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Part VIII

Regional arrangements

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Introductory note

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security.¹ While Article 52 encourages the engagement of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes prior to their referral to the Security Council, Article 53 allows the Council to utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority and with its explicit authorization. Article 54 stipulates that regional arrangements should inform the Council of their activities at all times.

During the period under review, in its decisions, the Council underlined the importance of the role of regional and subregional organizations and of the cooperation with them, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter to maintain international peace and security and thereby contribute to international efforts to upholding the Charter. The Council also recognized that regional and subregional organizations were well positioned to understand the root causes of conflicts and disputes and underlined the importance of utilizing the existing and potential capabilities of regional and subregional organizations in this regard. The Council welcomed the strong cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States and reiterated its intention to consider further steps to promote closer cooperation between the two organizations and to promote the coherence and effectiveness of their efforts. The Council underscored the importance of further consolidation of the United Nations-African Union cooperation through partnership in the different components of the African Peace and Security Architecture. In this regard, the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held their sixth joint informal seminar and fifteenth annual joint consultative meeting,

¹ Chapter VIII of the Charter refers to “regional arrangements or agencies”. For the purposes of the *Repertoire*, the term “regional arrangements” is understood to encompass regional and subregional organizations as well as other international organizations.

both conducted via videoconference on 16 and 17 December 2021, respectively.² In addition to the African Union and the League of Arab States, engagement with other regional arrangements, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe featured prominently in Council discussions.

Discussions in the Council focused on various aspects of the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, including on the role of regional organizations as mediators and guarantors of peace processes, the efforts of regional organizations toward the pacific settlement of disputes, as well as on enforcement action and peacekeeping by regional organizations. Discussions also addressed the complementary roles of the United Nations and regional organizations, the comparative advantages of regional organizations to maintain international peace and security and the need for adequate, sustainable and predictable funding for regionally led peacekeeping operations.

In connection with the pacific settlement of disputes, the Council highlighted in its decisions the important role played by regional and subregional organizations, particularly subregional economic communities, including among others, the Economic Community of Central African States, Economic Community of West African States, Group of Five for the Sahel, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community to prevent and end conflicts, mediate in disputes, promote reconciliation and ensure successful peace processes. The Council underlined the mediation efforts of regional and subregional organizations in connection with the situations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Great Lakes Region, Haiti, Libya, Mali, the Sudan and South Sudan, Western Sahara, Yemen, as well as the Great Lakes, West Africa and the Sahel, and in relation to the dispute between Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations, the Council renewed the authorization of two existing missions, namely the African

² See [S/2022/174](#) and [A/76/2](#). For more information on prior practice concerning the informal joint meetings of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2008-2009 to 2020*, part II, sect. I.C.

Union Mission in Somalia and the European Union Force-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Force in Kosovo continued to operate without any decisions taken with respect to its mandate. The Council also recognized that ad hoc and unpredictable financing arrangements for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter could impact the effectiveness of these peace support operations and encouraged further dialogue on options for addressing this issue.

As in previous periods, the Council authorized enforcement action by regional and subregional organizations beyond the framework of peacekeeping operations, such as in relation to Libya and Somalia, and continued to request reporting by regional organizations, particularly on the implementation of mandates of relevant regional peacekeeping operations and cooperation with the United Nations.

The practice of the Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter in 2021 is illustrated below in five sections. Each section covers both the decisions adopted by the Council and the discussions held during Council meetings and videoconferences. Section I examines the practice of the Council regarding cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security concerning agenda items of a thematic nature. Section II deals with the recognition by the Council of the efforts of regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. Section III covers the practice of the Council relating to its cooperation with regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping. Section IV describes the practice of the Council in authorizing enforcement action by regional organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations. Section V refers to the reporting on the activities of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

I. Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations under thematic items

Note

Section I examines the practice of the Security Council in 2021 in cooperating with regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, in connection with items of a thematic nature. The section is divided in two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII and subsection B covers discussions on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII.

A. Decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter in five of its decisions. Those decisions were adopted under the items entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” and “Maintenance of international peace and security”. The text of the relevant provisions is included in table 1 below.

Table 1
Decisions adopted in 2021 containing explicit references to Chapter VIII

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Provisions</i>
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security		
S/PRST/2021/2 29 January 2021	Fourth paragraph	The Security Council expresses its appreciation for the briefings of Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, on 18 January 2021, and reiterates that cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security, and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, is significant to improve collective security

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Provisions</i>
S/PRST/2021/9 19 April 2021	Second paragraph	The Security Council reiterates its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and recalls that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations can improve collective security
S/PRST/2021/21 28 October 2021	Second paragraph	The Security Council reiterates its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and recalls that cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations can improve collective security
	Fourteenth paragraph	The Security Council reaffirms the importance of further strengthening cooperation and developing an effective partnership with the African Union underpinned by mutual consultations between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council in their respective decision-making processes and common strategies for a holistic response to conflict, as appropriate, based on respective comparative advantage, transparency, and accountability to address common security challenges in Africa in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, including Chapter VIII and the purposes and principles
	Seventeenth paragraph	The Security Council encourages continued development and application of mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes through regional and subregional arrangements, provided that their activities are - consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. The Council reiterates its support for the efforts of all relevant sub-regional organizations and mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, in particular the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the International Conference on the Great Lakes region(ICGLR)
	Twenty-fourth paragraph	The Security Council recognizes that one major constraint facing the African Union in effectively carrying out the mandates of maintaining regional peace and security is securing predictable, sustainable and flexible resources, and recognizes that ad hoc and unpredictable financing arrangements for African Union led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter may impact the effectiveness of these peace support operations, and encourages further dialogue on options for addressing this issue
	Thirty-third paragraph	The Security Council commends the efforts and progress made by African countries, the African Union, and sub-regional organizations, in countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and commends the important contribution of security initiatives in Africa, including the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The Security Council stresses that UN institutions should

<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Provisions</i>
		work closely with the African Union, and African sub-regional organisations and arrangements, as well as Member States of the region, in a coordinated and coherent manner, in developing and further implementing national and regional strategies and plans of action to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism conducive to terrorism upon request, in full compliance with obligations under international law
Maintenance of international peace and security		
S/PRST/2021/22 9 November 2021	Ninth paragraph	The Security Council also recognises that there is a need for an integrated coherent approach among relevant political, security and development actors, within and outside the UN system, consistent with their respective mandates, including sub-regional and regional organisations in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, to address the underlying root causes of conflict in an inclusive, integrated and sustainable manner
S/PRST/2021/23 16 November 2021	Fifth paragraph	The Security Council underlines the importance of the role of regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements and of cooperation with them, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, with regard to maintaining international peace and security, contributing to international efforts to uphold the Charter

Further, the Council also recognized and referred to the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security without making explicit reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter.

For example, in resolution [2601 \(2021\)](#) adopted on 29 October 2021 under the item entitled “Children and armed conflict”, the Council underlined the importance of coordination between the United Nations, regional and subregional organizations in preventing violations and abuses against children affected by armed conflict.³

In a presidential statement issued on 29 January 2021, in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council welcomed the strong cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States and reiterated its intention to consider further steps to promote closer cooperation between the two organizations in the fields of conflict early warning, prevention, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, sustaining peace, addressing root causes of conflicts and counter-terrorism, as well as in other areas of common interest; and to promote the coherence and effectiveness of their efforts.⁴ The Council expressed support for the holding of an annual briefing by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States

³ Resolution [2601 \(2021\)](#), para. 5.

⁴ [S/PRST/2021/2](#), fifth paragraph.

to the Council to further promote the cooperation on matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security, especially at the regional level, and consider ways to improve collective security.⁵ The Council welcomed the opening of the United Nations Liaison Office to the League of Arab States and emphasized the importance of intensifying the coordination between the League and the United Nations special envoys and representatives of the Secretary-General, including through the arrangement of periodic meetings, with a view to reaching a more comprehensive understanding of different crisis situations in the region, and developing effective solutions through joint action where appropriate.⁶

In a presidential statement issued on 19 April 2021 in connection with the same item, the Council recognized that regional and subregional organizations were well positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region which could have been a benefit for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of these conflicts, and underlined the importance of utilizing the existing and potential capabilities of regional and subregional organizations in this regard, including through encouraging countries in the region to resolve differences peacefully through dialogue, reconciliation, consultation, negotiation, good offices, mediation and judicial settlement of disputes.⁷ Moreover, recognizing that regional and subregional organizations were also well positioned in promoting confidence, trust and dialogue among concerned parties within their respective regions, the Council further recognized the desirability of promoting closer and increased operational cooperation, as appropriate, between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the fields of conflict early warning, prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and to enhance coherence, synergy and collective effectiveness of their efforts.⁸ The Council emphasized the role of States, regional and subregional organizations, the United Nations and relevant stakeholders in promoting confidence-building measures and dialogue at various levels while ensuring synergy, coherence and complementarity of such efforts.⁹ The Council requested the Secretary-General, while presenting regular written reports on matters seized by it, to make recommendations for further enhancing cooperation

⁵ *Ibid.*, eleventh paragraph.

⁶ *Ibid.*, thirteenth and fifteenth paragraphs.

⁷ [S/PRST/2021/9](#), third paragraph.

⁸ *Ibid.*, sixth paragraph.

⁹ *Ibid.*, seventh paragraph.

between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in promoting confidence-building and dialogue.¹⁰

In a presidential statement issued on 28 October 2021 also under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council underscored the importance of further consolidation of the United Nations-African Union cooperation through partnership in the different components of the African Peace and Security Architecture, including on early warning, preventive diplomacy, mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, electoral assistance, promotion and protection of human rights, international humanitarian law and the rule of law, protection of civilians including women and children, and the prevention of and response to sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, post-conflict recovery and reconstruction.¹¹ The Council underscored the need for strengthening and leveraging collaboration between the United Nations, the African Union and regional economic communities/regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, through consultations and joint action across the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention to peacemaking, sustaining peace to peacebuilding.¹² The Council further recognized the need for greater coordination between the United Nations and the African Union in peacebuilding, including through practical means for enabling local ownership, closer collaboration on operational and programmatic engagements, enhancing national and continental African capacities for planning and implementation of programmes and projects, and addressing context-specific cross-border challenges and subregional dimensions of peacebuilding.¹³

In connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, in a presidential statement issued on 8 April 2021, the Council encouraged continued partnership and cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations to mitigate the threat to civilians from landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices.¹⁴ By resolution [2616 \(2021\)](#), adopted on 22 December 2021 under the same item, the Council acknowledged with appreciation the efforts made by intergovernmental, regional and subregional

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, last paragraph.

¹¹ [S/PRST/2021/21](#), tenth paragraph.

¹² *Ibid.*, fifteenth paragraph.

¹³ *Ibid.*, twenty-ninth paragraph.

¹⁴ [S/PRST/2021/8](#), ninth paragraph.

organizations, including through regional initiatives, strategies and action plans, in support of the effective implementation of arms embargoes imposed by the Council, and in capacity-building to prevent and address the illicit trade in, and destabilizing accumulation of, small arms and light weapons, and to prevent their illicit diversion in violation of Council-mandated embargoes.¹⁵

On 24 May 2021, in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Council issued a presidential statement by which it reaffirmed its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the partnership between the United Nations and regional as well as subregional organizations in relation to the safety and security of peacekeepers and encouraged partnerships to support the African Union’s efforts to continue to develop policy, guidance and training to ensure the safety and security of its peacekeepers.¹⁶ By resolution [2589 \(2021\)](#) of 18 August 2021 adopted under the same item, the Council affirmed its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the partnership between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union, to provide capacity-building assistance to host States for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of cases of killing of, and all acts of violence against United Nations personnel serving in peacekeeping operations, including, but not limited to, their detention and abduction.¹⁷ Furthermore, by resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#) of 9 September 2021, also in connection with the item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations”, the Council recognized the contribution of regional and subregional organizations to peacebuilding and peacekeeping transitions, and called upon the Secretary-General to consult relevant regional and subregional organizations, as appropriate, in the planning and execution of transition processes and to ensure that transition plans clearly articulated the potential roles of these organizations.¹⁸

B. Discussion on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the Charter

¹⁵ Resolution [2616 \(2021\)](#), twelfth preambular paragraph.

