”, requested the President of the Assembly to reconsider the timing of the plenary meeting of the Assembly on the report of the Security Council, in close coordination with the President of the Council, so that discussions of the report were not conducted in a perfunctory manner.⁴⁰ No special reports were submitted by the Council to the Assembly during the reporting period.

At the end of the reporting period, the Council issued a note by the President of the Council dated 27 December 2019.⁴¹ In the note, the Council reiterated its willingness to take action necessary to ensure the timely submission of its report to the General Assembly in accordance with Article 24 (3) of the Charter. The members of the Council also recalled that the introduction to the report should be completed no later than 31 January so as to allow the Secretariat enough time for translation. The Council also decided that the Secretariat should submit the draft report, including the introduction to the report, to the members of the Council no later than 15 March following the period covered by the report, so that it may be discussed and thereafter adopted by the Council no later than 30 May, in time for its consideration by the Assembly immediately thereafter. The Council further specified that the aforementioned provision would be applicable to the report to be presented to the Assembly at its seventy-fifth session, in 2021, covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2020.

³⁸ See [A/73/PV.105](#) (Switzerland (on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group and in its national capacity), Thailand (on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Liechtenstein, Singapore, Argentina, Uruguay, Rwanda and Austria); and [A/73/PV.106](#) (Cuba, El Salvador, Mexico, Norway, Georgia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Pakistan, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Cyprus, New Zealand, Ireland, Estonia and India).

³⁹ See [A/73/PV.105](#) (Ukraine, Singapore, Argentina, Rwanda and Austria); and [A/73/PV.106](#) (Cuba, El Salvador, Norway, Italy, Georgia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Pakistan, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Islamic Republic of Iran, Cyprus, Ireland and India).

⁴⁰ General Assembly resolution [73/341](#), para. 17.

⁴¹ [S/2019/997](#). The note by the President of the Security Council was one of eight notes issued on 27 December 2019 in the context of the work of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Matters. For further details on these notes, see part II, sect. VIII.

³⁴ [S/2019/582](#).

³⁵ See [S/2019/666](#).

³⁶ See [S/PV.8597](#).

³⁷ See [A/73/PV.105](#) and [A/73/PV.106](#). See also General Assembly decision [73/561](#).

Case 1 Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At its 8539th meeting, held on 6 June 2019, under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”,⁴² the Council held the annual open debate on its working methods held under the presidency of Kuwait.⁴³ During the meeting, the Council discussed the timely submission and improvement of its annual report to the General Assembly.⁴⁴

Regarding the submission of the report by the Council to the General Assembly, the representative of Switzerland, speaking on behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, stressed the importance of ensuring the adequate consideration of the annual report of the Council to the Assembly, mandated by Article 24 of the Charter, in order to enable an inclusive and substantial exchange of views between the Council and the wider membership. He also called on the Council to expedite the adoption of its 2018 annual report and to set a date for its timely consideration by the Assembly. The representative of Singapore noted that, in order for the wider membership to have a considered debate on the work of the Council, the reports should be made available to all members in good time, and regretted the recent trend whereby the report had been submitted later and the debate on the report had been rushed and held at very short notice. He further opined that a delay in the submission of the report did not help the credibility or legitimacy of the Council and indicated that a thorough debate in the Assembly on the work and report of the Council would help to enhance the Council’s credibility and legitimacy. The representative of Argentina emphasized the importance of ensuring a fluid dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, including through the timely submission to the Assembly of the annual reports of the Council, in accordance with Article 24 (3) of the Charter. The representative of India noted that the way in which the reports were submitted caused delays in how and when they were discussed by the Assembly and deprived the membership of an important opportunity to engage with the Council. He also called for the engagement between the two organs to be restored and strengthened. The Executive Director of Security

Council Report similarly opined that the engagement of the wider membership in the work of the Council could include more interaction with regard to the annual report, and pointed out that while the report was due in the spring, in the current year and previous two years the summer had arrived with no report. She further noted that the discussion of the annual report was a primary format through which the wider membership could underline its views and expectations of the Council and suggested that the reporting process be elevated. The representative of Slovenia, echoed by the representative of Costa Rica, also called for the timely submission of the annual report, and indicated that the discussion by the Assembly on the annual report of the Council should be more substantive and allow for an honest exchange of views.

Concerning the substance of the annual report of the Council, the representative of India noted that, while there had been longstanding demands for the annual reports to be more substantive and analytical, the reports were more often full of the usual factual indicators. The representative of Brazil, explicitly citing Article 24 (3) of the Charter, also recalled the frequent call from the wider membership for the submission of analytical and comprehensive annual reports including an assessment of the work of the Council and the challenges ahead. The representative of Costa Rica called for the annual reports to contain analytical elements of the daily work of the Council and to avoid a simple description of what the Council had carried out, in order for States to have the opportunity to participate actively in an interactive and inclusive debate on that analysis. The representative of Cuba regretted that the Council continued to submit to the Assembly annual reports that were merely a descriptive overview of its meetings, activities and decisions, rather than providing an explanatory, comprehensive and analytical description of its work that would enable the wider membership to assess the reasons for and implications of the Council’s decisions. The representative of Colombia also indicated that it was necessary to improve the quality and analytical content of the annual report, and emphasized that the report should not be treated as a procedural matter but rather incorporate greater detail on the tenor of the discussions held and the results achieved based on the resolutions adopted, with a view to adding value to the considerations and observations of the Assembly regarding the actions of the Council. The representative of Ukraine noted that the timely issuance of monthly assessments should not be overlooked, since those assessments constitute a valuable source for preparing annual reports.

⁴² See S/PV.8539.

⁴³ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 29 May 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/450).

⁴⁴ See S/PV.8539.

A few speakers also referred to the matter of special reports of the Council on its measures to maintain international peace and security. The representative of Brazil indicated that, despite having been envisioned in the Charter as another way of keeping the wider membership abreast of the Council's activities, special reports had rarely been presented to the General Assembly. The representative of Cuba said that the lack of special reports on measures to maintain international peace and security for consideration by the Assembly, as requested under Articles 15 and 24 of the Charter, was another shortcoming that the Council should overcome.

G. Relations with subsidiary organs established by the General Assembly

During the period under review, the Council continued to develop its relations with various subsidiary organs established by the General Assembly, namely, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Human Rights Council and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People

During 2019, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People participated in the work of the Council. The Chair and Vice-Chair of the Committee participated in four

meetings concerning the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question.⁴⁵ On the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, the President of the Council participated in the 398th meeting of the Committee, on 27 November 2019.⁴⁶

Human Rights Council

Several decisions adopted by the Security Council contained references to the Human Rights Council. In those decisions, the Council welcomed the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai region mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 35/33, and welcomed the ongoing interaction of Morocco with the special procedures of the Human Rights Council. No decision of the Council made reference to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations during the reporting period. Decisions concerning the relations with the Peacebuilding Commission, a joint subsidiary organ of the Security Council and the General Assembly, are covered in detail in part IX, section VII.

Table 5 contains all the provisions of the decisions in which the Security Council made explicit reference to the Human Rights Council.

⁴⁵ See S/PV.8449, S/PV.8517, S/PV.8583 and S/PV.8648.

⁴⁶ See A/AC.183/PV.398.

Table 5
Security Council decisions containing references to subsidiary organs of the General Assembly

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Human Rights Council	
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	
Resolution 2463 (2019) 29 March 2019	Reiterates its condemnation of the violence witnessed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Kasai region, strongly condemns the violence committed in Yumbi territory on 16–18 December 2018, some of which the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office reported may constitute crimes against humanity, further reiterates the importance and urgency of prompt and transparent investigations into violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in these regions, including sexual violence, as well as its intention to closely monitor progress of the investigations into these violations and abuses, in order to bring to justice and hold accountable all those responsible, and looks forward to their results; welcomes the commitments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities in that regard, further welcomes the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai regions mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 35/33, requests the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to implement all the recommendations made by the team of international experts in its report, and to cooperate with the team of two international human rights experts, charged with monitoring, evaluating, providing support and reporting on the implementation by

Decision and date

Provision

the Democratic Republic of the Congo of those recommendations; further welcomes the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's continued cooperation with the United Nations team deployed, as agreed, to assist the Congolese authorities investigations into the deaths of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, and calls on them to ensure all perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable (para. 4)

The situation in Western Sahara

Resolution [2468 \(2019\)](#)
30 April 2019

Welcoming in this regard, steps and initiatives taken by Morocco, and the role played by the National Council on Human Rights Commissions operating in Dakhla and Laayoune, and Morocco's interaction with Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council (nineteenth preambular paragraph)

See also resolution [2494 \(2019\)](#), nineteenth preambular paragraph

The relations between the Security Council and the Human Rights Council were also addressed in meetings of the Council. At a meeting on the situation in Somalia held on 15 November 2019,⁴⁷ the representative of the Russian Federation voiced concern over the inclusion of language on Djibouti and Eritrea in the text of the Council resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#) on the Somali sanctions regime. He pointed out that the Council had lifted restrictions on Eritrea the year before and the situation between Asmara and Djibouti did not pose a threat to international peace and security, and the settlement of outstanding issues between the two countries was a matter of bilateral diplomacy. In that regard, he emphasized that the issues did not come under the direct purview of either the Council or the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia, and that there was a specific body for discussing them, namely, the Human Rights Council. He called for respecting the division of labour in the United Nations. At the same meeting, the representative of China said that his country had always believed that human rights issues should be discussed in specialized bodies, such as the Human Rights Council, and that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum to discuss human rights issues. At meetings held under the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question",⁴⁸ speakers called on the Council to consider and follow-up on the findings of the report in connection with the independent international commission of inquiry on the protests in the Occupied Palestinian Territory established by the Human Rights Council.

In addition, communications of the Council addressed the relations with the Human Rights Council

further to certain initiatives of some Council members. By a note verbale dated 30 April 2019 from the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,⁴⁹ the Permanent Mission of Germany transmitted a letter from the President of the Human Rights Council. In the note verbale, the President of the Human Rights Council referred to a breakfast organized by and hosted at the Permanent Mission of Germany, on 10 April 2019, with the members of the Security Council, which he described as a valuable opportunity to establish an informal channel of dialogue between the Human Rights Council and the Security Council. He also referenced a proposal discussed at the meeting to organize some form of informal discussion in Geneva between the members of the Human Rights Council and the President of the Security Council for the month. He noted that a practice existed in the Human Rights Council whereby informal conversations between high-level United Nations representatives and members and observers were convened in an ad hoc manner. In this regard, he added that it would be very constructive should there be an opportunity for future Presidents of the Security Council to organize such an informal discussion. In a letter dated 30 May 2019 from the Permanent Representatives of China and Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,⁵⁰ the Permanent Representatives of China and the Russian Federation clarified that their respective countries did not consider the informal breakfast hosted by the Permanent Mission of Germany on 10 April 2019 between members of the Security Council and the President of the Human Rights Council as the establishment of an informal channel of dialogue between the two bodies, and recalled their countries' rejection of the proposal

⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8665](#).

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8489](#) (State of Palestine), and [S/PV.8532](#) (Kuwait).

⁴⁹ [S/2019/356](#).

⁵⁰ [S/2019/449](#).

of convening an informal discussion of any kind in Geneva between the members of the Human Rights Council and the President of the Security Council. The Permanent Representatives expressed their conviction regarding the necessity of following the existing division of labour between the principal organs of the United Nations and emphasized that as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council was not authorized to interact with the Security Council. They also indicated that any contacts between the President of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council should be considered and agreed upon by the members of the Security Council and that all possible trips of the President of the Security Council to Geneva for an informal dialogue with the members of the Human Rights Council would be considered unapproved initiatives in which the President of the Security Council would not be representing the Council in that capacity.

In a second note verbale dated 30 April 2019 from the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,⁵¹ the Permanent Mission of Germany transmitted a letter from the Chair of the Coordination Committee of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. In the letter, the Chair conveyed information concerning the work of special procedures mandate holders in 2018. He also outlined past formal and informal interactions with the Security Council. In this connection, he referred to the participation of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities in an Arria-formula meeting on the situation of persons with disabilities in armed conflict and expressed the hope that these interactions would be maintained and strengthened.⁵²

In a letter dated 22 August 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,⁵³ the Permanent Representative of Myanmar expressed concern regarding an Arria-formula meeting scheduled for the following day, entitled “Mass atrocity crimes in Myanmar: where do we stand on accountability?”, co-hosted by Germany, Peru and Kuwait. In the letter, the Permanent Representative criticized the purpose and title of the meeting, saying that it was grossly misleading and erroneously conveyed the message that mass atrocities had actually been committed in Myanmar. In addition, he stated that he considered the meeting to be just another one-sided

blaming and finger-pointing session, rather than a sharing of objective and balanced views from relevant stakeholders, and that the intention of the meeting was against the Council’s own stated commitment to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of Myanmar, as contained in the statement by the President of the Council dated 6 November 2017.

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

Concerning the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, participants in Council meetings reaffirmed the importance of the Special Committee as the principal organ to discuss questions relating to peacekeeping operations. At various meetings of the Council, the representative of the Russian Federation insisted that general questions relating to peacekeeping that affected all United Nations peacekeeping operations should be discussed in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In a meeting specifically dedicated to the item “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the representative of the Russian Federation also recalled that the action plan for the report on improving security of United Nations peacekeepers by former United Nations Force Commander Lieutenant General dos Santos Cruz should be implemented only within the parameters agreed on by the Special Committee. At a meeting under the item entitled “The situation in Cyprus”, the representative of the Russian Federation recalled that general peacekeeping issues that affected all United Nations peacekeeping missions should be discussed in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, with the participation of troop-contributing countries. He also stated that the decision on how to apply comprehensive documents such as the Secretariat’s unfinished strategy to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping should be made by the Special Committee. He added that bypassing the Special Committee was “unacceptable” and called on Council members to show greater respect for the prerogatives of specialized intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations. In response, the representative of the United Kingdom expressed disagreement with the argument that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations must approve, endorse or authorize any new developments in peacekeeping policy before they could be implemented by the Secretariat. He further indicated that while the Special Committee had a mandate to “comprehensively review” all aspects of cross-cutting peacekeeping policy, it did not have a right of veto over policy implementation and could not obstruct the ability of the Council to make decisions on

⁵¹ S/2019/357.

⁵² For further details on informal meetings of the members of the Council, see part II, sect. I.C.

⁵³ See S/2019/676.

matters of international peace and security. He added that his country would not want to see the Special Committee's functions exceed the terms of the powers prescribed in Article 10 of the Charter. The representative of the United States of America, recalling that the Council had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, noted that one of the main ways in which it exercised that responsibility was through setting peacekeeping mandates and policies. He added that the view that the Council should cede its leadership and responsibilities to the Special Committee was unacceptable and pledged to continue to defend the primacy of the Council on peacekeeping matters.

Case 2, in relation to United Nations peacekeeping operations, highlights key discussions on the interaction between the Council and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations established by the General Assembly with respect to their distinct functions and mandates.

Case 2 United Nations peacekeeping operations

During the period under review, the Council discussed the role of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations at three of six meetings held under the item entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations".

At the 8521st meeting, held on 7 May 2019, the Council held a high-level open debate under the presidency of Indonesia, under the sub-item entitled "Investing in peace: improving the safety and performance of United Nations peacekeepers".⁵⁴ At the meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations should play a key role alongside the Council in defining the parameters for United Nations peacekeeping, and indicated that his country could not accept attempts to circumvent the Special Committee in order to push issues through the Council that had failed to reach agreement in the General Assembly. The representative of South Africa reaffirmed the primacy of the Special Committee in making United Nations peacekeeping policy. The representative of Guatemala underlined that the mandates of the Council were bolstered and updated by the work of the Special Committee, which included a section entitled "Best practices and training" in its annual reports. The representative of Nepal opined that the Special Committee should be revitalized to make it

more effective in providing policy guidance to peace operations.

At the 8570th meeting, held on 10 July 2019,⁵⁵ concerning triangular cooperation in peacekeeping,⁵⁶ the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations referred to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations as an important forum for discussion involving members of the Council and troop- and police-contributing countries.⁵⁷ The representative of Côte d'Ivoire recalled that the Special Committee and the Council had been seized with the issue of triangular cooperation for several years, as evidenced by numerous decisions and/or recommendations made in pursuit of efficient cooperation. The representative of France recalled that the Special Committee provided an opportunity for all peacekeeping stakeholders to speak and opined that, instead of establishing new meeting formats to enhance triangular cooperation, efforts should be made to revitalize and improve the effectiveness of existing formats, including through enhanced participation. The representative of the United States also noted the existence of forums such as the Special Committee where all Member States had an opportunity to engage with the Secretariat and to provide guidance on issues that impacted United Nations peacekeeping.

The representative of Kuwait noted that the cooperation of the Council's Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations with the Special Committee provided the Council with the opportunity to take into consideration the concerns of troop- and police-contributing countries as well as those of the wider membership, and recalled that the Special Committee was the sole body mandated to tackle all peacekeeping issues. The representative of the Russian Federation similarly indicated that the Special Committee was the key platform of the United Nations system for implementing triangular cooperation, adding that it was within the Special Committee that members of the Council and troop- and police-contributing countries developed common approaches to the parameters of peacekeeping activities and engaged in interactive dialogue with the Secretariat on current issues. He added that the recommendations and decisions adopted by the Special Committee should guide the Secretariat and missions on the ground in discharging their functions. He further emphasized the importance of observing the division of labour within the United

⁵⁵ See [S/PV.8570](#).

⁵⁶ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 27 June 2019 from the representative of Peru to the Secretary-General ([S/2019/538](#)).

⁵⁷ See [S/PV.8570](#).

⁵⁴ See [S/PV.8521](#).

Nations system and avoiding overstepping the mandate of the Special Committee in considering common issues in peacekeeping while specifying that the Council certainly played the primary role in designing the mandates for specific United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The representative of Ethiopia stated that continuous engagement and consultation with relevant actors – particularly the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly – was imperative for the success of peacekeeping operations. The representative of Bangladesh indicated that consultations between the Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat could help to ease tensions on unresolved issues in other bodies such as the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Fifth Committee. The representative of Uruguay indicated that the Special Committee constituted a useful body that brought together the three actors of triangular cooperation and from which recommendations and political directives could be issued on the topic.

At the 8612th meeting, held on 9 September 2019,⁵⁸ concerning United Nations peacekeeping and focused largely on the Action for Peacekeeping initiative of the Secretary-General, the representative of Kuwait indicated that the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was the only Committee mandated to conduct a comprehensive review of peacekeeping in all its aspects and that it reflected a basic consensus among Member States regarding all peacekeeping concepts and policies. The representative of South Africa urged all Member States to work in unison to ensure that the Special Committee continued to discharge its mandate and provide support to the work of the Council. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping hinged on respect for the division of labour within the Organization, where the Special Committee played the key role of defining shared approaches to peacekeeping and establishing relevant instructions for the Secretariat; the Fifth Committee discussed logistical, budgetary and staffing issues; and the Council subsequently took those discussions into account to make informed decisions in designing the individual mandates of peacekeeping operations.

⁵⁸ See [S/PV.8612](#).

H. Other Security Council practice bearing on relations with the General Assembly

There were no special sessions of the General Assembly convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Council pursuant to Article 20 of the Charter. Nonetheless, in connection with the reconvening in June 2018 of the tenth emergency special session of the Assembly,⁵⁹ at a meeting of the Council on 23 May 2019⁶⁰ on protection of civilians in armed conflict, the representative of the League of Arab States regretted that the Council had neither discussed nor sought to agree on a mechanism for the protection of the Palestinian people under occupation further to the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly and the Council pursuant to resolution [ES-10/20](#).

A number of resolutions and presidential statements adopted by the Council during 2019 made specific references to the General Assembly in connection with policy and implementation issues other than those covered in subsections A, D, E and G above. With regard to the environmental footprint of large United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Council continued to request the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to consider the environmental impact of their operations when fulfilling their mandated tasks and to manage them as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations.⁶¹

On the situation concerning Haiti, the Council recalled General Assembly resolution [71/161](#) on the new United Nations approach to cholera in Haiti and noted the continued progress in reductions of suspected cases of cholera, while also reaffirming the importance of the continued work by the Government of Haiti,

⁵⁹ See [A/ES-10/PV.38](#). For more information, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2018*, part IV, sect. I.H.

⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8534](#).

⁶¹ See resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), para. 42, in relation to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), para. 61, in relation to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; and resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), para. 42, in relation to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

non-governmental organizations and the United Nations with the support of the international community to eradicate cholera in Haiti.⁶² Regarding

⁶² Resolution 2466 (2019), tenth preambular paragraph.

the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the Council recalled Assembly resolution 73/178 on missing persons.⁶³

⁶³ Resolution 2474 (2019), seventh preambular paragraph.

II. Relations with the Economic and Social Council

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

Note

Section II concerns the relationship between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, with a particular focus on the practice of the Security Council in relation to Article 65 of the Charter. It covers the deliberations of the Security Council concerning relations with the Economic and Social Council, including the participation of the President of the Economic and Social Council in a meeting of the Security Council held in October 2019. The Security Council did not address any requests to the Economic and Social Council for information or assistance, nor did it explicitly refer to Article 65 of the Charter in any outcome documents. Communications of the Security Council did not include any references to its relations with the Economic and Social Council; nonetheless, in identical letters dated 23 January 2019 from the President of the Economic and Social Council and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council,⁶⁴ the President of the Economic and Social Council transmitted a summary of a joint meeting of the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission on the linkages between climate change and challenges to peacebuilding and sustaining peace in the Sahel, held on 13 November 2018. The summary indicated that the event built on, inter alia, relevant meetings of the Security Council.

Discussions concerning relations with the Economic and Social Council

During the period under review, there were several references to the relations between the Security

⁶⁴ See [A/73/39-S/2019/73](#).

Council and the Economic and Social Council in the deliberations of the Security Council, including one explicit reference to Article 65. The key discussions in this regard took place in the context of a thematic debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” as well as during the annual open debate on the Security Council’s working methods as featured in cases 3 and 4, respectively.

In addition, at meetings held under the item entitled “The situation concerning Haiti”, some speakers, when discussing the transition of the United Nations presence in Haiti from a peacekeeping mission to a special political mission, underscored that the Economic and Social Council and its Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti should play an important role in that process.⁶⁵ For the first time since 2009,⁶⁶ the President of the Economic and Social Council participated in a meeting of the Council held under the item entitled “The situation concerning Haiti”, on 15 October 2019.⁶⁷ In her statement, the President of the Economic and Social Council explicitly invoked Article 65 of the Charter when recalling that the situation of Haiti had been on the agenda of the Economic and Social Council since 1999, primarily through the work of its Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti, which had been set up in response to a Security Council request to the Economic and Social Council, under Article 65, to provide recommendations on the long-term development of Haiti. She specified that the work of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti had included interactions between its Chair and the Security Council. She further noted that the Chair of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group had informally briefed the members of the Security Council on the Ad Hoc Advisory Group’s findings and recommendations following a visit to Washington, D.C., and Haiti in early 2019. She also stressed the need for continued collaboration between the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council and called for breaking down the traditional silos between the peace and development pillars of the

⁶⁵ See [S/PV.8502](#) (Peru and Argentina); and [S/PV.8559](#) (Peru and Haiti).

⁶⁶ See [S/PV.6101](#).

⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8641](#).

United Nations in order to deliver more coherent and effective efforts and to address the interconnected challenges facing Haiti. At the same meeting, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru stressed the need for close cooperation between the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and other entities of the system, in particular the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti of the Economic and Social Council. The representative of France indicated that in carrying out its work, BINUH would take into account the lessons learned by the United Nations from its presence on the ground in Haiti for more than 25 years, especially through the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti. The representative of Haiti commended the exceptional work done by the Ad Hoc Advisory Group and expressed hope that BINUH would collaborate closely with it.

Case 3 Maintenance of international peace and security

At its 8451st meeting, held on 25 January 2019, the Council held a high-level open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security”,⁶⁸ organized by the Dominican Republic, which held the presidency for the month.⁶⁹ During the meeting, the representative of Peru, echoed by the representative of Kazakhstan, underscored the importance of the development of synergies among the Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as with the competent bodies and agencies of the United Nations system, with a view to having early warning systems for climate-related risks and other multidimensional threats.⁷⁰ The representative of the Republic of Korea, defining climate change as “the fundamental cross-cutting issue of our time”, called for a comprehensive response from the United Nations system as a whole with deepened collaboration and coordination in responding to the multifaceted security aspects of climate change. He mentioned, as an example of a meaningful effort in that regard, the joint meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Economic and Social Council held on 13 November 2018 concerning the impact of climate change on the security and humanitarian situation in the Sahel region.

⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8451](#).

⁶⁹ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 January 2019 from the representative of the Dominican Republic to the Secretary-General ([S/2019/1](#)).

⁷⁰ [S/PV.8451](#).

The representative of Liechtenstein indicated that, although there were other United Nations organs with the competence to address climate change, including the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, it was essential that the Council address the international and transnational threat posed by climate change to peace and security. The representative of Algeria also underlined that it was not illegitimate to think that the Council had a role, a mission and a responsibility in addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security which had yet to be defined. He also recalled that, in its presidential statement of 20 July 2011,⁷¹ the Council had recognized the responsibilities and mandates of the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council in regard to sustainable development issues, including climate change. On the other hand, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that climate change should be addressed in other forums, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, but not the Security Council.⁷² He added that there was no consensus among Council members or the wider membership on whether the issue fell within the Council’s purview, and indicated that many countries considered the Council’s consideration of climate change as an encroachment upon the powers and functions of other United Nations organs. The representative of Uruguay, while acknowledging the open debate’s contribution to the discussion of “a priority topic for the future of life on our planet”, warned against linking climate change to security issues and called for the discussion of specific related topics to be restricted to the “corresponding decision areas”, including the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.

Case 4 Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At its 8539th meeting, held on 6 June 2019 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”,⁷³ the Council held its annual open debate on working methods under the presidency of Kuwait.⁷⁴ During the meeting, the Council discussed, inter alia, its relationship with the Economic and Social Council.⁷⁵

⁷¹ [S/PRST/2011/15](#).

⁷² See [S/PV.8451](#).

⁷³ See [S/PV.8539](#).

⁷⁴ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 29 May 2019 from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General ([S/2019/450](#)).

⁷⁵ See [S/PV.8539](#).

In that regard, the representative of the Russian Federation indicated that his country was very cautious in the consideration of thematic subjects in the Council not to violate the established division of labour vis-à-vis the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other bodies of the Organization, and in order to avoid distracting the Council from its work and priority tasks. The representative of China underscored his country's support to enhance the interaction between the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other bodies to make the work of the Security Council more transparent, and recalled that during its presidency of the Security Council in November 2018, China had made a point of improving

its interaction with the Presidents of the Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council. The representative of Turkey called on Council members to bear in mind in their efforts that the Council was the main organ for the maintenance of peace and security but not the only one, and called on them to ensure better coordination with the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat, as well as with the Peacebuilding Commission. The representative of Bahrain similarly indicated that increased coordination, cooperation and interaction among the main organs of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, the Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat, was extremely important.

III. Relations with the International Court of Justice

Article 94

1. *Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.*

2. *If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.*

Article 96

1. *The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.*

2. *Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.*

Note

Section III concerns the relationship between the Council and the International Court of Justice. In accordance with Article 94 of the Charter, the Council may make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment rendered by the Court if a party to a case fails to perform its obligations under that judgment. Pursuant to Article 96, the Council may also request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. In addition, pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the

International Court of Justice, notice of any provisional measures to be taken to preserve the rights of parties may be given by the Court to the parties and to the Council.

During the period under review, the Council did not discuss its relations with the International Court of Justice during its deliberations, nor did it make recommendations or decide on measures with regard to the judgments rendered by the Court or request the Court to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. In line with the practice of the Council, the President of the International Court of Justice was invited to participate in one private meeting of the Council, on 31 October 2019, under the item entitled "Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice".⁷⁶ During the review period, no explicit references to Articles 94 or 96 of the Charter were made in decisions of the Council. The paragraph below covers communications concerning relations with the International Court of Justice.

Communications concerning relations with the International Court of Justice

During the period under review, the Council continued to exchange letters with the Secretary-General and to receive his reports on the progress of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission established to facilitate the implementation of the ruling of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 on the land and maritime boundary dispute between the

⁷⁶ See [S/PV.8653](#).

two countries.⁷⁷ In addition, in a letter dated 10 April 2019 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,⁷⁸ the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Tunisia transmitted a letter from the Permanent Observer Mission of the League of Arab States concerning the decision of the President of the United States to recognize the sovereignty of Israel over the "occupied Syrian Golan". In the "Statement on Golan"

⁷⁷ See the following exchange of letters: [S/2019/1012](#) and [S/2019/1013](#). See also the following reports: [S/2019/549](#) and [S/2019/1005](#).

⁷⁸ [S/2019/306](#).

transmitted therein,⁷⁹ issued at the thirtieth ordinary session of the Council of the League of Arab States on 31 March 2019, the leaders of the Arab States rejected the decision of the President of the United States and instructed the ministers for foreign affairs of Member States to intensify bilateral and multilateral contacts with the international community, "including by having the Arab representative in the Security Council (the State of Kuwait) put a draft resolution before the Council and by seeking an opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding the illegality and invalidity of the American decision".

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, annex.

Part V
**Functions and powers of the
Security Council**

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Introductory note

Part V of the present Supplement covers the functions and powers of the Security Council, as defined in Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, and is accordingly divided into three sections. Under each section, explicit and implicit references to those Articles in decisions, communications and meetings of the Council during 2019 are listed. For 2019, sections I and II also include case studies that examine specific instances in which Articles 24 and 25 were discussed or which otherwise illustrate how the Council has applied or interpreted those Articles. Section III does not include any such case studies, since there were no specific instances of relevant discussions on Article 26 of the Charter in 2019.

As outlined in section I below, in 2019, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 24 of the Charter in its decisions and instead made implicit references by mentioning its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” in 11 of its decisions in connection with various country- or region-specific items, such as the situation in Libya and the question concerning Haiti, as well as thematic items, such as women and peace and security, the maintenance of international peace and security, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and cooperation with regional and subregional organizations. In addition, the Council discussed its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in connection with a broad range of items. The most salient deliberations took place under country-specific items, such as the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and thematic items relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, the working methods of the Council in connection with the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#)), and children and armed conflict.

As outlined in section II, in 2019, while the Council made no explicit reference to Article 25 in its decisions, one resolution did contain an implicit reference to the obligation of Member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council. By contrast, Article 25 was invoked explicitly during Council meetings in nine instances: twice regarding the situation in Libya, three times in connection with the working methods of the Council as set out in the note by the President of the Council ([S/2017/507](#)), twice with regard to non-proliferation and twice in relation to the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. Four draft resolutions concerning the situation in the Middle East that were not adopted also contained explicit references to Article 25.

As described in section III, in 2019, the Council did not refer to its responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments pursuant to Article 26 in any of its decisions. However, Article 26 was explicitly invoked on one occasion during the discussion about the working methods of the Council. None of the communications addressed to the Council referred to Article 26.

I. Primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24

Article 24

1. *In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.*

2. *In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII.*

3. *The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.*

Note

Section I covers the practice of the Council concerning its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 of the Charter¹ and is divided into two subsections. Subsection A deals with decisions adopted in 2019 that refer to the primary responsibility of the Council under Article 24. Subsection B examines references to that Article made in discussions held during Council meetings.

During the period under review, the Council adopted no decisions containing explicit references to Article 24. By contrast, Article 24 was referred to explicitly on various occasions during meetings of the Council in connection with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as discussed in subsection B. In addition, only one communication² in 2019 contained an explicit reference to Article 24. In a letter from the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Article 24 was explicitly invoked in connection with “several dangerous actions” by the United States of America that threatened the peace and security of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole.

¹ Article 24 (3), under which the Council is required to submit annual and special reports to the General Assembly, is covered in part IV, sect. I.F.

² S/2019/765.

A. Decisions referring to the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 24 in its decisions. However, in eight resolutions and three presidential statements adopted in 2019, the Council referred to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security while taking a variety of actions. Implicit references to Article 24 appeared mainly in preambular paragraphs of resolutions and initial paragraphs of presidential statements.

1. Resolutions

In 2019, the Council implicitly invoked Article 24 in eight resolutions in which it reaffirmed, reiterated, recalled, bore in mind or indicated that it was mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Two of those resolutions were adopted in connection with the items concerning Haiti and Libya.³ In both instances, the Council acted explicitly under Chapter VII of the Charter. The other six resolutions adopted in 2019 concerned thematic items and dealt with a broad range of topics including the African Union initiative Silencing the Guns by 2020, sexual violence in conflict, missing persons in armed conflict and the protection of persons with disabilities in armed conflict.⁴ Further details on those resolutions are given in table 1 below.

2. Presidential statements

In 2019, the Council made implicit references to Article 24 in three presidential statements,⁵ in which it recalled or reaffirmed its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The three presidential statements dealt with a variety of issues, including cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the seventieth anniversary of the Geneva Conventions and the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law. Further details on the presidential statements are included in table 1 below.

³ Resolutions 2466 (2019) and 2473 (2019).

⁴ Resolutions 2457 (2019), 2467 (2019), 2474 (2019), 2475 (2019), 2491 (2019), and 2493 (2019).

⁵ S/PRST/2019/5, S/PRST/2019/8, and S/PRST/2019/14.

Table 1
Decisions in 2019 with implicit references to Article 24 (1) of the Charter

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraph</i>	<i>Item</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>
Resolution 2457 (2019) 27 February 2019	First preambular paragraph	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Silencing the guns in Africa
Resolution 2466 (2019) 12 April 2019	Fourteenth preambular paragraph	The question concerning Haiti	
Resolution 2467 (2019) 23 April 2019	Fifth preambular paragraph	Women and peace and security	Sexual violence in conflict
Resolution 2473 (2019) 10 June 2019	Third preambular paragraph	The situation in Libya	
Resolution 2474 (2019) 11 June 2019	Second preambular paragraph	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	Missing persons in armed conflict
Resolution 2475 (2019) 20 June 2019	First preambular paragraph	Protection of civilians in armed conflict	
Resolution 2491 (2019) 3 October 2019	Fourth preambular paragraph	Maintenance of international peace and security	
Resolution 2493 (2019) 29 October 2019	Second preambular paragraph	Women and peace and security	Towards the successful implementation of the women, peace and security agenda: moving from commitments to accomplishments in preparation for the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)
S/PRST/2019/5 13 June 2019	First paragraph	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Cooperation between the Security Council and the League of Arab States
S/PRST/2019/8 20 August 2019	First paragraph	The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security	
S/PRST/2019/14 22 November 2019	Second paragraph	Maintenance of international peace and security	

B. Discussions relating to the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security

During the period under review, Article 24 was invoked both explicitly and implicitly at numerous meetings of the Council. Speakers made 11 explicit references at six meetings held under the items entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”,⁶ “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”,⁷ “Maintenance of international peace and security”,⁸ “The situation in Libya”,⁹ “Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the General Assembly”¹⁰ and “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.¹¹

The following case studies illustrate the nature of some of the issues discussed in 2019 in connection with the interpretation of the primary responsibility of the Council under Article 24. The discussions were held under a broad range of items on the agenda of the Council and were focused on the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security (case 1), the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (case 2), the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), which concerns the working methods of the Council (case 3) and children and armed conflict (case 4).

Case 1 Maintenance of international peace and security

At the 8451st meeting, held on 25 January 2019 at the initiative of the Dominican Republic, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,¹² a high-level open debate was convened under the sub-item entitled “Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security”.¹³ At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, the Chief Scientist of the

World Meteorological Organization and a research assistant for the environmental security programme of the Stimson Center.

During the open debate, some speakers supported the engagement of the Council in discussing climate and security as part of its agenda. The representative of Belgium welcomed the role of the Council in addressing the impact of climate change on international peace and security; to effectively discharge its mandate, the Council had to pay attention to early warning signs and develop greater sensitivity to situations that could lead to conflict, including climate-related situations. He added that it was high time for climate-related risks to be reflected in the regular work of the Council and proposed an annual thematic briefing. A similar view was expressed by Germany, whose representative underscored that the debate about the policy consequences of climate change belonged in the Council, given that climate change was increasingly becoming a threat to international peace and security. He added that it should become routine for the Council to take the link between climate and security into account in all conflict situations. The representative of France affirmed that the risks to international security posed by climate change had to become a central element of the conflict prevention agenda. She noted that a rigorous and regular analysis of those risks was necessary and that the Council and the Secretary-General needed to play a pivotal role in that regard.

The representative of Peru noted that the debate enabled the participants to discuss the tasks and competencies of the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security through a broad multidimensional approach to security. He said that it was important in that context to address climate-related risks, which could pose threats to international peace and security. He argued that the consequences of climate change transcended the mandate of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and could require a response from the Council in the context of its responsibilities related to conflict prevention and resolution. Similarly, the representative of Canada highlighted that climate and security must have a clear place in the Council’s deliberations. She acknowledged that the Council had shown leadership by adopting resolutions in which it had recognized the adverse effects of climate change on the stability and security of regions, such as the Lake Chad basin region and the Sahel. She argued that it was critical for the Council to better understand climate-related security risks and report on climate risks when analysing a conflict or region. The representative of Norway

⁶ See S/PV.8506 (United States and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).

⁷ See S/PV.8539 (Norway, Morocco, Islamic Republic of Iran and Cuba).

⁸ See S/PV.8546 (Indonesia).

⁹ See S/PV.8588 (Libya).

¹⁰ See S/PV.8597 (United Kingdom).

¹¹ See S/PV.8648 (Kuwait).

¹² The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 January 2019 (S/2019/1).

¹³ See S/PV.8451.

echoed that position, noting that the Council had the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and that the climate-security nexus merited being firmly placed on the agenda of the Council. The representative of Ireland stated that climate and security concerns should be considered across all country-specific situations on the agenda of the Council and added that his delegation wanted to see United Nations operations across the peace and development nexus assessing the risks of climate change. The representative of the United Arab Emirates stated that the link between climate change and international security demanded concrete action and attention from the Council and affirmed that addressing it did not necessarily require a change in the Council's mechanics. A similar view was shared by the representative of Mauritius who maintained that the Council was the appropriate platform to address the threat posed by climate change.

In addition, various speakers¹⁴ expressed support for the appointment of a new special representative of the Secretary-General on climate and security.¹⁵ Speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community, the representative of Barbados noted with interest the call made at the 8307th meeting of the Council, on 11 July 2018, by the Pacific small island developing States for the appointment of a special representative on climate and security, who would not expand the mandate of the Council, but instead would serve the Secretary-General and fill a critical gap in the United Nations system.¹⁶

Other speakers at the meeting agreed that there was a need for the Council to define the security dimension of climate change.¹⁷ The representative of Indonesia argued that, while the Council could deal with the security dimension of climate change, the Framework Convention on Climate Change should remain the principal body dealing with climate change itself. She stated that the Council's homework was to better define what fell under the ambit of climate change itself and what constituted the security dimension of climate-related impacts, while individual countries bore the responsibility to respond to those impacts and that the Council should not interfere. The representative of South Africa stated that the Council should highlight climate change as a factor in those situations that are within its purview and where climate change is thought to be contributing significantly to

insecurity. However, he cautioned against duplicating the efforts of other United Nations system bodies, noting that the Council may not be the appropriate forum for addressing climate change owing to its limited membership and specific peace and security focus. The representative of the Dominican Republic also warned against duplicating the work of other organs but recalled that the Council had already set precedents on the matter. He urged the Council to reach consensus on including the effects of climate change in its work on security. Recognizing the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement on climate change as the primary forums for coordinating the global response to climate change, the representative of Trinidad and Tobago noted that an enhanced understanding of climate-related security risks and how to address them in the Council should not, and would not, duplicate the responsibilities of other United Nations system bodies. The representative of Mexico also highlighted the importance of a clear division of labour within the United Nations system for addressing the impact of climate change on international peace and security. He noted that the Council should have reliable and rigorous analytical tools that could inform and support its decisions before it considered making climate change a standing item on its agenda. The representative of India asked if the needs of climate justice could be served by shifting climate law-making from the inclusive Framework Convention on Climate Change to decision-making by a structurally unrepresentative organization. He weighed in favour of a cautionary approach, as the subject was a contested one.

Some speakers favoured the engagement of other bodies on climate change over that of the Council. The representative of the Russian Federation deemed it excessive, and even counterproductive, to discuss climate change in the Council whose aim under the Charter was to swiftly respond to serious challenges to international peace and security. He argued that the practice of considering this topic in the Council undercut the current division of labour within the United Nations. Instead, he suggested that climate risks be taken into consideration in the context of specific and real situations on the agenda of the Council. In a similar vein, the representative of Pakistan underscored that actions on climate change should be undertaken within the confines of the mandates of the relevant bodies. The representative of Brazil argued that environmental issues did not fall squarely under the authority of the Council, the primary organ charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Similarly, the representative of the Islamic

¹⁴ Canada, Norway, Barbados, Ireland, Nauru, Costa Rica and Tuvalu.

¹⁵ For further information on special representatives, see part IX, sect. VI.

¹⁶ See [S/PV.8451](#). See also [S/PV.8307](#).

¹⁷ See [S/PV.8451](#).

Republic of Iran observed that the Council had neither the legal competence nor the technical capacity to address the issue of climate change, recalling that there had been no consensus about this issue falling within the purview of the Council. He noted that many countries considered the discussion of this topic by the Council as an example of its encroachment upon the powers and functions of other United Nations organs. He therefore urged the Council to stick to its core mandate only. The representative of Algeria argued that it might seem awkward for the Council to take into consideration the effects of climate-related disasters and climate change on international peace and security. He noted that the Council had numerous issues on its agenda and that a great deal was expected of it in terms of action and efficiency in preventing conflicts and resolving existing ones. He suggested that it would be natural for the Council to focus on that task rather than on opening new, undefined territories for consideration.

Case 2
The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

On 26 January 2019, at the request of the United States, the Council held its 8452nd meeting under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”.¹⁸ At the outset of the meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation requested a procedural vote and took the floor to explain his request. He noted that the internal situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was not an item on the agenda of the Council and that the country did not represent a threat to peace and security. He added that, if anything did represent a threat to peace, it was “the shameless and aggressive actions” of the United States and its allies aimed at ousting the country’s legitimately elected President. In response, the Secretary of State of the United States said that the focus of the Council was to safeguard international peace and security. The Organization of American States had passed a resolution on 10 January in which it had refused to recognize “the illegitimate Maduro regime”. The Secretary of State noted that, despite the calls from regional bodies, the United Nations had yet to hold a formal meeting on the subject. He said that there was a new leader in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, who had promised to return constitutional order and elections to the country, and to bring security back to the region. He affirmed that the Council could not delay that critical conversation. The provisional agenda was put to a vote and received nine votes in

favour, four against and two abstentions.¹⁹ Following the vote, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, who reported on the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and recalled the Secretary-General’s statement on the importance for all actors to exercise maximum restraint to avoid an escalation of violence and confrontation.²⁰

In their statements, speakers expressed divergent views on whether the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela merited being discussed in the Council as a threat to international peace and security. The representative of Equatorial Guinea believed that it was an internal matter and that it did not pose a threat to international peace and security. He therefore urged the Council to be sufficiently cautious and to take into account recent experiences in the Middle East and Africa in order to avoid a spillover. A similar view was held by the representative of China, who opposed adding the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the agenda of the Council, stating that it was a domestic matter and that it did not constitute a threat to international peace and security. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia expressed concern over the convening of the meeting. Affirming that the Council was called upon to look into matters related to threats to international peace and security, he said that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela did not in any way constitute a threat. By contrast, the representative of France asserted that it was perfectly legitimate for the Council to address the situation in that country as part of its role in conflict prevention. Similarly, the representative of Belgium said that it was clear that the Council had a responsibility to address the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which constituted a threat to international peace and security. The representative of Argentina said that the Council should reaffirm its role as a guarantor of international peace and security; the Council could not remain indifferent in the face of the tragedy, which, in the view of Argentina, was a threat to international peace and security. The representative of Brazil said that it was crucial for the Council to address the situation, while the representative of Honduras requested the Council to urgently and diligently attend to the matter. According to the representative of Indonesia, the inclusion of the matter

¹⁸ See [S/PV.8452](#).

¹⁹ *For*: Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: China, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa; *abstaining*: Côte d’Ivoire, Indonesia. For more information on procedural votes, see part II, sect. VIII.C.

²⁰ See [S/PV.8452](#).

on the agenda of the Council had to reflect a commitment to supporting the realization of sustained peace and stability in the country.

On 26 February 2019, the Council held its 8472nd meeting, under the same item.²¹ During the discussion, the representative of South Africa affirmed that the Council was the principal organ charged with maintaining international peace and security; the Council was being divided on the internal affairs of a State Member of the United Nations. He said that threats to use force against the territorial integrity and political independence of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela were inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations, which was founded to maintain international peace and security. The representative of Germany disagreed and expressed the view that the matter belonged on the agenda of the Council, as it was a threat to international peace and security. The representative of the United Kingdom agreed with the representative of Germany and noted that the agenda did not mention the situation in the region or wider threats to international peace and security; the agenda item was “the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”. At the same meeting, the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela stated that the Council was not there to make war or establish conditions for others to make war, nor was it there to endorse violence or breaches of the Charter of the United Nations. Rather, he said, the Council was there to maintain international peace and security and preserve future generations from the scourge of war. In her statement, the representative of Cuba expressed the hope that the Council would fulfil its role and responsibility as the primary guarantor of international peace and security and would not lend its support to military adventures. Noting that the Council held the mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security, the representative of Belize urged it to respect the commitment of leaders in the region to maintaining Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace and to dissuade any actions that would lead to any military conflagration in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Two days later, the Council held its 8476th meeting, under the same item.²² At the meeting, two competing draft resolutions on the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela failed to be adopted.²³ The representative of Peru stated that his country had voted in favour of draft resolution

[S/2019/186](#) to enable the Council, pursuant to the mandate bestowed upon it by the Charter of the United Nations, to adopt a decision that would contribute to regional peace and security.²⁴ Explaining her vote, the representative of Poland suggested that it was the primary responsibility of the Council to address, urgently, the worsening humanitarian crisis affecting millions of Venezuelans. She stressed that it was the responsibility of the Council to address situations that endangered the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of South Africa stated that it would urge the Council, in any further action, to be guided by genuine efforts to maintain international peace and security and promote the unity of peoples. In his statement, the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela said that the world could not understand why the Government of the United States refused to adopt a draft resolution prohibiting the use and threat of use of force in the case of his country, given that the primary function of the Council was the maintenance of international peace and security.

On 10 April 2019, the same item was discussed at the 8506th meeting.²⁵ On that occasion, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Joint Special Representative of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and International Organization for Migration for Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the region, and a researcher at Johns Hopkins University.

During the discussion,²⁶ two speakers made explicit references to Article 24. In his statement, the Vice-President of the United States affirmed that Article 24 conferred on the Council the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. He called for the Council to rededicate itself to the mission upon which it was founded: to maintain international peace and security. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela stated that the Council, under Articles 24, 34 and 39 of the Charter, had the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and to determine the existence of any threat to the peace or of any act of aggression. In reference to the briefings heard by the Council on the humanitarian crisis in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the representative of the United Kingdom said that it was right that the Council should discuss such issues. She acknowledged that there was an “age-old debate” that the Council had never resolved as to how bad a situation had to get within a

²¹ See [S/PV.8472](#).

²² See [S/PV.8476](#).

²³ [S/2019/186](#) and [S/2019/190](#). For further details, see part III, sect. II, case 1.

²⁴ See [S/PV.8476](#).

²⁵ See [S/PV.8506](#).

²⁶ United States and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

country in order for it to constitute the sort of issue that the Council would look at. However, she said that the figures that the Council had heard and the views of the regional and international authorities, as represented by the Joint Special Representative and the Emergency Relief Coordinator, made it “absolutely an issue that the Council should be discussing”. The representative of Indonesia noted that the Council had met three times to discuss the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and had failed thus far to make any difference in the country. He added that, based on the principles of the Charter, the Council had to discharge its responsibility by assisting the country in stabilizing itself and restoring normalcy.

Case 3
Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

At the 8539th meeting, held on 6 June 2019 at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,²⁷ the Council convened its annual open debate on working methods under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”.²⁸

The representative of South Africa delivered a joint statement on behalf of the 10 elected members of the Council, in which he noted that enhancing the functionality and efficiency of the Council would serve to improve its ability to maintain international peace and security by drawing on the diverse expertise, perspectives and dynamism of non-permanent members and other stakeholders. He argued that such an approach reflected the expectation of Member States, which had conferred on the Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, that the Council’s actions should be prompt and effective.

The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his country took a cautious approach to the consideration of thematic subjects, especially those that, according to the Charter, came under the remit of other United Nations system organs, violating the established division of labour and distracting the Council from its work on its priority tasks. The representative of China affirmed that the Council should concentrate on its priorities and discharge its duties in strict accordance with its mandate, which would mean focusing on major issues of great urgency that threatened international peace and security, rather

than intervening in domestic settings. Noting an increase in the number of cross-cutting items on the agenda of the Council in recent years, some of which exceeded its mandates, he added that the Council had to take the concerns of Member States in that regard seriously. The representative of Cuba referred to Article 24 twice during her statement. She said that, under Article 24, Members recognized that the Council acted on their behalf in the discharge of its functions and that the work of the Council was therefore the shared responsibility of all Member States. She added that greater transparency in the work of the organ would therefore contribute to the effective exercise of that shared responsibility. She also mentioned Article 24 in connection with the lack of special reports on measures to maintain international peace and security for consideration by the General Assembly, which she deemed a shortcoming that the Council had to overcome. She stated that the Council had to align its functions with the mandate entrusted to it under the Charter and cease taking up issues beyond its remit, in particular those that fell under the mandate of the Assembly.²⁹

The representative of Kuwait affirmed that improving and developing the working methods of the Council were decisive factors in its ability to fulfil its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.³⁰ Similarly, the representative of Morocco stated that, under Articles 24, 25 and 26, the Council was granted considerable powers and privileges, which it could not exercise without adopting an effective and efficient approach. He added that the Council had to support, in particular, the development of its working methods by ensuring the proper implementation of its mandate. The representative of Norway, speaking on behalf of the five Nordic countries, affirmed that the responsibility of the Council to act on behalf of the entire United Nations membership was enshrined in Article 24 and called for broader engagement in that regard. She said that interaction with the broader membership had to be improved and enhanced, adding, “the Council needs to talk with countries – not only about them”. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasized that accountability stemmed from Articles 24 and 25; the Council, acting on behalf of the Organization’s entire membership and being accountable to it, was obliged to act in accordance with the Charter, under which Member States had agreed to carry out its decisions. He added that, while Member States continued to fulfil

²⁷ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 29 May 2019 (S/2019/450).

²⁸ See S/PV.8539.

²⁹ For further information on relations with the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.

³⁰ See S/PV.8539.

their respective commitments, it was regrettable that the Council had not acted in accordance with the Charter in many cases.

Speakers also addressed the use of the veto in connection with the Council's ability to perform its function of maintaining international peace and security. The representative of Singapore noted that the veto had too often been used to block Council action aimed at preventing mass atrocity crimes and expressed the view that the permanent members had to wield their special privileges with increased responsibility; otherwise, the Council would not be able to discharge its duties in the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Mexico recalled that the Member States had conferred on the Council the responsibility to act in order to ensure swift and effective action in the maintenance of peace and international security; however, on a number of occasions, it had not been "up to the task" and had allowed crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide to occur as a result of its failure to take timely action. The representative of Costa Rica echoed similar views, reiterating that there was a need to move towards defining limitations on the use of the veto as an imperative in fulfilling the mandate of the Council to maintain international peace and security.

Case 4 Children and armed conflict

At the 8591st meeting, convened on 2 August 2019 at the initiative of Poland, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,³¹ the Council held an open debate under the item entitled "Children and armed conflict".³² At the outset of the meeting, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict noted that 2019 marked 20 years since the Council had first adopted a resolution on children and armed conflict (resolution [1261 \(1999\)](#)) and the thirtieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. She also noted that 4 August 2019 was the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution [1882 \(2009\)](#), in which the Council decided that it was necessary to increase the focus of the children and armed conflict mandate on killing, maiming and rape and other forms of sexual violence.

The representative of China said that achieving peace provided the best protection for children. As children bore the brunt of war and conflicts,

preventing, resolving and diffusing conflicts was a top priority, which, he noted, was the fundamental way out. He affirmed that the Council should fulfil its duties by using all political means as stipulated in the Charter. He added that the key to implementing resolution [1882 \(2009\)](#) on the protection of children affected by armed conflict lay in the efforts and cooperation of the Governments concerned. In his statement, the representative of Kuwait focused on the implementation of Council resolutions, with a view to putting an end to violations perpetrated against children in armed conflict. He recalled the responsibility of Member States to save future generations from the scourge of war, as well as the special privileges granted to the Council in order to achieve that noble goal. He called on Member States to implement the Council's resolutions in order to achieve the purpose for which it was formed. The representative of Kenya called on the Council not only to maintain peace but also to use its mandate to bring peace to areas in conflict. He stated that the protection of children would be guaranteed only where there was peace and where national laws and international humanitarian law were observed and implemented. Similar observations were made by the representative of Viet Nam, who reaffirmed the principle of the primary responsibility and authority of States to protect their civilians in armed conflicts; a comprehensive approach was needed to address the root causes of the hardship that children bore. He said that the Council, as part of its primary responsibility, should focus more efforts on conflict prevention and resolution and that cooperation among the United Nations and regional organizations could be enhanced to provide more effective protection for children.

The representative of the Russian Federation underlined that the Council took consistent measures to protect children and prevent acts of violence against them. He emphasized that greater attention should be paid to the six categories of the most serious violations against children, within the framework of both the monitoring and reporting mechanism and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, in accordance with resolution [1612 \(2005\)](#) and subsequent documents. He expressed the belief that attempts to dilute the mandate of the Council by forcing it to consider issues related to rights of children in a context outside the maintenance of international peace and security context, were a step in the wrong direction. He called for adhering to the principle of the division of labour in order to be most effective in solving all issues related to the plight of children.

³¹ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 30 July 2019 ([S/2019/605](#)).

³² See [S/PV.8591](#).

Referring to the report by the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict,³³ the representative of Canada characterized the situation of children in the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and other conflict-affected areas as devastating.³⁴ He stated that it would be “a blatant understatement” to say that Canada was disappointed with the Council’s inability to maintain international peace and security in those and other cases. He added that addressing vulnerability to serious

violations was not the sole responsibility of the Council. The representative of India expressed disappointment that, despite the clear mandate of the Council, the Secretary-General had included situations in his report that were not armed conflicts or threats to the maintenance of international peace and security. She observed that the attempt to selectively expand the mandate to certain situations only politicized and instrumentalized the agenda, thereby obfuscating, and diverting attention from, the real threats to international peace and security.

³³ S/2019/509.

³⁴ See S/PV.8591.

II. Obligation of Member States to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council under Article 25

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Note

Section II outlines the practice of the Council in relation to Article 25 of the Charter, which concerns the obligation of Member States to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council. It is divided into two subsections. Subsection A contains references to Article 25 contained in decisions of the Council, while subsection B examines how the principle of Article 25 was dealt with in deliberations of the Council.

In 2019, the Council did not invoke Article 25 explicitly in any of its decisions. Implicit reference, however, was made in one resolution, as illustrated in subsection A. Article 25 was invoked on numerous occasions during the meetings of the Council, both explicitly and implicitly. Most discussions revolved around the impact of the non-implementation of decisions of the Council on its credibility, while others centred on the binding nature of resolutions as stipulated in Article 25. Details of the most salient issues related to Article 25 addressed during the meetings in 2019 are provided in subsection B. Explicit references to Article 25 were also made in five communications of the Council.³⁵ Furthermore, Article 25 was explicitly invoked in four draft resolutions that were not adopted.³⁶

³⁵ S/2019/185; S/2019/339; S/2019/474, annex; S/2019/863; and S/2019/909.

³⁶ S/2019/756, S/2019/757, S/2019/961 and S/2019/962. For further information, see part I, sect. 22.

A. Decisions referring to Article 25

In 2019, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 25 in its decisions. However, in its resolution 2493 (2019), the Council recalled “the primary role of Member States to implement fully all Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security”.³⁷

In addition, four draft resolutions in connection with the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, which were submitted under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East” and not adopted, also contained explicit references to Article 25. In those draft resolutions, the Council would have underscored that Member States were obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Council’s decisions.³⁸

B. Discussions relating to Article 25

During the year under review, Article 25 was explicitly and implicitly referred to at numerous meetings of the Council. Nine explicit references were made during deliberations in several meetings held under the items entitled “The situation in Libya”,³⁹ “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”,⁴⁰ “Non-proliferation”,⁴¹ and “The situation in the Middle East, including the

³⁷ Resolution 2493 (2019), seventh preambular paragraph.

³⁸ S/2019/756, S/2019/757, S/2019/961 and S/2019/962, final preambular paragraph. For further information, see part I, sect. 22.

³⁹ See S/PV.8523 (Libya); and S/PV.8588 (Libya).

⁴⁰ See S/PV.8539 (Morocco and Islamic Republic of Iran).

⁴¹ See S/PV.8564 (Islamic Republic of Iran); and S/PV.8695 (Russian Federation).

Palestinian question”.⁴² The case studies below illustrate the most significant discussions held in connection with the interpretation of Article 25 of the Charter concerning the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question (case 5), the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (case 6), preventing and combating the financing of terrorism (case 7) and the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#)) (case 8).

Case 5

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

On 22 January 2019, the Council held its 8449th meeting, the first quarterly open debate for the year under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.⁴³ At the meeting, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General gave the Council an update on the latest developments that had taken place during the reporting period. During the discussion that followed, several speakers criticized the continued violations of relevant resolutions, recalling their binding nature and appealing to the Council to ensure compliance.

In their remarks, several speakers maintained that violations of relevant resolutions undermined their effectiveness and affected the credibility of the Council. The Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations characterized Israel’s activities in East Jerusalem as flagrant violations of resolutions [478 \(1980\)](#) and [2334 \(2006\)](#), adding that Israel persisted with an illegal settlement campaign in blatant contempt of the authority of the Council, thereby making a mockery of its credibility. Speaking on behalf of the States members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the representative of Bangladesh expressed a similar view, stating that Israel’s policy constituted blatant contempt for, and systemic violation of, numerous resolutions. Urging all sides to comply with the relevant resolutions, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia asserted that the continued violations of the relevant resolutions reduced the credibility of the Council. A similar standpoint was taken by the representative of South Africa, who noted that there had been “minimal effort” to implement resolution [2334 \(2006\)](#), which called into question the credibility of the decisions of the Council, especially if it was the Council itself that had taken no action to ensure their implementation. He urged the Council not to allow its decisions to be undermined and blatantly

violated in some areas. The representative of Germany recalled that resolutions were binding international law and not an “à la carte menu”. The representative of France made a similar observation, stating that international law and relevant Council resolutions were not optional or “to be chosen as one likes”.

With regard to Lebanon, the representative of Israel observed that, as indicated by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and stated by several Member States, the tunnels built by Hizbullah violated resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). The representative of Lebanon, on the other hand, called on the Council to shoulder its responsibilities and issue a clear and unequivocal message condemning Israel for any violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). Referring to the firing of missiles by Israel over Lebanese territory into his country, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic noted that such actions were in gross violation of the relevant Council resolutions, adding that they would not have occurred if the Council had not failed to impose the implementation of those resolutions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Concerning the Palestinian question, the representative of Ecuador observed that resolution [2334 \(2016\)](#) was the most viable path to restoring peace in the region; its implementation was vital for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue and could not be divorced from Council action to ensure compliance with and observance of resolution [1322 \(2000\)](#). According to the representative of Egypt, the reason for the inability to judge whether Council resolutions had the potential to bring about peace was the fact that “we have never witnessed their implementation or any serious attempt to do so”. Explaining the reasons behind the instability in the Middle East, the representative of Viet Nam noted that Council resolutions had not been respected or implemented and had even been violated. He pointed to the lack of goodwill and practical steps on the part of many of the parties concerned aimed at complying with Council resolutions and other United Nations resolutions.

At its 8583rd meeting, held on 23 July 2019, the Council convened its third quarterly debate under the item.⁴⁴ During the discussion, speakers dwelled on the role of international law in the conflict and on the legal status and binding nature of Council decisions.

The representative of the United States affirmed that international consensus was not international law and stated that the conflict was not going to be resolved by reference to international law when such law was inconclusive. He further stated that the

⁴² See [S/PV.8648](#) (Kuwait); and [S/PV.8669](#) (South Africa).

⁴³ See [S/PV.8449](#).

⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8583](#).

conflict would also not be resolved by constantly referencing the hundreds of United Nations resolutions on the issue, which he described as “heavily negotiated, purposely ambiguously worded resolutions” and a “cloak” to avoid substantive debate about the realities on the ground and the complexity of the conflict. He also said that one of the most often-cited resolutions, resolution 242 (1967), had been “hotly debated over the past half-century” without getting closer to a lasting and comprehensive peace. He added that a comprehensive and lasting peace would not be created by fiat of international law or by these “heavily wordsmithed, unclear resolutions”. In response, the representative of Germany reaffirmed his country’s belief in Council resolutions, affirming that they were binding international law. He reiterated that international law was not an “à la carte menu” and recalled that, on other occasions, United States representatives had insisted on international law and on the implementation of Council resolutions, such as those on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He affirmed his support for that position and stated that his delegation worked very hard to implement Council resolutions, word for word; for his country, resolution 2334 (2016) was binding law, and that was the international consensus. Echoing that position, the representative of Belgium reiterated the key role of the Council as the guarantor for any comprehensive, just and lasting solution, in line with its previous resolutions and with full respect for international law. He expressed his country’s belief in international law and in the need to respect it. In reference to the same argument, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that that international consensus was international law because Council resolutions constituted international law and needed to be complied with. He added that any revision of that international consensus was also in the hands of the Council. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled the binding nature of resolutions and the responsibility of the Council to implement them. The representative of Uruguay underscored his country’s disagreement with those who rejected provisions adopted in the Council or the General Assembly or the judgments and opinions of the International Court of Justice.

Case 6 Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

At its 8487th meeting, held on 19 March 2019 under the item entitled “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”,⁴⁵ the Council heard a briefing by

⁴⁵ See [S/PV.8487](#).

the representative of Indonesia in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). During the meeting, speakers discussed the implementation of the non-proliferation regime and the compliance of Member States with the obligations contained in resolution 1540 (2004), and stressed the importance of the effective implementation of the resolution.

In his briefing, the representative of Indonesia recalled that the Council had recognized, through its resolution 2325 (2016), that the full and effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) was a long-term task that would require continued efforts at all levels. A similar view was held by the representative of Poland, who underscored that obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) were not a one-time task. The representative of Belgium concurred that the full implementation of the resolution was a long-term endeavour and a work in progress.

Highlighting the importance of transparency and outreach for the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), the representative of Indonesia also noted that active engagement between the State and relevant sectors of society, including industry, academia and professional associations, could also contribute to its full implementation. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that international and regional organizations, business, academic and scientific circles, and other sectors of civil society played a very important but secondary role in helping States to implement specific provisions. The representative of Equatorial Guinea underlined that the implementation of the resolution should not only be through the adoption of legislation, but also through technical assistance from the Committee. Representatives of other Member States echoed similar views, with the representative of Côte d’Ivoire stressing the importance of capacity-building for Member States in order to help them to meet their obligations, and the representative of Germany noting that providing assistance to States for full and effective implementation was of the utmost importance. The representative of China expressed the view that the Committee had been effective in that regard by facilitating the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and in enhancing capacity-building and technical assistance. At the same time, he noted that it was necessary to strictly abide by the mandate of the resolution.

The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the particular value of resolution 1540 (2004) was that it was a “mechanism for cooperation, not coercion or the imposition of so-called solutions”. In his statement, the representative of the United States

described resolution 1540 (2004) as the only legally binding instrument requiring Member States to adopt controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The representative of France referred to resolution 1540 (2004) as a pillar of the non-proliferation architecture underpinning the entire collective security system.

Case 7

Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

On 28 March 2019, at the initiative of France, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,⁴⁶ the Council convened its 8496th meeting as a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “Preventing and combating the financing of terrorism”.⁴⁷ The Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France presided over the meeting. At the outset of the meeting, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2462 (2019), under Chapter VII of the Charter, in which it reaffirmed its resolution 1373 (2001), in particular its decisions that all States were to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts.⁴⁸ At the meeting, the Council also heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, who expressed the readiness of the Office to support Member States in implementing resolution 2462 (2019).⁴⁹

During the debate, speakers highlighted the importance of effectively implementing the Council resolutions related to preventing and combating the financing of terrorism. Noting that the adoption of resolution 2462 (2019) was a strong political act, the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France appealed to all States and multilateral institutions and all members of the private sector and civil society to commit to implementing it in all its aspects. A similar view was held by the representative of the United Kingdom, who called for its effective implementation by all Member States. In his statement, the representative of the United States affirmed that, under the resolution, Member States were obligated to criminalize terrorism financing, even in the absence of a link to a specific terrorist act. That new and very important global obligation, he added, would help to ensure that Member States had the frameworks in place

to utilize an important counter-terrorism financing tool effectively, and that the Council had been clear in its intent when creating that obligation. He reaffirmed that Member States must implement resolution 2462 (2019) in a manner consistent with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international refugee law. Similarly, the representative of Germany said that, in resolution 2462 (2019), the Council reaffirmed countries’ obligations under international law; the resolution was not to be misused to criminalize impartial, neutral and independent humanitarian action.

The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic affirmed that the credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations in implementing a resolution such as resolution 2462 (2019) depended primarily on the implementation of previous Council resolutions related to preventing and combating the financing of terrorism, and on preventing certain Governments and parties from exploiting such resolutions to exert political and economic pressure on other Member States. Arguing that Qatar financed, armed and trained armed groups in the Syrian Arab Republic, he expressed concern about the “professional and balanced implementation” of Council resolutions on combating terrorism and financing it. In response, the representative of Qatar rejected the accusations of violating Council resolutions, stating that it was no longer possible to “keep count of the United Nations reports that document the Syrian regime’s violations of all Security Council resolutions on Syria”. The representative of India noted that the usefulness of any resolution would be in its implementation. He further urged the Council to “do a better job at overseeing the implementation” of relevant resolutions on the financing of terrorism. He also welcomed the rectification by the Council of instances of non-implementation so as to enhance awareness of, as well as the effective implementation of, the various Council resolutions on counter-terrorism.

