Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition (2024)

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1 Introduction Chemical terrorism is a threat because toxic chemicals and their precursors are sought and have been used by domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations (VEO) referred to as terrorist groups. Many U.S. counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD or CWMD) terrorism policies and strategies were enacted and received significantly more attention following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent mailing of envelopes containing spores of B. anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax. The use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria and violent extremist organizations as part of the Syrian civil war also brought renewed attention to the risk of chemical threats (the White House, 2012). The U.S. capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. 1.1 STATEMENT OF TASK Recognizing the need to understand current U.S. strategies to adequately address chemical terrorism, Section 1299I of the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the Secretary of Defense (who delegated to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy OUSD(P)) to sponsor the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to conduct an independent review of strategies to prevent, counter, and respond to chemical terrorism. Box 1-1 provides the statement of task for which the committee was charged with addressing those points. BOX 1-1 Study Statement of Task (SOT) The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) will appoint an ad hoc topical committee to address specific issues related to chemical terrorism threats. This committee will address the adequacy of strategies to prevent, counter, and respond to chemical terrorism, and identify technical, policy, and resource gaps with respect to: 1. identifying national and international chemical risks, and critical emerging threats; 2. preventing state-sponsored and non-state actors from acquiring or misusing the technologies, materials, and critical expertise needed to carry out chemical attacks, including dual-use technologies, materials, and expertise; 3. countering efforts by state-sponsored and non-state actors to carry out such attacks; 4. responding to chemical terrorism incidents to attribute their origin and help manage their consequences; 5. budgets likely to be required to implement effectively such strategies; and 6. other important matters that are directly relevant to such strategies. NASEM will produce a consensus report and may produce additional products (such as proceedings of workshops) by mutual agreement with the sponsor. The consensus report will be unclassified with a classified annex. Prepublication Copy 14 

Introduction 1.1.1 Study Scope Given the breadth of the study’s statement of task, the committee has taken a high-level view of this tasking and focused on identifying the most important technical, policy, and resource gaps with respect to strategies for identifying, preventing, countering, responding to, and budgeting for chemical threats and attacks against U.S. interests. The committee decided to combine preventing and countering terrorism in their strategy assessment. Identifying emerging threats was limited to those that enable capabilities to respond to chemical terrorist attacks and their immediate effects. Table 1-1 provides definitions for several key terms used throughout the report. Considerations of long-term health and environmental effects were beyond the scope of the charge. The committee considered both high-level approaches as well as publicly available strategy documents developed by the U.S. government (USG) and limited the timeframe to post- 9/11 Strategies (2001-2023). Other strategies and related documents considered by the committee are in Appendix A. In addition to evaluating documents, the committee was also briefed by representatives of various federal agencies through several information-gathering meetings (see full list of briefers Appendix A). In conducting the strategies assessment, the committee has focused on chemical threats originating from non-state actors with or without state involvement (e.g., knowledge or capabilities sharing and other forms of support to enable chemical terrorism) but not the states themselves. The committee also conducted a high-level review of recent chemical terrorism events, leveraging the work of subject matter experts including members of the committee. The recent rise of domestic terrorist events has motivated the committee to focus on this aspect along with foreign terrorism (whether directed abroad or at domestic targets). The study’s emphasis on domestic terrorism is aligned with the 2023 FBI and DHS assessment and data report, which states: “The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. One of the most significant terrorism threats to the United States we face today is posed by lone actors and small groups of individuals who commit acts of violence motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or personal grievances. Of these actors, domestic violent extremists represent one of the most persistent threats to the United States today.” (FBI, 2023) Furthermore, federal organizations that are key players in the chemical terrorism space recognize that the definition of domestic violent extremist (DVE) will need to be updated in order to accurately assess the current threat space: “In 2021, the FBI, DHS I&A, and NCTC jointly updated the booklet, U.S. Violent Extremist Mobilization Indicators, which contains observable indicators to help bystanders or observers recognize behaviors that may indicate mobilization to violence. Unlike prior editions⎯which focused entirely on foreign terrorist-inspired, homegrown violent extremists⎯the 2021 edition was expanded to include indicators that apply across U.S.