



Security Council

Distr.: General
15 November 2022

Original: English

Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 June to 2 November 2022

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report, issued on 14 July 2022 (S/2022/556), including on the provisions of resolution 2650 (2022). Outstanding obligations remain for both parties under resolution 1701 (2006). On 27 October, Lebanon and Israel exchanged separate letters with the United States of America, noting their agreement to the terms related to the establishment of a permanent maritime boundary between them. There was no progress towards a permanent ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of UNIFIL

2. Some tensions persisted in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) area of operations. UNIFIL observed illumination rounds, fired by the Israel Defense Forces, in response to what the latter asserted were suspicious activities, and impacting north of the Blue Line close to Shab'a on 21 August and close to Ghajar on 6 September and 23 October (both Sector East). On 22 August, UNIFIL detected a mortar shell, fired from an area north of Shab'a and landing within Lebanon. UNIFIL dispatched air and vehicle patrols to the suspected launch site. Six individuals, three of whom carried assault rifles, stopped one of the vehicle patrols and gestured for it to leave the area. Subsequently, UNIFIL, in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, visited the suspected impact point, but no remnants of a mortar round were found. A UNIFIL visit to the suspected launch site is pending facilitation by the Lebanese Armed Forces.

3. UNIFIL observed individuals throwing stones at the Israeli technical fence on numerous occasions, in particular near Shaykh Abbad's tomb in Hula, in Mays al-Jabal (both Sector East), and in Bustan (Sector West). The Israel Defense Forces pointed their weapons at individuals approaching the Blue Line on at least 14 occasions and fired rounds in the air on at least 13 occasions in Hula and Shab'a. The most serious such incident occurred in Hula on 28 August, when the Israel Defense



Forces fired approximately 30 rounds in the air and launched two tear gas grenades and three smoke grenades after individuals had approached the Blue Line. Two of the smoke grenades landed in a nearby UNIFIL position. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident. On 14 October, an Israel Defense Forces soldier threw two stun grenades, which landed north of the Blue Line in Hula. Instances of weapon-pointing across the Blue Line also continued, with UNIFIL interposing between the parties on 18 September in Majidiyah (Sector East). On 17 October, the Israel Defense Forces fired four flares, two of which landed north of the Blue Line near Hula.

4. From 21 June to 2 November, UNIFIL concluded investigations into four incidents described in the previous report (S/2022/556): an illumination shell, fired by Israel Defense Forces across the Blue Line and landing in Lebanon on 14 April; a rocket, fired from Lebanon by unknown parties and landing in Israel on 25 April, and indirect artillery fired by Israel Defense Forces in response; illumination shells fired from Israel across the Blue Line on 17 May; and an Israel Defense Forces drone found near Rumaysh (Sector West) on 26 May. The findings of the investigations were shared with the parties. On 31 August and 5 September, the General Directorate of General Security of Lebanon facilitated the return of equipment seized from UNIFIL peacekeepers during incidents that occurred in 2021 and 2022.

5. The Israel Defense Forces continued the construction of their T-wall south of the Blue Line, from Shlomi to Hanita and from Zar'it to Biranit (see S/2022/556, para. 7). The construction of the wall, which has reached a length of 7.9 km, remains outside the Lebanese “reservation areas” north of Shlomi and east of Alma al-Sha'b and Hanita.

6. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. Between 21 June and 2 November, UNIFIL recorded 207 airspace violations, totalling 257 hours and six minutes in overflight time. Uncrewed aerial vehicles accounted for approximately 96.7 per cent of the violations. On 18 July, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that they had downed a drone south of the Blue Line. UNIFIL did not observe the incident.

7. From 21 June to 2 November, UNIFIL observed 432 ground violations by Lebanese civilians crossing south of the Blue Line, including 290 violations by shepherds and farmers and 8 by individuals near the Shu'ayb well, close to Blida. Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers crossed the Blue Line in Hula on 9 and 10 August while monitoring groundworks by the Israel Defense Forces south of the Blue Line. Israel Defense Forces soldiers crossed the Blue Line in Bastrah, Kfar Shuba (both Sector East) and Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West) on 13 and 30 August and on 21 September while patrolling. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that they had apprehended an individual who had crossed the Blue Line near Hula on 26 July and two other individuals on 29 September. All three individuals were released within two days.

8. The occupation of northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces is a continuing violation of resolution 1701 (2006). While the Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, the Government of Israel has yet to respond. The Israel Defense Forces continued roadworks in the area (see S/2022/556, para. 6). UNIFIL has requested the Israel Defense Forces to cease the works.

9. To help keep the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons, UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, maintained 16 permanent checkpoints, and a monthly average of 124 temporary checkpoints and 316 counter-rocket-launching

operations. In the reporting period, the average percentage of total operations that could be conducted in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces was maintained at 19.8 per cent.

10. UNIFIL observed unauthorized weapons in its area of operations on 196 occasions, including pistols observed on four occasions and assault weapons observed on three occasions. UNIFIL also observed individuals with assault rifles at the firing ranges in Zibqin (Sector West) and Qantarah (Sector East) on 15 occasions (see [S/2022/556](#), para. 10). UNIFIL further observed a progressive upgrade of facilities and the installation of permanent structures at these firing ranges. No weapons were observed at the firing ranges in Furn and Dayr Amis (Sector West) during the reporting period. All other observations of weapons related to hunters. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces of each of the incidents.

11. Pursuant to resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), UNIFIL maintained its high operational tempo and visible presence, undertaking an average of 14,139 monthly operational activities, including 6,401 vehicular, air or foot patrols. Air reconnaissance patrols continued over areas where ground patrols have limited access, including private property and land that are contaminated by explosive remnants of war or anti-personnel mines, and wadis. Some 10.3 per cent of UNIFIL operational activities included at least one woman peacekeeper.