Case 8

Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)

On 6 June 2019, at its 8539th meeting, held under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”,⁵⁰ the Council convened its annual open debate on working

⁴⁶ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 14 March 2019 (S/2019/239).

⁴⁷ See S/PV.8496.

⁴⁸ Resolution 2462 (2019), para. 1.

⁴⁹ See S/PV.8496.

⁵⁰ See S/PV.8539.

methods.⁵¹ During the discussion, speakers made both explicit and implicit references to Article 25.⁵²

In his briefing to the Council, the Director of the Centre for Policy Research at the United Nations University discussed the risks to the legitimacy and effectiveness of sanctions regimes. Based on a research study conducted with his colleagues, he noted that, if courts in different countries found that the working methods used for sanctions listings were not in line with their countries' due process norms, those Member States would be unable to implement the binding decisions of the Council adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The representative of Morocco explicitly invoked Article 25 in his statement, noting that the Council could not exercise the considerable powers and privileges granted to it under Articles 24, 25 and 26 unless it adopted an effective and efficient approach.

The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that accountability was an essential concept within the Council's working methods, adding that accountability stemmed from Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter. He explained that, under Article 24, the

Council was obliged to act in accordance with the Charter and that, under Article 25, Member States had agreed to carry out its decisions; although, in practice, Member States abided by their commitments, it was regrettable that the Council had not acted in accordance with the Charter in many cases. He cited the example of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which contained a reference to the obligations of Member States under Article 25, arguing that the United States brazenly threatened other States to either violate that resolution or face punishment. He further added that, in such situations, and without being in breach of their Charter obligations, Member States had the right to defy the decisions of the Council simply because such decisions did not command a duty of compliance. In the light of a conditional link between Articles 24 and 25, States had no obligation to comply with a decision that was not in conformity with the Charter and even had a duty to defy such ultra vires decisions by the Council, given that compliance with them would lead to the violation of the rights of other countries, which was prohibited under international law. He concluded that States therefore had both the legal and legitimate right and duty to defy the ultra vires decisions of the Council.

⁵¹ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 29 May 2019 ([S/2019/450](#)).

⁵² See [S/PV.8539](#).

III. Responsibility of the Security Council to formulate plans to regulate armaments under Article 26

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Note

Section III covers the practice of the Council concerning its responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, as stipulated in Article 26 of the Charter.

In 2019, the Council did not refer explicitly to Article 26 in any of its decisions. However, Article 26 was invoked explicitly at the 8539th meeting of the Council, held on 6 June 2019, the annual open debate on working methods convened under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))".⁵³ At the meeting, the representative of Morocco stated that, under Articles 24, 25 and 26, the Council was granted considerable powers and privileges, which it could not exercise without adopting an effective and efficient approach. To that end, he called on the Council to support the development of its working methods by ensuring the proper implementation of its mandate. Article 26 was also not referenced explicitly in any of the communications of the Council in 2019.

⁵³ See [S/PV.8539](#).

Part VI

Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter

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Introductory note

Part VI of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Security Council with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes within the framework of Chapter VI (Articles 33 to 38) and Articles 11 and 99 of the Charter of the United Nations. It is divided into four main sections.

Section I provides an illustration of how States brought disputes or situations to the attention of the Council during the period under review, pursuant to Article 35 of the Charter. It also provides a survey of the practice of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, under Articles 11 (3) and 99, respectively, in drawing the attention of the Council to situations which are likely to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Section II contains a description of investigative and fact-finding activities performed by the Council and other bodies that may be deemed to fall under the scope of Article 34, including Council missions. Section III provides an overview of the decisions of the Council taken with regard to the pacific settlement of disputes, specifically illustrating recommendations of the Council to parties to a conflict and its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General in the peaceful settlement of disputes. Section IV contains a reflection of constitutional discussions on the interpretation or application of the provisions of Chapter VI and Article 99.

The practice of the Council with respect to the pacific settlement of disputes is not discussed in an exhaustive manner in part VI, which is focused instead on selected materials aimed at highlighting the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter in the decisions and deliberations of the Council. Actions with regard to the pacific settlement of disputes in the context of the United Nations field missions authorized under Chapter VII are covered in the relevant sections of parts VII and X. Joint or parallel efforts undertaken by the Council and regional arrangements or agencies in the pacific settlement of disputes are covered in part VIII.

During 2019, as described in section I, Member States brought various matters to the attention of the Council, several of which it had not been previously seized. The Council convened two public meetings in response to a communication from a Member State under a new item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela” and the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)”. Council members also discussed the India-Pakistan question in informal consultations, pursuant to a written request from a Member State. The Secretary-General continued to draw the attention of the Council to situations already on its agenda that were deteriorating, including the conflicts in Mali, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

As described in section II, the Council dispatched five missions in 2019: one to Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau; one to Burkina Faso and Mali; one to Iraq and Kuwait; one to Colombia; and one to Ethiopia and South Sudan. The Council acknowledged and deliberated on the investigative functions of the Secretary-General and the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Human Rights Council in connection with the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mali, South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

As described in section III, the Council highlighted the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes and its close connection with the need to address the root causes of conflict, of including affected groups in peace processes and of ensuring justice and accountability. The Council called on the parties to cease

hostilities and respect ceasefires; ensure the full and accelerated implementation of peace agreements; engage in peaceful and inclusive political dialogue, reconciliation and elections; and use dialogue to resolve longer-term outstanding disputes. The Council recognized the good offices work of the Secretary-General, as well as that of his special representatives and envoys, in support of efforts to end violent conflict, peace and reconciliation processes and the resolution of outstanding disputes.

As described in section IV, during 2019, the discussions in the Council were focused on the importance of and need for greater use of peaceful means in the settlement of disputes, with a particular emphasis on the role of conflict prevention, mediation and reconciliation and the meaningful participation of women and young people in peace processes and decision-making, the relevance of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter in comparison with the provisions of Chapter VII in the context of United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions and the role of the Secretary-General and his special envoys and representatives, through their good offices, in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

I. Referral of disputes or situations to the Security Council

Article 11

...

3. *The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.*

Article 35

1. *Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.*

2. *A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.*

3. *The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.*

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Note

Within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, Articles 35 (1) and (2) are generally regarded as the basis on which Member States and States that are not members of the United Nations may refer disputes to the Council. Under Articles 11 (3) and 99, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, respectively, may also bring to the attention of the Council situations that are likely to threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

The practice of the Council in this regard is described below in three subsections. Subsection A provides an overview of the referrals of disputes or situations by States to the Council pursuant to Article 35. Subsections B and C deal with referrals to the Council by the Secretary-General and the General Assembly, respectively, of matters likely to endanger international peace and security.

In 2019, pursuant to a letter from the United States, the Council convened a meeting under a new item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”. Council members also held consultations on the India-Pakistan question pursuant to a letter from Pakistan.

No State that was not a member of the United Nations brought any dispute or situation to the attention of the Council during the period under review. Neither the General Assembly nor the Secretary-General explicitly referred to the Council any matters likely to endanger international peace and security.

A. Referrals by States

During the period under review, certain situations were referred to the Council pursuant to Article 35 (1) of the Charter by individual Member States and groups of affected or concerned Member States. The majority of such situations were referred to the Council without an explicit reference to Article 35. Article 35 was explicitly mentioned in two communications from Member States: one from Cyprus,¹ regarding the status of the city of Varosha, and one from Qatar,² regarding an airspace incident involving Qatar and Bahrain.

As shown in table 1, the Council convened two meetings pursuant to communications submitted to its President. In a letter dated 24 January 2019 addressed to the President of the Council,³ the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations transmitted resolution CP/RES. 1117 (2200/19) of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, of 10 January 2019, and resolution AG/RES. 2929 (XLVIII-O/18) of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, adopted on 5 June 2018, concerning the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Pursuant to that communication, the Council convened a meeting on 26 January 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”.⁴ At the outset of the meeting, the provisional agenda was adopted following a procedural vote.⁵ The Council held three additional meetings under this item in 2019.⁶

¹ S/2019/815.

² S/2019/121.

³ S/2019/80.

⁴ See S/PV.8452.

⁵ For more information on the adoption of the agenda, see part II, sect. II.

⁶ See S/PV.8472, S/PV.8476 and S/PV.8506.

On 20 May 2019, the Council convened a meeting at the request of the Russian Federation expressed in a letter dated 17 May 2019 addressed to the President of the Council,⁷ following the adoption by the Parliament of Ukraine of a law on “the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language”. In the letter, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations affirmed that the law violated the spirit and letter of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, endorsed by the Council in its resolution [2202 \(2015\)](#). The provisional agenda for the meeting was not adopted, and the meeting was adjourned shortly after the vote.⁸

Council members also met once in informal consultations of the whole pursuant to a written request from Pakistan. In a letter dated 13 August 2019 addressed to the President of the Council,⁹ the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations transmitted a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan drawing the attention of the Council to the recent developments “in occupied Jammu and Kashmir”. In his letter, the Minister requested an urgent meeting of the Council under the item entitled “The India-Pakistan question” to consider the situation arising from the recent “aggressive actions by India”, which posed “a threat to international peace and security”.

⁷ [S/2019/408](#).

⁸ See [S/PV.8529](#).

⁹ [S/2019/654](#). See also subsequent letters from the representative of Pakistan dated 22 August 2019 ([S/2019/679](#)), 21 September 2019 ([S/2019/766](#)) and 4 November 2019 ([S/2019/860](#)).

Table 1

Communications bringing disputes or situations to the attention of the Security Council that resulted in a meeting of the Council and/or informal consultations of the whole, 2019

<i>Communication</i>	<i>Action requested of the Security Council</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>
The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela		
Letter dated 24 January 2019 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/80)		S/PV.8452 26 January 2019
Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)		
Letter dated 17 May 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/408)	For the President of the Council to arrange for a briefing of the Council to be held in the Council Chamber at 3 p.m. on 20 May 2019, in connection with the item entitled “Letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264)”	S/PV.8529 20 May 2019 ^a
The India-Pakistan question		
Letter dated 13 August 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/654)	To convene an urgent meeting under the item entitled “The India-Pakistan question” to consider the situation arising from the recent aggressive actions by India and to allow a representative of the Government of Pakistan to participate in the meeting in accordance with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council	Informal consultations of the whole 16 August 2019 ^b

^a The meeting was convened but the agenda was not adopted.

^b [A/74/2](#), para. 72.

Other matters of which the Council was not seized were brought to the attention of the Council by Member States in communications that did not result in a meeting. For example, in a letter dated 7 February 2019,¹⁰ the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations informed the Council that a Bahraini Air Force aircraft had violated the airspace of Qatar on 27 December 2018 without prior authorization from the competent Qatari authorities. According to the letter, the incident represented a “flagrant violation of international law” and was thus brought to the attention of the Council in accordance with Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter. In the letter, the Permanent Representative condemned and strongly rejected “such illegal behaviour”, holding Bahrain responsible for the air violation and reiterating that Qatar would take the measures required to defend its borders, airspace, maritime space and national security, in accordance with international laws and rules. She called on the Council to put a stop to “provocative Bahraini violations” in order to maintain international peace and security.¹¹

Matters brought to the attention of the Council in communications submitted by Member States sometimes fell beyond the scope of Chapter VI of the Charter relating to the pacific settlement of disputes. For example, by a letter dated 26 February 2019,¹² the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations transmitted a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, in which the Minister drew attention to “developments whereby Indian military aircraft violated the Line of Control” and, on the same day, hit “the territory of Pakistan”. In his letter, the Minister said that he regarded those developments as “an act of aggression against Pakistan” that would have “grave implications for regional peace and security”. Noting that “wilful and dangerous aggressive actions” by India constituted a clear violation of the Charter, the Minister maintained that Pakistan reserved the right to take appropriate action in self-defence.

In a letter dated 15 May 2019,¹³ the Permanent Representatives of Norway, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations drew the attention of the Council to an incident posing “a threat to the safety and security of international shipping and

maritime navigation”. According to the letter, four commercial vessels carrying the flags of those three countries had been targeted and damaged on 12 May 2019 in the territorial waters of the United Arab Emirates. In a letter dated 6 August 2019,¹⁴ the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations denounced “several dangerous actions” that undermined the peace and security of both the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Latin American and Caribbean region. Such actions, according to the letter, included a threat by the President of the United States regarding the imposition of a naval blockade and quarantine and “hostile and illegal” incursions by United States military aircraft and ships within the flight information region and into the jurisdictional waters, respectively, of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Citing Chapter VII of the Charter, the Permanent Representative referred to the situation as an “aggression and violation of the Charter” and requested the Council to investigate the threats in accordance with Article 34. The Council did not, however, determine the existence of any new threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in connection with those communications.¹⁵

B. Referrals by the Secretary-General

Article 99 of the Charter provides that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Like Article 35, Article 99 does not specify the means by which the Secretary-General may bring such a matter to the attention of the Council. During the period under review, the Secretary-General did not invoke Article 99, either directly or by implication. Discussions of relevance for Article 99 are featured in cases 10 and 11 below.

The Secretary-General continued to draw the attention of the Council to situations already on its agenda that were deteriorating or with respect to which he requested the Council to take urgent action. In his letters transmitting the monthly reports of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Secretary-General reiterated that the use

¹⁰ S/2019/121.

¹¹ For more information on previous incidents involving Bahrain and Qatar, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2018*, part VI, sect. I.

¹² S/2019/182.

¹³ S/2019/392.

¹⁴ S/2019/641.

¹⁵ For more information concerning the determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. I.

of chemical weapons was abhorrent and that impunity for their use was inexcusable. He emphasized the fundamental importance of unity in the Council to achieving the urgent obligation of accountability.¹⁶

At the 8497th meeting of the Council, held on 29 March 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in Mali”,¹⁷ the Secretary-General informed the Council that the security situation in Mali was deteriorating rapidly, in particular in the centre of the country. He stressed that if concerns related to the expansion of extremist movements and its effect on intercommunal tensions and to the proliferation of arms were not addressed, there was a high risk of further escalation that could lead to the commission of atrocity crimes. He called on the Government of Mali, the leaders of the political opposition and the signatory movements to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 to overcome the challenges facing the country.¹⁸ In another instance, at the Council’s 8619th meeting, held on 16 September 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”,¹⁹ the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen gave a briefing on the worrying military escalation following an attack on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia on 14 September 2019, which, he noted, had

consequences well beyond the region. Echoing the statement of the Secretary-General condemning the attack, the Special Envoy added that that extremely serious incident made the chances of a regional conflict beyond Yemen much higher and of a rapprochement much lower.²⁰

In 2019, Member States made references to horizon-scanning briefings conducted during informal consultations, by which the Secretariat brought new situations to the attention of Council members, in connection with the Council’s meetings on the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507), peace and security in Africa and cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations.²¹

C. Referrals by the General Assembly

Under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, the General Assembly may call the attention of the Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security. During the period under review, the General Assembly did not refer any such situations to the Council under that Article.²²

¹⁶ S/2019/91, S/2019/201, S/2019/279, S/2019/355, S/2019/447, S/2019/541, S/2019/601, S/2019/697, S/2019/784, S/2019/854, S/2019/915 and S/2019/1016.

¹⁷ See S/PV.8497.

¹⁸ For more information on the situation in Mali, see part I, sect. 13.

¹⁹ See S/PV.8619.

²⁰ For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 22.

²¹ See, for example, S/PV.8539, S/PV.8548, S/PV.8633 and S/PV.8650.

²² For more information on the relations between the Council and the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.

II. Investigation of disputes and fact-finding

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Note

Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. On that basis, the Council may determine whether the continuation of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and

security. Article 34 does not prevent the Secretary-General or other organs from performing investigative functions, nor does it limit the Council’s general competence to obtain knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute or situation by dispatching a fact-finding or investigative mission.

Section II provides an overview of the practice of the Council relating to fact-finding and investigation in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter, in three subsections. Subsection A relates to Council missions; subsection B to investigative and fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General; and subsection C to other instances of investigative functions acknowledged by the Council.

During the reporting period, the Council dispatched five missions to the field: one to Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau; one to Burkina Faso and

Mali; one to Iraq and Kuwait; one to Colombia; and one to Ethiopia and South Sudan. The objectives of the missions were to take stock of evolving situations on the ground and to express support for peace processes, political transitions and post-conflict recovery efforts and for the work of United Nations peacekeeping operations, special political missions and country teams. The Council acknowledged the investigative functions of the Secretary-General and findings of investigations related to serious violations and abuses of international human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed in the Central African Republic in the period between January 2003 and December 2015, possible crimes against humanity committed in Yumbi territory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 16 to 18 December 2018 and sexual violence in northern Unity in South Sudan in the period between September and December 2018. The Council expressed support for the work of the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali and renewed the mandate of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD), established pursuant to resolution 2379 (2017). The Council also recognized the investigative work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Human Rights Council in connection with the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. Council members deliberated on the investigative functions of the Secretary-General and the Human Rights Council in relation to the situations in Iraq, Myanmar and the Syrian Arab Republic.

A. Security Council missions

During 2019, the Council dispatched five missions consisting of all 15 Council members: one to West Africa (Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau); one to the Sahel (Burkina Faso and Mali); one to Iraq and

Kuwait; one to Colombia; and one to the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and South Sudan). None of those missions were explicitly charged with investigative tasks. The objectives of the missions were, inter alia: (a) to take stock of the transition process in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as those in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and express support for the conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and of the United Nations country teams in the Mano River subregion; (b) to assess the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 and the level of operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, as well the current security situation in Burkina Faso, including the threat posed by terrorism and transnational organized crime; (c) to demonstrate support for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, the efforts of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to implement its mandate and the efforts of UNITAD; (d) to demonstrate the full commitment of the Council to the peace process in Colombia and express support for the efforts of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia to implement its mandate; and (e) to demonstrate the support of the Council for the peace process in South Sudan and urge the parties to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan signed in 2018 to resolve outstanding issues in order to allow for the peaceful formation of a revitalized transitional Government of national unity. On 22 October 2019, during their visit to Ethiopia, Council members met with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at their thirteenth annual joint consultative meeting.²³

Table 2 provides more information on the missions dispatched in 2019, including their terms of reference and reports to the Council.

²³ A/74/2, para. 55. For more information on regional arrangements, see part VIII.

Table 2
Security Council missions, 2019

<i>Duration</i>	<i>Destination</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>Terms of reference</i>	<i>Report</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>
13–17 February 2019	West Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau)	All Council members (co-leaders: Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea)	S/2019/123 8 February 2019	S/2019/303 10 April 2019	S/PV.8470 26 February 2019	Security Council mission

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2019

<i>Duration</i>	<i>Destination</i>	<i>Composition</i>	<i>Terms of reference</i>	<i>Report</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Item</i>
21–25 March 2019	Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali)	All Council members (co-leaders: Côte d’Ivoire, France, Germany)	S/2019/252 20 March 2019	No report available	S/PV.8492 27 March 2019	Security Council mission
27–30 June 2019	Iraq, Kuwait	All Council members (co-leaders: Kuwait, United States)	S/2019/533 27 June 2019	No report available	S/PV.8571 11 July 2019	Security Council mission
11–14 July 2019	Colombia	All Council members (co-leaders: Peru, United Kingdom)	S/2019/557 10 July 2019	S/2019/827 18 October 2019	S/PV.8580 19 July 2019	Security Council mission
19–23 October 2019	Africa (Ethiopia, South Sudan)	All Council members (co-leaders: South Africa, United States)	S/2019/825 16 October 2019	No report available	No briefing held	

In 2019, the Council referred to such missions in two of its decisions. In its resolution [2475 \(2019\)](#) of 20 June 2019, in connection with the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”, the Council recognized the importance of interactions with civil society and, in that regard, expressed its intention to consider including interactive meetings with local persons with disabilities, and their representative organizations, in the field during Council missions.²⁴

In connection with the measures set out in the note by the President of the Council of 30 August 2017,²⁵ Council members agreed on additional measures to enhance the efficiency and transparency of the Council’s work as it pertained to its missions. In the note by the President of 27 December 2019,²⁶ Council members reaffirmed the value of their missions for understanding, assessing and preventing the escalation of particular conflicts or situations on the agenda of the Council. In the note, the Council members underlined the importance of conducting missions within a conflict prevention framework to countries or regions with developing crises, in addition to visiting countries hosting peace operations mandated by the Council. In an effort to promote greater efficiency and flexibility, Council members agreed to consider different composition formats when planning missions, including considering the possibility of sending smaller groups of Council members, inviting the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission to participate as observers and dispatching missions with regional and subregional organizations. Lastly, Council members stressed the importance of effective communication and engagement with the host

country and encouraged closer coordination within the United Nations system, including with the Chairs of the Council’s subsidiary bodies. At a meeting on the Council’s working methods in the context of the implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#)) (case 1), Council members also discussed the value and means of enhancing Council missions.

Case 1 Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))

On 6 June 2019, at its 8539th meeting, convened at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,²⁷ the Council held an open debate under the sub-item entitled “Working methods of the Security Council”.²⁸ In her opening remarks, discussing initiatives for strengthening the role of the Council in conflict prevention and peacekeeping, the Executive Director of Security Council Report, a non-governmental organization, stated that the Council had used visiting missions to good effect, including visiting countries not on its agenda, citing the mission to Burkina Faso as a recent example. She explained that field visits, which had been used occasionally with a preventive intent, were valuable because they allowed Council members to gain a different sense of local dynamics, of how Council mandates were implemented in practice and of the work of the United Nations country teams. Noting that such visits were “phenomenally expensive” and rarely coordinated with field travel conducted by the subsidiary bodies of the Council, including the

²⁴ Resolution [2475 \(2019\)](#), para. 10.

²⁵ [S/2017/507](#).

²⁶ [S/2019/990](#).

²⁷ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 29 May 2019 ([S/2019/450](#)).

²⁸ See [S/PV.8539](#).

Peacebuilding Commission, the Executive Director said that active coordination and the revived use of mini-missions could give such trips greater strategic impact while reducing costs.

In the discussion, the representative of the United Kingdom agreed that Council missions should be well-considered, be properly aligned with the activities of other bodies and ensure a focus on conflict prevention. He added that the Council should reconsider the possible use of mini-missions. Referring to the possibility of doing more to institutionalize the linkages with the Peacebuilding Commission, the representative of Canada called on the Council to consider inviting the Chair of the Commission or the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Commission to join Council missions to countries in which both bodies were engaged. He added that the Council, when conducting field visits, should meet with local women's civil society groups.

The representative of Egypt called for periodic briefings to the wider membership on the monthly programme of work, including any Council visits to be carried out in a given month. The representative of South Africa stated that additional measures to facilitate the planning and preparations of newly elected Council members would allow them to better prepare for meetings and visiting missions. The representative of Ukraine expressed his delegation's satisfaction in seeing several of its priorities, including making the field visits of the Council more transparent, reflected in the note by the President (S/2017/507).

B. Investigative and fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General

Decisions of the Council

In its decisions during the period under review, the Council acknowledged the investigative or fact-finding functions of the Secretary-General, in particular through the work of investigative mechanisms and United Nations peacekeeping operations, in connection with five country-specific items on its agenda, namely, the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mali and South Sudan, and with the thematic item entitled "Threats to international peace and security". The relevant provisions of those decisions are set out in table 3 below.

In connection with the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council called on the national authorities to follow up on the recommendations of the report of the mapping project conducted pursuant to

resolution 2301 (2016) by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, which described serious violations and abuses of international human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed in the country in the period between January 2003 and December 2015.²⁹

With regard to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council reiterated its condemnation of the violence witnessed in the eastern part of the country and the Kasai region. It also strongly condemned the violence committed in Yumbi territory from 16 to 18 December 2018, some of which the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported might constitute crimes against humanity.³⁰ In addition, with regard to the investigations into the killing in March 2017 of the two members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the four Congolese nationals accompanying them, the Council welcomed the work of the United Nations team and the commitment of the Secretary-General that the United Nations would do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators were brought to justice.³¹ The Council also welcomed in that regard the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the United Nations team deployed to assist the Congolese authorities and called on them to ensure that all perpetrators were brought to justice and held accountable.³²

In relation to the situation concerning Iraq, the Council mandated the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of UNAMI to promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, and to support the work of UNITAD.³³ In connection with the item entitled "Threats to international peace and security", the Council reaffirmed its resolution 2379 (2017), by which UNITAD had been established, and extended the mandate of the Investigative Team until 21 September 2020.³⁴

²⁹ Resolution 2499 (2019), para. 23.

³⁰ Resolution 2463 (2019), para. 4.

³¹ Resolution 2478 (2019), fourth preambular paragraph.

³² *Ibid.*; and resolution 2502 (2019), para. 7. For more information on the matter, S/2017/917 and *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017*, part VI, sect. II.B.

³³ Resolution 2470 (2019), para. 2 (d). For more information on the mandate of UNAMI, see part X, sect. II. For more information on the mandate of UNITAD, see part IX, sect. III.

³⁴ Resolution 2490 (2019), paras. 1–2.

Regarding the situation in Mali, the Council called on all parties to cooperate fully with the International Commission of Inquiry established by the Secretary-General in accordance with the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 and as requested by the Council in resolution 2364 (2017).³⁵ The Council also mandated the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to continue to support the operations of the International Commission of Inquiry.³⁶

In connection with South Sudan, the Council expressed grave concern at the ongoing reports of sexual and gender-based violence, in particular against women and girls, including the findings of the Secretary-General in his report on conflict-related

sexual violence (S/2018/250) regarding the use of sexual violence as a tactic by the parties against the civilian population.³⁷ The Council also made reference to the report of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and OHCHR of February 2019 on conflict-related sexual violence in northern Unity in the period between September and December 2018, in which the normalization and continuation of violence against women and girls, despite the suspension of most military offensives, was documented.³⁸ In addition, the Council took note of the joint report of UNMISS and OHCHR on freedom of expression in the country and expressed grave concern regarding the reports on the human rights situation in South Sudan issued by the Mission and the Secretary-General.³⁹

³⁵ Resolution 2480 (2019), para. 13.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 28 (a) (iii). For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

³⁷ Resolution 2459 (2019), eighteenth preambular paragraph.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, twenty-first and twenty-fourth preambular paragraphs.

Table 3

Decisions relating to investigative and/or fact-finding activities by the Secretary-General, 2019

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	
Resolution 2499 (2019) 15 November 2019	Calls on the authorities of the Central African Republic to follow up on the recommendations of the report of the mapping project describing serious violations and abuses of international human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Central African Republic between January 2003 and December 2015 (para. 23)
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	
Resolution 2463 (2019) 29 March 2019	Reiterates its condemnation of the violence witnessed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Kasai region, strongly condemns the violence committed in Yumbi territory from 16 to 18 December 2018, some of which the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office reported may constitute crimes against humanity, further reiterates the importance and urgency of prompt and transparent investigations into violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in these regions, including sexual violence, as well as its intention to closely monitor progress of the investigations into these violations and abuses, in order to bring to justice and hold accountable all those responsible, and looks forward to their results; welcomes the commitments of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in that regard, further welcomes the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai regions mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 35/33, requests the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to implement all the recommendations made by the team of international experts in its report, and to cooperate with the team of two international human rights experts charged with monitoring, evaluating, providing support and reporting on the implementation by the Democratic Republic of the Congo of those recommendations; further welcomes the continued cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the United Nations team deployed, as agreed, to assist the Congolese authorities' investigations into the deaths of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, and calls on them to ensure all perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable (para. 4)

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Resolution 2478 (2019) 26 June 2019	Reiterating the need for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to swiftly and fully investigate the killing of the two members of the Group of Experts and the four Congolese nationals accompanying them and bring those responsible to justice, welcoming the Secretary General's commitment that the United Nations will do everything possible to ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice, further welcoming the work of the United Nations team deployed to assist the Congolese authorities in their investigations, in agreement with the Congolese authorities, and welcoming their continued cooperation (fourth preambular paragraph)
Resolution 2502 (2019) 19 December 2019	Welcomes the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai regions mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 35/33 , recognizes the improvements in the cooperation since President Tshisekedi's election, requests the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to implement all the recommendations made by the team of international experts in its report, and to cooperate with the team of two international human rights experts charged with monitoring, evaluating, providing support and reporting on the implementation by the Democratic Republic of the Congo of those recommendations, further welcomes the continued cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the United Nations team deployed, as agreed, to assist the Congolese authorities' investigations into the deaths of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, and calls on them to ensure all perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable (para. 7)

The situation concerning Iraq

Resolution 2470 (2019) 21 May 2019	Decides further that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, at the request of the Government of Iraq, and taking into account the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General (S/2019/414), shall: ... (d) promote accountability and the protection of human rights, and judicial and legal reform, with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq, in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq, in addition to supporting the work of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD), established in resolution 2379 (2017) (para. 2 (d))
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The situation in Mali

Resolution 2480 (2019) 28 June 2019	Calls upon all parties to fully cooperate with the International Commission of Inquiry established in accordance with the Agreement and as requested by resolution 2364 (2017) (para. 13) Decides that the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali shall include the following priority tasks: (a) <i>Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali</i> ... (iii) To support the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures of the Agreement, especially in its part V, by continuing its current activities, including with respect to the support of the operations of the International Commission of Inquiry (para. 28 (a) (iii))
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Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

Resolution 2459 (2019) 15 March 2019	Expressing grave concern at ongoing reports of sexual and gender-based violence, particularly against women and girls, including the findings of the report of the Secretary-General on sexual violence in conflict to the Security Council (S/2018/250) of the use of sexual violence as a tactic by parties to the conflict against the civilian population in South Sudan, including use of rape and gang-rape of women and girls, and abduction, forced marriage and sexual slavery, and where persistent levels of conflict-related sexual violence and other forms of violence against women
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and girls have become normalized and continued after the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and despite the suspension of most military offensives, as documented in the February 2019 United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) report on conflict-related sexual violence in northern Unity between September and December 2018, underlining the urgency and importance of timely investigations and the provision of assistance and protection to victims of sexual and gender-based violence (eighteenth preambular paragraph)

Taking note of the UNMISS OHCHR report on the freedom of expression in South Sudan, and expressing ongoing concern on the severe restriction of freedoms of opinion, expression and association, and condemning the use of media to broadcast hate speech and transmit messages instigating violence against a particular ethnic group, a practice that has the potential to play a significant role in promoting mass violence and exacerbating conflict, and calling on the Government of South Sudan to immediately condemn and counter increasing hate speech and ethnic violence and to promote reconciliation among its people, including through a process of justice and accountability (twenty-first preambular paragraph)

Expressing grave concern regarding the reports on the human rights situation in South Sudan issued by UNMISS and the Secretary-General, as well as the report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan and the separate opinion, expressing grave concern that according to some reports, including the African Union Commission of Inquiry report on South Sudan released on 27 October 2015, there were reasonable grounds to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed and the reports of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan released on 23 February 2018 and 20 February 2019 that war crimes and crimes against humanity may have been committed, emphasizing its hope that these and other credible reporting will be duly considered by any transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms for South Sudan, including those established in the Revitalized Peace Agreement, stressing the importance of collection and preservation of evidence for eventual use by the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, and encouraging efforts in this regard (twenty-fourth preambular paragraph)

Threats to international peace and security

Resolution 2490 (2019)
20 September 2019

Reaffirms its resolution 2379 (2017), by which UNITAD, headed by a Special Adviser, was established, and recalls the terms of reference approved by the Council (see S/2018/119) (para. 1)

Takes note of the request from the Government of Iraq contained in its letter dated 19 September 2019 (S/2019/760) and decides to extend until 21 September 2020 the mandate of the Special Adviser and UNITAD, with any further extension to be decided at the request of the Government of Iraq, or any other Government that has requested the Team to collect evidence of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) in its territory, in accordance with its resolution 2379 (2017) (para. 2)

Requests the Special Adviser to continue to submit and present reports to the Council on the Investigative Team's activities every 180 days (para. 3)

New investigative action by the Secretary General

During the reporting period, the Secretary-General undertook one new investigative action, in connection with the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. In his report of 21 August 2019 on the implementation of Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018) and 2449 (2018), the

Secretary-General noted his decision to establish an internal United Nations Headquarters board of inquiry to investigate a series of incidents in the north-western part of the Syrian Arab Republic. The investigation would encompass incidents that had taken place since the signing of the memorandum on the stabilization of the situation in the Idlib de-escalation area by the Russian Federation and Turkey on 17 September 2018 and would cover the destruction of, or damage to,

facilities on the deconfliction list and United Nations-supported facilities in the area.⁴⁰

With respect to ongoing investigations, by his letters dated 17 May and 13 November 2019 addressed to the President of the Council,⁴¹ the Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD transmitted the second and third reports on the activities of the Investigative Team. In his report of 30 December 2019 on the situation in Mali,⁴² the Secretary-General informed the Council that the mandate of the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali, established on 19 January 2018, had been extended until June 2020.⁴³

Meetings of the Council

In meetings of the Council, Council members made reference to the investigative authority of the Council and the role of the Secretary-General. For example, at the 8539th meeting of the Council, held on 6 June 2019 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”,⁴⁴ the representative of the United Kingdom asserted that it was important to respond to the call of the Secretary-General for a surge in diplomacy to support conflict prevention. He noted that the Council needed to shoulder its responsibilities under Article 34 of the Charter and that Council members had too often blocked or attempted to block discussions of situations that could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

At the 8452nd meeting, held on 26 January 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”,⁴⁵ the representative of Peru stated that it was important for the Council to discuss the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter, by which the Council was authorized to address any situation that was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. At the same meeting, the representative of Kuwait pointed to the fundamental role of the Council, in accordance with Article 34, in implementing preventive diplomacy in order to prevent conflicts and address crises at an early stage should there be any early signs of a situation leading to a threat to international peace and security. At the 8506th

meeting, held on 10 April 2019 under the same item,⁴⁶ the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela stated that the Council, under Articles 24, 34 and 39, had the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and for determining the existence of any threat to the peace or any act of aggression. He called on the Council to investigate and determine whether there was a legal basis for what he described as aggression against the people of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

At the 8534th meeting, held on 23 May 2019 under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”,⁴⁷ the representative of Belgium maintained that the Council must be better informed about cases of serious violations of international law and should make better use of relevant instruments for that purpose. The representative of Lithuania stated that the commissions, mechanisms and other investigative bodies established by the United Nations were important tools for ensuring the preservation of evidence for future investigations. The representative of Fiji urged the Council to use all tools at its disposal to protect civilians in armed conflicts, including establishing mechanisms in the form of commissions of inquiry and investigations to address violations. The representative of Costa Rica recognized the efforts of the Council to establish ad hoc tribunals and investigative mechanisms, such as the investigative mechanism created in the case of the chemical weapons attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic, and urged their re-establishment.

The Council also discussed the investigations of the Council and the Secretary-General in connection with the mandates and work of UNITAD in the context of threats to international peace and security (case 2) and the United Nations internal board of inquiry established by the Secretary-General to investigate incidents that had taken place in the north-western part of the Syrian Arab Republic since 17 September 2018 in the context of the situation in the Middle East (case 3).

Case 2 Threats to international peace and security

On 15 July 2019, at the 8573rd meeting of the Council, held under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”,⁴⁸ the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General and Head of UNITAD presented his second report on the activities of the

⁴⁰ S/2019/674, para. 43.

⁴¹ S/2019/407 and S/2019/878.

⁴² S/2019/983.

⁴³ For more information on the International Commission of Inquiry on Mali, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2018*, part VI, sect. II.B.

⁴⁴ See S/PV.8539.

⁴⁵ See S/PV.8452.

⁴⁶ See S/PV.8506.

⁴⁷ See S/PV.8534.

⁴⁸ See S/PV.8573.

Investigative Team.⁴⁹ The Special Adviser noted that UNITAD had made significant progress since his previous briefing, in December 2018, and had begun to receive evidence, information and witness statements.⁵⁰ He informed the Council that investigative efforts in Iraq were focused on three main areas: (a) attacks against the Yazidi communities in the Sinjar area; (b) crimes against religious minorities, women and children and crimes relating to sexual slavery and gender-based violence in Mosul; and (c) the massacre at Camp Speicher in June 2014. The Special Adviser stressed that, in order to fully deliver on its mandate, UNITAD would focus on ensuring that its work fed into proceedings in Iraqi courts and contributed to domestic accountability efforts. He emphasized that the ability of the Investigative Team to deliver on its mandate depended on the support of the Council and the international community.

In the discussion, the representative of Belgium stated that, in establishing the Investigative Team, the Council had played its part in ensuring measures to combat impunity and promote respect for international law, both of which contributed to the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that UNITAD was an important element of the counter-terrorism strategy in the Middle East. The representative of France welcomed the determination of Iraq to integrate the fight against impunity into efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraqi society, which was key to preventing a resurgence of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh).

Commending UNITAD for the establishment of its witness protection strategy, the representative of the Dominican Republic underscored the need to protect the rights of women and children and to prevent persons with family ties to ISIL members from being prosecuted for the crimes of their relatives. The representative of Poland stated that, in order to deliver meaningful justice to the victims of the crimes of ISIL members, the Investigative Team would need to ensure that the collection and analysis of evidence was conducted in accordance with the highest international standards. The representative of Germany, echoed by the representatives of Belgium and France, stated that evidence gathered by UNITAD should be used only in prosecutions that complied with international legal standards, which disqualified the use of such evidence if capital punishment could not be excluded.

⁴⁹ S/2019/407.

⁵⁰ See S/PV.8573.

With regard to the composition of UNITAD, the representative of Poland recognized the efforts made to ensure geographical diversity and gender, ethnic and religious balance in the appointment of Iraqi members of the Investigative Team. She emphasized that the composition of the team should reflect the diversity of the Iraqi population in order to increase its capabilities in collecting evidence in various communities.

Council members welcomed the efforts by UNITAD to strengthen cooperation with the Iraqi authorities. The representative of Côte d'Ivoire expressed deep concern about the ongoing challenges that could hinder such cooperation, in particular the characterization in Iraqi legislation of crimes within the scope of the investigation as only terrorist crimes, as well as the need for judicial cooperation among States in the region. A number of speakers emphasized that the work of UNITAD should fully respect the sovereignty of Iraq. The representative of the United States called on the Government of Iraq to continue to give the Investigative Team the space to operate effectively, stating that independence and impartiality were essential to the Team's credibility.

Noting that the crimes of ISIL did not stop at the Iraqi border, the representative of Germany encouraged the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General to pursue transnational cooperation in the investigations and welcomed the possible support for the prosecution of those crimes in other national jurisdictions. The representative of the Russian Federation urged the Special Adviser to strictly follow his core mandate, which was to support national efforts to prosecute ISIL members for the most serious crimes under international law committed in Iraq.

Case 3 **The situation in the Middle East**

On 14 November 2019, the Council held its 8664th meeting, under the item entitled, "The situation in the Middle East",⁵¹ in connection with the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. In his briefing, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator expressed concern about an increase in air strikes and ground-based strikes, mostly in parts of southern and western Idlib, which had caused a high number of civilian casualties. He added that civilians in those areas continued to suffer under the presence of Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, a United Nations-listed terrorist organization. In that context, the Under-Secretary-General stated that the internal United Nations Headquarters board of inquiry established by the Secretary-General had begun its

⁵¹ See S/PV.8664.

work of investigating a series of incidents that had occurred in the north-western part of the Syrian Arab Republic since September 2018. He reminded the Council of the Secretary-General's request for all relevant parties to extend their support to the board in the conduct of its duties.

In the discussion, a number of Council members welcomed the establishment of and expressed support for the board of inquiry. The representative of the United States noted that her delegation sought full accountability for those responsible for the attacks on hospitals, schools and civilian homes. The representative of France expressed the hope that the board of inquiry would shed light on new strikes on medical facilities in the north-western part of the country. She added that those who committed such flagrant violations of international humanitarian law must be held accountable before the courts and called for the cooperation of all parties with the board. The representative of Peru expressed the hope that the board would help to clarify the facts and responsibilities with regard to the attacks perpetrated on facilities covered by the system to prevent attacks on humanitarian targets.

Several speakers addressed the issue of whether the findings of the board of inquiry would be made public. The representative of the United States, echoed by the United Kingdom, maintained that a public accounting of the board's findings would be essential

to ensuring accountability and deterring future attacks. The representative of the Dominican Republic expressed the hope that at least part of the board's conclusions and recommendations would be made public. The representative of Germany cited a news report about possible "pressure on the Secretary-General" by the Russian Federation to keep the board's findings secret. In response, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the board of inquiry was an internal mechanism of the United Nations and that its report would be presented to the Secretary-General. He added that it would be for the Secretary-General, who was required to follow corresponding procedures, to decide what to do with the report.

C. Other instances of investigative functions acknowledged by the Security Council

In decisions of the Council

During the period under review, the Council recognized the investigative functions of other bodies of the United Nations, notably OHCHR and the Human Rights Council, in relation to the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, as well as under the thematic item entitled "Women and peace and security". Table 4 contains the provisions of Council decisions referring to such functions.

Table 4

Decisions relating to investigation and inquiry by United Nations bodies and related organizations, 2019

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
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The situation in the Central African Republic

Resolution 2499 (2019) 15 November 2019	Calls on the authorities of the Central African Republic to follow up on the recommendations of the report of the mapping project describing serious violations and abuses of international human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Central African Republic between January 2003 and December 2015 (para. 23)
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The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Resolution 2463 (2019) 29 March 2019	Reiterates its condemnation of the violence witnessed in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Kasai region, strongly condemns the violence committed in Yumbi territory from 16 to 18 December 2018, some of which the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office reported may constitute crimes against humanity, further reiterates the importance and urgency of prompt and transparent investigations into violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights in these regions, including sexual violence, as well as its intention to closely monitor progress of the investigations into these violations and abuses, in order to bring to justice and hold accountable all those responsible, and looks forward to their results; welcomes the commitments of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in that regard, further welcomes the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai regions mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 35/33 , requests the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to implement all the recommendations made by the team of international
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experts in its report and to cooperate with the team of two international human rights experts charged with monitoring, evaluating, providing support and reporting on the implementation by the Democratic Republic of the Congo of those recommendations; further welcomes the continued cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the United Nations team deployed, as agreed, to assist the Congolese authorities' investigations into the deaths of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, and calls on them to ensure all perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable (para. 4)

Resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#)
19 December 2019

Welcomes the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the team of international experts on the situation in the Kasai regions mandated by the Human Rights Council in its resolution [35/33](#), recognizes the improvements in the cooperation since President Tshisekedi's election, requests the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to implement all the recommendations made by the team of international experts in its report, and to cooperate with the team of two international human rights experts, charged with monitoring, evaluating, providing support and reporting on the implementation by the Democratic Republic of the Congo of those recommendations, further welcomes the continued cooperation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the United Nations team deployed, as agreed, to assist the Congolese authorities' investigations into the deaths of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, and calls on them to ensure all perpetrators are brought to justice and held accountable (para. 7)

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

Resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#)
15 March 2019

Expressing grave concern at ongoing reports of sexual and gender-based violence, particularly against women and girls, including the findings of the report of the Secretary-General on sexual violence in conflict to the Security Council ([S/2018/250](#)) of the use of sexual violence as a tactic by parties to the conflict against the civilian population in South Sudan, including use of rape and gang-rape of women and girls, and abduction, forced marriage and sexual slavery, and where persistent levels of conflict-related sexual violence and other forms of violence against women and girls have become normalized and continued after the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and despite the suspension of most military offensives, as documented in the February 2019 United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) report on conflict-related sexual violence in northern Unity between September and December 2018, underlining the urgency and importance of timely investigations and the provision of assistance and protection to victims of sexual and gender-based violence (eighteenth preambular paragraph)

Taking note of the UNMISS and OHCHR report on the freedom of expression in South Sudan, and expressing ongoing concern on the severe restriction of freedoms of opinion, expression and association, and condemning the use of media to broadcast hate speech and transmit messages instigating violence against a particular ethnic group, a practice that has the potential to play a significant role in promoting mass violence and exacerbating conflict, and calling on the Government of South Sudan to immediately condemn and counter increasing hate speech and ethnic violence and to promote reconciliation among its people, including through a process of justice and accountability (twenty-first preambular paragraph)

Women and peace and security

Resolution [2467 \(2019\)](#)
23 April 2019

Noting United Nations commissions of inquiry and United Nations fact-finding missions, as appropriate and where relevant, as mechanisms to verify and investigate allegations of violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law, and, in accordance with their respective mandates, to make recommendations to advance accountability and justice and protection for survivors, and, in accordance with their respective mandates and within existing resources, to partner with funds and agencies in the provision of specialized multisectoral services (seventeenth preambular paragraph)

Decision and date

Provision

Encourages relevant United Nations mandating bodies, as appropriate, in the establishment, inter alia, of commissions of inquiry and independent investigative entities to ensure that considerations to address sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations are included in their mandates and terms of reference, where relevant, and the Secretary-General to ensure that they are established and operationalized with the capacity and relevant expertise to address such considerations, and in this regard encourages the use of existing rosters of investigators with relevant expertise; emphasizes further that all efforts to document and investigate sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations should take into account the specific needs of survivors, be well-coordinated and respect safety, confidentiality and informed consent of survivors as well as independence and impartiality, and that monitoring and investigation strategies are connected to specialized multisectoral referral pathways to services for survivors (para. 8)

In communications of the Council

Council members also made reference to the investigative functions of other bodies of the United Nations and related organizations in their communications. For example, by a letter dated 26 February 2019 addressed to the President of the Council,⁵² the Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations, also on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Paraguay, transmitted a document entitled “Lima Group Declaration in support of the process of democratic transition and the reconstruction of Venezuela”. According to the Declaration, the members of the Group decided to promote the designation by the Human Rights Council of an independent expert or a commission of inquiry on the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in response to the deep concern with “the serious violations of human rights in the context of a political, economic, social and humanitarian crisis” in that country, expressed in Human Rights Council resolution 39/1 of 27 September 2018. The members of the Group also reiterated their call on the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to respond promptly to the situation in that country, prior to the presentation of her comprehensive report at the forty-first session of the Human Rights Council.

In a letter dated 20 May 2019 addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,⁵³ the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations transmitted an aide-memoire on the assessments by the Russian Federation of the report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the incident of alleged use of

toxic chemicals as a weapon in Duma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018.⁵⁴

In meetings of the Council

At the 8477th meeting of the Council, held on 28 February 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”, Council members discussed the work of the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, established by the Human Rights Council in its resolutions 39/2 of 27 September 2018 and 34/22 of 24 March 2017, respectively, as described in case 4.

Case 4

The situation in Myanmar

On 28 February 2019, at the 8477th meeting of the Council, held under the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar”,⁵⁵ the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar announced that the Independent Commission of Enquiry, established by Myanmar, had responded positively to her recommendation that it engage with United Nations human rights entities, including OHCHR and the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, established by the Human Rights Council. She also called for complementarity between the Commission and the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar of the Human Rights Council. The Special Envoy underscored the importance of national responsibility and ownership of the accountability process, while clarifying that accountability should extend beyond criminal liability to include initiatives that gave victims different kinds of voices.

⁵² S/2019/183.

⁵³ S/2019/415.

⁵⁴ S/2019/208, annex. For more information on the matter, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2018*, part VI, sect. II.B.

⁵⁵ See S/PV.8477.

In the discussion, several Council members echoed the call of the Special Envoy for complementarity between the United Nations accountability mechanisms and the Independent Commission of Enquiry of Myanmar. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that better outcomes would result from greater cooperation between the Commission and the efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The representative of Germany stressed that the Independent Investigative Mechanism of the Human Rights Council must be complementary and that those responsible for the ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity must be brought to justice. The representative of Peru expressed the hope that the efforts of the Commission and those of the Mechanism would contribute to the goal of achieving justice. The representative of the United States stated that the operationalization of the Mechanism had been expeditious, recalling that its mandate was to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of the most serious crimes. The representative of the Russian Federation added that the Commission was gradually gaining momentum and expressed his delegation's satisfaction that it had not refused to engage in dialogue with international bodies.

The representative of France maintained that the Council had no guarantee that the Independent Commission of Enquiry was truly able to carry out an independent, credible and impartial investigation. Stating that the conclusions of the independent international fact-finding mission were unambiguous, he called on the Council to ensure full cooperation

with the International Criminal Court and the Independent Investigative Mechanism. Similarly, the representative of the Dominican Republic maintained that, according to the report of the fact-finding mission dated 12 September 2018, the judicial system in Myanmar could not conduct a just and independent investigation and the process would therefore need to be led by the international community.

The representative of Myanmar expressed his country's strong objection to the establishment of the Independent Investigative Mechanism, because it had been set up beyond the mandate of the Council and represented a "discriminatory and double-standard practice" on the part of the United Nations human rights body. He added that the Mechanism's terms of reference were very intrusive and that such measures would further polarize the different communities within Myanmar. He stated that the report of the independent international fact-finding mission was biased and one-sided and that it had been prepared mainly on the basis of interviews and information gathered from non-governmental organizations and human rights organizations.

The representative of Bangladesh expressed the view that the national investigation processes of Myanmar had repeatedly failed and that, as a result, the existing United Nations mechanisms needed to be operationalized in order to address the issue of accountability. He called on the Council to negotiate a draft resolution in which it would establish a regular reporting cycle as an oversight mechanism for progress in investigations of human rights violations.

III. Decisions of the Security Council concerning the pacific settlement of disputes

Article 33

1. *The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.*

2. *The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.*

Article 36

1. *The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.*

2. *The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.*

3. *In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International*

Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. *Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.*

2. *If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.*

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

Note

Article 33 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations expressly provides the framework for parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means. According to Article 33 (2), the Council shall call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such peaceful means as provided for in Article 33 (1). The Council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment for the settlement of disputes under Article 36 (1). According to Article 36 (2) and (3), the Council should take into consideration procedures for the settlement of the dispute already adopted by the parties and that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice. Article 37 (2) envisages that, following a referral, the Council shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. Article 38 provides that the Council may make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

In Section III, the decisions of the Council in 2019 are examined in connection with the peaceful settlement of disputes within the framework of Chapter VI of the Charter. Decisions explicitly adopted under Chapter VII have not been considered for the purposes of the present section. In subsections A to C, ways in which the Council addressed the pacific settlement of disputes are illustrated in the context of, respectively: thematic

issues; country-specific and regional situations; and the settlement of disputes involving the Secretary-General. In subsection D, regional arrangements and agencies are addressed; decisions of the Council in support of the pacific settlement of disputes by regional organizations are covered in part VIII.

A. Decisions of the Security Council concerning thematic issues

The present subsection provides an overview of the decisions adopted by the Council on thematic issues that relate to the pacific settlement of disputes. During the period under review, the decisions of the Council highlighted the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes and addressing the root causes of conflict, of including affected groups and their interests in peace processes and of ensuring justice and accountability, including for missing persons. A more detailed description of the decisions of the Council relating to these subjects is set out below.

Peaceful settlement of disputes and addressing the root causes of conflict

In 2019, the Council reaffirmed the importance of achieving sustainable peace and security by dialogue, mediation, consultations and political negotiations to bridge differences and to end conflict.⁵⁶ On the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the Council reaffirmed their fundamental importance for the protection of those affected by armed conflict. In that context, the Council recalled its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the need to address underlying root causes of armed conflict through dialogue, mediation, consultations and political negotiations.⁵⁷

Inclusion of youth, child protection, persons with disabilities and women in the pacific settlement of disputes

The Council reaffirmed the role of young people in the prevention and resolution of conflict and as a key aspect of the sustainability, inclusiveness and

⁵⁶ Resolution 2493 (2019), third preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “Women and peace and security”.

⁵⁷ S/PRST/2019/8, first paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security”.

success of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.⁵⁸ It emphasized the importance of giving due consideration to child protection issues from the early stages of all peace processes, in particular the integration of child protection provisions, and of peace agreements that put strong emphasis on the best interest of the child.⁵⁹ The Council urged Member States to enable the meaningful participation and representation of persons with disabilities, including their representative organizations, in humanitarian action, conflict prevention, resolution, reconciliation, reconstruction and peacebuilding, and to consult with those with expertise working on disability mainstreaming.⁶⁰

The Council reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, as recognized in resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2242 (2015).⁶¹ The Council urged Member States to ensure and promote the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all stages of peace processes, including through mainstreaming a gender perspective.⁶² Member States were urged to facilitate such participation from the outset, both in negotiating parties' delegations and in the mechanisms set up to implement and monitor agreements.⁶³ Lastly, the Council requested that all heads of United Nations entities lend all support to the Secretary-General in the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, including to develop context-specific approaches for the participation of women in all United Nations-supported peace talks.⁶⁴

Ensuring accountability

The Council recognized the importance of truth, justice and accountability in efforts towards reconciliation and the peaceful settlement of conflicts, and the end of impunity.⁶⁵ Specifically, the Council noted that accountability for missing persons as a result of conflict could be among the components of

the design and implementation of peace negotiations and agreements and peacebuilding processes, including with reference to justice and rule of law mechanisms.⁶⁶ The Council therefore called on all parties to armed conflict, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to include provisions to facilitate the search for missing persons and to take all necessary steps to protect victims and witnesses testifying about those reported missing in order to end impunity.⁶⁷

B. Recommendations of the Security Council concerning country specific and regional situations

Article 33 (2) of the Charter provides that the Council shall call upon the parties to settle disputes by the means established in Article 33 (1), when deemed necessary. In addition, Article 36 (1) provides that the Council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. Article 37 (2) establishes further that, if the Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. Article 38 provides that, without prejudice to Articles 33 to 37, the Council may make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute, if all the parties so request.

The present subsection provides an overview of the practice of the Council relating to the pacific settlement of disputes in situations specific to a country or region. In dealing with complex situations in which the Council determined the existence of a threat to international peace and security, the Council utilized the tools available under Chapter VII of the Charter in parallel with those available under Chapter VI, with a view to restoring peace and to recommending procedures or methods for the pacific settlement of disputes. The decisions featured in this overview do not include those adopted expressly under Chapter VII, which are covered in parts VII and X. The section also does not include the wide variety of good offices, mediation and political support tasks of peacekeeping operations and special political missions specifically mandated by the Council in 2019, which are covered in part X.

In 2019, the Council made a wide range of recommendations with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes, most of which were primarily

⁵⁸ Resolution 2457 (2019), para. 16, in connection with the item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security".

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 17.

⁶⁰ Resolution 2475 (2019), para. 6, in connection with the item entitled "Protection of civilians in armed conflict".

⁶¹ Resolution 2457 (2019), para. 15.

⁶² Resolution 2493 (2019), para. 2. See also resolution 2467 (2019), paras. 20 and 30, also in connection with the item entitled "Women and peace and security".

⁶³ Resolution 2493 (2019), para. 3.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 9 (a).

⁶⁵ Resolution 2474 (2019), penultimate preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Protection of civilians in armed conflict".

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 14.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 15.

intra-State conflicts. As described in the overview below, the Council called on the parties to: (a) cease hostilities and respect ceasefires; (b) ensure the full and accelerated implementation of peace agreements; (c) engage in peaceful and inclusive political dialogue, reconciliation and elections; and (d) use dialogue to resolve longer-term outstanding disputes.

Cessation of hostilities and ceasefire

With the continued fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic and the escalation of conflict in and around Tripoli in Libya and in southern Yemen, the Council urged the parties to cease hostilities and engage in dialogue to find a political solution. The Council also called on Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to prevent any further breaches of the ceasefire in the Golan Heights and on Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and find a long-term solution to their dispute.

Regarding the situation in the Golan Heights, the Council stressed the obligation of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to scrupulously and fully respect the terms of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 1974. The parties were called upon to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation and encouraged to take full advantage of the liaison function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) to address issues of mutual concern.⁶⁸ Regarding the situation in Lebanon, the Council reiterated its call for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the principles and elements set out in paragraph 8 of resolution 1701 (2006).⁶⁹

In connection with the situation in Libya, the Council called on all parties to work together in the spirit of compromise, to refrain from any actions that could undermine the political process, to exercise restraint, to protect civilians and to engage seriously in national reconciliation. It also reiterated calls on the parties to commit to a lasting ceasefire and political dialogue under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and

Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).⁷⁰

With respect to the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council reaffirmed that there could be no military solution to the conflict and that it could only be resolved through the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015),⁷¹ in which it had called for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition. The Council expressed particular concern regarding the recent violent attempt to take over State institutions in the southern part of Yemen and called on all parties to engage constructively in dialogue under the auspices of Saudi Arabia.⁷² The Council reiterated its call on the Government of Yemen and the Houthis to fully implement the 2018 Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra's Isa.⁷³ The Council also called on the parties to increase the participation of women in their delegations to 30 per cent.⁷⁴

Full and accelerated implementation of peace agreements

The Council welcomed the new peace agreement signed in the Central African Republic and called for its full implementation. Noting the considerable progress made in the implementation of the Colombian peace agreement, the Council encouraged the parties to sustain their efforts in that regard. With respect to Mali and South Sudan, the Council urged the parties to accelerate the implementation of key provisions of peace agreements and to resolve outstanding issues preventing further progress in that regard.

The Council welcomed the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic by the authorities and 14 armed groups in Bangui on 6 February 2019. It urged national stakeholders to implement the Peace Agreement in good faith and without delay in order to meet the aspirations expressed by the people of the

⁶⁸ Resolutions 2477 (2019), para. 2, and 2503 (2019), para. 2, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 22. For more information on the mandate of UNDOF, see part X, sect. I.

⁶⁹ Resolution 2485 (2019), para. 4, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East".

⁷⁰ Resolution 2486 (2019), fifth preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled, "The situation in Libya". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 12. For more information on the mandate of the UNSMIL, see part X, sect. II.

⁷¹ S/PRST/2019/12, fourth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East".

⁷² S/PRST/2019/9, third paragraph, in connection with the item entitled, "The situation in the Middle East".

⁷³ Resolutions 2452 (2019), fourth preambular paragraph, and 2481 (2019), fourth preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East".

⁷⁴ S/PRST/2019/9, penultimate paragraph.

Central African Republic for peace, security, justice, reconciliation, inclusivity and development.⁷⁵

Welcoming the progress made towards peace across Colombia since the adoption of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, the Council urged the parties, with the support of relevant State institutions and security forces, as well as civil society, to work together to sustain progress and address challenges through the comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement.¹⁷⁶

Regarding the situation in Mali, the Council urged the Government of Mali, the Plateforme coalition of armed groups and the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad coalition of armed groups to continue to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, signed in 2015, through significant, meaningful and irreversible measures to be taken on an urgent basis. The Council also encouraged the swift completion of constitutional reform following an inclusive and collaborative process, with the full engagement and consensus of the Government, signatory armed groups, the political opposition and civil society.⁷⁷

In connection with the situation in South Sudan, the Council called for the senior leadership of the parties to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, signed in 2018, to continue to hold regular face-to-face meetings to resolve outstanding issues to allow for the peaceful formation of a revitalized transitional Government of national unity.⁷⁸ The Council also called on the parties to expedite the process of implementing transitional security arrangements and to continue consultation on the issue of the number and boundaries of states, with a view to finding a common solution.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ S/PRST/2019/3, third paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in the Central African Republic". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 6.

⁷⁶ Resolution 2487 (2019), fourth preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)".

⁷⁷ S/PRST/2019/2, seventh paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Mali". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 13.

⁷⁸ S/PRST/2019/11, second paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 9.

⁷⁹ Ibid., fourth paragraph.

Peaceful and inclusive political dialogue, reconciliation and elections

The Council underscored the importance of inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation, the consolidation of peace through governance reform and peaceful and credible elections in Guinea-Bissau, in Somalia and in the West African region. The Council also highlighted the importance of the meaningful participation of women and young people in peace and decision-making processes.

In connection with peace and security in Africa, the Council encouraged Member States to facilitate the full and meaningful participation of youth in peace processes and at all decision-making levels and to include young women in those processes. It also encouraged States to integrate youth and youth-led civil society in efforts to promote a culture of peace, tolerance, intercultural and interreligious dialogue, as well as to take steps to encourage the meaningful participation of youth in the reconstruction of areas devastated by conflict, to bring help to refugees, internally displaced persons and war victims and promote peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation.⁸⁰

The Council urged national stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau to strictly respect and comply with the Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau and the ECOWAS road map itself in addressing their differences and the challenges facing their country.²⁸¹ The Council called upon them to engage in inclusive and genuine dialogue and work together to consolidate the progress made so far, and to address the root causes of instability.⁸² While expressing deep concern over the social and political situation in the country, the Council called upon the President of Guinea-Bissau, José Mário Vaz, and the Government, led by the Prime Minister, Aristides Gomes, in charge of conducting the electoral process, to resolve their differences in the spirit of respect and cooperation.⁸³

With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council urged the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to accelerate the

⁸⁰ S/PRST/2019/15, seventh paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Peace and security in Africa". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 11.

⁸¹ Resolution 2458 (2019), para. 8, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Guinea-Bissau". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 7.

⁸² Resolution 2458 (2019), para. 14.

⁸³ S/PRST/2019/13, second paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Guinea-Bissau".

Government-led inclusive political settlement through regular high-level dialogue, through the National Security Council mechanism, with Parliament and through inclusive dialogue.⁸⁴ The Council emphasized the need for reconciliation, including inter- and intra-clan reconciliation, across the country as the basis of a long-term approach to stability. It also urged the Federal Government and the federal member states to pursue reconciliation talks at the local, regional and national level.⁸⁵

In connection with the situation in West Africa, the Council urged the national authorities in the Gambia and its people to continue in their efforts towards consolidating peace, through political reform, security sector reform and transitional justice processes, as well as through the review of the Constitution.⁸⁶ The Council encouraged the consolidation of ongoing political reforms in the region to prevent violence and instability, as well as progress in the area of national reconciliation in Sierra Leone and Liberia.⁸⁷ The Council also emphasized the need for national stakeholders in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Togo to work together to facilitate the timely preparation for, and holding of, genuinely free and fair, credible, timely and peaceful elections, to take all appropriate steps to prevent violence, to ensure a level playing field for all candidates and to work towards the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women.⁸⁸

Resolution of outstanding disputes through dialogue

In connection with Cyprus, Western Sahara and relations between South Sudan and the Sudan, including with regard to the dispute over the Abyei Area, the Council called on parties to resolve outstanding disputes through dialogue, with a view to achieving a lasting political solution.

In that regard, the Council called upon the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot sides, specifically the leaders of the two communities and all involved parties, to actively and meaningfully engage with openness and creativity, fully commit to a settlement process under United Nations auspices, use the United Nations consultations to restart negotiations and avoid

any actions that could damage the chances of success.⁸⁹ The Council urged the sides to renew their efforts to achieve an enduring, comprehensive and just settlement based on a bicomunal and bizonal federation with political equality, as set out in relevant Council resolutions, including paragraph 4 of its resolution 716 (1991).⁹⁰

With respect to the Abyei Area, the Council reiterated that any territorial disputes between States must be settled exclusively by peaceful means and underscored that the future status of Abyei would be resolved by negotiations between South Sudan and the Sudan in a manner consistent with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army of 9 January 2005.⁹¹ The Council urged continued progress towards the establishment of the Abyei Area institutions and the implementation of confidence-building measures among the respective communities, ensuring that women were involved in all stages.⁹² The Council also determined that both parties should demonstrate measurable progress on border demarcation.⁹³

With regard to the situation concerning Western Sahara, the Council emphasized the need to achieve a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution based on compromise.⁹⁴ The Council called upon Morocco, the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro, Algeria and Mauritania to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General, without preconditions and in good faith, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the

⁸⁴ Resolution 2461 (2019), para. 5, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Somalia". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 2.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

⁸⁶ S/PRST/2019/7, twelfth paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Peace consolidation in West Africa". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 10.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, fourteenth paragraph.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, fifteenth paragraph.

⁸⁹ Resolutions 2453 (2019), para. 2, and 2483 (2019), paras. 1–2, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Cyprus". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 19.

⁹⁰ Resolution 2483 (2019), fourth preambular paragraph.

⁹¹ Resolutions 2469 (2019), third preambular paragraph, and 2497 (2019), third preambular paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan".

⁹² Resolutions 2469 (2019), paras. 9 and 18, and 2497 (2019), paras. 10 and 18.

⁹³ Resolutions 2465 (2019), para. 3, in connection with the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", and 2497 (2019), para. 3.

⁹⁴ Resolutions 2468 (2019), para. 2, and 2494 (2019), para. 2, in connection with the item entitled "The situation concerning Western Sahara". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 1.

Charter.⁴⁹⁵ Emphasizing the importance of a renewed commitment by the parties to advancing the political process in preparation for further negotiations, the Council encouraged the neighbouring countries to make important and active contributions to that process.⁵⁹⁶

C. Decisions involving the Secretary-General in the Council's efforts at the pacific settlement of disputes

While Article 99 of the Charter provides that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, the Charter does not specifically define the role of the Secretary-General in relation to matters of peace and security. The work of the Council regarding conflict prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes has, however, required the involvement of the Secretary-General in all relevant aspects of that agenda.

During the period under review, the Council recognized the good offices work of the Secretary-General, as well as that of his special representatives and envoys, in support of efforts to end violent conflict, peace and reconciliation processes and the resolution of outstanding disputes.

Good offices to end violence

The Council highlighted the role of the Secretary-General and his special envoys and representatives in efforts to end the fighting and resume political dialogue in Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen and to achieve a permanent ceasefire in Lebanon. In connection with the situation in Lebanon specifically, the Council expressed strong support for the continued efforts of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to engage Israel and Lebanon in discussing a wider range of issues. It also urged the parties to cooperate with the Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution envisaged in resolution 1701 (2006).⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Resolutions 2468 (2019), para. 4, and 2494 (2019), para. 4.

⁹⁶ Resolutions 2468 (2019), para. 8, and 2494 (2019), para. 8.

⁹⁷ Resolution 2485 (2019), paras. 12 and 16. For more information on the mandate of UNIFIL, see part X, sect. I.

With respect to the situation in Libya, the Council expressed its strong support for the ongoing efforts of UNSMIL and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and underscored the importance of the United Nations central role in facilitating a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process.⁶⁹⁸ The Council also reiterated its request that all Member States fully support the efforts of the Special Representative and that they use their influence with the parties to bring about a ceasefire and an inclusive political process.⁹⁹

In connection with the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council welcomed the announcement of 23 September 2019 by the Secretary-General regarding the agreement of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Syrian Negotiation Commission for a credible, balanced and inclusive Constitutional Committee facilitated by the United Nations in Geneva.¹⁰⁰ It expressed its appreciation for the diplomatic engagement of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria to finalize that process.¹⁰¹

In connection with the situation in Yemen, the Council underlined its full support for the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and called on the Government of Yemen and the Houthis to engage constructively and continuously with him.¹⁰² The Council also expressed support for the efforts of the Special Envoy to work with the parties to pave the way for the resumption of comprehensive negotiations, without delay, on the security and political arrangements necessary to end the conflict and resume a peaceful transition.¹⁰³

Good offices in support of peace and reconciliation processes

The Council highlighted the role of the Secretary-General in support of inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation in consolidating peace and resolving political tensions in Somalia, in the Central African region and in West Africa and the Sahel.