-based ideologically motivated violent extremists, including indicators validated as relevant for DVEs.” Prepublication Copy 15 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies TABLE 1-1 Key Definitions Term Definition Chemical weapon A toxic chemical and its precursors or a munition, device, or equipment specifically designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those toxic chemicals. (Condensed from 18 USC Ch. 11B Chemical Weapons 229F).a Chemical-terrorism The unlawful use of chemical hazards/agents/weapons or threat of use of chemical hazards/agents/weapons against persons, property, environmental, or economic targets, to induce fear or to intimidate, coerce, or affect a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political, social, ideological, or religious objectives (DHS, 2017) (Adapted from DHS risk lexicon). Domestic Terrorism • Involves an act that: 1) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources, and is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and • Appears to be intended to: − Intimidate or coerce a civilian population; − Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or − Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. (DHS lexicon)a Domestic Violent A domestic violent extremist (DVE) is defined as an individual based and operating Extremist primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence dangerous to human life.c Weapon of mass Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction destruction or causing mass casualties (DoD dictionary) (DoD, 2021) Weapon of mass effect Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of inflicting significant destructive, psychological, and/or economic damage to the United States (Adapted from Weapons of Mass Effect Task Force, 2006) Emerging threats Threats with the potential to materialize in the next 5 to 10 years. Strategies Statements of goals to fulfill assigned missions based on existing and expected resources Prevention Activities and operations to dissuade states or non-states from pursuing the development of acquisition of WMD (JP 3-40) Countering Activities and operations to interdict or stop a chemical terrorism plot or attack that is an immediate threat or underway/being executed Response Immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs; include the execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery (DHS risk lexicon) a See https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title18/part1/chapter11B&edition=prelim#:~:text=(1)%20 Chemical%20weapon%20.,consistent%20with%20such%20a%20purpose)]. b Definition of “domestic terrorism” from the Homeland Security Act definition of “terrorism,” 6 USC § 101(18), which is similar, but not identical, to the 18 USC § 2331(5) definition. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. c See https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/fbi-dhs-domestic-terrorism-strategic-report-2023.pdf/view. These terms apply to terrorist groups that use a wide range of WMDs–staying within the scope of this study, the committee placed more focus on chemical terrorism threats that were likely to cause immediate or significant impacts. Chemical terrorism threats considered include agents identified as chemical weapons as well as existing and emerging threats including toxic industrial chemicals and materials (TICs and TIMs). Prepublication Copy 16 

Introduction 1.1.2 Committee’s Approach The committee recognized that its recommendations to improve strategies may only be implemented by actions requiring budget authority. The committee took a high-level view of this task and focused on identifying the most important technical, policy, and resource gaps with respect to identifying, preventing, countering, and responding to chemical threats and attacks. The committee undertook an information-gathering strategy. As the study commenced, the committee collected policy documents regarding existing U.S. strategies against chemical weapons. As relevant strategies were published after the committee commenced, they were also evaluated. After the study committee had completed its data-gathering activities for this study, DoD issued the 2023 Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. As a result, the study committee’s report does not formally examine the new strategy document, but that strategy document is based on the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which is discussed in the study committee’s report. The study committee’s ideas, findings, and recommendations still apply and merit full consideration. Additionally, the committee received numerous briefings: from the study sponsor, organizations associated with strategies against chemical weapons, and subject-matter experts otherwise aligned with the SOT. The briefings focused the committee on aspects of the broad chemical weapons landscape most and least aligned with the SOT. For budgetary assessment (Line 6 of the SOT), the committee compiled a series of national functions and the benefits of retaining these resources in future budgets. Two parallel committees with