12. Misleading information about UNIFIL and its role was circulated in the days following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#). In that regard, some media and public figures questioned the right of UNIFIL to undertake patrols without the Lebanese Armed Forces. Such statements contributed to tension with local communities in the first half of September. To address the misperceptions, the mission engaged with local and international media, issuing statements and participating in interviews, underscoring the mission's commitment to security and stability in South Lebanon. UNIFIL also emphasized that the Mission is mandated to patrol with or without Lebanese Armed Forces as an integral part of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), and that UNIFIL is in Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese authorities and continues to coordinate its activities with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

13. While its freedom of movement was respected in most cases, the mission encountered several impediments in that regard (see annex I). The most serious incident occurred on 21 June, when several individuals entered a UNIFIL observation tower in Shab'a and physically confronted a peacekeeper. On 22 August, armed individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol in Shab'a (see para. 2 above). Stones were thrown at UNIFIL patrols on 13 occasions, causing minor damage to UNIFIL vehicles on two occasions. On 29 September and 3 October, individuals fired what appeared to be fireworks in the direction of a UNIFIL helicopter overflying the area near the firing range of Dayr Amis (Sector West). On 7 August, in Yarun, the Israel Defense Forces pointed weapons in the direction of UNIFIL personnel. On 22 August, an Israel Defense Forces soldier in Ghajar pointed a laser beam at peacekeepers in a watchtower. On 8 September, in connection with maintenance work, Israeli civilian workers in occupied northern Ghajar pushed boulders and soil from an elevated area onto an adjacent road north of the Blue Line, putting UNIFIL soldiers at risk and restricting UNIFIL access to the Blue Line. UNIFIL has since restored access to the area.

14. Despite repeated requests, UNIFIL has yet to gain full access to several locations of interest, including Green Without Borders sites, the tunnels crossing the Blue Line (see [S/2019/237](#)) and the aforementioned firing ranges. From 21 June to 2 November, UNIFIL observed the installation of new containers and prefabricated buildings at 10 sites along the Blue Line and the removal of four containers. As at 2 November, there were 17 containers observed at 16 sites. Some of these structures had visible Green without Borders markings. In identical letters dated 5 July from the

Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2022/535), the Permanent Representative stated: “The State of Israel demands that the United Nations and its relevant bodies act now in order to facilitate the dismantling of all Hezbollah outposts in southern Lebanon, and especially those military infrastructures recently erected along the Blue Line”. In identical letters dated 6 September from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2022/674), Israel expressed “growing concern at the installation of at least 21 ‘containers’ placed by Hezbollah along the Blue Line under the guise of Green Without Borders”. At five of these sites, UNIFIL access to the Blue Line was temporarily hindered. However, as of 18 October, UNIFIL has regained full access to the Blue Line at all five locations.

15. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to support maritime interdiction operations, hailing 2,940 vessels in the reporting period. The Lebanese Armed Forces inspected and cleared all 512 vessels referred to them by UNIFIL for inspection.

16. Owing to a delay in the rotation of one vessel, the Task Force has been temporarily operating with four vessels and with no helicopter since August, which has created challenges in maintaining a permanent presence at sea covering all three maritime corridors. The replacement of the fifth vessel is scheduled for December.

17. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Navy continued preparatory steps for a partial transfer of Task Force responsibilities. To that end, the Lebanese Navy participated in maritime interdiction operations along with the Task Force. There were 280 training sessions and exercises conducted, including the joint practice of common operational standards for commanding, monitoring and hailing activities. The participation of the Lebanese Navy continued to fluctuate owing to resource constraints and maintenance requirements.

18. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL continued their engagement within the framework of the strategic dialogue process. In that regard, on 11 October, a senior-level meeting was held between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces to start the development of benchmarks and timelines for an effective and durable deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon and the territorial waters of Lebanon. As of 2 November, 62 personnel, including 10 women, have been deployed to the Lebanese Armed Forces model regiment. The Lebanese Armed Forces have not been able to fully utilize their newly inaugurated headquarters owing to a lack of fuel to power water pumps and generators.

19. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 2650 (2022), UNIFIL resumed the temporary provision of non-lethal material and support to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Since 30 September, 80,000 litres of fuel and approximately 60,000 meals have been provided. As the signature of a new memorandum of understanding remains pending, handover certificates were utilized for the purpose of accountability.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

20. UNIFIL convened tripartite meetings on 11 August and 29 September. Issues discussed included incidents along the Blue Line and violations of resolution 1701 (2006). The parties did not make any progress towards a common understanding on outstanding contentious points along the Blue Line.

21. As was agreed through the Tripartite Mechanism, UNIFIL, in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces, undertook works to prevent flooding near Kfar Kila on 20 July. On 8 August, UNIFIL facilitated maintenance of the water pump serving Ghajar village. In October, UNIFIL facilitated

the crossing of the Blue Line by Lebanese farmers harvesting olives in Blida, Aytarun and Mays al-Jabal.

22. Despite the agreement of Israel to the proposal made in 2008 for a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv, the establishment of the office remains pending.

23. UNIFIL, through quick-impact projects and outreach initiatives, continued to assist local authorities with the delivery of basic services, such as water and sanitation, electricity and health care, as well as to support food production by local farmers. For the 2022/23 financial year, 41.9 per cent of the budget for quick-impact projects is dedicated to projects directly benefiting women. Through civil-military cooperation initiatives, the mission supported alternative energy production and the provision of medical assistance to the local population.

24. UNIFIL continued to support the implementation of resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) on women and peace and security, including by providing training on gender mainstreaming to 3,248 UNIFIL military and civilian personnel, including 164 women. On 16 September, UNIFIL inaugurated additional accommodation for women peacekeepers at four United Nations positions, funded through the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations.

C. Disarming armed groups

25. No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups in violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) continued to restrict the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory.

26. Hizbullah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintains military capabilities. On 13 July, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated: "We have diverse capabilities [...] in the air, options at sea and options on land, all options are open and on the table". In an interview on the Al Mayadeen television channel on 25 July, he stated: "If there was to be a war between Lebanon and Israel, it might not stay between the two countries. It can escalate to include the entire region".

27. During counter-terrorism operations between June and November, Lebanese security forces arrested an unspecified number of individuals, including suspected affiliates of Da'esh.

28. Multiple personal disputes escalated into shootings, resulting in 40 fatalities, including of one child and one woman, and 161 injuries, including of two children and four women, mostly in northern and eastern Lebanon.

29. On 4 July, a personal dispute between members of factions in Ein El Hilweh Palestine refugee camp escalated into a shooting, causing injuries, property damage and the temporary displacement of residents. On 8 July and 10 September, disputes between two families associated with the Ansarullah Movement and Fatah, respectively, escalated into shootings in Ein El Hilweh, also causing injuries, property damage and the temporary displacement of residents. On 8 August, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization's National Security Force in Ein El Hilweh Palestine refugee camp was shot dead. On 24 October, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested nine individuals and seized weapons and ammunition in an operation in Nahr el-Bared refugee camp. In protest, some camp residents forced the temporary closure of United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) facilities.

30. There was no progress in dismantling the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

D. Arms embargo and border control

31. Allegations of arms transfers to non-State armed actors continued and remain of serious concern. If confirmed, such transfers would constitute a violation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) (see annex II). While taking allegations of arms transfers seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently.