¹⁶ [S/PRST/2021/11](#), twelfth paragraph.

¹⁷ Resolution [2589 \(2021\)](#), para. 7.

¹⁸ Resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), para. 12.

In 2021, at meetings and open videoconferences, Council members and other participants discussed the role of regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security in connection with a wide variety of thematic items, including “Briefings by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”,¹⁹ “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”,²⁰ “Children and armed conflict”,²¹ “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”,²² “Maintenance of international peace and security”,²³ “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”,²⁴ “Small arms”,²⁵ “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”,²⁶ “United Nations peacekeeping operations”²⁷ and “Women and peace and security”.²⁸ Discussions held in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” highlighted the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in addressing challenges to peace and security in fragile contexts (see case 1). Further, discussions held in relation to the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” served to highlight ways of strengthening cooperation with the League of Arab States to jointly address challenges to international peace and security in the Arab region (see case 2), the overall importance of Chapter VIII of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security and how to enhance partnerships with regional and subregional organizations (see case 3) and cooperation with the African Union and regional economic communities in Africa (see case 4).

¹⁹ See [S/2021/256](#).

²⁰ See [S/2021/66](#), [S/2021/394](#), [S/PV.8792](#) and [S/2021/941](#).

²¹ See [S/2021/617](#).

²² See [S/PV.8798](#) and [S/2021/572](#).

²³ See [S/2021/24](#), [S/2021/198](#), [S/2021/250](#), [S/2021/346](#), [S/2021/456](#), [S/2021/621](#), [S/2021/722](#), [S/PV.8850](#), [S/2021/815](#), [S/PV.8900](#), [S/PV.8906](#), [S/2021/952](#), [S/PV.8923](#) and [S/2021/1026](#).

²⁴ See [S/PV.8877](#) and [S/2021/868](#).

²⁵ See [S/PV.8874](#) and [S/PV.8909](#).

²⁶ See [S/2021/48](#).

²⁷ See [S/2021/501](#), [S/PV.8851](#), [S/2021/783](#) and [S/PV.8901](#).

²⁸ See [S/2021/375](#), [S/PV.8886](#) and [S/2021/886](#).

Case 1

Maintenance of international peace and security

On 6 January 2021, at the initiative of Viet Nam which held the presidency of the Council for the month,²⁹ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” focusing on challenges of maintaining peace and security in fragile contexts.³⁰ Council members heard a briefing by the Secretary-General, Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the former President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.

Noting that the linkages between conflict and fragility were particularly visible on the African continent, the Secretary-General stated that the United Nations-African Union joint frameworks on peace and security and sustainable development had been key instruments to prevent and sustainably resolve conflicts in Africa, as well as to strengthen the resilience of States to withstand threats.³¹ He recalled that the United Nations had worked closely with the African Union and regional economic communities to address various trends in the Great Lakes and Central African region, such as limited State authority, the continued presence and activities of armed groups, human rights violations, the illicit exploitation of natural resources and unemployment, which continued to drive instability. The Secretary-General highlighted the commitment of the United Nations to support the Agenda 2063 of the African Union and the establishment of a joint United Nations-African Union group on the implementation of the Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063. Further, noting that African Member States had heeded the calls of the international community to respond to major crises with significant regional and global implications, he underscored that African Union peace support operations authorized by the Council required predictable, flexible and sustained financing through assessed contributions and called on the Council to finalize its discussion on this matter.

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission stated that the United Nations-African Union partnership focused on the necessary consultation and strategic mobilization process with a view to eradicating the root causes of the

²⁹ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 28 December 2020 ([S/2020/1296](#)).

³⁰ See [S/2021/24](#).

³¹ *Ibid.*

fragility that many African States faced in order to provide appropriate, coherent and decisive responses to prevent and manage conflicts in Africa. He added that the close consultations between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union sought to promote that objective and that such consultations increased the common understanding of the challenges faced by the African continent and enhanced response mechanisms, including through preventive diplomacy.

In their statements, members and non-members of the Council discussed the advantages of cooperation between the United Nations, including the Security Council, with the African Union and other regional organizations in addressing peace and security challenges in fragile contexts, particularly in Africa. In this regard, the President of Tunisia stated that, while his country highly appreciated the important role that the African Union and subregional organizations had been playing to overcome fragility, including through the Silencing the Guns in Africa initiative, the United Nations, with its broad institutional framework and responsibilities, remained a key actor in addressing the root causes of insecurity, violence and conflict in an effective and efficient way. The Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam underlined the need to utilize the role of regional organizations within the global governance system and promote cross-regional cooperation in the development and implementation of measures to address fragility. The Foreign Secretary of India stressed that the Council needed to remain respectful of the regional approach adopted by countries, in collaboration with regional organizations, to address common challenges. The representative of Belgium noted that regional organizations were important partners, especially in Africa, where many countries were affected by fragility and conflict. He stressed that the Council should remain alert to all early-warning signs and expressed support for the Council to regularly receive ad hoc briefings by the Secretariat outlining the risks of certain countries and regions triggering or exacerbating root causes of fragility, conflict or humanitarian crisis, while taking into account elements of conflict sensitivity. Nonetheless, he added that this did not necessarily mean that the Council or the United Nations needed to take action themselves, and that other actors, such as regional or subregional organizations, could be more relevant.

The delegation of Egypt underlined that partnerships with regional and subregional organizations remained key to advancing complementarities and

leveraging the comparative advantage of each organization in support of countries in states of fragility. In that vein, Egypt opined that the African Union-United Nations strategic partnership was of the utmost importance to ensuring better strategic, policy and operational coordination and coherence of efforts, including through capacity-building and financing. Similarly, the delegation of Italy stressed that partnership was a crucial element to allow the United Nations to be more effective in managing drivers of fragility, especially in Africa. The delegation of South Africa stated that in situations of fragility, partnerships among relevant stakeholders in preventing conflicts and among the relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations and regional and subregional bodies must be harnessed and strengthened, including through closer cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. The delegation also emphasized the need to strengthen the cooperation between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, as well as between the Peacebuilding Commission and the African Union Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Centre. The Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines underscored the need to leverage with greater frequency the strategic advisory capacity and convening platform of the Peacebuilding Commission to mobilize multilateral partners, including regional and subregional organizations, so as to assist Member States in building institutions, strengthening capacities and addressing the challenges of fragility. Noting that changing weather patterns could contribute to fragility and drive conflict, the Minister of State for European Affairs of Ireland stated that early action to address climate change required improving coherence across the United Nations system, from the Council to the Peacebuilding Commission and United Nations country teams, as well as with regional organizations.

Case 2

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 18 January 2021, at the initiative of Tunisia which held the presidency of the Council for the month,³² Council members held an open videoconference in

³² A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 30 December 2020 ([S/2020/1316](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/structure)).

connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” on cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States. At the videoconference, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.³³

In her remarks, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs stated that the close cooperation between the United Nations, including its special envoys and representatives, and the League of Arab States had been crucial in augmenting efforts to address various situations in the Arab world. She stressed the critical role of the Council in amplifying collective efforts of the United Nations and the League in the region. She further looked at the Council, as a principal steward of Chapter VIII of the Charter, to continue to support the collaborative work of the two organizations to promote peace and prosperity in the region.

In the subsequent discussion, Council members exchanged views on the country-specific and cross-border challenges to international peace and security in the Arab region that the United Nations and the League of Arab States needed to address jointly, as well how to enhance their cooperation under Chapter VIII of the Charter. In this regard, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia said that strengthening and promoting cooperation between the United Nations and the League helped to enhance the common understanding of the deepest causes of the crises in the Arab region and allowed existing conflicts to be comprehensively and permanently settled and their causes to be effectively addressed, which thereby enhanced the role of preventive diplomacy as a mechanism for maintaining international peace and security. He added that this cooperation needed to be strengthened in order to address shared challenges, particularly terrorism and violent extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, matters related to illegal migration and the repercussions of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). The representative of Estonia encouraged United Nations agencies to seek ways to enhance coordination with the League in the fields of preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding, climate change and ensuring accountability for crimes against humanity. Welcoming the establishment of the United Nations Liaison Office to the

³³ See [S/2021/66](#).

League of Arab States, the representative of France stated that its work should further enhance concrete cooperation initiatives, particularly with regard to conflict prevention and the promotion of United Nations values in the League's member states.

The representative of India stated that there needed to be greater policy synergy between the United Nations and the League of Arab States and that any United Nations peace initiative in West Asia and North Africa needed to take into consideration the League and other relevant stakeholders so that a unity of purpose and character was reached through common solutions. The representative suggested for the engagement between the two organizations to focus on peacebuilding and development, especially in post-conflict scenarios. The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the COVID-19 pandemic had compounded the already difficult socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in a number of Arab countries, which called for enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and the League in countering new challenges, peacekeeping and jointly preventing the escalation of conflicts in the region. Expressing the view that cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should aim to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter, especially the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-interference, the representative of Viet Nam stated that the Council and the League could strengthen their cooperation on the basis of regional visions and values.

In terms of specific proposals on how to strengthen cooperation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad of Tunisia proposed a regular exchange of views on the current affairs in the Arab region, including through, among other formats, regular meetings between the representatives of the Secretary-General in the region and the Council of the League and the holding of an extraordinary meeting of the Security Council at the leadership level, with the participation of the leaders of the Arab Summit Troika and the Secretary-General of the League on the margins of the General Assembly. The representative of Estonia, in addition to ongoing dialogue between their respective envoys, called for the exchange of relevant information and joint action to address the underlying causes of conflict. The representative of France recalled his country's proposal to hold an annual meeting of the Council to address issues of common concern, which would be attended by the

relevant special representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General and a representative of the League.

Given the significant number of issues that the Council was seized with from all over Africa and the Arab world, the representative of Kenya believed that a trilateral consultative exchange among the African Union, League of Arab States and the Council could contribute to a more effective partnership and could yield even greater reach and capability in delivering the peace that the people of the League and African States craved. Such a trilateral approach could also have increased momentum in the various situations in Africa, including in Libya, the Sudan, Somalia, counter-terrorism initiatives and operations in the Horn of Africa, the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel, as well as help promote collective and coordinated measures to secure the maritime domain, especially in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates recommended more formal and informal consultations and meetings between the Council and members of the League and stressed the need for this cooperation to include all stages of early warning about crises and be given a high priority to prevent the onset of further crises, developing ways of exchanging information between the two bodies and building capacity in the area of preventive diplomacy.

Case 3

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 19 April 2021, at the initiative of Viet Nam which held the presidency of the Council for the month,³⁴ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.³⁵ Council members heard a briefing by the Secretary-General and former Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon.

In his briefing, the Secretary-General noted that cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations had grown exponentially

³⁴ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 25 March 2021 ([S/2021/297](#)).