similar charges are evaluating other national strategies against threats: one with a biological terrorism focus (Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Biological Threats) and one with a nuclear terrorism focus (Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Nuclear Threat). While radioactive substances are specific chemical elements (e.g., radon, isotopes of cobalt, cesium-137, polonium-210, uranium-235, plutonium-239, and americium-241), this chemical terrorism-focused committee decided that agents and terrorist activities where the harm primarily derives from radioactivity and the hazards derived therefrom are the purview of the nuclear committee. Differentiation between the focus of the biological and chemical committees could be more difficult.1 While some areas, such as bacteria (e.g. protein toxins produced by bacteria), 1 “Chemical Terrorism” versus “Biological terrorism” or “radiological terrorism” is not defined in the U.S. Code. “Chemical weapons” are defined in 18 U.S.C. 11B - CHEMICAL WEAPONS, see https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2015-title18/html/USCODE-2015-title18-partI- chap11B.htm. “Chemical weapon.—The term “chemical weapon” means the following, together or separately: “(A) A toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose. “(B) A munition or device, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (A), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munition or device. “(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in subparagraph (B). Prepublication Copy 17 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies viruses, and fungi are more easily delineated within the domain of biological terrorism; other materials like peptides and molecular toxins (e.g., cyanotoxin, Anatoxin-a) blur this division (Fozo et al., 2008; Hayes, 2003). Chemical compounds and mixtures, including biologically derived molecules (peptides, prions, genetic material), were considered to be within the purview of this consensus study. The committee recognizes that this division does not rigorously define the chemical or biological terrorism boundary, however, they made this practical choice to impose limits on the scope of strategies to be investigated. The committee recognizes that this division is not without problems, especially in the context of increasingly interdisciplinary scientific approaches. This report will discuss threats at the intersection of biological and chemical terrorism between committees as it pertains to the charge. 1.2 CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT The next sections describe five trends that the committee considers to be significant⎯in varying ways and degrees⎯to the current and future environment of chemical threats: erosion of norms of non-use of chemical agents (1.2.1); return to great power competition (1.2.2); emerging technologies (1.2.3); challenges to domestic capacity to respond (1.2.4); and threat of pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) (1.2.5). The committee’s analysis, findings, conclusions, and recommendations intersect with these phenomena. 1.2.1 Erosion of Norms of Non-Use of Chemical Agents While chemical agents have a long history, the world saw a transformative change in the scope and scale of their use on the battlefield in WWI continuing through the ongoing Syrian civil war. Recent use by authoritarian states to target defectors and dissidents has also revitalized international and domestic attention and interest in chemical weapons. International law, laws of armed conflict, arms control, and other treaties, contribute to global norm formation (Deitelhoff, 2019; Katzenstein, 1996; Price, 1995; Tannenwald, 1999; Brunnée, 2019; Nyarko, 2018). How and to what extent those legal frameworks apply to non- state actors, including VEOs is debated (O’Donnell, 2006; Federer, 2019; Birdsall, 2016, Wunderlich, 2020), including in the U.S. Supreme Court.2 However, under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR1540) countries are required to prevent terrorist access to WMD. Similarly, the CWC requires adhering states to ensure that chemical weapons are not used within their territory. “Purposes not prohibited by this chapter.—The term “purposes not prohibited by this chapter” means the following: “(A) Peaceful purposes.—Any peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity. “(B) Protective purposes.—Any purpose directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons. “(C) Unrelated military purposes.—Any military purpose of the United States that is not connected with the use of a chemical weapon or that is not dependent on the use of the toxic or poisonous properties of the chemical weapon to cause death or other harm. “(D) Law enforcement purposes.—Any law enforcement purpose, including any domestic riot control purpose and including imposition of capital punishment.” 2 Rasul v Bush (03-334) 321 F.3d 1134, reversed and remanded. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-334.ZO.html Prepublication Copy 18 