32. Reports of Hizbullah's military engagement in the Syrian Arab Republic continued.

33. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces arrested 76 individuals of unspecified nationality in at least 46 operations to counter the smuggling of drugs, fuel, weapons and other goods. On 17 September, in Baalbek, the Lebanese Armed Forces seized an estimated 1 million "Captagon" pills. The same day, the Internal Security Forces confiscated a similar amount of the pills at the Beirut port. On 20 October, also at the port, the customs administration of Lebanon seized an estimated 1 million such pills, and on 30 October, the Internal Security Forces seized over 5.4 million such pills in Sidon, South Lebanon.

34. In operations to counter the smuggling of migrants, the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces arrested 62 Lebanese citizens, 31 Palestinians, 112 Syrians and 279 individuals of unspecified nationality, mostly in the Akkar Governorate, northern Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces prevented 12 attempted irregular movements, involving 412 individuals, mostly in North Lebanon. Sometime between the evening of 22 September and the following morning, a boat that reportedly departed from Minnayah carrying 120–150 individuals, sank off the coast of the Syrian Arab Republic. The bodies of over 90 persons, including women and children, have been recovered. Subsequently, on 24 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested three individuals in connection with the incident. On 29 September, the caretaker Minister of Interior and Municipalities of Lebanon, Bassam Mawlawi, announced measures to curb irregular migration, including a public awareness campaign, registration of boats and an increase in naval patrols. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is aware of 48 attempted movements by sea involving 4,211 individuals in 2022 as at 24 October, which is more than all such movements and passengers recorded for 2021.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

35. UNIFIL cleared 11,352 square metres of land in its area of operations, finding and disposing of 2,424 anti-personnel mines and one unexploded ordnance in the reporting period. UNIFIL conducted 99 visits to monitor quality assurance and quality control with regard to demining and 12 risk awareness briefings for 215 United Nations military and civilian personnel, including 30 women. UNIFIL also supported the Lebanese National Mine Action Centre by conducting an explosive ordnance risk education activity.

F. Delineation of borders

36. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab'a Farms area. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in the report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) (see [S/2007/641](#), annex).

37. On 2 July, Israel intercepted three drones that were heading towards the offshore Karish gas field. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the incident, and stated: “The message was delivered”. In a speech on 13 July, Mr. Nasrallah stated: “We launched three unarmed drones of different sizes [...] we wanted the Israelis to intercept them [...] because we want all those operating in the area to understand that they are not in a safe environment”. On 4 July, the caretaker Prime Minister of Lebanon, Najib Azmi Mikati, had stated: “Any action outside the framework of the State’s responsibility and the diplomatic context in which the negotiations are happening is unacceptable and exposes it to unnecessary risks”. UNIFIL did not observe the incident.

38. In identical letters dated 11 July from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2022/550), the Permanent Representative raised “serious concerns” regarding an incident in which “Hezbollah ... launched three uncrewed aerial vehicles into Israel’s exclusive economic zone”. He stated that the vehicles had been launched “towards the gas rig located in the Karish natural gas field ... in a deliberate attempt to threaten Israel and gather intelligence”. He also stated: “Israel holds the Government of Lebanon responsible for all hostilities emanating from Lebanese territory”. In response, in identical letters dated 11 August from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (A/76/921-S/2022/619), the Permanent Representative conveyed the following instructions from her Government: “Israel cannot claim that there exists an internationally recognized and established exclusive Israeli economic zone as long as indirect negotiations between Lebanon and Israel have not produced an agreement on the disputed areas.” The Government of Lebanon further stated: “These were unarmed drones of which the Lebanese authorities had no prior knowledge”.

39. On 11 October, the President of the United States, Joseph R. Biden Jr., issued a statement in which he announced that the Governments of Israel and Lebanon had “agreed to formally end their maritime boundary dispute and establish a permanent maritime boundary between them”. The agreement was formalized through an exchange of separate letters, between Lebanon and the United States, and between Israel and the United States, signed at a meeting chaired by the United States and hosted by the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon at UNIFIL premises in Naqurah, South Lebanon, on 27 October. In separate letters dated 27 October 2022 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Lebanese and Israeli Governments provided the coordinates of the maritime boundary to be deposited with the United Nations.

G. Political and institutional stability

40. On 23 June, following binding parliamentary consultations convened by the President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, the caretaker Prime Minister, Mr. Mikati, was designated to form a new Government after receiving 54 votes out of 127 (one member of Parliament boycotted the session). Noting that Lebanon was “facing the challenge of either total collapse or gradual salvation”, Mr. Mikati called on all political forces to assume “collective responsibility” and act in a “constructive spirit”. He emphasized the importance of concluding an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the need for cooperation with Parliament to pass the necessary legislation.

41. In a statement on 24 June, the International Support Group for Lebanon took “note of the designation”, urged the swift formation of a Government that can implement important outstanding reforms and called upon authorities to deliver on commitments made in the 7 April staff-level agreement with IMF. On 5 October, the

International Support Group emphasized the importance of adhering to the constitutional calendar for the presidential election. Calling for an empowered Government, the Group urged Lebanese politicians to swiftly reach broad-based national consensus “to avoid a multilayered executive vacuum”.

42. On 29 June, the Prime Minister designate presented his first proposal for a new Cabinet line-up to Mr. Aoun. No agreement was reached prior to the end of Mr. Aoun’s presidential term on 31 October.

43. The period allotted for Parliament to elect the next President started on 1 September. On 29 September, the Speaker of the Parliament of Lebanon, Nabih Berri, convened the first parliamentary session to elect a President, at which no candidate secured the required two thirds majority. On 13 October, the quorum to hold the session was not met. No candidate secured a majority vote at sessions held on 20 and 24 October. As at 31 October, a new President had not been agreed upon. On 30 October, Mr. Aoun signed a decree stating: “The government headed by Mr. Mohamed Najib Mikati is deemed to have resigned”. The same day, Mr. Aoun also wrote to Parliament calling for it to hold a session “to take the appropriate measure in this regard”. Also on 30 October, Mr. Mikati wrote to Mr. Berri, stating: “The decree, which accepted the resignation of an already-resigned government, is legally lacking any constitutional value”. He noted the Government’s continued conducting of business and carrying out of all its constitutional duties.