³⁵ See [S/2021/394](#).

since 1945 and encompassed preventive diplomacy, mediation, counter-terrorism, preventing violent extremism, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, promoting human rights, advancing the women and peace and security agenda, combating climate change and, since 2020, the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.³⁶ He underlined that the investment of the United Nations and regional organizations in institutionalizing partnerships had translated into more effective engagements before, during and after crises, with concrete operational results. The Secretary-General further underlined that strengthening such partnerships was an integral part of his vision for a networked multilateralism. In his remarks, former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon underlined that, against the backdrop of a plethora of monumental challenges faced by the international community, the role of cooperative partnerships between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, as envisioned under Chapter VIII of the Charter, was all the more critical to helping to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. The former Secretary-General noted that as the COVID-19 pandemic continued, it was more important than ever to pursue multilateral and multi-layered solutions to security problems, borne out of robust partnerships with the United Nations, its Member States and, particularly, regional organizations all working together. Moreover, as regional conflicts continued to both emerge and deepen, the United Nations could no longer deal with all these crises alone and the partnership approach could best bear fruit for both conflict prevention and resolution.

Following the briefings, members and non-members of the Council discussed the various aspects of and ways to strengthen the cooperation between the Council and regional and subregional organizations within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter. In that regard, several speakers emphasized the importance of cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security and preventing and resolving conflicts.³⁷ The representative of the Russian Federation underscored that cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations was an inalienable part of the agenda of the Council. The representative of Liechtenstein underlined that the effective work of and cooperation with regional organizations was essential to the Council's effectiveness.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., India, Ireland, Argentina, Italy, Lebanon, Liechtenstein and Ukraine.

The representative of the Republic of Korea noted that given the intertwined and complex nature of global crises, the United Nations needed to forge more effective and stronger partnerships with regional and subregional organizations in the context of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

A number of delegations discussed the comparative advantages of regional and subregional organizations as the basis for their contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.³⁸ The Special Representative of President Xi Jinping, State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China opined that the United Nations and the Security Council needed to play a useful overall coordination role and provide more assistance to regional organizations, which in turn could leverage their own advantages and help resolve regional disputes in a manner that was suited to regional realities. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico recognized that owing to their familiarity with the realities of their respective geographical areas and their experience and knowledge of local dynamics, regional organizations needed to be a first instance for prevention and for attention to potential conflicts and crises that could spill over a country's borders. The delegation of Malta affirmed that the local know-how and expertise of regional organizations could assist the work of the Council in conflict prevention and resolution through the regional promotion of confidence-building measures.

Speakers reflected on the complementary roles of the Council and regional and subregional organizations and the principle of subsidiarity as provided under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Some underlined that, while the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security remained with the Council, regional and subregional organizations also had a role in that regard under Chapter VIII.³⁹ The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the view that neither could the Council disregard the potential of regional arrangements in conflict prevention and resolution, nor could such arrangements substitute for the Council, adding that resorting to regional organizations needed to be considered as a subsidiary and complementary means for the Council in discharging its Charter-based duties. The representative added that all regional arrangements or agencies that intended to

³⁸ Ibid., Viet Nam, Estonia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, China, India, Ireland, Mexico, Tunisia, Norway, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, European Union, Afghanistan, Argentina, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, International Organization of la Francophonie, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malta, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda and Ukraine.

³⁹ Ibid., Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, and South Africa.

undertake activities authorized under Chapter VIII needed to act in full conformity with the Charter, strictly observe the principle of transparency and seriously avoid politicization and selective approaches. The Minister of State for the Commonwealth, the United Nations and South Asia of the United Kingdom said that if and when national and regional efforts failed, it was the Council that had the primary responsibility to ensure international peace and security, and that when prevention failed or there was no regional consensus, it was the Council that needed to lead the international community. Similarly, the representative of Pakistan opined that regional and subregional organizations in certain parts of the world had been either ineffective or unable to play any meaningful role towards resolving long-lasting and festering disputes as well as situations of foreign occupation and that, under such circumstances, the Council had to discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security by resolving such conflicts.

On the other hand, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stated that the Council was required to always lend its full support and encouragement to all regional mechanisms and refrain from any actions that could circumvent or undermine the legitimate role of regional bodies. The representative of South Africa stated that his country subscribed to the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity in addressing eruptions of conflict, further stressing that it was of paramount importance that the relevant regions were afforded an opportunity, in line with Chapter VIII of the Charter, to participate adequately in addressing conflict situations in their regions. The Permanent Observer of the African Union said that the lack of clarity on how to operationalize the principles of non-interference and subsidiarity continued to inhibit the African Union's ability to respond to and intervene in emerging crises across the continent, as Member States continued to invoke the principle of non-interference, limiting the ability of the African Union to address or prevent conflicts in a timely manner. The principle of subsidiarity, on the other hand, recognized the primacy of regional organizations in leading interventions in Member States. She added that the continued lack of clarity around these two principles had posed a critical challenge to coordination among the United Nations, the African Union and regional mechanisms. The representative of Ethiopia stated that, in responding to challenges, the international community must always be guided by the Charter which called for parties to resort to regional agencies

or arrangements as the first step in the settlement of disputes.⁴⁰ The representative of the Philippines stressed that one challenge for the United Nations, particularly the Council, was knowing when to step in and when to step back and when inputs of regional and subregional organizations needed to be made indispensable before any measure or resolution was put forth to that body.

Regarding specific areas and frameworks of cooperation, several speakers discussed cooperation in the face of new challenges to international peace and security, especially the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change.⁴¹ Regarding peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, and particularly the African Union, multiple speakers underscored the need for adequate, sustainable and predictable funding through the United Nations.⁴² The delegation of Guatemala opined that regional and subregional organizations could contribute to the joint analysis and effective strategic planning for conducting peacekeeping missions or special political missions, allowing for strengthened coherence between their political strategies, improving coordination in peacebuilding and ensuring the coherence and the complementarity of such efforts. The delegation of Argentina recalled that both the 2015 report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations,⁴³ and the most recent statement of commitments under the Secretary-General's "Action for Peacekeeping" initiative highlighted the need to continue improving collaboration, planning and coordination among the United Nations peace operations and those of regional and subregional entities that were authorized by the Council under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter and were present in the same theatres.⁴⁴ The representative of Niger emphasized the need for harmonizing agendas through more regular meetings, so as to establish effective and permanent coordination. The representative of Peru stressed the need for detailed information sharing among the various entities of the United Nations system and regional and subregional organizations and horizon-scanning through, for example, the preparation of joint reports by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and relevant regional and subregional organizations. Several speakers highlighted the importance of the

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 63-64.

⁴¹ Ibid., Viet Nam, Mexico, Tunisia, Norway, Niger, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, and Republic of Korea.

⁴² Ibid., Kenya, China, Niger, African Union, Ethiopia, Italy and Pakistan.

⁴³ See [S/2015/446](#).

⁴⁴ See [S/2021/394](#).

Peacebuilding Commission in support of effective cooperation with regional organizations.⁴⁵

In addition, participants also highlighted the contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security of specific regional arrangements, including their engagement with the United Nations and the Council. For example, the representative of Ethiopia urged closer collaboration and strategic dialogue, partnerships and more regular exchanges of views at the working level, between the United Nations and the African Union, in order to strengthen preventive diplomacy capacities. He added that Ethiopia took note of continued progress on the annual consultative meeting with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, more regular exchanges of information, enhanced consultations on mandates and mandate renewals and greater collaboration between the Secretariat and the African Union Commission, including joint field visits by senior officials. Focusing on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), several speakers discussed its efforts to resolve the situation in Myanmar, including in collaboration with the United Nations.⁴⁶ Speakers also discussed the Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership between ASEAN and the United Nations for the period 2021-2025,⁴⁷ with the representative of Switzerland welcoming the enhanced cooperation on confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy that was provided for in the Plan. Concerning the League of Arab States, its Secretary-General invited the Council and other relevant United Nations agencies to establish strategic working partnerships with the League and its member States to lay the foundations for security, stability and sustainable development in the Arab region, given the fundamental understanding by the League of the problems that afflicted the region and the United Nations system's fundamental responsibilities with respect to peacekeeping and international security. Further, the representative of Pakistan recalled that General Assembly resolution [75/16](#), requested the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to continue to cooperate in their common search for solutions to global problems, such as questions that related to international peace and security and disarmament and self-determination.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Egypt, Peru, Republic of Korea and Romania.

⁴⁶ Ibid., United Kingdom, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Republic of Korea.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Brunei Darussalam, Australia, Philippines, and Switzerland.

Case 4

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 28 October 2021, at the initiative of Kenya which held the presidency of the Council for the month,⁴⁸ Council members held a high-level open videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” focusing on cooperation with the African Union.⁴⁹ Council members heard briefings by the Deputy Secretary-General and the African Union High Representative for the Peace Fund.⁵⁰

Addressing Council members in his capacity as the Chairperson of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the President of Ghana expressed the hope that solidarity would be renewed within the Council in addressing the gaps in cooperation between the United Nations and the continental and regional arrangements of Africa.⁵¹ In this context, he suggested regular consultations between the United Nations and the African Union and its organs, such as the Peace and Security Council, as well as with regional economic communities such as ECOWAS, which provided an important framework for bridging differences in the conceptual understanding of the security challenges on the continent, and for improving a harmonized understanding of the responses required to address such challenges. While acknowledging the laudable collaboration between ECOWAS and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, he suggested that more was required and more could be done if greater solidarity were shown in putting resources towards the agenda of conflict prevention. He further suggested that the cooperation between the United Nations and Africa needed to be a steady effort towards resolving the root causes of these conflicts,

⁴⁸ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 18 October 2021 ([S/2021/887](#)).

⁴⁹ See [S/2021/941](#).

⁵⁰ Ibid. The statement of the African Union’s High Representative for the Peace Fund was not included in the letter of the President of the Council compiling all statements. For further details on the working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic also relating to its documentation, see part II, as well as *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, part II, sect. I.

⁵¹ See [S/2021/941](#).

within the context of sustaining peace, encompassing programmes aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflicts.

In their statements, Council members discussed the complementary roles of the United Nations, the African Union and subregional organizations in addressing international peace and security challenges in Africa. In this regard, the representative of France underlined that the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union was an essential tool for ensuring peace and security on the African continent in accordance with the principles outlined in Chapter VIII of the Charter. Several Council members highlighted the comparative advantages of the African Union and its subregional organizations.⁵² For example, the President of Tunisia stated that the familiarity of the African Union, African organizations and regional economic groups with African reality and their ability to handle its specificities needed to perhaps give them a preferential advantage when it came to assuming greater responsibilities in this area.

Council members further called for and outlined various ways of strengthening the cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and subregional organizations in Africa.⁵³ The President of Tunisia said that stepping up cooperation, partnership and complementarity between the United Nations and the African Union to manage conflicts and push forward their settlement through new mechanisms and ideas needed to be a strategic priority, as it could be an effective tool for meeting challenges to peace and security throughout Africa and mitigating their repercussions for the rest of the world. He expressed satisfaction with the development of consultation mechanisms between the United Nations and the African Union, including the periodic meetings between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, and stressed the need to raise the level of that coordination to bring about a quantum leap in cooperative relations to higher levels of integration and role-sharing in managing conflicts and addressing their underlying causes. The President further believed that reinforcing coordination between the special envoys of the Secretary-General and the African Union would create more effective tools for mediating and promoting the peaceful settlement of conflicts. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, National Security,

⁵² Ibid., Tunisia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and China.

⁵³ Ibid., Kenya, Tunisia, Viet Nam, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, India, Ireland, United Kingdom, Estonia, China and France.