Regarding the situation in Somalia, the Council expressed its deep appreciation for the support provided by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to the Federal Government of Somalia, in particular with regard to the development of an inclusive political settlement and preparations for

⁹⁸ Resolution 2486 (2019), fourth preambular paragraph.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, nineteenth preambular paragraph.

¹⁰⁰ S/PRST/2019/12, first paragraph.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, third paragraph.

¹⁰² S/PRST/2019/9, first paragraph.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

the inclusive one-person-one-vote elections in 2020 and 2021, state-level elections, the constitutional review process and the mediation, prevention and resolution of conflicts.⁷¹⁰⁴

In connection with the situation in the Central African region, the Council welcomed the role of the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) in promoting inclusive political dialogue in non-mission settings such as Cameroon, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe, in encouraging stability in the region and in assisting the countries of the subregion in consolidating peace, resolving tensions and preventing or mitigating political crises.¹⁰⁵

Concerning West Africa and the Sahel, the Council called upon the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) to encourage all political stakeholders to use dialogue to resolve their differences with respect to constitutional review processes.¹⁰⁶ The Council underlined the need for the United Nations to sustain support for political reforms in the region and national reconciliation in Liberia and Sierra Leone.¹⁰⁷

Good offices in support of the resolution of outstanding disputes

The Council expressed support for the Secretary-General in efforts to address longer-term disputes regarding Cyprus, the Abyei Area and Western Sahara. The Council also addressed the role of the United Nations in supporting the resolution of outstanding issues related to missing persons and the return of property between Iraq and Kuwait.

Regarding the situation in Cyprus, the Council welcomed the willingness of the Secretary-General for his good offices to remain available to assist the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, and expressed its full support therefor, should they jointly decide to re-engage in negotiations with the necessary political will. The Council requested the Secretary-General to maintain transition planning in relation to a settlement, guided by progress in negotiations, and encouraged the

sides to engage with each other, as well as with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations good offices mission in that regard.¹⁰⁸ The Council called upon the relevant parties involved to explore ways to establish mechanisms and enhance existing initiatives, with UNFICYP as facilitator through its liaison role, for effectively alleviating tensions and to help to address island-wide matters that affected all Cypriots.¹⁰⁹

With respect to the situation in the Abyei Area, the Council encouraged the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa to continue coordinating efforts to facilitate the full implementation of the 2011 agreements between South Sudan and the Sudan. The Council encouraged the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to coordinate with the Panel and the Special Envoy on reconciliation, community sensitization and political peace processes.¹¹⁰ The Council requested that the Secretary-General consult with the parties and the African Union in relation to, inter alia, enhancing the role played by the Special Envoy in supporting the African Union and helping the parties to establish temporary administrative and security arrangements for Abyei and to achieve a political solution with regard to its status.¹¹¹

The Council expressed its full support for the ongoing efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara to sustain the renewed negotiations process in order to achieve a solution with regard to the situation concerning Western Sahara.¹¹² The Council called on the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General, to implement their commitments to the Personal Envoy and to refrain from any actions that could undermine the United Nations-facilitated negotiations or further destabilize the situation in the Western Sahara.¹¹³

With regard to relations between Iraq and Kuwait, the Council expressed its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and Head of the United Nations Assistance

¹⁰⁴ Resolution 2461 (2019), para. 4. For more information on the mandate of the UNSOM, see part X, sect. II.

¹⁰⁵ S/PRST/2019/10, second paragraph, in connection with the item entitled "Central African region". For more information on the item, see part I, sect. 8. For more information on the mandate of UNOCA, see part X, sect. II.

¹⁰⁶ S/PRST/2019/7, thirteenth paragraph. For more information on the mandate of UNOWAS, see part X, sect. II.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., fourteenth paragraph.

¹⁰⁸ Resolution 2453 (2019), para. 7.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., para. 6.

¹¹⁰ Resolutions 2469 (2019), para. 10, and 2497 (2019), para. 11. For more information on the mandate of UNISFA, see part X, sect. I.

¹¹¹ Resolution 2497 (2019), para. 9.

¹¹² Resolutions 2468 (2019), para. 3, and 2494 (2019), para. 3.

¹¹³ Resolutions 2468 (2019), paras. 4 and 6, and 2494 (2019), paras. 4 and 6.

Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs for UNAMI in their efforts to resolve outstanding issues related to missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and the return of Kuwaiti property.⁸¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ S/PRST/2019/1, second paragraph, in connection with the item entitled “The situation between Iraq and Kuwait”. For more information on the mandate of UNAMI, see part X, sect. II.

IV. Discussion on the interpretation or application of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter

Note

Section IV features the main discussions in the Security Council in 2019 with regard to the interpretation of specific provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the role of the Council and the Secretary-General in the peaceful settlement of disputes. It excludes those that concern regional organizations, which are covered in part VIII. During the year under review, explicit references were made to Article 33,¹¹⁵ Article 99¹¹⁶ and Chapter VI¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ In connection with the letter dated 13 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/264), see S/PV.8461 (Kuwait) and S/PV.8575 (Kuwait); in connection with the letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136), see S/PV.8516 (Kuwait); in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8546 (South Africa); in connection with peace and security in Africa, see S/PV.8633 (Programme Manager of the Zanele Mbeki Development Trust and Kuwait); and in connection with peacebuilding and sustaining peace, see S/PV.8668 (Resumption 1) (Bahrain).

¹¹⁶ In connection with the maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8546 (Kuwait).

¹¹⁷ In connection with the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see S/PV.8452 (Mexico); S/PV.8472 (South Africa and Indonesia); S/PV.8476 (South Africa); and S/PV.8506 (Indonesia); in connection with the situation concerning Haiti, see S/PV.8502 (Belgium, Haiti and Argentina); in connection with women and peace and security, see S/PV.8514 (South Africa); in connection with implementation of the note by the President of the

D. Decisions involving regional arrangements or agencies

During the period under review, pursuant to Article 52 of the Charter, the Council expressed support for the crucial role of regional and subregional organizations and other arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes, and encouraged them to continue with those efforts and enhance their cooperation and coordination with the United Nations in that regard. The Council’s decisions regarding joint or parallel efforts undertaken by the Council and regional organizations, arrangements or agencies in the pacific settlement of disputes during the period under review are covered in part VIII.

during deliberations, but, in most cases, this did not result in a constitutional discussion. No explicit references were made to Articles 36, 37 or 38.

The section is divided into three subsections: A. Reference to peaceful means of settlement in the light of Article 33 of the Charter; B. Relevance of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter in comparison with the provisions of Chapter VII; and C. Utilization of Article 99 of the Charter by the Secretary-General for the pacific settlement of disputes. The section features cases in which there were relevant constitutional discussions during the period under review.

A. Reference to peaceful means of settlement in the light of Article 33 of the Charter

Article 33 of the Charter stipulates that any dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of

Security Council (S/2017/507), see S/PV.8539 (Ukraine and Bahrain); in connection with maintenance of international peace and security, see S/PV.8546 (Secretary-General, Kuwait, South Africa, Peru, Equatorial Guinea, Poland and Côte d’Ivoire); in connection with cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, see S/PV.8548 (Kuwait); in connection with threats to international peace and security, see S/PV.8569 (Peru); in connection with peace and security in Africa, see S/PV.8633 (Programme Manager of the Zanele Mbeki Development Trust, Kuwait, China and South Africa); and in connection with peacebuilding and sustaining peace, see S/PV.8668 (China and Guatemala); and S/PV.8668 (Resumption 1) (Lebanon).

international peace and security should first be addressed through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means, and states that the Council can call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means. During the period under review, discussions with respect to Article 33 were held in connection with the following items: (a) “Maintenance of international peace and security” (cases 5 and 8); (b) “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace” (case 6); and (c) “Women and peace and security” (case 7).

Case 5

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 12 June 2019, at its 8546th meeting, convened at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the presidency for the month,¹¹⁸ the Council held an open debate under the sub-item entitled “Conflict prevention and mediation”.¹¹⁹ In his briefing, the Secretary-General stated that conflict prevention and mediation were two of the most important tools available to reduce human suffering. He recalled that in Chapter VI of the Charter a broad range of tools were set out for parties to use for the prevention and resolution of conflict, including negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means chosen by the parties. He urged Governments to make full use of those tools and the Council to use its own authority to call upon the parties to pursue them. Noting that prevention and mediation would not work without broader political efforts, the Secretary-General urged Council members and all Member States to strive for greater unity to ensure that those efforts were as effective as possible.

In her remarks, the Chair of The Elders focused on three specific areas in which The Elders believed that the Council could play a proactive and positive role on conflict, namely, prevention, climate change and the impact of technology. With regard to prevention, she stated that it was by far the most effective way to deal with conflicts and should not be viewed narrowly in terms of immediate security and stability. She added that the Council should redouble its collective efforts to ensure that the perspectives and experiences of women were reflected in the mainstream of peacekeeping and prevention policy. She encouraged the Council to adopt a more holistic approach to conflict prevention, including climate change, as that would both make it more effective and would support the mandate of other parts of the United Nations system. She expressed

support for the creation of an institutional focal point, in the form of a special representative of the Secretary-General, to pull together expertise on climate change from across and beyond the United Nations, to help the Council to assess the diverse, complex and shifting impacts of climate change on conflicts. With regard to technology, she reflected on its impact on youth, highlighting social media as being a powerful tool for connecting people around the world, as well as a tool for enabling violent extremism and spreading misinformation. She also raised the need to develop global norms and rules around cyberconflict prevention. The Deputy Chair of The Elders and former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, expressed the view that the working methods of the Council could be improved to encourage Council members to agree on a joint common position to address conflicts in their early stages. He called on Council members to do more to support the Secretary-General in using his good offices to help to prevent and reduce the threat of conflict and emphasized the role of regional organizations in preventing and resolving conflict and the need for greater coordination between the Council and regional organizations in that regard.

During the discussion, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait recalled that the Charter provided the Council with many tools that encouraged conflict resolution by peaceful means, especially Chapter VI, in which stress was placed on the preventive role of the Council. He added that the Council had the right to call on parties to conflicts to resolve their disputes by the means outlined in Chapter VI and to investigate any dispute or situation that might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuation was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of Peru stated that recourse to the means of peaceful settlement of disputes provided for in Chapter VI was an underutilized tool with a genuine capacity to offer positive alternatives for action before, during and after conflicts. Noting that under Article 33 of the Charter, parties to a dispute should first seek a solution through political means, the representative of South Africa stated that, before considering the use of force under Chapter VII, the Council must consider a peaceful political solution to the conflict. The representative of Côte d’Ivoire recalled that conflict prevention through mediation was a primary duty of States, which were responsible for taking every possible measure to create the sociopolitical conditions essential to maintaining peace.

Council members widely referred to the importance of mediation and conflict prevention for the

¹¹⁸ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to letter dated 31 May 2019 (S/2019/456).

¹¹⁹ See S/PV.8546.

pacific settlement of disputes, including for the work of the Council. The representative of the United States stated that the Council rarely explored mediation as a tool in resolving conflicts and that better prevention and mediation would help to prevent costly peacekeeping missions and provide an exit strategy for existing missions. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed that if the Council did not find ways for effective conflict prevention in countries not yet on its agenda where concerns existed, then it was more likely that they would actually come onto the agenda. The representative of Germany stated that the Council should move more often from early warning to early action.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait stated that mediation efforts must be comprehensive and deal with the root causes of conflicts. The representative of China added that conflicts had a variety of deep-seated causes, such as extreme poverty, imbalanced development, lack of resources and ethnic and tribal tensions. Several representatives highlighted the need for inclusivity and greater and more meaningful participation of women and young people in mediation and prevention. Others also expressed support for greater coordination with regional mediation efforts.

The representative of China stated that conflict prevention must adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter, such as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, non-aggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The representative of the Russian Federation added that international assistance in a mediation context should be provided only with the consent of the parties to the dispute and must be impartial and free of preconditions. He added that prevention should not be seen as a panacea for all ills and that it could not become a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign States.

With respect to obstacles precluding preventive action by the Council, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait stated that the Council's success in using preventive tools depended on the unity and consensus of its members. Similarly, the representative of Indonesia stated that Council unity was as essential as the need for a sincere, well-owned and resolute effort by the parties to a conflict to resolve their disputes peacefully. The representative of the Russian Federation expressed the view that if all Council members genuinely made the interests of States in question their top priority, rather than inflicting coercive unilateral economic measures on them, the potential of the Organization with regard to issues of

conflict prevention and mediation would increase significantly.

Several speakers shared recommendations on how to strengthen the preventive and mediation role of the Council. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait specifically referred to sending small delegations of Council members to undertake mediation efforts and holding meetings in various formats to discuss matters that could threaten international peace and security. He added that traditional tools of peacekeeping operations and sanctions could be used more efficiently to achieve the purposes of preventive diplomacy. Stating that the Council very often focused on the use of the military in peacekeeping operations, the representative of Germany called for greater use of police to achieve prevention. The representative of Peru recalled that the elected members of the Council had been promoting the idea of holding of periodic informal meetings with the Secretariat in order to learn, from a regional perspective and on a rotational basis, about potential threats to peace and security. He added that it would be beneficial for the Council to make use of the various meeting formats available in a preventive context, such as Arria-formula meetings and informal interactive dialogues. Council members also discussed how to enhance the good offices and mediation work of the Secretary-General (see case 10).

Case 6 Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

On 11 and 19 November 2019, at its 8668th meeting, convened at the initiative of the United Kingdom, which held the presidency for the month,¹²⁰ the Council held an open debate under the sub-item entitled "The role of reconciliation in maintaining international peace and security".¹²¹ In his remarks, the Secretary-General stated that successful reconciliation contributed to preventing a recurrence of conflict and to building more peaceful, resilient and prosperous societies, in particular in the aftermath of large-scale violence and human rights violations. Notwithstanding its vital importance, he added that the concept of reconciliation must evolve to keep up with the changing nature of conflict. In that regard, the Secretary-General noted that reconciliation must come from within communities, with the participation of all, including women, civil society groups, religious leaders, young people and members of marginalized groups. Successful reconciliation processes, according to the Secretary-

¹²⁰ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 11 November 2019 (S/2019/871).

¹²¹ See S/PV.8668 and S/PV.8668 (Resumption 1).

General, must also address the pain and suffering of victims, understand the motivation of offenders, render justice, provide remedy and ensure truth.

The Dean of the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University stressed that reconciliation should be viewed as a transformational process and rely on local approaches. He added that reconciliation should occur not only after violent conflict, but also as the first option for achieving peace. The Director of Programs and Development of the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, a non-governmental organization in Somalia, highlighted that country's experience with reconciliation and emphasized that successful reconciliation processes should include as many sectors of the population as possible and seek to build consensus. She urged the Council to utilize resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) to advance and mandate the inclusion of women in reconciliation strategies.

In the subsequent discussion, the representative of Côte d'Ivoire said that reconciliation should play a role throughout the entire peace continuum, from prevention, through management, to the consolidation of post-crisis stability. Beyond the national arena, he added that reconciliation was also needed in cases of conflicts between States. The representative of China underscored that dialogue and consultations were the only ways to achieve reconciliation and that his delegation supported such peaceful means to resolve international disputes and hotspot issues.

Several speakers emphasized the need to tailor reconciliation processes to local circumstances and the importance of national ownership. The representative of Kuwait stated that there was no one reconciliation model and that every situation had its own characteristics, depending on the nature of the conflict and the historical, cultural, social and economic dimensions related to its outbreak. Referring to transitional justice as one of the methods of reconciliation, the representative of South Africa stated that such processes must respond to the specific context of the country in transition. The representative of China stated that the support of the international community in that context must be based on respect for national sovereignty and ownership, as well as independence, unity and territorial integrity. The representative of the Russian Federation added that such assistance should not become a way to impose ready-made solutions from the outside. The representative of Namibia cautioned that the vested interests of external parties could jeopardize reconciliation processes. The representative of India said that artificially imposed standards or timelines were unlikely to result in successful

reconciliation. The representative of Germany noted that national sovereignty should be respected, but within the limits of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

A number of speakers stressed the need for reconciliation processes to be inclusive. The representative of Indonesia noted that lasting reconciliation required all segments of society to be on board. The Minister of State (for the Commonwealth, the United Nations and South Asia) of the United Kingdom emphasized the key role that faith leaders could play in encouraging dialogue and mediating between different groups. The representative of Armenia noted that the participation of women affected by conflict in peace processes had proved to increase the chances of durable and lasting settlements and reconciliation. The representative of the Dominican Republic stated that youth, including young women, must be involved as stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring of transitional justice processes, including truth-seeking, reparation and reconciliation programmes. The representative of Belgium stressed the need for a victim-centred approach and the need to take into account the experiences of children, refugees, internally displaced persons, minorities and members of other vulnerable groups.

In connection with the role of the United Nations in reconciliation, the representative of China stated that Chapter VI of the Charter should be fully leveraged with regard to the good offices and mediation roles of the Organization. The Minister of State of the United Kingdom maintained that the Council had a pivotal and key role to play, by working with the Secretary-General and his offices for mediation and support, special political missions, the Peacebuilding Commission and others. He added that Council members had a particular responsibility to ensure that their efforts succeeded through, inter alia, monitoring reconciliation processes, women mediators, deciding when to deploy missions and ensuring that women had a place at the very heart of the table at every stage of recovery and reconciliation. The representative of Germany stated that reconciliation and mediation capacities should be included more often in mission mandates. The representative of Ireland underscored that transitions from United Nations peacekeeping operations were an important moment to ensure continued reconciliation, namely through the strengthening of United Nations country teams, engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission and support for the Peacebuilding Fund.

Case 7

Women and peace and security

On 29 October and 4 November 2019, at its 8649th meeting, convened at the initiative of South Africa, which held the presidency for the month,¹²² the Council held a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “Towards the successful implementation of the women, peace and security agenda: moving from commitments to accomplishments in preparation for the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)”.¹²³

At the outset of the meeting on 29 October, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2493 (2019), in which Member States were urged to commit to implementing the women and peace and security agenda and its priorities by ensuring the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all stages of peace processes.¹²⁴ In the resolution, the Council also urged Member States supporting peace processes to facilitate the full, equal and meaningful inclusion and participation of women in peace talks from the outset, both in negotiating parties’ delegations and in the mechanisms set up to implement and monitor agreements.¹²⁵

In his briefing, the Secretary-General stated that, nearly two decades after the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), women still faced exclusion from many peace and political processes.¹²⁶ He observed that peace agreements were being adopted without provisions that considered the needs and priorities of women and girls. The Secretary-General highlighted the efforts of the United Nations to implement a new and stronger policy on women and peace and security, including reporting by the special political missions and his special envoys on their efforts to promote the direct participation of women throughout all stages of peace processes.

In her remarks, the Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women underscored the need for Member States to demand the direct and meaningful participation of women in all phases of peace talks. She noted that, in all ongoing peace processes, fewer than 8 per cent of agreements reached contained gender-

related provisions and that, even where agreements included specific gender provisions, ensuring their implementation remained a challenge. The representative of the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa) and the African Women Leaders Network noted the importance of developing a strategy that would allow for women’s leadership to play a substantial role in calming tensions, promoting a cessation of hostilities and initiating dialogue among the parties to the conflict. The representative of the non-governmental organization Working Group on Women, Peace and Security urged the international community to support the call for at least 50 per cent representation of Sudanese women across all peace processes, including in ongoing negotiations, and at all levels of Government.

In the subsequent discussion,¹²⁷ many speakers noted the connection between the participation of women and the sustainability of peace processes and agreements. The Minister for International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa stated that the women and peace and security agenda was an essential tool for ending the use of force as a means of settling disputes. The representative of Poland noted that security efforts were more successful and sustainable when women contributed to prevention and early warning, as well as to peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict resolution and peacebuilding. She added that women had a unique vantage point from which they were able to recognize signs of impending conflict and were often viewed by negotiating parties as honest brokers in peace processes, increasing the likelihood of an agreement being reached.

In discussing the gap in the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, the representative of Poland stated that, between 1992 and 2018, women constituted 13 per cent of negotiators, 3 per cent of mediators and only 4 per cent of signatories in major peace processes tracked. The representative of the United Arab Emirates maintained that women should be an integral part of both formal and informal negotiations from start to finish. The representative of Kazakhstan stated that efforts should be redoubled to support women in grass roots organizations working for a culture of peace, community-based reconciliation and an end to all forms of impunity. The representative of China stated that Member States shoulder the primary responsibility for the promotion of the effective participation of women in peace processes, emphasizing the need to fully respect national sovereignty.

¹²² The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 8 October 2019 (S/2019/801).

¹²³ See S/PV.8649, S/PV.8649 (Resumption 1) and S/PV.8649 (Resumption 2).

¹²⁴ Resolution 2493 (2019), para. 2.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 3. For more information on women and peace and security, see part I, sect. 30.

¹²⁶ See S/PV.8649.

¹²⁷ See S/PV.8649 and S/PV.8649 (Resumption 1).

The representative of Kazakhstan stated that the lack of participation of women in peace processes stemmed from the fact that violent conflicts were growing more complex and fractured with the proliferation of non-State actors. The representative of Australia said that the exclusion of women from conflict resolution and peacebuilding put peace and stability at risk and compounded negative outcomes for women and girls. He added that, in order to deliver on the women and peace and security agenda, the international community must address the root causes of gender inequality and protect women's rights. Ensuring greater participation by women, according to the representative of Côte d'Ivoire, first required adequate education, health and empowerment opportunities for women and girls. Similarly, the Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany called for capacity-building to enhance the qualitative participation of women in peace, security and peacebuilding processes.

The representative of Switzerland stated that the Council must ensure that its resolutions, including mission mandates, contained provisions requiring the meaningful participation of women in peace and security. The representative of Brazil noted that women peacekeepers were often the only ones able to make contact with the local female population, enabling missions to better protect civilians and fulfil their mandates as a whole. The representative of Peru called on the Council to redouble its efforts to integrate gender specialists into political and peacekeeping missions. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that United Nations special envoys should be held to account on their commitments to implement resolution 1325 (2000). She added that United Nations-led peace processes must be closely supported by gender experts, something that needed to be integrated throughout missions.

Case 8 Maintenance of international peace and security

On 17 July 2019, the Council held its 8577th meeting, convened at the initiative of Peru, which held the presidency for the month,¹²⁸ under the sub-item entitled "Implementation of the youth, peace and security agenda".¹²⁹ In her briefing, the Envoy of the Secretary-General on Youth stated that negative stereotypes contributed to the marginalization and stigmatization of youth. She emphasized the need to address the challenges facing young people, such as unemployment,

child marriage and mental health, as well as the importance of embracing young people as equal partners in efforts to prevent conflict and build peace. The Envoy made reference to the recognition and institutionalization of the youth and peace and security agenda within the United Nations through the launch of the United Nations Youth Strategy and the work of peacekeeping operations and special political missions on engaging young people in conflict prevention and resolution. She concluded by noting that efforts to build and sustain peace needed to be democratized to include the communities most affected.

The Programme Coordinator for HAKI Africa, a national human rights organization based in Kenya, stressed the need to create an enabling environment for peacebuilding by further implementing resolutions 2250 (2015) and 2419 (2018) on youth and peace and security. She called for enhancing the participation of young people in peace processes. The Executive Director of Afghans for Progressive Thinking, a national non-governmental organization, discussed the role of young people in the Afghan peace process and called on the United Nations to develop policies that would make young people an integral part of the decision-making process.

During the discussion, Council members exchanged views on the contributions of young people to conflict prevention and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The representative of the United Kingdom highlighted the importance of an inclusive political process when it came to conflict prevention and resolution, because when peace processes were inclusive, they were one third more likely to be sustainable. The representative of Indonesia referred to the calls of the Secretary-General for the inclusion of youth in all stages of the peace continuum, from conflict prevention, to conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The representative of the Dominican Republic stated that young people, with their immeasurable transformative and innovative potential, played a vital role in deterring conflict, acting as peacemakers in their communities and transforming societies by making them more just, inclusive and peaceful. The representative of Belgium added that the participation of young people in formal and informal peace and mediation processes could enhance the legitimacy and sustainability of those processes. The representative of the United States remarked that young people had played a critical role in countering terrorist narratives through the use of innovative tools and approaches. The representative of Peru highlighted the importance of the inclusion of young women in decision-making. The representative

¹²⁸ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 27 June 2019 (S/2019/539).

¹²⁹ See S/PV.8577.

of the Russian Federation cautioned that attention should be paid to the phenomenon of using radicalized young people to achieve domestic political goals, in particular externally orchestrated processes aimed at overthrowing legitimate authorities under the guise of democracy and human rights.

Underscoring the need for the Council to work to prevent and resolve conflicts through political means, the representative of China stated that the United Nations must engage in close exchanges on the needs of young people in armed conflict and in post-conflict situations. He also noted the need to fully consider youth-related factors in the political settlement of hotspot issues and ensure the constructive participation of young people in peace processes. The representative of the Dominican Republic called for the creation of networks of young mediators at the regional level and to ensure that young people briefed the Council on the maintenance of international peace and security in open debates and briefings. The representative of Kuwait noted that many initiatives had been undertaken to implement the youth and peace and security agenda, ranging from peace missions that involved young people in building social cohesion and stability in many-conflict affected regions worldwide, to high-level political initiatives.

Speaking on behalf of the three African members of the Council, the representative of Equatorial Guinea emphasized the urgent need to empower young people, not only in Africa, but around the world, so that they could be more influential and productive actors in their societies. The representative of Kuwait noted that the proliferation of conflicts, in particular in the Arab world, as well as unemployment, poverty, terrorism and radicalization, impeded the implementation of the youth and peace and security agenda. The representative of Belgium stated that the viewpoints and needs of young people should be central to processes of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well as to community violence-reduction programmes and actions to prevent violent extremism.

B. Relevance of the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter in comparison with the provisions of Chapter VII

During the period under review, some discussions in the Council touched upon the distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter. At the 8546th meeting, held under the item entitled “Maintenance of

international peace and security” (see case 5),¹³⁰ the representative of South Africa stated that, before considering the use of force under Chapter VII, the Council must consider a peaceful political solution to conflict, as envisaged in Chapter VI. He added that Article 33 specifically provided that parties to a dispute should “first of all” seek a solution through political means, including negotiation and mediation. At the 8633rd meeting of the Council, held under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” (see case 11),¹³¹ the representative of China underscored the need to make good use of Chapter VI, as well as the good offices and mediation capacity of the United Nations, while avoiding taking action by invoking Chapter VII at every turn. The issue was also addressed in Council meetings on the question concerning Haiti (case 9).

Case 9 The question concerning Haiti

On 3 April 2019, at its 8502nd meeting, held under the item entitled, “The question concerning Haiti”,¹³² the Council discussed the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) and the establishment of a future United Nations presence in the country. Expressing support for the recommendations of the Secretary-General with regard to the choice of a special political mission to succeed MINUJUSTH,¹³³ the representative of Belgium stated that a mandate under Chapter VI of the Charter was appropriate and noted that such an option was favoured by the Haitian authorities.¹³⁴ The representative of Argentina emphasized that a mission deployed under Chapter VI should support Haitian actions related to socioeconomic development during the transition period, in coordination with the United Nations country team, the Peacebuilding Commission and the Economic and Social Council. The representative of the Russian Federation recalled that his delegation had long said that the situation in Haiti was not a threat to international peace and security and that there was no need to continue to act under Chapter VII in that country.

At its 8510th meeting, on 12 April 2019,¹³⁵ acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution 2466 (2019), with 13 votes in favour and

¹³⁰ See [S/PV.8546](#).

¹³¹ See [S/PV.8633](#).

¹³² See [S/PV.8502](#).

¹³³ See [S/2019/198](#). For more information on the question concerning Haiti, see part I, sect. 14. For more information on the mandate of MINUJUSTH, see part X, sect. I.

¹³⁴ See [S/PV.8502](#).

¹³⁵ See [S/PV.8510](#).

2 abstentions. By the resolution, the Council extended the mandate of MINUJUSTH for a final period of six months until 15 October 2019.¹³⁶ Explaining his delegation's decision to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, the representative of the Russian Federation criticized the adoption of the text under Chapter VII.¹³⁷ He added that his delegation failed to understand how the human rights situation in a country where an armed conflict had long been over presented a threat to international peace and security. In contrast, the representative of France stated that the resolution, which included a mention of Chapter VII, provided MINUJUSTH with the necessary means to conclude the tasks that were entrusted to it and expedite the transition to a special political mission. Elaborating on the relationship between Chapter VII and human rights monitoring, the representative of Germany expressed the view that respect for human rights was a question of security and, therefore, rightfully within the Mission's mandate.

At the 8559th meeting, on 25 June 2019,¹³⁸ pursuant to the recommendation of the Secretary-General to establish a special political mission to succeed MINUJUSTH, the Council adopted resolution 2476 (2019), in which it requested the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) beginning on 16 October 2019 and for an initial period of 12 months. BINUH was mandated to, *inter alia*, advise and assist the Government in promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including the rule of law, planning elections and addressing human rights abuses and violations.¹³⁹

C. Utilization of Article 99 of the Charter by the Secretary-General for the pacific settlement of disputes

Article 99 of the Charter stipulates that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. In the discussions of the Council presented below, Member States encouraged the Secretary-General to fully exercise his power under Article 99 and to strengthen the effectiveness of his good offices. The multiple tools available to the Secretary-General under Article 99 were discussed in connection with the

following items: (a) "Maintenance of international peace and security" (case 10); and (b) "Peace and security in Africa" (case 11).

Case 10 Maintenance of international peace and security

On 12 June 2019, at the 8546th meeting of the Council, held under the sub-item entitled "Conflict prevention and mediation",¹⁴⁰ the Secretary-General stated that his good offices and those of his envoys were aimed at helping parties to peacefully resolve differences. He updated the Council on the work of his representatives and envoys in support of the political processes in the Central African Republic, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, as well as on the work of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia on transboundary issues and the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The Secretary-General added that peacekeeping operations and special political missions were undertaking vital conflict prevention and resolution efforts and emphasized the importance of mainstreaming women's rights and gender equality across the prevention and mediation work of the United Nations.

The Deputy Chair of The Elders welcomed the emphasis of the Secretary-General on prevention and noted that Member States must ensure that the work of the United Nations for prevention and peacebuilding was properly supported and funded. He called on Council members to do more to support the Secretary-General in the use of his good offices to help to prevent and reduce the threat of conflict. He added that they should also recognize that the work of the Council on peace and security was undermined when its members subverted the Organization's own peace envoys and peace processes.

During the subsequent discussion, Council members expressed support for the good offices, conflict prevention and mediation efforts of the Secretary-General. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait highlighted the inherent right and responsibility conferred upon the Secretary-General under Article 99 to play a role in preventing conflicts through his good offices or those of his special envoys and representatives in any conflict zone. The representative of France commended the Secretary-General for giving top priority to conflict prevention and welcomed his reforms, which he said should enable the entire United Nations system to be more effective in preventing crises. In particular, he referred to the strengthening of United Nations

¹³⁶ Resolution 2466 (2019), para. 1.

¹³⁷ See S/PV.8510.

¹³⁸ See S/PV.8559.

¹³⁹ Resolution 2476 (2019), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of BINUH, see part X, sect. II.

¹⁴⁰ See S/PV.8546.

mediation capacities through the creation of the High-level Advisory Board on Mediation and noted that the Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisors of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs was being deployed increasingly on the ground, sometimes at very short notice. The representative of China expressed support for the rapid-response system of the same Department. Similarly, referring to the critical need for the United Nations to retain an agile mediation capacity, the representative of the United Kingdom described the Standby Team as an important part of that prevention toolkit, with a wide range of preventive diplomacy capacities and expertise, including on the design and management of dialogue processes, constitution-making, gender and inclusion issues, natural resources, power-sharing and security arrangements. The representative of Poland expressed gratitude to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts to promote mediation as the most cost-effective and underrated method of conflict resolution.

Highlighting the role played by and the enormous potential of the United Nations regional political offices as sources of early warning in territories that were often not included on the Council's agenda, the representative of Peru expressed regret that the valuable information they produced was received only once every six months. He noted that the actions of the political offices should be strengthened with greater capacities for analysis and evaluation of the situation on the ground. Similarly, the representative of Belgium stated that more dynamic, and probably more frequent, informational meetings with the heads of United Nations regional offices would be more valuable and that those offices constituted an ideal vehicle for supporting or collaborating with regional and subregional organizations.

The representative of Equatorial Guinea emphasized the need to increase the participation of women in conflict prevention and mediation missions, as that would help the Council to better understand both the causes of conflicts and alternative solutions to them. The representative of the Russian Federation stressed the importance of ensuring that United Nations mediators were chosen on the basis of objective criteria and with respect for regional balance.

Case 11 Peace and security in Africa

On 7 October 2019, at its 8633rd meeting, convened at the initiative of South Africa, which held the presidency for the month,¹⁴¹ the Council held an

¹⁴¹ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 October 2019 (S/2019/786).

open debate under the sub-item entitled, "The centrality of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution".¹⁴² In his statement to the Council, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the United Nations, together with partners such as the African Union and subregional organizations, was making progress on conflict prevention in many parts of Africa. In that regard, he made particular reference to the work of the United Nations and the special representatives of the Secretary-General and special political missions to prevent the spiralling of a political crisis in the Gambia; facilitate peaceful presidential elections in Madagascar; address political tensions in Guinea-Bissau and the root causes of conflict in Cameroon; support elections in Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone; and prevent a further escalation of violence and facilitate a return to the political process in Libya.

In her remarks, a visiting scholar and the Associate Director of the Institute for African Studies at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University expressed regret that the use of the Secretary-General's good offices in deploying special envoys and representatives in conflict areas was aimed more at attempting to prevent conflicts from escalating than at preventing them from occurring altogether. While noting the reports of successful cases of interventions in Burkina Faso, Colombia, Mali and elsewhere, she said that it was usually a case of too little, too late. She commended the fact that the Women's Platform for the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region, initiated and launched by a former Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, had been made a flagship program for preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding in the region, with tremendous success. She added that the African Women Leaders Network and the FemWise-Africa network were at the disposal of the Secretary-General to assist him in his good offices and diplomatic efforts.

The Programme Manager of the Zanele Mbeki Development Trust described the role of the African Women in Dialogue platform, which had been launched in 2018, in facilitating for women, and in particular marginalized women, the promotion of healing and peaceful coexistence on the African continent. Moreover, noting that preventative diplomacy was used in the United Nations system at large, and in the office of the Secretary-General in particular, she expressed the hope that prevention would also become a central pillar of the Council's work, through the African Women in Dialogue platform.

¹⁴² See S/PV.8633.

During the discussion, a number of speakers highlighted the role of the Secretary-General, through his good offices, in conflict prevention. The representative of Kuwait noted the fundamental role played by the Secretary-General, having been granted the right and responsibility for preventing conflicts through his good offices or through his envoys and special representatives in conflict zones. The representative of Indonesia encouraged the Secretary-General to utilize every instrument in his preventive toolbox to avoid the recurrence of conflict. The representative of Ethiopia stated that the use of preventive diplomacy by the United Nations system and particularly the Secretary-General's good offices remained indispensable but underutilized in avoiding and containing crisis situations. The Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations stressed the need to utilize all preventive diplomacy tools, including good offices, special representatives, special envoys and emissaries, in order to foster a collective approach to the goal of providing coherent, effective and timely responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.

The representative of France commended the Secretary-General for his initiative in stepping up peace diplomacy and the reforms undertaken to strengthen mediation capacities and the early warning role of United Nations country teams. The representative of the Russian Federation said that the United Nations had every tool at its disposal as a basis for its work in preventive diplomacy, namely Chapters I and VI of the Charter, as well as a number of resolutions, including resolution [2171 \(2014\)](#), in

which the fundamental principles of international assistance in that area were enshrined. He added that the establishment in 2017 of the High-level Advisory Board on Mediation, composed of authoritative politicians and diplomats, was an important element of those efforts.

In terms of further improvements, the representative of Belgium stressed that rapid diplomatic response mechanisms could also be advanced through the good offices of the Secretary-General and his special envoys, as well as those of resident coordinators. While noting that conflict prevention was of course preferable to conflict resolution, the representative of the United Kingdom underscored that it required effective horizon-scanning capacities and commended the Secretariat and the African Union Commission for their work on strengthening their ability to conduct joint analysis and reporting. He also commended the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for the horizon-scanning discussion held on Latin America as an example wherein Council members had been provided with an informal opportunity to understand the situation in a range of countries not on the Council's agenda. The representative of South Africa urged the Secretary-General to deploy more women mediators, peace envoys and special representatives to assist in conflict resolution and mediation across Africa. The representative of France recommended that a report of the Secretary-General be prepared with a view to providing a regular assessment of the risks posed by climate change on international security, along with concrete recommendations.

Part VII

Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Chapter VII of the Charter)

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Introductory note

Part VII of the present Supplement deals with action taken by the Security Council with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, including Articles 39 to 51. This part is divided into 10 sections, each focusing on selected material to highlight the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter VII by the Council in its deliberations and decisions. Sections I to IV cover material related to Articles 39 to 42, which regulate the power of the Council to determine threats to international peace and security and to take the appropriate action in response to those threats, including the imposition of sanctions measures or the authorization of the use of force. Sections V and VI focus on Articles 43 to 47, regarding the command and deployment of military forces. Sections VII and VIII address, respectively, the obligations of Member States under Articles 48 and 49, while sections IX and X address, respectively, the practice of the Council with respect to Articles 50 and 51. The sections contain subsections on discussions held within the Council regarding the proper interpretation and implementation of the Articles governing the primary responsibility of the Council to maintain international peace and security.

During the period under review, as in previous periods, the Council adopted 50 per cent of its resolutions (26 out of 52 resolutions) explicitly under Chapter VII of the Charter. Most of those resolutions concerned the mandates of United Nations and regional peacekeeping missions or multinational forces, and the imposition, extension, modification or termination of sanctions measures.

As discussed in section I, in 2019, the Council determined that the Houthi attacks against civilian infrastructure in Saudi Arabia posed a serious national security threat to Saudi Arabia, as well as a wider threat to regional security. In addition, during the reporting period, the Council reaffirmed that the situations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan (including Abyei) and the Sudan, and Yemen constituted threats to regional and/or international peace and security. In connection with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council maintained its determination that the situation in the region continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security.

With respect to specific countries and regions, the Council in its decisions recalled past determinations of threats to international peace and security of significance in those situations. For example, in relation to Libya, the Council reaffirmed its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constituted one of the most serious threats to peace and security. In connection with the situation in Somalia, the Council reiterated that incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, were an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continued to pose a threat to international peace and security. In relation to the situation in West Africa, the Council recalled that the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons continued to pose threats to international peace and security, including in West Africa and the Sahel. Similarly, and for the first time in relation to the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, the Council determined that the illicit trade, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world, including Africa, continued to pose threats to international peace and security, caused significant loss of life, and contributed to instability and insecurity.

As in past practice, the Council reaffirmed in its decisions under thematic items that terrorism, terrorist groups and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as their means of delivery, constituted threats to international peace and security. The Council also reaffirmed that the linkages between international organized crime and terrorism represented a threat to international peace and security. Throughout 2019, the Council continued to address threats to international peace and security that were routinely discussed in the past, such as terrorism, the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, the illicit trade, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, as well as organized crime, including mercenarism in Africa. Consistent with practice in preceding years, climate change as a threat to international peace and security was also addressed in discussions of the Council during the review period.

As described in section II, in 2019, the Council adopted no decisions calling for compliance with provisional measures that may have been of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 40 of the Charter. In addition, there was no discussion of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 40 of the Charter.

As covered in section III, during the period under review, the Council imposed a new ban on components that could be used in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices and modified the arms embargo on the Central African Republic. The Council renewed the existing measures concerning the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen, and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities. No changes were made to the measures concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya or the Sudan, nor to those concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and associates. As far as judicial measures were concerned, no action was taken in 2019.

As described in section IV, the Council reiterated authorizations granted prior to 2019 to United Nations peacekeeping missions and multinational forces to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter, with regard to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan (including Abyei and Darfur). In that regard, the Council renewed the authorization to use force to discharge the protection of civilians mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union Mission in Somalia and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. Moreover, the Council reiterated the authorization granted to the French forces in the Central African Republic and Mali to take all necessary measures to support MINUSCA and MINUSMA, respectively, in fulfilling the mandated tasks. With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council also extended the authorization to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. In relation to the situation in Libya, the Council reiterated its authorization to Member States to take all necessary measures when confronting migrant smugglers and when carrying out the inspection of vessels in the implementation of the arms embargo. With regard to

the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council authorized the Member States acting under the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence, to take “all necessary measures” to effect the implementation of and ensure compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO, take “all necessary measures” in their defence.

As described in sections V to VIII, in the context of peacekeeping, the Council called upon Member States to contribute troops and other assets, including aerial force enablers, while Member States called for deepening its interaction and consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries during the period under review. In addition, the Council frequently requested compliance with its decisions adopted under Chapter VII by States and non-State actors alike, as well as by regional and subregional organizations. As featured in section IX, the Council discussed the impact of counter-terrorism measures and sanctions on the provision of humanitarian assistance. As covered in section X, Article 51 and the principle of individual and/or collective self-defence were cited abundantly in communications addressed to the Council and in its discussions. However, the volume of substantive deliberations on the scope, interpretation and application of Article 51 and the right to self-defence in meetings of the Council decreased as compared with 2018.

I. Determination of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Note

Section I concerns the practice of the Council with regard to the determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter. It provides information regarding the determination of the existence of a threat by the Council and examines instances in which a threat was debated. The section is divided into three subsections. Subsection A provides an overview of the decisions of the Council relating to the determination of a “threat to the peace”. Subsection B contains a series of case studies describing some of the arguments advanced during the Council’s deliberations in connection with the determination of a threat in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter and the adoption of some of the resolutions mentioned in subsection A. Subsection C provides an outline of the references to Article 39 found in communications addressed to the Council in 2019.

A. Decisions relating to Article 39

New threats

During the period under review, the Council did not determine the existence of any breach of the peace, act of aggression or new threat to international peace and security. However, in a presidential statement issued on 29 August 2019, the Council determined that the Houthi attacks on civilian infrastructure in Saudi Arabia posed a serious national security threat to the country, as well as a wider threat to regional security.¹

Continuing threats

In 2019, the Council continued to monitor the evolution of existing and emerging conflicts and

situations to determine, reaffirm and recognize the existence of continuing threats. The relevant provisions of the decisions, concerning country- or region-specific or thematic items, in which the Council referred to continuing threats to peace and security during the period under review are set out in tables 1 and 2, respectively.

In that regard, the Council determined that the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan, and Yemen continued to pose threats to international peace and security and/or threats to international peace and security in the respective regions. In Asia, with respect to Afghanistan, the Council recognized that, notwithstanding accelerated efforts to make progress towards reconciliation, the situation in Afghanistan remained a threat to international peace and security, and reaffirmed the need to combat the threat by all means.

In Europe, in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council determined that the situation in the region continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security.

In Africa, with respect to the situation in Libya, the Council reaffirmed its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constituted one of the most serious threats to peace and security. The Council made the same determination under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”. In relation to the situation in South Sudan and the Sudan, the Council recognized that the current situation in Abyei and along the border between South Sudan and the Sudan continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security. Concerning the situation in Somalia, the Council expressed grave concern that Al-Shabaab continued to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, in particular through its increased use of improvised explosive devices. The Council also condemned any flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, including when they resulted in supplies to Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), and when they undermined the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region. In connection with peace consolidation in West Africa,

¹ [S/PRST/2019/9](#), fifth paragraph.

the Council recalled that the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons continued to pose threats to international peace and security, including in West Africa and the Sahel.

In 2019, several decisions adopted in connection with thematic items also contained references to threats to international peace and security. In that regard, for the first time under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council expressed grave concern that the illicit trade, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world, including Africa, continued to pose threats to international peace and security. Under the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”, the Council determined that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security. Under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”,

the Council determined that the linkages between international terrorism and organized crime, whether domestic or transnational, constituted a serious challenge and a threat to international security. As in previous years, the Council called upon Member States to strengthen their efforts as well as international regional cooperation to counter the threat posed by the illicit cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which could significantly contribute to the financial resources of terrorist groups. The Council also recalled that ISIL (Da’esh) constituted a global threat to international peace and security through its terrorist acts, its violent extremist ideology, its continued gross, systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, its violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, in particular those committed against women and children, and including those motivated by religious or ethnic grounds, and its recruitment and training of foreign terrorist fighters whose threat affected all regions and Member States.

Table 1

Decisions in which the Council referred to continuing threats to the peace, by region and country, in 2019

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Provision</i>
Africa	
The situation in the Central African Republic	
Resolution 2454 (2019) 31 January 2019	Determining that the situation in the Central African Republic continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolutions 2488 (2019) and 2499 (2019) (penultimate preambular paragraphs)</i>
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	
Resolution 2463 (2019) 29 March 2019	Determining that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph) <i>See also resolutions 2478 (2019) and 2502 (2019) (penultimate preambular paragraphs)</i>
The situation in Libya	
Resolution 2473 (2019) 10 June 2019	Reaffirming its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)
Resolution 2486 (2019) 12 September 2019	Recalling its determination in its resolution 2213 (2015) that the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (final preambular paragraph)
The situation in Mali	
Resolution 2480 (2019) 28 June 2019	Determining that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)
Resolution 2484 (2019) 29 August 2019	Determining that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph)

Decision and date

Provision

The situation in Somalia

- Resolution [2472 \(2019\)](#)
31 May 2019 Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)
- Resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#)
15 November 2019 Condemning Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, expressing grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, particularly through its increased use of improvised explosive devices, and further expressing grave concern at the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL also known as Da'esh) (fourth preambular paragraph)
- Condemning any flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, including when they result in supplies to Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL, and when they undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region, and further condemning continued illegal flows of weapons and ammunition from Yemen to Somalia (sixth preambular paragraph)
- Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph)
- Resolution [2500 \(2019\)](#)
4 December 2019 Determining that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, are an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph)

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

- Resolution [2455 \(2019\)](#)
7 February 2019 Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (second preambular paragraph)
- Resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#)
15 March 2019 Determining that the situation in South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (penultimate preambular paragraph)
- See also resolution [2471 \(2019\)](#) (penultimate preambular paragraph)*
- Resolution [2465 \(2018\)](#)
12 April 2019 Recognizing that the current situation in Abyei and along the border between the Sudan and South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (final preambular paragraph)
- See also resolutions [2469 \(2019\)](#) and [2497 \(2019\)](#) (final preambular paragraphs)*
- Resolution [2479 \(2019\)](#)
27 June 2019 Determining that the situation in the Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)
- See also resolution [2495 \(2019\)](#) (penultimate preambular paragraph)*

Peace consolidation in West Africa

- [S/PRST/2019/7](#)
7 August 2019 The Security Council recalls that the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons continues to pose threats to international peace and security, including in West Africa and the Sahel (twenty-first paragraph)

Asia

The situation in Afghanistan

- Resolution [2501 \(2019\)](#)
16 December 2019 Recognizing that, notwithstanding accelerated efforts to make progress toward reconciliation, the situation in Afghanistan remains a threat to international peace and security, and reaffirming the need to combat this threat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in this effort (penultimate preambular paragraph)

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2019

Decision and date

Provision

Europe

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Resolution 2496 (2019) 5 November 2019 Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)

Middle East

The situation in the Middle East

Resolution 2456 (2019) 26 February 2019 Determining that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)

Resolution 2485 (2019) 29 August 2019 Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (final preambular paragraph)

Table 2

Decisions in which the Council referred to continuing threats to the peace, by thematic issue, in 2019

Decision and date

Provision

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

Resolution 2457 (2019) 27 February 2019 Gravely concerned that the illicit trade, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world, including Africa, continue to pose threats to international peace and security, cause significant loss of life, contribute to instability and insecurity (seventh preambular paragraph)

Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Resolution 2464 (2019) 10 April 2019 Determining that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (penultimate preambular paragraph)

Threats to international peace and security

Resolution 2482 (2019) 19 July 2019 Calls upon Member States to enhance coordination of efforts at all levels in order to strengthen a global response to linkages between international terrorism and organized crime, whether domestic or transnational, which constitute a serious challenge and a threat to international security (para. 1)

Calls upon Member States to strengthen their efforts as well as international and regional cooperation to counter the threat to the international community posed by the illicit cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which can significantly contribute to the financial resources of terrorist groups, and to act in accordance with the principle of common and shared responsibility in addressing and countering the world drug problem, including through cooperation against the trafficking in illicit drugs and precursor chemicals, also underlining the importance of border management cooperation, and welcomes in this context the continued efforts of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (para. 4)

Resolution 2490 (2019) 20 September 2019 Recalling that Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) constitutes a global threat to international peace and security through its terrorist acts, its violent extremist ideology, its continued gross, systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, its violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, particularly those committed against women and children, and including those motivated by religious or ethnic grounds, and its recruitment and training of foreign terrorist fighters whose threat affects all regions and Member States (third preambular paragraph)

Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

Resolution 2462 (2019) 28 March 2019	Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed (second preambular paragraph)
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B. Discussions relating to Article 39

During the period under review, while no explicit references to Article 39 were made in meetings of the Council, several issues regarding the interpretation of Article 39 and the determination of threats to international peace and security arose during the deliberations of the Council.

In 2019, the Council discussed threats to international peace and security in the context of several country- or region-specific situations and conflicts. In that regard, the Council deliberated on whether the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela posed a threat to regional or international peace and security at four meetings held under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela” (see case 1).

On 16 September 2019, under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”,² the Council heard a briefing on the situation in Yemen and discussed the attack on the Aramco oil facilities in Saudi Arabia of 14 September 2019. At that meeting, the speakers unanimously condemned the attack, claimed by Ansar Allah. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that it was a clear threat to regional and international peace and security and an effort to disrupt global oil supplies. The representative of Poland similarly indicated that incidents such as the attack in question posed a direct threat to the global energy supply as well as to broader security and stability in the Middle East. The representative of Côte d’Ivoire acknowledged that the attacks were likely to undermine regional security and stability, and the representative of Peru said they put regional and world security at high risk.

On 11 December 2019, under the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”,³ the Council met to address the threat to regional and international peace and security posed by the nuclear activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The meeting was held in response

to the launch of missiles carried out by the country on 28 November 2019. During the meeting, the representatives of the Dominican Republic and Peru stated that the ballistic missile programme and launches, respectively, of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were a serious threat to international peace and security. The representative of the United Kingdom similarly asserted that international peace and security were under threat, owing to the unabated development of ballistic missile and nuclear weapon technology by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The representative of the United States stated that the ballistic missile tests undermined regional security and stability. The representative of France said that the launches demonstrated the willingness of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to develop its missile arsenal, violated the decisions of the Council and undermined regional stability and security and international peace and security. The representative of Côte d’Ivoire condemned the repeated military exercises, which he said constituted serious breaches of international security and undermined the efforts of the international community to ensure peace and a peaceful coexistence among the countries of the region. The representative of Kuwait said that the progress on the Korean peninsula was being threatened as talks had begun to grind to a halt and ballistic missile launches had returned, accompanied by inflammatory statements, including threats of conducting further provocative missile attacks that would, in his view, jeopardize regional and international peace and security.

Consistent with past practice, the Council continued to discuss threats to international peace and security in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in its meetings under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.⁴

As in previous years, on multiple occasions in 2019, the Council addressed the existential nature of traditional and contemporary threats to international peace and security at its thematic meetings. In that

² See [S/PV.8619](#).

³ See [S/PV.8682](#).

⁴ See, for example, [S/PV.8449](#), [S/PV.8583](#) and [S/PV.8648](#).

regard, on 25 January 2019, the Council held a discussion on the threat that climate change posed to international peace and security, under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” (see case 2).

Under the same item, on 5 February 2019, the Council held a meeting at the initiative of Equatorial Guinea, which held the presidency for the month,⁵ under the sub-item entitled “Transnational organized crime at sea as a threat to international peace and security”.⁶ Various speakers⁷ at the meeting acknowledged the existence of a threat to international peace and security posed by transnational crime at sea. Many deliberated upon the nature of transnational crime at sea, as well as specific crimes and recent developments, of varying relevance to the interpretation of Article 39. The Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) briefed the Council on crimes occurring at sea in different parts of the world, including the trafficking of drugs, the smuggling of migrants and terrorist materials, piracy and armed robbery, kidnap for ransom and illegal fishing, which threatened international peace and security. The representative of China noted that pirate attacks and armed robbery occurred frequently; maritime trafficking in arms, drugs and persons continued unabated; and illegal funds flowed to terrorist organizations, extremist forces and criminal groups, exacerbating national and regional instability and threatening international peace and security. The representative of Sri Lanka addressed the vulnerability of ungoverned undersea cables. In his view, given that more than 80 per cent of Internet traffic was transferred using undersea cables and that Internet connectivity was inextricably linked to the economies of most countries, the seabed was becoming a tangle of ungoverned undersea cables, presenting a new threat to international peace and security. In that regard, he noted his country’s endorsement of the recommendations put forward by UNODC to address that new threat in order to support all States, namely, classifying submarine cables as critical communications infrastructure and/or critical national infrastructure, developing a national action plan for resilience in addressing the protection of submarine cables, enhancing the legal treatment of submarine cables in line with public international law and encouraging

States to designate a lead agency on the protection of submarine cables.

At a meeting convened at the initiative of Equatorial Guinea, which held the presidency for the month,⁸ under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, on 4 February 2019,⁹ the Council discussed the threat to international peace and security posed by mercenarism in Africa during a ministerial-level meeting. At that meeting, several speakers recognized the activities or the use of mercenaries as a threat to regional or international peace and security or peace and security in Africa.¹⁰ The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Côte d’Ivoire further elaborated that mercenarism was an old and widespread practice characterized by the formation of armed groups comprising large and extremely well-armed combat forces ready to fight on behalf of the highest bidder, thereby posing a lasting threat to the peace and stability of States and regions. The President of Equatorial Guinea stated that mercenary activities had been devastating and constantly leading to major challenges, such as obstacles to the self-determination of peoples, and that the negative consequences of that phenomenon were indicative of the danger and threat that mercenary activities posed to peace and security on the continent. The representative of the Sudan said that mercenaries sought to perpetuate conflicts, fragile conditions and weak Governments, and were therefore one of the greatest threats to maintaining peace and security.

Under the same item, on 9 July 2019,¹¹ prior to adopting resolution 2482 (2019) later that month, the Council considered the linkages between international terrorism and organized crime. In the resolution, the Council reaffirmed that, whether domestic or transnational, those linkages constituted a serious challenge and a threat to international security (see case 3).¹²

On 27 February 2019, the Council met under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “Silencing the guns in Africa” at the initiative of Equatorial Guinea, which held the presidency for the month.¹³ At that meeting, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2457 (2019), by which

⁵ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 31 January 2019 (S/2019/98).

⁶ See S/PV.8457.

⁷ Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Kuwait, South Africa, Senegal and Italy.

⁸ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 31 January 2019 (S/2019/97).

⁹ See S/PV.8456.

¹⁰ Côte d’Ivoire, China, France, South Africa and Djibouti.

¹¹ See S/PV.8569.

¹² Resolution 2482 (2019), para. 1.

¹³ See S/PV.8473. The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 13 February 2019 (S/2019/169).

it expressed grave concern that the illicit trade, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world, including Africa, continued to pose threats to international peace and security, caused significant loss of life and contributed to instability and insecurity.¹⁴ During the debate, the representative of Japan said that small arms and light weapons were a force multiplier of instability that exacerbated and prolonged conflict. He stressed that small arms and light weapons were the greatest common factor among various types of security threats on the African continent.¹⁵ Similarly, the representative of Mexico stated that conventional weapons accounted for the largest number of deaths and victims throughout the world and perpetuated armed conflicts. He noted that their uncontrolled proliferation in various regions of the world posed a threat to international peace and security. The representative of Djibouti, expressing regret that light weapons were readily available, said that they triggered and perpetuated violent conflicts and that they constituted a threat to international peace and security. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran underscored that one of the sources of the occurrence, exacerbation and prolongation of conflicts in Africa was certainly the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of arms, in particular small arms and light weapons, along with their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled proliferation. He further explained that that had a wide range of humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences and posed a serious threat to peace, security, stability and sustainable development in various parts of Africa. The representative of Ghana opined that the illicit manufacture and trade in small arms and light weapons was perhaps one of the biggest threats to peace and security in Africa.

Throughout 2019, the Council continued to address on numerous occasions the threats to international peace and security it had discussed in the past, including those posed by terrorism, the activities of terrorist organizations and the problem of foreign terrorist fighters,¹⁶ and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.¹⁷

¹⁴ Resolution 2457 (2019), seventh preambular paragraph.

¹⁵ See [S/PV.8473](#).

¹⁶ Under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, see, for example, [S/PV.8460](#), [S/PV.8496](#) and [S/PV.8605](#); and under the item entitled “Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council”, see [S/PV.8528](#).

¹⁷ Under the item entitled “Non-proliferation”, see, for example, [S/PV.8500](#), [S/PV.8564](#) and [S/PV.8695](#); and under the item entitled “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, see [S/PV.8487](#).

Case 1 The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

On 26 January 2019, at its 8452nd meeting,¹⁸ the Council discussed the events in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, including the large-scale protests that culminated in the self-proclamation of Juan Guaidó as the interim President of the country on 23 January 2019. During the meeting, the Council voted on the provisional agenda for the meeting entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”.¹⁹ Prior to the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation requested the floor and expressed the view that the internal situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was not an item on the agenda of the Council, that no external threats were arising from it and that it did not represent a threat to peace and security.²⁰ He said that, if anything did represent such a threat, it was the “shameless and aggressive actions of the United States and its allies aimed at ousting the legitimately elected President of Venezuela”. After the vote, by which the provisional agenda was adopted,²¹ the representative of China made similar remarks, underscoring that the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was a domestic matter that did not constitute a threat to international peace and security and stressing that China was opposed to adding it to the agenda of the Council. The representative of Nicaragua also stressed that the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela did not pose a threat to international peace and security, and the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines said that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela represented no danger to international peace and security even though its Government had been subjected to a “systemic campaign of aggression”. The representative of Cuba stated that the main threat to peace and security in Latin America and the Caribbean was “the bullying of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by the United States and its allies”. Echoing those statements, the representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia underscored that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in no way constituted a threat to either the region or the world; on the contrary, the aggressions of which the Bolivarian Republic of

¹⁸ See [S/PV.8452](#).

¹⁹ For more information on the agenda, see part II, sect. II.

²⁰ See [S/PV.8452](#).

²¹ The provisional agenda received nine votes in favour (Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States), four against (China, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa) and two abstentions (Côte d’Ivoire, Indonesia).

Venezuela had been on the receiving end were what constituted a threat to international peace and security.

Other speakers deliberated on the ways in which the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela could threaten international peace and security. Speaking before the vote, the Secretary of State of the United States focused on the humanitarian situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, including the fact that 3 million Venezuelans had been forced to flee the country, flooding the region and threatening international peace and security. After the vote, other speakers agreed that the situation in the country deserved consideration by the Council. The representative of Canada wondered how there could be any doubt that the movement of more than 3 million refugees constituted a threat to international peace and security. The representative of Peru noted with alarm that the rupture of constitutional order in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had given way to a serious political, economic and humanitarian crisis, which represented a threat to regional peace and security. The representative of Poland stated that the delegation supported the request by the United States and other countries for the briefing because they believed that the scale of Venezuelan migration and the humanitarian crisis – both resulting from the “oppressive regime of Nicolás Maduro” – had an undeniable impact and tremendous consequences on the situation in neighbouring Latin American countries, and that the situation *de facto* posed a threat to the stability and security of the region. The representative of Colombia stated that the “dictatorship in Venezuela” had posed a threat to peace, security and stability in the region, while running contrary to international law, in particular inter-American law.

The representative of Germany drew on the briefing delivered earlier at the meeting by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, including the reports of the violent deaths, which he said must be subject to independent and impartial investigations. He reasoned that given the massive violations of human rights and the threats to international peace and security, it was right that the Council discussed the issue. The representative of Kuwait said that the Council had a fundamental role to play in implementing preventive diplomacy in order to prevent conflicts and address crises at an early stage, should there be any signs of a situation leading to a threat to international peace and security. The representative of Belgium affirmed that it was clear that the Council had a responsibility to address the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which constituted a threat to international peace and

security. The representative of Argentina emphasized that the Council could not remain indifferent in the face of the tragedy, which was a threat to international peace and security because of its tragic consequences, in particular for the Venezuelan people and the region. The representative of Honduras said that, notwithstanding Chapter VIII of the Charter regarding regional arrangements and relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council had the responsibility to respond to threats to international peace and security. She added that, since all the region and its peoples were affected by the protracted crises in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the deterioration with regard to the rule of law, stability, security and elemental guarantees and freedoms, they requested the Council to urgently and diligently attend to the matter. The representative of Brazil stated that it was crucial that the Council address the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, not only because it could pose real and immediate risks to peace and security in Latin America and the Caribbean, but because it was a situation that demanded collective and urgent action.

The following month, on 26 February 2019, the Council held its 8472nd meeting, under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”.²² During the meeting, the representative of Peru stated that the continuation of the illegitimate regime in and of itself represented an unprecedented threat to the peace, security, freedom and prosperity of the entire region. The representatives of Argentina, Canada and Guatemala, invited under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, echoed the statement, agreeing that “Maduro and his illegitimate regime in power” represented an unprecedented threat to the security and peace of the entire region.

The representative of Belgium affirmed that the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was a clear threat to the stability of the region. The representative of the Dominican Republic underscored that the high cost incurred by flows of impoverished people, which could threaten the stability of host countries and the region, could not be ignored. The representative of Kuwait shared the concern about the humanitarian situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which had caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans to neighbouring States, adding it had been a tremendous challenge for host countries to provide safe and secure shelter to those people, constituting a threat to regional security and stability.

The representative of South Africa stated that, while his delegation did not believe that the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela posed a threat to international peace and security, the efforts of the Council in confronting the situation should be framed by Chapter VI of the Charter. The representative of Germany said he disagreed with South Africa, stressing that the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela belonged on the agenda of the Council and that it was a threat to international peace and security for two reasons. First, because there were 3.4 million refugees across the border, now living in the border areas of Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, affecting the stability, wealth and conditions of those countries. Second, because human rights were not solely an internal affair, but rather “a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations”, quoting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that he agreed with the representative of Germany and added that the “actions of the Maduro regime” had led to an economic collapse which threatened the peace and security of the region.

The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the topic of the meeting should have been “Threats to international peace and security”, given the threats to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela posed by a number of States, and that, rather than the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the situation surrounding the country should have been discussed. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela stressed that when powerful countries and other countries that were subordinate thereto organized aggression against the sovereignty of a free people, such as that of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, then the issue was undoubtedly a threat to the peace and security of the region, which in turn affected international peace and security. The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia said that the situation that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was experiencing demanded the attention of the Council, not because the country constituted a threat to international peace and security, but because the actions that had been taken against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela indeed posed a very serious threat to peace and stability within the region.

Case 2

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 25 January 2019, the Council held its 8451st meeting, a high-level open debate, under the

²² See [S/PV.8472](#).

above-referenced item, at the initiative of the Dominican Republic, which held the presidency for the month.²³ The Council considered the sub-item entitled “Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security”.²⁴ At the outset of the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, the Chief Scientist of the World Meteorological Organization and a research assistant at the Environmental Security Program of the Stimson Center.

In her briefing to the Council, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs said that she was encouraged by the holding of the debate, which signalled the willingness to establish a shared understanding of the impact of climate-related security risks on international peace and security. She also stated that major armies and businesses had long recognized the need to prepare for climate-related risks, rightfully perceiving climate change as a threat multiplier, and stressed the need to not “lag behind”. The Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme appealed to all participants to consider how the world now viewed climate risk and how it was assessing the threat that it posed to the future not only of economies but also of human and national security. The research assistant at the Environmental Security Program of the Stimson Center stated that the Council should adopt a draft resolution that formally recognized climate change as a threat to international peace and security. She regretted that it had been 10 years since its first debate on the issue and that no such resolution had been adopted, and stressed that climate change was a security threat both in its direct impacts and as a threat multiplier.

Council members addressed the impact of climate change on international peace and security to varying degrees. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany affirmed that climate change was increasingly becoming a threat to international peace and security and that the debate about its policy consequences belonged in the Council. He added that it should become routine for the Council to take the link between climate and security into account in conflict situations. The representative of China stated that climate change was a major challenge that affected the future and destiny of humankind, inducing natural disasters, wreaking havoc in many parts of the world and posing grave threats to food security, water

²³ See [S/PV.8451](#). The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 January 2019 ([S/2019/1](#)).

²⁴ See [S/PV.8451](#).

resources, the ecological environment, energy, human life and property. He added that those issues had become disruptive factors in certain regions, undermining peace and stability. The representative of Peru emphasized that it was important to address climate-related risks to human security, which had the potential to lead to humanitarian crises, conflicts and disasters that could pose threats to international peace and security. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic emphasized that the attention given to the link between the environment and security was consistent with the efforts of the international community to build an institutional architecture that responded to the multiple challenges posed by environmental degradation. He also said that the nexus between climate change and security had been addressed sporadically in the Council and noted a renewed interest in the issue. He added that, with regard to the link between the environment and security, the Council had already set precedents by accepting that environmental change and degradation were risk factors in several conflict-prone areas and that the negative effects of climate change could contribute to destabilization. In that connection, he said that the Council had to be equipped with the tools necessary to systematically assess the relationship between the effects of the climate change and conventional risks. By contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation deemed it excessive, and even counterproductive, to consider climate change in the Council. While acknowledging that the climate was indeed changing, he stated that climate change was not a universal challenge in the context of international security. The representative of South Africa pointed out that, as evidence-based studies had shown, it was often difficult to determine a direct causal nexus between climate change and natural disasters, on the one hand, and threats to international peace and security, on the other. He further explained that, in specific circumstances, they could be an exacerbating factor or a threat multiplier to more direct and specific root causes of conflict.