44. On 2 November, the International Support Group for Lebanon recalled its earlier statement of 5 October, noting with concern “the continued lack of cooperation among Lebanese political actors that has precipitated a presidential vacuum, at a time when Lebanon most requires quick and decisive action to address its dire economic, financial and humanitarian crises”. It called upon the Members of Parliament “to elect, without delay, a new President of the Republic who will unite the Lebanese people in the national interest”.

45. On 20 October, the Constitutional Council rejected 5 out of 15 challenges filed with regard to the results of the 15 May parliamentary elections (see [S/2022/556](#), para. 43). Its investigation of the remaining appeals was ongoing. On several occasions, the Head of the Council refuted allegations of political interference in the review process. The Supervisory Commission for Elections has yet to release its final report. On 4 July, the European Union Election Observation Mission released its final report, identifying 23 recommendations aimed at strengthening the electoral process, including the following: establishment of voting “megacentres”; independence of the Supervisory Commission for Elections; and adoption of temporary special measures to increase the participation of women.

46. At its first post-election plenary session, on 26 July, Parliament adopted amendments to the bank secrecy law, which were vetoed by Mr. Aoun and returned for reconsideration. Subsequently, on 18 October, Parliament adopted a revised bank secrecy law, which Mr. Aoun approved. A draft capital controls law and a draft bank resolution law remain pending.

47. On 26 September, Parliament adopted the 2022 State budget, which projected 40,873 billion Lebanese pounds in expenditures, 29,986 billion in revenues, and a deficit of 10,887 billion. The budget envisioned an exchange rate of 15,000 Lebanese pounds to the dollar for customs and included a temporary threefold increase of public sector salaries.

48. On 21 September, following a staff visit, IMF stated: “Despite the urgency [...] progress in implementing the reforms agreed under the April staff-level agreement remains very slow”. It insisted that “completion of prior actions is needed for the IMF Board to consider the request for a financial programme”, and stressed: “The large

losses in the banking sector need to be recognized and addressed upfront, while respecting the hierarchy of claims. Small depositors must be fully protected and recourse to public resources [...] limited". It urged the preparation of "a credible 2023 budget [...] with the necessary revenue raising measures, including the use of a realistic exchange rate". It noted "some positive steps" on bank secrecy reform but stated that the country had fallen short "of the changes needed to bring it in line with best international practice".

49. Meanwhile, socioeconomic conditions continued to deteriorate. On 29 August, the Central Bank of Lebanon ended a credit facility at preferential exchange rates for petrol importers, precipitating a rise in gas prices. On 28 September, the caretaker Minister of Finance, Youssef Khalil, announced that the national currency, previously fixed at 1,500 Lebanese pounds to the dollar, would be fixed at 15,000 Lebanese pounds to the dollar effective 1 November. On 30 September, the caretaker Prime Minister clarified that the new exchange rate would be applied gradually. As at 2 November, no change in the exchange rate had been implemented. On 23 October, the Lebanese pound recorded a new low on the parallel market, reaching 40,600 pounds to the dollar. In protest of the sharp decline in purchasing power for civil servants, telecommunications, education, State media and judiciary employees went on partial strike, exacerbating service disruptions.

50. On 21 June, Lebanon signed a contract with Egypt to purchase 650 million cubic metres of gas per year, and a transfer agreement with the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate the import of the Egyptian gas through the Arab Gas Pipeline (see [S/2021/953](#), para. 44). As at 2 November, the implementation of the agreement remained pending. On 11 August, Lebanon and Iraq renewed an agreement for Iraq to supply Lebanon with fuel to generate one to two hours of electricity per day for another year. Following a visit by a Lebanese delegation to Tehran in mid-September, the Islamic Republic of Iran offered 600,000 tons of fuel over five months, "as a gift". On 26 September, the caretaker Minister of Energy and Water of Lebanon, Walid Fayad, said that "the Iranian donation would reach Lebanon within weeks" but that authorities first wanted to ensure that "Iranian fuel matches the requested specifications".

51. The public procurement law, adopted in 2021 (see [S/2021/953](#), para. 53), entered into force on 29 July 2022. Subsequently, the authority in charge of regulating and monitoring the public procurement system was formed. Insufficient financial resources and the inability to recruit personnel pending approval of the internal and financial regulations of the National Anti-Corruption Commission continued to hamper its operationalization.

52. Demonstrations and roadblocks to protest the deteriorating economic conditions, inflation, currency depreciation and power shortages continued. On 30 June, in Tripoli, Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces intervened after protesters had fired in the air. On 7 July, in Beirut, a members of a bank depositor association blocked the road in front of the Central Bank, demanding access to their deposits. From 11 August to 2 November, armed individuals – some of whom were women – entered 21 banks across the country and demanded access to their funds. Condemning the incidents, the Association of Banks in Lebanon went on strike from 19 to 26 September and restricted banking services as of 5 October. On 19 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces dispersed supporters of individuals arrested in connection with the bank hold-ups following attempts to enter the Justice Palace in Beirut.

53. On 20 July, the Congress of the United States approved \$83.5 million in livelihood support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces, for an initial period of six months. The support is expected to be provided through a financial transfer and accountability mechanism managed by the United Nations Development

Programme under the auspices of the Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon and in line with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces and paragraph 10 of resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#). Separately, since 12 August, the Lebanese Armed Forces have received \$20 million from Qatar to support the salaries of personnel.

54. The price of the food basket monitored by the World Food Programme (WFP) increased by 50 per cent since January, reaching 988,000 Lebanese pounds in September. Since October 2019, food prices have increased more than 1,800 per cent. WFP continued to support vulnerable communities with in-kind food assistance and cash transfers, including through the National Poverty Targeting Programme. As of October, WFP delivered cash payments to 352,000 vulnerable people in Lebanon under the Emergency Social Safety Net Project financed by the World Bank. On 18 October, Parliament approved a World Bank loan of \$150 million to finance wheat imports.

55. The National Commission for the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared in Lebanon and the National Human Rights Commission, including the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, have yet to become operational pending the allocation of resources. Nevertheless, the National Human Rights Commission provided legal support to victims of torture and followed up on cases of ill-treatment and torture.