Legal Affairs and Information of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines underscored the need to further broaden the strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union with the systematic engagement of various subregional organizations and mechanisms on the African continent. The President of Viet Nam affirmed that the United Nations and the African Union needed to be the vanguards in jointly implementing the Silencing the Guns in Africa initiative, Agenda 2063 of the African Union and the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Similarly, with respect to addressing the root causes of conflict, the President of Tunisia called for a comprehensive approach to peace that addressed not only the security aspect, but also the developmental, social and environmental dimensions, in line with the two agendas of the two organizations. Several Council members also specifically discussed the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic.⁵⁴

Regarding cooperation between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the President of Viet Nam stated that the strategic partnership between them needed to be promoted in a comprehensive and effective manner, particularly in enhancing the early-warning capacity of traditional and non-traditional security risks for peacekeeping missions in Africa. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, National Security, Legal Affairs and Information of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines noted that joint institutional engagement between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union needed to be pursued, in a consultative and pragmatic fashion, to address emerging and consequential challenges such as climate change and environmental degradation, while other areas for coordinated action included mine action, terrorism, piracy and organized crime. The Prime Minister of Norway said that it was a shared responsibility to strengthen the cooperation between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and recommended that they meet on a more regular basis, carry out more joint visits and for the Security Council to invite representatives from the African Union and the regional economic communities to provide more frequent briefings. The representative of India observed that the African members of the Security Council could play an important role in resolving the issues that divided the Security Council and the Peace and Security

⁵⁴ Ibid., Norway, China, France and Mexico.

Council of the African Union and underlined the importance of re-energizing and strengthening liaison mechanisms.

In relation to African-led peacekeeping operations, the President of Kenya underscored that the missions of both the United Nations and the African Union were increasingly contending with sophisticated international terrorist groups, in addition to overseeing peace agreements and needed greater military capacity and resources to respond effectively to the complex environment they faced. Effective peacekeeping, according to the President, required better alignment between the African-led first responders to terrorist groups and United Nations peacekeeping missions. In this context, multiple Council members underscored the need for adequate, sustainable and predictable funding for African-led missions,⁵⁵ with the Presidents of Kenya and Tunisia and the representatives of India and France specifically calling for the use of United Nations assessed contributions for this purpose.⁵⁶ The representative of the Russian Federation called instead for the use of funds from the African Union Peace Fund. The representative of Ireland stressed the need to deepen and strengthen cooperation between the two organizations to ensure that mission transitions took place in a responsible, coordinated and graduated manner, were responsive to the needs on the ground and respected human rights, in line with Security Council resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#).⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Ibid., Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ireland, China, and France.

⁵⁶ Ibid., Kenya, Tunisia, India and France.

⁵⁷ Ibid. For further details on the adoption of resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), see part I, sect. 22.

II. Recognition of the efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

Note

Section II deals with recognition by the Council of the efforts by regional and subregional organizations in the pacific settlement of local disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes, and subsection B covers discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 52 of the Charter in any of its decisions. The Council, however, acknowledged and expressed support for the engagement of regional and subregional arrangements in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention, resolution and sustaining peace, as well as the implementation of peace agreements, political dialogue and transitions, reconciliation processes and addressing the root causes of conflict. The Council did so in relation to a wide variety of items on its agenda, as featured in more detail in table 2 below. The list of items below is organized in alphabetical order.

Table 2
Decisions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2566 (2021) 12 March 2021	Seventh preambular paragraph	Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)
	Resolution 2605 (2021) 12 November 2021	Sixth and twelfth preambular paragraphs, para. 5	African Union, ECCAS, ICGLR
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution 2612 (2021) 20 December 2021	Sixth preambular paragraph, para. 14	African Union, ICGLR, Southern African Development Community (SADC)

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>	
The question concerning Haiti	S/PRST/2021/7 24 March 2021	Tenth paragraph	Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Organization of American States (OAS)	
The situation in Libya	S/PRST/2021/12 15 July 2021	Seventh paragraph	African Union, European Union, League of Arab States	
The situation in the Great Lakes Region	S/PRST/2021/19 20 October 2021	Third paragraph	African Union, ECCAS, East African Community, ICGLR, SADC	
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021) 29 June 2021	Eleventh and twelfth preambular paragraphs	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	
The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2590 (2021) 30 August 2021	Fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs	African Union, ECOWAS	
	Resolution 2564 (2021) 25 February 2021	para. 1	Gulf Cooperation Council	
The situation in Myanmar	S/PRST/2021/5 10 March 2021	Fourth paragraph	ASEAN	
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021) 12 March 2021	Sixth preambular paragraph, paras. 19, 20	African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	
	Resolution 2575 (2021) 11 May 2021	Fourth preambular paragraph	African Union	
	Resolution 2577 (2021) 28 May 2021	Third preambular paragraph	IGAD	
	S/PRST/2021/20 27 October 2021	Sixth paragraph	African Union, IGAD	
	Resolution 2609 (2021) 15 December 2021	Fifth preambular paragraph, paras. 12, 20, 23 and 34	African Union	
	Peace consolidation in West Africa	S/PRST/2021/3 3 February 2021	Seventh and fourteenth paragraphs	African Union, ECOWAS, Group of Five for the Sahel
		S/PRST/2021/16 17 August 2021	Sixth, ninth and tenth paragraphs	African Union, ECCAS, ECOWAS
Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2021/10 19 May 2021	Twenty-seventh paragraph	African Union	
	S/PRST/2021/18 15 September 2021	Third, fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs	African Union	

B. Discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the discussions among Council members, in relation to the situation in the Central African Republic, focused on the good offices and mediation efforts of the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes in the Central African Republic in support of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the engagement of the African Union and ECCAS in support of the transition process in Chad following the death of President Idriss Deby Itno.⁵⁸ In relation to the Sudan and South Sudan, Council members discussed the role of the African Union in efforts to resolve the final status of the Abyei Area,⁵⁹ the work of the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in support of the political transition in the Sudan,⁶⁰ and the implementation of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.⁶¹ Discussions further highlighted the role of the African Union, the European Union and the League of Arab States in stabilizing Libya,⁶² and the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo.⁶³ Further, discussions in the Council also addressed the contribution of the African Union and the regional economic communities to Africa's recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for cooperation between regional and subregional organizations and the United Nations in relation to mediation and peacebuilding efforts.⁶⁴

In addition, discussions among members and non-members in the Council covered the role of the African Union and ECOWAS in support of the political transition in Mali (see case 5), the engagement of the African Union and IGAD to end the conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia (see case 6) and the negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan under the auspices of the African Union to resolve the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (see case 7).

Case 5

⁵⁸ See [S/2021/76](#), [S/2021/187](#), [S/PV.8787](#), [S/PV.8802](#), [S/PV.8882](#), [S/PV.8933](#) and [S/PV.8936](#).

⁵⁹ See [S/2021/408](#) and [S/PV.8887](#).

⁶⁰ See [S/2021/246](#), [S/2021/495](#), [S/PV.8857](#) and [S/PV.8925](#).

⁶¹ See [S/2021/219](#), [S/PV.8801](#), [S/PV.8859](#) and [S/PV.8931](#).

⁶² See [S/2021/292](#), [S/2021/498](#), [S/PV.8820](#) and [S/PV.8912](#).

⁶³ See [S/PV.8880](#).

⁶⁴ See [S/2021/490](#).

The situation in Mali

At the 8794th meeting of the Council, held on 14 June 2021 under the item entitled “The situation in Mali”, the Council heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on the events in that country following the overthrow of the President and Prime Minister of the transitional Government on 24 May 2021.⁶⁵ The Special Representative recalled that the coup had been condemned by the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS and by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and that both organizations suspended Mali from their respective membership. ECOWAS further reaffirmed the need to respect the transition time frame, including the date set for the presidential elections on 27 February 2022, and called for the immediate appointment of a civilian Prime Minister. The Special Representative noted that the ECOWAS mediator, former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, had been actively involved in efforts to ensure the implementation of the decisions that had been taken, with the support of the local follow-up committee, of which MINUSMA was a member.

During the ensuing discussion, several Council members expressed support and commended the mediation efforts of ECOWAS and the African Union.⁶⁶ The representative of the United States expressed support for the establishment by ECOWAS of a mechanism to monitor compliance with the transition period and the holding of presidential elections on 27 February 2022 and the ECOWAS statement issued following its extraordinary summit on 30 May 2021, which called for the immediate release of detainees and those that were under house arrest, strict adherence to the transition period of 18 months and the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister and an inclusive Government, as well as for the transitional President, Vice President and Prime Minister not to be candidates in the presidential election under any circumstances. The representative of the United Kingdom said that her country condemned the coup and stood ready to support the efforts of ECOWAS and the United Nations to ensure compliance with ECOWAS conditions, make progress towards elections, and help ensure that human rights were protected and promoted

⁶⁵ See [S/PV.8794](#).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, France, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), United States, Ireland, Norway, Russian Federation, India, Viet Nam and Estonia.

and that the rule of law was upheld. The representative of Mexico urged regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS, to exert their utmost influence on the new authorities in order to avoid further setbacks in the transition process and in the implementation of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The representative of France recognized that the mediation efforts of ECOWAS had seen some progress, in particular the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister and the formation of a Government. Speaking on behalf of Kenya, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the representative of Niger expressed support for the recommendations and decisions taken at the ECOWAS summit, but added that those decisions, particularly the imposition of sanctions, must not aggravate the situation in Mali or jeopardize the achievements of the fight against terrorism in the region.

At the 8893rd meeting, held on 20 October 2021 under the same item, the representative of Ireland underscored the need for the Council to work closely with the African Union and ECOWAS to achieve progress on the political transition and a return to constitutional order.⁶⁷ The representative of the United Kingdom underlined the need for the Council to keep the developments in Mali under close review, in the hope that the transitional authorities would deliver the timely return to constitutional rule promised to ECOWAS and to the Council, and reiterated the need to follow ECOWAS should they fail to do so. The representative of India stressed that the mediation and good offices role of regional and subregional organizations in Africa remained vital in resolving armed conflicts, political impasses and helping the countries in their political transitions and urged the Malian transitional authorities to cooperate with ECOWAS.

⁶⁷ See [S/PV.8893](#).

Case 6

Peace and security in Africa

At the 8816th meeting, held on 8 July 2021 under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, the Council discussed the dispute between Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.⁶⁸ The Council heard briefings by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa and the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme. Following the briefers, reading out a statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on behalf of the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chairperson of the African Union, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo noted that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which had the aim of increasing Ethiopia’s energy supply, was causing issues for its immediate neighbours, namely the Sudan and Egypt. Holding the chairpersonship of the African Union in 2021 and 2022, the Democratic Republic of the Congo had taken a series of diplomatic initiatives at the highest level which allowed for the sharing of information on the best ways to resume negotiations on an agreement that took into account the interests of all parties. He recalled that, to assist in the facilitation efforts, the Council had invited the representatives of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan to continue discussions under the auspices of the African Union and mediation by its Chairperson, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and the Charter of the United Nations. He called on the Council, whose primary role in resolving international disputes was undisputable, to support the African Union and assist the facilitator in the quest for peace in that volatile area of the Horn of Africa.

In the subsequent discussion, several Council members recognized and expressed support for the good offices of the African Union, with several speakers emphasizing the importance of the principle of subsidiarity as provided under Chapter VIII of the Charter.⁶⁹ The representative of the Niger stressed the need to prioritize reaching a regional and African solution to the Dam issue. In addition, several speakers emphasized that the African Union remained the best forum for finding a

⁶⁸ See [S/PV.8816](#).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Niger.

comprehensive agreement in this regard.⁷⁰ The representative of Mexico held that, based on Chapter VIII of the Charter, it was particularly important that the international community supported the efforts of the African Union to bring the positions of Egypt, Ethiopia and the Sudan closer together and resume negotiations, taking into account the proven capacity of that organization to seek African solutions to problems that affected the continent.