Other speakers spoke also about climate change as a threat multiplier responsible for the exacerbation of conflicts. The representative of Mexico said that the indirect effects of climate change on populations constituted a threat to international peace and security and were risks factors with regard to the emergence and the exacerbation of conflicts. Similarly, the representative of Morocco, highlighting the threat multiplier aspect of climate change, stated that it was essential to address the negative impacts of climate change not only because of their direct impact on food security, but also because they posed a threat to

international peace and security. The representative of Liechtenstein noted that Member States had become increasingly aware of the fact that climate change was a driver of insecurity and a threat multiplier for conflict, as well as a threat to collective security, and although there were other United Nations organs with the competence to address climate change, it was essential that the Council address the international and transnational threat that climate change posed to peace and security. The representative of New Zealand stated that climate change was not a future challenge to be endlessly discussed but a real and immediate threat. He recalled the statement of the Secretary-General that climate change was the defining issue of our time and a threat to livelihoods, well-being and international peace and security.

The observer for the European Union stated that climate change acted as a threat multiplier for conflicts over increasingly scarce resources and for instability and international and internal displacement. The representative of Latvia said that climate change was one of the greatest challenges of our time and that it undoubtedly affected geopolitical stability and security, while acting as a threat multiplier, especially for the most vulnerable regions – in some cases reinforcing conflicts. The representative of Trinidad and Tobago said that, as a threat multiplier, climate change applied additional stress on limited resources, social and economic pressures and the adaptive capacity of fragile ecosystems, which could lead to scarcity, population displacement and conflict. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia recalled that the security threats of climate change were indisputable and, in places that had no capacity to adapt, potential security threats became real security threats. The representative of Ireland underlined that climate-related disasters were a major threat that would continue to occur, and the Council had to respond to their impacts. He further referred to a body of research that had demonstrated the links among climate change, conflict and displacement and characterized climate change as a threat multiplier, observing that while the impact of climate-related disasters on international peace and security varied across regions and States, a global response was the only way to address the threat. The representative of the Republic of Korea indicated that, whereas in countries such as small island developing States, climate change itself posed the most significant threat to security, elsewhere it was becoming increasingly clear that climate change, interacting with other factors, was creating and pushing regional instability into full-blown conflicts and humanitarian crises. To prevent climate crises from further spiralling into threats to peace and security, he added that

international cooperation and support for vulnerable countries were crucial.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Haiti said that it was essential that the international community recognize the significance of climate-related disasters for international peace and security and the importance of implementing a common action plan to counter the threats that they posed. The representative of Norway said that the relationship between climate change and security was complex and that, while climate change was seldom a direct cause of conflict, it worked as a threat multiplier. The representative of Japan said that attention should be paid to the fact that peace and security, development, human rights and humanitarian elements were interlinked and noted that climate risks, including disasters, which could act as a threat multiplier, were increasing in least developed countries. The representative of Italy noted that hurricanes, droughts, sea level rise and extreme weather conditions could be considered new forms of natural hybrid threats to global security owing to their devastating effects on access to water and food, health conditions and socioeconomic development. The representative of Finland similarly noted that the threat that climate change and climate-related disasters posed to international peace and security was real. He further underscored that climate change affected food and water security and multiplied risks related to conflicts and forced migration.

Other speakers assessed climate change itself as a threat to international peace and security. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Maldives pointed out that hunger and displacement were leading to conflicts and entire nations were sinking under water. He wondered what was a greater security threat than that. He stressed that countries on the front line of impact, such as Maldives, could not wait, and added: "We cannot wait until we can all agree with the facts on the ground: that climate change is a threat to international peace and security." The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines said that the climate threat was unique, unprecedented, urgent and often difficult to deal with, but that that was no reason to "sweep it under the rug". She noted, though, that the rise of climate change as the existential threat of "our era" had not replaced the persistent peril of armed conflicts and cautioned against presenting a false choice among those issues and noted that they all must be dealt with, no matter how inconvenient climate-related security might be. The representative of Uruguay stressed that it was timely to reaffirm that climate change posed a real threat to the present and near future for all of humankind and, as such, international peace and

security were also affected. The representative of the Sudan said that, in addition to armed conflicts and international terrorism, the list of fundamental threats posed to international peace and security in today's world now also included threats caused by climate and environmental changes, which represented an additional driver of the factors threatening international peace and security. The representative of Romania stressed that climate change not only exacerbated threats to international peace and security but was itself a threat to international peace and security. The representative of Tuvalu similarly asserted that climate change was a global threat to peace and security. The representative of Mauritius emphasized that climate change was a complex threat to the peace, stability and sustainability of the planet, contributing to political violence and undermining the capacities of Governments. He noted that the potential of climate-related migration and displacement to cause conflict and pose a threat to international peace and security could not be overstated.

Some speakers proposed action by the Council. The representative of Chile emphasized that it was essential to develop analytical skills within the United Nations system to allow for the swift evaluation of the possible climate-related threats to international security, while providing the Council with useful information on those threats and helping States to develop and implement action plans to tackle them. The representative of Nauru, who spoke on behalf of the States members of the Pacific Islands Forum, suggested that the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General on climate and security, whose functions would include, inter alia, keeping the Secretary-General and the Council informed about emerging climate risks that threatened international peace and security and monitoring potential tipping points at the climate-security nexus, was a critical next step to prepare for the security implications of climate change. The representative of Barbados, who spoke on behalf of the 14 States members of the Caribbean Community, noted with interest the call for the appointment of a special representative on climate and security. She also supported the call for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction to brief the Council on climate change security threats resulting from natural disasters. She said that the Council should place emphasis on addressing the full gamut of the risks that climate change posed to peace and security and that the understanding of how climate change threatened peace and security and drove conflicts needed to be improved across the United Nations system. Similarly, the

representative of Belize, speaking on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States, stated that it had become increasingly necessary for the Council to have a more comprehensive understanding of the international peace and security risks arising from climate change and climate-related disasters, to be in a position to act appropriately.

The representative of Brazil pointed out that linking security issues to the environmental agenda risked mistakenly assuming that any environmental stress or natural disaster would lead to social unrest, armed conflict and, eventually, a threat to international peace and security. He stressed that there was no direct cause-and-effect relationship between a natural disaster and the outbreak of conflict. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran questioned the legal competence and technical capacity of the Council to address the issue of climate change. He further opined that the insistence of the Council on delving into issues that were not proven to threaten international peace and security, while not having been able to fully address certain serious conflicts, was incomprehensible.

Case 3 Threats to international peace and security

On 9 July 2019, the Council held its 8569th meeting under the above item and under the sub-item entitled “Linkages between international terrorism and organized crime” at the initiative of Peru, who held the presidency for the month.²⁵ At the outset of the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate; and an international consultant from the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.²⁶

The Executive Director of UNODC thanks the Council for its continued attention to the threats to international peace and security posed by terrorism and organized crime. He observed that criminals and terrorists had differing objectives and added that terrorist tactics could be employed by organized criminal groups while terrorists raised funds through criminal activities. The international consultant from the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute stressed that the linkages that existed between terrorism and organized crime were not independent security

threats, per se; rather, the ties that developed between them exacerbated the security environment.

Several speakers recognized the linkages between international terrorism and organized crime as a threat to international peace and security.²⁷ The representative of China noted a mutual collusion and infiltration between terrorism and organized crime, explaining that terrorist organizations were using organized crime for financing and organized criminal groups were resorting to extreme measures or committing terrorist activities, all of which posed a serious threat to international peace and security.

The representative of Kuwait added that the working methods of terrorist groups were evolving and their area of operations was becoming more diversified and that they were financing their operations through transnational organized crime in certain regions, including by trafficking in drugs, arms, humans and migrants, illegal trafficking in natural resources and kidnapping for ransom. He further stated that the phenomenon of terrorism was linked to transnational organized crime regardless of the differences in methodologies and goals and that they both constituted a threat to international peace and security. The representative of Côte d’Ivoire added that the exacerbation of the two phenomena, which had been particularly acute in West Africa, showed that, despite their different natures and modes of operation, they fed on each other when the conditions were right and both were a serious threat to international peace and security. Similarly, the representative of India stated that, while the nature of the relationship between terrorist and criminal groups could vary according to a variety of factors, they both relied on strategic recourse to the unsanctioned and illegitimate use of violence to undermine governance and development, and both led to destabilizing established State structures, thereby undermining and threatening international peace and security.

The representative of Australia affirmed that the link between terrorist groups and transnational, serious and organized crime presented a complex and evolving threat to international security. He further recalled the examples of international terrorist groups using sophisticated criminal activities to enhance and fund their operations and evade detection, in particular through kidnapping for ransom, money-laundering, drug trafficking, encryption and cybercrime. The representative of Nigeria stated that, while the existence of militant groups and organized criminal gangs was not a new phenomenon, in recent times, their manifestation and intricate linkages had been of

²⁵ See [S/PV.8569](#). The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 27 June 2019 ([S/2019/537](#)).

²⁶ See [S/PV.8569](#).

²⁷ Peru, Côte d’Ivoire, Kuwait, Slovenia and Armenia.

growing concern at the national, regional and international levels and, more importantly, their convergence had become an urgent threat to international peace and security. The representative of Morocco noted the existence of linkages between cross-border crime, armed groups, separatist movements, terrorist groups and traffickers of all kinds in Africa and added that drug and arms traffickers had joined the ranks of terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaida and its branch in the Islamic Maghreb and entities affiliated with Da'esh. He said that all of those criminal networks were interlinked and fuelled one another further as they became more global, thereby increasing their capacity to destabilize and undermine the territorial integrity of States, which he considered to undoubtedly be a threat to peace and security not only in Africa, especially the Sahel-Maghreb area, but throughout the entire world.

The representative of Mexico, while recognizing that both international terrorism and organized crime endangered peace and security, underlined the need to differentiate between them, which is why there were two different legal frameworks, each with its own institutional scaffolding. He further stressed that generalizations about the scope of the link between the two phenomena were neither valid nor timely, nor were generalizations about the responses required to prevent, combat and mitigate their effects. The representative of Colombia stated, by contrast, that terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security, as well as transnational organized crime, which constantly threatened the security of States, had been perceived in the past as differentiated criminal phenomena that were unrelated to each other, but over the years, they had developed close links, forming a criminal alliance that could affect any State.

The representative of Norway, speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, recalled that both terrorism and organized crime threatened international peace and security, and the representative of Azerbaijan stated that terrorism and related criminal activities continued to represent a serious threat to international peace and security. The representative of Trinidad and Tobago underscored that, in the Caribbean, transnational organized crime and its attendant cross-border activities had evolved into a major threat to regional security.

On 19 July 2019, at its 8582nd meeting, held under the same item,²⁸ the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2482 \(2019\)](#), in which it recognized the linkages between international terrorism and organized crime, whether domestic or transnational, as a serious challenge and a threat to international security.²⁹ At the meeting, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru stated that, with the resolution, the international community had a new tool to respond to that major challenge and threat to international security, in keeping with the obligations of States under international law, in particular international humanitarian law, international human rights law and refugee law.³⁰ The representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that the resolution should not be seen in and of itself as the end result of the work in that area. He added that the nature of the threat was changing rapidly, and the Council would have to revisit the issue of the nexus between terrorism and criminal activity.

C. References to Article 39 in communications addressed to the Security Council

During the period under review, two letters from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela addressed to the President of the Council contained explicit references to Article 39 of the Charter. In his letter dated 20 September 2019,³¹ the Permanent Representative deemed “reckless” and “wholly unfounded” the accusations by the Governments of the United States and Colombia that his country was a threat to peace and security. According to the letter, the accusation violated international law because the Government of the United States had no authority to call the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela a threat that warranted the use of military force and such authority was exclusive to the Council, as established in Article 39. In his letter dated 3 October 2019,³² he emphasized that the ability to determine the truth of the facts was an essential element in guaranteeing the maintenance of international peace and security and an attribution vested in the Council under Article 39.

²⁸ See [S/PV.8582](#).

²⁹ Resolution [2482 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

³⁰ See [S/PV.8582](#).

³¹ [S/2019/765](#).

³² [S/2019/792](#).

II. Provisional measures to prevent an aggravation of the situation in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Note

Section II covers the practice of the Security Council in relation to Article 40 of the Charter, regarding provisional measures to prevent an

aggravation of the situation. While Article 40 suggests that provisional measures to prevent the aggravation of a conflict would be adopted prior to the imposition of measures under Chapter VII (Articles 41 and 42), the practice of the Council reflects a more flexible interpretation of that provision. Given the prolonged and rapidly changing nature of conflicts dealt with by the Council, provisional measures have been imposed in parallel to the adoption of measures under Articles 41 and 42.

During the period under review, no explicit reference to Article 40 of the Charter was made in the Council's decisions or during its deliberations, nor was there any discussion of constitutional significance on its interpretation. Similarly, there was no explicit reference to Article 40 in any of the communications of the Council.

III. Measures not involving the use of armed force in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Note

Section III covers decisions of the Security Council imposing measures not involving the use of force, pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter. In 2019, the Council, under Chapter VII, imposed a new ban on components that could be used in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices and modified the arms embargo on the Central African Republic. During the review period, the Council explicitly referred to Article 41 in the preamble of resolution [2464 \(2019\)](#) in connection with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.³³ No judicial measures were imposed under Article 41.³⁴

The present section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A contains an outline of the decisions in which the Council imposed, modified or terminated measures under Article 41 of the Charter. It is organized under two main headings, dealing with decisions on issues of a thematic and country-specific nature. Subsection B covers the deliberations of the Council during the review period and is also organized under two headings, each highlighting the salient issues that were raised in connection with Article 41, with respect to thematic items or country-specific items.

A. Decisions relating to Article 41

Decisions on thematic issues relating to Article 41

The Security Council adopted a number of decisions on issues of a thematic nature concerning sanctions measures and their implementation under the following items: (a) "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security"; (b) "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts"; (c) "Women and peace and security"; and (d) "Threats to international peace and security".

In resolution [2457 \(2019\)](#), adopted under the item entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and

³³ Resolution [2464 \(2019\)](#), final preambular paragraph.

³⁴ For information on the activity of the Council regarding issues pertaining to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, see part IX, sect. IV.

regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council noted the resolutions adopted and sanctions measures taken to support the prevention of the illegal exploitation of natural resources and so-called conflict minerals (such as tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold), as well as diamonds, cobalt, charcoal and wildlife from fuelling armed conflicts, and encouraged the States members of the African Union to promote the transparent and lawful management of natural resources, including the adoption of government revenue targets to finance development, sustainable regulatory and customs frameworks, and responsible mineral sourcing supply chain due diligence.³⁵ The Council also underlined the need for effective implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament instruments and regimes, as well as arm embargoes that it had imposed, welcomed efforts to assist Member States and intergovernmental, regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union, in capacity-building to prevent and address the illicit trade in, and destabilizing accumulation and misuse of, small arms and light weapons, and encouraged African States to safeguard national stockpiles of weapons to prevent their illicit diversion.³⁶

In resolution 2462 (2019), adopted under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, the Council reaffirmed that sanctions were an important tool under the Charter in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, including in countering terrorism and terrorism financing.³⁷ The Council underscored the need to ensure that all Member States were in full compliance with the measures imposed by resolution 2368 (2017) and urged all States to participate actively in implementing and updating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list and to consider including individuals and entities involved in the financing of terrorism.³⁸ The Council called on States to invest resources in the implementation of sanctions regimes pursuant to resolutions 1373 (2001), 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), and in the seizure of funds in the course of investigations.³⁹ The Council also encouraged Member States to improve efforts and take decisive action to identify cases of trafficking in persons and in cultural property that finance terrorism with a view to holding those responsible accountable.⁴⁰ The Council further mandated its subsidiary bodies to undertake specific

tasks related to countering the financing of terrorism.⁴¹ Under the same item, the Council adopted resolution 2501 (2019), reiterating the need to ensure that the sanctions regime imposed by the Council in its resolution 1988 (2011) contributed effectively to ongoing efforts to advance reconciliation to bring about peace, stability and security in Afghanistan.⁴²

By resolution 2467 (2019), adopted under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, the Council reiterated its intention, when adopting or renewing targeted sanctions in situations of armed conflict, to consider including designation criteria pertaining to acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence and urged existing sanctions committees to apply targeted sanctions against those who perpetrated and directed sexual violence in conflict, where it was within the scope of the relevant criteria for designation and consistent with resolution 2467 (2019) and other relevant resolutions.⁴³ In that connection, the Council called upon all peacekeeping and other relevant United Nations missions and United Nations entities to share with relevant sanctions committees all pertinent information about sexual violence.⁴⁴ The Council also encouraged the Secretary-General to ensure that expert groups of sanctions committees included members with dedicated sexual violence and gender expertise and to include information on incidents, patterns, trends and perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations in their reports and recommendations to committees.⁴⁵ Under the same item, the Council adopted resolution 2493 (2019), requesting the Secretary-General to include in his next annual report on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and its subsequent resolutions an assessment of the progress and commitments made on dedicated gender expertise in the expert groups of sanctions committees.⁴⁶

By resolution 2482 (2019), adopted under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, the Council encouraged all States to continue efforts to end the illicit trade in natural resources and to hold those complicit in the illicit trade accountable, as part of broader efforts to ensure that the illicit trade in natural resources was not benefiting sanctioned entities, terrorist groups, armed groups or criminal networks.⁴⁷

³⁵ Resolution 2457 (2019), ninth preambular paragraph.

³⁶ Ibid., para. 13.

³⁷ Resolution 2462 (2019), sixteenth preambular paragraph.

³⁸ Ibid., paras. 9 and 12.

³⁹ Ibid., para. 13.

⁴⁰ Ibid., para. 25.

⁴¹ Ibid., para. 35. For more information about such bodies, see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁴² Resolution 2501 (2019), seventh preambular paragraph.

⁴³ Resolution 2467 (2019), para. 10.

⁴⁴ Ibid., para. 12.

⁴⁵ Ibid., para. 11.

⁴⁶ Resolution 2493 (2019), para. 10 (c).

⁴⁷ Resolution 2482 (2019), para. 14.

Decisions on country-specific issues relating to Article 41

During the period under review, the Council renewed the existing measures concerning the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen,⁴⁸ as well as those concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities. In addition, the Council imposed a new ban on components that could be used in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices and modified the arms embargo on the Central African Republic (see case 7). No changes were made to the measures concerning ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and associates, nor to those concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya or the Sudan.

The present subsection concerning the developments in each of the sanctions regimes does not include reference to the subsidiary bodies of the Council responsible for their implementation. The decisions of the Council relating to the subsidiary bodies are described in detail in part IX, section I.B. The decision(s) on the establishment and history of each of the sanctions regimes are covered in previous supplements to the *Repertoire*.

The categories of sanctions measures used in the present subsection, such as arms embargoes, asset freezes or travel bans, are for clarification purposes only, and are not intended to serve as legal definitions of the measures. In addition, developments in the sanctions measures imposed by the Council during the period under review are categorized according to the following main actions taken by the Council:

⁴⁸ The arms embargo concerning Yemen remained unchanged; see the paragraph on Yemen in the present section.

“establishment”,⁴⁹ “modification”,⁵⁰ “extension”,⁵¹ “limited extension”⁵² or “termination”.⁵³

The sanctions regimes are discussed below in the order of their establishment. Each of the following subsections consists of a narrative section describing the most significant developments in 2019 and a table including all relevant provisions of Council decisions concerning changes to a sanctions regime, according to the categories outlined above (a number indicates the corresponding paragraph of the Council resolution). Tables 3 and 4 provide an overview of relevant decisions adopted in 2019 by which the Council established or modified sanctions measures it had previously imposed.

- ⁴⁹ An action by the Council is categorized as an “establishment” when a sanctions measure is initially imposed by the Council.
- ⁵⁰ When a change is introduced to the measure, it is categorized as a “modification”. A measure is modified when: (a) elements of the measure are terminated or newly introduced; (b) information on designated individuals or entities is modified; (c) exemptions to the measure are introduced, modified or terminated; or (d) elements of the measure are otherwise modified.
- ⁵¹ An action by the Council is categorized as an “extension” when the sanctions measure concerned is not modified or terminated and the Council extends or restates the measure without specifying an end date.
- ⁵² An action by the Council is categorized as a “limited extension” when the sanctions measure concerned is extended for a specific period of time, including a date upon which the measure will terminate unless further extended by the Council.
- ⁵³ An action by the Council is categorized as a “termination” when the Council ends the specific sanctions measure. However, if only an element of the measure is terminated, but other elements of that measure remain, the action will be categorized as a modification of the measure.

**Table 3
Overview of country-specific decisions on measures pursuant to Article 41, in place or imposed, in 2019**

<i>Sanctions regime</i>	<i>Resolutions by which measures were established or subsequently modified</i>		<i>Resolutions adopted in 2019</i>
Somalia	733 (1992)	2002 (2011)	2498 (2019)
	1356 (2001)	2023 (2011)	2500 (2019)
	1425 (2002)	2036 (2012)	
	1725 (2006)	2060 (2012)	
	1744 (2007)	2093 (2013)	
	1772 (2007)	2111 (2013)	
	1816 (2008)	2125 (2013)	

**Part VII. Actions with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression
(Chapter VII of the Charter)**

<i>Sanctions regime</i>	<i>Resolutions by which measures were established or subsequently modified</i>		<i>Resolutions adopted in 2019</i>
	1844 (2008)	2142 (2014)	
	1846 (2008)	2182 (2014)	
	1851 (2008)	2184 (2014)	
	1872 (2009)	2244 (2015)	
	1897 (2009)	2246 (2015)	
	1907 (2009)	2316 (2016)	
	1916 (2010)	2317 (2016)	
	1950 (2010)	2383 (2017)	
	1964 (2010)	2385 (2017)	
	1972 (2011)	2444 (2018)	
ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities	1267 (1999)	2161 (2014)	None
	1333 (2000)	2170 (2014)	
	1388 (2002)	2178 (2014)	
	1390 (2002)	2199 (2015)	
	1452 (2002)	2253 (2015)	
	1735 (2006)	2347 (2017)	
	1904 (2009)	2349 (2017)	
	1989 (2011)	2368 (2017)	
	2083 (2012)	2161 (2014)	
Taliban and associated individuals and entities	1988 (2011)	2160 (2014)	2501 (2019)
	2082 (2012)	2255 (2015)	
Iraq	661 (1990)	1723 (2006)	None
	687 (1991)	1790 (2007)	
	707 (1991)	1859 (2008)	
	1483 (2003)	1905 (2009)	
	1546 (2004)	1956 (2010)	
	1637 (2005)	1957 (2010)	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1493 (2003)	1857 (2008)	2463 (2019)
	1552 (2004)	1896 (2009)	2478 (2019)
	1596 (2005)	1952 (2010)	2502 (2019)
	1616 (2005)	2136 (2014)	
	1649 (2005)	2147 (2014)	
	1671 (2006)	2198 (2015)	

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<i>Sanctions regime</i>	<i>Resolutions by which measures were established or subsequently modified</i>		<i>Resolutions adopted in 2019</i>
	1698 (2006)	2211 (2015)	
	1768 (2007)	2293 (2016)	
	1771 (2007)	2360 (2017)	
	1799 (2008)	2424 (2018)	
	1807 (2008)		
Sudan	1556 (2004)	2138 (2014)	2455 (2019)
	1591 (2005)	2200 (2015)	
	1672 (2006)	2265 (2016)	
	1945 (2010)	2340 (2017)	
	2035 (2012)	2400 (2018)	
Lebanon	1636 (2005)		None
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1718 (2006)	2270 (2016)	None
	1874 (2009)	2321 (2016)	
	2087 (2013)	2356 (2017)	
	2094 (2013)	2371 (2017)	
		2375 (2017)	
		2397 (2017)	
Libya	1970 (2011)	2238 (2015)	2473 (2019)
	1973 (2011)	2259 (2015)	2486 (2019)
	2009 (2011)	2278 (2016)	
	2016 (2011)	2292 (2016)	
	2040 (2012)	2357 (2017)	
	2095 (2013)	2362 (2017)	
	2146 (2014)	2420 (2018)	
	2174 (2014)	2441 (2018)	
	2208 (2015)		
	2213 (2015)		
Guinea-Bissau	2048 (2012)		None
Central African Republic	2127 (2013)	2262 (2016)	2454 (2019)
	2134 (2014)	2339 (2017)	2488 (2019)
	2196 (2015)	2399 (2018)	
	2217 (2015)		

**Part VII. Actions with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression
(Chapter VII of the Charter)**

<i>Sanctions regime</i>	<i>Resolutions by which measures were established or subsequently modified</i>		<i>Resolutions adopted in 2019</i>
Yemen	2140 (2014)	2266 (2016)	2456 (2019)
	2204 (2015)	2342 (2017)	
	2216 (2015)	2402 (2018)	
South Sudan	2206 (2015)	2290 (2016)	2471 (2019)
	2241 (2015)	2353 (2017)	
	2252 (2015)	2418 (2018)	
	2271 (2016)	2428 (2018)	
	2280 (2016)		
Mali	2374 (2017)	2432 (2018)	2484 (2019)

Table 4
Overview of measures pursuant to Article 41, in place or imposed, in 2019

<i>Sanctions regime</i>	<i>Type of measure</i>																					
	<i>Arms embargo</i>	<i>Asset freeze</i>	<i>Travel ban or restrictions</i>	<i>Ban on arms exports by target State</i>	<i>Ban/restriction on workers abroad</i>	<i>Ban on improvised explosive device components</i>	<i>Business restrictions</i>	<i>Charcoal ban</i>	<i>Diplomatic/overseas representation restrictions</i>	<i>Embargo on natural resources</i>	<i>Financial restrictions</i>	<i>Luxury goods embargo</i>	<i>Natural gas embargo/restriction</i>	<i>Non-proliferation measures</i>	<i>Oil/petroleum and petroleum products embargo/restriction</i>	<i>Prohibition on bunkering services/port entry</i>	<i>Public financial support for trade restrictions</i>	<i>Restrictions on ballistic missiles</i>	<i>Sectoral ban</i>	<i>Specialized teaching and technical cooperation restrictions</i>	<i>Transport and aviation sanctions</i>	<i>Trade ban on cultural goods</i>
Somalia	X	X	X			X		X														
ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida	X	X	X																			X
Taliban	X	X	X																			
Iraq	X	X																				
Democratic Republic of the Congo	X	X	X																			X
Sudan	X	X	X																			
Lebanon ^a		X	X																			
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Libya	X	X	X	X			X				X				X	X						
Guinea-Bissau			X																			
Central African Republic	X	X	X																			
Yemen	X	X	X																			
South Sudan	X	X	X																			
Mali		X	X																			

^a Pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006), the Council decided, inter alia, that States should take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. In 2019, by resolution 2485 (2019), the Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) and requested the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), including an enhanced annex on the implementation of the arms embargo.

Somalia

In 2019, the Council adopted resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), by which it reaffirmed and recalled the existing sanctions measures, renewed for one year the partial lifting of the arms embargo, the exemptions related to humanitarian aid and the authorization for maritime interdiction of arms imports and charcoal exports, and imposed a ban on components that could be used in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices. Table 5 provides an overview of the changes to the measures authorized by the Council in 2019.

The Council reaffirmed the arms embargo initially imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution [733 \(1992\)](#) and paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution [1425 \(2002\)](#),⁵⁴ as well as the specific exceptions to it,⁵⁵ renewed the partial lifting of the arms embargo on the Somali security forces until 15 November 2020⁵⁶ and outlined the procedures for advance requests for approval and notifications to the Committee.⁵⁷ The Council also reaffirmed the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution [2036 \(2012\)](#) and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution [2182 \(2014\)](#), and decided to renew until 15 November 2020 the authorization for Member States to inspect vessels and to seize and dispose of any prohibited items bound to or from Somalia, where there were grounds to believe that the vessels were in

violation of the charcoal ban and arms embargo as set out in paragraph 15 of resolution [2182 \(2014\)](#).⁵⁸ Recalling its resolutions that imposed targeted sanctions, the Council decided that until 15 November 2020 the asset freeze measure should not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance to Somalia.⁵⁹

Expressing grave concern that Al-Shabaab continued to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region and noting the group's increased use of improvised explosive devices in their attacks, the Council decided that all States should prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer to Somalia of the items in part I of annex C to resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#) from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) would be used, or that there was a significant risk they could be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices.⁶⁰ The Council called on Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote vigilance by their nationals as well as individuals and firms subject to their jurisdiction that were involved in the sale, supply or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that could be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including items in part II of annex C to the same resolution.⁶¹

⁵⁴ Resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), para. 6. For information on the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) and the Panel of Experts on Somalia, see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁵⁵ Resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), para. 19.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 9. The Council further provided that weapons and military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institutions other than those of the Federal Government (in accordance with para. 9) would not be resold to, transferred to or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institution (*ibid.*, para. 7).

⁵⁷ Resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), paras. 10–17.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 23.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 20 and 22.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, fourth preambular paragraph and para. 26. Items in Annex C to resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#) included explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment and related technology. For items in part I of annex C directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia, the Council decided that the State should notify the Committee of the sale, supply or transfer (*ibid.*, para. 27).

⁶¹ Resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), para. 28.

Table 5
Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Somalia, in 2019

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph 2498 (2019))</i>
Arms embargo	733 (1992) , para. 5 1425 (2002) , paras. 1–2	Extension (6) Exemption (9, 19)
Asset freeze	1844 (2008) , para. 3	Extension (20) Exemption (22)
Ban on improvised explosive device components	2498 (2019) , para. 26	Establishment (26)

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph)</i> <i>2498 (2019)</i>
Charcoal ban	2036 (2012), para. 22	Extension (23) Limited extension (23)
Travel ban	1844 (2008), para. 1	Extension (20)

Taliban and associated individuals and entities

In 2019, the Council adopted resolution 2501 (2019), by which it reaffirmed the asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo measures with respect to individuals and entities designated prior to the date of adoption of resolution 1988 (2011) as the Taliban, as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of

Afghanistan as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011).⁶² Table 6 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

⁶² Resolution 2501 (2019), para. 1. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, see part IX, sect. I.B.

Table 6

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, in 2019

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph)</i> <i>2501 (2019)</i>
Arms embargo	1333 (2000), para. 5	Extension (1)
Asset freeze	1267 (1999), para. 4 (b)	Extension (1)
Travel ban	1390 (2002), para. 2 (b)	Extension (1)

ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities

During the period under review, the Council did not make any modifications to the sanctions measures on ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and associates. By resolution 2462 (2019), the Council stressed the need for robust implementation of the measures outlined in paragraph 1 of resolution 2368 (2017) and urged all States to participate actively in implementing and updating the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list and to consider including, when submitting new listing requests, individuals and entities involved in the financing of terrorism.⁶³

⁶³ Resolution 2462 (2019), para. 12. For more information, see the subsection entitled "Decisions on thematic issues relating to Article 41" in the present section. For information on the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, see part IX, sect. I.B.

Iraq

In 2019, the Council did not adopt any new resolutions concerning the remaining sanctions measures on Iraq, consisting of an arms embargo, with exemptions, and an asset freeze on senior officials, State bodies, corporations and agencies of the former Iraqi regime. Pursuant to resolution 1483 (2003), the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) continued to oversee the implementation of the asset freeze and maintain the lists of individuals and entities.⁶⁴

Democratic Republic of the Congo

In 2019, the Council adopted resolution 2478 (2019), by which it renewed the sanctions measures on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, comprising an arms embargo, a travel ban, an asset freeze and restrictions on transportation and aviation, including related exemptions, until 1 July 2020.⁶⁵ Table 7 provides

⁶⁴ For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003), see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁶⁵ Resolution 2478 (2019), para. 1. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) and the Group of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004), see part IX, sect. I.B.

an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

In addition, by resolutions [2463 \(2019\)](#) and [2502 \(2019\)](#), which extended the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the Council recalled that it was prepared to impose targeted sanctions under paragraph 7 (d) and (e) of resolution [2293 \(2016\)](#) (asset freeze and travel ban) regarding, inter alia, human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law, demanded that all armed groups cease immediately all

forms of violence, including violations and abuses against children, the use of civilians as human shields and other destabilizing activities, the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources, and recalled that the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo could lead to sanctions under paragraph 7 (d) of resolution [2293 \(2016\)](#).⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), fifteenth preambular paragraph and para. 11, and resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), paras. 5 and 13.

Table 7

Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 2019

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph 2478 (2019))</i>
Arms embargo	1493 (2003) , para. 20	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)
Asset freeze	1596 (2005) , para. 15	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)
Travel ban or restrictions	1596 (2005) , para. 13	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)
Transportation and aviation sanctions measures	1807 (2008) , paras. 6 and 8	Limited extension (1)

Sudan

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any new resolution modifying the sanctions measures in place in relation to the Sudan. However, in resolution [2455 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, the Council recalled the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban measures and designation criteria established by previous resolutions and reaffirmed the related exemptions.⁶⁷ The Council expressed its intent to regularly review the measures on Darfur, in the light of the evolving situation on the ground and the reports submitted by the Panel of Experts and further expressed its intent to establish clear, well-identified and measurable key benchmarks that could serve in guiding the Council to review measures on the Government of the Sudan.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Resolution [2455 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, paras. 3 and 4. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) and the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, see part IX, sect. I.B.

Lebanon

During the period under review, the Council did not make any modifications to the sanctions measures established pursuant to resolution [1636 \(2005\)](#), consisting of an asset freeze and a travel ban, which were to be imposed on individuals designated by the International Independent Investigation Commission or the Government of Lebanon as suspected of involvement in the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut that killed the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafic Hariri, and 22 others.⁶⁹

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

During the period under review, the Council did not make any modifications to the sanctions measures concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) continued to oversee the implementation of the asset freeze, arms embargo, travel ban and other restrictions previously imposed by resolutions [1718](#)

⁶⁹ Resolution [1636 \(2005\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph and para. 3. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1636 \(2005\)](#), see part IX, sect. I.B.

(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017). By resolution 2464 (2019), the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) supporting the Committee was extended until 24 April 2020.⁷⁰

Libya

During the period under review, the Council did not adopt any new resolution modifying the sanctions measures concerning Libya.⁷¹ However, by resolution 2473 (2019), it extended the authorizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya for a further period of 12 months and requested the Secretary-General to report to it within 11 months on its implementation.⁷² In addition, by resolution 2486 (2019), which renewed the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the Council underscored the importance of ensuring that existing sanctions measures were fully implemented and that violations were reported to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and recalled that individuals or entities engaging in, or providing support for, acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya could be designated for targeted sanctions, pursuant to resolution 2441 (2018).⁷³ The Council also recalled its decision that all Member States should comply with the arms embargo, in line with resolution 2441 (2018) and all of its previous resolutions.⁷⁴

Guinea-Bissau

During the period under review, the sanctions regime for Guinea-Bissau continued to remain in force, but did not undergo any modifications.⁷⁵ In resolution 2458 (2019), the Council expressed its readiness to take additional measures to respond to the further worsening of the situation in Guinea-Bissau.⁷⁶ The Council also decided to review the sanctions measures within seven

months from the date of adoption of the resolution in the light of the expectations regarding the conduct of legislative and presidential elections in 2019, and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report and recommendations on, inter alia, the continuation of the sanctions regime in the post-election environment.⁷⁷

Central African Republic

During the period under review, the Council adopted two resolutions and a presidential statement related to the sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic.⁷⁸ Table 8 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.⁷⁹

By resolution 2454 (2019), the Council extended until 31 January 2020 the sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic as well as related exemptions and reaffirmed that the travel ban and asset freeze would apply to individuals and entities designated by the Committee.⁸⁰ The Council expressed its intention to establish, no later than 30 April 2019, clear and well-identified key benchmarks regarding the reform of the security sector, the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation process, and the management of weapons and ammunition, which could serve in guiding the review of the arms embargo measures on the Government of the Central African Republic.⁸¹ The Council further expressed its intention to review, by 30 September 2019, the arms embargo measures on the Government of the Central African Republic in the light of an assessment to be conducted by the Secretary-General on the progress achieved on the key benchmarks that were subsequently established by the Council in its presidential statement of 9 April 2019.⁸²

⁷⁰ Resolution 2464 (2019), para. 1. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁷¹ For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁷² Resolution 2473 (2019), paras. 1–2.

⁷³ Resolution 2486 (2019), twentieth preambular paragraph.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

⁷⁵ For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau, see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁷⁶ Resolution 2458 (2019), para. 31.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 32 and 33. The report of the Secretary-General was submitted to the Council on 29 August 2019 (S/2019/696).

⁷⁸ Resolutions 2454 (2019) and 2488 (2019) and S/PRST/2019/3. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁷⁹ S/PRST/2019/3 is not included in the table as it does not contain provisions extending or modifying the sanctions measures.

⁸⁰ Resolution 2454 (2019), paras. 1–2.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

⁸² *Ibid.*, para. 10. See S/PRST/2019/3. In a letter dated 31 December 2019 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General provided an update on the progress achieved on the key benchmarks established in the presidential statement of 9 April 2019 (S/2019/1008).

By resolution [2488 \(2019\)](#), the Council took note, inter alia, of the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic on 6 February 2019 in Bangui and of the assessment report submitted by the Secretary-General.⁸³ By the resolution, the Council decided to adjust the arms embargo by expanding the categories of items that were not subject to the embargo and by requiring a notification to, instead of an approval by, the Committee for the use of certain supplies.⁸⁴ The Council also modified the reporting and notification requirements to the Committee.⁸⁵ In addition, the Council decided that arms and other related lethal equipment sold or supplied

to the security forces of the Central African Republic solely for their development could not be resold to, transferred to or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of either the security forces or the selling or supplying Member State.⁸⁶

In addition, by resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), the Council recalled that individuals or entities that undermined peace and stability could be listed for targeted measures pursuant to resolution [2454 \(2019\)](#), as could those committing acts of incitement to violence, in particular on an ethnic or religious basis, and then engaging in or providing support for acts that undermined the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic.⁸⁷

⁸³ Resolution [2488 \(2019\)](#), third and fifth preambular paragraphs. See also [S/2019/609](#).

⁸⁴ Resolution [2488 \(2019\)](#), para. 2 (d) and (f)–(i).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 3–4.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

⁸⁷ Resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), paras. 5 and 21.

Table 8
Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning the Central African Republic, in 2019

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolutions adopted during the review period (paragraph)</i>	
		<i>2454 (2019)</i>	<i>2488 (2019)</i>
Arms embargo	2127 (2013) , para. 54	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)	Modification (2) Exemption (2)
Asset freeze	2134 (2014) , paras. 32 and 34	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)	
Travel ban or restrictions	2134 (2014) , para. 30	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)	

Yemen

In 2019, the Council adopted resolution [2456 \(2019\)](#), extending the asset freeze and travel ban, as well as the relevant exemptions to those measures, until 26 February 2020.⁸⁸ By the same resolution, the Council reaffirmed the arms embargo as set out in resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), as well as the designation criteria set out in

prior resolutions and reaffirmed its intent to keep the situation in Yemen under continuous review and its readiness to review the appropriateness of the sanctions measures in the light of developments in the country.⁸⁹ Table 9 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

⁸⁸ Resolution [2456 \(2019\)](#), para. 2.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 2–4 and 12. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) and the Panel of Experts on Yemen, see part IX, sect. I.B.

Table 9
Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Yemen, in 2019

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph)</i>
		<i>2456 (2019)</i>
Arms embargo	2216 (2015) , paras. 14–16	Extension (2)
Asset freeze	2140 (2014) , paras. 11 and 13	Limited extension (2) Exemption (2)
Travel ban or restrictions	2140 (2014) , para. 15	Limited extension (2) Exemption (2)

South Sudan

In 2019, the Council adopted resolution [2471 \(2019\)](#), by which it renewed the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban, as well as the relevant exemptions to those measures, until 31 May 2020.⁹⁰ Table 10 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.

In the context of the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), in resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#), the Council expressed its intention to consider all appropriate measures against those who took actions that undermined the peace, stability and security of South Sudan and specifically underscored that individuals or entities that were responsible or complicit in, directly

⁹⁰ Resolution [2471 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1–2.

or indirectly, attacks against UNMISS personnel and premises and any humanitarian personnel, could meet the designation criteria.⁹¹ In a presidential statement issued on 8 October 2019, the Council stressed that actions that threatened the peace, security or stability of South Sudan could be subject to sanctions under resolutions [2206 \(2015\)](#) and [2428 \(2018\)](#) and affirmed its readiness to adjust the measures contained therein in the light of the implementation by parties to the conflict of, inter alia, the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, signed in 2018.⁹²

⁹¹ Resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#), para. 3.

⁹² [S/PRST/2019/11](#), penultimate paragraph. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

Table 10
Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning South Sudan, in 2019

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph) 2471 (2019)</i>
Arms embargo	2428 (2018) , para. 4	Limited extension (2) Exemption (2)
Asset freeze	2206 (2015) , paras. 12 and 14	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)
Travel ban or restrictions	2206 (2015) , para. 9	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)

Mali

In 2019, the Council adopted resolution [2484 \(2019\)](#), which extended the asset freeze and travel ban as well as the relevant exemptions to those measures, until 31 August 2020.⁹³ By the same resolution, the Council reaffirmed the designation criteria established in resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) and its intent to keep the situation in Mali under continuous review.⁹⁴ Table 11 provides an overview of the changes to the measures during the period under review.⁹⁵

⁹³ Resolution [2484 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, paras. 2 and 5.

⁹⁵ Resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#) is not included in the table as it does not contain provisions extending or modifying the sanctions measures. For information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

In addition, in resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), related to the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the Council stressed that individuals or entities placed on the sanctions list should not benefit from any financial, operational or logistical support from United Nations entities deployed in Mali, until their removal from the list and without prejudice to the exemptions set by paragraphs 2 and 5 to 7 of resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#).⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), para. 3.

Table 11
Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Mali, in 2019

<i>Provision relating to sanctions measures</i>	<i>Resolution establishing measures</i>	<i>Resolution adopted during the review period (paragraph 2484 (2019))</i>
Asset freeze	2374 (2017), para. 4	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)
Travel ban or restrictions	2374 (2017), para. 1	Limited extension (1) Exemption (1)

B. Discussions relating to Article 41

The present subsection covers the discussions in the Council regarding the use of sanctions and other measures pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter, organized under two main headings: thematic issues and country- and region-specific issues.

During the period under review, Article 41 of the Charter was explicitly referred to on three occasions at Council meetings. On 10 April 2019, at the 8506th meeting, held under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”,⁹⁷ the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela recalled the responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and enquired as to the legal basis, in international law and under the Charter, for the United States and the United Kingdom to impose “economic destruction” on his country without the express authorization of the Security Council. He also asked whether those measures were in line with those provided for under Article 41. On 2 August 2019, at the 8591st meeting, held under the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”,⁹⁸ the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela once again recalled Article 41, this time in connection with the denunciation by his country of the announcement by the President of the United States that he was considering imposing a naval blockade and quarantine against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. On 28 October 2019, at the 8648th meeting, held under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”,⁹⁹ the representative of Kuwait stated that the Council had tools available, including the imposition of sanctions under Article 41, that might ensure that Israel respected and implemented relevant Council resolutions.

⁹⁷ See [S/PV.8591](#).

⁹⁸ See [S/PV.8506](#).

⁹⁹ See [S/PV.8648](#).

The use of sanctions was widely discussed by Council and non-Council members in deliberations in relation to both thematic and country- or region-specific items during 2019. For example, on 1 April 2019, at its 8499th meeting, held under the item entitled “The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security” and the sub-item entitled “International humanitarian law”,¹⁰⁰ the Council heard a briefing on, among other subjects, the impact of sanctions and counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian action and practical measures States could take to minimize that impact. The representative of Belgium urged the Council to prohibit measures within the framework of combating terrorism that impeded the work of humanitarian organizations. He stressed that it was essential for the Council to take into account the potentially adverse effects on the humanitarian situation of the policies it adopted against terrorist groups operating in war zones, as well as sanctions measures that could have a negative impact on carrying out humanitarian work in specific contexts. The representative of China stated that the Council should work on preventing sanctions from adversely affecting humanitarian relief operations. The representative of Germany welcomed the discussion on the impact of counter-terrorism laws, as well as the consequences of sanctions on humanitarian work.

The Council also discussed the need for gender expertise in sanctions expert groups under the thematic item entitled “Women and peace and security” (see case 4). In addition, during its discussions under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the Council addressed the possibility of lifting sanctions on the Sudan (see case 5) and the conditions for the review, modification or lifting of sanctions in the context of the renewal of the sanctions measures on South Sudan (see case 6). It also addressed the easing of the arms embargo in the context of the situation in the Central African Republic (see case 7).

¹⁰⁰ See [S/PV.8499](#).

Case 4 **Women and peace and security**

On 23 April 2019, the Council convened its 8514th meeting under the above-referenced item and under the sub-item entitled “Sexual violence in conflict” at the initiative of Germany, which held the presidency for the month.¹⁰¹

During the meeting, the Council considered the latest report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence.¹⁰² During the discussion, several speakers expressed support for dedicated gender expertise in expert groups supporting sanctions committees.¹⁰³ The representative of Côte d’Ivoire stressed that the presence of experts on sexual violence issues within sanctions committees would help to better identify the perpetrators of sexual violence and prompt action provided for by international legislation in that area. He stressed that the persistence of gender-based sexual violence was less a matter of the existence of normative frameworks than of the effective implementation of sanctions against perpetrators of sexual crimes. The representative of the Dominican Republic said that it was vital that gender experts be mandated to the sanctions committees and that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict regularly report to them.

The representative of Hungary said that it was necessary to involve more experts in international monitoring committees, United Nations fact-finding missions and Security Council sanctions committees to prevent and avoid impunity for those who committed sexual violence in conflict situations, in order to discourage such crimes. The representative of Canada expressed support for survivor-centred efforts to more systematically document and report sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations. In that regard, he urged the Secretary-General to ensure that gender and sexual violence expertise was included in international procedures, such as sanctions committees. He also repeated the call on the Council to systematically and explicitly incorporate and apply sexual violence as a designation criterion in United Nations sanction regimes. The representative of Norway, speaking also on behalf of Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden, called for the systematic use of gender expertise in United Nations operations and stressed the need for resolutions, mandates and sanctions to address conflict-related sexual violence.

¹⁰¹ See [S/PV.8514](#). The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 11 April 2019 ([S/2019/313](#)).

¹⁰² [S/2019/280](#).

¹⁰³ See [S/PV.8514](#) (Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Hungary, Canada and Costa Rica).

The representative of Qatar said that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and expert groups should consistently provide briefings and information on individuals or entities responsible for perpetrating sexual violence to sanctions committees, encourage Member States to list them those individuals and entities and recommend targeted sanctions. Highlighting that the use of sanctions in cases of sexual violence in the context of armed conflict and terrorism should be consistent, the representative of Costa Rica stressed that, for it to be effective, relevant sanctions committees should deploy sexual and gender-based violence specialists as part of their investigative work, recommending measures applied under international law to target all those involved in financing, planning or supporting groups with connections to acts of sexual violence.

The representative of Rwanda said that relevant sanctions committees should work closely with the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict in order to regularly appraise cases of sexual violence.

Case 5 **Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan**

At its 8446th meeting of the Council, held on 17 January 2019, the Council heard a briefing by the representative of Poland, in her capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) concerning the Sudan, on the work of the Committee covering the period from 4 October 2018 to 17 January 2019.¹⁰⁴ Speaking in her national capacity, she noted that sanctions were not a punishment, but a policy tool aimed at changing behaviour and making it constructive, and that they should be subjected to regular reviews in order to best reflect the dynamics on the ground. In that regard, she recalled her recommendation, made following her visit to the Sudan in April 2018,¹⁰⁵ that the Council pursue its intention, as expressed in paragraph 3 of resolution [2400 \(2018\)](#), to review the measures on Darfur in the light of the evolving situation on the ground. As part of such a review, the Council could consider setting solutions-oriented parameters for the eventual termination of the measures in the long term, which might serve as a vehicle for positive change in the Sudan.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ See [S/PV.8446](#).

¹⁰⁵ See [S/PV.8287](#).

¹⁰⁶ See [S/PV.8446](#).

In the discussion, the representative of Indonesia said that sanctions measures and applications must be periodically evaluated, including against the backdrop of the latest situation on the ground, and that economic development should also be considered in the context of the efficacy of sanctions. The representative of China said that the Council should review the sanctions on the Sudan in a timely manner and make adjustments in the light of the latest developments, with a view to the eventual lifting of the sanctions. The representative of Kuwait said that, as the security situation in Darfur was stabilizing, with the exception of some combat operations near Jebel Marra, the time had come for the Council to review the sanctions regime in accordance with resolution 2400 (2018), with the aim of lifting it gradually and in a manner that would enhance the Government's ability to enforce its authority throughout all of its territories. He added that Kuwait had hoped that the review would have taken place within a year of the adoption of resolution 2400 (2018).

Welcoming the recommendation of the Chair of the Committee, the representative of South Africa said that the Council should respond to the progress on the ground in normalizing the situation in Darfur, which had driven the drawdown of the contingent numbers in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). He stated that it was important that the Council be able to recognize and acknowledge that progress had been made, thanks to the measures imposed in resolution 1591 (2005), and that the Council should be able to relax some of the sanctions. The representative of Equatorial Guinea said that it was necessary to review the sanctions in parallel with the withdrawal process for UNAMID.

The representative of the Russian Federation said that the positive developments observed in Darfur suggested that the sanctions had already served their purpose and that concrete parameters for lifting them were long overdue. He pointed out that the previous Committee Chair had recommended that easing the sanctions regime should go hand in hand with withdrawing the Blue Helmets.

While noting that the decreasing financial and logistical support from South Sudan to Darfuri rebels was encouraging, the representative of the United States expressed concern over reports of growing support from Libyan groups to Darfuri armed groups. He added that reported defiance of the arms embargo by all armed groups and the Government of the Sudan underscored the need for greater attention to the implementation of the arms embargo. The representative of France said that the sanctions regime remained a key instrument during the transitional

phase, during which the Council was to remain particularly vigilant. The representative of Germany said that it was necessary to uphold the sanctions regime and maintain the work of the Panel of Experts.

The representative of the United Kingdom expressed support for the recommendations to the Committee made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, including that any future benchmarking process for the possible lifting of targeted sanctions include the provisions related to sexual violence in resolution 2429 (2018) and the prevention and accountability measures required under resolutions 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013).

The representative of the Sudan urged the Council to review the sanctions imposed on Darfur, given the fact that all reports submitted by the Secretary-General and the Panel of Experts during the period under review confirmed the continued improvement of the situation there.

Case 6 Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

At its 8536th meeting, held on 30 May 2019,¹⁰⁷ the Council adopted resolution 2471 (2019), in which it renewed the sanctions measures on South Sudan, with five abstentions.¹⁰⁸ Following the vote, several Council members expressed regret about the lack of consensus in adopting the resolution.¹⁰⁹

The representative of the United States noted, in support of the resolution, that since the strengthening of the sanctions regime and the imposition of an arms embargo, the warring parties had signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and there had been widespread adherence to the ceasefire. He stated that, while the United States remained concerned about delays in implementing key provisions of the peace agreement and ongoing violence against civilians, it could not be denied that some initial progress towards peace had been made immediately following the action of the Council on sanctions 10 months earlier. He added that there were undoubtedly many factors besides a strengthened sanctions regime that had contributed to that turn of events and that his country was counting on the region to

¹⁰⁷ See S/PV.8536.

¹⁰⁸ The draft resolution received 10 votes in favour (Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom, United States), none against and 5 abstentions (China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Russian Federation, South Africa).

¹⁰⁹ United States, Poland, Kuwait and United Kingdom.

maintain pressure on the parties to implement the peace agreement and to uphold the United Nations arms embargo to prevent the flow of weapons into South Sudan, which would further destabilize the country and the region. The representative of Poland explained her delegation's support for the resolution, saying that it was important to maintain the sanctions regime. In that regard, she said that her country saw the significant reduction in violence across the country, especially against civilians, and believed that it was a direct effect of the arms embargo. She explained her country's belief that it was the responsibility of the Council to continue to stem and control the flow of arms into the territory of South Sudan and, by doing so, steadily reduce the violence and brutality against innocent civilians. The representative of Belgium, explaining his country's support for the resolution, said that the sanctions regime continued to be part of the measures that were needed to contribute to the stabilization of South Sudan and that prematurely lifting the arms embargo could have negative consequences, in particular for the protection of civilians. The representative of France mentioned that the sanctions regime was a tool to support the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and deprive the parties to the conflict of the means to commit violence. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that sanctions offered a form of accountability and sent a message that heinous acts of violence would not be tolerated by the international community. On the arms embargo, he noted that, with the peace deal only recently extended, for the Council to allow an unhindered flow of arms into the country would be irresponsible and risk fuelling further violence. The representative of Indonesia expressed the hope that the technical extension of the sanctions regime would provide a space for the South Sudanese parties to instil confidence and work together.

Some of the delegations that abstained did not share the view that progress in the political process in South Sudan was attributable to the strengthening of sanctions.¹¹⁰ The representative of South Africa stated that the sanctions imposed on South Sudan were not timely given the complex political process and that sanctions should be used to encourage progress in the political process and not as a punitive measure. He added that a volatile political process should be safeguarded and free from external pressure. The representatives of Côte d'Ivoire and the Russian Federation ascribed the recent signing of the Revitalized Agreement to the continued engagement of various actors in South Sudan, in particular regional actors. The representative of the Russian Federation

spoke against the automatic extension of sanctions and urged that decisions be based on the situation on the ground in every such case. He added that the arms embargo had prevented the region from giving flexible support to the settlement with the help of its own security initiatives. The representative of Equatorial Guinea explained his delegation's position by saying that extending the embargo and adopting further sanctions were not the right steps to take to motivate those involved to continue their efforts towards achieving peace. While supporting the sanctions in some aspects, he argued that the Council must know when to impose them and when not to do so and that it needed to give the political stakeholders in South Sudan an opportunity to continue their efforts to achieve peace through peaceful means and dialogue. He also drew attention to the fact that arms embargoes were often imposed to the detriment of Governments and eventually led to a situation in which the armed groups were better armed and equipped than the Government forces. The representative of China noted that his country still did not support the arms embargo imposed on South Sudan and expressed the hope that the Council would make timely adjustments to the relevant measures in the light of the changes in the situation on the ground in South Sudan.

The representative of Germany questioned the rationale of easing the sanctions regime and the arms embargo, given the volatile political process. Similarly, the representative of the Dominican Republic questioned the need to make a change, rather than waiting for control of the situation to be further consolidated.

Case 7 The situation in the Central African Republic

At its 8617th meeting, held on 12 September 2019 under the item entitled "The situation in the Central African Republic", the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2488 (2019), by which it decided to adjust the arms embargo measures imposed on the Central African Republic.¹¹¹ Several Council members welcomed the unanimous adoption of the resolution.¹¹² As penholder, the representative of France noted that the resolution reflected the balance in the positions taken by Council members. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the resolution streamlined the process through which the Government of the Central African Republic could acquire arms and equipment and that it was a clear message of support

¹¹⁰ South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Russian Federation and Equatorial Guinea.

¹¹¹ See [S/PV.8617](#).

¹¹² France, Côte d'Ivoire (also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa), United States, United Kingdom, Indonesia and Germany.

for the Government's progress in the areas of weapons management, security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

The representative of Côte d'Ivoire, speaking also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa, welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution [2488 \(2019\)](#), by which the Council eased the arms embargo imposed on the Government of the Central African Republic. He commended the penholder on ensuring that the commitment of the members of the Council vis-à-vis the Government was respected with regard to the easing of the arms embargo in the light of the progress achieved, which he said would be a powerful driver in speeding up the re-establishment of State authority throughout the entire country. The representative of China said that the adoption of the resolution would help strengthen the Central African Republic in terms of peace, security and capacity-building and would help promote peace and stability in the country. The representative of Peru said that, with the adoption of the resolution, the Government of the Central African Republic could continue to benefit from the arms embargo exemptions and receive support from its partners to strengthen the capacity of its national defence and security forces. In that regard, the representative of the United Kingdom urged the Government to make use of the exemption process to ensure that the forces of the Central African Republic were equipped with the weapons and material they needed.

Recognizing the progress made by the Government of the Central African Republic in the implementation of the five benchmarks set by the Council in the presidential statement dated 9 April 2019,¹¹³ the representative of the United States pledged to continue bilateral support to help the Government achieve the key benchmarks.¹¹⁴ The representative of Germany also acknowledged the work and progress of the Central African Republic on the benchmarks, especially given the relatively short time that had elapsed since April, underlining that the Government's work was part of an ongoing process. He encouraged the authorities to continue their efforts towards making further progress. The representative of Indonesia said that the adoption of resolution [2488 \(2019\)](#) was the culmination of the Government's efforts and progress made in the implementation of the key benchmarks. He added that sanctions were not the end but the means to achieving collective goals and should be used in line with the real situation on the ground.

¹¹³ [S/PRST/2019/3](#), seventh paragraph.

¹¹⁴ See [S/PV.8617](#).

The representative of Belgium also welcomed the easing of the arms embargo but noted that the recent outbreaks of violence in the Central African Republic showed that the sanctions regime remained relevant. The representative of the United States recognized that armed groups continued to violate the arms embargo with impunity and urged the region to end the arms trafficking that undermined the national security of the Central African Republic. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed that it was vital to ensure that weapons intended for the security forces did not fall into the hands of armed groups and called on regional States and regional organizations to fully enforce the terms of the arms embargo and curb the flow of illicit weapons and ammunition. The representative of Poland emphasized that the current regime already allowed a controlled delivery of weapons to the national security forces and said that ensuring real diligence and transparency in the area of arms management was key, in particular with regard to compliance with international humanitarian and human rights standards.

Also noting the positive progress made by the Government in the implementation of the assessment criteria for the arms embargo, the representative of China expressed his support for the Government's wishes for the early lifting of sanctions and the arms embargo against the Central African Republic. The representative of the Russian Federation urged all Council members to consider the expectations of the authorities of the Central African Republic for deeper modifications to the arms embargo. He stated the intent to revisit the issue during the next review of sanctions relating to the Central African Republic and expressed the hope that the Council would consider a more substantive adjustment to the arms embargo that would fully reflect the interests of strengthening Government security structures, expanding State institutions and safeguarding security, law and order throughout the whole country.

At the end of the meeting, the representative of the Central African Republic recognized that the adjusted arms embargo measures would provide support for the Government's efforts aimed at security sector reform and extending State authority and would allow her country's security and defence forces to be trained, equipped and armed. Nonetheless, she expressed her country's hope for the total lifting of the arms embargo, given that it had put the Central African Republic at a disadvantage in terms of the supply of weapons, ammunition and logistical resources compared with the armed groups that continued to receive them on a significant scale.

IV. Measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Note

Section IV covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 42 of the Charter, regarding the authorization of the use of force by peacekeeping operations and multinational forces, as well as interventions by regional organizations.¹¹⁵

During the period under review, the Council authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter, with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security by several peacekeeping missions and multinational forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan (including Abyei and Darfur).

The present section is divided into three subsections. Subsection A outlines decisions in which the Council authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter. Subsection B covers discussions of the Council of relevance for Article 42. Subsection C provides an overview of the communications addressed to the Council containing references to Article 42.

A. Decisions relating to Article 42

During the reporting period, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 42 of the Charter in its decisions. Nonetheless, the Council adopted several resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter by which it authorized peacekeeping missions and multinational forces, including those deployed by regional

organizations, to use “all necessary measures” or “all necessary means”, or to take “all necessary action(s)” for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.

For information on the authorization of the use of force by missions in the past, including some of the missions covered below, see previous Supplements. For further information on the specific mandates of each of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, see part X of the present Supplement.

In 2019, the Council reiterated its authorization to use force in relation to various situations and disputes. In Africa, in relation to the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council renewed the authorization for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic to use “all necessary means” to carry out its mandate within its capabilities and areas of deployment,¹¹⁶ and for the French forces to use “all the means” to provide operational support to the Mission when under serious threat.¹¹⁷

Consistent with past practice in connection with the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council authorized the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to take “all necessary measures” to carry out its mandate.¹¹⁸

With respect to the flows of arms and related materiel transferred to or from Libya in violation of the arms embargo, the Council extended the authorizations first granted in paragraphs 4 and 8 of resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#) to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” when conducting inspections of vessels and seizing items in the course of such inspections, emphasizing that the inspections should be carried out in compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law and “without causing undue delay to or undue interference with the exercise of freedom of navigation”.¹¹⁹ In connection with the smuggling of migrants into, through and from Libyan territory, the Council renewed the authorizations granted in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#) to

¹¹⁵ The Council’s authorization of the use of force by regional organizations is covered in part VIII. The authorization of the use of force by peacekeeping operations is covered in part X in the context of the mandates of peacekeeping operations.

¹¹⁶ Resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), para. 31.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 52.

¹¹⁸ Resolutions [2463 \(2019\)](#), para. 28, and [2502 \(2019\)](#), para. 27.

¹¹⁹ Resolution [2473 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, that were engaged in the fight against the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons, to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers when carrying out inspections of vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they had reasonable grounds to suspect were being used for the smuggling of migrants or trafficking in persons and to seize such vessels that were confirmed to be used for such activities.¹²⁰ The Council reaffirmed paragraph 11 of resolution 2240 (2015), in which it had clarified that the authorization to use force applied only when confronting smugglers of migrants and traffickers in persons on the high seas off the Libyan coast, and should not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international law.¹²¹

With regard to the situation in Mali, the Council, as it had in previous years, authorized the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to use “all necessary means” to carry out its mandate,¹²² and French forces, within the limits of their capacities, to use “all necessary means” until the end of the mandate of MINUSMA to intervene in support of the Mission when under imminent and serious threat, upon the request of the Secretary-General.¹²³ The Council requested MINUSMA to continue to carry out its mandate with a “proactive, robust, flexible and agile posture”.¹²⁴

In connection with the situation in Somalia, the Council decided that the African Union Mission in Somalia would be authorized to take “all necessary measures”, in full compliance with the obligations of participating States under international humanitarian and human rights law and in full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, to carry out its mandate.¹²⁵ In addition, the Council renewed, for a period of 12 months, the authorizations granted in paragraph 14 of resolution 2442 (2018) to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia for which advance notification had

been provided by Somali authorities to the Secretary-General.¹²⁶

In connection with the situation in Abyei, the Council recalled that the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei to protect civilians, as set out in paragraph 3 of resolution 1990 (2011), included taking the “necessary actions” to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, irrespective of its source, and in that regard underlined that peacekeepers were authorized to use “all necessary means”, including force, to protect civilians under threat of physical violence.¹²⁷

In relation to the situation in Darfur, the Council decided that the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur would continue to implement its mandate as set out in resolution 2429 (2018).¹²⁸

With regard to the situation in South Sudan, the Council authorized the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to use “all necessary means” to perform its mandated tasks, and for its regional protection force to use “all necessary means, including undertaking robust action where necessary and actively patrolling”, to accomplish its mandate.¹²⁹ The Council further stressed that this mandate included authority to use “all necessary means” to accomplish the mandated tasks of UNMISS, in particular the protection of civilians, and that such actions included, within the Mission’s capacity and areas of deployment, defending protection of civilians sites, including by extending weapons-free zones to protection sites where appropriate, addressing threats to the sites, searching individuals attempting to enter the sites, seizing weapons from those already inside or attempting to enter the sites, and removing armed actors from the sites or denying them entry.¹³⁰

In the Americas, concerning the situation in Haiti, the Council authorized the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti to use “all necessary means” to carry out its mandate to support and develop the Haitian National Police.¹³¹

In Europe, in relation to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council renewed its authorization for Member States, under the European Union Force-Althea (EUFOR-Althea) and the North

¹²⁰ Resolution 2491 (2019), para. 2.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Resolution 2480 (2019), para. 19.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, para. 42.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 22.

¹²⁵ Resolution 2472 (2019), para. 8.

¹²⁶ Resolution 2500 (2019), para. 14.

¹²⁷ Resolutions 2469 (2019), para. 12, and 2497 (2019), para. 13.

¹²⁸ Resolutions 2479 (2019), para. 2, and 2495 (2019),

para. 3. See also resolution 2429 (2018), paras. 15 and 48.

¹²⁹ Resolution 2459 (2019), paras. 7 and 10.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 14.

¹³¹ Resolution 2466 (2019), para. 9.

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence, to take “all necessary measures” to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina; authorized Member States to take “all necessary measures”, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO, in defence of the EUFOR-Althea or the NATO presence, respectively; and recognized the right of EUFOR-Althea and NATO to take “all necessary measures” to defend themselves from attack or the threat of attack.¹³²

In the Middle East, in connection with the situation in Lebanon, the Council recalled its authorization to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to take “all necessary action” in the areas of deployment of its forces, to ensure that its area of operations was not utilized for hostile activities, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties, to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers, and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.¹³³

B. Discussions relating to Article 42

During the period under review, the Council made no explicit references to Article 42 of the Charter at its meetings, but did continue to discuss issues relating to the authorization of the use of force by peacekeeping missions in carrying out protection of civilians mandates, in particular under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict” (case 8).

In addition, at the 8521st meeting, held on 7 May 2019 under the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”,¹³⁴ the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the effectiveness of peacekeepers depended not only on their training, but also on the way in which the Council formulated the mandates of its missions. He expressed alarm at the excessive enthusiasm for so-called robust mandates and stressed that the right to use force increased security risks for blue helmets themselves, turning them into targets and even parties to conflicts. He recalled the letter dated 31 August 2018 addressed to the Secretary-General,¹³⁵ in which the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations had expressed his country’s objection to tying

human rights issues to the protection of civilians, because the protection of civilians involved the use of force (“all necessary means”) under Chapter VII. He added that there could be no question of monitoring human rights with the use of force.¹³⁶ At the same meeting, the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela stressed that respect for the basic principles of peacekeeping – consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate – was necessary for the success of operations, in particular those with protection of civilians mandates. The representative of Nepal stated that the mandates and the capacities of peacekeepers must continuously be aligned in view of evolving realities on the ground, with the Secretariat deploying mobile training support teams made up of experienced peacekeepers from troop- and police-contributing countries, as may be necessary, to provide training on mission-specific mandates, the rules of engagement and the use of force.

Case 8 Protection of civilians in armed conflict

On 23 May 2019, the Council convened its 8534th meeting at the initiative of Indonesia, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,¹³⁷ under the item entitled “Protection of civilians in armed conflict” At the meeting, the representative of France said that his country was committed to ensuring that the protection of humanitarian and health-care personnel was integrated into military operations, starting at the planning stage, and that the use of force could be authorized to protect them from hostile acts.¹³⁸ The representative of the European Union stressed that protection of civilians must be at the core of peacekeeping mandates. He underscored that peacekeepers must protect civilians and be able and prepared to use force when civilians were under threat of physical violence, consistent with clear mandates, and that operations must be equipped with necessary tools in that regard.