Introduction “[A]ll States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;” and “[A]ll States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials…” (UNSCR, 2004) Non-state actors are not party to international treaties. Acts of terrorism directed at civilians and other non-combatants violate the norms of the laws of armed conflict. Nonetheless, the existing legal frameworks and associated norms can serve as guides and models for thinking about the violent use of unconventional weapons, like chemical agents, against civilians or against uniformed service members in non-combatant situations. Since WWI, efforts domestically and internationally have led to the creation of international institutions and the establishment of international law and norms intended to reduce and eliminate the horrors of chemical weapons. These efforts grew out of visceral experiences from the war, during which chemical agents were extensively used, especially in the Western operational theater of trench warfare. Following WWI, states negotiated the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, more commonly known as the Geneva Protocol. The Geneva Protocol had a relatively narrow scope and prohibited the use of biological and chemical weapons in interstate conflict, but it did not prohibit production, stockpiling, or testing of either class of weapons. The United States did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until 1975 and did so in the context of ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which prohibits stockpiling, production, testing, and use of chemical weapons during interstate conflict, entered into force in 1997. As part of the CWC, a stand-alone international body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), was created to oversee the implementation of the treaty, including the demilitarization of declared stockpiles. As of late 2023, more than 190 states parties are included in the Convention. In 2008, the bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, commonly known as the Graham/Talent WMD Commission, issued its final report. Among its conclusions was “Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a WMD will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.” 3 The Graham/Talent WMD Commission further clarified the type of WMD to which they were referring, asserting that “terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon.” Few considerations were made regarding chemical weapons in the report. By 2013, the world witnessed a resurgence of the use of chemical weapons by state- 3 World at Risk, https://web.archive.org/web/20090130205134/http://documents.scribd.com /docs/15bq1nrl9aerfu0yu9qd.pdf, p 15. The text of the report reads: “The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon.” Prepublication Copy 19 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies based actors.4 Those uses were deployed for targeted assassination of political rivals and persons seen as politically threatening to authoritarian regimes; or as part of an inter-state civil war (i.e., Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Syrian Civil War). These are not the types of uses of chemical weapons that drove much of the Cold War era thinking, which was heavily influenced by military use in WWI and significantly less use (but some terrible exceptions and much stockpiling) in WWII. The last decade has seen renewed use of chemical weapons in conflicts and by authoritarian states as a means to limit rivals and others seen as threatening. A more detailed discussion of the history and analysis of the use of chemical agents by non-state actors, and terrorists, is discussed in Chapter 4. 1.2.2 Return to Great Power Competition The October 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) began by noting a strategic shift in the international security environment: “… the post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next” (NSS, 2022a). Referred to as great power competition (GPC) or less commonly, strategic competition, the United States has shifted its strategic posture over the last decade from an emphasis on countering VEOs to addressing challenges from inter-state competition. The NSS asserts that “[t]he most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy” (NSS, 2022b). This intensified competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Russian Federation (Russia) “has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues” (O’Rourke, 2022). The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), counterterrorism efforts, and U.S. operations in the greater Middle East and SW Asia—which had been at the center of U.S. security policy following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001— have given way to a stronger focus on China and Russia. This strategic shift, which began with the United States “pivot” or “re-balance” to Asia announced in 2011 (Clinton, 2011), is resulting in changes throughout the U.S. Government (USG), especially in those offices and agencies whose mission is directly related to national and international security. Budgets are being re-considered and changes to organizational structures, including force planning, are being made or contemplated (O’Rourke, 2022). The committee tried to be attentive to how this major strategic shift is or could potentially impact the United States’ ability to prevent, counter, and respond to chemical terrorism threats. National security strategies are issued and updated on a periodic basis by various USG agencies. The 2022 National Defense Strategy Data Sheet (DoD, 2022) (and the full strategy released 10/27/22) details the United States’ shift to GPC, which could inadvertently create gaps in U.S. preparedness for chemical terrorism threats: hence a motivation for examining current strategies as directed in the SOT (Box 1-1). The committee elaborates on this trend and its future implications on U.S. national strategies and budget in Chapter 7. 1.2.3 Emerging Technologies Historically, terrorists have overwhelmingly pursued conventional weapons (largely guns and bombs) and have not shown a proclivity to innovate in general (Hoffman, 1993, 2001). Nonetheless, terrorist organizations, notably al Qaeda, have shown a capacity to exploit 4 This observation was made previously in Kosal (2019). Prepublication Copy 20 

