Foreign-Funded Language
and Culture Institutes at
U.S. Institutions of
Higher Education
Practices to Assess and Mitigate Risk
_____
Philip J. Hanlon, Jayathi Y. Murthy, and Sarah M. Rovito, Editors
Committee on Confucius Institutes at
U.S. Institutions of Higher Education
U.S. Science and Innovation Policy
Policy and Global Affairs
Consensus Study Report
NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20001
This activity was supported by a contract between the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Department of Defense. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization or agency that provided support for the project.
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Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2023. Foreign-Funded Language and Culture Institutes at U.S. Institutions of Higher Education: Practices to Assess and Mitigate Risk. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27065.
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COMMITTEE ON CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AT U.S. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
PHILIP J. HANLON (Chair), President Emeritus and Professor of Mathematics, Dartmouth College
JAYATHI Y. MURTHY (Vice Chair) [NAE],* President and Professor of Mechanical, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Oregon State University
HANNAH L. BUXBAUM, Vice President for International Affairs and Professor of Law and John E. Schiller Chair, Indiana University
CLAUDE R. CANIZARES [NAS], Bruno Rossi Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ROBERT L. DALY, Director, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
PETER K. DORHOUT, Vice President for Research and Professor of Chemistry, Iowa State University
MELISSA L. FLAGG, Founder, Flagg Consulting LLC
MARY GALLAGHER, Lowenstein Professor of Democracy, Democratization, and Human Rights, University of Michigan
JENNY J. LEE, Vice President for Arizona International and Dean of International Education, University of Arizona
IVETT A. LEYVA, Professor and Department Head in Aerospace Engineering, Texas A&M University
ELIZABETH D. PELOSO, Associate Vice President and Associate Vice Provost of Research Services, University of Pennsylvania
ANNA B. PUGLISI, Senior Fellow, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University
JEFFREY M. RIEDINGER, Vice Provost Emeritus of Global Affairs and Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Washington
C. REYNOLD VERRET, President and Professor of Biochemistry, Xavier University of Louisiana
Study Staff
SARAH M. ROVITO, Study Director and Senior Program Officer, U.S. Science and Innovation Policy
TOM WANG, Policy Theme Lead and Senior Board Director, U.S. Science and Innovation Policy
FRAZIER F. BENYA, Senior Program Officer, U.S. Science and Innovation Policy
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* Designates membership in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), National Academy of Engineering (NAE), or National Academy of Medicine (NAM).
JOHN VERAS, Associate Program Officer, U.S. Science and Innovation Policy
BEAU NIELSEN, Research Associate, U.S. Science and Innovation Policy
JORDAN GRAVES, Senior Program Assistant, U.S. Science and Innovation Policy
CLARA HARVEY-SAVAGE, Senior Finance Business Partner, U.S. Science and Innovation Policy
Consultant
JOE ALPER, Consulting Writer
Acknowledgment of Reviewers
This Consensus Study Report was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process.
We thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
Duane Blackburn, The MITRE Corporation; Esther Brimmer, Council on Foreign Relations; Arthur Ellis, Elsevier; Jane Gatewood, University of Rochester; Thomas Gold, University of California, Berkeley; James Holloway, University of New Mexico; Brendan Mulvaney, National Defense University; Robert Nobles, Emory University; Dick Obermann, U.S. House of Representatives (ret.); Bill Priestap, Trenchcoat Advisors; Robert Quinn, Scholars at Risk; and Arun Seraphin, Emerging Technologies Institute.
Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations of this report nor did they see the final draft before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Julia Phillips, Sandia National Labs (ret.), and Jared Cohon, Carnegie Mellon University (ret.). They were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out
in accordance with the standards of the National Academies and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies.
Acknowledgments
The committee acknowledges the U.S. Department of Defense for its support of this study.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRESENTERS
The committee gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the following individuals during open, public sessions held in support of the Confucius Institutes at U.S. Institutions of Higher Education consensus study:
February 15, 2023
- Jessa Albertson, Global Engagement Review Director, Stanford University
- Jeff Stoff, Founder and President, Center for Research Security & Integrity
March 23, 2023
- Amy E. Gadsden, Associate Vice Provost for Global Initiatives and Executive Director of Penn China Initiatives, University of Pennsylvania
- Richard Lester, Japan Steel Industry Professor and Associate Provost, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
In addition, the committee gratefully acknowledges the written input provided by Paul Manfredi, Professor of Chinese and Chair of Languages and Literatures, Pacific Lutheran University and Director, Confucius Institute of the State of Washington.
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Contents
Report Purpose, Charge, and Approach
2 CHARACTERISTICS AND FEATURES OF FOREIGN-FUNDED LANGUAGE AND CULTURE INSTITUTES
Other Formal Foreign-Funded Language and Culture Institutes
3 BENEFITS AND RISKS OF FOREIGN-FUNDED LANGUAGE AND CULTURE INSTITUTES
Benefits Associated with Foreign-Funded Language and Culture Institutes
Risks Associated with Foreign-Funded Language and Culture Institutes
Findings Regarding Background and Context
Findings Regarding Foreign Language and Culture
Findings Regarding Foreign-Funded Language and Culture Institutes
Findings Regarding Foreign Contracts and Gifts
A COMMITTEE BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
C REGULATORY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES
E FOREIGN-FUNDED LANGUAGE AND CULTURE INSTITUTES
F INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY DOCUMENTS DEVELOPED BY U.S. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Preface
The remarkable openness of American universities has reaped enormous dividends for the United States over the last century. Over this period, American universities became a magnet for international talent, attracting brilliant minds from across the world and establishing American dominance in research and higher education. Of 104 Nobel prizes awarded to Americans between 2000 and 2021 in chemistry, medicine, and physics, 38 percent were awarded to immigrants; nearly all who were trained at or employed by U.S. universities and associated institutions. At least as importantly, international students trained at U.S. universities who returned to their home countries had been exposed to American ideas and beliefs. One could argue that soft power is the most durable of powers and that American universities have been an extraordinary vehicle for the projection of U.S. soft power over the decades.