Council members also exchanged views on how the United Nations and the Council could support the African Union-led negotiations. The representative of Tunisia said that it was important for the United Nations and the Council to support the African Union by sending a clear message on the issue, as part of cooperation and integration between the United Nations and regional organizations. The representative of the Russian Federation proposed that all the interested parties hold a round of negotiations in New York, brokered by the presidency of the African Union, which would be the best possible contribution of the Council to resolving the situation in the spirit of the shared principle of African solutions to African problems.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt expressed the view that, despite the highly appreciated good offices of two Chairs of the African Union, the African Union-led process had failed to yield the desired agreement and that the process, in this format, had reached an impasse. He called upon the Council to adopt the draft resolution circulated by Tunisia, the purpose of which was to relaunch negotiations according to an augmented format that retained and enhanced the leadership of the Chairperson of the African Union and which enabled international partners, including the United Nations, to use their expertise in the area to aid the three countries to conclude an equitable agreement. He added that the resolution was aimed at implementing and effectuating the outcomes of the two meetings of the Bureau of the African Union Assembly that were held on the matter, which instructed the parties to expeditiously finalize the text of a legally binding agreement on the filling and operation of the dam and called upon them not to take unilateral measures that could jeopardize that process. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan expressed hope that the Council would assume its responsibilities in maintaining regional peace and security in a preventative way by calling on the concerned parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the African Union. The Minister of Water,

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, United States, Estonia and Ireland.

Irrigation and Energy of Ethiopia said that his country looked forward to continuing the African Union-led trilateral negotiations, and requested the Council to return the matter of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam to the able and legitimate leadership of the African Union.

Case 7

Peace and security in Africa

At the 8843rd meeting, held on 26 August 2021 under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, Council members heard a briefing by the Secretary-General on the situation in Tigray.⁷¹ During the subsequent discussion, the representatives of India and Mexico encouraged further progress with the regional mediation efforts of the African Union for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.⁷² Most Council members noted and welcomed the appointment of the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, as the High Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for the Horn of Africa.⁷³ The representative of Norway said that it was vital that States in the region, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union brought their full weight to bear in order to end the hostilities in Tigray and Ethiopia. She further underscored that the Council needed to lend all possible support to regional efforts. The representative of the United States welcomed the personal engagement of the Secretary-General and his leadership in initiating dialogue towards a resolution of the conflict and encouraged him to work closely with the African Union and regional and international partners, with the full backing of the Council. The representative of China expressed hope that the United Nations and the African Union would strengthen their collaboration and jointly play a constructive role in promoting reconciliation among all Ethiopian parties through dialogue.

At the 8899th meeting, held on 8 November 2021 under the same item, the Council heard a briefing by the Under Secretary-General of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the High Representative of the Chairperson of

⁷¹ See [S/PV.8843](#).

⁷² *Ibid.*, Mexico and India.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Ireland, France, Norway, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, China, Mexico and Kenya (also on behalf of Niger, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines).

the African Union Commission for the Horn of Africa.⁷⁴ In her remarks, the Under-Secretary-General noted that the Secretary-General had offered the African Union High Representative for the Horn of Africa the full support of the United Nations for his efforts to resolve the Tigray conflict. The High Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for the Horn of Africa urged the Council to call on the international community to rally behind the African Union-led process in order to ensure coherence and unity of purpose in the African Union peace-making efforts in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Ethiopia.

Following the briefings, several Council members commended and expressed support for the mediation efforts of the African Union High Representative.⁷⁵ Several Council members called on the parties to the conflict to cooperate with the African Union High Representative.⁷⁶ The representative of India called upon all stakeholders to purposefully take the opportunity that was provided by the mediation efforts of the African Union High Representative and underlined that it was important that regional initiatives led by the African Union be encouraged and actively supported by the Council. The representative of China said that the international community, and the Council in particular, needed to give the time and space needed for the African Union and others to make use of their good offices. The representative of Ethiopia expressed the belief that a regional solution was best placed to support Ethiopia in getting out of the problem and that, out of his country's conviction in peaceful solutions to all disputes, it would keep engaging all well-meaning actors, the African Union High Representative and regional leaders. In the course of this process, Ethiopia hoped that it would have the understanding of the Council and its membership.

⁷⁴ See [S/PV.8899](#).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Tunisia, France, India, and Estonia.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, India, United States, and Mexico.

III. Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

Note

Section III describes the practice of the Security Council in connection with the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, and subsection B covers discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

Subsection A covers decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements and is organised in three separate subheadings covering peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements and authorized by the Council, other peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements and other regional missions and security forces.

(i) Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements authorized by the Security Council

In 2021, the Council renewed the authorization of two peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, namely, the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea),⁷⁷ and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).⁷⁸ The Council also modified the mandate of AMISOM, as detailed below. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Kosovo Force, established by resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#), continued to operate, and no decisions were taken with respect to its mandate.⁷⁹ Concerning the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which was terminated on 31 December 2020, the Council recognized in 2021 the progress made with the

⁷⁷ Resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. In addition to the authorization to EUFOR-Althea, the Council renewed its authorization provided by paragraph 11 of resolution [2183 \(2014\)](#) to maintain a presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form of a NATO Headquarters (see resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#), para. 2).

⁷⁸ Resolutions [2563 \(2021\)](#) and [2614 \(2021\)](#), para. 1 and resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), para. 10.

⁷⁹ For more information on the international security presence in Kosovo, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1996-1999*, chapter VIII, sect. F.

Mission's drawdown by resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#),⁸⁰ as well as the progress achieved in Darfur since its deployment in 2007 by a presidential statement.⁸¹ An assessment of lessons learned from the Mission's experience was circulated to the Council at the end of 2021, as requested in resolution [2559 \(2020\)](#).⁸²

African Union Mission in Somalia

In 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolutions [2563 \(2021\)](#) of 25 February, [2568 \(2021\)](#) of 12 March, [2592 \(2021\)](#) of 30 August, [2607 \(2021\)](#) of 15 November and [2614 \(2021\)](#)⁸³ of 21 December 2021 addressing the mandate and reconfiguration of AMISOM. By resolution [2563 \(2021\)](#), the Council authorized the members of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM for a period of two weeks, until 14 March 2021, without any changes to the mandate as set out in resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#).⁸⁴

In terms of composition, by resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), the Council authorized the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of 19,626 uniformed AMISOM personnel until 31 December 2021, inclusive of a minimum of 1,040 police personnel including five Formed Police Units, as well as 70 civilian personnel supported by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia to conduct tasks in line with the Somalia Transition Plan and the phased handover of security to Somali security forces commencing in 2021.⁸⁵

Concerning its mandate, the Council authorized AMISOM to take all necessary measures to carry out its mandate and largely maintained the Mission's strategic objectives.⁸⁶ By the resolution, the Council specifically requested AMISON to: (i) reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and armed opposition groups with a view to enabling a stable, federal, sovereign and united Somalia; (ii) support actively the transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali Security Forces through training and mentoring, by facilitating the handover of responsibility for

⁸⁰ Resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#), eighteenth preambular paragraph. For information on the history and mandate of UNAMID, see previous supplements covering the period 2007-2019.

⁸¹ See [S/PRST/2021/14](#), first paragraph.

⁸² *Ibid.*, second and third paragraphs. See also letter dated 28 December 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, submitting the lessons learned from the experience of UNAMID ([S/2021/1099](#)).

⁸³ Resolution [2614 \(2021\)](#), para. 1 extended the mandate of AMISOM until 31 March 2022.

⁸⁴ Resolution [2563 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. See also resolution [2520 \(2020\)](#), paras. 11 and 12.

⁸⁵ Resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), para. 10.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, paras. 11 and 12.

security functions from AMISOM to Somali authorities in liberated areas, and by conducting jointly planned and agreed operations with the Somali Security Forces with increasing emphasis on these being Somali-led; and (iii) assist the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states and Somali Security Forces in providing security for the political process at all levels, including stabilization efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding, and by providing relevant support to Somali police and civilian authorities.⁸⁷ The Council modified the functions of AMISOM in support of the strategic objectives by requesting the Mission to work towards the operational timetables and objectives identified within the transition plan, conduct jointly-planned integrated operations with the Somali Security Forces to secure and recover areas from Al-Shabaab, and allow for the transfer of security responsibilities to the latter forces in these areas when appropriate; realign AMISOM sectors with the federal member states boundaries by the end of 2021; and provide mobile capabilities, assisting the posture of the Somali Security Forces to become more offensive.⁸⁸ Furthermore, the Council welcomed the envisaged reconfiguration of AMISOM from the beginning of 2022 so that it focused on enabling and supporting the Somali Security Forces and the protection of the United Nations in Somalia and authorized the Mission to commence initial work to do so.⁸⁹

Regarding the way forward, the Council recognized the need for a reconfigured African Union mission, from the beginning of 2022 and took note of the request of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to enable the African Union Commission to finalise its independent assessment to report in May 2021.⁹⁰ The Council urged the African Union to mandate in May 2021 an AMISOM that supported and enabled the implementation of the Somali Transition Plan and identified and implemented the necessary steps in 2021 in order to ensure continued delivery of support to Somali security efforts in 2022, including through a reconfigured African Union mission from 2022 that would be able to better face the changing threat posed by Al-Shabaab and armed opposition groups, and was focused

⁸⁷ Ibid., para. 12.

⁸⁸ Ibid., paras. 13 (a), (c)-(e) and (g).

⁸⁹ Ibid., para 13 (k).

⁹⁰ Ibid., paras. 2 and 7. See also letter dated 2 November 2021 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting the report of the independent assessment team on the engagement of the African Union in and with Somalia post-2021 ([S/2021/922](https://www.un.org/secure/2021/922)).

on supporting and enabling the Somali security forces to take primary responsibility for security.

The Council requested the Secretary-General, jointly with the African Union and in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia and donors, to produce a proposal on the strategic objectives, size and composition of a reconfigured African Union mission by the end of September 2021.⁹¹ The Council further requested the Secretary-General to present options for continuing United Nations logistical support from 2022, to include continued United Nations support for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and to the Somali Security Forces alongside a reconfigured African Union mission, for consideration by the Council by the end of October 2021.⁹² Furthermore, underlining the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council and under the Council's authority consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Council encouraged the Secretary-General, African Union and Member States to continue efforts to explore in earnest funding arrangements for AMISOM, bearing in mind the full range of options available to the United Nations, African Union, European Union and to other partners, and considering the limitations of voluntary funding, in order to establish secure future funding arrangements for AMISOM.⁹³

By resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), the Council took note of the publication of the United Nations-mandated independent assessment in January 2021, and anticipated the publication of the African Union-mandated independent assessment.⁹⁴ By resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated the mandate of AMISOM to support the implementation of the sanctions measures on Somalia and the work of the Panel of Experts.⁹⁵ Finally, by resolution [2614 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the existing mandate of AMISOM, as set out in resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), until 31 March 2022.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), para. 9. See also [S/2021/858](#) and [S/2021/859](#).

⁹² *Ibid.*, para. 21. For more information on the mandate of UNSOM, see part X, sect. II.

⁹³ Resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), para. 25.

⁹⁴ Resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#), seventeenth preambular paragraph. See also [S/2021/858](#).

⁹⁵ Resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#), paras. 7, 35 and 40.