Introduction expectations regarding terrorist behavior and operations (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Scholars have looked at the question of terrorist innovation, both empirically and more speculatively (Ackerman, 2016; Dolnik, 2007; Gill et al., 2013; Kosal, 2009; Logan et al., 2021; Lubrano, 2021; Ranstorp and Normark, 2015; Tennenbaum and Kosal, 2021; Tishler, 2018). Settling on a single definition or time horizon for what qualifies as an emerging technology is debated. One description delineates what qualifies as an emerging technology via five key attributes that a technology must possess in order to qualify as an emerging technology: radical novelty, relatively fast growth, coherence, prominent impact, and uncertainty and ambiguity (Rotolo, 2015). The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) has promulgated a list of specific technologies that have been identified as relevant to security concerns in its Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update (The White House, 2022a), but it does not define what an emerging technology is, which is not uncommon to encounter in documents. While an exhaustive chemical threats inventory was out of scope for the study, it was necessary for the committee to identify what chemical threats they would use to compare strategies. Additionally, the role of strategies in encouraging and enabling cooperation among U.S. agencies at multiple levels, as well as with allied nations, was included in the report. Discussions regarding the likelihood and feasibility of deploying emerging threats technologies by various actors are further discussed in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, concerns about non-state actors using U.S. ingenuity against the country, especially in the context of emerging technology, are perennial concerns. 1.2.4 Domestic Capacity to Respond Public and expert concerns about the ability of the United States to respond effectively or adequately have been heightened during the initial response to the COVID-19 global pandemic (Latkin et al., 2020; Hamilton et al., 2021; Pollard and Davis, 2022; Deslatte, 2020; Goldstein and Wiedemann, 2020; Goldfinch et al., 2021) and the rise in domestic partisanship (Kushner et al., 2020; Van Green and Tyson, 2020; Funk et al., 2020; Roberts, 2020; Milligan, 2020). These concerns are especially impactful in working across levels of government⎯for example, among cities, counties, states, tribal authorities, and the federal government—as trust in government correlates positively with effective response in emergency situations (Lau et al., 2020). Confidence in government institutions “has been identified as a cornerstone of the political system, particularly in crises such as natural disasters, economic crises, or pandemics” (Han et al., 2021). An investigative report, led by the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, Philip Zelikow, found that “[t]he leaders of the United States could not apply their country’s vast assets effectively enough in practice” (Washington Post, 2023). Questions remain regarding the domestic capacity to respond. While most questions are beyond the scope of this committee, the scope and scale of the broader impact on public confidence is an aspect that the committee considered important enough to highlight as a trend with impacts on the United States’ ability to identify, counter, and respond to chemical terrorism threats. In the context of the broader threat of terrorism, the government agency, Europol, highlighted how COVID-19 and the perceived inability of governments to respond, including those outside the United States, has affected terrorist groups. They specifically note that “for those advocating extremist ideologies, the crisis has emerged as an opportunity to advance their Prepublication Copy 21 

Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies narrative.” (EUROPOL, 2022) U.S. capacity and capability to respond to terrorist incidents, including those that employ traditional, improvised, or emerging chemical agents. The effectiveness of the National Response Framework and other strategies implicitly relies on a robust capacity to respond. Further implications of this trend in the context of other specific strategies are discussed in Chapter 6. 1.2.5 Pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) In considering the intersections of pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and the threat of chemical terrorism, the foremost reason for this consideration is that it may be a proxy for thinking and preparing to respond to other agents. This concept is not new; the world witnessed the potential for opioid-like compounds to cause significant fatalities in 2002 when Russian special police used an aerosolized fentanyl analog, carfentanil, to end the siege of a Moscow theater by Chechen separatists. That incident has prompted a good deal of writing on concerns related to riot-control agents (RCA) (Timperley et al., 2018; Martínková and Smetana, 2020; Robinson, 2007; Klotz et al., 2003; Fidler, 2005; Crowley, 2016). That event also points to concerns regarding an emerging class of agents, including their