The success of this model has led American universities to regard international collaborations as essential. International connections allow the United States to tap talent from across the globe, bring a diversity of perspectives to the nation’s research and teaching, and deepen our understanding of issues that may manifest themselves differently in other parts of the world. However, this model has been called into question many times over the decades, through the years of the Cold War, the conflict with Iran, the rise of Japan in the 1980s, and most recently, with the rise of China. The case of China is especially complex: the opening up of the Chinese economy during the waning decades of the 20th century was followed by its rapid economic rise. This can be attributed to rapidly increasing funding for research and development, implementing a dictatorial approach requiring all Chinese parties to collaborate for the national good, and
ignoring international science and technology norms in order to achieve objectives (Ford et al., 2021; SCSP, 2022). Today, with an aggressive leader at the helm of the Chinese Communist Party, a significant deterioration has occurred in U.S.-China relations that does not promise to ease any time soon. American universities are faced with resultant challenges to appropriately protect sensitive research; academic freedoms and free speech; and the rights of faculty, staff, and students of Chinese origin on their campuses. At the heart of these actions is the vexing question of how to keep the great engine of American scholarship going while upholding cherished values and simultaneously providing clear-eyed, effective, and practical protections against bad actors. These types of concerns, though prompted by deteriorating relations with China, can just as easily arise with respect to other countries in future.
This document is the second of two consensus reports issued by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (the National Academies) in response to a request from the Department of Defense (DOD) to address these thorny issues as they relate to foreign-funded language and culture institutes on U.S. host campuses. DOD developed the Statement of Task in response to Section 1062 of the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act. The first of these reports, issued in January 2023, responded to DOD’s first charge in the Statement of Task to develop waiver criteria that it could use to permit the establishment and continued presence of Confucius Institutes on U.S. university campuses that received DOD funding, which would otherwise be prohibited. This second report responds to DOD’s second charge to address the security concerns raised by hosting foreign-funded language and culture institutes on U.S. campuses more broadly. It tasks the National Academies with identifying the characteristics and features of these programs that raise concerns and should prompt further deliberation and vetting before entering into or continuing a partnership. Of course, the same concerns should compel reconsidering existing partnerships as well. Though DOD does not require this second report to develop waiver criteria, it does request the National Academies to identify implementable best practices and principles regarding appropriate operations while considering the level of sensitivity of the research being conducted on campus. At the request of DOD, both reports were written at the unclassified level to ensure maximum transparency and accessibility and to engender trust between institutions of higher education and the agency.
The committee consisted of higher education leaders, national security experts, science and technology policy experts, foreign language and China experts, and experts in international programs. Building on the information gathered for its first report, the committee conducted an extensive literature review of relevant legislation, think tank reports, and the recommendations of a variety of professional associations. The committee heard from university representatives from Stanford University, the University of Pennsylvania, and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and received written input from a university representative from Pacific Lutheran University.
As noted in the first report, the committee found that foreign-funded language and culture institutions on campus pose a risk that the host institution can manage but never fully eliminate. It recommends that U.S. host institutions should create both formal and voluntary processes to handle these risks. U.S. host institutions conducting $50 million or more of federally funded research per year should be in compliance with National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33) or subsequent versions of this document (NASEM, 2023).1 The committee also recommends that additional study should be undertaken to support developing research security recommendations and implementable practices for institutions that are below the $50 million federal research expenditure threshold and therefore not subject to NSPM-33. When the foreign partner is a designated country of concern, the host institution should consider additional vetting in accordance with institutional procedures to mitigate the elevated risk.
U.S. host institutions also have an important role to play in developing an awareness of security issues in their campus community. They should clarify and disseminate processes to initiate and review foreign collaborations and to secure and protect intellectual property. They should also take an active role in educating faculty and staff and cultivating a culture of compliance when engaging with foreign-funded institutes, programs, and partnerships.
The committee recommends actions at the national level to provide consistent frameworks for U.S. institutions of higher education and advocates for the U.S. government to create a publicly available clearinghouse of research security information and resources that institutions of higher education can access. Furthermore, it is essential to develop a harmonized and consistent approach across federal agencies for reporting foreign gifts and contracts by U.S. institutions of higher education so that institutions of higher education do not have to deal with a patchwork of contradictory requirements. Higher education accrediting bodies should subject foreign-funded language and culture institutes at U.S. host institutions to review as part of the accreditation process.
We would like to close by expressing our deepest appreciation to all who made this consensus study possible: the committee members who generously volunteered their time and expertise and whose spirited and frank discussions helped surface important insights; the experts who shared their knowledge and deep experience; Joe Alper, who helped create a coherent and readable report; and finally, the support provided by the able staff at the National Academies, led by the energetic and efficient Sarah Rovito. We hope the recommendations of this
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1 A Request for Information on the NSPM-33 Research Security Programs Standard Requirement was published in the Federal Register in March 2023, with a comment period end date of June 2023; see https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/07/2023-04660/request-for-information-nspm-33-research-security-programs-standard-requirement.
report will not only help protect national security but also protect the cherished freedoms and close international collaborations that have made U.S. higher education the envy of the world.
Philip J. Hanlon, Chair
Jayathi Y. Murthy, Vice Chair
Committee on Confucius Institutes at U.S. Institutions of Higher Education