The representative of Argentina said that it was essential that the protection of civilians during peacekeeping operations took place within a framework of respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter. He added that it was necessary to strengthen protection activities in the mandates of peacekeeping operations and to ensure that they had the necessary resources for their implementation. He stated that the use of force in response to threats of physical violence against civilians

¹³² Resolution 2496 (2019), paras. 5–6.

¹³³ Resolution 2485 (2019), para. 20.

¹³⁴ See S/PV.8521.

¹³⁵ S/2018/815.

¹³⁶ See S/PV.8521.

¹³⁷ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 8 May 2019 (S/2019/385).

¹³⁸ See S/PV.8534.

must be authorized in accordance with the applicable legal obligations, the mandate established by the Council and the specific rules of confrontation and engagement of each mission. He concluded that the use of unarmed strategies to protect civilians in peacekeeping operations were valuable instruments that could help promote the pursuit of peaceful solutions. The representative of Guatemala stressed that the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations must be carried out in accordance with missions' mandates and applied to all prevention activities and responses to acts of violence against civilians, including the use of force as a last resort when necessary. The representative of Brazil also stated that force should be used only as a last resort.

The representative of Cuba emphasized that the Council must fulfil its vital responsibility to maintain international peace and security by encouraging respect for international law and the peaceful settlement of disputes. He stressed that the Council must refrain from supporting military ventures and from threatening the use of force to resolve conflicts. He warned that peace operations with robust mandates that allowed for the proactive use of force had not always ensured a safer environment, and that the flexible application or reinterpretation of peacekeeping principles had increased the risk of threats to and attacks against United Nations personnel and had affected their integrity, credibility and neutrality.

C. References to Article 42 in communications addressed to the Security Council

During the period under review, one communication addressed to the Council contained an explicit reference to Article 42 of the Charter. In a letter dated 6 August 2019 addressed to the President of the Security Council,¹³⁹ the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations drew the attention of the Council to "several dangerous actions" that undermined the peace and security of his country and the Latin American and Caribbean region. In the letter, he referred specifically to the following: a threat levelled by the United States to imminently impose an illegal naval blockade and a quarantine against his country; hostile and illegal incursions by United States military aircraft within the flight information region of Venezuela; and an illegal incursion of a United States military ship into the jurisdictional waters of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. He characterized naval blockades as a means of force established in Chapter VII of the Charter. In doing so, he cited Article 42 and asked when the Council approved such actions.

¹³⁹ S/2019/641.

V. Consideration of Articles 43 to 45 of the Charter

Article 43

1. *All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.*

2. *Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.*

3. *The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.*

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Note

Under Article 43 of the Charter, all Member States undertake to make available to the Council, for the maintenance of international peace and security, armed forces, assistance and facilities in accordance with special agreements. Such agreements, to be entered into by the Council and Member States, were conceived to regulate the numbers and types of troops, their readiness and location and the nature of facilities to be provided.

No agreements under Article 43 were ever concluded, however, and in the absence of such agreements, there is therefore no practice in application of Article 43. The United Nations has developed practical arrangements to carry out military operations in the absence of such agreements. In that context, the Council authorises peacekeeping forces (under the command and control of the Secretary-General and assembled pursuant to ad hoc agreements entered into by the United Nations and Member States), and national or regional forces (under national or regional command and control) to conduct military action. Peacekeeping operations, as well as their mandates, are covered in detail in part X of the present Supplement.

Articles 44 and 45 of the Charter contain explicit references to Article 43 and are therefore intimately linked. As with Article 43, there is no practice of application of Articles 44 and 45. Nonetheless, the Council has developed, through its decisions, a practice by which to (a) call on Member States to contribute armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, (b) consult Member States contributing troops for United Nations peacekeeping activities, and (c) call on Member States to contribute military air assets in the context of peacekeeping. Some of those decisions are presented in section VII of the present chapter, which relates to Article 48, to the extent that they concern action required to carry out decisions of the Council regarding the maintenance of international peace and security.

During the period under review, in its decisions, the Council called for the provision of troops and other military assistance, including air assets, and funding, to the African Union Mission in Somalia, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Council did not, however, engage in any constitutional discussion concerning Articles 43 and 45 during the reporting period. Throughout 2019, the Council held meetings in which it deliberated and adopted decisions in which it emphasized the importance of consulting

troop- and police-contributing countries on issues pertaining to the mandates of peacekeeping operations. Set out below is an overview of the practice of the Council during 2019 concerning the need for Member States to contribute, support and provide assistance to peacekeeping operations (subsection A) and the need for consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries (subsection B).

A. Need for Member States to contribute, support and provide assistance, including military air assets, to peacekeeping operations

In 2019, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 43 or Article 45 in its decisions or discussions, but did call on Member States to contribute, support and provide assistance to peacekeeping operations. In resolutions [2469 \(2019\)](#) and [2497 \(2019\)](#), the Council urged the Governments of South Sudan and the Sudan to facilitate basing arrangements for the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei in the mission area, including Athony airport, and to provide flight clearances and logistical support.¹⁴⁰

In resolution [2472 \(2019\)](#), adopted on 31 May 2019, the Council reiterated its call for new donors to provide support for the African Union Mission in Somalia through the provision of additional funding for troop stipends, equipment and technical assistance.¹⁴¹

In resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), adopted on 28 June 2019, the Council urged Member States to provide MINUSMA with troops and police with adequate capabilities, as well as with equipment, including enablers specific to the operating environment. In the resolution, the Council noted the potential adverse effects on mandate implementation of national caveats that had not been declared and accepted by the Secretary-General prior to deployment and called on Members States to provide troops to MINUSMA with a minimum of declared caveats.¹⁴²

In resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#) of 15 November 2019, the Council reiterated its concern at the continuing lack of capabilities for MINUSCA, the need to fill gaps, in particular with regard to military helicopters, and once again stressed the importance of current and future troop- and police-contributing countries' providing troops and police with adequate capabilities, equipment

¹⁴⁰ Resolutions [2469 \(2019\)](#), para. 7, and [2497 \(2019\)](#), para. 8.

¹⁴¹ Resolution [2472 \(2019\)](#), para. 22 (a).

¹⁴² Resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), para. 45.

and predeployment training to enhance the Mission's capacity to operate effectively.¹⁴³

During the period under review, several discussions of the Council touched upon the importance of providing peacekeeping operations with adequate troops and equipment, including military air assets. For example, at the 8612th meeting, held on 9 September 2019 under the item entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations",¹⁴⁴ the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations underscored that technology such as unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles, sense-and-warn systems and remote sensors had become necessities for uniformed personnel. He looked forward to continuing to work with troop- and police-contributing countries, as well as with willing partners, to address those gaps and ensure full operational readiness, and expressed support for innovative solutions such as having equipment-contributing countries and joint deployments. He stressed that troop- and police-contributing countries should come equipped with vehicles that could withstand the impact of improvised explosive devices, such as mine-protected armoured personnel carriers; MINUSMA required an additional 80 such vehicles. The representative of China stressed that the international community should provide greater support for efforts to build the peacekeeping capacity of those troop-contributing countries that were also developing countries, while troop-contributing countries should ensure that peacekeepers were adequately trained, equipped and resourced. The representative of the United States stated that peacekeeping was a shared responsibility that came with shared costs; it was the responsibility of all Member States to step up their efforts to make sure peacekeepers were well trained and well equipped. The representative of Equatorial Guinea underscored that peacekeeping troops and police should have the best possible training and equipment, and the representative of Senegal stated that providing training and capacity-building were a fundamental part of providing peacekeeping operations with well-trained and adequately equipped troops. The representative of Italy similarly emphasized the need to continue to provide peacekeeping operations with the best troops, first-rate equipment and appropriate enablers. Taking note of the number of fatalities peacekeepers had suffered since 2013, the representative of Bangladesh stressed the need for improvements on a range of issues, including rapid deployment and unimpeded access for troops. The representative of Pakistan underscored that even the best training and equipment could not be expected to deliver in the face of unrealistic expectations, and that it was

imperative that all assets be available for utilization as the situation on the ground warranted.

B. Recognition of the need to consult troop- and police-contributing countries

During the period under review, the Council adopted two decisions relevant to the need to consult troop- and police-contributing countries on issues pertaining to peacekeeping. On 26 June and 19 December 2019, respectively, the Council adopted resolutions [2477 \(2019\)](#) and [2503 \(2019\)](#) on the situation in the Middle East. In those resolutions, the Council emphasized the importance of the Council's and troop-contributing countries' having access to reports and information related to the redeployment configuration of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and reiterated that such information assisted the Council in evaluating, mandating and reviewing the Force and in effectively consulting troop-contributing countries.¹⁴⁵ On 28 June 2019, the Council adopted resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#) on the situation in Mali. In the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to ensure that troop-contributing countries received sufficient information related to up-to-date tactics, techniques and procedures to reduce troop casualties in an asymmetric environment before deploying to Mali.¹⁴⁶

In 2019, the Council made no explicit references to Article 44 during its discussions. Nonetheless, the importance of consulting troop- and police-contributing countries on issues relating to the mandates of peacekeeping operations continued to be discussed under the item entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations", in particular at the 8570th meeting.¹⁴⁷ At that meeting, the Council focused specifically on triangular cooperation between the Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Council (case 9). At a subsequent meeting under the same item, several speakers stressed the importance of triangular cooperation.¹⁴⁸

Consistent with recent practice, at the annual debate on the working methods of the Council, held on 6 June 2019 under the item entitled "Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)",¹⁴⁹ several speakers addressed the issue of consulting troop- and police-contributing countries. The representatives of France, the United Kingdom and

¹⁴³ Resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), para. 36.

¹⁴⁴ See [S/PV.8612](#).

¹⁴⁵ Resolutions [2477 \(2019\)](#), thirteenth preambular paragraph, and [2503 \(2019\)](#), thirteenth preambular paragraph.

¹⁴⁶ Resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), para. 47.

¹⁴⁷ See [S/PV.8570](#).

¹⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8612](#) (Bangladesh, Russian Federation and United Republic of Tanzania).

¹⁴⁹ See [S/PV.8539](#).

China recalled that they always consulted or ensured the participation of troop-contributing countries in their work at the Council.¹⁵⁰ The representative of Italy stated that in reviewing the mandates of peacekeeping operations, due consideration should be given to the views of troop- and police-contributing countries, which was crucial to nurturing trust between them and Council members. The representative of Brazil noted that more should be done to enhance the consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries and that their views should have a bearing on the formation, review and drawdown of peacekeeping operations and the mandates of special political missions. He regretted that the mechanism for consultations in place had not yet had the desired impact on the deliberations of the Council. Several representatives stated that consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries were essential for peacekeeping operations to be effective and successful.¹⁵¹ The representative of Guatemala expressed appreciation for section VIII of the annex to the note by the President of 30 August 2017 (known as note 507);¹⁵² the section indicated the importance of consultations among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries and was a valuable contribution to enhancing the capacity of the Council to take appropriate, effective and timely decisions in the discharge of its responsibilities.¹⁵³ The representative of Egypt similarly recalled paragraph 91 of note 507, stressing that consultation between the Council and troop-contributing States should be improved. The representative of Turkey recognized transparency as especially important for the mandates of peacekeeping operations and sanctions regimes, and underscored that the Council must cooperate more closely with troop- and police-contributing countries. The representative of Costa Rica expressed the view that the practice of regularly consulting troop- and police-contributing countries should be institutionalized. The representative of Argentina called on the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to continue holding regular and predictable meetings with troop-contributing countries on relevant issues.

Case 9 United Nations peacekeeping operations

At the 8570th meeting, held on 10 July 2019 at the initiative of Peru, which held the presidency for the month,¹⁵⁴ the Council considered, for the first time, the subitem entitled “Strengthening triangular cooperation”,

under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”.¹⁵⁵ The Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations gave a briefing on ways to strengthen, sharpen and re-energize the approach to triangular dialogue and cooperation among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries. He noted that strong triangular cooperation was crucial to enhancing peacekeeping operations. He stated that mandates could benefit strongly from the perspectives and experiences of troop and police contributors present on the ground, which would make those mandates more focused, adapted and achievable. He elaborated on a number of existing mechanisms to facilitate consultations among the three stakeholders, including the formal and informal consultations of the Council with troop- and police-contributing countries, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, the Military Staff Committee and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the General Assembly.¹⁵⁶

The MINUSMA Force Commander stated that he had close interaction and was in close dialogue with troop-contributing countries through their national representatives in order to provide information, get their opinions and create and guide confidence among them.¹⁵⁷ He added that, as Force Commander, he could help to ensure that the members of the triangle had as good an understanding as possible of the situation within the Mission and that candid and relevant information went directly to the troop contributors’ capitals.

In her briefing, a senior fellow at the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations of the International Peace Institute said that triangular cooperation was at the crossroads of the work of the Council, such as when the Council took a decision, created a peacekeeping operation or considered a mission drawdown or closure. At each of those stages, she stressed, the Council must engage in some form of dialogue with the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries. She further emphasized that that dialogue must be strengthened and should even be a basic principle in an Organization where those who mandated, paid for and contributed personnel were not the same. She made a number of suggestions to strengthen triangular cooperation. In particular, she suggested that 10 troop and police contributors was a good number to allow for a focused discussion; while

¹⁵⁰ See *ibid.*, (China, France and United Kingdom).

¹⁵¹ See *ibid.*, (Canada, India, Morocco and Slovenia).

¹⁵² S/2017/507.

¹⁵³ See S/PV.8539.

¹⁵⁴ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 27 June 2019 (S/2019/538).

¹⁵⁵ See S/PV.8570.

¹⁵⁶ For more information on the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, see part IX; on the Military Staff Committee, see part VII, sect. VI; and on the relationship between the Security Council and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, see part IV, sect. I.G.

¹⁵⁷ See S/PV.8570.

some flexibility would be required in adjusting the exact number of attendees, the meetings should not turn into yet another forum where no one was willing to talk openly and informally about real issues. She recommended that consultations should be held before the renewal of mandates, before and after the Secretariat conducted a major strategic review, and whenever a major mission-related crisis occurred. She explained that the idea would be that views and concerns expressed by troop- and police-contributing countries would be taken into account by the penholder and would thus shape how a given mandate was conceived. She added that meetings could be held at the start of the process initiated by the penholder to renew a mandate and immediately after the advance copy of the report of the Secretary-General was shared with the main contributors. She proposed that the meetings could be strengthened by holding a parallel, purely military discussion in the informal setting of the Military Staff Committee, to which key contributors not serving in the Council could be invited.

The representative of Côte d'Ivoire, speaking also on behalf of Equatorial Guinea and South Africa,¹⁵⁸ said that promoting effective triangular cooperation among the Council, as the body responsible for mandating peace missions, the Secretariat, as the body responsible for planning and managing those missions, and, importantly, the troop- and police-contributing countries, as the countries implementing those mandates, remained one of the priorities for United Nations peacekeeping operations. He emphasized that the nature of mandates was of paramount importance to all actors in peacekeeping and that it was important in that regard to recognize the importance of consultation with, and the full involvement of, troop-contributing countries and peace coordination committees throughout the duration of peacekeeping operations, including in the development of mandates. He suggested that the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations could play a monitoring and evaluation role in following up on the commitments regarding triangular cooperation made by the Council in its resolutions on peacekeeping operations.

The representative of the Dominican Republic stressed that it was imperative to recognize the essential roles that the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries played in entrusting, planning, managing and executing peacekeeping operations, which was why triangular cooperation needed to be strengthened, thus promoting collaboration, cooperation and mutual trust. He noted the continued lack of timely information and effective dialogue among

the three parties and called for a balance between formal and informal consultations in an efficient format and with timely interactions. He also called for consultations whenever operations underwent a transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, or troops were being reduced or withdrawn. He said that triangular dialogues should be participatory and inclusive, with greater attention being paid to concerns expressed by the troop- and police-contributing countries, bearing in mind their knowledge of the existing realities on the ground. He underscored that it was important that troop- and police-contributors receive updated and regular information from the Secretariat and that the Secretariat respond rapidly to their requests for information.

The representative of France stressed that triangular cooperation in the form of regular consultations was necessary throughout the life cycle of a peacekeeping operation. She said that troop and police contributors had much to contribute to the planning, decision-making and effective deployment of operations and that the information and lessons they had retained from theatres of operations were very useful in drawing up mandates and adjusting them. She said that sustained dialogue among the Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat was essential for the effective management of missions. She joined other speakers in noting that many tools were already available to ensure the smooth functioning of triangular cooperation, such as Council meetings held in a number of formats that allowed for interaction with troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat, meetings of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, at which all peacekeeping stakeholders had an opportunity to speak, and meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries organized by the Secretariat.

The representative of Kuwait recalled that the meetings of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations had been held with the participation of troop-contributing countries on an equal footing with Council members, which made it one of the most inclusive tools of the Council for working with those countries. He noted that the cooperation of the Working Group with the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which enabled the Council to take into account the concerns of troop and police contributors. He stressed that consultations must not be limited to formal meetings, but must also include informal consultations of penholders with troop-contributing countries and host States. The representative of the United States similarly focused on the existing forums for consultations between the three stakeholders, the Working Group being one of those, and encouraged more troop-contributing States to make greater use of

¹⁵⁸ Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and South Africa.

those forums by attending and participating in the discussions. The representative of Poland expressed the opinion that, while the informal meetings between the Council and the contributors were already well established and utilized, the pre-meetings organized by penholders also served to share concerns and perspectives and allowed for a genuine and frank exchange of views ahead of mandate renewals. She suggested that it would be worth extending such discussions to all mandate renewals as preparatory meetings. With regard to the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, she noted its ability to adjust discussions to the current needs. The representative of Bangladesh stated that the Working Group needed to be utilized for more in-depth discussions of common concerns, and it could play a catalytic role in further institutionalizing triangular cooperation by regular and systematic engagement of troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat.

The representative of Indonesia focused on the quadrilateral consultations among the host countries, the Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat, within which the parties could discuss the larger picture of political strategy and priorities.

The representative of China noted that strengthening triangular cooperation among the Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat was crucial to enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. He said that better use should be made of Council meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries to promote more comprehensive and in-depth discussions. He proposed that the role of the Working Group be better leveraged to serve as communication channel among the three actors. He stressed that the penholders should strengthen communication with the troop- and police-contributing countries when drafting relevant resolutions on peacekeeping operations. The representative of Belgium similarly encouraged penholders to take into account the considerations expressed by contributors when drafting resolutions for mandate renewals, and the troop- and police-contributors, including small and medium-sized contributors, to participate in the meetings of the Working Group.

The representative of the Russian Federation emphasized that triangular cooperation played a significant and defining role in the practical effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping as it brought together the key players involved in setting tasks, planning, managing and carrying out peacekeeping operations. He said that the key platform of the United Nations system for implementing such cooperation was the Special Committee on

Peacekeeping Operations of the General Assembly. He advocated for putting into practice the proposals for promoting triangular cooperation in the reports of the Special Committee and underlined that peacekeeping mandates and the conceptual know-how of the Secretariat should correlate with the opinions of troop- and police-contributing countries, and host States.

The representative of the United Kingdom acknowledged the value of views from the ground and the need to seek the perspectives of troop- and police-contributing countries, but pointed out that no single contributor had a monopoly on the truth about what was happening on the ground. He stated that the Council therefore needed to make sure that the views of the Special Representatives and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Force Commanders and all other relevant analyses were also considered.

The representative of Ethiopia emphasized the need to see greater involvement on the part of troop- and police-contributing countries in the mandating process. He regretted that it was still the Secretariat and the resolution penholders, and not those involved on the ground, who presented analyses of the political, security and humanitarian situations for missions. He noted that the lack of participation in the process of mandate preparation and renewal negatively affected performance and damaged trust among the Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat. For successful operations, it was necessary for the Council to institutionalize regular consultations with the stakeholders. He stressed that such discussions should not be confined to formal talks in New York and that there should be informal discussions at the field level that could address shortfalls in information flows and institutional arrangements. He stated that penholders should make it a priority to consult with troop-contributing countries in good faith and not overlook institutional arrangements.

The representative of Rwanda echoed most speakers in saying that sustained, meaningful consultations with troop-contributing countries at all stages of planning and decision-making were critical to the success of any United Nations peacekeeping operation. This meant that the Council could not work in isolation from the implementers of its resolutions and mandates. He suggested that meetings should be informal in the sense of promoting a frank, transparent and constructive dialogue, and held in formats that allowed participants to discuss of both operational and political decisions. The representative of Bangladesh stated that, despite a clear division of responsibilities among the three parties of the triangle, there were significant interlinkages and interplay among their work. Therefore, meaningful cooperation and consultations

among them were crucial to drafting clearly defined, realistic and achievable mandates. He stated that the objective of strengthening triangular cooperation should primarily be about overcoming the so-called Christmas-tree mandate dilemma. The representative of Pakistan said that there was a need to institutionalize triangular cooperation to engage troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat early in the process. He added that formal meetings needed to be revitalized to maximize their benefit through the timely provision of relevant information to troop- and police-contributing countries and ensure substantive and meaningful dialogue ahead of mandate renewals.

The representative of Egypt noted the continued absence of a strategic dimension in the ongoing consultations between the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries that would make the troop contributors real partners in efforts to ensure that peacekeeping operations met their strategic objectives. He said that the current format of the consultations in accordance with resolution [1353 \(2001\)](#) did not rise to the desired level of triangular cooperation. The representative of Uruguay similarly noted a shared perception among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries that the current consultations fell short of expectations and had yet to reach their full potential.

VI. Role and composition of the Military Staff Committee in accordance with Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. *There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.*

2. *The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.*

3. *The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.*

4. *The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.*

Note

Section VI covers the practice of the Council under Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter regarding the Military Staff Committee, including instances in which the Council considered the role of the Military Staff Committee in planning the application of armed force, and in advising and assisting the Council on the military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security.

During the period under review, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 46 or Article 47 in any of its decisions. Also, no reference was made to Article 46 in any of its discussions. Nonetheless, on 10 July 2019, at the initiative of Peru, which held the presidency for the month,¹⁵⁹ the Council convened its 8570th meeting under the item entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations" and the sub-item entitled "Strengthening triangular cooperation".¹⁶⁰ Several speakers referred to the role the Military Staff Committee played in facilitating triangular consultations among the Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries.¹⁶¹ The representative of the Russian Federation said that the potential of the Military Staff Committee remained underestimated and that, pursuant to Article 47 of the Charter, the Committee should be called upon to advise and assist the Council on all questions relating to the military requirements of the Council.¹⁶² He added that it was logical to give closer consideration to ways of utilizing the analytical

¹⁵⁹ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 27 June 2019 ([S/2019/538](#)).

¹⁶⁰ See [S/PV.8570](#).

¹⁶¹ For more information, see part VII, sect. V.B (case 9).

¹⁶² [S/PV.8570](#).

capacities and practical assistance that the Committee could provide. He pointed to the usefulness of the practice of conducting country visits to United Nations missions, following up with a report with recommendations for the Council and inviting military representatives of the elected Council members to take part in the meetings of the Military Staff Committee. He further deemed it important that the authority of the Military Staff Committee be reconfirmed, and that the Secretariat provide it with all the necessary assistance in its activities involving the maintenance of international peace and security.

During the same meeting, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations noted a number of mechanisms to facilitate triangular dialogue and cooperation, including the formal and informal consultations of the Council with troop- and police-contributing countries, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and the Military Staff Committee. Another briefer at the meeting, a senior fellow at the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations of the International Peace Institute, suggested that the triangular consultations should be held at the expert level and attended by political and military experts, as they

were fundamentally political and military in nature. She added that, at times, when stakes were higher, those meetings could be held at a more senior level to allow for effective decisions being taken. With reference to resolution 1353 (2001), she argued that such meetings could be strengthened by holding a parallel discussion of a purely military nature within the informal setting of the Military Staff Committee, to which key contributors not serving the Council could be invited. The representative of Belgium recognized some merit in spurring an enhanced dialogue on increasingly technical and military issues to enable horizontal dialogue among the experts of the respective contributors. In that regard, he indicated that consideration should be given to the role that the Military Staff Committee should play in a triangular structure.

As is customary, the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly issued during the reporting period made reference to the activities of the Military Staff Committee.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ See A/73/2, part IV.

VII. Action required of Member States under Article 48 of the Charter

Article 48

1. *The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.*

2. *Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.*

Note

Section VII covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 48 of the Charter, regarding the obligation of all or some Member States to carry out the decisions of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Under Article 48 (2), Member States shall carry out the decisions directly, or through international organizations of which they are members. The section is focused on the types of obligations imposed on Member States pursuant to Article 48, and on the range of addressees designated

by the Council to implement, or comply with, decisions adopted.

While Article 48 relates to requests to Member States to carry out action decided upon by the Council, during 2019, as in previous periods, the Council addressed some of its pleas to “actors” or “parties”, reflecting the intra-State and increasingly complex nature of many contemporary conflicts dealt with by the Council. In its requests to carry out actions, the Council also addressed “regional and subregional organizations”, signalling the importance of such entities in tackling disputes and situations before the Council. Additional information on the engagement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security is provided in part VIII.

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 48 in any of its decisions. The Council, however, adopted resolutions and issued presidential statements in which it underlined the obligation of Member States and other entities concerned to comply with the measures imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter pursuant to Article 48. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions of the Council requiring Member States to

carry out actions in relation to measures under Article 41. Subsection B covers decisions of the Council requiring Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 42. During 2019, no references to Article 48 were found in communications to the Council nor was there any discussion held in relation to the interpretation or application of that Article.

A. Decisions in which the Security Council required Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 41 of the Charter

In 2019, the Council adopted a number of decisions under Article 41. With regard to judicial measures taken under that article, the Council called upon all the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to fully cooperate with the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.¹⁶⁴

With regard to decisions adopted under Article 41 concerning sanctions, the Council frequently requested, or stressed the importance of specific measures being implemented by all Member States or all States, as well as regional organizations. The Council requested the countries specifically targeted by the measures to carry out the actions required.

With regard to the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council urged all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic and the safety of its members.¹⁶⁵ It urged all Member States to ensure unhindered access¹⁶⁶ and recalled that all Member States were to continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Central African Republic of arms and related materiel of all types.¹⁶⁷ The Council further requested the country's authorities to report, by 30 June 2019, to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic on the progress achieved on established benchmarks,¹⁶⁸ and to allow the Panel of Experts and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in

the Central African Republic access to exempted arms and related lethal equipment.¹⁶⁹

With regard to the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Council urged "all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties" to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009).¹⁷⁰

With respect to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council called for enhanced cooperation between all States, in particular those in the region, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1533 (2004), and encouraged all parties and all States to ensure cooperation with the Group of Experts by individuals and entities within their jurisdiction or under their control.¹⁷¹

In connection with the situation in Lebanon, the Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution 1701 (2006) according to which all States were to take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and related materiel by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft to any entity or individual in Lebanon, other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.¹⁷²

With regard to the situation in Libya, the Council called for full compliance with the arms embargo by all Member States in line with resolution 2441 (2018) and its previous resolutions on the embargo.¹⁷³

With regard to the situation in Somalia, the Council requested the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other Member States to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, and to submit an update on concrete actions taken in that regard.¹⁷⁴ The Council called on Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction involved in the sale, supply or transfer of explosive precursors

¹⁶⁴ Resolution 2496 (2019), para. 1.

¹⁶⁵ Resolution 2454 (2019), para. 6.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

¹⁶⁷ Resolution 2488 (2019), para. 1.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, fifth preambular paragraph, and S/PRST/2019/3, penultimate paragraph.

¹⁶⁹ Resolution 2488 (2019), para. 8.

¹⁷⁰ Resolution 2464 (2019), para. 5.

¹⁷¹ Resolution 2463 (2019), para. 40.

¹⁷² Resolution 2485 (2019), para. 19.

¹⁷³ Resolution 2486 (2019), twenty-first preambular paragraph.

¹⁷⁴ Resolution 2498 (2019), para. 2.

and materials to Somalia that could be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, to keep records of transactions and share information with the Federal Government of Somalia, the Committee and the Panel of Experts on Somalia regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into those chemicals by individuals in Somalia.¹⁷⁵ The Council urged the Federal Government of Somalia to cooperate with the Panel of Experts to facilitate interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) held in custody, and reiterated the importance of cooperation between the Panel of Experts and the Federal Government of Somalia, including by assisting in investigations and providing access to armouries and military storage facilities.¹⁷⁶ With regard to anti-piracy measures pertaining to Somalia, the Council called on all States to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts, including by sharing information regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia. The Council renewed its call on States and regional organizations that were able to do so to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft and by providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces.¹⁷⁷

With respect to the situation in South Sudan, the Council urged all parties, Member States, and international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts on South Sudan and further urged all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access.¹⁷⁸

In relation to the situation in Yemen, the Council urged all parties, all Member States, and international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts on Yemen and urged all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites, in order for the Panel to execute its mandate.¹⁷⁹

With respect to measures adopted under Article 41 to counter terrorism and the financing of terrorism, the Council reaffirmed and emphasized its decisions in resolutions 1373 (2001) and 2178 (2014) that all States were to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support,

active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, that all Member States were to criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds were to be used to carry out terrorist acts; and that all Member States were to establish serious criminal offenses regarding the travel, recruitment and financing of foreign terrorist fighters.¹⁸⁰ The Council further urged all States to participate actively in implementing and updating the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list and to consider including, when submitting new listing requests, individuals and entities involved in the financing of terrorism.¹⁸¹

B. Decisions in which the Security Council required Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 42 of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council urged, called upon and requested action by a particular Member State, a designated group of Member States, all Member States, all parties, and, on one occasion, the African Union, in relation to measures adopted under Article 42 of the Charter.

With respect to the situation in Abyei, the Council called upon all Member States, in particular the Sudan and South Sudan, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Abyei and throughout the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone of all personnel, as well as of equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles, aircraft, and spare parts that were for the exclusive and official use of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei.¹⁸² The Council called upon the Governments to facilitate travel from within the Sudan and South Sudan to and from Abyei and to fully adhere to their obligations under the status-of-forces agreements.¹⁸³

Concerning the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council urged all parties in the country to cooperate fully with the deployment and activities of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 28.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 30–31.

¹⁷⁷ Resolution 2500 (2019), paras. 11–12.

¹⁷⁸ Resolution 2459 (2019), para. 22.

¹⁷⁹ Resolution 2456 (2019), para. 8.

¹⁸⁰ Resolution 2462 (2019), paras. 1–2.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 12. For more information, see part VII, sect. III.A.

¹⁸² Resolutions 2469 (2019), para. 22, and 2497 (2019), para. 22.

¹⁸³ Resolutions 2469 (2019), para. 7, and 2497 (2019), para. 8.

(MINUSCA), in particular by ensuring the safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of the country to enable MINUSCA to carry out fully its mandate. The Council called upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from the Central African Republic of all personnel, as well as of equipment, provision, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts that were for the exclusive and official use of MINUSCA.¹⁸⁴

In connection with the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council called on the Government of that country to take further military action in accordance with international law in coordination and with the support of MONUSCO to end the threat posed by domestic and foreign armed groups operating in the eastern part of the country.¹⁸⁵ The Council reiterated its call on all parties to cooperate fully with MONUSCO and to remain committed to the full and objective implementation of the Mission's mandate.¹⁸⁶

In relation to the question concerning Haiti, the Council called upon the Government of Haiti to continue to facilitate the mandate and functioning of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti.¹⁸⁷

With regard to the situation in Lebanon, the Council called upon all parties to prevent any violation of the Blue Line, respect the Blue Line in its entirety and cooperate fully with the United Nations and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The Council urged all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of members of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel, and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and the Force's access to all parts of the Blue Line was fully respected and was unimpeded, in conformity with the Force's mandate and rules of engagement. The Council called on the Government of Lebanon to facilitate UNIFIL access in line with resolution 1701

(2006), and called on all States to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL.¹⁸⁸

In connection with the situation in Mali, the Council stressed the importance of providing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with the necessary performance capacities to fulfil its mandate while ensuring the best possible level of safety and security for its personnel and urged Member States to provide troops and police that had adequate capabilities and equipment, including enablers specific to the operating environment, and called on Member States to provide troops with a minimum of declared caveats.¹⁸⁹ The Council urged all parties in Mali to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of the Mission's personnel and called upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Mali of all personnel, equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods that were for the exclusive and official use of MINUSMA.¹⁹⁰

In connection with the situation in South Sudan, the Council demanded that the Government of South Sudan and opposition groups cease their obstruction of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).¹⁹¹ The Council further demanded that the Government comply with the obligations set out in the status-of-forces agreement between the Government and UNMISS and immediately cease obstructing UNMISS in the performance of its mandate. The Council also called on the Government to take action to deter, and to hold those responsible to account for, any hostile or other actions that impeded UNMISS and to guarantee UNMISS unimpeded access to United Nations premises in line with the agreement.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁴ Resolution 2499 (2019), paras. 47–48.

¹⁸⁵ Resolution 2463 (2019), para. 15.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, twenty-eighth preambular paragraph.

¹⁸⁷ Resolution 2466 (2019), para. 8.

¹⁸⁸ Resolution 2485 (2019), paras. 11, 14–15 and 18.

¹⁸⁹ Resolution 2480 (2019), paras. 44–45.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 8 and 52.

¹⁹¹ S/PRST/2019/11, eighth paragraph.

¹⁹² Resolution 2459 (2019), paras. 2 and 12.

VIII. Mutual assistance pursuant to Article 49 of the Charter

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Note

Section VIII covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 49 of the Charter, concerning mutual assistance among Member States in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Council.

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly invoke Article 49 in any of its decisions. However, in its decisions in 2019, the Council called upon Member States to cooperate with each other or assist specific States in the implementation of measures imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter. The present section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions in which the Council urged cooperation among Member States with respect to measures under Article 41. Subsection B covers decisions in which the Council requested mutual assistance in relation to measures under Article 42.

In 2019, as in previous periods, there was no constitutional discussion in the Council relating to the interpretation or application of Article 49 of the Charter. No reference to Article 49 was found in the communications received by the Council.

A. Decisions in which the Security Council requested mutual assistance in the implementation of measures under Article 41 of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council called upon Member States to enhance their cooperation in implementing specific sanctions measures. The addressees of the calls of the Council for mutual assistance ranged from individual Member States, in particular concerned States and neighbouring States, to “all Member States”, as well as regional and subregional organizations.

For example, in connection with the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council called on the authorities of that country and those of neighbouring

States to cooperate at the regional level to investigate and combat transnational criminal networks and armed groups involved in arms trafficking and called on them to reactivate their joint bilateral commissions to address cross-border issues, in particular issues related to arms trafficking.¹⁹³

With regard to the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council called for enhanced cooperation between all States, particularly those in the region, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1533 (2004).¹⁹⁴

With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council requested the Federal Government of that country to strengthen its cooperation and coordination with other Member States, particularly other those in the region, and with international partners, to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, which includes compliance with resolutions 1373 (2001), 2178 (2014), and 2462 (2019), and relevant domestic and international law.¹⁹⁵

With respect to measures adopted under Article 41 to counter terrorism and the financing of terrorism, the Council called on Member States to strengthen international cooperation to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, including by ensuring the effective exchange of relevant information; ensuring that their financial intelligence units served as the central agencies for the receipt of suspicious transaction reports and other information relevant to money-laundering, predicate offences and the financing of terrorism; enhancing cross-border cooperation among and between customs and tax authorities and improving the coordination of international police and customs operations; and improving the quality of the information shared internationally between financial intelligence units on the financing of foreign terrorist fighters by fully implementing the standards of the Financial Action Task Force in that regard.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹³ Resolution 2488 (2019), para. 9.

¹⁹⁴ Resolution 2463 (2019), para. 40.

¹⁹⁵ Resolution 2498 (2019), para. 2.

¹⁹⁶ Resolution 2462 (2019), para. 28.

B. Decisions in which the Security Council requested mutual assistance in the implementation of measures under Article 42 of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council adopted several resolutions in which it requested the Member States to cooperate with each other in carrying out measures under Article 42 of the Charter, under which the use of force is authorized. The types of assistance requested included sharing information and capacity-building to deter various criminal acts and coordination among Member States to deter such acts.

For example, concerning the situation in Lebanon, the Council continued to call upon Member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable them to perform their duties in line with resolution 1701 (2006).¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁷ Resolution 2485 (2019), penultimate preambular paragraph.

With respect to the situation in Libya and the question of migration, the Council reiterated the calls made in previous resolutions for “all flag States involved” to cooperate with efforts to inspect vessels suspected of being used for the smuggling of migrants or trafficking in persons from Libya.¹⁹⁸ The Council also reiterated previous resolutions in which it had called upon Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations, including the European Union, to cooperate with the Government of National Accord and with each other, including by sharing information to assist Libya in building capacity to secure its borders and to prevent, investigate and prosecute instances of the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons through its territory and in its territorial sea.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁸ Resolution 2491 (2019), para. 1. See also resolution 2240 (2015), para. 9.

¹⁹⁹ Resolution 2491 (2019), paras. 1–2. See also resolutions 2240 (2015), paras. 1–2 and 9, 2312 (2016), paras. 2–3, and 2380 (2017), paras. 2–3.

IX. Special economic problems of the nature described in Article 50 of the Charter

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Note

Section IX covers the practice of the Council in relation to Article 50 of the Charter, regarding the right of States to consult the Council with a view to resolving economic problems arising from the implementation of preventive or enforcement measures, such as sanctions, imposed by the Council.

During the period under review, the Council continued its practice of imposing targeted instead of comprehensive economic sanctions, thereby minimizing the unintended adverse impact on third States.²⁰⁰ None of the Council-mandated sanctions committees received formal requests for assistance under Article 50 of the Charter.

²⁰⁰ For more information on sanctions measures, see part VII, sect. III.

The Council did not explicitly invoke Article 50 of the Charter in any of its decisions during the reporting period. However, during the period under review the Council adopted resolution 2462 (2019), in which it urged States, when designing and applying measures to counter the financing of terrorism, to take into account the potential effect of those measures on exclusively humanitarian activities.²⁰¹

While no explicit mentions of Article 50 of the Charter were made at the meetings of the Council, some references to the consequences of sanctions made by speakers during the 8496th meeting held on 28 March 2019 under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security” were of relevance for the interpretation and application of Article 50 (case 10).

Case 10

Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

On 28 March 2019, the Council convened its 8496th meeting at the initiative of France,²⁰² which held the presidency for the month, under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and

²⁰¹ Resolution 2462 (2019), para. 24.

²⁰² The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 14 March 2019 (S/2019/239).

security”.²⁰³ At the meeting, the Council considered the subitem entitled “Preventing and combating the financing of terrorism”. During the meeting, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2462 (2019), referenced above, on countering the financing of terrorism. During the debate, several speakers addressed the need to take into account the negative consequences that counter-terrorist activities, including sanctions, could have on the provision of humanitarian assistance. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of France welcomed the balance struck in the text between the objective of better combatting the financing of terrorism and the ability of humanitarian actors to carry out their mission in proper conditions without hinderance to their activities. The representative of Poland said that one should not turn a blind eye to the unintended consequences of sanctions, which could affect humanitarian actions. The representative of Belgium similarly acknowledged the potentially harmful effects of counter-terrorism policy on the work of humanitarian organizations and stated that mitigation measures should be taken to prevent possible negative consequences. He stressed the need to prioritize the implementation of the new resolution. The representative of South Africa highlighted the importance of fighting terrorism without negatively affecting humanitarian aid and medical assistance, and welcomed the efforts made by France to provide assurances to that effect in the resolution. The representative of the Holy See underscored that the Council needed to ensure that counter-terrorism measures did not limit or inhibit the capacity of non-governmental and charitable organizations to provide humanitarian aid to vulnerable groups or persons. The representative of Liechtenstein encouraged the Council to issue consistent guidance to States to avoid unintended consequences from the implementation of its resolutions and to adopt a more coherent approach to ensure that humanitarian actors were given the necessary space to operate.

²⁰³ See S/PV.8496.

The representative of Norway stressed the need to take into consideration the concerns raised by humanitarian actors about the unintended negative impact that measures to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism could have on their ability to address humanitarian needs. The representative of Germany also addressed the concerns of some humanitarian organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, about the possible negative consequences of resolution 2462 (2019) for their work. He noted that it was impossible to provide humanitarian assistance without money and that financial transactions were needed to buy food and medicine; thus, it was paramount not to erect barriers to humanitarian assistance by restricting the access of humanitarian personnel to funds in conflict regions. He said that he believed that the resolution would strike the necessary balance by promoting effective counter-terrorism measures on the one hand and a safe space for principled humanitarian action on the other. The representative of the Dominican Republic similarly underscored the need to work together to find a formula that ensured that the implementation of measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism did not end up negatively affecting the excellent work that non-profit and non-governmental organizations were doing.

The Permanent Observer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations expressed concern about the growing impact that counter-terrorism measures could have on impartial humanitarian action. He acknowledged States’ legitimate concerns and their need to take the measures necessary to ensure security and eliminate terrorism, but stressed that certain measures, most notably counter-terrorism legislation and sanctions, could criminalize and restrict humanitarian action, jeopardizing the ability to cross front lines in order to deliver humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by armed groups and individuals designated as terrorists.

X. Right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the

exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Note

Section X deals with the practice of the Council in relation to Article 51 of the Charter, regarding the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” in the event of an armed attack against a Member State. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers the discussions of the Council of relevance to the interpretation and application of Article 51 and subsection B covers references to Article 51 and the right to self-defence in communications addressed to the Council. The Council did not refer to Article 51 or the right of self-defence in its decisions during the reporting period.

A. Discussions relating to Article 51

In 2019, Article 51 of the Charter was explicitly invoked four times during the deliberations of the Council, as described in the two sub-sections below.²⁰⁴ Moreover, the right of self-defence was discussed at several meetings of the Council in relation to a number of thematic and country- and region-specific items on its agenda.

Discussion on thematic items

At the 8539th meeting, held on 6 June 2019 under the item entitled “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2017/507)”,²⁰⁵ the representative of Mexico noted the ongoing invocations by some Member States of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations with regard to using military means to address threats to international peace and security, in particular from non-State actors. He expressed concern that the practice, coupled with the ambiguous language of some recent Council resolutions, increased the risk of broadening in practice the exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force in paragraph 4 of Article 2.

At the 8564th meeting, held on 26 June 2019 under the item entitled “Non-proliferation”,²⁰⁶ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Council that in regard to the “United States spy drone”,²⁰⁷ his country had acted in self-defence, in

accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and in full conformity with international law.

At the 8600th meeting, held 20 August 2019 under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”,²⁰⁸ the representative of the United Kingdom recalled that the Islamic Republic of Iran had a legitimate role in the Middle East and recognized that it had a right to self-defence. However, she said that the way it pursued its national interests contributed to several regional problems. The representative of Bahrain stated that “Iran-backed coup militias” continued to place obstacles before the Government of Yemen and threatened Saudi Arabia. He condemned the attack against Saudi oil facilities by the Houthi militias and expressed support for the measures taken by Saudi Arabia to defend its security and interest. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran said that, in order to secure its borders, his country would vigorously exercise its inherent right to self-defence. The representative of Israel recalled that Tehran was succeeding only in one key respect – bringing Israel closer to its Arab neighbours. He recalled that at the Warsaw summit in February, Arab Foreign Ministers had stood alongside Israel against the “regime that hijacked Iran” and had asserted the right of Israel to defend itself.

Discussions on country- and region-specific items

During the period under review, discussions relevant to the interpretation and application of Article 51, as well as to the right of self-defence, were held with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular, many speakers discussed the aforementioned concepts at two meetings held under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” on 22 January and 26 March 2019 (case 11). At the meeting held on 22 January 2019,²⁰⁹ the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran explicitly referred to Article 51, stressing that all countries in the region had an inherent right to defend themselves against any armed attack by Israel, and no one could deny or suspend that right. He added that they would decide how and when to exercise it.

On 24 October 2019, the Council convened its 8645th meeting, under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East”.²¹⁰ In connection with Operation Peace Spring launched by Turkey in the north-eastern part of the Syrian Arab Republic on 9 October 2019,²¹¹

²⁰⁴ See S/PV.8449 (Islamic Republic of Iran); S/PV.8539 (Mexico); S/PV.8564 (Islamic Republic of Iran); and S/PV.8645 (Syrian Arab Republic).

²⁰⁵ See S/PV.8539.

²⁰⁶ See S/PV.8564.

²⁰⁷ See letter dated 20 June 2019 from the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2019/512). See also table 12 of the present section.

²⁰⁸ See S/PV.8600.

²⁰⁹ See S/PV.8449.

²¹⁰ See S/PV.8645.

²¹¹ See letter dated 9 October 2019 from the representative of Turkey addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/804).

the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that it was “not that surprising that, in its aggression” against his country, the Turkish regime had “invoked Article 51 of the Charter”. He argued that it echoed the approach taken by its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, who had invoked that article to justify direct military intervention, invasion and the undermining of the sovereignty, security and stability of a number of States Members of the United Nations.²¹² He said that this had been the case when the “so-called international coalition was established, an illegitimate coalition whose crimes and puppet militias” had “paved the way for the Turkish aggression”. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic added that it was strange that “this magical article” should be invoked by some to justify waging wars and military aggression on States Members of the United Nations without any consideration for the mandate of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, and suggested that, perhaps, the Council should hold a meeting with representatives of the Office of Legal Affairs to clarify that important article of the Charter. He further condemned the “Turkish aggression” in the strongest terms and rejected its attempts to justify its actions on the pretext of self-defence or counter-terrorism. At the same meeting, the representative of Turkey said that his country reserved its right to self-defence against terrorist elements that may have remained in the Operation Peace Spring area. He assured the Council that his country’s fight against terrorism would always be in accordance with international humanitarian law.

Case 11

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

On 22 January 2019, the Council held its 8449th meeting, under the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”.²¹³ At the meeting, the representative of the United States condemned the launching of a rocket from the Syrian Arab Republic towards Israel and called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to withdraw all forces from the Syrian Arab Republic and to reaffirm the right of Israel to self-defence. The representative of Equatorial Guinea urged the Israeli security forces, in cases where they were exercising their inalienable right to self-defence, to take into account their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law and avoid actions that made it more difficult to resume dialogue. Expressing concern over the

increase in violence in the West Bank, the representative of the United Kingdom voiced her full support for the right of Israel to defend itself, but urged the Israeli security forces to refrain from the use of excessive force against unarmed civilians. On a similar note, the representative of Argentina, while recognizing the right of Israel to exercise legitimate self-defence, and without prejudice to that right, recalled that the actions of Israel needed to be compatible with international humanitarian law and needed to be pursued while taking into account the principles of distinction between civilians and combatants, proportionality and military necessity in terms of the use of force.

The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic stated that the aggression by Israel against his country and its “multifaceted support for terrorist organizations” had not been condemned and that there had been no calls by the Council to ensure accountability owing to the positions of the United States, Britain and France, which were “partners and supporters of Israel and its aggression”. Nonetheless, his country would exercise its legitimate right to self-defence and work to regain the occupied Syrian Golan by all possible means. The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran recalled Article 51 of the Charter and stressed that all countries in the region had an inherent right to defend themselves against any armed attack by Israel.

During the Council’s 8489th meeting, held on 26 March 2019 under the same item,²¹⁴ the representative of the United States strongly condemned the rocket attack on Israel from the Gaza Strip and reaffirmed the right of Israel to defend itself. The representative of Poland also strongly condemned the rocket attack. While recognizing the right of Israel to defend itself, she called on all sides to exercise maximum restraint in order to avert any escalation, which had the potential to lead to a full-scale war in the Gaza Strip.

The representative of Peru stressed that, in accordance with international humanitarian law, the legitimacy of defensive action by Israel depended on its compliance with the principles of proportionality and caution and called on all stakeholders to adopt the necessary measures to prevent acts of violence and the loss of life. The representative of the United Kingdom, while emphasizing that she was not taking away “one iota” from the right of Israel to self-defence, nor undermining or denying the fact that Hamas operatives exploited protests at the Gaza perimeter fence, voiced concern over the volume of live fire that had been

²¹² See [S/PV.8645](#).

²¹³ See [S/PV.8449](#).

²¹⁴ See [S/PV.8489](#).

used, resulting in injuries and fatalities, and stated that the cycle of violence served no one's interests.

B. References to Article 51 and the right of self-defence in communications addressed to the Security Council

In 2019, Article 51 was explicitly invoked 15 times in 12 communications from Member States addressed to the President of the Council or circulated as a document of the Council. The communications concerned a variety of disputes and situations. The complete list of letters from Member States containing explicit references to Article 51 is given in table 12 below.

In addition, references to the principle of self-defence were found in other communications from several Member States. The Islamic Republic of Iran submitted various communications in which it stated that if war were imposed on it, it would vigorously exercise its inherent right to self-defence in order to defend itself and to secure its interests;²¹⁵ that the downing of a United States unmanned aircraft system that was "deep within Iranian airspace" was in full conformity with the country's inherent right to self-defence;²¹⁶ that it supported the inherent right of all regional countries "attacked by the Zionist regime" to self-defence against any violation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity or any imminent or attempted attack by that "regime";²¹⁷ and recalling an inherent right of Yemen in defending itself against the "aggression" by Saudi Arabia.²¹⁸ Israel submitted various communications in which it called on the Council to condemn terrorism against Israel and support the fundamental right of Israel to self-defence.²¹⁹ Libya submitted one communication in which it transmitted a letter from the Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya regarding his briefing before the Council on

29 July 2019. In the communication, the Government stressed that it had done no more than exercise its legitimate self-defence in connection with the alleged surprise attack on Tripoli by General Haftar.²²⁰ Pakistan submitted communications in which it reaffirmed its resolve to defend itself against any act of aggression by India,²²¹ reserved the right to take appropriate action in self-defence in that regard²²² and informed the Council that, in exercise of its right to self-defence, the country's air force had shot down two Indian aircraft and captured an Indian pilot, who had been immediately repatriated.²²³ Qatar submitted a communication in which it reiterated that it would take the measures required to defend its borders, airspace, maritime space and national security.²²⁴ Saudi Arabia submitted one communication in connection with the attack against the Aramco oil facilities in the country, in which it affirmed its capability and resolve to defend its land and people and to forcefully respond to the "aggressions".²²⁵ Tunisia transmitted a declaration by the Council of the League of Arab States, in which the participants stressed that Saudi Arabia had a right under the Charter of the United Nations to defend its own territory.²²⁶ Turkey submitted a communication in which it emphasized its entitlement to exercise its inherent right of self-defence emanating from the Charter in response to threats to its national security.²²⁷ The United States submitted a communication to inform the Council that it had taken action in self-defence following a threat to a United States Navy vessel by forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.²²⁸ Yemen submitted one communication, in which it affirmed that it reserved the right to defend its security and territorial integrity, as guaranteed by the Charter and international law, and to confront the military insurrection backed by the United Arab Emirates.²²⁹

²¹⁵ See S/2019/413.

²¹⁶ See S/2019/652.

²¹⁷ See S/2019/714.

²¹⁸ See S/2019/785.

²¹⁹ See S/2019/369.

²²⁰ See S/2019/631.

²²¹ See S/2019/172.

²²² See S/2019/182.

²²³ See S/2019/654.

²²⁴ See S/2019/121.

²²⁵ See S/2019/758.

²²⁶ See S/2019/504.

²²⁷ See S/2019/958.

²²⁸ See S/2019/624.

²²⁹ See S/2019/778.

Table 12

Communications from Member States containing explicit references to Article 51 of the Charter in 2019

<i>Document symbol</i>	<i>Document title</i>
S/2019/81	Letter dated 25 January 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2019/148	Letter dated 15 February 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2019/241	Letter dated 15 March 2019 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
S/2019/512	Letter dated 20 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
S/2019/573	Letter dated 16 July 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
S/2019/723	Letter dated 6 September 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2019/765	Letter dated 20 September 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2019/791	Letter dated 2 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2019/792	Letter dated 3 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2019/804	Letter dated 9 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
S/2019/818	Identical letters dated 14 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
S/2019/1003	Letter dated 27 December 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Part VIII

Regional arrangements

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Introductory note

Article 52

1. *Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.*

2. *The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.*

3. *The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.*

4. *This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.*

Article 53

1. *The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.*

2. *The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.*

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security.¹ While Article 52 encourages the engagement of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes prior to their referral to the Security Council, Article 53 allows the Council to utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority and with its explicit authorization. Article 54 stipulates that regional arrangements should inform the Council of their activities at all times.

¹ Chapter VIII of the Charter refers to “regional arrangements or agencies”. For the purposes of the *Repertoire*, the term “regional arrangements” is understood to encompass regional and subregional organizations, as well as other international organizations.

During the period under review, the Council reaffirmed the importance of enhancing cooperation between the United Nations and regional arrangements on conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter. The Council acknowledged the progress made in the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, as evidenced by the increasing number of joint missions, briefings, reports and declarations, and underlined the importance of developing an effective partnership underpinned by consultations between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The two Councils held their thirteenth annual joint consultative meeting in Addis Ababa on 21 October 2019. Engagement with other organizations in addition to the African Union, such as the League of Arab States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, featured prominently in the discussions in the Council.

In 2019, the Council focused in its deliberations on the means to further strengthen cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, the need for adherence to international humanitarian law, international human rights law and conduct and discipline compliance frameworks. In addition, the modalities of ensuring predictable and sustainable funding for African Union-led peacekeeping operations continued to be debated in the meetings of the Council.

In its decisions in connection with the pacific settlement of disputes, the Council continued to highlight the crucial importance of the role played by regional and subregional arrangements in mediation and good offices to end conflicts and ensure successful peace negotiations. The Council highlighted the mediation efforts of regional and subregional arrangements in connection with political crises and the implementation of peace agreements in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia and South Sudan, as well as in the Central African region and in West Africa and the Sahel.

Concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations, the Council renewed the authorization of two existing missions, namely the African Union Mission in Somalia and the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea), while the Kosovo Force of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continued to operate, no decisions having been taken with respect to its mandate. The Council continued to support ongoing efforts in West Africa and the Sahel to fully operationalize the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. As in previous periods, the Council authorized enforcement action by regional and subregional organizations beyond the framework of peacekeeping operations in relation to Libya, Somalia and South Sudan, and continued to request reporting by regional organizations, in particular on mandate implementation of relevant regional peacekeeping operations and cooperation with the United Nations.

The practice of the Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter in 2019 is illustrated below in five sections. Each section covers both the decisions adopted by the Council and the discussions held during Council meetings. Section I examines the practice of the Council regarding cooperation with regional and subregional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security concerning items of a thematic nature. Section II deals with the recognition by the Council of the efforts of regional arrangements in the peaceful settlement of disputes, within the framework of Article 52. Section III covers the practice of the Council in connection with cooperation with regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping. Section IV describes the practice of the Council in authorizing enforcement actions by regional organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations. Section V refers to reporting on the activities of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security.

² See [S/2019/825](#).

I. Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations under thematic items

Note

Section I examines the practice of the Council in 2019 in cooperating with regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, in connection with items of a thematic nature. The section is divided into two subsections: (a) decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII; and (b) discussions on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII.

A. Decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter in three of its decisions, adopted under the thematic items entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” and “Threats to international peace and security”. The text of those provisions is included in table 1.

Table 1
Decisions adopted in 2019 containing explicit references to Chapter VIII

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Provisions</i>
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Resolution 2457 (2019) 27 February 2019	Fourth preambular paragraph	Expressing concern over conflicts in different geographic areas, and reiterating that United Nations cooperation with regional and subregional organizations is critical to contributing to the prevention of the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, in line with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations
		Eighteenth preambular paragraph	Recalling resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) , in which the need was acknowledged to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council and utilized pursuant to Chapter VIII
		Para. 4	Takes note of the ongoing efforts of the African Union and the subregional organizations, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture to strengthen their capacity and undertake peace support operations in the continent, in accordance with Chapter VIII, particularly the African Standby Force and its Rapid Deployment Capability, and encourages the United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission to collaborate towards strengthening the Peace and Security Architecture by supporting the related road map and the African Union Master Road Map of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020 and their respective work plans
		Para. 11	Notes the importance of consultations between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council in their respective decision-making processes and common

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Provisions</i>
			strategies for a holistic response to conflict, as appropriate, based on respective comparative advantage, burden sharing, joint analysis and planning missions and assessment visits by the United Nations and the African Union, monitoring and evaluation, transparency and accountability, to address common security challenges in Africa in accordance with the Charter, including its Chapter VIII, and its purposes and principles
		Para. 21	Reiterates its intention to consider steps that can be taken to enhance practical cooperation with the African Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa in line with Chapter VIII
	S/PRST/2019/5 13 June 2019	Third paragraph	The Council expresses its appreciation for the briefings of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, held on 13 June 2019, and reiterates that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security, and consistent with Chapter VIII, can improve collective security
Threats to international peace and security	Resolution 2482 (2019) 19 July 2019	Para. 21	Recognizes the role of regional and subregional organizations and mechanisms, consistent with Chapter VIII, in deepening the assessment of threats in their respective regions, in contributing to the effective implementation of Council resolutions, in strengthening the capacities of Member States, in facilitating technical assistance and information-sharing, and in contributing to national ownership and disseminating awareness

In other decisions on various thematic issues, the Council, without explicit reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter, recognized and referred to the role of regional and subregional arrangements. Under the item entitled “Women and peace and security”, the Council adopted resolution [2467 \(2019\)](#), in which it affirmed the primary role of Member States in fully implementing the relevant provisions of Council resolutions on women and peace and security, and the important complementary role of United Nations system entities and regional organizations. In the same resolution, the Council recognized the efforts of regional and subregional organizations in implementing resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) and subsequent resolutions on women and peace and security, and welcomed the efforts of regional and subregional organizations to address and eliminate

sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict settings and to support Member States in that regard.³ Under the same item, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2493 \(2019\)](#), in which it reaffirmed the primary role of Member States to implement fully all Council resolutions on women, peace and security, and the important complementary role of United Nations entities and regional organizations, and welcoming their efforts in implementing resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#).⁴ The Council encouraged regional organizations to consider convening meetings in the lead-up to the twentieth

³ Resolution [2467 \(2019\)](#), seventh and twenty-fourth preambular paragraphs and para. 33.

⁴ Resolution [2493 \(2019\)](#), seventh and tenth preambular paragraphs.

commemoration of resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#), with the participation of Governments, relevant stakeholders and civil society to review the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda in their respective regions; it also encouraged them to identify practical and measurable steps for fully implementing the agenda and invited them to report on that progress during the annual open debate of the Council.⁵

In connection with the item entitled “Protection of civilians”, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2474 \(2019\)](#). In the resolution, the Council called upon all parties to armed conflict to take all appropriate measures to actively search for persons reported missing. In that regard, the Council stressed the importance of strengthening the role and capacity of the existing national, regional and international mechanisms addressing the issue of persons missing due to armed conflict and to provide advice and support to Member States, as well as to national, international and regional organizations, to provide training, exchange, as appropriate, information from their respective registries of missing persons cases and share best practices in close cooperation with all relevant organizations.⁶ The Council called upon all Member States to engage in networking, in the exchange of experience, best practices and technical recommendations and in other means of cooperation and coordination with State institutions and, as appropriate, with national commissions on missing persons and competent regional and international organizations and mechanisms.⁷

Under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, the Council adopted resolution [2501 \(2019\)](#), by which it extended by 12 months the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.⁸ The Council decided that the responsibilities of the Monitoring Team included cooperating closely with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and engaging in a regular dialogue with Member States and other relevant organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Combined Maritime Forces on the nexus between narcotics trafficking and the Taliban, as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan.⁹ The Council also decided that the Monitoring Team should consult with

the intelligence and security services of Member States, including through regional forums, in order to facilitate the sharing of information and strengthen the enforcement of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of the resolution, that it should consult with the Government of Afghanistan, other Member States, international and regional organizations, and relevant representatives of the private sector on the threat posed by improvised explosive devices to peace, security and stability in Afghanistan, and that it should work with relevant international and regional organizations in order to promote awareness of, and compliance with, the measures.¹⁰

B. Discussions on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the Charter

At a number of Council meetings held in 2019, speakers discussed the role of regional and subregional organizations under the items entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”,¹¹ “Maintenance of international peace and security”,¹² “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”,¹³ “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”,¹⁴ “United Nations peacekeeping operations”,¹⁵ “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”,¹⁶ “The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security”,¹⁷ “Threats to international peace and security”,¹⁸ and “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”.¹⁹ Discussions held in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” served to highlight the importance of promoting closer ties between the Council and the League of Arab States (see case 1). Under the same item, the Council engaged in discussions on counter-terrorism cooperation in Central

⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 8.

⁶ Resolution [2474 \(2019\)](#), paras. 2 and 11.

⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 13.

⁸ Resolution [2501 \(2019\)](#), para. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, annex, subpara. (o).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, annex, subparas. (q), (v) and (w).

¹¹ See [S/PV.8473](#), [S/PV.8482](#), [S/PV.8548](#), [S/PV.8626](#) and [S/PV.8650](#).

¹² See [S/PV.8451](#), [S/PV.8457](#), [S/PV.8546](#), [S/PV.8577](#), [S/PV.8600](#) and [S/PV.8631](#).

¹³ See [S/PV.8579](#) and [S/PV.8668](#).

¹⁴ See [S/PV.8264](#) and [S/PV.8543](#).

¹⁵ See [S/PV.8508](#), [S/PV.8521](#), [S/PV.8570](#), [S/PV.8612](#) and [S/PV.8661](#).

¹⁶ See [S/PV.8479](#).

¹⁷ See [S/PV.8499](#) and [S/PV.8596](#).

¹⁸ See [S/PV.8456](#) and [S/PV.8569](#).

¹⁹ See [S/PV.8460](#) and [S/PV.8496](#).

Asia between the United Nations and the relevant regional and subregional organizations (see case 2).

Case 1
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

At its 8548th meeting, held on 13 June 2019 at the initiative of Kuwait, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,²⁰ the Council held a high-level briefing on cooperation between the Council and the League of Arab States.²¹ The Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and by the Secretary-General of the League. After the briefings, several Council members²² made explicit references to Chapter VIII of the Charter. In addition, the representative of Kuwait made an explicit reference to Article 52.

The Secretary-General stated that the United Nations and the League of Arab States shared a common mission to prevent conflict. He underscored the vital role played by the League in global conflicts, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic, Libya, Lebanon and Somalia. He informed the Council that the United Nations liaison office to the League in Cairo was to become operational in June 2019 as the first such office to be funded through the United Nations regular budget.

The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States emphasized his organization's determination to exercise a greater role in contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Arab region and in defending the national security of its member States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. He reiterated the need for the transparent and frank exchange of information between the League and the Council regarding matters affecting the region, and called for greater coordination between the League and the United Nations special representatives and envoys to Arab conflicts. Thanking the United Nations for its support in strengthening the capacities of the League, he announced the League's intention to establish and deploy peace missions in the field to areas of crisis in the near future. He concluded by stating that the partnership between the League and the Council afforded the Council the added legitimacy and

credibility it often required to secure support for its actions in the region.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait referred to resolution 1631 (2005) and welcomed a new stage of cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States. He called for stronger cooperation between the two organizations in order to bridge the gap between the resolutions adopted by the Council and regional organizations and the implementation of those resolutions. In that regard he underlined the need for a legal institutional framework underpinning the relationship between the two organizations and Kuwait's efforts to establish one, which Kuwait hoped to complete before the end of its Council membership.

Several States²³ underlined the importance of enhanced coordination between the Council and the League of Arab States in the maintenance of international peace and security and, specifically, the prevention and resolution of regional conflicts. The representative of South Africa pointed to the conflicts in Somalia and the Sudan as examples in which political and strategic alignment between the Council and regional organizations could be effective in yielding results. With regard to conflict prevention, the representative of Indonesia stated that information-sharing, joint early warning mechanisms and measures to enhance the capacity of the League should be explored. The representative of Germany underscored human rights as a particularly relevant area for cooperation between the League and the Council. The representative of Côte d'Ivoire stated that the support of the United Nations for the League should be focused on economic and social development in order to robustly address the underlying causes of the crises in the region. Welcoming the opening of the United Nations liaison office to the League in Cairo, Belgium mentioned joint analysis and common early warning mechanisms as essential instruments for strengthening the League's role in conflict prevention. He emphasized that cooperation between the United Nations and the League had to be guided by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and address the root causes of conflict with respect to human rights, inclusive governance and the rule of law.

Some Council members underlined the importance of cooperation among regional organizations themselves, in particular between the League of Arab States and the African Union. The

²⁰ The Council had before it a concept annexed to a letter dated 31 May 2019 (S/2019/455).

²¹ See S/PV.8548.

²² Kuwait, Poland, South Africa, Indonesia, China, Peru, Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea.

²³ Kuwait, Dominican Republic, South Africa, United States, Indonesia, China, Russian Federation, Peru, Germany, Côte d'Ivoire and Belgium.

representative of South Africa emphasized the importance of greater cooperation in instances where States had overlapping memberships in regional organizations. Noting the significant membership overlap between the League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the representative of Equatorial Guinea similarly called on the League to partner with other regional organizations with a view to promoting coordination and economizing effort.

Speakers expressed support for regular communication and exchanges of information between the Council and the League of Arab States, in line with the President's statement. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland called for a regular assessment of the cooperation between the League and the United Nations, drawing on the experiences and best practices developed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The representative of South Africa called for a more formalized and structured form of coordination between the Council and regional organizations. The representative of France suggested that the Council meet informally with the Special Envoys and Special Representatives for the North Africa and Middle East region once a year, in the presence of a representative of the League, and welcomed the Council's commitment to invite the League's Secretary-General to provide briefings on an annual basis. The representative of Indonesia stated that cooperation between the Council and the League should be more structured to ensure its effectiveness and sustainability and that it should go beyond regular briefings and annual informal meetings to enable more meaningful dialogue. The representative of Belgium welcomed the request to convene joint meetings of the Council and the League at regular intervals, as was the case with other regional organizations such as the European Union and African Union.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait made a statement on behalf of the Council in his capacity as President.²⁴ According to the statement, the Council encouraged the holding of an annual briefing by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and an annual informal meeting between the League and Council members;²⁵ emphasized the importance of intensifying the coordination between the League and the United Nations with a view to addressing crises in the region; and also emphasized the importance of trilateral cooperation between the

League, the United Nations, and the African Union on cross-regional peace and security issues.²⁶

Case 2 Cooperation between the United Nations and regional subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

At its 8626th meeting, convened on 25 September 2019 at the initiative of the Russian Federation, which held the presidency of the Council for the month,²⁷ the Council held a ministerial-level debate on cooperation between the United Nations and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in countering terrorist threats.²⁸ The Council heard briefings by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Acting Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The representatives of Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also participated in the meeting. During the meeting, several Council members²⁹ explicitly invoked Chapter VIII of the Charter.