lethality and potential operational use. PBAs that affect the central nervous system are a class of chemicals that are authorized and used for legitimate medical, veterinary, pharmaceutical, chemical production, agricultural, and other purposes (Caves and Carus, 2022). Developed as anesthetics (pain reducers or sensation reducers), analgesics (pain relievers), anticonvulsants, anorexiants (appetite suppressants), anti-Parkinson agents, cholinesterase inhibitors (nerve agent countermeasures), and calmatives (sedatives) (Daggett, 2007), they are a subset of incapacitating agents. If used in a contraindicated manner, in excess (overdose), or in certain exposure contexts, they can cause incapacitation, injury, or death. These substances include opioids, like fentanyl, but also nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs), like ibuprofen; barbiturates and benzodiazepines,5 used to treat seizures; and carfentanil, used legitimately in large animal veterinary practices or less so by Russian Spetsnaz (Special Police) Forces in 2002 in response to Russian domestic terrorists who occupied a crowded theater, taking 850 hostages (also known as the 2002 Nord-Ost siege) (Riches et al., 2012). Opioids are not inherently chemical weapons.6 Designation of something as a chemical weapon is not solely based on its toxicity (see definition of chemical weapon Table 1-1). Opioids have legitimate and beneficial uses. (World Health Organization, n.d.) Local or criminally- motivated attacks are not chemical terrorism.7 The committee notes that a careful unpacking of the issues surrounding opioids is necessary due to the complexity and need to clearly state that the current epidemic (The White House, 2022b)8 is not chemical terrorism and that pharmaceutical pain medications, licit or illicitly obtained, are not chemical weapons. The U.S. opioid epidemic may, however, be an example for thinking about a number of pressing issues 5 For example, the opioid benzodiazepine Seizalam was cited as an example of countermeasure for chemical terrorism during one of the committee’s briefings. 6 See 18 U.S.C. 11B - CHEMICAL WEAPONS, see https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE- 2015-title18/html/USCODE-2015-title18-partI-chap11B.htm. 7 See https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/12-158. 8 In-line with the statement of task, the committee primarily focused on non-state actors and did not assess U.S. strategies to address threats or attacks from state actors. Prepublication Copy 22 

Introduction directly related to U.S. strategies and efforts to reduce the threat of chemical weapons by both state and non-state actors in the 21st Century. 1.3 REPORT ORGANIZATION The remainder of this report discusses the trends mentioned in Section 1.2 and the current state of U.S. strategies for identifying, preventing/countering, and responding to chemical terrorism. Chapter 2 introduces the chemical threat landscape⎯both baseline and emerging threats that set the stage for the committee’s analysis. Then, a systematic methodology to assess the adequacy of USG strategies is presented in Chapter 3. The subsequent chapters provide an assessment of the strategies from the perspective of identifying chemical threats (Chapter 4), preventing or countering chemical attacks (Chapter 5), and responding to chemical attacks or chemical hazards (Chapter 6). Throughout the report, technical, policy, and resource gaps in the strategies are discussed. Findings, conclusions, and recommendations related to each framework (identify, prevent/counter, or respond) are presented. A brief summary can be found at the end of each chapter. Finally, Chapter 7 covers major themes that cut across the previous chapters and provides broader recommendations applied to the overall national strategy (i.e., shift towards GPC) beyond the documents assessed by the committee. REFERENCES Ackerman, Gary A. “Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts.” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 9, no. 1, 2016, pp. 119–33. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 26465417. Birdsall Andrea. 2016. “But We Don’t Call It ‘torture’! Norm Contestation During the U.S. ‘War on Terror.’” International Politics 53(2):176–97. Brunnée Jutta Toope Stephen J. 2019. Norm Robustness and Contestation in International Law: Self-Defense against Non-State Actors. Journal of Global Security Studies 4 (1):73–87. Latkin, C. A., L. D., J. C. Strickland, B. Colon, R. Rimal and B. Boodram. 2020. An Assessment of the Rapid Decline of Trust in U.S. Sources of Public Information about COVID-19, Journal of Health Communication, 25:10, 764-773, doi: 10.1080/10810730.2020.1865487. Caves, Jr., John P. and Carus, W. Seth. 2022. Controlling Chemical Weapons in the New International Order, Proceedings NDU CSWMD, August 2022, https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/ Publications/Publication-View/Article/3144576/controlling-chemical-weapons-in-the-new- international-order. Clinton, H. 2011. America’s Pacific Century. Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011. https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/& “Barack Obama says Asia-Pacific is ‘top U.S. priority,’” BBC, 17 November 2011. https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-asia-15715446. Crowley, M. 2016. Chemical Control: Regulation of Incapacitating Chemical Agent Weapons, Riot Control Agents and Their Means of Delivery. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Daggett, M. 2007. Pharmacological Overview of Calmatives, NCJ No. 220986, National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), Dept of Justice, https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/ virtual-library/abstracts/pharmacological-overview-calmatives. Prepublication Copy 23 