⁹⁶ Resolution [2614 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

Operation Althea of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

By resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#) of 3 November 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council renewed its authorization of EUFOR-Althea for a period of 12 months.⁹⁷ The Council reiterated its authorization to Member States to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and stressed that the parties would be held equally responsible for compliance with those annexes and would be subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence as might be necessary.⁹⁸ The Council also authorized Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO Headquarters, in defence of EUFOR-Althea or the NATO presence, respectively, and to assist both organizations in carrying out their missions. In addition, the Council recognized the right of EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence to take all necessary measures to defend themselves from attack or threat of attack.⁹⁹

(ii) Other peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

In addition to AMISOM and EUFOR-Althea, the Council also referred to the role and mandates of other peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, namely, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the European Union Training Missions in the Central African Republic and Mali.

Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel

In a presidential statement issued on 3 February 2021, the Council welcomed the leadership demonstrated by countries in West Africa and the Sahel as well as the African Union and ECOWAS in spearheading initiatives to address security challenges exacerbated by terrorism and transnational organized crime in the region, including through the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, which continued

⁹⁷ Resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. For information on the establishment of EUFOR-Althea, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004-2007*, chap. XII, part III.C.

⁹⁸ Resolution [2604 \(2021\)](#), para. 3.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 4. For further information on the authorization of the use of force in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, see part VII, sect. IV.

to demonstrate increased tangible operational results.¹⁰⁰ In a presidential statement issued on 28 October 2021, the Council commended the efforts and progress made by African countries, the African Union and subregional organizations, in countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture and, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, *inter alia*, commended the important contribution of the Joint Force.¹⁰¹

By resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#) of 29 June 2021, the Council welcomed the increased autonomy of the Group of Five for the Sahel Executive Secretariat and of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel as steps towards self-sufficiency and encouraged the G5 Sahel States to ensure that the Joint Force continued to scale up its level of operation in order to demonstrate increased tangible results.¹⁰² The Council expressed support for the support provided by MINUSMA to the Joint Force, as per the conditions set out in resolutions [2391 \(2017\)](#) and [2531 \(2020\)](#), and the support in the technical agreement between the United Nations, European Union and the Group of Five for the Sahel, through emergency evacuation of the sick or wounded and casualty evacuation, access to life support consumables, and use of engineering plant equipment, material and enabling units.¹⁰³ The Council stressed that operational and logistical support from MINUSMA, as per the conditions set by resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#), was a temporary vital measure, and called upon the Joint Force to continue developing its own capacity to support itself.¹⁰⁴ The Council also encouraged a more robust examination of alternative support to the Joint Force with detailed and operational options of this support and requested the Secretary-General to include these in a report to be issued no later than 30 September 2021.¹⁰⁵

The Council further requested the Secretary-General to continue to ensure close coordination and information sharing, where appropriate, between MINUSMA, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and subregional organizations, including ECOWAS and the Group of Five for the Sahel, as well as to ensure adequate coordination, exchange of information and, when applicable, support within their respective mandates and through existing mechanisms, between

¹⁰⁰ [S/PRST/2021/3](#), tenth paragraph. See also [S/PRST/2021/16](#), ninth paragraph.

¹⁰¹ [S/PRST/2021/21](#), thirty-third paragraph.

¹⁰² Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 38.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, para. 39. For more information on the mandate of MINUSMA, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁰⁴ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 40.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* See also [S/2021/850](#).

MINUSMA, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the French Forces and the European Union missions in Mali.¹⁰⁶

European Union Training Missions in the Central African Republic and Mali

By resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#) of 12 November 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council decided that the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) included providing strategic and technical advice to the authorities of the Central African Republic to implement the National Strategy on Security Sector Reform and the National Defence Plan, in close coordination with, inter alia, the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA), European Union Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM-RCA), the African Union Observer Mission in the Central African Republic and other international partners.¹⁰⁷ The Council also decided that the mandate of MINUSCA included taking a leading role in supporting the Central African Republic authorities in enhancing the capacities of the Internal Security Forces, particularly command and control structures and oversight mechanisms and to coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training between the international partners in the Central African Republic, in particular with EUTM-RCA and EUAM-RCA, in order to ensure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of security sector reform.¹⁰⁸

By resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council encouraged the European Union, notably its Special Representative for the Sahel and its European Union Training Mission in Mali and European Union Capacity-building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel, to continue its efforts to support Malian authorities in security sector reform and the re-establishment of State authority and presence throughout the Malian territory.¹⁰⁹ The Council further encouraged close coordination of these efforts with the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Force in Mali (MINUSMA) and requested the Secretary-General to enhance cooperation between MINUSMA and the European Union Training Mission in Mali

¹⁰⁶ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), paras. 28, 32 and 41.

¹⁰⁷ Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 35 (d)(i). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.

¹⁰⁸ Resolution [2605 \(2021\)](#), para. 35 (d)(iii).

¹⁰⁹ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 44.

and EUCAP Sahel missions, including by developing further complementarity between the missions and by exploring modalities for potential mutual support.¹¹⁰

(iii) Other regional missions and security forces

In 2021, the Council also made reference in its decisions to the role and mandates of other regional missions and security forces such as the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Southern Africa Development Community Mission in Mozambique.

In a presidential statement issued on 3 February 2021, the Council welcomed the leadership demonstrated by countries in West Africa and the Sahel as well as the African Union and ECOWAS in spearheading initiatives to address security challenges exacerbated by terrorism and transnational organized crime in the region, including through the Multinational Joint Task Force.¹¹¹ In a presidential statement issued on 28 October 2021, the Council commended the efforts and progress made by African countries, the African Union and subregional organizations, in countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture and, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, commended the important contribution of, inter alia, the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin and the Southern Africa Development Community Mission in Mozambique.¹¹² In addition, the Council noted that the African Union was considering the establishment of a capacity within the African Standby Force as a further effort in combatting terrorism in Africa while commending the efforts by the African Union, regional economic and mechanisms and African Member States to fully operationalize the multidimensional African Standby Force, and the support of international partners in this regard.¹¹³

B. Discussion concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council discussed the role of peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, such as EUFOR-Althea,¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ [S/PRST/2021/3](#), tenth paragraph. See also [S/PRST/2021/16](#), ninth paragraph.

¹¹² [S/PRST/2021/21](#), thirty-third paragraph.

¹¹³ Ibid., nineteenth paragraph.

¹¹⁴ See [S/2021/436](#), [S/PV.8810](#) and [S/PV.8896](#).

AMISOM,¹¹⁵ and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel.¹¹⁶ The most detailed discussions in this regard were held under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” on the support of the United Nations to the counter-terrorism efforts of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (see case 8) and under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia” in relation to the reconfiguration of AMISOM after 2021 to support Somali security forces in taking over security responsibilities (see case 9).

Case 8

Peace and security in Africa

At the 8903rd meeting, held on 12 November 2021 under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations further to the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel.¹¹⁷ In his statement, the Under-Secretary-General noted the letter of the Secretary-General, dated 4 October 2021, which presented the key findings of an assessment of the operationalization of the Joint Force and possible avenues for enhanced support carried out by the Secretariat.¹¹⁸ While noting that MINUSMA had spared no effort in support of the Joint Force within the framework of its mandate, he stated that there were limits to a support model that relied on donor financing, which was unpredictable and could not meet all of the Joint Force’s needs. The Under-Secretary-General expressed the conviction that only a dedicated support office, funded through assessed contributions, could provide the needed support. A support office, according to the Under-Secretary-General, would also provide an opportunity to scale up not only logistical and operational support, but also efforts to protect civilians, promote human rights and ensure greater coherence among military, political and development efforts. Moreover, the Under-Secretary-General stated that a second-best option, as proposed in the letter of the Secretary-General, would be the establishment of an advisory office that would provide technical and expert assistance to the Executive Secretariat of the

¹¹⁵ See [S/2021/173](#), [S/2021/260](#), [S/2021/484](#), [S/PV.8779](#), [S/PV.8833](#), [S/PV.8907](#) and [S/PV.8939](#).

¹¹⁶ See [S/2021/47](#), [S/2021/336](#), [S/PV.8794](#), [S/PV.8809](#), [S/PV.8893](#) and [S/PV.8903](#).

¹¹⁷ See [S/PV.8903](#). See also [S/2021/940](#).

¹¹⁸ See [S/2021/850](#).

Group of Five for the Sahel in a number of cross-cutting areas, including the pooling and sharing of resources, as well as possibly assisting with efforts to strengthen institutional governance.

Speaking on behalf of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the representative of Chad noted that the Group of Five was a unique, relevant and beneficial initiative, emanating from the States concerned, and remained the only framework for action capable of providing the most appropriate solutions to the challenges facing the Sahel.¹¹⁹ While it was an initiative of its member States, it was also an instrument for international peace and security. The representative of Chad reiterated the call to the Council to create a support office to provide the Joint Force with sustainable, predictable and reliable funding, enabling it to focus entirely on its fundamental mission, namely, to bring security to the region in order to create a climate conducive to development.

During the discussion, Council members expressed concern regarding the security and humanitarian situation in the Sahel and underscored the importance of the mandate of the Joint Force. The representative of India stated that the operational support provided by MINUSMA to the Joint Force had proven insufficient and that it was therefore important that traditional peacekeeping be complemented by regional organizations to neutralize terrorist groups and entities.

Several Council members voiced their support for the proposal of the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations support office to ensure sustainable and predictable funding for the Joint Force.¹²⁰ The representative of France stated that while the support of the European Union, African Union and West African countries to the Joint Force was substantial, it was insufficient. The United Nations had the legitimacy and capacity to provide predictable and sustainable support, including financial capacity, to organize a logistical support chain. He noted that the Secretary-General had indicated that a United Nations support office funded through assessed contributions could be operational within one year and that its cost would be limited, especially if it was decided initially to concentrate support on Force-led cross-border operations alone.

¹¹⁹ See [S/PV.8903](#).

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, France, Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) and Norway.

By contrast, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation had hoped that the Secretary-General's letter would have proposed options for bilateral and multilateral support mechanisms other than just the United Nations. Furthermore, noting the fundamental concern of the United Kingdom with United Nations involvement in offensive, national counter-terrorism operations, the representative stated that his delegation did not believe that the Organization was the right vehicle to provide durable support to the Joint Force. Similarly, the representative of the United States stated that the United Nations, regardless of the mechanism, was not an appropriate vehicle to provide logistical support to the Joint Force, adding that his country looked forward to working with fellow Council members to identify additional bilateral and non-United Nations multilateral options to fill the critical gaps. Furthermore, the representative of the United States stated that the focus of the Council had to remain squarely on political solutions and tying security responses to effective political strategies, including addressing problems with governance.

Other Council members underscored their willingness to hold further discussions within the Council to come up with a solution that ensured sustainable, predictable and adequate funding for the Joint Force.¹²¹ The representative of the Russian Federation noted that both options presented by the Secretary-General required a clear understanding of their timing and feasibility, effectiveness, the costs involved and the sources of funding.

The representative of Mexico stated that his delegation did not understand the reservations that were expressed in connection with the legitimate needs of the countries of the Group of Five for the Sahel, adding that if all terrorist acts were indeed threats to international peace and security, as was established in resolutions [1368 \(2001\)](#) and [1373 \(2001\)](#), the United Nations had a role to play in addition to bilateral efforts. The representative of India stated that over the past three years the Council was grappling with the issue of support to regional security initiatives such as the Joint Force and that its indecisiveness had allowed terrorist groups to expand their areas of influence.