56. The investigation into the Beirut port explosion remained stalled. Mr. Khalil has yet to sign the appointment decree to fill the vacancies in the General Assembly of the Court of Cassation, which suspended the work of the lead investigating judge, Tarek Bitar. On 6 September, the Higher Judicial Council approved a request by the caretaker Minister of Justice, Henry Khoury, to appoint an alternate judge to consider requests for release of 17 individuals detained in connection with the investigation. An agreement on the nominee has not yet been reached. Representatives of some of the victims' families considered the decision to be the "result of political pressures". Criminal complaints were filed by victims' families against Mr. Khalil and Mr. Khoury for "exploiting influence, violating duties and harming others". In a statement on 3 August, the International Support Group for Lebanon called upon the authorities "to do everything possible to unblock any hurdles to the completion of an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation". Emphasizing the importance of the rule of law and accountability and of ending impunity, the Group stated that it expected "the Parliament to adopt the necessary legislation [...] to strengthen the independence of the judiciary". Separately, six special rapporteurs and experts called upon the Human Rights Council to launch an international investigation into the explosion.

57. On 31 July and on 4 and 23 August, parts of the grain silos damaged in the port explosion collapsed. The resulting dispersal of dust prompted official health warnings. Only 12 of 48 silos remain standing, though none have been operational since the port explosion. On 4 August, several protests were held throughout the country to commemorate the second anniversary of the port explosion.

58. One year after the deadly clashes in Tayyounah, Beirut, on 14 October 2021 (see [S/2021/953](#), para. 57), the prosecution of 68 individuals charged in the case remains pending. On 12 October, the Military Court of Cassation ordered the release of all suspects who were still detained in the case. As at 2 November, there had still been no progress in the investigation into the 4 February 2021 killing of Lokman Slim (see [S/2021/240](#), para. 46).

59. Several journalists, writers and a comedian were subjected to death threats or assaulted. Some were summoned by the Internal Security Forces for questioning over allegations of insulting officials. One photographer was assaulted after documenting protests over water shortages in Bayt Yahun, south Lebanon. On 24 June, the caretaker

Minister of Interior banned gatherings promoting the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer people after criticism from religious authorities.

60. On 6 September, the National Commission for Lebanese Women released a study in which it called for equal nationality rights for men and women. The Commission also trained gender focal points across government ministries on gender equality, and women and peace and security. The United Nations supported the establishment of 2 additional local mediation networks, bringing the total to 10. The two-track dialogue process between women from traditional political parties and emerging groups aimed at bolstering inclusive dialogue and trust-building continued.

61. As at 30 September, 837,458 refugees and asylum seekers were registered with UNHCR in Lebanon, including 825,081 Syrian refugees and 12,377 refugees and asylum seekers of other nationalities. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government of Lebanon since 2015, the actual number of refugees remains unknown. The Government estimates that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. On 1 September, the General Directorate of General Security announced that it would resume the regularization of Syrians who entered Lebanon irregularly before 24 April 2019. The decision will be in effect through 30 December 2022. On 26 October, the General Directorate of General Security facilitated the voluntary repatriation of an estimated 700 refugees to the Syrian Arab Republic. Deportations of Syrians who had entered or re-entered Lebanon irregularly after 24 April 2019 continued, often without the application of legal procedural safeguards. As at 30 September, UNHCR had verified the return of 6,145 Syrian refugees in 2022.

62. Lebanese authorities have increasingly called for the repatriation of Syrian refugees and for international assistance for Syrian refugees to be provided inside the Syrian Arab Republic instead of Lebanon. In a letter dated 8 September addressed to the Secretary-General, the caretaker Prime Minister called for “the implementation without delay of the international mechanism for the return of refugees set forth by UNHCR and its Executive Committee”. On the basis of the protection thresholds established to monitor the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the UNHCR assessment remains that conditions for safe return have not yet been met in the Syrian Arab Republic.

63. Restrictive measures such as local curfews and the limiting of refugee access to subsidized bread, as well as increasing incidents of community tension, increased significantly during wheat and bread shortages in July. On 6 September, Amnesty International reported that one detained Syrian refugee had died after being tortured while in the custody of Lebanon’s State Security agency in Bint Jubayl, southern Lebanon. The government commissioner of the Permanent Military Court examined the body and ordered the detention of five officers in the State Security branch.

64. Palestine refugees continued to face food insecurity, lack of access to education and medical care, and evictions. Incidents of violence and threats against UNRWA staff and break-ins and thefts at UNRWA facilities increased.

65. As at 2 November, Lebanon had recorded 1,218,923 cases of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and 10,710 associated deaths. Also as at 2 November, 2,733,290 individuals, including Syrian and Palestine refugees and migrant workers, had received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine. Eighteen cases of monkey pox have been confirmed to date, with evidence of local transmission. Since 6 October, 406 cases of cholera have been confirmed.

66. As at 2 November, under the emergency response plan launched on 4 August 2021, United Nations agencies and partners had provided life-saving humanitarian support to more than 715,000 of the most vulnerable Lebanese citizens, Palestine

refugees and migrants. By 2 November, the plan was 61.2 per cent funded, with \$334.6 million of \$546 million requested. The United Nations estimates that approximately 2.5 million people in Lebanon have humanitarian needs, including 2.2 million Lebanese citizens, 208,000 Palestine refugees and 86,000 migrants.

67. During the period from January from September 2022, reported funding under the Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework stood at \$44.2 million, including \$30.8 million in received funding and \$13.4 million carried over from 2021. The Framework's pooled fund, the Lebanon Financing Facility managed by the World Bank, reported \$71.66 million in commitments and pledges by donors, with \$60.17 million paid in as at 31 March. Originally envisaged to cover an 18-month period until 30 June 2022, discussions are ongoing regarding the way forward for the Framework.

68. As at 30 September, overall international assistance to Lebanon reported by donors stood at \$1.24 billion, comprising \$832.4 million disbursed in 2022 and \$406 million carried over from 2021. Donors reported \$768 million in outstanding commitments for 2022 and \$413 million in commitments for 2023 and beyond. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2022 is funded at \$1.14 billion of \$3.36 billion requested, with United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations reporting \$812 million in funds received in 2022 and \$330.4 million carried over from 2021.

III. Security and safety measures

69. In line with the COVID-19 country-wide business continuity plan for Lebanon and World Health Organization guidelines, UNIFIL maintained its eased COVID-19 protocol, adopted on 15 April.

70. In accordance with the Action for Peacekeeping commitment to improve the safety and security of peacekeepers, UNIFIL continuously reviewed its security plans and risk prevention and mitigation measures in close coordination with the Lebanese authorities. Strict security measures remained in place in the Arqub area (Sector East), including the use of armed escorts for official movements by all United Nations personnel. UNIFIL facilitated 42 missions to the Arqub area, including by members of the United Nations country team.

71. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against peacekeepers. The Permanent Military Court held hearings on 23 September concerning the attack on peacekeepers in Khiyam on 24 June 2007 and the case of terrorist intent, opened in January 2014. Hearings in two cases of serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers perpetrated in Qasimiyah on 16 July 2007 and in Rumaylah on 27 May 2011 were also held on 23 September. There has been no progress in criminal proceedings related to the incident of 4 August 2018 in the village of Majdal Zun (Sector West) (see [S/2018/1029](#)) or the acts of aggression against UNIFIL peacekeepers in Shaqra on 22 December 2021, in Bint Jubayl on 4 January 2022 and in Ramiyah on 25 January ([S/2022/214](#), para. 70).

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

72. As at 2 November, UNIFIL comprised 10,213 military personnel, including 778 women (7.6 per cent), from 48 troop-contributing countries; 235 international civilian staff, including 90 women (38.3 per cent); and 552 national civilian staff, including 151 women (27.4 per cent). The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised four vessels

and 495 of the Force's military personnel, including 33 women (6.67 per cent). In addition, 52 military observers, including 12 women (22.6 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serve with Observer Group Lebanon, under the operational control of UNIFIL. The most senior military women serve at the rank of Colonel; the most senior civilian woman serves at the D-2 level.

73. As part of the Action for Peacekeeping efforts to support effective performance and accountability, UNIFIL implemented the quarterly Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System evaluation, confirming the effectiveness of mission operations. In accordance with the implementation of the Action for Peacekeeping commitments and resolution [2436 \(2018\)](#), UNIFIL finalized the assessment of 34 subordinate units, including 2 ships, for logistics, training and operational preparedness on 30 June. Minor shortfalls were identified in six units related to communication, information-sharing, training, operations and logistics, which were subsequently resolved. In July, UNIFIL initiated the assessment of 16 additional units, including 2 ships.

74. UNIFIL continued implementation of the assessment of the continued relevance of UNIFIL resources (see [S/2020/473](#)), pursuant to resolution [2539 \(2020\)](#). In September, UNIFIL returned one additional United Nations position in the vicinity of Mari (Sector East) to the Government of Lebanon. Pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), UNIFIL has begun to develop a strategy to counter disinformation and misinformation.

V. Conduct and discipline

75. From 1 June to 31 October, UNIFIL recorded nine cases of possible unsatisfactory conduct but no allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Both UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon remain committed to a strict adherence to the United Nations policy of zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse. In this regard, in September, UNIFIL trained 24 investigating officers from 12 contingents on their responsibilities. The mission also trained 69 military staff officers on the prevention of sexual harassment.

VI. Observations

76. I welcome the resolution by Lebanon and Israel of their maritime boundary dispute and the establishment of their maritime boundary, under the mediation of the United States of America. This positive development can enhance stability and prosperity for both countries and the region. I encourage the two parties to seize this positive momentum to resume talks on the delineation of their land boundary. The United Nations remains ready to support such a process, if requested by the parties and within its capacity and mandate. Addressing existing points of contention along the Blue Line could remove points of friction.

77. It is of concern that neither a Government has been formed since the designation of Mr. Mikati as Prime Minister in June nor has a new President been elected to succeed Mr. Aoun. The country can ill afford any further political stalemate or such executive vacuum. I call upon the political actors to work together to adopt a constructive and flexible approach to prioritize the national interest and meet their constitutional obligations. I encourage the continuation of these processes to reach a consensus through an inclusive process that engages the broadest possible support, so as to help to set the country on a sustainable path to stability and economic recovery.

78. Furthermore, I urge all political, economic and financial stakeholders to accelerate the implementation of reforms responding to the needs and aspirations of the Lebanese people and as stipulated in the IMF staff-level agreement. The magnitude of the socioeconomic crisis compels the Lebanese leadership to act with determination and urgency.

79. The continued self-acknowledged maintenance of unauthorized weapons outside State control by Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups represents a persistent, grave violation of resolution 1701 (2006). I call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all action necessary to ensure there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State, including through the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. I repeat my call that outstanding elements of resolution 1701 (2006) and the issue of the national defence strategy require addressing through a national dialogue and encourage relevant actors within Lebanon to reinvigorate efforts towards this objective. It is important that earlier decisions of the Lebanese National Dialogue pertaining to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada are implemented.

80. The continued presence of unauthorized weapons in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line, including as observed at the firing ranges, is of serious concern. The presence and active use of weapons at the firing ranges outside State control represents a grave violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The continued lack of access for UNIFIL to the firing ranges is unacceptable.

81. The Lebanese Armed Forces and other State security institutions continue to preserve stability and security under challenging conditions. I welcome the ongoing efforts by the international community to provide much-needed assistance, whether in kind or through financial contributions. The establishment of a United Nations mechanism for emergency financial support in accordance with the human rights due diligence policy can help to safeguard the readiness and operational capacity of the security sector. I encourage partners to consider contributing financial resources to complement existing commitments to this mechanism. I also welcome the resumption of the provision by UNFIL of non-lethal support to the Lebanese Armed Forces in the south, pursuant to resolution 2650 (2022). The provision of fuel, food, medical supplies and logistical support assist in maintaining the operational tempo of the Lebanese Armed Forces. I urge increased assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces, as the only legitimate armed forces of Lebanon, and all State security institutions.

82. In support of the extension of State authority, accelerated progress in the strategic dialogue between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces is required. It is important that long-standing efforts towards capability development and a transfer of responsibilities be made concrete. While current financial constraints are well acknowledged, calls for additional international funds would also require further demonstrable commitment by the Lebanese authorities to an effective and durable deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces. In this regard, additional staffing and training for the model regiment and curriculum development for the Lebanese Armed Forces navy would be welcome.

83. I am concerned by the continued incidents along the Blue Line, including firing in the air, the use of smoke and stun grenades and weapons pointing across the Blue Line, and stone-throwing. Each of those incidents has the potential to lead to escalation, with serious consequences. Similarly, the launch of drones towards the offshore Karish field on 2 July heightened tensions, increased the risk of miscalculation and threatened a precarious stability.

84. Some improvement since the last reporting period notwithstanding, incidents affecting UNIFIL freedom of movement remain of concern. I welcome UNIFIL efforts to clarify the provisions of resolution 2650 (2022) on the independence of the mission's patrols. It remains important for the Lebanese authorities to help to dispel inaccurate notions and to raise understanding among local communities of the mission's mandate, including its freedom of movement, both with the Lebanese Armed Forces and independently.