In his briefing, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stressed the importance of international cooperation in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, highlighted the important role played by the three organizations under discussion in promoting regional counter-terrorism cooperation, and mentioned that the United Nations was strengthening institutional links with each of them. The Acting Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization called for broadening cooperation between his Organization and the Office of Counter-Terrorism, while the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States mentioned the role of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in harmonizing national legislation to combat terrorism. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation expressed satisfaction at the openness of the three organizations to deepening cooperation with the United Nations in the area of

²⁴ S/PRST/2019/5.

²⁵ Ibid., fourth and sixth paragraphs.

²⁶ Ibid., seventh paragraph.

²⁷ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 13 September 2019 (S/2019/742).

²⁸ See S/PV.8626.

²⁹ Russian Federation, Kuwait, Equatorial Guinea, Poland and Peru.

combating terrorism in order to maintain regional and international peace and security.

Many speakers³⁰ emphasized the importance of coordination between the United Nations and the three organizations in fighting terrorism and radicalization. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation noted that interaction between the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the United Nations was becoming increasingly substantive in the area of counter-terrorism. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait encouraged the Council to convene more meetings to review and promote cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, in line with Chapter VIII, and generally to scale up cooperation with those organizations as a means to address threats to international peace and security. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Equatorial Guinea stated that collaboration between the Council and regional organizations facilitated the exchange of information, good practices and lessons learned, which were key elements in the struggle against terrorism. In that connection, he called for consolidating the relationship between the Council and regional organizations with a view to making it more strategic. Given the mobility of foreign terrorist fighters in Asia, many of whom came from or returned to Africa and other regions, he encouraged efforts by organizations to coordinate with their counterparts in other regions, in particular in Africa.

The Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland stressed that regional organizations contributed to international peace and security only when they reflected the interests of their member States and were “not used as a tool for the

³⁰ Russian Federation, Belgium, China, South Africa, Indonesia, Equatorial Guinea, France, Poland, United States, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Pakistan, Mongolia and India.

domination of a few”. He said that the position of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States with regard to the illegal annexation of parts of Ukraine put their impartiality in question. Without a common approach to such issues, he noted, the cooperation of the United Nations with such partners in combating terrorism would be disputable. The representative of the United States urged those organizations to look closely at revising how they addressed terrorism in order to better avoid conflating separatism, extremism and terrorism in their core documents and to fully promote the observance of applicable international law.

Speakers focused on the need for regional and subregional organizations to respect and uphold the principles honoured within the United Nations framework in countering terrorism, in particular with regard to human rights. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Development Cooperation of Belgium stated that partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations should be aligned with United Nations documents and fully embrace the values of the United Nations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic stated that regional organizations should rely on the United Nations, international human rights law and humanitarian law as a point of reference. The Minister of State attached to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France stated that the fight against terrorism was at the heart of the Council’s action and could not be effective unless it was conducted with full respect for human rights and in line with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed that partnerships with regional organizations had to reflect the obligation to protect humanitarian activity. The representative of the United States underlined the need to ensure that regional organizations reflected all elements of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy and promoted a human rights-compliant approach to fighting terrorism.

II. Recognition of the efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

Note

Section II deals with recognition by the Council of the efforts of regional and subregional organizations in the pacific settlement of local disputes, within the

framework of Article 52 of the Charter. The section is divided into two subsections: (a) decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes; and (b) discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

During the period under review, in several of its decisions, the Council welcomed, commended and encouraged the engagement of regional and subregional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes as described in further detail below. The Council did not explicitly refer to Article 52 in any of its decisions.

In connection with the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council issued a presidential statement in April 2019 in which it welcomed the signing in Bangui, on 6 February 2019, of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic by the authorities of the Central African Republic and 14 armed groups, under the auspices of the African Union and within the framework of the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation.³¹ In the statement, the Council welcomed the engagement of the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the United Nations.³² The Council called on neighbouring States, regional organizations, and all international partners to support the implementation of the Agreement and to coordinate their actions in order to bring lasting peace and stability to the Central African Republic.³³ In September 2019, the Council unanimously adopted a resolution in which it reiterated those calls.³⁴

In November 2019, the Council adopted resolution 2499 (2019), in which it called on neighbouring States, regional organizations and all international partners to support the peace process, including the implementation of the Peace Agreement, in a coherent and coordinated manner and through strengthened partnerships, and emphasized the important role of the guarantors and facilitators of the Agreement, including the African Union, ECCAS and neighbouring States, using their influence to enhance the adherence by armed groups to their commitments.³⁵

Regarding the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council encouraged the continuation of efforts by the Secretary-General, the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to restore peace and security in that country.³⁶

The Council called upon regional organizations to provide political support to the strengthening of State institutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the restoration of trust among the parties, including through their good offices, in order to consolidate peace and security and tackle the root causes of conflict in priority areas.³⁷ In addition, the Council decided that the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) would include as a priority task the provision of technical and political support, including through good offices and engagement with interlocutors across the political spectrum, including the Government, opposition parties, local authorities and civil society, in coordination with regional and international partners, with a view to furthering reconciliation, democratization and inclusion.³⁸

With respect to the situation in Guinea-Bissau, the Council encouraged the commitment, efforts to mediate and direct contacts of the African Union with the political actors of Guinea Bissau with a view to stepping up the efforts to help to overcome the current blockage of the political situation.³⁹ The Council reiterated the importance of the role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in supporting peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Guinea-Bissau and took note of the ECOWAS assessment of Guinea-Bissau on 15 December 2018.⁴⁰ The Council commended the important efforts of ECOWAS and encouraged ECOWAS to continue to extend its political support to the authorities and political leaders of Guinea Bissau through the use of good offices and mediation and encouraged ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries to take the necessary steps towards organizing a meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau, in consultation with the United Nations, the European Union and all stakeholders.⁴¹ It encouraged ECOWAS to continue to extend its political support to the authorities and political leaders of Guinea-Bissau through the use of good offices and mediation and encouraged the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, the European Union and the United Nations to provide support to ECOWAS in doing so.⁴²

³¹ S/PRST/2019/3, third paragraph.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Resolution 2488 (2019), third preambular paragraph.

³⁵ Resolution 2499 (2019), para. 6.

³⁶ Resolution 2463 (2019), seventeenth preambular paragraph, and resolution 2502 (2019), sixth preambular paragraph.

³⁷ Resolution 2463 (2019), para. 3, and resolution 2502 (2019), para. 3.

³⁸ Resolution 2463 (2019), para. 29 (ii) (a). For further information on the mandate of MONUSCO, see part X, sect. I.

³⁹ Resolution 2458 (2019), twenty-first preambular paragraph.

⁴⁰ Ibid., para. 11.

⁴¹ Ibid., paras. 17–18.

⁴² Ibid., para. 29.

Concerning the situation in Mali, the Council encouraged all relevant United Nations agencies, as well as bilateral, regional and multilateral partners, to provide the necessary support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali by the Malian parties, in particular its provisions pertaining to sustainable development.⁴³ In addition, regarding the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to ensure close coordination and information-sharing, where appropriate, between MINUSMA, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), subregional organizations, including ECOWAS and the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel), and Member States in the region.⁴⁴

With respect to the situation in Somalia, the Council made an explicit reference to Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter in resolution 2472 (2019) in that it underlined the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for peace support operations led by the African Union and authorised by the Council and under the Council's authority consistent with Chapter VIII.⁴⁵ The Council called for increased coordination of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia, the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states at all levels, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum and the comprehensive approach to security mechanism.⁴⁶ The Council requested the Secretary-General to work closely with the African Union in supporting the implementation of the resolution, including to provide technical and advice on the planning, deployment and strategic management of AMISOM in line with the mandate of the United Nations Office to the African Union.⁴⁷

Concerning the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan" and with regard to the Abyei Area, the Council commended the continued assistance provided to the parties by the African Union, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and encouraged the Panel and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa to continue to coordinate efforts to facilitate the full implementation of the 2011 agreements, namely the Agreement between the Government of the

Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area, the Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan on Border Security and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, and the Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of South Sudan.⁴⁸ The Council requested the Secretary-General to consult with the parties and the African Union related to the state of engagement by the African Union and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on political mediation of the Abyei dispute and on border issues between the Sudan and South Sudan, and provide recommendations on the most appropriate framework, structure or organizational mandate for the region to provide support to the parties that will enable further progress in those areas.⁴⁹ The Council encouraged the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei to coordinate with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the Special Envoy with regard to reconciliation, community sensitization and political peace processes.⁵⁰

Concerning the same item and with respect to the conflict in South Sudan, the Council welcomed the rapid assessment of violations by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism and encouraged IGAD to share reports with the Council rapidly.⁵¹ The Council expressed appreciation for the leadership shown by IGAD in advancing the peace process for South Sudan and welcomed the commitment of and efforts made by IGAD and its member States, the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, and the African Union and its Peace and Security Council to continue their engagement with South Sudanese leaders to address the current crisis through continued and proactive engagement.⁵² Welcoming the efforts of IGAD, the African Union, the Peace and Security Council and countries in the region to find durable solutions to peace and security challenges in South Sudan, the Council encouraged their continued firm engagement with the leaders of South Sudan to meet without delay all commitments made under cessation of hostilities agreements and the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (Revitalized Peace Agreement). The Council underlined the support by IGAD to the national

⁴³ Resolution 2480 (2019), para. 14.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 27. For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

⁴⁵ Resolution 2472 (2019), para. 23.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 4 (a).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 21.

⁴⁸ Resolution 2469 (2019), fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs and para. 10.

⁴⁹ Resolution 2497 (2019), para. 9 (2).

⁵⁰ Resolution 2469 (2019), para. 10, and resolution 2497 (2019), para. 11.

⁵¹ Resolution 2459 (2019), fourth preambular paragraph.

⁵² *Ibid.*, fifth preambular paragraph.

dialogue, in cooperation with the United Nations and the African Union, and urged IGAD to appoint a chairperson for the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission.⁵³ The Council requested and encouraged the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to exercise his or her good offices to lead the United Nations system in South Sudan in assisting the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, the African Union, IGAD and other actors with the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and to promote peace and reconciliation. In that regard, the Council underscored the critical role of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism and the critical role that the United Nations played, in coordination with regional organizations and other actors, in advancing political dialogue between parties and contribute to achieving an enduring cessation of hostilities and lead the parties to an inclusive peace process.⁵⁴

In connection with the item entitled “Central African region”, the Council acknowledged that the mandate of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) remained valid. It welcomed the recommendation that UNOCA enhance its work on early warning and analysis with a gender perspective, good offices in non-mission settings, support for and strengthening the capacity of ECCAS and building partnerships with civil society and supporting subregional civil society networks.⁵⁵ The Council also welcomed the cooperation between UNOCA and other regional entities and encouraged enhanced cooperation between UNOCA and UNOWAS, ECCAS, ECOWAS and United Nations country teams, to address cross-border threats and interregional issues, such as the crisis in the Lake Chad basin region, transhumance, forced displacement and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.⁵⁶

In connection with the item entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa”, the Council expressed

its full support to the Special Representative for West Africa and the Sahel in carrying out his mandate and for the ongoing activities undertaken by UNOWAS and noted the increased demands on UNOWAS, including in Guinea-Bissau, in post-transition countries and in joint work with ECOWAS and the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel.⁵⁷ The Council welcomed the ongoing cooperation between UNOWAS and UNOCA in addressing cross-regional threats to peace and security in West and Central Africa and the Sahel, including on early warning systems, and called for cooperation between ECOWAS, ECCAS, UNOWAS and UNOCA on maritime crime, organized crime and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.⁵⁸ The Council also welcomed the efforts by UNOWAS and ECOWAS to work towards the systematic involvement of women in initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism.⁵⁹ With regard to conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in the region, the Council encouraged ECOWAS and its Member States to address the challenges driving those conflicts with the support of UNOWAS and to do so in a coordinated and holistic manner.⁶⁰ Regretting the terrorist activity in the Lake Chad basin region and noting the progress made in the implementation of Council resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#) in support of a regional response to the crisis in the Lake Chad basin, the Council welcomed efforts of the Governments in the Lake Chad Basin Region and regional and subregional organizations to prevent the crisis from deteriorating further.⁶¹ The Council recognized the need for enhanced national and regional efforts to effectively address the security situation as well as the humanitarian and early recovery needs.⁶²

The provisions of decisions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional and subregional organizations are detailed in table 2. The decisions are organized in alphabetical order by item.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, para. 11. See also [S/PRST/2019/11](#), seventh paragraph.

⁵⁴ Resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#), para. 16.

⁵⁵ [S/PRST/2019/10](#), fourth paragraph.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, fifth paragraph. For further information on the mandates of UNOCA and UNOWAS, see part X, sect. II.

⁵⁷ [S/PRST/2019/7](#), third paragraph.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, fourth paragraph.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, seventeenth paragraph.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, twentieth paragraph.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, twenty-fourth paragraph.

⁶² *Ibid.*

Table 2
Decisions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>
Central African region	S/PRST/2019/10 12 September 2019	Fourth and fifth paragraphs	ECCAS, ECOWAS
The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2499 (2019) 15 November 2019	Para. 6	African Union, ECCAS
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2463 (2019) 29 March 2019	Para. 1	African Union, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, SADC
The situation in Guinea-Bissau	Resolution 2458 (2019) 28 February 2019	Ninth preambular paragraph, paras. 7, 11, 17 and 29	African Union, Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, ECOWAS, European Union
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019) 28 June 2019	Para. 27	ECOWAS
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2472 (2019) 31 May 2019	Para. 11	African Union
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019) 15 March 2019	Fourth, fifth, twenty-third, thirty-third and thirty-fourth preambular paragraphs and paras. 3–4, 9, 11, 16 and 23	African Union, IGAD
	Resolution 2497 (2019) 14 November 2019	Para. 9 (2)	African Union
Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2019/7 7 August 2019	Third, fourth, seventeenth, nineteenth and twentieth paragraphs	African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel, ECCAS, ECOWAS

Abbreviations: ECCAS, Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS, Economic Community of West African States; IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on Development; SADC, Southern African Development Community.

B. Discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

During the period under review, Council discussions addressed the mediation efforts of the African Union in the rapidly developing political situation in the Sudan following the removal of President Al-Bashir. During the biannual briefings by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the Court's investigation into alleged crimes in Darfur, under the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", several Council members expressed support for the role of the African Union in leading the mediation process to

restore peace in the country.⁶³ In addition, various Council members referred to the role of regional and subregional organizations in the pacific settlement of disputes in connection with the broader cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union and other regional organizations in conflict prevention and resolution (see case 3) and the support of the United Nations and the African Union to the mediation role of IGAD in South Sudan (see case 4).

Case 3 Peace and security in Africa

At the 8633rd meeting, held on 7 October 2019 at the initiative of South Africa, which held the

⁶³ See [S/PV.8554](#) (France, Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea); and [S/PV.8691](#) (Russian Federation, Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa).

presidency of the Council for the month,⁶⁴ the Council held a debate under the sub-item entitled “The centrality of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution”.⁶⁵ Opening the meeting, the Secretary-General referred to the ongoing progress on conflict prevention being made together with regional partners in Africa, namely the African Union, ECOWAS, SADC, the International Organization of la Francophonie and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries. He noted that the Council’s strong engagement in prevention efforts on the African continent in collaboration with regional and subregional partners was needed more than ever. The Council heard briefings by academic and civil society representatives, including a visiting scholar and Associate Director of the Institute for African Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, the Programme Manager of African Women in Dialogue, South Africa, and the Programme Manager of the Zanele Mbeki Development Trust. The Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations and the Permanent Observer of ECCAS to the United Nations also gave briefings to the Council.

In the ensuing discussion, Council members⁶⁶ welcomed the deepening partnership between the United Nations and the African Union. Several Council members made explicit references to Chapter VIII of the Charter to underline the role played by regional and subregional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes. The representative of Poland underlined the importance of enhanced cooperation among the United Nations, the African Union and other regional and subregional organizations in conflict prevention and mediation, as outlined in the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security and in the African Union initiative on “Silencing the guns in Africa by 2020”. In that connection, the representative of Poland explicitly referred to Chapter VIII, Article 52, of the Charter, in which the importance of regional bodies in the peaceful settlement of disputes and the primacy of preventive diplomacy are highlighted as a first step towards conflict prevention and resolution.

The representative of Côte d’Ivoire stated that the new types of threats to peace and security in Africa required a coordinated response from several actors, including the United Nations, subregional organizations and civil society. He noted that the African Union was

demonstrating its willingness to increase its capacity to anticipate and prevent conflicts by placing the Continental Early Warning System at the core of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Its interaction with the early warning and rapid response systems of the regional economic communities enabled it to identify the signs and underlying structural causes of conflicts and develop more effective preventive responses. He noted that the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network, also known as ECOWARN, had enabled that organization to carry out numerous preventive diplomacy efforts in recent years and direct mediation efforts and good-offices missions at the political actors and civil society organizations in the countries concerned. The early warning systems of the African Union and subregional organizations had made significant progress. Despite the many challenges, they were essential links in conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms in Africa and therefore deserved support.

The representative of Côte d’Ivoire also emphasized that in order to be effective, conflict prevention and resolution efforts must be part of an effective and coordinated approach that would enable the United Nations, the African Union and subregional organizations to align their initiatives. Citing the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, in particular in the context of the situations in the Central African Republic and Libya, the representative of Côte d’Ivoire was pleased to see the expansion of the cooperative dynamic in conflict prevention to African subregional organizations and commended the exemplary cooperation between ECOWAS and UNOWAS, whose effectiveness was fully borne out in the prevention and management of crises in their successive interventions in Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Burkina Faso and the Gambia.

The representative of Kuwait referred to the role that Ethiopia and the African Union had played in assisting the parties concerned in the Sudan in reaching an agreement during the transitional period and, in that regard, highlighted the importance of conflict resolution through mediation as one of the means for resolving international disputes by conducting a constructive and meaningful dialogue, as provided for under Chapter VI, Article 33 of the Charter. He made an explicit reference to Chapter VIII, in which the peaceful resolution of local disputes through arrangements with regional and subregional organizations was promoted because of their geographical proximity and historical knowledge of such disputes. He paid tribute to the Charter-based cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union and noted that the United Nations and

⁶⁴ The Council had before it a concept note annexed to a letter dated 2 October 2019 (S/2019/786).

⁶⁵ See S/PV.8633.

⁶⁶ Kuwait, Dominican Republic, France, and Poland.

the African Union had made significant progress in that regard, especially in the cooperation between the Security Council of the United Nations and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. He also noted the continued cooperation between the Peacebuilding Commission and every African Union entity. He called for maintaining those gains and building on them. He reiterated the importance of promoting the role of prevention and mediation in conflict prevention and resolution, as well as of cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, and reaffirmed that the Security Council could make use of many of the preventive measures offered in the Charter.

The representative of the Russian Federation expressed full support to the strengthening of partnerships between the two Councils, underlining the great potential of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Security Council on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. He said that such cooperation had to be based on mutual respect and had to align with regional initiatives, and that preventive diplomacy should be founded on an impartial and balanced approach, free of mentorship and pressure on political processes in sovereign States. He said that only mediation based on bringing positions closer together, seeking areas of agreement and achieving mutually acceptable accords had any chance of success.

The representative of Belgium expressed support for regional integration as the best way to resolve cross-border and regional problems in a consensus-based manner in order to unify regions and create solidarity. She affirmed that mediation was an area in which complementarity came into full play. Regional and subregional organizations brought their local knowledge and expertise to the table, while the United Nations brought its neutrality, authority and universal norms. She referenced successful examples of regional organizations taking a leading role, in particular the Guinea-Bissau Group of Five, in Guinea-Bissau, and the African Union supported by ECCAS, in the Central African Republic. She welcomed the determination demonstrated by the ECOWAS at its extraordinary summit in Ouagadougou in resolving intercommunal conflicts in West Africa.

The representative of Peru noted that the mechanisms set up within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture were aimed at preventing conflicts from escalating. They included a continental early warning system and mechanisms aimed at preventing structural conflict. He noted that mediation activities in many African countries had increased in recent years and that the African Union

had established its Mediation Support Unit. He believed that it was crucial to develop multidisciplinary mediation teams in which women and young people were represented.

The representative of the Russian Federation noted that a number of mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention had emerged in the arsenal of African countries in recent years. This was evidenced by a major contribution to the achievement of comprehensive peace agreements in the Central African Republic and South Sudan, the holding of peaceful and democratic elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, and improvements in the situation in the Horn of Africa. He highlighted the role of various African subregional organizations, including ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC and ECCAS, and noted the recent successful prevention of a political crisis in Madagascar by the African Union, the United Nations, SADC and other partners.

The representative of the United Kingdom paid tribute to the efforts of the African Union and African subregional organizations for their swift and decisive action in June in response to a brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters in the Sudan and the subsequent mediation by the African Union, which had been crucial to supporting the transition to a civilian-led Government in the Sudan. He affirmed that the conflict prevention and resolution efforts worked best where the United Nations, the African Union and subregional organizations coordinated to leverage their comparative advantages, as seen in the Central African Republic, where the United Nations and the African Union continued to play a vital role in supporting the implementation of the peace agreement. With regard to the situation in Cameroon, he called on the African Union and ECCAS to support an inclusive and peaceful resolution of the crisis. On the situation in Libya, he noted that the international community should follow a single shared road map towards the resumption of a political process, aligning behind United Nations leadership and its ability to leverage the support and expertise of all relevant actors, including the African Union, the League of Arab States and the European Union, behind a successful process.

The representative of the Dominican Republic stressed the importance of regional bodies in the peaceful settlement of disputes set out in Chapter VIII of the Charter and stated that collective action could be strengthened by involving regional and local authorities, in particular in the areas of prevention, development and post-conflict situations. He called for the redoubling of efforts to continue support for the region in

implementing the African Union Master Road Map of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020.

The representative of Germany also expressed support for such African Union initiatives as “Silencing the guns in Africa by 2020” and for the push by African States for a stronger integration of African Union-United Nations peacekeeping efforts. He noted that the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union was undoubtedly the most important partnership in terms of building and sustaining peace and security on the African continent and expressed the hope that the partnership would develop further to address all phases of conflict, from prevention and peace operations to post-conflict peacebuilding. Looking beyond the African Union, he said that other organizations, such as ECOWAS and IGAD, could and should play a much stronger role in preventing conflict and addressing its root causes.

The representative of France also called for closer cooperation with African regional and subregional organizations under Chapter VIII so as to enhance the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy. In line with other Council members, the representative of France gave specific examples of coordinated and united action by the United Nations and regional organizations, such as the African Union and ECOWAS, in particular in Burkina Faso in 2015 and in the Gambia in 2016, and the efforts of IGAD that led to the signing, in 2018, of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.

The representative of the United States pointed out that despite its many meetings to discuss areas of the world affected by conflict and instability, there was still more the Council could and should do to address conflict before it erupted. She stressed that the Council should increase coordination with regional and subregional bodies, as neighbouring countries often bore the burdens of spillover from conflict.

The representative of China stated that the Council should fully leverage the unique roles of regional organizations such as the African Union while remaining committed to addressing African issues through political and diplomatic means and making good use of Chapter VI of the Charter, as well as of the good offices and mediation capacity of the United Nations.

The representative of Equatorial Guinea highlighted the importance of conflict prevention as the most effective way to mitigate the human suffering and immense economic cost of conflicts and their aftermaths. The United Nations, through the General Assembly and the Council, together with regional and subregional organizations, had an important role to

play in conflict prevention through a range of tools provided for in the Charter. He added that strengthening international cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union was essential, since the development of Africa was a precondition for peace and harmony throughout the world.

The representative of Indonesia noted that the United Nations could not prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa single-handedly. To achieve a conflict-free Africa, the African Union and subregional organizations had increasingly been taking charge of peace and security matters on the continent. Highlighting the quintessential nature of the robust partnership between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, he said that it was necessary to make full use of the comparative advantage of such organizations, their unmatched knowledge about conflict on the continent and their familiarity with relevant stakeholders. He called on the United Nations to engage with them at the earliest signs of conflict to identify workable approaches and team up with them in mediation efforts. He added that the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had been working tirelessly to promote what was known as the ASEAN way, with its fundamental reliance on preventive diplomacy. Therefore, South-East Asia and Africa had much to learn from each other in preventing and resolving conflicts.

The representative of South Africa underlined that cooperation and coordination among the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations could play an important role in conflict prevention. He called for enhanced and continuous strategic and operational coordination of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention and resolution efforts by the United Nations, the African Union, the regional economic communities and other international and local partners. He paid tribute to the United Nations-African Union mediation efforts in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, the Sudan and elsewhere on the continent and hoped that the recent operationalization of the Peace Fund of the African Union would further boost its capacities and efforts in mediation and conflict prevention on the continent.

Case 4 Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan

At its 8689th meeting, held on 17 December 2019 under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”,⁶⁷ The Council

⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8689](#).

considered the latest report of the Secretary-General,⁶⁸ which was focused on the progress towards the formation of a transitional Government in South Sudan and the regional efforts by the African Union and IGAD in support of the transition and the peacebuilding process.⁶⁹ The Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and by the representative of Poland, who spoke in her capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan. The Special Representative reported that Uganda had hosted and followed up directly on a tripartite meeting and that IGAD had met several times. He noted the efforts of the Special Envoy of IGAD for South Sudan and highlighted that the African Union had kept the country under constant review.

The representative of the United States emphasized the importance of regional engagement and recognized the efforts of South Africa, which had worked in collaboration with the Special Envoys of IGAD and Kenya, as well as with the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, to convene the parties. She affirmed that, for real progress to be achieved, Member States in the region should hold the leaders of South Sudan accountable so as to prevent suffering in the region if the current process collapsed.

The representative of South Africa, speaking also on behalf of the two other African Council members, namely Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea, encouraged the parties to continue their dialogue by peaceful means, utilizing the frameworks of IGAD to bridge their divergent views. He urged the international community to lend its continued support to the parties at that critical juncture, and the Government of South Sudan and IGAD to address the final status of the former Vice-President of South Sudan, Riek Machar, in order to facilitate his full and effective involvement in moving forward with the peace process. Calling on all groups to join the political process, the representative of South Africa requested IGAD to pursue its efforts in engaging Thomas Cirillo and Paul Malong to join the Revitalized Peace Agreement.

The representative of Germany concurred with South Africa on the crucial importance of the regional actors in making progress in the peace process. He noted that it was essential to maintain the pressure of the region on the parties to the conflict. He welcomed the fact that IGAD and, in particular, the Sudan and

Uganda, as guarantors of the peace agreement, had successfully mediated a consensus among the parties about the way to continue the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement. He called on the region, in particular IGAD and the African Union, to remain committed, exert pressure on all sides and support the pursuit of solutions based on a consensus between the parties. He encouraged IGAD to share its 50-day interim report and its recommendations with the Council in due course.

The representative of France appealed to the Ugandan authorities to play their crucial role in ensuring compliance with the new pre-transition timeline. She called on the Council to reflect on the best way for the United Nations to support regional efforts and highlighted the importance of setting up the new monitoring mechanism announced by IGAD as soon as possible and fully enabling the group of five African States mandated by the African Union to support IGAD mediation efforts in South Sudan.

The representative of Poland also commended the involvement of IGAD and its member States and affirmed that the region's role in ensuring that the Revitalized Agreement would be implemented and the parties would be held accountable could not be overestimated. She echoed the request by South Africa that the status of Mr. Machar should be resolved as soon as possible.

The representative of Kuwait appreciated the active role that the countries in the region had played in making peace, in particular Ethiopia, the Sudan and Uganda. He welcomed the support given by IGAD in connection with those efforts, most recently in its communiqué of 10 November.

Echoing the call for the expeditious disbursement of funds for the Revitalized Peace Agreement, the representative of Indonesia stated that the proactive and continued engagement of IGAD, the African Union and guarantors of the Agreement was crucial, including their efforts to facilitate dialogue between senior leaders and supervise progress on critical tasks.

The representative of China called on the United Nations and the Council to enhance coordination with the African Union, IGAD, other regional and subregional organizations and the countries of the region, including the Sudan. He noted that support to IGAD should continue so that it could play its role as the main mediation channel and focus on helping the Government of South Sudan and the opposition to consolidate mutual trust and confidence and maintain a dialogue in order to reach consensus as soon as

⁶⁸ S/2019/936.

⁶⁹ See S/PV.8689.

possible on such core issues as security arrangements and the number of federal states and their boundaries.

The representative of the Russian Federation took note of the position of IGAD, which had welcomed the extension of the pre-transition period, and hoped that the South Sudanese parties would take the steps necessary to resolve the outstanding issues on the agenda. Urging the non-signatories to the Revitalized Agreement to join the concerted process of building the State without delay, he emphasized the importance of regional players' taking the lead in supporting the South Sudanese peace process. In that connection, he welcomed the efforts of the African Union and IGAD, as well as of South Africa, the Sudan and Uganda and noted that they had to maintain a united approach that would enable them to act in the spirit of the principle of African solutions to African problems.

The representative of the United Kingdom strongly welcomed the region's engagement and

leadership in efforts to achieve progress in the peace process and urged the regional partners, in particular IGAD, to redouble their efforts to ensure progress. Noting that the release of the IGAD 50-day interim report would mark an important moment, he called on the Council to work hand in hand with IGAD and suggested that the Council should consider in its consultations how to deepen such cooperation. He noted that the Council had to stand ready, in coordination with IGAD and the African Union, to support the parties on the pathway to peace and to make the necessary compromises.

The representative of Peru stated that the Council should remain united in providing the support and political follow-up required to cement the peace process in South Sudan in close coordination with the African Union and IGAD as regional leaders. The actions of the African Union and IGAD would play a decisive role in consolidating peace and in what he hoped would soon be a successful transition period.

III. Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

Note

Section III describes the practice of the Council in connection with the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping. The section is divided into two subsections: (a) decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements; and (b) discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council renewed the authorization of two peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, namely the European Union Force-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina,⁷⁰ and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).⁷¹ The Council welcomed the leadership demonstrated by countries in West Africa and the Sahel in spearheading initiatives to address security challenges and commended their efforts as well as of the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),

through the deployment of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel). It encouraged ECOWAS and G5 Sahel to identify areas of complementarity in preventing conflict and sustaining peace in the region, and recalled the important role of United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) in providing technical assistance to the permanent secretariat of the G5 Sahel.⁷²

In its decisions in 2019, the Council took note of the work carried out by relevant United Nations peace operations and called for their cooperation with several other regionally led military and police training missions, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan,⁷³ the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic,⁷⁴ and the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau.⁷⁵ The NATO Force in Kosovo, established by resolution 1244 (1999), continued to operate without any decision taken with respect to its mandate.

⁷² S/PRST/2019/7, nineteenth paragraph.

⁷³ See, for example, resolution 2489 (2019), para. 5 (h).

⁷⁴ See, for example, resolution 2499 (2019), tenth preambular paragraph.

⁷⁵ See, for example, resolution 2458 (2019), nineteenth preambular paragraph and para. 24.

⁷⁰ Resolution 2496 (2019), para. 4.

⁷¹ Resolution 2472 (2019), para. 7.

The decisions by which the Council authorized peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations during the reporting period are listed in table 3.

Table 3
Decisions by which the Security Council authorized peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Peacekeeping operations</i>
The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Resolution 2496 (2019) 5 November 2019	Paras. 3 and 5–6	EUFOR-Althea
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2461 (2019) 27 March 2019	Paras. 2–3, 11 and 14	AMISOM
	Resolution 2472 (2019) 31 May 2019	Paras. 7–18	AMISOM

Abbreviations: AMISOM, African Union Mission in Somalia; EUFOR-Althea, operation Althea of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Operation Althea of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

During the review period, the Council renewed the authorization for operation Althea of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) for a period of 12 months.⁷⁶ The Council reiterated its authorization to Member States to take “all necessary measures” to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and stressed that the parties would be held equally responsible for compliance with those annexes and would be subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence as might be necessary.⁷⁷ The Council also authorized Member States to take “all necessary measures”, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO headquarters, in defence of EUFOR-Althea or the NATO presence respectively, and to assist both organizations in carrying out their missions.⁷⁸

African Union Mission in Somalia

In 2019, the Council adopted resolutions [2461 \(2019\)](#) of 27 March, [2472 \(2019\)](#) of 31 May, and [2498 \(2019\)](#) of 15 November, in connection with AMISOM. The Council renewed its authorization for the States members of the African Union to maintain the

deployment of AMISOM initially authorized in 2007, until 31 May 2020.⁷⁹

By resolution [2472 \(2019\)](#), the Council reduced the level of uniformed AMISOM personnel by 1,000 to a maximum of 19,626 by 28 February 2020, in line with the transition plan.⁸⁰ The Council maintained the existing strategic objectives of the Mission, to be pursued in the context of the transition as part of which Somalia would take responsibility for security, as set out on the transition plan. Those objectives included a gradual handover security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, with the Somali security institutions taking the lead by 2021; reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups with a view to enabling a stable, federal, sovereign and united Somalia; and assisting the Somali security forces in providing security for the political process at all levels.⁸¹ To achieve those objectives, the Council authorized AMISOM to carry out a series of priority tasks consisting of, among other things: maintaining a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM concept of operations, prioritizing the main population centres; mentoring and assisting Somali security forces, including combat readiness mentoring for Somali military forces; securing key supply routes, including routes to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in coordination with stabilization and reconciliation

⁷⁶ Resolution [2496 \(2019\)](#), paras. 3–4. For information about the establishment of EUFOR-Althea, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007*, chap. XII, part III.C.

⁷⁷ Resolution [2496 \(2019\)](#), para. 5.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

⁷⁹ Resolution [2472 \(2019\)](#), para. 7. For information on the establishment of AMISOM, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007*, chap. XII, part III.C.

⁸⁰ Resolution [2472 \(2019\)](#), para. 7.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

actors; and conducting targeted offensive operations in support of the transition plan.⁸²

The Council underlined the continued importance of full compliance by AMISOM forces in carrying out their mandate with the obligations of the participating States under international law, and called upon AMISOM and the African Union to monitor and promptly and thoroughly investigate violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.⁸³ The Council requested the African Union to update, by November 2019, and to continue to develop the concept of operations throughout the transition in collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations and key partners to strengthen operational coordination among AMISOM contingents and to strengthen command, control and accountability.⁸⁴

The Council strongly encouraged efforts to increase the percentage of female uniformed personnel deployed to AMISOM by the troop- and police-contributing countries, and urged AMISOM to ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of women across its operations and to integrate a gender perspective throughout the delivery of its mandate.⁸⁵

With regard to Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Council stressed the need for more predictable, sustainable and flexible financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council and encouraged the Secretary-General, the African Union and Member States to continue efforts to explore in earnest funding arrangements for AMISOM.⁸⁶

The Council reaffirmed the Council's intention to keep the configuration of AMISOM under review and called upon the Secretary-General to conduct an independent assessment before 31 January 2021 with a view to presenting options to the Council on international engagement in Somalia after 2021, including on the role of the United Nations, the African Union and international partners.⁸⁷

In addition, by resolution 2498 (2019), the Council reiterated its request that AMISOM support and assist the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states in the implementation of the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia and document and register military equipment captured as

part of its offensive operations or in the course of carrying out its mandate.⁸⁸ The Council called upon AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the Panel of Experts on Somalia to charcoal-exporting ports, and reiterated its request that States, the Federal Government and AMISOM provide the Panel with information and assist it in its investigations.⁸⁹

Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel

In 2019, the Council welcomed the initiatives of the countries in West Africa and the Sahel to address the security challenges in the region through the deployment of the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel, which was established in February 2017 by five States in the Sahel, namely Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger.⁹⁰ By its resolution 2480 (2019), the Council encouraged the G5 Sahel States to ensure that the Joint Force continued to scale up its level of operation in order to demonstrate increased tangible operational results.⁹¹ In the same resolution, the Council stressed that operational and logistical support from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), in line with the conditions set in resolution 2391 (2017), had the potential to allow the Joint Force to enhance its ability to deliver on its mandate. The Council recalled paragraph 13 of resolution 2391 (2017) and noted the request expressed by the G5 Sahel during the Council's mission on the Sahel in March 2019 that life support consumables be provided to the Joint Force by MINUSMA be used by all G5 Sahel contingents operating as part of the Joint Force.⁹²

The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to ensure that there was adequate coordination, exchange of information and support between MINUSMA, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force, the French forces and the European missions in Mali within their respective mandates and through existing mechanisms, and to report to the Council every three months on those matters.⁹³ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to enhance the exchange of information

⁸² Ibid., para. 10.

⁸³ Ibid., para. 15.

⁸⁴ Ibid., paras. 11–12.

⁸⁵ Ibid., para. 18.

⁸⁶ Ibid., para. 23.

⁸⁷ Ibid., para. 34.

⁸⁸ Resolution 2498 (2019), paras. 8 and 24. See also 2472 (2019), para. 10 (i). For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Somalia, see part VII, sect. III.

⁸⁹ Resolution 2498 (2019), paras. 24 and 31.

⁹⁰ S/PRST/2019/7, nineteenth paragraph. For more information on the deployment of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017* part VIII, sect. III.

⁹¹ Resolution 2480 (2019), para. 37.

⁹² Ibid., paras. 38–39.

⁹³ Ibid., paras. 30 and 64 (ii).

between MINUSMA and the G5 Sahel States through the provision of relevant intelligence.⁹⁴

Resolute Support Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Afghanistan

In connection with the situation in Afghanistan, the Council reaffirmed the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to closely coordinate and cooperate with the NATO Resolute Support Mission.⁹⁵

B. Discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council discussed the role of regional peacekeeping operations such as EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina,⁹⁶ AMISOM in Somalia,⁹⁷ the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel⁹⁸ and the Resolute Support Mission, in Afghanistan.⁹⁹ As illustrated in the case studies under the items entitled “The situation in Somalia” (case 5) and “Peace and security in Africa” (case 6), Council deliberations were focused on the necessary support (including financial support) and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in addressing the conflicts in Somalia and the Sahel.

Case 5 The situation in Somalia

At its 8533rd meeting, held on 22 May 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia”,¹⁰⁰ the Council heard briefings by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of AMISOM and the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator. The briefers focused on the political crisis, the security challenges posed by Al-Shabaab, the attack on the United Nations compound on 1 January and the expulsion of the Special Representative of the

Secretary-General for Somalia, Nicholas Haysom, at the beginning of 2019.

While most Council members commended the everyday efforts and sacrifice made by AMISOM, some Council members noted the importance of aligning the Mission’s reconfiguration and changes in the number of its troops and its mandate with security situation on the ground. The representative of China stated that the Council should continue to support the efforts of the African Union and other regional and subregional organizations that helped to maintain peace and security in Somalia, and as Somalia continued to face serious threats posed by Al-Shabaab, his country supported the Council’s extension of the AMISOM mandate and maintaining Mission forces in the country at the level necessary. The representative of the United Kingdom welcomed efforts to build the impetus in the AMISOM mandate renewal and stressed that a transition worked best when troop numbers were aligned to the tasks that the troops had to do, and not the other way around. The representative of Indonesia emphasized that AMISOM had to be reconfigured in a way that did not create a security vacuum and of taking the potential humanitarian impact and the safety of the civilian population fully into account. The representative of Peru said that it would be important to maintain the Mission’s troop strength while taking into account the current security conditions and delays in the implementation of the transition plan; the reconfiguration of AMISOM and the transfer of sites to Somali security institutions had to be conducted while taking into account the humanitarian consequences and ensuring the protection of the civilian population. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the reconfiguration should go hand in hand with the formation of the military and law-enforcement bodies of Somalia. He underlined that the plan was to have AMISOM participating actively in the preparation and holding of the general elections planned for 2020 and 2021 and noted that, in the run-up to the elections, it would not make sense to sharply reduce the number of African peacekeepers in Somalia.

The representative of France stated that the reconfiguration of AMISOM should be continued in support of the transition plan. He noted that the Badbaado operation, in which AMISOM was supporting the Somali army in the liberation of areas in southern Mogadishu, was a good example of cooperation in support of the implementation of the transition plan. He said that it was possible and necessary to continue a moderate reduction in the AMISOM troop ceiling to further encourage the implementation of the security transition; that was not

⁹⁴ Ibid., para. 40.

⁹⁵ Resolution 2489 (2019), para. 5 (h).

⁹⁶ See resolution 2489 (2019), para. 5 (h).

⁹⁷ See S/PV.8440, S/PV.8533, S/PV.8537, S/PV.8601 and S/PV.8671.

⁹⁸ See S/PV.8526, S/PV.8627, S/PV.8633, S/PV.8670 and S/PV.8685.

⁹⁹ See S/PV.8481, S/PV.8555, S/PV.8613 and S/PV.8687.

¹⁰⁰ See S/PV.8533.

a matter of withdrawing troops from particularly sensitive areas or from Mogadishu, but from more stable areas.

The representative of Poland pointed out that the drawdown plan should include specific steps and a realistic timetable for the transfer of responsibility from the Mission to the Somali National Army. The representative of Kuwait welcomed the joint United Nations and African Union review, which had resulted in a new AMISOM concept of operations, in line with the transition plan and national security architecture, accompanied by the gradual decrease in Mission personnel.

Some Council members¹⁰¹ highlighted the importance of stable and sustainable financial support for AMISOM. The representative of France stated that it was essential for new partners, in particular those identified in the report of the United Nations and African Union Special Envoys on the financing of AMISOM, to commit themselves and participate in the financing. He added that, given the number of requests for support from the African Union, the European Union could not continue to finance the salaries of AMISOM soldiers alone. The representative of Poland said that the need for burden-sharing regarding the financing of AMISOM had become more pressing than ever. The representative of China hoped that the United Nations and the international community would provide stable, predictable and sustainable financial support for AMISOM and help the relevant troop-contributing countries to build capacity in order to combat Al-Shabaab more effectively.

Case 6 Peace and security in Africa

At its 8526th meeting, held on 16 May 2019 under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”,¹⁰² the Council discussed the report of the Secretary-General on the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel,¹⁰³ which had been submitted to the Council further to resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#). The Council heard briefings by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, the High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel, the European Union Special Representative for the Sahel and the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).¹⁰⁴ The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Burkina Faso gave a briefing on behalf of the G5 Sahel.

The briefers expressed concern at the continued deterioration of the security situation in Mali and the Sahel and noted that, despite the challenging circumstances, some progress had been made and the Joint Force was able to carry out operations in several sectors since the beginning of the year, even if it was still far from being at its full operational capacity. The briefers highlighted the importance to the full operationalization of the Joint Force of having the support of the Council and the international community in the form of predictable funding and of having the political commitment of the G5 Sahel States.

The Assistant Secretary-General for Africa emphasized the importance of maintaining the momentum for the Joint Force and called on the leaders of the G5 Sahel States to further clarify the strategic concept of operation. She asked the members of the Council to consider other options to allow for more predictable financial support and more effective long-term planning. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Burkina Faso reported that the Joint Force had gone from the concept phase to the implementation phase and appealed to the Council and the partners of the G5 Sahel to continue their support for its full operationalization. He asked the Council to accede to the current request, endorsed by the Secretary-General, to establish a new United Nations approach to support the Joint Force and thereby enable it to better respond to the security challenges. The High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel recalled the decision taken by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in April to renew the mandate of the Joint Force and the regular requests from the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel that the Joint Force enjoy direct financing from the United Nations and operate under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Special Representative of the European Union for the Sahel reaffirmed the commitment of the European Union to coordinate international support for the Joint Force and continue to build a partnership with the G5 Sahel States. The Executive Director of UNODC reported that the G5 Sahel States had achieved some notable results with the support of UNODC in addressing regional judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance, and the investigation of the financing of terrorism and illicit trafficking.

The representative of France pointed out that, in the context of the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the Sahel, it was crucial to fully mobilize the G5 Sahel States so that the Joint Force could deliver on its full potential. He reaffirmed his country’s ultimate aim of strengthening the multilateral support to the Joint Force by equipping it

¹⁰¹ China, France and Poland.

¹⁰² See [S/PV.8526](#).

¹⁰³ [S/2019/371](#).

¹⁰⁴ See [S/PV.8526](#).

with a robust mandate and implementing a logistics package, because the success of G5 Sahel efforts could be ensured only with predictable and sustainable support.

The representatives of Côte d'Ivoire and Equatorial Guinea shared their views about the challenges facing the financing of the Joint Force and expressed support for predictable and sustainable funding under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to ensure the effectiveness of the Joint Force. The representatives of Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa and Kuwait endorsed the communiqué in which the Conference of Heads of State of G5 Sahel had urged partners of the G5 Sahel to honour their financial pledges. They expressed the view that the Secretary-General's proposal to establish a support office independent of MINUSMA and funded through assessed contributions would be a useful tool for ensuring predictable and sustainable financing for the Joint Force. The representative of South Africa stated that such an office would enable the Force to have the necessary capacity and the critically needed logistical and operational base for the full and effective operationalization of the Joint Force. He added that the Council should consider further opportunities to reinforce partnerships and strengthen the role of the African Union when discussing African-led peace operations.

The representative of Equatorial Guinea expressed support for placing the mandate of the Joint Force under Chapter VII of the Charter in order to provide it with the additional political legitimacy that it deserved. Noting the potential impact of not taking rapid and decisive measures on coastal countries of the area such as Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin and Ghana, he called for an international coalition similar to those assembled for Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, but this time with the help of the African Union, to stop the insecurity in West Africa. The representative of Belgium also explicitly expressed his support for the Joint Force being mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. He highlighted that the Joint Force had to be able to rely on adequate and sustainable funding from mandatory United Nations contributions.

The representative of China called on the international community to provide continuing support for the Joint Force; MINUSMA should continue to provide the Joint Force with a support package, in accordance with the relevant agreements. The representative of Indonesia noted that MINUSMA was playing an important role in supporting the Joint Force and said that further consideration should be given to

enhancing that support, including when discussing the renewal of the Mission's mandate. The representative of Germany expressed his country's readiness to consider ways in which the Council could increase support for the Joint Force and called on all international partners who had pledged support to increase the predictability of the Force's funding. The representative of the United Kingdom urged all partners to meet the financial commitments they had made with the utmost urgency so as to aid the Joint Force in overcoming its funding challenges. The representative of the Russian Federation also emphasized the importance of ensuring stable and predictable funding for the Joint Force and expressed his country's willingness to consider financing for the Joint Force from the regular United Nations budget.

The representative of the Dominican Republic stated that, in addition to providing the Joint Force with predictable funding to increase the capacity, effectiveness and efficiency of its operations against terrorism and cross-border crime in the Sahel, more should be done to solve the underlying problems with a view to building capacities that would contribute to sustainable socioeconomic development.

The representative of the United States said that bilateral assistance remained the best way to support the Joint Force. He expressed disappointment at the fact that members of the Council and others continued to call for authorization under Chapter VII and for United Nations-assessed funding for the Joint Force; Chapter VII authorization was not necessary to accomplish the mission of the Joint Force, as the G5 Sahel States already had agreements in place for military operations in their respective territories. He expressed regret at the insufficient leveraging of the technical agreement with MINUSMA and the European Union.

Several Council members emphasized the importance of regional and subregional cooperation. The representative of Peru welcomed the increased regional cooperation between the members of the G5 Sahel and their neighbours regarding the exchange of information and the fight against insecurity and the terrorist threat. He emphasized the effective coordination among UNOWAS, the African Union, ECOWAS and various regional organizations and United Nations system entities. The representative of Poland added that as the Sahel was facing diverse transnational and transboundary challenges, cooperation and coordination between neighbouring countries and within regional organizations, particularly African regional and subregional organizations, was crucial to achieving tangible and long-lasting progress in conflict

resolution and stabilization efforts. The representative of the United States stated that the dire security situation demanded that the international community focus its collective efforts in the Sahel in a smart, deliberate and collaborative way, which required that the region and its partners continue to pursue more than security responses alone and address the root causes of conflict through coordinated humanitarian, health, agricultural, governance and development assistance. He added that significant improvements in security could be achieved through effective

coordination with the security and development actors in the region and through the leadership of the African Union and ECOWAS. The representative of China emphasized the role of regional mechanisms and encouraged the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel, the African Union, ECOWAS and other regional and subregional organizations to take the lead in addressing issues related to the Sahel and assist the G5 Sahel permanent secretariat in its capacity-building efforts to secure, as soon as possible, the ability to coordinate international community support for the Joint Force.

IV. Authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Council in utilizing regional and subregional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority, as provided in Article 53 of the Charter. The present section focuses on the authorization of enforcement action by regional and other organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations; authorizations to use force accorded by the Council to regional peacekeeping operations are covered in section III above. Cooperation with regional arrangements in the implementation of measures adopted by the Council under Chapter VII not involving the use of force is also covered in the present section. The section is divided into two subsections: (a) decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements; and (b) discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements and the implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

During the reporting period, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 53 of the Charter in its decisions. The Council did, however, authorize the use of force by regional arrangements beyond the context of regional peacekeeping operations.

With respect to the situation in Libya and acting under Chapter VII, the Council extended for a further 12 months the authorizations to Member States “acting nationally or through regional organizations” to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected of carrying arms or related materiel to or

from Libya, in violation of previous Council resolutions and to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” to carry out such inspections, as set out in resolution 2420 (2018).¹⁰⁵ Also acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed the authorizations, set out in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution 2240 (2015), to Member States “acting nationally or through regional organizations” to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels suspected of being used for the smuggling of migrants or trafficking in persons from Libya, and to seize those vessels that were confirmed as being used for those purposes, and authorized Member States to use “all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances” in confronting smugglers of migrants or traffickers in persons in carrying out the aforementioned activities.¹⁰⁶ In both cases, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it within 11 months of the adoption of the resolutions on their implementation.¹⁰⁷ The Council also issued a presidential statement on 7 August 2019 in connection with the item entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa”, reaffirming its condemnation of all instances of trafficking in persons and encouraging further cooperation between the European Union, the African Union and the United Nations aimed at saving and protecting the lives of migrants and refugees along routes and in particular inside Libya.¹⁰⁸

In relation to the situation in Somalia, also acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed its call upon States and regional organizations to take part in the fight

¹⁰⁵ Resolution 2473 (2019), para. 1. See also resolution 2292 (2016), paras. 3–4.

¹⁰⁶ Resolution 2491 (2019), para. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Resolutions 2473 (2019), para. 2; and 2491 (2019), para. 3. See also resolution 2240 (2015), paras. 17–18.

¹⁰⁸ S/PRST/2019/7, twenty-second and twenty-sixth paragraphs.

against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft, by providing basing and logistical support for counter-piracy forces, and by seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery.¹⁰⁹ The Council also renewed for a period of 12 months the authorizations, as set out in resolution 2442 (2018), granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.¹¹⁰ The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council within 11 months of the adoption of the resolution on its implementation and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including voluntary reports by cooperating States and regional organizations.¹¹¹

Concerning the situation in South Sudan and acting under Chapter VII, the Council decided to maintain the force levels of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), including its regional protection force established pursuant to resolution 2304 (2016).¹¹² The Council decided that the mandate of UNMISS, would include participating in and supporting the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in the implementation of its ceasefire monitoring and verification mandate and actively participating in and supporting the work of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission.¹¹³ The Council took note of steps taken by the African Union to set up the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and welcomed the formal invitation that the African Union had extended to the United Nations to provide technical assistance in setting up the Court. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to make available technical assistance to the Commission of the African Union and the Government of South Sudan in setting up the Court and the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing.¹¹⁴

The Council adopted several decisions in which it either requested the support of regional and subregional

organizations in the implementation of sanctions measures or called on regional and subregional organizations to cooperate with the various sanctions committees and panels of experts. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council encouraged all Member States, in particular the States members of the Economic Community of Central African States and of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, to utilize the advance notification and exemption procedures established under the arms embargo to return arms and related materiel belonging to the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic.¹¹⁵ The Council urged all parties, as well as regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic and the safety of its members.¹¹⁶ The Council urged all parties, as well as regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts on South Sudan to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites, so that it could execute its mandate.¹¹⁷

B. Discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements and the implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements

During the period under review, following established practice, the Council heard two semi-annual briefings under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the Court’s investigation into alleged crimes committed in Darfur.¹¹⁸ After the briefings, Council members discussed the position of regional organizations regarding the implementation of resolution 1593 (2005), in which the Council, acting under Chapter VII, referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.¹¹⁹

¹⁰⁹ Resolution 2500 (2019), para. 12.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., para. 14. See also resolution 2442 (2018), para. 14.

¹¹¹ Resolution 2500 (2019), para. 29.

¹¹² Resolution 2459 (2019), para. 6. For more information on the mandate of the regional protection force, see part X, sect. I.

¹¹³ Resolution 2459 (2019), para. 7 (d).

¹¹⁴ Ibid., para. 32. See also paras. 33–35.

¹¹⁵ Resolution 2454 (2019), para. 8. See also resolution 2399 (2018), para. 8.

¹¹⁶ Resolution 2454 (2019), para. 6. See also resolution 2399 (2018), para. 37.

¹¹⁷ Resolution 2459 (2019), para. 22.

¹¹⁸ See S/PV.8554 and S/PV.8691.

¹¹⁹ See S/PV.8554 (China and Kuwait); and S/PV.8691 (China and Kuwait).

V. Reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security

Note

Section V examines reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of Article 54 of the Charter. It is divided into two subsections: (a) decisions concerning reporting by regional arrangements; and (b) discussions concerning reporting by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 54 of the Charter in its decisions. The Council did, however, request reporting from regional organizations, in particular the African Union, either directly or through the Secretary-General, on issues such as cooperation on peace and security between the United Nations and the African Union, in particular with respect to peace support operations, such as the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel in Mali, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and support for the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms in South Sudan, as described in further detail below.

With regard to the situation in Mali, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every three months after the adoption of resolution 2480 (2019) on 28 June 2019, on the coordination, exchange of information and mutual operational and logistical support between, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force, the French forces and the European Union missions in Mali.¹²⁰

With regard to Somalia, in resolution 2500 (2019), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council within eleven months of the adoption of the resolution on its implementation and on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, including voluntary reports by cooperating States and regional

organizations.¹²¹ The Council requested the African Union to keep it informed every 90 days on the implementation of the AMISOM mandate in no fewer than four written reports, the first of which to be submitted no later than 15 August 2019.¹²² In that regard, the Council requested the African Union to report specifically on joint operations in support of the transition plan, including the use of coordination mechanisms and their effectiveness; performance issues, including command and control, and conduct and discipline; measures taken to protect civilians; the provision of equipment; and, in the first report, a reconfiguration plan on locations for drawdown determined by a threat assessment of AMISOM.¹²³

In connection with the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the Council invited the African Union to share information on progress made in the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan.¹²⁴ With regard to the situation in Darfur, the Council decided to extend, temporarily and exceptionally, the period of drawdown for military personnel of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in order to maintain the Operation’s self-protection capacities. In that regard, the Council requested the Secretary-General and invited the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to provide the Council with a special report, no later than 30 September 2019, containing an assessment of the situation on the ground, recommendations on the appropriate course of action regarding the drawdown of UNAMID and a joint African Union-United Nations political strategy with detailed options for a follow-on mechanism to UNAMID.¹²⁵

Decisions adopted during the period under review in connection with the obligation to keep the Council informed of activities undertaken by regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security are listed in table 4.

¹²¹ Resolution 2500 (2019), para. 29. For more information on the authorization of enforcement action by regional organizations in Somalia, see sect. IV.A.

¹²² Resolution 2472 (2019), para. 32.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Resolution 2459 (2019), para. 39.

¹²⁵ Resolution 2479 (2019), paras. 2–3.

¹²⁰ Resolution 2480 (2019), para. 64 (ii).

Table 4
Decisions concerning reporting of activities by regional arrangements

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decisions</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Reporting from</i>
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2480 (2019) 28 June 2019	Para. 64 (ii)	Secretary-General
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2472 (2019) 31 May 2019	Para. 32	African Union
	Resolution 2500 (2019) 4 December 2019	Para. 29	Secretary-General, voluntary reporting by cooperating States and regional organizations
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2459 (2019) 15 March 2019	Para. 39	Secretary-General
	Resolution 2479 (2019) 27 June 2019	Para. 3	Secretary-General, Chairperson of the African Union Commission

B. Discussions concerning reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, Article 54 of the Charter was explicitly referenced only once during Council discussions. At the 8452nd meeting, held on 26 January 2019 under the item entitled “The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”,¹²⁶ before the adoption of the agenda, the Secretary of State of the United States made reference to a letter “under Article 54” from the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States describing the destabilizing impact of the crisis on the region. The Secretary of State noted that, despite the tragedy and the calls from regional bodies to give it more attention, the United Nations had yet to hold a formal meeting on the subject.

Several Council members made reference to reporting to the Council by regional organizations that was relevant to the application and interpretation of Article 54. At the 8650th meeting of the Council, held on 30 October 2019 under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the representative of France expressed support for the sustainable and predictable development and funding of operations conducted by the African Union and the United Nations and stated that the efforts of the two organizations should be continued on several tracks,

such as budgets and finance, human rights compliance and reporting between the two organizations.¹²⁷ At the same meeting, in connection with the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in peacekeeping and in peace support operations, the representative of the United Kingdom underlined the importance of robust financial reporting arrangements; clear joint planning and coordination structures; and strong compliance frameworks for human rights, international humanitarian law and conduct and discipline.

At the 8689th meeting, held on 17 December 2019 under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”,¹²⁸ the Council discussed the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan.¹²⁹ At the meeting, the representative of Germany welcomed the successful mediation by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and, in particular, the Sudan and Uganda, as guarantors of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, had successfully mediated a consensus among the parties in South Sudan for the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement, and encouraged IGAD to share its 50-day interim report and its recommendations with the Council.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ See [S/PV.8452](#).

¹²⁷ See [S/PV.8650](#).

¹²⁸ See [S/PV.8689](#).

¹²⁹ [S/2019/936](#).

¹³⁰ See [S/PV.8689](#).

Part IX

Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: committees, tribunals and other bodies

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Introductory note

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

The power of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs is set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part IX of the present Supplement covers the practice of the Council relating to committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, and special advisers, envoys and representatives, as well as the Peacebuilding Commission. It also includes instances of subsidiary organs that were proposed but not established, where applicable. Field-based missions, including United Nations peacekeeping and political missions, are covered in part X. Field-based missions led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII. Each subsection below provides a summary of the major developments relating to each subsidiary organ during the period covered by this Supplement.

I. Committees

Note

Section I focuses on the decisions of the Council adopted during 2019 concerning the establishment of committees and the implementation of and changes to their mandates, as well as their termination. Subsection A covers standing committees and subsection B covers committees established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The description of each committee includes the tasks of the committee, as mandated by the Council in the context of the implementation of sanctions measures such as an arms embargo, an asset freeze and/or a travel ban. Information on measures mandated by the Council pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter is provided in part VII, section III. The committees are discussed within each subsection below in the order of their establishment.

The committees of the Council consist of all 15 members of the Council. Their meetings are held in private, unless a committee itself decides otherwise, and decisions are reached by consensus. The Council has both standing committees that meet only when issues under their purview are being considered and committees established on an ad hoc basis, in response to specific requirements of the Council, such as counter-terrorism or sanctions committees.

The Bureau of each committee generally consists of a Chair and a Vice-Chair, who are elected by the Council on an annual basis.¹ Since the issuance in 2012 of a note by the President of the Council on this matter, the process for the appointment of Chairs and Vice-Chairs has been conducted with the participation of all Council members in a “balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way”.² According to the note by the President of the Council dated 30 August 2017, the informal process would be undertaken in such a way “so as to facilitate an exchange of information related to the work of the subsidiary bodies involved” and would be “facilitated jointly by two members of the Council working in full cooperation”.³ On 27 December 2019, a new note by the President was

issued, according to which the Council members stressed that the “informal consultation process should take into account the need for a shared responsibility and a fair distribution of work for the selection of the Chairs among all members of the Council, bearing in mind the capacities and resources of members”.⁴

A. Standing committees

During 2019, the standing committees, namely, the Committee of Experts on Rules of Procedure, the Committee of Experts established by the Council at its 1506th meeting to study the question of associate membership, the Committee on the Admission of New Members and the Committee on Council Meetings away from Headquarters, continued to exist but did not meet.

B. Committees established under Chapter VII of the Charter

Subsection 1 deals with the committees and associated monitoring teams, groups or panels of experts (expert groups) that oversaw specific sanctions measures in 2019.⁵ As described in more detail below, while many of the mandates of the committees remained largely unchanged, the Council modified some aspects of the mandates of certain committees or requested committees or expert groups to carry out specific tasks. For example, the Council mandated the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia to monitor compliance with the ban on components used to manufacture improvised explosive devices, as newly imposed under resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), and the Panel of Experts on Somalia was requested to conduct a focused analysis on the revenue sources of Al-Shabaab.⁶ The Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, together with the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) concerning counter-terrorism, was requested to hold, no later than 28 March 2020, a joint special meeting on terrorist financing threats and trends. In preparation for the meeting, the Analytical

¹ For the bureaux of the committees during the period covered in the present Supplement, see [S/2019/2](#) and [S/2019/2/Rev.1](#).

² [S/2012/937](#).

³ [S/2017/507](#), annex, paras. 111–114. It was also indicated in the note that the Council should make every effort to agree on the appointment of the Chairs for the following year no later than 1 October. Previous notes of this nature were [S/2006/507](#) and [S/2010/507](#).

⁴ [S/2019/991](#).

⁵ For information concerning the sanctions measures relevant to each of the committees, see part VII, section III.

⁶ Resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1 and 26–28.

Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, was tasked with preparing a report on actions taken by Member States to disrupt terrorist financing.⁷

Subsection 2 deals with subsidiary organs with a thematic scope, namely, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), which have broader mandates relating to terrorism and non-proliferation. Other subsidiary bodies, including the Office of the Ombudsperson, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and expert groups are discussed together with the relevant committees.

⁷ Resolution 2462 (2019), paras. 36–37.

The committees carried out their mandate of, inter alia, listing and delisting individuals and entities, granting exemptions and processing notifications, monitoring and assessing implementation and reporting to the Council. In addition to reporting by means of written reports, some Committee Chairs gave briefings to the Council in open meetings and closed consultations.

As outlined in table 1, briefings by Chairs of subsidiary organs took place under both thematic and country-specific items and briefings were delivered as joint or individual briefings, in the context of which Chairs reported at varying intervals (from one to five times in 2019) on a variety of aspects of the work of subsidiary organs, including their mandates and/or any visits conducted by the Chairs.

Table 1
Briefings by Chairs of Security Council subsidiary organs, 2019

<i>Item</i>	<i>Briefing by the Chair</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>
Thematic		
Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council	Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)	S/PV.8528 20 May 2019
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003) Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions Informal Working Group on International Tribunals Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations	S/PV.8688 17 December 2019
Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)	S/PV.8487 19 March 2019
Country-specific		
The situation in Afghanistan	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)	S/PV.8613 10 September 2019
The situation in the Central African Republic	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013)	S/PV.8467 21 February 2019
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)	S/PV.8584 24 July 2019

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2019

<i>Item</i>	<i>Briefing by the Chair</i>	<i>Meeting record and date</i>
The situation in Libya	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)	S/PV.8448 18 January 2019
		S/PV.8488 20 March 2019
		S/PV.8530 21 May 2019
		S/PV.8588 29 July 2019
		S/PV.8611 4 September 2019
The situation in Mali	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)	S/PV.8636 8 October 2019
The situation in the Middle East	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)	S/PV.8525 15 May 2019
The situation in Somalia	Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)	S/PV.8647 25 October 2019
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)	S/PV.8446 17 January 2019
		S/PV.8490 26 March 2019
		S/PV.8565 26 June 2019
		S/PV.8632 3 October 2019
		S/PV.8684 12 December 2019
	Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015)	S/PV.8689 17 December 2019

1. Committees overseeing specific sanctions measures

During the period under review, the total number of active committees overseeing specific sanctions

measures was 14. An overview of the committees, including selected categories of the main mandatory measures that they oversaw during 2019, is provided in table 2.

Table 2
Security Council committees responsible for oversight of specific sanctions measures, 2019

	<i>Arms embargo</i>	<i>Asset freeze</i>	<i>Travel ban or restrictions</i>	<i>Non-proliferation measures/restrictions on ballistic missiles</i>	<i>Financial restrictions</i>	<i>Petroleum related (including bunkering services)</i>	<i>Natural resources^a</i>	<i>Other^b</i>
Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)	X	X	X				X	X
Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) , 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015)	X	X	X					X

**Part IX. Subsidiary organs of the Security Council:
committees, tribunals and other bodies**

	<i>Arms embargo</i>	<i>Asset freeze</i>	<i>Travel ban or restrictions</i>	<i>Non-proliferation measures/restrictions on ballistic missiles</i>	<i>Financial restrictions</i>	<i>Petroleum related (including bunkering services)</i>	<i>Natural resources^a</i>	<i>Other^b</i>
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1518 (2003)	X	X						
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)	X	X	X					X
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005)		X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)	X	X	X		X	X		
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012)			X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015)	X	X	X					
Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)		X	X					

^a Refers to a variety of measures on natural resources, including charcoal, coal, iron, gold, titanium, copper, nickel, silver and zinc.

^b Including measures relating to transport and aviation measures, the ban on components of improvised explosive devices, trade restrictions and/or diplomatic restrictions.

Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia

In 2019, in its resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), the Council imposed a ban on components that could be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices in Somalia.⁸ Accordingly, the mandate of the Committee pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Somalia was modified to monitor compliance with the components ban, including through the processing of notifications from Member States concerning the sale, supply or transfer of such components listed in part I of annex C to resolution

⁸ Resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), para. 26.

[2498 \(2019\)](#).⁹ The Council also consolidated and streamlined provisions regarding the arms embargo by, inter alia, identifying specific items listed in annexes A and B to resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#) as subject to advance approvals by or notifications to the Committee.¹⁰ In addition, the Council requested the Committee to transmit advance requests for approval and

⁹ Ibid., para. 27. The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze, a travel ban, a charcoal ban and, since 2019, a ban on components of improvised explosive devices.