Expressing deep concern about the attacks against civilians, including allegations of sexual violence against women and girls, reportedly also committed by

¹²¹ Ibid., Russian Federation, India, Estonia, Ireland, China and Mexico.

members of the Joint Force, the representative of Norway underlined that any support that involved the United Nations had to fully comply with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy and that military operations had to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Echoing this view, the representative of Ireland encouraged the Joint Force to increase efforts to gather and share information on the impact of its operations and, crucially, to differentiate national operations from those of the Joint Force. Several Council members further took note of the work of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in support of these efforts.¹²² The representative of Ireland stated that the greater inclusion of women, including at senior levels, could significantly enhance the effectiveness of the Joint Force's operations. The representative of Mexico argued that any Council decision concerning the Joint Force should consider the experience of MINUSMA in providing logistical support to the Joint Force so as to anticipate problems in the implementation of the Force's mandate.

Case 9

The situation in Somalia

At the 8907th meeting, held on 17 November 2021 under the item entitled "The situation in Somalia", Council members discussed the modalities for the reconfiguration of AMISOM into a new mission after 2021.¹²³ In his briefing, noting that the Mission's mandate was coming to an end on 31 December 2021, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia stated that there was an absolute need for a new mission that would take over from AMISOM. To achieve that, there was a need, as a matter of urgency, to continue and conclude, in a detailed and exhaustive manner, the discussions that would shape the future mission and were relevant to its effectiveness and success.

In the discussion, also speaking on behalf of Niger, Kenya and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and his delegation, the representative of Tunisia took note of the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 7 October

¹²² Ibid., Niger (also on behalf of Kenya, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia), Norway, Ireland and United States.

¹²³ See [S/PV.8907](https://www.un.org/press/docs/2021/211117_somalia_situation.html).

2021.¹²⁴ The communiqué endorsed the report of the African Union-led independent assessment of the African Union's engagement in and with Somalia post-2021 and its first option, namely, to establish an African Union-United Nations multidimensional stabilization mission in Somalia, deployed under Chapter VII of the Charter, which would ensure predictable and sustainable multi-year financing for the future mission through United Nations assessed contributions.¹²⁵ He also said that there was a need to thoroughly address the financing challenges of any engagement of the African Union in Somalia post-2021 through the provision of adequate, sustainable and predictable financing, including access to assessed contributions. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the support for Somalia's security transition needed to be both realistic and affordable and to support the progressive transition to Somali-led security. She added that the African Union-United Nations multidimensional stabilization mission model that had been endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union would not achieve that and would run counter to the idea of progressive transition to full Somali security responsibility. The representative of China said that before the Council took a decision on the post-2021 AMISOM configuration further to negotiations between Somalia, the African Union, the United Nations and other major parties, the funds needed for the operations of AMISOM had to be guaranteed to avoid a security vacuum due to funding gaps. The representative of France noted the need to draw lessons from the AMISOM model and its shortcomings in terms of strategic direction and effectiveness. He also said that it was becoming urgent to find an effective, collective and sustainable solution in terms of funding.

At the 8939th meeting held on 21 December 2021, the Council adopted resolution [2614 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter and renewing its authorization to the members of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM for a period of three months, until 31 March 2022.¹²⁶ Following the adoption of the resolution, several Council members stated that they voted in favour of a three-month rollover of the mandate of AMISOM to provide additional time for an agreement on a reconfigured African Union-led mission in Somalia.¹²⁷ The

¹²⁴ Ibid. See also [S/2021/922](#).

¹²⁵ See [S/PV.8907](#).

¹²⁶ Resolution [2614 \(2021\)](#), para. 1. See [S/PV.8939](#).

¹²⁷ See [S/PV.8939](#), United States, France and United Kingdom.

representative of France welcomed the constructive approach adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in its communiqué of 7 December 2021, which confirmed the intention of the African Union to contribute to the joint report with the Secretary-General on the future of AMISOM that had been requested by the Security Council in resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#). He also said that the Council needed to take a decision in March 2022 to establish a reconfigured African Union mission and that, if it was prevented from doing so, this would call into question the funding of the European Union of AMISOM. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that, in resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), the Council had asked the Secretary-General to, jointly with the African Union, and in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia and donors, produce a proposal on the strategic objectives, size and composition of a reconfigured African Union mission, but that more time was required to reach consensus on that proposal. She urged all stakeholders, especially the United Nations, the African Union, the Federal Government of Somalia and donors, to use the rollover period to engage in good faith to reach consensus on the way ahead. The representative of Somalia reaffirmed that the Somali transition plan remained the only road map and strategic vision of his Government and the Council for a phased, conditions-based AMISOM exit strategy and recalled Somalia's position that it would not accept an African Union-United Nations hybrid mission, or any post-2021 security arrangements, without host State consent.

IV. Authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Council in utilizing regional and subregional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority, as provided for in Article 53 of the Charter. This section focuses on the authorization of enforcement action by regional and other organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations which are covered in section III above. Cooperation with regional arrangements in the implementation of measures adopted by the Council under Chapter VII not involving the use of force is also covered in this section. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements and subsection B covers discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

In 2021, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 53 of the Charter in its decisions. The Council did, however, authorize the use of force by regional arrangements beyond the context of regional peacekeeping operations.

Concerning the situation in Libya, by resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the authorizations as set out in resolution [2526 \(2020\)](#) for Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to inspect vessels they had reasonable grounds to believe were carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya in order to ensure implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, and to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections.¹²⁸ By resolution [2598 \(2021\)](#), acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed the authorizations to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, set out in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels believed to be used for migrant smuggling and human trafficking from Libya, seize those that were confirmed as being used for those

¹²⁸ Resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#), para. 1.

purposes, and authorized Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers in carrying out the aforementioned activities.¹²⁹

Concerning the situation in Somalia, by resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#), the Council commended the efforts of the European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta and the counter-piracy activities of the African Union onshore in Somalia to suppress piracy and to protect ships transiting through the waters off the coast of Somalia.¹³⁰ By the same resolution, acting under Chapter VII, the Council decided, for a further period of three months, to renew the authorizations set out in paragraph 14 of resolution [2554 \(2020\)](#) granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.¹³¹

Also acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted several decisions not involving the use of force, such as requesting the support of regional and subregional organizations in implementing sanctions measures or calling for the cooperation of regional and subregional organizations with the sanctions committees and panels of experts concerning the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Yemen, as outlined in table 4 below.

In addition, in connection with the situation in South Sudan, the Council recognized the steps taken by the African Union to establish the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, requested the Secretary-General to continue to make available technical assistance to the African Union Commission and the Government of South Sudan in setting up the Court, and for the implementation of other aspects of Chapter V of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan related to transitional justice.¹³²

¹²⁹ Resolution [2598 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

¹³⁰ Resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#), ninth preambular paragraph.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, para. 14.

¹³² Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), eighteenth preambular paragraph and para. 22.

Table 3
Decisions by which the Council requested the cooperation of regional arrangements in the implementation of enforcement action

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution 2588 (2021) 29 July 2021	para. 9
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021) 12 March 2021	Twenty-first preambular paragraph and para. 21
	Resolution 2577 (2021) 28 May 2021	para. 19
The situation in the Middle East	Resolution 2564 (2021) 25 February 2021	para. 12

B. Discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements

In 2021, the discussions among Council members continued to address enforcement action as well as other Chapter VII measures undertaken by regional arrangements in the context of meetings and videoconferences of the Council in relation to a variety of agenda items, thematic and country or region specific, as described below. In 2021, there was one explicit reference to Article 53 of the Charter made during a high-level open videoconference held on 19 April 2021 in connection with the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”. At the videoconference, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that all regional arrangements or agencies that intended to undertake activities authorized under Chapter VIII of the Charter needed to act in full conformity with the Charter, strictly observe the principle of transparency and seriously avoid politicization and selective approaches.¹³³ He stressed that such arrangements must not be abused by those members seeking to impose their will on the countries of the region concerned, both members and non-members of the regional agency concerned, adding that instead of building confidence, in practice that would lead to mistrust. He also recalled that, as stipulated in Article 53 (1) of the Charter, no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Council. At the same videoconference, addressing the cooperation

¹³³ See [S/2021/394](#).

between the United Nations and regional organizations in crisis resolution, the representative of the Russian Federation underscored that priority should be given to settling disputes by peaceful means, with any coercive measures having to be duly authorized by the Council.¹³⁴ Similarly, the Special Representative of President Xi Jinping, State Councillor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of China maintained that enforcement operations needed to be authorized by the Council.

At an open videoconference held on 13 January 2021 in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Mali”, the representative of the Russian Federation welcomed the fact that steps that were aimed at the restoration of constitutional rule had resulted in the lifting of the restrictions of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Mali.¹³⁵ As Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, the representative of Mexico further expressed his delegation’s interest in maintaining close cooperation with members of the Council and in nurturing a permanent dialogue with regional organizations and neighbouring countries.¹³⁶ Subsequently, at the 8794th meeting held on 14 June 2021 under the item entitled “The situation in Mali”, the representative of Niger expressed support for the recommendations and decisions taken at the ECOWAS extraordinary summit on 30 May 2021 following the overthrow of the President and Prime Minister of the transitional Government on 24 May 2021, but added that those decisions, particularly the imposition of sanctions, must not aggravate the situation in the country or jeopardize the achievements of the fight against terrorism in the region.¹³⁷

At the 8791st meeting, held on 9 June 2021 under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, Council members heard the periodic briefing by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on the implementation of resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#) by which the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, referred the situation in Darfur to the Court.¹³⁸ During the

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ See [S/2021/47](#).

¹³⁶ Ibid. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Mali, see part. VII, sect. III.A(i)(n). For more information concerning the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, see part IX sect.I.B.1(n).

¹³⁷ See [S/PV.8794](#).

¹³⁸ See [S/PV.8791](#). In 2021, the Prosecutor briefed only once departing from the practice of two briefings per year since the adoption of the resolution. For more information, see part I, sect. 7 and *Repertoire, Supplements 2004-2007 to 2020*.

discussion, the representative of Kenya recalled the Council's invitation to the Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements that would facilitate the Court's work, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region under resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#).¹³⁹ He further stated that Kenya would like to hear from the Prosecutor about the status of engagement with the African Union, if any, to that end, particularly given that, under Article 1 of the Rome Statute, the Court was complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The representative of China reiterated the position that the Court should strictly adhere to the principle of complementary jurisdiction, respect in earnest the judicial sovereignty of nations, pay full attention to the legitimate demands of the Government of the Sudan and the African Union and respect the views of the Government.¹⁴⁰

At the 8874th meeting, held on 6 October 2021 under the item entitled "Small arms", the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs welcomed the Council's employment of weapons and ammunition management as part of the benchmark assessments of arms embargoes and added that it was important to note that available standards and guidelines needed to be applied in such contexts to further improve national and regional implementation and enforcement of embargoes.¹⁴¹ At the 8930th meeting, held on 14 December 2021 under the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the representative of Ireland recalled the call set out in paragraph 2 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which encouraged all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including by refraining from actions that undermined implementation of commitments thereunder.¹⁴²

In 2021, discussions in the context of meetings and videoconferences of the Council also focused on the activities and mandate of Operation IRINI in Libya in connection with the items entitled, "The situation in Libya", "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security" and "Maintenance of international peace and

¹³⁹ See [S/PV.8791](#).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ See [S/PV.8874](#).