85. I welcome the Lebanese authorities' intervention to facilitate UNIFIL access to the Blue Line near sites where containers and other infrastructure were placed close to the Blue Line. I reiterate the obligation of the Lebanese Armed Forces to facilitate UNIFIL access to all areas requested by the mission and the need for the Government of Lebanon to investigate any restrictions on the movement of UNIFIL. As reaffirmed in paragraph 16 of resolution 2650 (2022), it is critical to implementation of the mandate that "the freedom of movement of UNIFIL in all its operations and UNIFIL's access to the Blue Line in all its parts is fully respected and unimpeded".

86. I express my serious concern at the firing of fireworks in the direction of UNIFIL helicopters on two occasions by individuals near the firing range of Dayr Amis, as well as weapon and laser pointing towards UNIFIL personnel by the Israel Defense Forces. I welcome the mission's efforts to ensure more systematic engagement to address issues of concern, including with both parties. There is an obligation on both parties to ensure the safety of UNIFIL personnel and hold accountable those who attack peacekeepers.

87. The continued violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft and uncrewed aerial vehicles remain of deep concern. The overflights constitute violations of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty, cause distress to the Lebanese population and undermine the credibility of UNIFIL. I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty. I call again for the Government of Israel to cease all overflights of Lebanese territory.

88. The ongoing occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, as well as ongoing works there by the Israel Defense Forces, represents a continuing violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and must cease. I again urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligation under resolution 1701 (2006) to withdraw from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line.

89. Two years have passed since the explosion in the Beirut port without anyone being held accountable. I appeal to the Lebanese authorities to take all steps necessary to overcome the obstacles impeding the conclusion of an impartial, thorough and transparent investigation. Similarly, the still unresolved case of the killing of Lokman Slim and the lack of progress in the investigation into the Tayyunah clashes are worrisome. I repeat my call for Parliament to accelerate its efforts to adopt legislation, in line with international standards, that strengthens the independence of the judiciary.

90. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to abide by its policy of disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration (2012), and for all Lebanese parties and nationals to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts in the region. I condemn any movement of fighters and war materiel across Lebanon's border with the Syrian Arab Republic in violation of resolution 1701 (2006).

91. I am concerned at the growing humanitarian needs in Lebanon. The situation of ordinary people is worsening day by day as the country is grappling with economic and financial meltdown, COVID-19 and now a cholera outbreak. The protracted economic crisis in Lebanon threatens to drive more people into poverty and food insecurity. The continued support of the international donor community to help to address the growing challenges of the population in Lebanon remains critical.

92. I appreciate the continued hospitality and generosity that Lebanon has extended to large numbers of refugees over decades and thank donors for their consistent support. Noting that the severe economic crisis has an impact on the lives of Lebanese citizens and refugees alike, it is crucial to maintain a donor response commensurate with the responsibility assumed by Lebanon to ensure that the protection space does not contract further. While the United Nations and partners continue to work to create the conditions for safe, dignified and voluntary returns, respect for due process of law, the principle of non-refoulement and the dignity of refugees remains indispensable.

93. Increased poverty among Palestine refugees and the intensified protests underline the need for adequate and predictable funding to UNRWA. I urge the international community to step up their efforts to support the Agency, so that it may continue to provide essential services and emergency assistance and ensure the protection of the Palestine refugee community.

94. I welcome the increase in the number of women deployed with UNIFIL, which contributes to the increased deployment and participation of uniformed women in peace operations and accelerates progress towards achieving gender targets set out in the uniformed gender parity strategy 2018–2028.

95. I express my gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon and encourage them to increase the number of women among military personnel in UNIFIL. I extend my appreciation to the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Joanna Wronecka, and the staff of her office; the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz, and the civilian and military personnel in UNIFIL under his leadership; and the members of the United Nations country team.

Annex I***Restriction of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 June to 2 November 2022**

1. In paragraph 16 of resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations including access to all parts of the Blue Line are fully respected and unimpeded. It also called on the Government of Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access to sites requested by the Mission for the purpose of swift investigations, including several Green Without Borders sites, the tunnels crossing the Blue Line (as reported in my [S/2019/237](#)), and the aforementioned firing ranges, in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.

2. During the reporting period, UNIFIL conducted an average of 6,401 monthly patrols during the day and night, of which 2,683 (41.9 per cent) were foot patrols. The Mission conducted an average of 2,157 patrols each month along the Blue Line, both by vehicle and on foot (48 and 52 per cent, respectively). In addition, the Mission conducted an average of 64 helicopter patrols, 928 inspection activities, including the conduct of temporary and permanent checkpoints, and counter rocket launching operations each month. While the freedom of movement of UNIFIL was respected in most cases, the Mission continued to experience some restrictions, mostly verbal threats, as detailed below.

3. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued to object to some patrol routes proposed by UNIFIL to expand its presence outside main routes and municipal centres on the grounds that they were either private roads or areas of strategic importance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL has consistently followed up on reported incidents with the appropriate authorities. It continuously engages with the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure freedom of movement and unrestricted access to all areas within its area of operations.

4. After an increase in the number of incidents impacting UNIFIL's freedom of movement in December 2021, UNIFIL experienced a decrease in such incidents from July 2022, except for a temporary increase in incidents in the first two weeks of September. Individuals shouted and made unfriendly gestures at UNIFIL patrols on at least 25 occasions. Stones were thrown at UNIFIL patrols on 13 occasions. Where verbal aggression or gesticulation was accompanied by damage to UNIFIL property or impacted the conduct of a patrol, the incidents are noted in this annex.

Access to all locations of interest

5. In October, UNIFIL regained access to the part of the Blue Line that had been temporarily restricted by containers or prefabricated buildings. UNIFIL is yet to gain access to several other sites of interest, including the firing ranges observed by the Mission's air reconnaissance patrols, as well as a number of Green without Borders sites close to the Blue Line. Repeated formal requests have been made to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Access to those locations is required both in connection with investigations and as part of the Mission's daily monitoring of the Blue Line, as mandated under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and recalled in resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#).

* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

Freedom of Movement incidents

6. On 21 June, several individuals, who had been observed crossing the Blue Line, entered a UNIFIL observation tower in Shab'a (Sector East). One of the individuals seized a cell phone from one of the peacekeepers but handed it back after having looked through the photos on the phone.

7. On 22 June, an individual in civilian clothes exited a building and shouted at Observer Group Lebanon personnel in near Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West). The individual also spoke on a handheld radio. Following this, the patrol left the location. UNIFIL contacted the local mayor about the incident. The mayor asked for the exact location of the incident in order to address the matter.