¹⁰ Ibid., paras. 9–17.

notifications from States or international, regional or subregional organizations to the appropriate national coordinating body in the Federal Government of Somalia.¹¹ The Council requested the Federal Government of Somalia to include in its regular reporting to the Committee an update on concrete actions taken to counter the financing of terrorism.¹² The Council also requested the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011).¹³ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.¹⁴

Also in its resolution 2498 (2019), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia was extended until 15 December 2020, the Council requested the Secretary-General to include members with dedicated gender expertise, in line with paragraph 11 of its resolution 2467 (2019), and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 15 November 2020.¹⁵ The Council requested the Panel, with input from the Federal Government of Somalia and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), to conduct an analysis of all of Al-Shabaab's revenue sources, their methods of storage and transfer, and mapping of illegal taxation systems and to provide recommendations to the Committee, and to include a focused analysis on the financial revenues of Al-Shabaab in its final report.¹⁶ In addition to providing periodic reports, the Panel was also requested to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the Federal Government of Somalia in weapons and ammunition management, including efforts towards establishing a national small arms and light weapons commission.¹⁷ In its resolution 2500 (2019), the Council called upon all States to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts on Somalia, including

on information-sharing regarding possible violations of the arms embargo or charcoal ban.¹⁸

Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

In 2019, the Council addressed matters related to the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities under the item entitled "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts".¹⁹ While the mandates of the Committee and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team remained largely unchanged in 2019,²⁰ the Council adopted resolutions in which it reiterated some of the core aspects of those mandates and set new tasks for the Committee. For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.²¹

In its resolution 2462 (2019), the Council underscored the need to ensure that all Member States were in full compliance with the measures imposed by the Council in its resolution 2368 (2017). The Council also recalled that the Monitoring Team's mandate included gathering information on instances of reported non-compliance with the sanctions measures imposed by resolution 2368 (2017), including by collating information from all relevant sources.²² The Council encouraged Member States to improve efforts and take decisive action to identify cases of trafficking in persons and in cultural property that finance terrorism with a view to holding those responsible accountable and to provide, as appropriate, the

¹¹ Ibid., para. 14.

¹² Ibid., para. 2.

¹³ Ibid., para. 21.

¹⁴ S/2019/978.

¹⁵ Resolution 2498 (2019), para. 29. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

¹⁶ Ibid., paras. 1 and 33.

¹⁷ Ibid., para. 30.

¹⁸ Resolution 2500 (2019), para. 11.

¹⁹ See part I, sect. 31.

²⁰ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions, designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban, and conducting periodic and specialized reviews of the entries on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list. The mandate of the Monitoring Team included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures, assisting the Committee in regularly reviewing names on the sanctions list, assisting the Ombudsperson to the Committee in carrying out the mandate and providing periodic reports.

²¹ S/2019/980.

²² Resolution 2462 (2019), para. 9.

Monitoring Team with relevant information pertaining to such cases.²³

In the same resolution, the Council requested the Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1373 \(2001\)](#) concerning counter-terrorism to hold, within 12 months, a joint special meeting on terrorist financing threats and trends as well as on the implementation of the provisions of that resolution.²⁴ Furthermore, the Council requested the Monitoring Team and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to prepare, ahead of the joint special meeting, a report on actions taken by Member States to disrupt terrorist financing.²⁵

In its resolution [2482 \(2019\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Council, within 12 months, a joint report by the Office of Counter Terrorism and UNODC, with inputs from the relevant entities of the United Nations system, including the Monitoring Team, on actions taken by Member States and the entities of the United Nations Global Compact Terrorism Coordination Compact to address the issue of linkages between terrorism and organized crime, whether transnational or domestic.²⁶

Committee established pursuant to resolution [1518 \(2003\)](#)

In 2019, there were no modifications to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1518 \(2003\)](#). By its resolution [1518 \(2003\)](#), the Council established the Committee and mandated it to continue to identify individuals and entities whose funds, other financial assets and economic resources should be frozen and transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq, in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#).²⁷ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.²⁸

Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

In 2019, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

remained largely unchanged.²⁹ The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from 27 April to 6 May 2019, regarding which he provided a briefing to the Council.³⁰ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.³¹

In its resolution [2478 \(2019\)](#), by which the mandate of the Group of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) was extended until 1 August 2020, the Council expressed its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 1 July 2020.³² In addition to providing periodic reports,³³ the Council requested the Group of Experts to circulate to the Committee, every 12 months, proposed updates to the existing information on the sanctions list concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo compiled in line with the Committee's guidelines and in consultation with the respective designating States and States of residence or nationality.³⁴ The requested updates were to include information concerning individuals on the sanctions list who were reportedly deceased and groups, undertakings and entities on the sanctions list reported or confirmed to have ceased to exist.³⁵

In its resolutions [2463 \(2019\)](#) and [2502 \(2019\)](#), by which the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was extended, the Council expressed its full support for the Group of Experts and encouraged timely information exchange between MONUSCO and the Group of Experts. The Council also authorized and requested MONUSCO to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo as

²⁹ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze, transport and customs controls and a travel ban.

³⁰ See [S/PV.8584](#).

³¹ [S/2019/965](#).

³² Resolution [2478 \(2019\)](#), para. 3. The mandate of the Group of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

³³ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, para. 25.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 36.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 37.

²⁶ Resolution [2482 \(2019\)](#), para. 25.

²⁷ For background information, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2000–2003*, chap. V, part I.B.2.

²⁸ [S/2019/963](#).

described in paragraph 1 of resolution 2293 (2016) in cooperation with the Group of Experts.³⁶

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan

In 2019, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan and its Panel of Experts remained unchanged.³⁷ The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to the Sudan from 11 to 14 November 2019, regarding which she provided a briefing to the Council.³⁸ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.³⁹

In its resolution 2455 (2019), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) was extended until 12 March 2020, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 12 February 2020.⁴⁰

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005)

During the period under review, there were no changes to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1636 (2005) to register and oversee the travel ban and asset freeze on individuals designated by the International Independent Investigation Commission or by the Government of Lebanon as suspected of involvement in the terrorist bombing in Beirut on 14 February 2005 that killed the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri, and 22 others.⁴¹ The Committee held no meetings during 2019. As at 31 December 2019, no individual had been registered.

³⁶ Resolution 2463 (2019), paras. 30 (iii) and 40, and resolution 2502 (2019), paras. 38–39. For more information on the mandate of MONUSCO, see part X, sect. I.

³⁷ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

³⁸ See S/PV.8684.

³⁹ S/2019/975.

⁴⁰ Resolution 2455 (2019), paras. 2–3.

⁴¹ For more information, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004–2007*, chap. V, part I.B.

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

During the period under review, there were no modifications to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).⁴² In 2019, the Committee approved 38 requests for exemptions from Member States, United Nations entities and other international organizations, compared with 3 in 2016, 2 in 2017 and 17 in 2018.⁴³ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.⁴⁴

In its resolution 2464 (2019), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) was extended until 24 April 2020, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 27 March 2020.⁴⁵

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya

In 2019, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya remained unchanged.⁴⁶ For more

⁴² The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals, entities and vessels subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising, inter alia, an arms embargo, an embargo relating to nuclear, ballistic missile and other weapons of mass destruction programmes, a sectoral bans on coal, minerals and fuel, a ban on the export of luxury goods, a travel ban, an asset freeze, a ban on the provision of financial services and a ban on specialized teaching and training in disciplines that could contribute to prohibited activities and programmes.

⁴³ S/2019/971, para. 38; S/2018/1148, para. 42; S/2017/1129, para. 42, and S/2016/1094, para. 34. For more information on discussions with regard to the humanitarian impact of sanctions in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the role of exemptions in humanitarian relief, see part I, sect. 35.C.

⁴⁴ S/2019/971.

⁴⁵ Resolution 2464 (2019), paras. 1–2. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

⁴⁶ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals, entities and vessels subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, a travel ban, an asset freeze and measures aimed at preventing illicit exports of petroleum.

information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.⁴⁷ The mandate of the Panel of Experts on Libya, which the Council had extended in 2018 for 15 months until 15 February 2020, also remained unchanged.⁴⁸

In its resolution 2486 (2019), by which the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was renewed, the Council underscored the importance of ensuring that existing sanctions measures were fully implemented and that violations were reported to the Committee. The Council also welcomed efforts by the Panel of Experts to investigate violations of the arms embargo and noted its intention to hold those who violated the arms embargo accountable through the Committee.⁴⁹

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)

In 2019, the Council addressed matters related to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) under two different items of its agenda, namely: (a) The situation in Afghanistan; and (b) Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.⁵⁰ The mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) remained largely unchanged.⁵¹ The Council adopted one resolution in relation to the mandate of the Committee and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. By its resolution 2501 (2019), the Council extended the mandate of the Monitoring Team for a period of 12 months until 16 December 2020, with the mandate set

⁴⁷ S/2019/972.

⁴⁸ Resolution 2441 (2018), para. 14. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, making recommendations on actions that the Council, the Committee, the Government of Libya or other States may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures and providing periodic reports.

⁴⁹ Resolution 2486 (2019), twentieth preambular paragraph and para. 4. For more information on the mandate of UNSMIL, see part X, sect. II.

⁵⁰ For more information, see part I, sects. 17 and 31.

⁵¹ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions, designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban, and conducting periodic and specialized reviews of the entries on the sanctions list. The Committee was also supported by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.

forth in the annex to the resolution.⁵² In the resolution, the Council also directed the Monitoring Team to gather information on instances of non-compliance with the measures imposed by resolution 2255 (2015) and to keep the Committee informed of such instances, as well as to facilitate, upon request by Member States, assistance on capacity-building. In addition, the Council encouraged Committee members to address issues of non-compliance and bring them to the attention of the Monitoring Team or the Committee, and directed the Monitoring Team to provide recommendations to the Committee on actions taken to respond to non-compliance.⁵³ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.⁵⁴

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau

Although the Council decided in February 2019 to review the sanctions measures imposed on Guinea-Bissau within seven months of the adoption of resolution 2458 (2019),⁵⁵ no changes were made in 2019 to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau. In that regard, the Committee continued to oversee the implementation of the travel ban, to designate individuals who met the listing criteria contained in resolution 2048 (2012) and to consider and decide on requests for exemptions from the sanctions measures. The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to Guinea and Guinea-Bissau from 28 to 30 October 2019, regarding which he provided a briefing to the Council.⁵⁶ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.⁵⁷

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic

In 2019, the Council adopted two resolutions relating to the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the

⁵² Resolution 2501 (2019), para. 2. See the annex to the resolution for a comprehensive overview of the mandate of the Monitoring Team.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

⁵⁴ S/2019/970.

⁵⁵ Resolution 2458 (2019), para. 32. For information on the sanctions measures against Guinea-Bissau, see part VII, sect. III.

⁵⁶ See S/PV.8688 and S/2019/966.

⁵⁷ S/2019/966.

Central African Republic.⁵⁸ By its resolution [2454 \(2019\)](#), the Council renewed until 31 January 2020 the sanctions measures imposed by the Council in resolution [2399 \(2018\)](#) and reaffirmed that the travel ban and asset freeze measures would apply to individuals and entities designated by the Committee.⁵⁹ By its resolution [2488 \(2019\)](#), the Council decided to adjust the arms embargo measures and to require more detailed information in the notifications and exemption requests addressed to the Committee.⁶⁰ The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to the Central African Republic from 1 to 4 October 2019, regarding which he provided a briefing to the Council.⁶¹ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.⁶²

Also in its resolution [2454 \(2019\)](#), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic was extended until 29 February 2020, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 31 January 2020.⁶³ Expressing concern about reports of illicit transnational trafficking networks that continued to fund and supply armed groups in the Central African Republic, the Council requested the Panel, in the course of carrying out its mandate, to devote special attention to the analysis of such networks, in cooperation with other expert groups established by the Council.⁶⁴ The Council also requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the Panel, to conduct an assessment of the progress achieved by the Government of the Central African Republic on the key benchmarks subsequently established by the Council in its presidential statement of 9 April 2019.⁶⁵

⁵⁸ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

⁵⁹ Resolution [2454 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1–2.

⁶⁰ Resolution [2488 \(2019\)](#), paras. 2–4. For more information on the sanctions measures against the Central African Republic, see part VII, sect. III.

⁶¹ See [S/PV.8688](#).

⁶² [S/2019/973](#).

⁶³ Resolution [2454 \(2019\)](#), paras. 3–4. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 10. See also [S/PRST/2019/3](#).

In its resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), by which the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was extended, the Council reiterated the tasks to be carried out by MINUSCA to assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts, including supporting the Panel in the collection of information on acts of incitement to violence, in particular on religious or ethnic grounds.⁶⁶

Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#)

In 2019, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2140 \(2014\)](#) remained largely unchanged.⁶⁷ The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the Islamic Republic of Iran from 30 March to 5 April 2019, regarding which he provided a briefing to the Council.⁶⁸ For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.⁶⁹

In its resolution [2456 \(2019\)](#), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Yemen was extended until 28 March 2020, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 28 February 2020.⁷⁰

Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan

In 2019, the mandates of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan and its Panel of Experts remained largely unchanged.⁷¹ The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to South Sudan, Uganda, the Sudan and Ethiopia from 6 to 15 October 2019, regarding which she provided a briefing to the

⁶⁶ Resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), para. 34 (a)–(d). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.

⁶⁷ Resolution [2456 \(2019\)](#), paras. 3 and 9–10. The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8525](#).

⁶⁹ [S/2019/969](#).

⁷⁰ Resolution [2456 \(2019\)](#), paras. 5–6.

⁷¹ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an arms embargo, an asset freeze and a travel ban.

Council.⁷² For more information on the work of the Committee, see its annual report for 2019.⁷³

In its resolution 2471 (2019), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts was extended until 30 June 2020, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 31 May 2020.⁷⁴

In its resolution 2459 (2019), the Council encouraged timely information exchange between the Panel of Experts and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and requested UNMISS to assist the Committee within existing resources.⁷⁵

Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali

In 2019, the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali remained largely unchanged.⁷⁶ The Chair of the Committee conducted a visit to Mali from 16 to 18 October 2019. For more information on the work of the Committee, including the Chair's visit to Mali, see its annual report for 2019.⁷⁷

In its resolution 2484 (2019), by which the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Mali was extended until 30 September 2020, the Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intention to review the Panel's mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension no later than 31 August 2020.⁷⁸ In addition, in its resolution

2480 (2019), by which the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was extended, the Council encouraged the Panel to identify parties responsible for the potential lack of implementation of the priority measures set out in the resolution and provided under the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 through its regular reporting and interim updates.⁷⁹ In these two resolutions, the Council also requested MINUSMA to assist and exchange information with the Committee and the Panel.⁸⁰

2. Other committees

During the period under review, both the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate established by resolution 1535 (2004) to support the Counter-Terrorism Committee remained active. In 2019, the Council adopted two resolutions relevant to the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate, which are described below. The focus of the Council's decisions during the period under review concerned broadly countering the financing of terrorism and the nexus between international terrorism and organized crime.

The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) continued to meet during the period under review. The Council did not adopt any resolutions relating to the Committee.

Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

In 2019, the Council adopted resolution 2462 (2019), in which it welcomed the adoption by the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the addendum to the guiding principles on foreign terrorist fighters (Madrid Guiding Principles) (S/2018/1177, annex), which contained, inter alia, specific recommendations on countering the financing of terrorism; the Council also stressed the importance of full and effective implementation of such principles.⁸¹

In the same resolution, the Council requested the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate,

⁷² See S/PV.8689.

⁷³ S/2019/967.

⁷⁴ Resolution 2471 (2019), para. 3. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering, examining and analysing information on compliance and, as of 2018, information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel and related military or other assistance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

⁷⁵ Resolution 2459 (2019), para. 22. For more information on the mandate of UNMISS, see part X, sect. I.

⁷⁶ The mandate of the Committee included monitoring implementation, deciding on requests for exemptions and designating individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures adopted by the Council, comprising an asset freeze and a travel ban.

⁷⁷ S/2019/968.

⁷⁸ Resolution 2484 (2019), paras. 3–4. The mandate of the Panel of Experts included supporting the Committee, gathering and analysing information on compliance, providing information relevant to the listing of individuals and entities subject to the sanctions measures and providing periodic reports.

⁷⁹ Resolution 2480 (2019), para. 6.

⁸⁰ Ibid., para. 29 (b); and resolution 2484 (2019), para. 3. For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

⁸¹ Resolution 2462 (2019), fourteenth preambular paragraph.

in accordance with resolution [2395 \(2017\)](#), to strengthen its assessment process relating to countering the financing of terrorism, including through targeted and focused follow-up visits as complements to its comprehensive assessments. The Council also tasked the Executive Directorate with providing to the Office of Counter-Terrorism, on the basis of its reporting and in consultation with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, an annual thematic summary assessment of gaps identified and areas requiring more action to implement key counter-terrorism financing provisions of relevant Council resolutions for the purpose of designing targeted technical assistance and capacity-building efforts.⁸² The Council also requested the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) to hold, within 12 months, a joint special meeting on terrorist financing threats and trends.⁸³ In addition, the Council requested the Monitoring Team and the Executive Directorate to prepare, ahead of the joint special meeting, a report on actions taken by Member States to disrupt terrorist financing.⁸⁴

In its resolution [2482 \(2019\)](#), in which the Council addressed the links between international terrorism and organized crime, the Council also recalled the importance for the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to include in its country assessments information regarding the efforts of Member States to address the issue of trafficking in persons and its link with sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations committed by terrorist groups as part of their strategic objectives and ideology.⁸⁵ In the same resolution, the Council encouraged the Counter-Terrorism Committee, with the support of its Executive Directorate, to continue to work together to facilitate technical assistance and capacity-building and to raise awareness in that area, in particular by strengthening its dialogue with States and relevant international, regional and subregional organizations.⁸⁶ The Council also directed the Counter-Terrorism Committee, with the support of its Executive Directorate and in coordination with other relevant

United Nations entities, to continue to identify and examine the efforts of Member States to impede terrorist groups from benefiting from organized crime, whether domestic or transnational, and requested the Executive Directorate, in cooperation with the Office of Counter-Terrorism and UNODC, to integrate consideration of the linkages between terrorism and organized crime, whether transnational or domestic, into its country assessments and analyses.⁸⁷

Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#)

In 2019, the Council did not adopt any resolutions relating to the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#). In fulfilment of its responsibilities under resolutions [1540 \(2004\)](#), [1673 \(2006\)](#), [1810 \(2008\)](#), [1977 \(2011\)](#) and [2325 \(2016\)](#), the Committee submitted its eighteenth programme of work, covering the period from 1 February 2019 to 31 January 2020,⁸⁸ and the review of the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) for 2019,⁸⁹ pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution [2325 \(2016\)](#).

On 19 March 2019,⁹⁰ under the item “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, the Council heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee on the Committee’s activities in promoting the full and effective implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), including its engagement with international and regional organizations with mandates directly related to the resolution, as well as its work with Member States to support their national implementation efforts. The Chair noted that, in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution [1977 \(2011\)](#), the Council had decided to conduct a review of the status of the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) before the expiry of the Committee’s mandate in April 2021. He also noted that the Committee had been mandated to include recommendations on adjustments to its mandate and to submit a report to the Council on the conclusions of the review. In that regard, he reported that the Committee had begun its preparatory work for the upcoming comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#).

⁸² Ibid., para. 35. See also resolution [2395 \(2017\)](#), para. 9.

⁸³ Resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#), para. 36.

⁸⁴ Ibid., para. 37.

⁸⁵ Resolution [2482 \(2019\)](#), seventeenth preambular paragraph.

⁸⁶ Ibid., para. 22.

⁸⁷ Ibid., para. 23.

⁸⁸ See [S/2019/127](#).

⁸⁹ See [S/2019/986](#).

⁹⁰ See [S/PV.8487](#). For more information on other briefings in 2019 by the Chair of the Committee, see sect. I.B.

II. Working groups

Note

During the period under review, working groups of the Council continued to meet. As in the case of the committees, the working groups were composed of all 15 members of the Council and meetings were held in private, unless otherwise decided. Decisions were

reached by consensus. In 2019, five of the six existing working groups of the Council held regular meetings.⁹¹

Information on the establishment, mandate, key provisions and Chairs and Vice-Chairs of the informal and ad hoc working groups of the Council in 2019 is provided in table 3.

⁹¹ The Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004) did not meet during the period under review.

Table 3
Working groups of the Security Council, 2019

<i>Establishment</i>	<i>Mandate</i>	<i>Chair (Vice-Chair)</i>
Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations		
Established on 31 January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/3)	To address both generic peacekeeping issues relevant to the responsibilities of the Council, and technical aspects of individual peacekeeping operations, without prejudice to the competence of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Where appropriate, to seek the views of the troop-contributing countries, including through meetings between the Working Group and the troop-contributing countries, so that their views are taken into account by the Council	Côte d'Ivoire (United Kingdom)
Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa		
Established in March 2002 (S/2002/207) ^a	To monitor the implementation of recommendations contained in the presidential statement S/PRST/2002/2 and previous presidential statements and resolutions regarding conflict prevention and resolution in Africa To propose recommendations on the enhancement of cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council as well as with other United Nations agencies dealing with Africa To examine, in particular, regional and cross-conflict issues that affect the Council's work on African conflict prevention and resolution To propose recommendations to the Security Council to enhance cooperation in conflict prevention and resolution, between the United Nations and regional (Organization of African Unity [now African Union]) and subregional organizations	South Africa (Côte d'Ivoire)
Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004)		
Established on 8 October 2004 (resolution 1566 (2004))	To consider and submit recommendations to the Council on practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, including more effective procedures considered to be appropriate for bringing them to justice through prosecution or extradition, freezing their financial assets, preventing their movement through the territories of Member States and preventing supply to them of all types of arms and related material, and on the procedures for implementing these measures	Peru (France, Russian Federation, South Africa)

<i>Establishment</i>	<i>Mandate</i>	<i>Chair (Vice-Chair)</i>
	To consider the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families, which might be financed through voluntary contributions which could consist in part of assets seized from terrorist organizations, their members and sponsors, and submit its recommendations to the Council	
Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict		
Established on 26 July 2005 (resolution 1612 (2005))	To review the reports of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict	Belgium (Côte d'Ivoire)
	To review progress in the development and implementation of the action plans called for in resolutions 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005)	
	To consider other relevant information presented to it	
	To make recommendations to the Council on possible measures to promote the protection of children affected by armed conflict, including through recommendations on appropriate mandates for peacekeeping missions and recommendations with respect to the parties to the conflict	
	To address requests, as appropriate, to other bodies within the United Nations system for action to support implementation of resolution 1612 (2005) in accordance with their respective mandates	
Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions		
Established in June 1993 (no formal decision was taken)	To deal with issues related to documentation and other procedural questions	Kuwait (Poland)
Informal Working Group on International Tribunals		
Established in June 2000 pursuant to a proposal made by some Council members at the 4161st meeting (no formal decision was taken) ^b	To deal with a specific issue pertaining to the statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and subsequently mandated to deal with other (legal) issues pertaining to the Tribunals	Peru (Germany)

^a In notes by the President of the Security Council, the Council renewed the mandate of the Working Group for periods of one year until 31 December 2011 (see [S/2003/1138](#), [S/2004/1031](#), [S/2005/814](#), [S/2007/6](#), [S/2008/795](#), [S/2009/650](#) and [S/2010/654](#)). From that date onward, the Working Group has continued to meet without the annual renewal of its mandate

^b See [S/PV.4161](#).

III. Investigative bodies

Note

During the period under review, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) for 12 months until 21 September 2020.⁹² The Council did not authorize the establishment of any new investigative bodies.

⁹² Resolution [2490 \(2019\)](#), para. 2.

United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

The Investigative Team formally commenced its activities on 20 August 2018.⁹³ On 17 May and 13 November 2019, the Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD submitted to the Council the second and third

⁹³ [S/2018/1031](#), para. 4. For more information on the establishment and history of UNITAD, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2016–2017* and *Supplement 2018*.

reports on the activities of the Team,⁹⁴ which included establishing core staff, facilities and initial evidence collection practices and collecting initial documentary, digital, testimonial and forensic materials in line with the investigative priorities set out in the first report. In 2019, the Council heard briefings by the Special Adviser on the activities of the Team and its progress in implementing its mandate since the second and third reports.⁹⁵

In addition, in 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2490 (2019), in which it reaffirmed resolution 2379 (2017), by which UNITAD had been established, and recalled the terms of reference approved

⁹⁴ S/2019/407 and S/2019/878. For more information on the investigative priorities, see the first report of the Special Adviser and Head of UNITAD (S/2018/1031).

⁹⁵ See S/PV.8573 and S/PV.8675.

by the Council.⁹⁶ By the same resolution, the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Special Adviser and UNITAD until 21 September 2020. The Council noted that any further extension of the mandate would be decided at the request of the Government of Iraq or any other Government that had requested UNITAD to collect evidence of acts that might amount to war crimes.⁹⁷ In addition, the Special Adviser was requested to continue to submit and present reports to the Council on the Team's activities every 180 days.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Resolution 2490 (2019), para. 1. For the terms of reference approved by the Council for UNITAD, see S/2018/118, annex.

⁹⁷ Resolution 2490 (2019), para. 2. See also resolution 2379 (2017), paras. 2–3, and letter dated 19 September 2019 from the representative of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/760).

⁹⁸ Resolution 2490 (2019), para. 3.

IV. Tribunals

Note

In a note by the President of the Council dated 2 February 2018,⁹⁹ the Council agreed that issues pertaining to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals would be considered under an item entitled “International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals”,¹⁰⁰ under which would be subsumed the earlier consideration by the Council of issues pertaining to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.¹⁰¹ During the period under

⁹⁹ S/2018/90.

¹⁰⁰ By resolution 1966 (2010), the Council established the Mechanism to carry out the residual functions of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) after the completion of their mandates. For more information on the activities of the Council during 2019 in connection with the Mechanism, see part I, sect. 27.

¹⁰¹ See *Repertoire, Supplement 2014–2015*, part I, sect. 26; *Supplement 2016–2017*, part I, sect. 28; and *Supplement 2018*, part I, sect. 27.

review, the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint the judges nominated to fill the vacancies resulting from the resignation of two judges of the Mechanism for the remainder of the respective terms of office.¹⁰²

Developments in 2019

By an exchange of letters dated 29 January and 4 February 2019 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,¹⁰³ the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a judge to fill a vacancy following the resignation of one of the judges of the Mechanism with effect from 7 January 2019 for the remainder of the term of office, ending on 30 June 2020.

By an exchange of letters dated 11 and 27 December 2019 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,¹⁰⁴ the Council took note of the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a judge to fill a vacancy following the resignation of another judge of the Mechanism with effect from 19 July 2019 for the remainder of the term of office, ending on 30 June 2020.

¹⁰² For more information on the actions of the Council concerning judges of the Mechanism, see part IV, sect. I.D.3.

¹⁰³ S/2019/107 and S/2019/108.

¹⁰⁴ S/2019/999 and S/2019/1000.

V. Ad hoc commissions

No new commissions were created during 2019. The United Nations Compensation Commission, established pursuant to resolutions [687 \(1991\)](#) and [692 \(1991\)](#) to process claims and pay compensation for

losses and damage suffered as a direct result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and 1991, continued to function, without any changes to its mandate.

VI. Special advisers, envoys and representatives

Note

Section VI provides a list of special advisers, envoys and representatives in whose appointment the Council has been involved and whose mandates relate to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Special representatives appointed as heads of peacekeeping or special political missions are covered in part X and those authorized by the General Assembly are covered in part IV. Previous supplements should be consulted for information concerning special advisers, envoys and representatives whose functions have ceased.

During the period under review, the following envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General continued to exercise their functions:

- Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara
- Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus
- Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide
- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)

- Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa
- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen
- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
- Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi
- Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

Decisions of the Council acknowledging the appointment of personal and special envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General, their mandate and any developments that occurred during the period under review are listed in table 4.

Table 4

Developments relating to special advisers, envoys and representatives, 2019

<i>Establishment/appointment</i>	<i>Decisions</i>
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	
S/1997/236 19 March 1997	Resolution 2468 (2019) , second, third, fifth, twelfth and thirteenth preambular paragraphs and paras. 3 and 6
	Resolution 2494 (2019) , second, third, fifth, twelfth and thirteenth preambular paragraphs and paras. 3 and 6
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	
S/1997/320 17 April 1997	There were no developments in 2019 ^a

Establishment/appointment

Decisions

[S/1997/321](#)

21 April 1997

Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

[S/2004/567](#)

12 July 2004

Resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#), seventeenth preambular paragraph and para. 7 (c) (iii)

[S/2004/568](#)

13 July 2004

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)

[S/PRST/2004/36](#)

19 October 2004

There were no developments in 2019

[S/2004/974](#)

14 December 2004

[S/2004/975](#)

16 December 2004

Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect

[S/2007/721](#)

31 August 2007

There were no developments in 2019

[S/2007/722](#)

7 December 2007

Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict

Resolution [1888 \(2009\)](#)

30 September 2009

Resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), twenty-fourth preambular paragraph

Resolution [2467 \(2019\)](#), paras. 2, 7, 12, 14, 18, 29 and 34

[S/2010/62](#)

29 January 2010

Resolution [2498 \(2019\)](#), para. 21

[S/2010/63](#)

2 February 2010

Resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), thirteenth preambular paragraph

Resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), para. 10

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

[S/2018/955](#)

24 October 2018

Resolution [2469 \(2019\)](#), fifth preambular paragraph and paras. 8, 10 and 32

Resolution [2497 \(2019\)](#), fifth preambular paragraph and paras. 9, 11, 31 and 33

[S/2018/979](#)

31 October 2018

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

[S/2012/469](#)

18 June 2012

Resolution [2456 \(2019\)](#), sixth preambular paragraph

Resolution [2481 \(2019\)](#), paras. 3–4

[S/2012/470](#)

21 June 2012

[S/PRST/2019/9](#), first, fourth, sixth, seventh and eleventh paragraphs

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

- [S/2013/166](#) Resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), paras. 26–27 and 47
 15 March 2013 Resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), sixth preambular paragraph and paras. 14, 26, 29 (ii) (b) and 52
- [S/2013/167](#) [S/PRST/2019/10](#), sixth paragraph
 18 March 2013

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi

- [S/2017/396](#) [S/PRST/2019/10](#), sixth paragraph
 3 May 2017
- [S/2017/397](#)
 4 May 2017

Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

- Resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#) Resolution [2470 \(2019\)](#), para. 2 (d)
 21 September 2017 Resolution [2490 \(2019\)](#), paras. 1–3
- [S/2018/118](#)
 9 February 2018
- [S/2018/119](#)
 13 February 2018

^a In 2019, the Council referred to the senior United Nations official in resolution [2483 \(2019\)](#) (eleventh preambular paragraph and para. 1).

VII. Peacebuilding Commission

Note

The Peacebuilding Commission was established by the Council in resolution [1645 \(2005\)](#) of 20 December 2005.¹⁰⁵ During the period under review, the Commission addressed an increased number of country-specific, regional and thematic issues to help to maintain and draw attention to and enhance coherence in peacebuilding and sustaining peace.¹⁰⁶ In

2019, the Commission addressed the situations in Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka and the regional situations in West Africa, the Sahel, the Great Lakes, the Lake Chad basin and the Mano River Union.¹⁰⁷

Appointments to the Organizational Committee

In 2019, Côte d’Ivoire and Peru were the two elected members of the Council that were selected to participate in the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission.¹⁰⁸

Developments in 2019

In 2019, consistent with past practice, the Council invited the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Chairs of its country-specific

¹⁰⁵ In its resolution [1645 \(2005\)](#), the Council, acting concurrently with the General Assembly, decided that the main purposes of the Peacebuilding Commission would be to, inter alia, bring together all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding to marshal the resources and advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, to focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict, and to provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations. For more information, see part I, sect. 36.

¹⁰⁶ Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its thirteenth session ([S/2020/80](#), para. 4).

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, paras. 5–22.

¹⁰⁸ See [S/2019/65](#).

configurations to provide briefings on their activities and on the situations on the agenda of the Commission.¹⁰⁹

Regarding the situation in Burundi, the Council heard three briefings by the Chair of the Burundi configuration, in which he addressed humanitarian, socioeconomic and political questions, as well as aspects concerning security and human rights in the country.¹¹⁰ The Council also heard a briefing by the Chair of the Central African Republic configuration, who shared his observations on his fourth visit to the country, which took place the day after the signing, in Bangui on 6 February 2019, of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic between the Government of the Central African Republic and 14 armed groups.¹¹¹ The Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration delivered a briefing to the Council regarding, inter alia, the projects funded by the Peacebuilding Fund to support political and institutional stabilization processes in Guinea-Bissau. In the same briefing, he also took note of the guidance provided by the Council in its resolution 2458 (2019) regarding the reconfiguration and drawdown of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS).¹¹²

During the open debate of the Council under the item “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace” held on 18 July 2019, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, gave a briefing to the Council on the importance of effective partnerships between the United Nations, national Governments and other key stakeholders in nationally owned transitions, citing as good examples the cases of Côte d’Ivoire in 2017 and Liberia in 2018.¹¹³ Consistent with established practice, the Chair of the Commission was also invited to various informal interactive dialogues of the Council in 2019.¹¹⁴

The Council referred to the Peacebuilding Commission and its mandate in several decisions adopted under both thematic and country- and region-specific items. In connection with the thematic item entitled “Women and peace and security”, the Council encouraged the Commission to continue to support the participation of women-led peacebuilding organizations in planning and stabilization efforts in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery.¹¹⁵ Under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council adopted resolution 2457 (2019), in which it encouraged the Commission to exchange views with relevant regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union, in line with resolutions 1645 (2005) and 2282 (2016), in connection with strengthening cooperation in support of efforts aimed at peacebuilding and sustaining peace in Africa.¹¹⁶

The Council also referred to the Peacebuilding Commission in decisions adopted under country- and region-specific items. In connection with the item entitled “Peace consolidation in West Africa”, in its presidential statement of 7 August 2019, the Council encouraged the consolidation of ongoing political reforms in the region to prevent violence and instability and welcomed the role of the Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund in sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts.¹¹⁷

In connection with the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council stressed the valuable role of the Peacebuilding Commission in bringing strategic advice, providing observations for the Council’s consideration and fostering a more coherent, coordinated and integrated approach to international peacebuilding efforts. The Council also encouraged continued coordination with the Commission and other relevant international organizations and institutions in support of the long-term peacebuilding needs of the

¹⁰⁹ The practice of inviting the Chairs of country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission to participate in formal Council meetings was established in the note by the President of the Council dated 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507, para. 61) and was reaffirmed in the note by the President dated 30 August 2017 (S/2017/507, para. 95).

¹¹⁰ See S/PV.8465, S/PV.8550, and S/PV.8652. For more information, see part I, sect. 3.

¹¹¹ See S/PV.8467. For more information, see part I, sect. 6.

¹¹² See S/PV.8614. For more information, see part I, sect. 7.

¹¹³ See S/PV.8579. For more information, see part I, sect. 36.

¹¹⁴ On 20 March 2019, the Chair and Vice-Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission were invited to give a briefing on the activities of the Commission in the Sahel in preparation for the Council’s mission to the region

from 21 to 25 March 2019. On 27 November 2019, at an informal interactive dialogue on the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, the Chair of the Commission gave a briefing to the Council on his visit to the Mano River Union and the Commission’s engagement with West Africa and the Sahel. The Chair of the Burundi configuration of the Commission was also invited to give a briefing to the Council at an informal interactive dialogue on the situation in Burundi on 28 August 2019. For more information on informal interactive dialogues, see part II, sect. I.C.

¹¹⁵ Resolution 2493 (2019), para. 4.

¹¹⁶ Resolution 2457 (2019), para. 10.

¹¹⁷ S/PRST/2019/7, fourteenth paragraph.

Central African Republic.¹¹⁸ The Council recognized the role of the Commission in enhancing the efforts to support the long-term peacebuilding priorities of Guinea-Bissau and affirmed that UNIOGBIS would continue to support the Government of Guinea-Bissau, in close cooperation with the Commission, in the mobilization, harmonization and coordination of international assistance for the upcoming legislative and presidential elections.¹¹⁹ The Council welcomed the active engagement of the Commission with the Government of Guinea-Bissau and relevant

stakeholders on the ground, as well as with regional organizations, with the view to maintaining the long-term peacebuilding priorities of the country, and urged the Commission to increase its important role in supporting sustainable peace in Guinea-Bissau.¹²⁰ Finally, in connection with the question concerning Haiti, the Council emphasized the important role of the Commission in support of the shared effort by the Government of Haiti and the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti to address gang violence and its impact.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Resolution 2499 (2019), para. 17.

¹¹⁹ Resolution 2458 (2019), paras. 6 (e) and 21.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 22.

¹²¹ Resolution 2466 (2019), eighth preambular paragraph.

VIII. Subsidiary organs of the Security Council proposed but not established

Note

During the period under review, there were no instances of a subsidiary organ being proposed but not established.

Part X

Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: peacekeeping operations and special political missions

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Introductory note

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Rule 28

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

The powers of the Security Council to establish subsidiary organs are set out in Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and reflected in rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Part X of the present Supplement covers decisions of the Council relating to field-based subsidiary organs that the Council established for the performance of its functions under the Charter and that were active during 2019. These field-based subsidiary organs, referred to herein as peace operations, can be divided into two categories: peacekeeping operations (covered in section I); and special political missions (covered in section II).

Other subsidiary organs, such as committees, working groups, investigative bodies, tribunals, ad hoc commissions, special advisers, envoys, representatives and coordinators, and the Peacebuilding Commission, are covered in part IX. Peace operations led by regional organizations are covered in part VIII, which deals with the Council's cooperation with regional organizations.

Peace operations covered in part X are presented by region and in the order in which they were established. Successor operations are listed immediately after their predecessors. The introduction to each main section includes overview tables identifying the mandates assigned to each operation (tables 1, 2, 4 and 5) and provides an analysis of the key trends and developments during the reporting period. The mandates of the operations are presented in those tables according to 21 categories of mandated tasks, which are based exclusively on the language of the decisions of the Council and do not necessarily reflect the specific structure or activities of the Mission. The categories are provided only as a convenience for readers and do not reflect any practice or position of the Council.

Subsections provide a summary of major developments concerning the mandate and composition of each operation, reflecting the decisions of the Council adopted during the period under review. For information on the mandate and composition of missions in the past, see previous supplements to the *Repertoire*.

I. Peacekeeping operations

Note

Section I focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of peacekeeping operations, as well as changes to their mandates and composition.

Overview of peacekeeping operations during 2019

During the period under review, the Council oversaw 14 peacekeeping operations.¹ Seven of the operations were in Africa, three in the Middle East, two in Europe and one each in the Americas and Asia. The Council did not establish any new operations in 2019 and one completed its mandate.

Terminations and extensions of mandates

By resolution [2466 \(2019\)](#) of 12 April 2019, the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) for a final period of six months until 15 October 2019. The Council also extended the mandates of the following peacekeeping operations:

- United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
- African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
- United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
- United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
- United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

- United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

The mandates of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) remained open-ended and no decision was required to extend them.

Mandates of peacekeeping operations, including the authorization of the use of force

In 2019, the most common tasks of peacekeeping operations mandated by the Council related to the provision of good offices, mediation and technical support to peace processes, the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance. The Council also tasked missions with human rights monitoring, reporting and protection, gender mainstreaming and, as part of stabilization activities, the capacity-building of national police forces. The Council continued to highlight the importance of cooperation and coordination between peacekeeping operations and United Nations country teams, as well as international, regional and subregional stakeholders in the implementation of mission mandates. The mandate tasks of more long-standing missions, such as MINURSO, UNMOGIP, UNTSO and UNDOF, remained more narrowly focused on the monitoring of ceasefires.

The Council reauthorized the use of force by MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSMA and MINUSCA.² UNAMID, UNISFA, MINUJUSTH and UNIFIL were reauthorized to take all necessary action in fulfilling only certain elements of their mandates, such as protecting civilians, United Nations personnel and equipment, ensuring their freedom of movement and that of humanitarian workers, protecting the Mission

² In connection with MONUSCO, resolutions [2463 \(2019\)](#), para. 28, and [2502 \(2019\)](#), para. 27; in connection with UNMISS, resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#), paras. 7 and 10; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), para. 19; and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), para. 31.

¹ For Council decisions and deliberations relating to the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, see part I, sect. 26. For Council discussions concerning individual peacekeeping operations, see the respective country-specific studies in part I.

area of responsibility and supporting the development of national police forces.³

The Council continued to highlight the need to tailor peacekeeping mandates to changing conditions on the ground by modifying mission objectives, priorities and tasks. In 2019, the Council acknowledged the recommendations of the Secretary-General regarding the modification of the mandates, composition and configuration of UNAMID, MINUSMA, MINUSCA and MINUJUSTH.⁴ The Council also acknowledged the findings of the strategic review of MONUSCO, conducted in 2019, as well as the reviews of UNFICYP and UNDOF, conducted in 2017 and 2018, respectively.⁵

In modifying mandates, the Council placed particular emphasis on strengthening peacekeeping support for stabilization, the implementation of newly concluded peace agreements and the adoption of a comprehensive, integrated and community-centred approach to the protection of civilians. Specifically, with the conclusion of the electoral cycle in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Council requested MONUSCO to support stabilization efforts, the strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms.⁶ MINUSMA was requested to support the stabilization and restoration of State authority in central Mali, including by addressing intercommunal violence and supporting the redeployment of the national security forces.⁷ In preparation for the Mission's drawdown and exit, UNAMID was requested to focus on supporting and expanding peacebuilding activities.⁸

Following the signing of new peace agreements in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, UNMISS and MINUSCA were tasked with providing good offices and technical and operational assistance for their implementation.⁹ MINUSCA was also mandated to support the creation of the conditions conducive to the full implementation of the agreement.¹⁰ UNAMID was requested to support the ongoing peace process between the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur armed movements and the implementation of any future peace agreement.¹¹ MINUSCA was also tasked with assisting in the preparation and delivery of peaceful elections in 2020 and 2021 through its good offices, security, operational, logistical and, as appropriate, technical support.¹²

The Council called on UNMISS, MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA to adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach to the protection of civilians, stressing in particular the importance of community engagement and local mediation.¹³ MONUSCO and MINUSMA were newly tasked with enhancing communication with the local population regarding their respective mandates.¹⁴ MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA were requested to mitigate the risk to civilians from any military or police operation, including in support of national forces, by tracking, preventing, minimizing and addressing civilian harm.¹⁵ UNMISS and MINUSMA were also requested to strengthen their activities with regard to the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence.¹⁶

In terms of cross-cutting issues, the Council requested UNISFA, UNMISS and MINUJUSTH to implement their mandates in a gender-responsive

³ In connection with UNAMID, resolutions 2479 (2019), para. 2, and 2495 (2019), para. 3; in connection with UNISFA, resolutions 2469 (2019), para. 12, and 2497 (2019), para. 13; in connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution 2466 (2019), para. 9; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution 2485 (2019), para. 20.

⁴ In connection with UNAMID, resolutions 2479 (2019), third preambular paragraph, and 2495 (2019), twelfth preambular paragraph; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2480 (2019), nineteenth preambular paragraph; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), eighteenth preambular paragraph; and, in connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution 2466 (2019), fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs.

⁵ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2502 (2019), para. 46; in connection with UNFICYP, resolution 2453 (2019), para. 8; and, in connection with UNDOF, resolutions 2477 (2019), para. 10, and 2503 (2019), para. 11.

⁶ Resolutions 2463 (2019), paras. 23 (b) and 29 (ii), and 2502 (2019), para. 29 (ii).

⁷ Resolution 2480 (2019), para. 28 (b) (i).

⁸ Resolution 2495 (2019), para. 3 (ii).

⁹ In connection with UNMISS, resolution 2459 (2019), para. 7 (d) (i); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), para. 32 (b) (i) and (iv).

¹⁰ Resolution 2499 (2019), para. 32 (b) (i).

¹¹ Resolution 2495 (2019), para. 3 (i).

¹² Resolution 2499 (2019), para. 32 (c).

¹³ In connection with UNMISS, resolution 2459 (2019), para. 7 (a) (vi); in connection with MONUSCO, resolutions 2463 (2019), para. 29 (i) (a) and (e), and 2502 (2019), para. 29 (i) (a) and (d); in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2480 (2019), para. 28 (c) (ii); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), para. 32 (a) (ii).

¹⁴ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2502 (2019), para. 29 (i) (d); and, in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2480 (2019), para. 16.

¹⁵ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2502 (2019), para. 29 (i) (a); in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2480 (2019), para. 28 (c) (ii); and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), para. 32 (a) (ii).

¹⁶ In connection with UNMISS, resolution 2459 (2019), para. 17; and, in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2480 (2019), para. 58.

manner and highlighted the need for the missions to have relevant capacities and expertise for this purpose.¹⁷ MONUSCO and MINUSCA were newly tasked with creating the conditions for and ensuring the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.¹⁸ The two missions were also tasked with supporting the participation and protection of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.¹⁹

The Council continued to pay significant attention to ensuring the effectiveness of efforts to prevent and address sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations. In that regard, during the reporting period, the Council recognized that the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates was the responsibility of all stakeholders and was contingent upon several critical factors, including well-defined, realistic and achievable mandates, political will, leadership, performance and accountability, adequate resources, policy, planning and operational guidelines, and training and equipment.²⁰

In accordance with resolution 2436 (2018), the Council reaffirmed its support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework that facilitated the effective and full implementation of mandates and included objective methodologies based on clear and well-defined benchmarks.²¹ The Council called for the application of the framework in 10 peacekeeping operations.²² For

several of them, the Council specified that this would include investigating and taking immediate action following significant performance failures to implement the protection of civilians strategy.²³ The Secretary-General was requested to ensure that performance data be used to improve mission operations, including decisions regarding deployment, remediation, repatriation and incentives.²⁴ Furthermore, also in connection with the effectiveness of missions, the Council requested the Secretary-General and/or troop- and police-contributing countries to increase the number of women and to ensure their full, effective and meaningful participation in all aspects of peacekeeping operations.²⁵

The Council stressed the need to improve how allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were addressed in peacekeeping operations. In that regard, the Council urged troop- and police-contributing countries to ensure full accountability through the timely investigation of allegations and to hold perpetrators accountable when there was credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse or other serious misconduct by their units.²⁶

¹⁷ In connection with UNISFA, resolution 2469 (2019), para. 28; in connection with UNMISS, resolution 2459 (2019), para. 17; in connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution 2466 (2019), para. 12.

¹⁸ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2502 (2019), para. 32; and in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), para. 44.

¹⁹ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2502 (2019), para. 32; and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), para. 32 (a) (iii) and (b) (iii)–(v).

²⁰ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2502 (2019), para. 40; in connection with UNMISS, resolution 2459 (2019), para. 19; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), para. 37.

²¹ Resolution 2436 (2018), para. 1.

²² In connection with MINURSO, resolution 2468 (2019), para. 11; in connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2463 (2019), para. 41; in connection with UNMISS, resolution 2459 (2019), para. 19; in connection with UNISFA, resolution 2469 (2019), para. 30; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2480 (2019), para. 51; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), para. 38; in connection with MINUJUSTH, resolution 2466 (2019), para. 13; in connection with UNFICYP, resolution 2453 (2019), para. 18; in connection with UNDOF, resolution 2477 (2019), para. 11; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution 2485 (2019), para. 24.

²³ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2502 (2019), para. 41; and, in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), para. 38.

²⁴ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2502 (2019), para. 41; in connection with UNISFA, resolution 2497 (2019), para. 29; in connection with MINUSMA, resolution 2480 (2019), para. 50; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), para. 38; in connection with UNFICYP, resolution 2483 (2019), para. 13; in connection with UNDOF, resolution 2503 (2019), para. 12; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution 2485 (2019), para. 24.

²⁵ In connection with MINURSO, resolutions 2468 (2019), para. 11, and 2494 (2019), para. 11; in connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2502 (2019), para. 41; in connection with UNISFA, resolution 2497 (2019), para. 28; in connection with MINUSCA, resolution 2499 (2019), para. 38; in connection with UNFICYP, resolutions 2453 (2019), para. 14, and 2483 (2019), para. 12; in connection with UNDOF, resolutions 2477 (2019), para. 11, and 2503 (2019), para. 12; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution 2485 (2019), para. 24.

²⁶ In connection with MONUSCO, resolution 2502 (2019), para. 45; in connection with UNISFA, resolution 2497 (2019), para. 30; in connection with UNFICYP, resolution 2483 (2019), para. 14; in connection with UNDOF, resolutions 2477 (2019), para. 12, and 2503 (2019), para. 13; and, in connection with UNIFIL, resolution 2485 (2019), para. 23. See also, in connection with UNMISS, resolution 2459 (2019), para. 20.

Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of the mandates of peacekeeping operations in 2019, showing the wide range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; and (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and reiterated by the Council during

the period under review. The tables also include the tasks of peacekeeping operations with open-ended mandates adopted in decisions of previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the operations concerned.

Table 1
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2019: Africa

Mandate	MINURSO	UNAMID	MONUSCO	UNISFA	UNMISS	MINUSMA	MINUSCA
Chapter VII		X	X	X	X	X	X
Authorization of the use of force		X	X	X	X	X	X
Ceasefire monitoring	X				X	X	
Civil-military coordination		X	X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Electoral assistance	X					X	X
Human rights-related ^a		X	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support	X	X	X		X	X	X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mission impact assessment			X			X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of civilians	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment		X	X	X	X	X	X
Public information			X			X	X
Rule of law/judicial matters		X	X	X		X	X
Security monitoring; patrolling; deterrence		X	X	X	X	X	X
Security sector reform			X			X	X
Support to military			X			X	X
Support to police	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Support to sanctions regimes		X	X		X	X	X
Support to State institutions		X	X		X	X	X

Abbreviations: MINURSO, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; MINUSCA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; MINUSMA, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNAMID, African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; UNMISS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

Table 2
Mandates of peacekeeping operations, 2019: Americas, Asia, Europe and Middle East

Mandate	MINUJUSTH ^a	UNMOGIP	UNFICYP	UNMIK	UNTSO	UNDOF	UNIFIL
Chapter VII	X			X			
Authorization of the use of force	X						X
Civil-military coordination				X			
Ceasefire monitoring		X	X		X	X	X
Demilitarization and arms management							X
Electoral assistance							
Human rights-related ^b	X			X			X
Humanitarian support			X	X			X
International cooperation and coordination			X	X	X	X	X
Political process	X		X	X			
Protection of civilians	X						X
Protection of humanitarian/United Nations personnel and facilities; ensuring free movement of personnel and equipment							X
Public information							
Rule of law/judicial matters	X						
Security monitoring; patrolling; deterrence							X
Security sector reform							
Support to military							X
Support to police	X		X	X			
Support to sanctions regimes							
Support to State institutions				X			X

Abbreviations: MINUJUSTH, United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti; UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNFICYP, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; UNMIK, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNMOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

^a By resolution 2466 (2019), the Council extended the mandate of MINUJUSTH, as set out in the table, for a final period until 15 October 2019.

^b Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

Authorized strength of peacekeeping operations

As illustrated in table 3, during the review period, the Council modified the composition of two

peacekeeping operations, MONUSCO and UNISFA. The Council decreased the number of military and increased the number of police personnel in both missions.

Table 3
Changes in composition of peacekeeping operations, 2019

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Changes in composition</i>	<i>Decision</i>
MONUSCO	The Council decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling from 16,215 to 14,000, while maintaining the number of military observers and staff officers at 660	2502 (2019)
	The Council decided to increase police personnel from 391 to 591, with the number of personnel of formed police units remaining at 1,050. The Council further agreed to a temporary deployment of an additional 360 personnel of formed police units provided they were deployed in replacement of military personnel	2502 (2019)
UNISFA	The Council decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling from 4,140 to 3,550 personnel	2469 (2019)
	The Council decided to increase the authorized police ceiling from 345, including 185 individual police officers and one formed police unit, to 640 police personnel, including 148 individual police officers and three formed police units	2469 (2019)
	The Council decided to maintain the authorized troop ceiling at 3,550 and to allow postponement in the withdrawal of 295 troops above the authorized troop ceiling until 15 May 2020	2497 (2019)

Abbreviations: MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNISFA, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei.

Africa

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by the Council on 29 April 1991, by resolution [690 \(1991\)](#), in accordance with the settlement proposals accepted by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). MINURSO was mandated to monitor the ceasefire, provide security for the repatriation of refugees and support the organization of a free and fair referendum.²⁷

In 2019, by resolutions [2468 \(2019\)](#) of 30 April 2019 and [2494 \(2019\)](#) of 30 October 2019, the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO for, six months and one year, respectively, the latter time until 31 October 2020.²⁸ Both resolutions were adopted with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions.²⁹

²⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINURSO, see previous supplements covering the period 1991–2018.

²⁸ Resolutions [2468 \(2019\)](#), para. 1, and [2494 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

²⁹ The Russian Federation and South Africa abstained in the votes on resolutions [2468 \(2019\)](#) and [2494 \(2019\)](#), expressing concern regarding the lack of balance and ambiguity in the provisions on the political process.

The Council did not modify the mandate of MINURSO during the period under review. By resolutions [2468 \(2019\)](#) and [2494 \(2019\)](#), the Council emphasized the need to achieve a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution to the question of Western Sahara based on compromise and the importance of aligning the strategic focus of MINURSO and orienting resources of the United Nations to that end.³⁰ In terms of reporting, the Council amended the requirement of the Secretary-General to brief the Council on the status of the negotiations and on challenges to the Mission's operations from within three months of the renewal of the mandate of MINURSO to within six months of its renewal and again prior to its expiration.³¹

The Council did not modify the composition of MINURSO during the period under review.

The representative of South Africa further expressed regret regarding the lack of a formal human rights monitoring mandate for MINURSO and the extension of the mandate period from 6 to 12 months. See [S/PV.8518](#) and [S/PV.8651](#). For more information on the situation concerning Western Sahara, see part I, sect. 1.

³⁰ Resolutions [2468 \(2019\)](#), para. 2, and [2494 \(2019\)](#), para. 2.

³¹ Resolution [2494 \(2019\)](#), para. 10.

African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

The Council established the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) by resolution 1769 (2007) of 31 July 2007 and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized UNAMID to take the necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of its own personnel and humanitarian workers.³²

In 2019, the Council adopted resolutions 2479 (2019) of 27 June 2019 and 2495 (2019) of 31 October 2019 concerning UNAMID, both under Chapter VII of the Charter. By resolution 2479 (2019), the Council provided for a four-month technical rollover of the Mission's mandate.³³ By resolution 2495 (2019), the Council extended the mandate for one year until 31 October 2020.³⁴

In the context of the political transition and civil unrest in the Sudan, the Council amended the mandate of UNAMID.³⁵ By resolution 2479 (2019) of 27 June 2019, the Council took note of the special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of UNAMID (S/2019/445),³⁶ in which they provided recommendations on the reconfiguration and drawdown of UNAMID. The Council extended, temporarily and exceptionally, the period of drawdown of military personnel outlined in resolution 2429 (2018), in order to maintain the Mission's self-protection capacities.³⁷

The Council requested the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to provide a special report no later than 30 September 2019 with an assessment of the situation and recommendations on the appropriate course of action regarding the drawdown of UNAMID.³⁸ In resolution

2479 (2019), the Council also requested the development of a joint African Union-United Nations political strategy detailing options for a follow-on mechanism to the Mission.³⁹

On 31 October 2019, by resolution 2495 (2019), the Council welcomed the establishment of a new transitional Government in the Sudan and commended the launch of peace negotiations on 14 October 2019.⁴⁰ In that context, the Council underscored that the withdrawal of UNAMID should take into account the progress made in the peace process.⁴¹ The Council took note of the special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General on UNAMID (S/2019/816).⁴²

The Council decided that UNAMID should continue to implement its mandate as set out in resolution 2429 (2018) and, in line with existing tasks and in cooperation with the United Nations country team, should focus on: (a) support for the peace process, including mediation between the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur armed movements, the national Peace Commission and support for any peace agreement; (b) support for peacebuilding activities, including strengthening the State liaison functions and expanding them into Jebel Marra; and (c) the protection of civilians, monitoring and reporting on human rights, including sexual and gender-based violence and grave violations against children, the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel, and contribute to the creation of the necessary conditions for the voluntary, informed, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons.⁴³

Taking note of the first option for the drawdown and reconfiguration of UNAMID in the special report, the Council decided that the Mission would maintain its troop and police ceilings until 31 March 2020, with modifications to its configuration on the ground.⁴⁴ The

³² For more information on the history of the mandate of the UNAMID, see previous supplements covering the period 2007–2018.

³³ Resolution 2479 (2019), para. 1.

³⁴ Resolution 2495 (2019), para. 1.

³⁵ For more information on the reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, see part I, sect. 9.

³⁶ Resolution 2479 (2019), third preambular paragraph.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 2. See resolution 2429 (2018), para. 5, providing for the decrease of the authorized troop ceiling from 8,735 to up to 4,050 personnel.

³⁸ Resolution 2479 (2019), para. 3 (i).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 3 (ii). In the letter dated 11 September 2019 from the President of the Council addressed to the Secretary-General, the President stated that Council members had taken note of the request of the Secretary-General for the time frame for the submission of the assessment report to be extended until 10 October 2019 to allow for sufficient time and enable substantive engagement with the transitional institutions, especially on the post-UNAMID arrangements. See S/2019/731 and S/2019/732.

⁴⁰ Resolution 2495 (2019), fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, seventh preambular paragraph.

⁴² *Ibid.*, eleventh preambular paragraph.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

Council requested the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to provide a special report no later than 31 January 2020 with an assessment of the situation and recommendations on the appropriate course of action regarding the drawdown of UNAMID. The Council also requested options for a follow-on presence to the Mission, based on the views and the needs of the Government of the Sudan.⁴⁵ The Council expressed its intention to decide by 31 March 2020 courses of action regarding the responsible drawdown and exit of UNAMID and the establishment of a follow-on presence to the Mission.⁴⁶

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was established by the Council on 28 May 2010 by resolution [1925 \(2010\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter, to succeed the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUSCO was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection mandate as set out in the resolution and tasked with, *inter alia*, ensuring the effective protection of civilians and supporting Government stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.⁴⁷

In 2019, the Council adopted resolutions [2463 \(2019\)](#) of 29 March 2019 and [2502 \(2019\)](#) of 19 December 2019 in connection with MONUSCO, both under Chapter VII of the Charter. By resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of MONUSCO for nine months, departing from the previous practice of extending the mandate for one year.⁴⁸ By resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), the Council once again extended the mandate of the Mission for one year until 20 December 2020.⁴⁹

By resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), following the conclusion of the presidential, national and provincial elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,⁵⁰

the Council redefined the priorities of MONUSCO and modified some of its mandate tasks. Specifically, the Council reiterated the strategic priority of MONUSCO to protect civilians and replaced the priority to support the electoral process with supporting the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions and key governance and security reforms.⁵¹

In accordance with the strategic priorities and stressing that the mandate should be implemented in accordance with a prioritization of tasks,⁵² the Council modified the priority tasks of MONUSCO. In that regard, the Council added a new priority task for the Mission, namely to support stabilization and the strengthening of State institutions, and key governance and security reforms.⁵³ The Council also added several elements to the protection of civilians and transitional justice support tasks.⁵⁴ The Council noted that all of the Mission's tasks were mutually reinforcing and should be implemented in a manner consistent with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁵⁵

In terms of the new priority task to support stabilization and the strengthening of State institutions, the Council requested MONUSCO to provide technical and political support with a view to furthering reconciliation, democratization and inclusion, and to promote intercommunal reconciliation.⁵⁶ The Mission was also requested to provide technical assistance to the Government on key mining activities, as well as the extraction, transport and trade of natural resources in the eastern part of the country.⁵⁷ The Council specified that the tasks regarding the strengthening of the capacity of the Congolese security forces would include the continued implementation of the integrated operational strategy for the fight against insecurity developed by MONUSCO.⁵⁸

Beyond the priority tasks, the Council reiterated, with several additions, the tasks of MONUSCO regarding disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; security sector reform; support for the implementation of the arms embargo; child protection; the environmental impacts of its operations; and those related to gender, sexual violence, and sexual exploitation and abuse.⁵⁹ In connection with

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

⁴⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of MONUSCO, see previous supplements covering the period 2010–2018.

⁴⁸ Resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), para. 21.

⁴⁹ Resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), para. 22.

⁵⁰ Resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), fourth preambular paragraph. For more information on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see part I, sect. 5.

⁵¹ Resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), para. 23. See also resolution [2409 \(2018\)](#), para. 31.

⁵² Resolution [2463 \(2019\)](#), para. 24.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, para. 29 (ii).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 29 (i) (a)–(b) and (e)–(f).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 29.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 29 (ii) (a).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 29 (ii) (d).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 29 (ii) (b).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, paras. 30 (i)–(iii), 31–34 and 42.

disarmament, the Council authorized MONUSCO to advise and support the authorities in the disposal of weapons and ammunitions of disarmed Congolese and foreign combatants.⁶⁰ MONUSCO was further requested to assist the Government and other stakeholders in ensuring the equal and meaningful participation and full involvement and representation of women in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.⁶¹ The Council urged MONUSCO to work with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region to seek political solutions to stop the cross-border flows of armed combatants, arms and conflict minerals.⁶² In the context of efforts to bring the Ebola outbreak in the country to an end, the Council requested all relevant parts of the United Nations system to continue their work and noted the important and positive role of MONUSCO in that regard.⁶³

Regarding the future of the MONUSCO mandate, the Council underscored the need to progressively transfer the Mission's tasks to the Government, the United Nations country team and other relevant stakeholders in order to enable the Mission's responsible and sustainable exit.⁶⁴ The Secretary-General was requested to conduct and provide, no later than 20 October 2019, an independent strategic review of MONUSCO assessing the continued challenges to peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and articulating a phased, progressive and comprehensive exit strategy.⁶⁵

By resolution 2502 (2019), the Council added several new elements to the Mission's priority tasks on the protection of civilians and support for stabilization. In that regard, MONUSCO was authorized to take all necessary measures to ensure the protection of civilians under threat of physical violence within its provinces of current deployment, with a specific focus on eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo while retaining a capacity to intervene elsewhere.⁶⁶ The Council specified that the Mission's operations should mitigate the risk to civilians by tracking, preventing, minimizing and addressing civilian harm.⁶⁷ MONUSCO was further requested to maintain a proactive deployment and a mobile, flexible and robust posture.⁶⁸ As part of its community engagement,

MONUSCO was tasked with laying out a strategy with the Government to build trust and understanding among the population regarding the Mission's efforts and to prevent disinformation.⁶⁹ The Council also provided for an expanded Intervention Brigade with enhanced effectiveness that included additional units with appropriate training under the command and control of the MONUSCO Force Commander.⁷⁰ The Council underlined that the entire MONUSCO force, including the Intervention Brigade, was required to prioritize the implementation of the protection of civilians mandate.⁷¹

The stabilization priority task of MONUSCO was expanded to include the existing tasks related to security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.⁷² With respect to security sector reform, the Council requested MONUSCO to provide strategic and technical advice to the Government on, inter alia, encouraging inclusive reform that delivered security and justice to all through independent, accountable and functioning justice and security institutions which take into account women's participation and safety.⁷³ MONUSCO would also promote and facilitate military, police, justice and prison sector reforms.⁷⁴ On disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the Council requested MONUSCO to coordinate with civil society, donor partners and government officials to support those efforts.⁷⁵ The Council also elaborated on the Mission's other stabilization tasks regarding the control of mining activities, the provision of good offices to address root causes of conflict and the undertaking of local dialogues on community security.⁷⁶ The Mission's task to ensure the protection of United Nations personnel and facilities and freedom of movement was no longer classified as a priority task.⁷⁷

In connection with the Mission's remaining tasks, the Council requested MONUSCO to engage women's networks as partners in protection and in support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform efforts.⁷⁸ MONUSCO was also requested to support the participation of women civil society leaders and organization members in conflict prevention and resolution, public institutions and decision-making, and to support the Government in

⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 30 (i) (b).

⁶¹ Ibid., para. 32.

⁶² Ibid., para. 27.

⁶³ Ibid., para. 38.

⁶⁴ Ibid., para. 44.

⁶⁵ Ibid., para. 45.

⁶⁶ Resolution 2502 (2019), para. 29 (i) (a).

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., para. 29 (i) (b).

⁶⁹ Ibid., para. 29 (i) (d).

⁷⁰ Ibid., para. 29 (i) (e).

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., para. 29 (ii) (f)–(g).

⁷³ Ibid., para. 29 (ii) (f).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid., para. 29 (ii) (h).

⁷⁶ Ibid., para. 29 (ii) (b)–(d).

⁷⁷ Ibid., para. 30.

⁷⁸ Ibid., para. 32.

advancing women's political participation, in particular achieving the 30 per cent constitutional quota.⁷⁹ MONUSCO was further tasked with continuing to ensure the effectiveness of the monitoring and reporting mechanisms on children and armed conflict.⁸⁰

In terms of the way forward, the Council took note of the independent strategic review requested by the Council in its resolution [2436 \(2019\)](#) and the conditions it highlighted for the exit of MONUSCO.⁸¹ The Council further noted the assessment in the review that an absolute minimum transition period of three years was required and that the tentative timeline would have to remain flexible and take into account the security situation based on ongoing assessments, as well as the red lines set out in the review.⁸² The resolution stressed that the activities of MONUSCO should be conducted in such a manner as to enable the Mission's exit based on the improvement of the situation on the ground, with a particular focus on the reduction of the threat to civilians.⁸³ The Secretary-General was requested to proceed with the gradual transfer of the Mission's programmatic activities to the relevant partners based on joint analysis with the Government, the United Nations country team and other partners and to articulate a joint strategy and identify a set of measurable benchmarks in that regard, to be proposed to the Council no later than 20 October 2020.⁸⁴

By resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), the Council also decided to reduce the Mission's authorized troop ceiling from 16,215 military personnel to 14,000, while maintaining the number of military observers and staff officers at 660.⁸⁵ The number of police personnel was increased from 391 to 591, with the number of personnel of formed police units remaining at 1,050.⁸⁶ The Council further agreed to a temporary deployment of an additional 360 personnel of formed police units provided they were deployed in replacement of military personnel.⁸⁷ Finally, the Council invited the Secretariat to consider further reductions in the Mission's level of military deployment and area of

operations based on the positive evolution on the situation on the ground.⁸⁸

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

The Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by resolution [1990 \(2011\)](#) of 27 June 2011, taking into account the Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, of 20 June 2011. The Council mandated UNISFA to, inter alia, monitor and verify the redeployment of any Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army or its successor from the Abyei Area, participate in relevant bodies as stipulated in the Agreement, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service. By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized UNISFA to take the actions necessary, inter alia, to protect United Nations and humanitarian personnel and property, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and ensure security in the Area. By resolution [2024 \(2011\)](#) of 14 December 2011, the Council expanded the mandate of UNISFA to include assisting the Sudan and South Sudan in ensuring the observance of their agreement on border security and supporting the operational activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.⁸⁹

In 2019, the Council adopted resolutions [2465 \(2019\)](#) of 12 April 2019, [2469 \(2019\)](#) of 14 May 2019, [2492 \(2019\)](#) of 15 October 2019, and [2497 \(2019\)](#) of 14 November 2019 concerning UNISFA. By resolution [2465 \(2019\)](#), the Council extended for six months the mandate of UNISFA in so far as it concerned the support of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.⁹⁰ Further, by resolution [2469 \(2019\)](#), the Council extended for six months the mandate of UNISFA, including its mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter, in the Abyei Area.⁹¹ Thereafter, the Council also authorized a technical roll-over of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism mandate for a period of one month⁹² and, by resolution

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., para. 31.