¹⁴² See [S/PV.8930](#).

security”¹⁴³ and EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the coast of Somalia in connection with the items entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, “Maintenance of international peace and security” and “The situation in Somalia”.¹⁴⁴ In both cases, participants at those meetings and videoconferences discussed the roles of the operations in support of the arms embargoes imposed by the Council concerning Libya and Somalia, respectively.¹⁴⁵

Concerning the Operation IRINI, at an open videoconference held on 28 January 2021 in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Libya”, the representative of Estonia maintained that the Council had tools at its disposal to support the implementation of the arms embargo through relevant authorizations.¹⁴⁶ He welcomed the efforts of Operation IRINI that acted strictly under those authorizations, was impartial in its activities and offered an important contribution to the implementation of the sanctions regime that the Council had put in place. The representative of Niger stated that, while his delegation welcomed the implementation of Operation IRINI, it was of the view that the Secretary-General needed to review the policy of disembarkation on Libyan soil of migrants and refugees intercepted at sea and expressed regret that the number of persons returned since the report of the Secretary-General had gone up from 11,000 to 11,900.¹⁴⁷ At the 8792nd meeting, held on 10 June 2021 under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the representative of the Niger expressed hope that the new Operation

¹⁴³ See [S/2021/97](#) (in connection with the situation in Libya), [S/PV.8792](#) (in connection with the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security), [S/PV.8820](#) (in connection with the situation in Libya), [S/PV.8855](#) (in connection with the situation in Libya), [S/2021/292](#) (in connection with the situation in Libya), [S/2021/498](#) (in connection with the situation in Libya) and [S/2021/722](#) (in connection with maintenance of international peace and security). For more information on the establishment of Operation Irini in Libya, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2020*, chapter VIII, sect. IV.

¹⁴⁴ See [S/2021/173](#) (in connection with the situation in Somalia), [S/2021/394](#) (in connection with the Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security), [S/PV.8792](#) (in connection with the Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security), [S/2021/722](#) (in connection with maintenance of international peace and security), and [S/PV.8917](#) (in connection with the situation in Somalia). For more information on the establishment of EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2008-2009*, chapter VIII, sect. IV.

¹⁴⁵ For further details, see part I sects. 2 and 10 as well as part VIII, sect. III concerning the sanctions measures in place with regard to Somalia and Libya and part IX, sect. I.B.1 concerning the sanctions committees established pursuant to resolutions [751 \(1992\)](#) and [1970 \(2011\)](#).

¹⁴⁶ See [S/2021/97](#).

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. See also [S/2020/1309](#).

IRINI would further contribute to the fight against breaches of the arms embargo on Libya and to combating the smuggling of migrants in the Mediterranean.¹⁴⁸ The representative of Mexico expressed hope that Operation IRINI could soon take concrete steps in coordination with the Libyan authorities to protect the human rights and dignity of migrants in the Mediterranean. Cautioning that the efforts of the European Union should not go beyond the frameworks set forth in Council mandates, the representative of the Russian Federation underlined that his delegation still had questions about Operation IRINI, as one of its objectives was to assist in the fulfilment of the United Nations arms embargo on Libya.

Regarding the EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, at an open videoconference held on 22 February 2021 in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Somalia”, the Managing Director of the European External Action Service noted that the mandate of Operation Atalanta had been expanded to include the secondary executive and non-executive tasks of countering trafficking in weapons and narcotic drugs and monitoring various illegal activities at sea.¹⁴⁹ With those adjustments, Operation Atalanta would support the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia and the ongoing fight against Al-Shabaab and its funding streams, while at the same time maintaining its core effort to counter piracy and protect the World Food Programme and other vulnerable shipments to Somalia. At the [8917th](#) meeting held on 3 December 2021, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously adopted [2608 \(2021\)](#), renewing for a further period of three months the authorizations set out in paragraph 14 of resolution [2554 \(2020\)](#), granted to States and regional organizations cooperating with Somali authorities in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.¹⁵⁰ In their statements after the vote, several Council members expressed regret about the length of the mandate extension provided in resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#). In that regard, the representative of France stated that the three-month extension was too brief to allow Operation Atalanta to carry out its tasks in proper conditions.¹⁵¹ She further underlined that Operation Atalanta did not just focus on combating piracy, but also contributed to cutting off the weapons trafficking that benefited Al-Shabaab and ensured security for vessels of the World

¹⁴⁸ See [S/PV.8792](#).

¹⁴⁹ See [S/2021/173](#).

¹⁵⁰ Resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#), para. 14. See [S/PV.8917](#).

¹⁵¹ See [S/PV.8917](#).

Food Programme and the channeling of international humanitarian assistance to Somalia. The representative of Estonia welcomed the fact that there had been no piracy attacks in the recent years on the Somali coast, which had been achieved in part thanks to the efforts of Operation Atalanta.¹⁵² He noted, however, that the short mandate adopted would likely adversely affect the operating conditions of Operation Atalanta and related activities. The representative of Ireland expressed concern that such a short time frame could threaten the continuation of Operation Atalanta, which conducted a crucial counter piracy naval operation in the region. Speaking after Council members, the representative of Somalia expressed the belief that Council resolutions on piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia had successfully achieved their intended objective and that Somalia gave consent for a technical rollover of three months for Operation Atalanta to allow for its transition to a bilateral maritime cooperation framework within the country's territorial waters to help with maritime security, which was the only sustainable way to preserve hard-earned gains.

¹⁵² Ibid.

V. Reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security

Note

Section V examines the reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of Article 54 of the Charter. The section is divided into three subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning reporting by regional arrangements, subsection B covers discussions concerning reporting by regional arrangements, and subsection C covers communications concerning reporting by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 54 of the Charter in its decisions. The Council did, however, request reporting from regional organizations on peacekeeping operations led by them, either directly or through the Secretary-General as well as on maritime enforcement actions undertaken further to relevant resolutions of the Council, as described in further detail and synthesized in table 4 below.

Concerning Libya, by resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report within 11 months on the implementation of the authorization set out in resolution [2526 \(2020\)](#) from Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.¹⁵³ In addition, by resolution [2598 \(2021\)](#), the Council renewed the reporting requests set out in paragraph 17 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), requiring Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations and utilizing the authority of the resolution, to inform the Council within three months and every three months thereafter on the progress of actions undertaken in exercise of the authority to inspect and seize vessels and to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out inspections of vessels on high seas off the Libyan coast suspected of carrying arms and or related material to or from Libya.¹⁵⁴ The

¹⁵³ Resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#), para. 2.

¹⁵⁴ Resolution [2598 \(2021\)](#), para. 3. See also resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), para. 17.

Council further requested the Secretary-General to report eleven months after the adoption of the resolution on its implementation.¹⁵⁵

With regard to the situation in Mali, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every three months after the adoption of resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), on the coordination, exchange of information and mutual operational and logistical support between MINUSMA, the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the French Forces and European partners, including Task Force Takuba, and the European Union missions in Mali.¹⁵⁶

In relation to Somalia, by resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the African Union to keep it informed every 90 days, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of the AMISOM mandate.¹⁵⁷ In that regard, the Council requested the African Union to report to the Council through no fewer than three detailed written reports with specific reporting on progress on joint operations in support of the Somalia Transition Plan, progress against the Mission's revised objectives and functions, accountability measures taken to address underperformance, measures taken to protect civilians and staffing of the civilian component. Further, the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed on the implementation of the resolution through his regular reports, which had been requested in resolution [2540 \(2020\)](#).¹⁵⁸ In addition, by resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it, within 11 months of the adoption of the resolution, on the situation with regard to piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, including an assessment of National Coast Guard capabilities as well as voluntary reports by cooperating States and regional organizations.¹⁵⁹

In connection with the item entitled "Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan", by resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), the Council condemned all fighting and other violations of the 21 December 2017 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access, and the permanent ceasefire provisions of the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, welcomed the rapid assessment of violations by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification

¹⁵⁵ Resolution [2598 \(2021\)](#), para. 3

¹⁵⁶ Resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), para. 61 (ii).

¹⁵⁷ Resolution [2568 \(2021\)](#), para. 39.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 41.

¹⁵⁹ Resolution [2608 \(2021\)](#), para. 29.

Mechanism and encouraged the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to share reports with the Council rapidly.¹⁶⁰ By the same resolution, the Council invited the African Union to share information on progress made in the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan with the Secretary-General.¹⁶¹ By resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to inform it of progress in implementing the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei in one written report, no later than 15 April 2022, and to include reporting on engagement by the African Union and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on political mediation of the Abyei dispute and the Sudan and South Sudan border issues, and recommendations on the most appropriate framework, structure or organizational mandate for the region to provide support to the parties that would enable further progress in these areas.¹⁶² Furthermore, the Secretary-General was requested to report on the efforts that were deployed by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa to support the African Union and help the parties to establish temporary administrative and security arrangements for Abyei and to achieve a political solution to the status of Abyei.

In 2021, the Council also continued to receive reports on the activities of EUFOR-Althea, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the NATO-led Kosovo Force.¹⁶³

Table 4
Decisions concerning the reporting of activities by regional arrangements

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decisions</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Reporting from</i>
The situation in Libya	Resolution 2578 (2021) 3 June 2021	para. 2	Secretary-General
The situation in Mali	Resolution 2584 (2021) 29 June 2021	para. 61 (ii)	Secretary-General

¹⁶⁰ Resolution [2567 \(2021\)](#), tenth preambular paragraph.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, para. 22.

¹⁶² Resolution [2609 \(2021\)](#), para. 34.

¹⁶³ Concerning the NATO-led Kosovo force, see resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#) and the corresponding reports of the Secretary-General: [S/2021/579](#), [S/2021/799](#), [S/2021/1044](#), and [S/2022/208](#); concerning EUFOR-Althea, see resolution [1575 \(2004\)](#) and the corresponding reports of the Secretary-General: [S/2021/616](#), [S/2021/1072](#) and [S/2022/591](#). Concerning the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, see resolution [2391 \(2017\)](#) and the corresponding reports of the Secretary-General: [S/2021/442](#), [S/2021/940](#) and [S/2022/382](#).

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decisions</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Reporting from</i>
Maintenance of international peace and security	Resolution 2598 (2021) 29 September 2021	para. 3	Member States (acting nationally or through regional organizations), Secretary-General
The situation in Somalia	Resolution 2568 (2021) 12 March 2021	para. 39	African Union
	Resolution 2568 (2021) 12 March 2021	para. 41	Secretary-General
	Resolution 2608 (2021) 3 December 2021	para. 29	Secretary-General (voluntary reporting by cooperating States and regional organizations)
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution 2567 (2021) 12 March 2021	para. 22	Secretary-General, African Union
	Resolution 2609 (2021) 15 December 2021	para. 34	Secretary-General

B. Discussion concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, Article 54 of the Charter was not explicitly referenced in the discussions of the Council. Nonetheless, during meetings and videoconferences of the Council, Council members and other speakers made reference to the reporting by regional organizations of relevance for the application and interpretation of Article 54. For example, at the 8792nd meeting held on 10 June 2021 under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stated that the European Union was probably one of the few international actors that was regularly reporting on their efforts to help implement the Council arms embargo on Libya, which remained crucial for the country’s stability.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁴ See [S/PV.8792](#).

C. Communications concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

In six letters addressed to the President of the Council, the representatives of Kuwait¹⁶⁵ and Qatar,¹⁶⁶ citing Article 54 of the Charter and in their respective capacities as Chairs of the Council of the League of Arab States, transmitted the decisions of the Council of the League on a variety of peace and security issues affecting the Arab region.

Further, the Executive Secretary of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) informed the Council about the deployment to Mozambique of the SADC Standby Force Mission for an initial period of three months from 15 July 2021.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ See [S/2021/790](#) and [S/2021/810](#).

¹⁶⁶ See [S/2021/285](#), [S/2021/462](#), [S/2021/589](#) and [S/2021/598](#).

¹⁶⁷ See [S/2021/658](#).