8. On 24 June, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol observed a new iron chain across a dirt road near Majidiyah (Sector East), blocking access to a site where four individuals in civilian clothes were observed setting up a camp. Another UNIFIL patrol was sent to the area to monitor the situation. As they arrived at the site, six individuals with two motorbikes started gesticulating and urging the patrol to leave the area. When the patrol drove away, the individuals followed them on a motorbike. Following a UNIFIL request, the Lebanese Armed Forces sent personnel to the area. Subsequently, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces have patrolled the road along which the camp is located on a daily basis.

9. On 20 July, a UNIFIL patrol team, while waiting for the Lebanese Armed Forces at a "meet up" point in Bayt Yahun (Sector West) in order to conduct a joint patrol, was surrounded by around ten individuals in civilian clothes, with five vehicles, who asked the patrol to leave the area. Some of the individuals were agitated and hit the patrol vehicles with their hands. Shortly thereafter, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, and UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces initiated their planned patrol.

10. On 9 August, an individual in civilian clothes approached a checkpoint which had been set up by the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL in the vicinity of Dayr Qanun (Sector West). The individual requested the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL peacekeepers to move their vehicles. After doing so, and after the Lebanese Armed Forces had left the location, the same individual again approached the UNIFIL peacekeepers and, with gestures and verbal aggression, told them to leave the area. The UNIFIL patrol left the area.

11. On 22 August, a UNIFIL patrol which was dispatched to locate the suspected launch site of suspected mortar fire (detailed in paragraph 2 in the body of this report) encountered six individuals, three of whom carried assault rifles, who gestured to the patrol to leave the area. Two concrete buildings, one with antenna on the roof, were also observed at the location amidst heavy vegetation. Another UNIFIL patrol dispatched in connection with the same suspected mortar firing visited the suspected impact point, in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, but no remnants of a mortar round were found. A UNIFIL visit to the suspected launch site is pending facilitation by the Lebanese Armed Forces.

12. On 23 August, a UNIFIL vehicle patrol was stopped by three individuals in civilian clothes in the vicinity of Shab'a (Sector East). The individuals approached the UNIFIL patrol, made threatening hand gestures and told the patrol to leave the location and not to come to this area again. Following this, the peacekeepers bypassed the location and continued their patrol.

13. On 3 September, a UNIFIL patrol encountered six individuals in civilian clothes in the vicinity of Hanin (Sector West). One of the individuals threw a stone towards one of the UNIFIL vehicles, breaking a rear window of the vehicle, without causing any injury to UNIFIL personnel. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces.

14. On 7 September, six individuals in civilian clothes blocked the road of a UNIFIL patrol in Rumaysh (Sector West) by placing stones across the road. The individuals, who behaved in a calm manner, demanded the presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Subsequently, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrived, and the individuals cleared the road and allowed the peacekeepers to proceed.

15. On 13 September, 12 individuals in civilian clothes stopped an Observer Group Lebanon patrol near a Green Without Borders site in Ayta al-Sha'b. The patrol informed the individuals about their mandate and mission. The individuals responded that they were familiar with the mandate and the difference between Observer Group Lebanon and UNIFIL. They added that, while they had allowed Observer Group Lebanon to pass the area in the past, they had now been instructed to stop all United Nations vehicles not escorted by the Lebanese Armed Forces. Following this, the peacekeepers bypassed the area and continued their patrol, as planned.

16. On 17 September, an Observer Group Lebanon foot patrol was stopped by three individuals in civilian clothes, exiting a container in Al Naqoura (Sector West). The individuals informed the patrol that they had been instructed to not let anybody pass through the location. The Observer Group Lebanon personnel then left the location and continued its patrol.

17. On 24 September, two individuals blocked the road of Observer Group Lebanon patrol by placing their vehicle across the road in the vicinity of Aytarun (Sector East). The individuals also made unfriendly gestures towards the patrol. The patrol was able to drive around the vehicle and continue its movement.

18. On 26 September, six individuals in civilian clothes with two vehicles and two motorcycles tried to block a UNIFIL Military Police vehicle in the vicinity of As Sultaniyah (Sector West). The UNIFIL team was waiting for the arrival of a joint UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces patrol. The UNIFIL personnel managed to avoid the obstruction and left the area.

19. On 29 September, a UNIFIL air reconnaissance patrol observed three individuals in civilian clothes outside a building near the firing ranges in Dayr Amis (Sector West). When the patrol flew near the building, the individuals launched what appeared to be fireworks towards the UNIFIL helicopter. There was no impact with the helicopter, but the air reconnaissance patrol left the area. UNIFIL formally protested the incidents in a letter to the Lebanese Armed Forces Commander.

20. On 3 October, a UNIFIL air reconnaissance patrol observed two individuals in civilian clothes outside a building in the vicinity of the firing range in Dayr Amis (Sector West). When the UNIFIL helicopter flew near the building, the crew detected smoke under and in front of the UNIFIL helicopter, resembling smoke from a flare. No damage to the UNIFIL helicopter was reported. Subsequently, the air patrol left the area. UNIFIL formally protested the incidents in a letter to the Lebanese Armed Forces Commander.

21. On 18 October, three individuals exiting a container near Ramiyah (Sector West) shouted aggressively at an Observer Group Lebanon team moving on foot towards a Blue Line barrel that they could not approach the barrel unless they were escorted by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The patrol members perceived the attitude of the individuals as aggressive and left the area. The following day, however, a UNIFIL patrol accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces visited the Blue Line barrel without incident.

22. On 22 October, a UNIFIL patrol observed approximately nine individuals in the vicinity of Al Jibbayn (Sector West). Three of them threw five stones towards the patrol vehicles. One stone hit and damaged the left rear window of the patrol's first vehicle with no injuries to any UN personnel. The patrol returned to its base.

23. On 28 October, an Observer Group Lebanon foot patrol in the vicinity of Ramyah (Sector West) was approached by three individuals who had come out of a nearby Green without Borders container. They told the patrol that they could not visit the Blue Line at location B30 without a Lebanese Armed Forces escort. The Observer Group Lebanon personnel informed the individuals that they do not conduct patrols together with the Lebanese Armed Forces. However, the individuals insisted that United Nations personnel visiting B30 must be accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. Following this, the Observer Group Lebanon personnel left the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces was informed.

Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. In paragraph 22 of its resolution [2650 \(2022\)](#), the Security Council recalled paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), according to which all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States on allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).
 2. Paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) stipulates that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, inter alia, the sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related material of all types. During the reporting period, no new information was shared with the Secretariat in this regard.
 3. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).
-