⁸¹ Ibid., para. 46. See also the letter dated 24 October 2019 addressed to the President of the Council ([S/2019/842](#)), in which the Secretary-General transmitted the independent strategic review report of MONUSCO.

⁸² Resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), para. 46.

⁸³ Ibid., para. 47.

⁸⁴ Ibid., paras. 48–49.

⁸⁵ Ibid., para. 23.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid. See also the report of the Secretary-General on MONUSCO of 26 November 2019 ([S/2019/905](#)), para. 60.

⁸⁸ Resolution [2502 \(2019\)](#), para. 23.

⁸⁹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNISFA, see previous supplements covering the period 2011–2018.

⁹⁰ Resolution [2465 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

⁹¹ Resolution [2469 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

⁹² Resolution [2492 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

2497 (2019), the Council extended the whole mandate of UNISFA for six months until 15 May 2020.⁹³

The Council largely maintained the existing mandate of UNISFA during the period under review, with minor modifications. By resolution 2469 (2019), the Council requested UNISFA to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate.⁹⁴ By resolution 2497 (2019), the Council expressed concern that women remained absent from the leadership of local peace committees and welcomed and encouraged the efforts of UNISFA to integrate women into peace discussions.⁹⁵ The Council further called upon UNISFA to sustain adequate expertise on women and child protection.⁹⁶

By resolution 2469 (2019), emphasizing the change in threat in the Abyei Area as characterized by the letter of the Secretary-General of 20 August 2018, the Council reduced the authorized troop ceiling from 4,140 to 3,550.⁹⁷ The Council further increased the number of police personnel from 345, including 185 individual police officers and one formed police unit, to 640 police personnel, including 148 individual police officers and three formed police units.⁹⁸ The Council requested the Secretary-General to appoint a civilian Deputy Head of Mission to further facilitate liaison between and engagement with the parties.⁹⁹

In terms of the way forward, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report no later than 15 October 2019 on updated recommendations for the reconfiguration of the UNISFA mandate, including a transition strategy that would allow for an eventual exit for the Mission.¹⁰⁰ The Council also requested an evaluation of the Mission's support for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism by 15 September 2019.¹⁰¹

By resolution 2497 (2019), consistent with the recommendations of the Secretary-General, the Council maintained the authorized troop ceiling at 3,550 and allowed the postponement in the withdrawal of 295 troops above the authorized troop ceiling until 15 May 2020.¹⁰² While maintaining the police personnel ceiling, the Council expressed its intention to reduce the police component as the Abyei Police Service was gradually established and providing effective law enforcement through the Abyei Area.¹⁰³ Finally, while reiterating its request to the Secretary-General to appoint a civilian Deputy Head of Mission, the Council requested the addition of civilian staff within existing resources to facilitate liaison between and engagement with the parties.¹⁰⁴

United Nations Mission in South Sudan

By resolution 1996 (2011) of 8 July 2011, the Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) under Chapter VII of the Charter, with a mandate to support peace consolidation and foster longer-term State-building and economic development; support the Government of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution and to protect civilians; and support the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations country team and other international partners, in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish the rule of law and to strengthen the security and justice sectors. UNMISS was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its protection of civilians mandate.¹⁰⁵

In 2019, by resolution 2459 (2019) of 15 March 2019, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of UNMISS for one year until 15 March 2020.¹⁰⁶ The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour and 1 abstention.¹⁰⁷

⁹³ Resolution 2497 (2019), paras. 1–2. For more information on the reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, see part I, sect. 9.

⁹⁴ Resolution 2469 (2019), para. 28.

⁹⁵ Resolution 2497 (2019), para. 19.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 28.

⁹⁷ Resolution 2469 (2019), eighth preambular paragraph and para. 3. See also the letter dated 20 August 2018 addressed to the President of the Council (S/2018/778), in which the Secretary-General provided recommendations for adjusting UNISFA to the realities on the ground.

⁹⁸ Resolution 2469 (2019), para. 4.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 34.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* See also the letter dated 20 September 2019 addressed to the President of the Council (S/2019/768), in which the Secretary-General provided an analysis and recommendations with respect to the mandate and configuration of UNISFA in terms of its support for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism.

¹⁰² Resolution 2497 (2019), para. 4. See also the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei (S/2019/817), paras. 52, 53 and 60.

¹⁰³ Resolution 2497 (2019), para. 5.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

¹⁰⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMISS, see previous supplements covering the period 2011–2018.

¹⁰⁶ Resolution 2459 (2019), para. 5.

¹⁰⁷ The Russian Federation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution, expressing disappointment with the reluctance of some Council members to welcome the Revitalized Agreement and the listing of UNMISS tasks related to gender and human rights before the provision of support to the Revitalized Agreement. See S/PV.8484. For more information on the reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, see part I, sect. 9.

Following the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in September 2018, the Council modified the mandate of UNMISS. Specifically, as part of the Mission's protection strategy, the Council requested UNMISS to support the development and implementation of gender-sensitive community violence reduction programmes.¹⁰⁸ UNMISS was also tasked with supporting the facilitation of the safe, informed, voluntary and dignified return or relocation of internally displaced persons from United Nations protection of civilians sites, in coordination with humanitarian actors and other relevant stakeholders.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, while continuing to intensify its presence and active patrolling in areas of high risk of conflict, high concentration of internally displaced persons and refugees, the Mission was requested to pay particular attention to women and children.¹¹⁰

With respect to its political mandate, UNMISS was tasked with supporting the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the peace process by providing good offices and participating in the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism and the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, especially at the subnational level.¹¹¹

In its resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#), the Council requested UNMISS to strengthen its sexual and gender-based violence prevention and response activities, including by ensuring that the risks thereof were included in the Mission's data collection, threat analysis and early warning systems and by engaging with victims of sexual violence and women's organizations.¹¹² The Mission was requested to continue to engage in dialogue with the parties to the conflict regarding the development and implementation of action plans on child protection and to support efforts aimed at releasing children associated with armed groups and forces in all parts of the country.¹¹³ The Council specified that the tasks of UNMISS in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan and the Panel of Experts would include the implementation of measures adopted in resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) related to the arms embargo.¹¹⁴

Regarding the future mandate of UNMISS, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide within 180 days of the mandate renewal a written report on future planning for the protection of civilians sites, including recommendations for steps necessary to foster a secure environment for the return or relocation of their residents.¹¹⁵

The Council did not modify the composition of UNMISS during the reporting period. The Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a military and police capability study subsequent to the parties negotiating permanent security arrangements and expressed its readiness to consider making the necessary adjustments to UNMISS, including its regional protection force, to match security conditions on the ground.¹¹⁶

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

The Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by resolution [2100 \(2013\)](#) of 25 April 2013, under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSMA was authorized to use all necessary means to stabilize population centres and support the re-establishment of State authority, support the implementation of a transitional road map, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property, assist the Malian authorities in promoting and protecting human rights, and support humanitarian assistance, national and international justice, and cultural preservation.¹¹⁷

In 2019, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted resolutions [2480 \(2019\)](#) of 28 June 2019 and [2484 \(2019\)](#) of 29 August 2019 concerning MINUSMA. The Council also issued a presidential statement on 3 April 2019.¹¹⁸ By resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), the mandate of MINUSMA was extended for one year until 30 June 2020.¹¹⁹

In the presidential statement of 3 April 2019, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide options for a potential significant adaptation of

¹⁰⁸ Resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#), para. 7 (a) (vi).

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 7 (a) (viii).

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 18.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, para. 7 (d) (i)–(iii).

¹¹² *Ibid.*, para. 17.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, para. 28.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 22. For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan, see part IX, sect. I.

¹¹⁵ Resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#), para. 36. See also the report of the Secretary-General on future planning for the protection of civilians sites in South Sudan ([S/2019/741](#)).

¹¹⁶ Resolution [2459 \(2019\)](#), para. 6.

¹¹⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2012–2018.

¹¹⁸ [S/PRST/2019/2](#).

¹¹⁹ Resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), para. 17.

MINUSMA with a view to enhancing its effectiveness to support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 through a greater focus on priority tasks.¹²⁰ The Council also requested the Secretary-General, as part of his regular reporting on MINUSMA, to include recommendations on ways for the Mission to enhance its support for the Malian authorities' efforts and actions to re-establish State presence in central Mali.¹²¹ The Council encouraged MINUSMA to continue to support the restoration of State authority in the centre of the country and to implement its good offices, reconciliation and protection of civilians mandate.¹²²

By resolution 2480 (2019), the Council took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali, dated 31 May 2019 (S/2019/454),¹²³ in which he provided options for the adaptation of MINUSMA, and amended the Mission's mandate. Specifically, while reiterating the strategic priority of MINUSMA to support the implementation of the Agreement, the Council added a second strategic priority for the Mission to facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive politically led Malian strategy to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence and re-establish State authority, State presence and basic social services in central Mali.¹²⁴ Moreover, the Council requested MINUSMA to continue to carry out its mandate with a proactive, robust, flexible and agile posture.¹²⁵

Under the framework of the two strategic priorities and stressing that the mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks, the Council reiterated that the Mission's priority tasks were support for the implementation of the Agreement, protection of civilians, good offices and reconciliation, promotion and protection of human rights, and humanitarian assistance, with some modifications.¹²⁶ The Council also added a new priority task to support the stabilization and restoration of State authority in the centre of Mali.¹²⁷

Regarding support for the implementation of the Agreement, the Council further requested MINUSMA to support the establishment of a comprehensive plan

for the redeployment of the reformed and reconstituted Malian Defence and Security Forces in the north of Mali.¹²⁸ In connection with the protection of civilians, the Council requested MINUSMA to strengthen community engagement and protection mechanisms, interaction with civilians, community outreach, reconciliation, mediation, support for the resolution of local and intercommunal conflicts and public information.¹²⁹ The Mission was requested to take mobile, flexible, robust and proactive steps to protect civilians, including through the deployment of ground and air assets. MINUSMA was also requested to prevent the return of active armed elements to key population centres and other areas where civilians were at risk.¹³⁰ In order to mitigate the risk to civilians before, during and after any military or police operation, the Council requested the Mission to track, prevent, minimize and address civilian harm resulting from the Mission's operations.¹³¹

Under the new priority task to support the stabilization and restoration of State authority in the centre of Mali, MINUSMA was tasked with supporting the Malian authorities in reducing violence and intercommunal tensions by using its good offices.¹³² The Mission would also support the authorities in ensuring that those responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law were held accountable.¹³³ In that context, MINUSMA was tasked with supporting the parties in addressing and implementing their commitments on the prevention and elimination of sexual and gender-based violence.¹³⁴ MINUSMA was encouraged to continue efforts to facilitate the return of State authority in the centre of Mali and to enhance communication on the role and responsibilities of the Malian authorities to protect civilians and the Mission's own role in that regard.¹³⁵

The Council further elaborated on the Mission's other tasks related to quick-impact projects and reiterated those related to assisting the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals,

¹²⁰ S/PRST/2019/2, eighth paragraph. For more information on the situation in Mali, see part I, sect. 13.

¹²¹ S/PRST/2019/2, ninth paragraph.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Resolution 2480 (2019), nineteenth preambular paragraph.

¹²⁴ Ibid., para. 20.

¹²⁵ Ibid., para. 22.

¹²⁶ Ibid., paras. 21 and 28 (a) and (c)–(f).

¹²⁷ Ibid., para. 28 (b).

¹²⁸ Ibid., para. 28 (a) (ii).

¹²⁹ Ibid., para. 28 (c) (ii).

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid., para. 28 (b) (i).

¹³³ Ibid., para. 28 (b) (iii).

¹³⁴ Ibid., para. 58.

¹³⁵ Ibid., para. 16.

groups, undertakings and entities.¹³⁶ By resolutions [2480 \(2019\)](#) and [2484 \(2019\)](#), the Council reiterated its request to the Mission to exchange information with and assist the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali.¹³⁷

In its resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), the Council requested MINUSMA to convene regular meetings of the Instance de Coordination au Mali as the main platform for coordination between the relevant security presences in Mali and the Sahel region.¹³⁸ Furthermore, the Council requested MINUSMA to develop a long-term conditions-based transition approach to ensure a phased, coordinated and deliberate transition of security responsibilities.¹³⁹ Strongly condemning attacks against peacekeepers, the Council called on MINUSMA to support the Government in ensuring accountability in that regard.¹⁴⁰

Regarding the future of the MINUSMA mandate, the Secretary-General was requested to conduct, within six months of the adoption of the resolution, a thorough assessment of the situation in northern and central Mali and of the Mission's configuration with regard to the implementation of its primary and secondary strategic priorities.¹⁴¹ The Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide an assessment of the implementation of the Mission's task in support of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel in his June 2020 quarterly report on MINUSMA.¹⁴² The Council expressed its intent, on that basis, to take a decision of the future of that mechanism at the end of the Mission's current mandate.¹⁴³

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was established by the Council on 10 April 2014 by resolution [2149 \(2014\)](#), under Chapter VII of the Charter. MINUSCA was authorized to take all necessary means to, inter alia, protect civilians and United Nations personnel and property; support the implementation of the transition process; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; promote and protect human rights; support justice and the rule of law; and support the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation strategies.¹⁴⁴

In 2019, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted resolutions [2488 \(2019\)](#) of 12 September 2019 and [2499 \(2019\)](#) of 15 November 2019 concerning MINUSCA. By resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), the Council extended the mandate of MINUSCA for one year until 15 November 2020.¹⁴⁵

By resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), the Council took note of the report of the Secretary-General ([S/2019/822](#))¹⁴⁶ and amended the mandate of MINUSCA. In that regard, the Council placed particular emphasis on tasks related to the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic signed by the national authorities and 14 armed groups on 6 February 2019, the 2020/2021 elections, and the protection and political inclusion of survivors of sexual violence. The Council recalled that the Mission's mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks.¹⁴⁷ Specifically, the Council expanded the priority tasks of MINUSCA to include support for the implementation of the Agreement, elections, national reconciliation, social cohesion and transitional justice; and to assist the authorities of the Central African Republic in the delivery of peaceful presidential, legislative and local elections in 2020 and 2021.¹⁴⁸ With certain modifications, the Council also reiterated the Mission's priority tasks regarding the

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 29 (a)–(b). For information on the mandate of the Committee pursuant to resolutions [1267 \(1999\)](#), [1989 \(2011\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, see part IX, sect. I.

¹³⁷ Resolutions [2480 \(2019\)](#), para. 29 (b), and [2484 \(2019\)](#), para. 3. For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, see part IX, sect. I.

¹³⁸ Resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), para. 30.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 32.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 47.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, para. 21. See also the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali ([S/2019/983](#)), in which he provided an assessment of the situation in northern and central Mali and of the Mission's configuration with regard to the implementation of its primary and secondary strategic priorities.

¹⁴² Resolution [2480 \(2019\)](#), para. 39.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUSCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2014–2018.

¹⁴⁵ Resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), para. 27. For more information on the situation in the Central African Republic, see part I, sect. 6.

¹⁴⁶ Resolution [2499 \(2019\)](#), eighteenth preambular paragraph.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 30.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 32 (b)–(c).

protection of civilians, the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the protection of United Nations personnel and equipment.¹⁴⁹

The tasks of MINUSCA in support of the political process were expanded to include the provision of political, technical and operational support to the implementation of the Agreement. The Mission was further tasked with taking active steps to support the authorities of the Central African Republic in the creation of conditions conducive to the full implementation of the Agreement.¹⁵⁰ The Council requested MINUSCA to provide good offices and technical expertise, including by working with regional and local bodies and religious leaders, in addressing the root causes of conflict.¹⁵¹ The Council specified that the task would be undertaken while ensuring the full, effective and meaningful participation of women, including survivors of sexual violence, and through support for local dialogue and community engagement.¹⁵² Similarly, the Council requested MINUSCA to assist the efforts of the national authorities for an increased participation of political parties, civil society, women, survivors of sexual violence, youth, faith-based organizations and, where and when possible, internally displaced persons and refugees in the peace process.¹⁵³ The inclusion of survivors of sexual violence was also referenced in the context of the Mission's transitional justice efforts.¹⁵⁴

The Council specified that the Mission's implementation of its political and security strategies, engagement with neighbouring countries and use of strategic communications would be conducted in support of the new Agreement.¹⁵⁵ MINUSCA was also requested to continue to coordinate international support and assistance to the peace process.¹⁵⁶

The Council requested MINUSCA to ensure "effective and dynamic" protection of civilians through a comprehensive and integrated approach by anticipating, deterring and stopping all armed groups from inflicting violence on the populations and by

supporting and undertaking local mediation efforts.¹⁵⁷ The Council provided that the Mission would mitigate the risk to civilians from any military or police operation by tracking, preventing, minimizing and addressing resulting civilian harm.¹⁵⁸ The Mission's mandate to protect women and children affected by armed conflict was expanded to include the adoption of a gender-sensitive, survivor-centred approach.¹⁵⁹

The Council also reiterated other tasks of MINUSCA to promote and protect human rights and made several modifications to its activities in support of the extension of State authority; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation; and support for national and international justice, the fight against impunity and the rule of law.¹⁶⁰ The Council emphasized the importance of ensuring the meaningful participation of women, including survivors of sexual violence, in all spheres and all levels.¹⁶¹ The Council further reiterated the tasks of MINUSCA in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic and the Panel of Experts, and in relation to its consideration of the environmental impacts of its operations, child protection, and weapons and ammunition management.¹⁶² By resolution 2488 (2019), the Council also reiterated the task of MINUSCA to report to the Committee on the implementation of the sanctions exemption in support of or use in the process of security sector reform.¹⁶³

The Council did not modify the composition of MINUSCA during the reporting period. Regarding the future of the Mission, the Secretary-General was requested to review and report on a regular basis the conditions required for the transition, drawdown and withdrawal.¹⁶⁴

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., para. 32 (a) and (d)–(e).

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 32 (b) (i).

¹⁵¹ Ibid., para. 32 (b) (iv).

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid., para. 32 (b) (iii).

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., para. 32 (b) (v).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., para. 32 (b) (ii) and (vi)–(vii).

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., para. 32 (b) (viii).

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 32 (a) (ii).

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., para. 32 (a) (iii).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., para. 33 (a) (i)–(ii), (b) (i) and (iii), (c) (i) and (iv), (d) and (e) (iv).

¹⁶¹ Ibid., para. 44.

¹⁶² Ibid., paras. 34, 42–43 and 45–46. For information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, see part IX, sect. I.

¹⁶³ Resolution 2488 (2019), para. 2 (b).

¹⁶⁴ Resolution 2499 (2019), para. 53.

Americas

United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti

The Council established the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, by resolution [2350 \(2017\)](#) of 13 April 2017, subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. MINUJUSTH was mandated to assist the Government of Haiti in strengthening rule of law institutions, supporting and developing the Haitian National Police, and engaging in human rights monitoring, reporting and analysis. The Mission was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate in support of the Haitian National Police and in protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.¹⁶⁵

In 2019, by resolution [2466 \(2019\)](#) of 12 April 2019, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the mandate of MINUJUSTH for a final period of six months until 15 October 2019.¹⁶⁶ The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions.¹⁶⁷

The Council reiterated the existing mandate of MINUJUSTH.¹⁶⁸ The authorization to MINUJUSTH to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to support and develop the Haitian National Police was also renewed.¹⁶⁹ While reaffirming the importance of MINUJUSTH taking fully into account gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate, the Council further reaffirmed the importance

of gender expertise and capacity strengthening in executing the Mission's mandate in a gender-responsive manner.¹⁷⁰

The Council welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on MINUJUSTH of 1 March 2019 ([S/2019/198](#)) and its recommendation that a special political mission succeed MINUJUSTH beginning on 16 October 2019.¹⁷¹ The Council requested the Secretary-General to initiate the necessary planning for an appropriate integrated United Nations system presence in Haiti, including a special political mission, which would have the capacity and expertise to coordinate the activities of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, to cooperate with the donor community and to continue to support the efforts of the Government of Haiti in peace consolidation and long-term development.¹⁷² The Secretary-General was requested to report to the Council within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution regarding the operational details and objectives of the proposed successor mission and to initiate transition planning and management in accordance with United Nations policies, directives and best practices.¹⁷³

The Council further requested the Secretary-General to prepare for and begin the gradual, phased withdrawal of MINUJUSTH personnel in advance of 15 October 2019, as appropriate, ensuring a seamless transition.¹⁷⁴ The Council also encouraged close collaboration between MINUJUSTH and the United Nations country team in Haiti to ensure a seamless transition from a United Nations peacekeeping presence.¹⁷⁵

The Council did not modify the composition of MINUJUSTH during the period under review.

¹⁶⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of MINUJUSTH, see previous supplements covering the period 2016–2018.

¹⁶⁶ Resolution [2466 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

¹⁶⁷ The Dominican Republic and the Russian Federation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution. The representative of the Russian Federation criticized the adoption of the text under Chapter VII of the Charter, while the Dominican Republic cautioned that the mandate of MINUJUSTH would expire at the same time that elections were expected to be held in Haiti. See [S/PV.8510](#). For more information on the question concerning Haiti, see part I, sect. 14.

¹⁶⁸ Resolution [2466 \(2019\)](#), paras. 6, 7 and 10.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 9.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 12.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, fifth preambular paragraph.

¹⁷² Resolution [2466 \(2019\)](#), para. 2.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, para. 3. See also the letter dated 13 May 2019 addressed to the President of the Council ([S/2019/387](#)), in which the Secretary-General reported on the operational details of a proposed special political mission in Haiti. For more information on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, see sect. II.

¹⁷⁴ Resolution [2466 \(2019\)](#), para. 2.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

Asia

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

The Council established the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) by resolution 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948. The first team of military observers, who eventually formed the nucleus of UNMOGIP, was deployed in January 1949 to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan established by resolution 39 (1948). Following the termination of the Commission, the Council, by resolution 91 (1951), decided that

UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the renewed hostilities in 1971, the task of UNMOGIP has been to monitor developments pertaining to the strict observance of the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. During 2019, the Council did not discuss UNMOGIP or make changes to its composition or mandate, which remained open-ended.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMOGIP, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1946–1951*, and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952–2018.

Europe

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The Council established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. UNFICYP was mandated, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.¹⁷⁷

In 2019, the Council adopted resolutions 2453 (2019) of 30 January 2019 and 2483 (2019) of 25 July 2019 concerning UNFICYP. The Council extended the mandate of the Mission twice, for a period of six months each time, the second time until 31 January 2020.¹⁷⁸

The Council did not modify the mandate of UNFICYP during the period under review. By resolution 2453 (2019), the Council noted the report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of UNFICYP, dated 28 November 2017 (S/2017/1008), which included recommendations to, inter alia, strengthen the Mission's capability for liaison and engagement with the parties to contribute effectively to conditions conducive to a resumption of settlement talks. The Council requested the Mission to fully implement the recommendations within existing resources.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNFICYP, see previous supplements covering the period 1964–2018.

¹⁷⁸ Resolutions 2453 (2019), para. 13, and 2483 (2019), para. 8. For more information on the situation in Cyprus, see part I, sect. 19.

¹⁷⁹ Resolution 2453 (2019), para. 8.

By resolution 2483 (2019), the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit by 10 January 2020 a report including further information on how best to strengthen the Mission's role in the buffer zone to de-escalate tensions between the parties.¹⁸⁰

The Council did not modify the composition of UNFICYP during the review period.

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the Council on 10 June 1999, by resolution 1244 (1999), under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council mandated UNMIK to carry out a range of tasks, including promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, performing basic civilian administrative functions, and organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.¹⁸¹ During 2019, the Council adopted no decisions relating to UNMIK and made no change to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Resolution 2483 (2019), para. 15.

¹⁸¹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNMIK, see previous supplements covering the period 1996–2018.

¹⁸² For more information on Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999), see part I, sect. 20.B.

Middle East

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established by the Council on 29 May 1948, by resolution [50 \(1948\)](#), to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine, following the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. UNTSO military observers have since remained in the Middle East and have continued to assist and cooperate with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in monitoring ceasefires and supervising armistice agreements.¹⁸³ During 2019, the Council adopted no decisions concerning UNTSO or make changes to its composition or to its mandate, which remained open-ended.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Council on 31 May 1974, by resolution [350 \(1974\)](#), following the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, in the Golan Heights. Since then, UNDOF has remained in the area to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, and to supervise the implementation of the Agreement and the areas of separation and limitation.¹⁸⁴

During 2019, the Council adopted resolutions [2477 \(2019\)](#) of 26 June 2019 and [2503 \(2019\)](#) of 19 December 2019 concerning UNDOF. The Council extended the mandate of the mission twice, for a period of six months each time, the second time until 30 June 2020.¹⁸⁵

The Council made no changes to the mandate of UNDOF during the reporting period. By resolutions [2477 \(2019\)](#) and [2503 \(2019\)](#), the Council encouraged the Department of Peace Operations, UNDOF and

UNTSO to continue relevant discussions on recommendations from the 2018 independent review to improve mission performance and the implementation of the UNDOF mandate.¹⁸⁶ The Council did not modify the composition of UNDOF during the reporting period.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by the Council on 19 March 1978, by resolutions [425 \(1978\)](#) and [426 \(1978\)](#), to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.¹⁸⁷

In 2019, by resolution [2485 \(2019\)](#) of 29 August 2019, the Council extended the mandate of UNIFIL for one year until 31 August 2020.¹⁸⁸ The resolution was adopted pursuant to the letter dated 1 August 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council ([S/2019/619](#)) on that extension.¹⁸⁹

By resolution [2485 \(2019\)](#), the Council made no changes to the mandate or the composition of UNIFIL. It reiterated the Mission's tasks, including the authorization to take all necessary action to secure its area of operations, security monitoring and patrolling, and cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Lebanese authorities in ensuring the full and effective participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels of decision-making.¹⁹⁰ As it did in resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#), the Council stressed the need to foster enhanced cooperation between UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, while welcoming the first improvements accomplished in terms of efficiencies

¹⁸³ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNTSO, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1946–1951*, and subsequent supplements covering the period 1952–2018.

¹⁸⁴ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNDOF, see previous supplements covering the period 1972–2018.

¹⁸⁵ Resolutions [2477 \(2019\)](#), para. 13, and [2503 \(2019\)](#), para. 14. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 22.

¹⁸⁶ Resolutions [2477 \(2019\)](#), para. 10, and [2503 \(2019\)](#), para. 11. See also the report of the Secretary-General on UNDOF ([S/2018/1088](#)), in which he provided an overview of the recommendations of the independent review of the mission's mandate.

¹⁸⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIFIL, see previous supplements covering the period 1975–2018.

¹⁸⁸ Resolution [2485 \(2019\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 22.

¹⁸⁹ Resolution [2485 \(2019\)](#), third preambular paragraph.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, paras. 14, 20 and 25.

and effectiveness between the two missions, as set out in the letter dated 31 December 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council (S/2018/1182).¹⁹¹ The Council encouraged the Secretary-General to further those efforts, as set out in the annex III of his report on the implementation of Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 18 February to 24 June 2019, dated 17 July 2019 (S/2019/574).¹⁹² The Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct and provide an assessment of the continued relevance of the resources of UNIFIL and options for improving the efficiency and effectiveness

¹⁹¹ Ibid., para. 13.

¹⁹² Ibid.

between UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon no later than 1 June 2020, taking into consideration the troop ceiling and the civilian component of UNIFIL.¹⁹³

The Council reiterated its call for the Government of Lebanon to present a plan to increase its naval capabilities as soon as possible, with the goal of ultimately decreasing the Maritime Task Force of UNIFIL and transitioning its responsibilities to the Lebanese Armed Forces.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Ibid., para. 8.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., para. 7.

II. Special political missions

Note

Section II focuses on the decisions adopted by the Security Council during the period under review concerning the establishment and termination of special political missions,¹⁹⁵ as well as the changes to their mandates.¹⁹⁶

Overview of special political missions during 2019

In 2019, the Council oversaw 12 special political missions. Five were based in Africa, three in the Middle East, and two each in the Americas and Asia. Their nature varied from regional offices, such as the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), to larger assistance missions, such as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

¹⁹⁵ Special political mission described in the present part include regional offices and offices in support of political processes. Other types of special political missions, such as offices of special and personal envoys, advisers or representatives of the Secretary-General, sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels and other entities and mechanisms, are covered in parts VII and IX of the present Supplement.

¹⁹⁶ For information on the envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General whose mandates relate to the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, other than those appointed as heads of peacekeeping or special political missions, see part IX, sect. VI.

Newly established special political missions and extensions of mandates

The Council established two new special political missions during the period under review. By resolution 2452 (2019) of 16 January 2019, the Council established the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) for an initial period of six months.¹⁹⁷ Further, by resolution 2476 (2019) of 25 June 2019, the Council established the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) beginning on 16 October 2019 for an initial period of one year.¹⁹⁸ The Council extended the mandates of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), UNOWAS, UNSMIL, UNSOM, UNAMA and UNAMI. The mandate of UNOCA had been renewed in 2018 for a three-year period until 31 August 2021, while the mandates of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon remained open-ended.

Mandates of special political missions

In 2019, for most special political missions, the Council prioritized mandate tasks related to the provision of good offices and mediation support for the implementation of peace agreements, inclusive peace processes, political dialogue and national reconciliation, political transitions consisting of electoral cycles and constitutional review processes. The Council also underlined the importance of strengthening good governance, the rule of law and

¹⁹⁷ Resolution 2452 (2019), para. 1.

¹⁹⁸ Resolution 2476 (2019), para. 1.

national institutions, as well as human rights monitoring and capacity-building. As part of those tasks, most missions were mandated to coordinate, support and ensure a division of labour between a broad spectrum of United Nations, international, regional and subregional partners and stakeholders. Regional offices, such as UNOCA and UNOWAS, continued to support the strengthening of local capacities in conflict prevention and early warning, and addressing cross-border and transnational security threats, such as transhumance, forced displacement, maritime security, organized crime, piracy and drug trafficking.

In considering the modification of mandates, the Council continued to take into account the findings and recommendations of mission reviews conducted by the Secretariat. In 2019, the Council endorsed the recommendations of the strategic assessment of UNIOGBIS with a view to its prospective completion in 2020.¹⁹⁹ The Council also acknowledged the reviews of UNOCA and UNMHA.²⁰⁰

The Council modified mandates of seven missions, namely UNIOGBIS, UNOCA, UNSMIL, UNSOM, UNOWAS, UNAMA and UNAMI, and defined new mandates for BINUH and UNMHA. A number of the changes focused on the provision of good offices, technical and operational support for upcoming electoral cycles in Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau and Haiti, as well as the Central African region.²⁰¹ In the case of Afghanistan, the Council strengthened the electoral assistance mandate of UNAMA to include support for the delivery of a robust and transparent results management process.²⁰² In terms of broader good offices and political support tasks, the Council requested UNSOM to work on accelerating an inclusive political settlement in Somalia and supporting national reconciliation talks.²⁰³

With the escalation of hostilities in Libya, UNSMIL was newly mandated to monitor a possible ceasefire in the country.²⁰⁴ Similarly, the Council tasked UNMHA with monitoring the implementation of

a ceasefire and supporting the parties in ensuring security.²⁰⁵

With respect to capacity-building, UNAMI was tasked with supporting national and international efforts on economic reform, capacity-building and setting conditions for sustainable development and recovery and reconstruction, including in areas affected by terrorism.²⁰⁶ The Council also elaborated upon the human rights capacity-building support of UNAMA and UNSOM.²⁰⁷ In the context of the support for the security sector, UNSOM was requested to strengthen engagement with the national authorities on human rights mitigation measures.²⁰⁸ Special emphasis on the monitoring of the status of detainees, places of detention and prison management was made in the mandate tasks of BINUH and UNAMA.²⁰⁹ In reinforcing the capacity of the national police forces, BINUH was tasked with providing human rights training, including on how to respond to gang violence and sexual and gender-based violence.²¹⁰

On cross-cutting issues, UNSOM, BINUH and UNAMA were requested to support the participation of women at all decision-making levels.²¹¹ While in the case of UNAMI, the Council reiterated its request, in all other cases, new elements were included in the task to support the participation of women. In addition, BINUH was requested to mainstream gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate.²¹² The Council noted that UNOCA should enhance its work on early warning and analysis with a gender perspective.²¹³ The Council also prioritized the protection of women and children in the mandate of UNAMA.²¹⁴ Finally, in connection with the situation in Somalia, the Council requested the United Nations and the national authorities to consider the adverse implications of climate change in their programmes.²¹⁵

¹⁹⁹ Resolution 2458 (2019), para. 2.

²⁰⁰ In connection with UNOCA, S/PRST/2019/10, third paragraph; in connection with UNMHA, resolution 2481 (2019), second preambular paragraph.

²⁰¹ In connection with UNIOGBIS, resolution 2458 (2019), paras. 2 (a) and 5 (b); in connection with UNOCA, S/PRST/2019/10, fourth paragraph; in connection with BINUH, resolution 2476 (2019), para. 1 (b) (i); and, in connection with UNAMA, resolution 2489 (2019), para. 5 (b).

²⁰² Resolution 2489 (2019), para. 5 (b).

²⁰³ Resolution 2461 (2019), paras. 5–6.

²⁰⁴ Resolution 2486 (2019), para. 1 (iv).

²⁰⁵ Resolution 2452 (2019), para. 2 (a)–(d).

²⁰⁶ Resolution 2470 (2019), para. 2 (c) (iii).

²⁰⁷ In connection with UNSOM, resolution 2461 (2019), para. 20; and, in connection with UNAMA, resolution 2489 (2019), para. 5 (e).

²⁰⁸ Resolution 2461 (2019), para. 14.

²⁰⁹ In connection with BINUH, resolution 2476 (2019), para. 1 (b) (v); and, in connection with UNAMA, resolution 2489 (2019), para. 5 (e).

²¹⁰ Resolution 2476 (2019), para. 1 (b) (ii).

²¹¹ In connection with UNSOM, resolution 2461 (2019), para. 9; in connection with BINUH, resolution 2476 (2019), para. 3; and, in connection with UNAMA, resolution 2489 (2019), para. 5 (f).

²¹² Resolution 2476 (2019), para. 3.

²¹³ S/PRST/2019/10, fourth paragraph.

²¹⁴ Resolution 2489 (2019), para. 5 (f)–(g).

²¹⁵ Resolution 2461 (2019), para. 21.

Tables 4 and 5 provide an overview of the mandates of special political missions in 2019, showing the range of tasks mandated by the Council. The mandates reflected in the tables include: (a) tasks mandated by the Council in decisions adopted during the reporting period; (b) tasks mandated in previous periods and specifically reiterated by the Council during the

period under review; and (c) tasks of missions with open-ended or multi-year mandates adopted in previous periods. The tables are provided for information purposes only and do not reflect any position or view of the Council with regard to the status of the mandates of the field missions concerned.

Table 4
Mandates of special political missions, 2019: Africa

Mandate	UNIOGBIS	UNOCA	UNSMIL	UNSOM	UNOWAS
Chapter VII					
Ceasefire monitoring			X		
Civil-military coordination					
Demilitarization and arms management		X	X	X	
Electoral assistance	X	X	X	X	X
Human rights-related ^a	X	X	X	X	X
Humanitarian support			X		X
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X
Maritime security		X		X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X
Public information					X
Rule of law/judicial matters	X		X	X	X
Security sector reform		X		X	X
Support to police				X	
Support to sanctions regimes			X		
Support to State institutions	X		X	X	X

Abbreviations: UNIOGBIS, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau; UNOCA, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

Table 5
Mandates of special political missions, 2019: Americas, Asia and Middle East

Mandate	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	BINUH	UNAMA	UNRCCA	UNAMI	UNSCOL	UNMHA
Chapter VII							
Ceasefire monitoring	X						X
Civil-military coordination			X				

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<i>Mandate</i>	<i>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</i>	<i>BINUH</i>	<i>UNAMA</i>	<i>UNRCCA</i>	<i>UNAMI</i>	<i>UNSCOL</i>	<i>UNMHA</i>
Demilitarization and arms management	X	X			X		X
Electoral assistance		X	X		X		
Human rights-related ^a		X	X		X		
Humanitarian support			X		X		
International cooperation and coordination	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Political process	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Protection of civilians			X				
Public information							
Rule of law/judicial matters		X	X		X		
Security monitoring; patrolling; deterrence							X
Security sector reform					X		
Support to police		X					
Support to sanctions regimes							
Support to State institutions			X		X		

Abbreviations: BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNAMI, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNMHA, United Nations Mission to Support the Hedaydah Agreement; UNRCCA, United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; UNSCOL, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon.

^a Includes tasks related to human rights; children and armed conflict; women and peace and security; and youth and peace and security.

Africa

United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) was established by the Council by resolution 1876 (2009) of 26 June 2009 to succeed the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau. UNIOGBIS was mandated to, inter alia, assist the work of the Peacebuilding Commission in Guinea-Bissau, strengthen the capacities of national institutions to maintain constitutional order, public security and the full respect for the rule of law, support an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process, provide strategic and technical support in security sector reform, undertake human rights promotion,

protection and monitoring, and enhance cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.²¹⁶

In 2019, the Council adopted resolution 2458 (2019) of 28 February 2019 and issued a presidential statement on 7 August 2019 in connection with UNIOGBIS.²¹⁷ By resolution 2458 (2019), the Council extended the mandate of the office for 12 months until 28 February 2020.²¹⁸

In 2019, in the context of the continued political and institutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau and the legislative and presidential elections scheduled for 10 March 2019, the Council amended the mandate of

²¹⁶ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNIOGBIS, see previous supplements covering the period 2008–2018.

²¹⁷ S/PRST/2019/7.

²¹⁸ Resolution 2458 (2019), para. 1.

UNIOGBIS.²¹⁹ By resolution 2458 (2019), the Council endorsed the recommendations of the Secretary-General regarding the reconfiguration of UNIOGBIS and the reprioritization of its tasks.²²⁰ In that regard, the Council outlined three phases: the electoral phase, in which UNIOGBIS would remain as currently configured and prioritize support for legislative and presidential elections while concentrating on good offices support; a post-electoral phase, in which the office would establish conditions conducive for the implementation of the reform agenda and enact the closure of its regional offices, no later than 31 December 2019; and a transition phase, entailing the implementation of the transition plan and the gradual transfer of tasks from UNIOGBIS to the United Nations country team, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and international partners, with a view to prospective completion by 31 December 2020.²²¹ The Council also stressed that the reconfiguration of UNIOGBIS should take place after the completion of the electoral cycle in 2019.²²² As of June 2019, according to the resolution, UNIOGBIS would operate as a streamlined good offices special political mission led by a Special Representative at the Assistant Secretary-General level.²²³

The Council reiterated the existing priorities of UNIOGBIS, including to support the implementation of the Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau and the Road Map itself, facilitate national reconciliation and the strengthening of democratic governance, ensure inclusive, free and credible elections, and provide support in the review of the Constitution of Guinea-Bissau.²²⁴ In addition to the priorities, UNIOGBIS would continue to provide support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in strengthening democratic institutions, promoting and protecting human rights, combating drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, incorporating a gender perspective into peacebuilding, and mobilizing international assistance with a view to the upcoming elections.²²⁵

On 7 August 2019, in connection with the mandate of UNOWAS, the Council issued a presidential statement reiterating its call for UNIOGBIS to gradually draw down and transfer its tasks to UNOWAS.²²⁶

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) was established by an exchange of letters dated 11 December 2009 and 30 August 2010 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.²²⁷ The functions of UNOCA included cooperating with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other regional partners in the promotion of peace and stability in the broader subregion, to carry out good offices roles in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, to strengthen the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs to advise the Secretary-General on matters relating to peace and security in the region, to promote an integrated subregional approach and facilitate coordination and information exchange among United Nations organizations and partners in the subregion, and to report to Headquarters on developments of subregional significance. UNOCA was subsequently further mandated to promote efforts to address the impact of emerging security and cross-border threats, incorporate gender perspectives in the implementation of its mandate and to take into consideration in its activities climate and ecological change and natural disasters on the stability of the Central African region.²²⁸

In 2019, the Council issued two presidential statements concerning UNOCA, on 7 August and 12 September 2019.²²⁹ The Council did not renew the mandate of the Office during the period under review.²³⁰

²¹⁹ For more information on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, see part I, sect. 7.

²²⁰ Resolution 2458 (2019), para. 2. See also the report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of UNIOGBIS (S/2018/1086).

²²¹ Resolution 2458 (2019), para. 2.

²²² *Ibid.*, para. 3.

²²³ *Ibid.*, para. 4.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 5 (a)–(c).

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 6 (a)–(e).

²²⁶ S/PRST/2019/7, eleventh paragraph.

²²⁷ S/2009/697 and S/2010/457.

²²⁸ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNOCA, see previous supplements covering the period 2008–2018.

²²⁹ S/PRST/2019/7 and S/PRST/2019/10. For more information on the Central African region, see part I, sect. 8.

²³⁰ The mandate of UNOCA was renewed for a three-year period from 1 September 2018 to 31 August 2021 by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council dated 24 and 28 August 2018 (S/2018/789 and S/2018/790).

In the presidential statement of 7 August 2019, the Council welcomed the ongoing cooperation between the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and UNOCA towards supporting the implementation of the Lomé Declaration on Peace, Security, Stability and the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism of 30 July 2018 and in addressing cross-regional threats to peace and security in West and Central Africa and the Sahel, including working on early warning systems. The statement further called for cooperation between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-ECCAS and UNOWAS-UNOCA in relation to maritime crime, organized crime and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.²³¹

On 12 September 2019, the Council welcomed the letter dated 1 August 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council on the conclusions of the strategic review of UNOCA.²³² The Council acknowledged that the mandate of UNOCA remained valid and welcomed the recommendation that it should enhance its work on: early warning and analysis with a gender perspective; good offices in non-mission settings, in particular in the lead-up to the upcoming electoral cycle in the region; support for and strengthening the capacity of ECCAS; and building partnerships with civil society and supporting subregional civil society networks. The Council reaffirmed those as the key priorities for the remainder of the mandate of UNOCA.²³³

The Council encouraged enhanced cooperation between UNOCA and UNOWAS, ECCAS, ECOWAS and United Nations country teams, to address cross-border threats and interregional issues, such as the Lake Chad basin crisis, transhumance, forced displacement, and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The Council further encouraged UNOCA to take into consideration climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors affecting the stability of the Central African region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity. The Council continued to stress the need for long-term strategies by Governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilization and build resilience, and further requested that such information

be taken into consideration by UNOCA in its activities.²³⁴

The Council welcomed the recommendation that UNOCA should continue to rally regional support for the peace process in the Central African Republic, in close consultation with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. The Council also welcomed the recommendation that there be a clear division of labour between UNOCA and other United Nations entities operating in the region, such as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi.²³⁵ Finally, the Council encouraged UNOCA to build on its partnership with United Nations resident coordinators and country teams, and with relevant regional directors of the Development Coordination Office to further support cross-border initiatives.²³⁶

United Nations Support Mission in Libya

By resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#) of 16 September 2011, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), with a mandate to support Libyan national efforts to restore public security and order and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue and promote national reconciliation, extend State authority, promote and protect human rights and support transitional justice, initiate economic recovery, and coordinate international support.²³⁷

By resolution [2486 \(2019\)](#) of 12 September 2019, the Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL for one year until 15 September 2020.²³⁸

The Council reiterated the existing mandate of UNSMIL, as defined by resolution [2434 \(2018\)](#), to support an inclusive political process and security and economic dialogue; the continued implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement; the consolidation of the governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord, including

²³¹ [S/PRST/2019/7](#), fourth paragraph. For more information on peace consolidation in West Africa, see part. I, sect. 10.

²³² [S/PRST/2019/10](#), third paragraph. See [S/2019/625](#). See also [S/PRST/2018/17](#), fifth paragraph.

²³³ [S/PRST/2019/10](#), fourth paragraph.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, fifth paragraph.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, sixth paragraph.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, seventh paragraph.

²³⁷ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSMIL, see previous supplements covering the period 2010–2018.

²³⁸ Resolution [2486 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

support for economic reform in collaboration with international financial institutions; and subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process, including the constitutional process and the organization of elections.²³⁹ While expressing grave concern over ongoing hostilities in and around Tripoli, the Council added to the Mission's mandate the task of supporting a possible ceasefire.²⁴⁰ The Council requested the Secretary-General to assess the steps required to reach a lasting ceasefire, the possible role of UNSMIL in providing scalable ceasefire support and the steps required to advance the political process from its current trajectory. The Secretary-General was requested to include a report on progress towards those objectives in his regular reporting.²⁴¹

Beyond those tasks, the Council reiterated the mandate of UNSMIL, within operational and security constraints, to undertake tasks related to support for key Libyan institutions; humanitarian assistance; human rights monitoring and reporting; support for securing and countering the proliferation of uncontrolled arms and related materiel; and the coordination of international assistance and the provision of advice to stabilize post-conflict zones.²⁴² The Council also reiterated its requests for UNSMIL to take fully into account a gender perspective throughout its mandate and to assist the Government of National Accord in ensuring the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in the democratic transition, reconciliation efforts, the security sector and in national institutions, as well as the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, in line with resolution 1325 (2000).²⁴³ Finally, the Council reiterated the request to the Secretary-General to report as necessary following consultations with the Libyan authorities on recommendations for the support of UNSMIL to the subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process and the security arrangements of UNSMIL to ensure it remained agile and responsive to developments on the ground.²⁴⁴

²³⁹ Ibid., para. 1 (i)–(iii) and (v).

²⁴⁰ Ibid., sixth preambular paragraph and para. 1 (iv). For more information on the situation in Libya, see part I, sect. 12.

²⁴¹ Resolution 2486 (2019), para. 3.

²⁴² Ibid., para. 2 (i)–(v).

²⁴³ Ibid., para. 5.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., para. 9.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

By resolution 2102 (2013) of 2 May 2013, the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), with the mandate, inter alia, to provide good offices functions to support the Federal Government of Somalia in the peace and reconciliation process and to provide strategic policy advice on peacebuilding and State-building; to assist in the coordination of international donor support, in particular on security sector assistance and maritime security; to help build the capacity of the Federal Government to promote respect for human rights, women's empowerment, child protection, the prevention of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and the strengthening of justice institutions; and to monitor, help to investigate and report on abuses or violations of human rights.²⁴⁵

In 2019, the Council adopted resolutions 2461 (2019) of 27 March 2019 and 2472 (2019) of 31 May 2019 concerning UNSOM. By resolution 2461 (2019), the Council extended the mandate of UNSOM for one year until 31 March 2020.²⁴⁶

By the resolution, the Council reiterated the existing mandate of UNSOM as defined by resolutions 2158 (2014) and 2408 (2018), while adding new language to the Mission's political and electoral support and human rights-related tasks. Specifically, the Council requested UNSOM to support the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to accelerate the Somali Government-led inclusive political settlement through regular high-level and inclusive dialogue.²⁴⁷ The Mission was further requested to support reconciliation talks at the local, regional and national levels.²⁴⁸ The Council also underlined the importance of the political and technical support of UNSOM, as well as operational and logistical support, in collaboration with the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), to the Federal Government of Somalia for the delivery of inclusive, peaceful, free and fair one-person-one-vote elections in 2020 and 2021.²⁴⁹ While urging the Federal Government and federal member states to increase the representation and participation of women

²⁴⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNSOM, see previous supplements covering the period 2013–2018.

²⁴⁶ Resolution 2461 (2019), para. 1.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., para. 5. For more information on the situation in Somalia, see part I, sect. 2.

²⁴⁸ Resolution 2461 (2019), para. 6.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., para. 8.

and youth at all decision-making levels, the Council requested UNSOM to continue to provide technical advice and capacity in that regard.²⁵⁰

In connection with the role of UNSOM to support a system-wide implementation of the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support for non-United Nations security forces across all United Nations support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali security sector, the Council specified that such support should include a strong focus on strengthening engagement with the Federal Government, including on mitigation measures.²⁵¹ The Mission was further requested to continue to provide technical advice and capacity-building support to the National Human Rights Commission and support to the Federal Government to promote and protect human rights.²⁵²

Strongly condemning recent attacks by the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, including the terrorist attack of 1 January 2019 on the United Nations compound in Mogadishu, the Council encouraged the United Nations to continue working on strengthening the security of the compound with the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM.²⁵³ Finally, the Council requested the United Nations and the Federal Government and the federal member states to consider the adverse implications of climate change in their programmes, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies.²⁵⁴

By resolution 2472 (2019), while extending its authorization for the deployment of AMISOM under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council called on AMISOM, UNSOM, UNSOS, the Federal Government and federal member states to increase coordination and collaboration at all levels, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum and the comprehensive approach to security mechanism.²⁵⁵

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) was established by an exchange of letters dated 14 and 28 January 2016 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,

merging the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel with the United Nations Office for West Africa. The Council mandated UNOWAS to, inter alia, monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General to assist in peacebuilding, sustaining peace efforts and enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation; enhance subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security; support the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and the coordination of international and regional engagements; and promote good governance, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and gender mainstreaming into conflict prevention and management initiatives. UNOWAS was subsequently mandated to take into account in its activities the adverse effects of climate and ecological change and natural disasters on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region.²⁵⁶

By the presidential statement issued on 7 August 2019, the Council noted the increased demands on UNOWAS, including in Guinea-Bissau, post-transition countries and joint work with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL).²⁵⁷ The Council welcomed the decision of the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review regarding the scope of the Office's mandate and activities, including on potential areas of improvement or new or refocused priorities, including on counter-terrorism, the effects of climate change on security and intercommunal violence.²⁵⁸ The Council also welcomed the decision of the Secretary-General to submit his findings in that regard by 15 November 2019 in order to inform the discussions of the Council on the renewal of the mandate, which would expire on 31 December 2019.²⁵⁹

In terms of the mandate tasks of UNOWAS, the Council called for cooperation between ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States, and UNOWAS and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa in relation to maritime crime,

²⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 9.

²⁵¹ Ibid., para. 14.

²⁵² Ibid., para. 20.

²⁵³ Ibid., para. 2.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., para. 21.

²⁵⁵ Resolution 2472 (2019), para. 4 (a). For more information on AMISOM, see part VIII, sect. III.

²⁵⁶ For more information on the mandate of UNOWAS, see previous supplements covering the period 2016–2018.

²⁵⁷ S/PRST/2019/7, third paragraph. For more information on peace consolidation in West Africa, see part I, sect. 10.

²⁵⁸ S/PRST/2019/7, fifth paragraph.

²⁵⁹ Ibid. See also the letter dated 15 November 2019 addressed to the President of the Council (S/2019/890), in which the Secretary-General transmitted the report on the independent strategic review of UNOWAS.

organized crime and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.²⁶⁰ While expressing concern about the increasingly polarized environment in relation to the amendment or revision of national constitutions in the region, the Council called upon UNOWAS to encourage all political stakeholders to use dialogue to resolve their differences in that regard.²⁶¹ Furthermore, the Council reiterated its request to UNOWAS to continue to integrate into its regular reporting issues related to the systemic involvement of women in initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism.²⁶² Recognizing the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region, the Council continued to stress the need for long-term strategies, based on risk assessments, by Governments and the

²⁶⁰ S/PRST/2019/7, fourth paragraph.

²⁶¹ Ibid., thirteenth paragraph.

²⁶² Ibid., seventeenth paragraph.

United Nations, and encouraged UNOWAS to continue to integrate that information into its activities.²⁶³

Upon the expiration of the Office's three-year mandate, by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council dated 19 and 27 December 2019, the Council provided for a one-month technical rollover of the Mission's existing mandate until 31 January 2020.²⁶⁴ In the letter, the President of the Council noted that the extension was requested by Council members in order to begin examining the proposal of the Secretary-General regarding the new mandate of UNOWAS.²⁶⁵

²⁶³ Ibid., twenty-fifth paragraph.

²⁶⁴ S/2019/1009 and S/2019/1010. The mandate of UNOWAS was previously renewed for a three-year period from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2019 by an exchange of letter between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council dated 27 and 29 December 2016 (S/2016/1128 and S/2016/1129).

²⁶⁵ S/2019/1010.

Americas

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

The Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia by resolution 2366 (2017) of 10 July 2017 after the completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The Verification Mission was mandated to, inter alia, verify the implementation of the process of political, economic and social reincorporation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) and of the personal and collective security guarantees provided under the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP, signed on 24 November 2016.²⁶⁶

By resolution 2487 (2019) of 12 September 2019, the Council extended the existing mandate of the Verification Mission for a period of one year until 25 September 2020.²⁶⁷ The Council further expressed its willingness to work with the Government of Colombia to further extend the mandate of the

²⁶⁶ For more information on the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, see previous supplements covering the period 2016–2018.

²⁶⁷ Resolution 2487 (2019), para. 1.

Verification Mission on the basis of agreement between the parties.²⁶⁸

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

By resolution 2476 (2019) of 25 June 2019, the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) beginning on 16 October 2019 and for an initial period of 12 months, subsequent to the closure of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH).²⁶⁹ The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions.²⁷⁰

BINUH was to be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General who would

²⁶⁸ Ibid., para. 2. For more information on the identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council (S/2016/53), see part I, sect. 15.

²⁶⁹ Resolution 2476 (2019), para. 1. For more information on MINUJUSTH, see sect. I.

²⁷⁰ China and the Dominican Republic abstained in the vote on the resolution. China noted that the mandate had to be clear and concise. The Dominican Republic called for a more broad-based mandate. See S/PV.8559. For more information on the question concerning Haiti, see part I, sect. 14.

play a good offices, advisory and advocacy role at the political level.²⁷¹ The Mission was mandated to advise the Government of Haiti in promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; preserving and advancing a peaceful and stable environment, including by supporting an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue; and promoting and protecting human rights.²⁷² BINUH was further tasked with assisting the Government in planning and executing free, fair and transparent elections; reinforcing the capacity of the Haitian National Police, including through training on human rights and crowd control, to respond to gang violence and sexual and gender-based violence, and to maintain public order; developing an inclusive approach to reduce community violence; addressing human rights abuses and violations and complying with international human rights obligations; improving penitentiary administration management and oversight of prison facilities; and strengthening the justice sector.²⁷³ The Council also requested BINUH to mainstream gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Government in ensuring the full, meaningful, and effective participation and involvement and representation of women at all levels.²⁷⁴

²⁷¹ Resolution 2476 (2019), para. 1.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, para. 1 (a).

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, para. 1 (b) (i)–(vi).

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

The Council underscored the need for the activities of BINUH and the United Nations country team in Haiti to be fully integrated.²⁷⁵ The Council also underlined the need to maintain close and sustained collaboration, coordination and information-sharing between all United Nations political, development, humanitarian and financial entities, as well as other local and international partners operating in Haiti.²⁷⁶

The Council outlined that the Mission would be comprised of a political and good governance unit; a unit on gang violence, community violence reduction and weapons and munitions management; a police and corrections unit including up to 30 civilian and seconded personnel to serve as police and corrections advisers and led by a United Nations police commissioner; a human rights unit; a security unit; a mission support unit; and public information, gender advisory, coordination and legal capacity, including a victims' rights advocate, within the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.²⁷⁷

The Secretary-General was requested, in the final report on MINUJUSTH due in October 2019, to provide strategic benchmarks with indicators for achieving the tasks of BINUH as defined in the resolution.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 6.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 4. See also the report of the Secretary-General on MINUJUSTH (S/2019/805), in which he provided the benchmarks on BINUH.

Asia

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by the Council by resolution 1401 (2002) of 28 March 2002 and was mandated to fulfil the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations under the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, signed in Bonn on 5 December 2001.²⁷⁹

In 2019, by resolution 2460 (2019) of 15 March 2019, the Council provided for a six-month technical

rollover of the mandate of UNAMA.²⁸⁰ By resolution 2489 (2019) of 17 September 2019, the Mission's mandate was extended for one year, until 17 September 2020.²⁸¹

By resolution 2489 (2019), the Council reiterated the priorities of UNAMA to provide outreach and good offices to support the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process and to coordinate and cooperate with the non-combat Resolute Support Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.²⁸² The Council specified that the electoral assistance tasks of UNAMA would include support for the organization of future timely, credible, transparent and inclusive elections, including the presidential elections scheduled for 28 September

²⁷⁹ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMA, see previous supplements covering the period 2000–2018. For more information on the situation in Afghanistan, see part I, sect. 17.

²⁸⁰ Resolution 2460 (2019), para. 4.

²⁸¹ Resolution 2489 (2019), para. 4.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, para. 5 (a) and (h).

2019. As part of the support, UNAMA would work closely with the election management bodies on and after election day to deliver a robust and transparent results management process. The Mission would also coordinate international community efforts both during and between elections.²⁸³

The Council decided that the role of UNAMA to promote coherent international support for the development and governance priorities of the Government of Afghanistan should be carried out in line with the commitments made at the Geneva Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan, held in November 2018.²⁸⁴ Furthermore, the Mission's tasks on supporting regional cooperation would include promoting partnership on connectivity and advancing shared goals of economic development across the region.²⁸⁵

The human rights tasks of UNAMA were expanded to include strengthening the capacity of civil society. The Mission was further requested to cooperate with the Government in monitoring places of detention and the treatment of those deprived of liberty. UNAMA would also advise, in close consultation with the Government, stakeholders on the establishment and implementation of judicial and non-judicial processes to address the legacy of large-scale human rights violations and abuses, as well as international crimes.²⁸⁶ The Council redefined as priorities the activities of UNAMA on gender equality, women's empowerment and the protection of children.²⁸⁷ With regard to gender equality, the Council requested the Mission to support gender equality and women's and girls' empowerment, education, human rights and full, safe, equal, effective and meaningful participation, engagement and leadership in all levels of decision-making.²⁸⁸ The Council further requested

UNAMA to call on the Government to ensure the protection of civilians, especially women, children and displaced persons, including from sexual- and gender-based violence.²⁸⁹

Finally, the Council reiterated the priority areas of UNAMA to support the implementation of the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation throughout the country and to coordinate and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.²⁹⁰ The Council also specified that the Mission's support for the efforts of the Government to fulfil its commitments to improve governance and the rule of law would include those defined under the Geneva Mutual Accountability Framework.²⁹¹

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia was authorized by the Council through an exchange of letters dated 7 and 15 May 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council,²⁹² at the initiative of the Governments of the region. With a view to strengthening the United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia, the Centre was assigned a number of tasks, including liaising with the Governments of the region on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground; and maintaining contact with regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Centre was established with an open-ended mandate. During the period under review, the Council made no changes to its mandate.

²⁸³ Ibid., para. 5 (b).

²⁸⁴ Ibid., para. 5 (c).

²⁸⁵ Ibid., para. 5 (d).

²⁸⁶ Ibid., para. 5 (e).

²⁸⁷ Ibid., para. 5 (f)–(g).

²⁸⁸ Ibid., para. 5 (f).

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., para. 7 (a) and (c).

²⁹¹ Ibid., para. 7 (b).

²⁹² [S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#). For more information on the history of the mandate of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, see previous supplements covering the period 2007–2018.

Middle East

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

The Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003 by resolution [1500 \(2003\)](#) to support the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of his mandate

under resolution [1483 \(2003\)](#), in accordance with the structure and responsibilities set out in his report of 17 July 2003.²⁹³ Those responsibilities included coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq and humanitarian and

²⁹³ [S/2003/715](#).

reconstruction assistance; promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development; and supporting efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions.²⁹⁴

In 2019, by resolution [2470 \(2019\)](#) of 21 May 2019, the Council extended the mandate of UNAMI for 12 months until 31 May 2020, returning to the previous practice, after having extended the mandate by 10 months in the previous year by resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#).²⁹⁵

By resolution [2470 \(2019\)](#), taking into account the views of the Government of Iraq,²⁹⁶ the Council reiterated the priority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq and UNAMI to provide advice, support and assistance to the Government and the people of Iraq on advancing inclusive, political dialogue and national and community-level reconciliation.²⁹⁷ The Council further reiterated the remaining tasks of UNAMI, with several additions. Specifically, the Mission's support for the coordination and implementation of programmes to improve the capacity of Iraq to provide effective essential civil and social services would also include support for health care and education and effective follow-up of international pledges.²⁹⁸ UNAMI was requested to support the return or local integration, as appropriate, of refugees and displaced persons.²⁹⁹ The Mission's support for the efforts of Iraq, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and others was to encompass recovery and reconstruction, including in areas affected by terrorism.³⁰⁰

Lastly, the Council emphasized the continued implementation of the independent external assessment recommendations by UNAMI, the Secretariat and United Nations agencies, offices, funds and programmes, as requested in resolution [2367 \(2017\)](#).³⁰¹ The Council also expressed its intention to review the Mission's mandate by 31 May 2020, or sooner, if requested by the Government.³⁰²

Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

The establishment of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon was authorized by the Council by means of an exchange of letters dated 8 and 13 February 2007 between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council.³⁰³ The Office was established with an open-ended mandate. The position of Special Coordinator was created to replace the position of Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon, which had been created in 2000.³⁰⁴ During the period under review, the Council made no changes to the mandate of the Office.³⁰⁵

United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

The Council established the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) by resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#) of 16 January 2019, for an initial period of six months, to support the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra's Isa, as set out in the Stockholm Agreement.³⁰⁶ UNMHA succeeded the work of an advance team that was established by resolution [2451 \(2018\)](#) of 21 December 2018 and deployed to begin monitoring and to support and facilitate the immediate implementation of the Stockholm Agreement.³⁰⁷ By resolution [2481 \(2019\)](#) of 15 July 2019, the Council extended the mandate of UNMHA for a further period of six months until 15 January 2020.³⁰⁸

By resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#), having considered the proposal of the Secretary-General on how the United Nations would support the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, as requested by the Council in its resolution [2451 \(2018\)](#), the Council mandated UNMHA to lead and support the functioning of the

²⁹⁴ For more information on the history of the mandate of UNAMI, see previous supplements covering the period 2003–2018. For more information on the situation concerning Iraq, see part I, sect. 25.

²⁹⁵ Resolution [2470 \(2019\)](#), para. 1. See also resolution [2421 \(2018\)](#), para. 1.

²⁹⁶ See [S/2019/414](#).

²⁹⁷ Resolution [2470 \(2019\)](#), para. 2 (a).

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (c) (ii).

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (c) (i).

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 2 (c) (iii).

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, para. 5.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, para. 4.

³⁰³ [S/2007/85](#) and [S/2007/86](#).

³⁰⁴ [S/2000/718](#).

³⁰⁵ For more information on the history of the mandate of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, see previous supplements covering the period 2004–2018. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 22. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, see sect. 24.

³⁰⁶ Resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#), para. 1. See also [S/2018/1134](#), annex. For more information on the situation in the Middle East, see part I, sect. 22.

³⁰⁷ Resolution [2451 \(2018\)](#), para. 5.

³⁰⁸ Resolution [2481 \(2019\)](#), para. 1.

Redeployment Coordination Committee in overseeing the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces and mine action operations; to monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire and the mutual redeployment of forces from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa; to work with the parties so that the security of the city and the ports is assured by local security forces; and to facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties in fully implementing the Hudaydah Agreement.³⁰⁹

The Council also underlined the importance of close collaboration and coordination between all United Nations entities operating in Yemen, including the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and the United Nations country team, UNMHA and the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism.³¹⁰

The Council approved the proposals of the Secretary-General on the composition and operational

aspects of the Mission. In that regard, the Council noted that UNMHA would be headed by the Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee at the level of Assistant Secretary-General, reporting to the Secretary-General through his Special Envoy for Yemen and the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.³¹¹ By resolution 2452 (2019), the Council requested the Secretary-General to present to the Council a review of UNMHA by five months from the date of its adoption.³¹²

By resolution 2481 (2019), having considered the letter of the Secretary-General dated 12 June 2019 addressed to the President of the Council (S/2019/485) on the review of UNMHA, the Council reiterated the existing mandate of Mission.³¹³ The Council requested the Secretary-General to present a further review of the Mission within three months of the adoption of the resolution.³¹⁴

³⁰⁹ Resolution 2452 (2019), second preambular paragraph and para. 2 (a)–(d). See also resolution 2451 (2018), para. 6, and letter dated 31 December 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council (S/2019/28).

³¹⁰ Ibid., para. 4.

³¹¹ Ibid., para. 3.

³¹² Ibid., para. 8.

³¹³ Resolution 2481 (2019), second preambular paragraph and para. 2.

³¹⁴ Ibid., para. 8. See also the letter dated 14 October 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council (S/2019/823) on the review of UNMHA.

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The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council and its supplements are published by the United Nations Secretariat as a guide to the proceedings of the Security Council from its first meeting in 1946 onwards. The *Repertoire* is designed to assist government officials, practitioners of international law, academics and all those interested in the work of the United Nations to follow the evolving practice of the Council and gain a better understanding of the framework within which it operates. The publication presents, as comprehensively as possible, new trends in the Council's application of the Charter of the United Nations and its own provisional rules of procedure. The *Repertoire* is the only such official record and is based solely on the deliberations of the Council, its decisions and other official documentation before the Council. The current Supplement, twenty-second in the series of Supplements to the *Repertoire*, covers the year 2019. This is the second Supplement to cover a one-year period, prepared with the aim of making available to the United Nations membership the most recent information on the work of the Council as soon as possible after the close of each year.

As detailed in this Supplement, the application of the Charter by the Security Council and the Council's actions in delivering its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, further evolved during 2019. The Council added a new item to its agenda, "The situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela", while continuing to concentrate most of its work on a range of situations in Africa and the Middle East. While in 2019 the Council adopted most of its decisions unanimously, some items on its agenda continued to challenge the Council's ability to achieve consensus. In 2019, the Council established a new special political mission, the United Nations Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), in order to support the ceasefire in Yemen. In addition, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) completed its mandate and was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). In 2019, the Council also issued eight new notes by the President relating to its working methods.