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Chemical Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies Nyarko, J. 2018. Giving the Treaty a Purpose: Comparing the Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements. The American Journal of International Law 113(1):54-89; Price, Richard MacKay. The Chemical Weapons Taboo. Cornell University Press. O’Rourke, R. 2022. Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, R43838, November 08, 2022, p 2, https://crsreports. congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R43838. O’Donnell, D. 2006. International treaties against terrorism and the use of terrorism during armed conflict and by armed forces. International Review of the Red Cross, 88(864), 853-880. doi:10.1017/S1816383107000847. Pollard M. S., Davis L. M. 2022. Decline in Trust in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Rand Health Q. 6:30-9(3):23 Price, R. 1995. “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo.” International Organization 49(1):73–103. Ranstorp, M. and Normark, M. (Eds.). 2015. Understanding Terrorism Innovation and Learning: Al-Qaeda and Beyond (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315726816. Riches, J. R., Read, R. W., Black, R. M., Cooper, N. J.; Timperley, C. M. 2012. Analysis of Clothing and Urine from Moscow Theatre Siege Casualties Reveals Carfentanil and Remifentanil Use, Journal of Analytical Toxicology, Volume 36, Issue 9, November/December 2012, pp 647-656. Roberts, D. 2020. Partisanship is the Strongest Predictor of Coronavirus Response. Vox. https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2020/3/31/21199271/coronavirus-in-us-trump- republicans-democrats-survey-epistemic-crisis. Robinson, JPP. 2007. Non-Lethal Warfare and the Chemical Weapons Convention, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Papers/421rev3.pdf. Rotolo, Daniele; Hicks, Diana; Martin, Ben R. 2015. “What is an emerging technology?” Research Policy. 44(10):1827–1843. Tannenwald, N. 1999. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use.” International Organization 53 (3):433–68. Tennenbaum, M. and Kosal, M. E. 2021. “The Interplay Between Frugal Science and Chemical and Biological Weapons: Investigating the Proliferation Risks of Technology Intended for Humanitarian, Disaster Response, and International Development Efforts,” in Weapons Technology Proliferation: Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic Approaches to Proliferation. pp 153-204. https://www.springer.com/us/book/978303 0736545. The White House. 2012. Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps, The White House, August 20, 2012. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps. The White House. 2022a. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022- Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf. The White House. 2022b. National Drug Control Strategy, The White House Executive Office of The President Office of National Drug Control Policy. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2022/04/National-Drug-Control-2022Strategy.pdf. Timperley, C. M. 2018. J. E. Forman, P. Åas, M. Abdollahi, D. Benachour, A. S. Al-Amri, A. Baulig, R. Becker-Arnold, V. Borrett, F. A. Cariño, C. Curty, D. Gonzalez, M. Geist, W. Kane, Z. Kovarik, R. Martínez-Álvarez, R. Mikulak, N. M. F. Mourão, S. Neffe, E. DS. Nogueira, P. Ramasami, S. K. Raza, V. Rubaylo, A. E. M. Saeed, K. Takeuchi, C. Tang, Prepublication Copy 26 

Introduction F. Trifirò, F. M. van Straten, A. G. Suárez, F. Waqar, P. S. Vanninen, M. Zafar-Uz- Zaman, S. Vučinić, V. Zaitsev, M. S. Zina, S. Holen, and F. Nurul Izzati. Advice from the Scientific Advisory Board of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on riot control agents in connection to the Chemical Weapons Convention, RSC Adv., 8:41731-41739. https://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlehtml/2018/ra/c8ra08 273a. Tishler, Nicole A. 2018. Trends in Terrorists’ Weapons Adoption and the Study Thereof, International Studies Review, Volume 20, Issue 3, September 2018, Pages 368–394. https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix038. UNSCR, United Nations Security Council Resolution. 2004. Resolution 1540. https://documents- dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement. Van Green, T., Tyson, A. 2020. 5 facts about partisan reactions to COVID-19 in the U.S. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/02/5-facts-about- partisan-reactions-to-covid-19-in-the-u-s. Washington Post. 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/24/covid-pandemic- government-response-report. https://covidcrisisgroup.org. Weapons of Mass Effect Task Force. 2006. Preventing the Entry of Weapons of Mass Effect into the United States. Homeland Security Advisory Council. https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ assets/hsac_wme-report_20060110.pdf. World Health Organization (WHO). (n.d.). Essential medicines lists. https://www.who.int/ groups/expert-committee-on-selection-and-use-of-essential-medicines/essential- medicines-lists. Wunderlich, Carmen. 2020. Rogue States as Norm Entrepreneurs, Springer Academic Publishers, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-27990-5. Prepublication Copy 27